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Strife Interview - Benedetto Della Vedova, Italian Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs: Europe’s uneasy path

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Andrea Varsori, Strife’s Editor-in-Chief in discussion with Benedetto della Vedova, the Italian Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs (Credit Image: Benedetto della Vedova’s staff)

Benedetto Della Vedova has been the Italian Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation since February 28, 2014, serving in the Renzi and Gentiloni governments; he has also been a Member of the Italian Senate since 2013. He is currently competing in the Italian national elections with the +Europa (“More Europe”) political party, headed by former Foreign Affairs minister Emma Bonino and campaigning on a strong pro-European platform. Strife’s Editor-in-Chief, Andrea Varsori, met with him at King’s, where he participated in the KCL Italian Society’s debate “The Road towards the United States of Europe”. On that occasion, they spoke on the future prospects for the EU, its internal divisions, and the Italian take on Brexit.

AV: 2017 was a year of important national elections in four European countries: the Netherlands, France, Germany, and Austria. Do you think that the European Union emerged stronger from this?

BDV: Absolutely. Especially concerning the French elections. I would like to highlight, however, that although this battle was won, and it was surely a hard one, the war is far from over. And this war consists in a considerable political struggle: that between those who support openness and those who support different varieties of closeness. In this regard, the Austrian elections demonstrated that this fight is not over yet. Van der Bellen’s victory [in the 2016 presidential elections] had seemingly given good reasons to many to hope for a pro-European turn in the country. In last year’s political elections, however, Sebastian Kurz’s ÖVP won and formed a government that has as its junior partner the nationalist FPÖ party. The match, thus, is not over yet.

AV: In this context, then, where can a new impulse to European integration come from? Maybe from the reform of a particular domain of EU governance?

BDV: Actually, I think that elections are the most important factor, with all their natural limits. We need to be aware of how people are voting in Poland, in Austria, in France, where the electoral results were fundamental, and of course in Italy, where there are reasons to be worried. Most importantly, we need to acknowledge the fact that the European Union is a recurring topic in several national campaigns. Different nationalist discourses are engaged in criticising the EU. It is necessary to build an effective counter-narrative, first of all on a political and symbolical level.

AV: Do you currently see any examples of this counter-narrative in Europe?

BDV: The foremost example I can think of is Macron’s electoral campaign. Most importantly, the French president has kept saying the same things after being elected, for example in his Sorbonne speech [on September 26, 2017]. Macron won exactly because he confronted nationalism directly, arguing, against the prevailing common sense, that there is a need for shared sovereignty, the only possible type of sovereignty.

AV: It was surely a controversial choice of terms. A sizeable portion of European citizens probably sees the very expression “shared sovereignty” as a contradiction in terms.

BDV: I think that the main fault of making this idea popular lies primarily on political leaders. They have often decided to use emotional arguments to their advantage, on the assumption that they would have benefited from them for a long time. This often did not happen, but those same ideas that they disseminated among the population stayed and took roots. Brexit is an example of this phenomenon.

Benedetto Della Vedova has been the Italian undersecretary for Foreign Affairs since February 2014 (Credit Image: ANSA)

AV: As far as Brexit is concerned, what do you think of the current state of UK-EU negotiations?

BDV: In my opinion, the EU has been doing very well. Up to now, Brussels managed to act without allowing internal divisions to have too much of an impact. Of course, within the Union there is a variety of positions, depending on what is at stake in each country. Besides this, the Union’s position has remained tightly knit and every member state is respecting it. Actually, the United Kingdom has the most unclear position. London must decide what endpoint it desires to achieve. On a continuum that goes from Canada to Norway, the United Kingdom should decide where to end up.

AV: Does Italy have a preferred endpoint in the current negotiations?

BDV: I can only tell you which my favourite endpoint is. Personally, I would prefer that Brexit negotiations ended by leaving room for a potential British change of mind. This change of mind can take place with a referendum, just like the one that was had in June 2016, and can express the opposite political choice. I am convinced that such a great democracy as Britain can reconsider the decision that it took.

AV: In this context, Italy is often described as sympathetic to the UK on Brexit. This impression is particularly evident in the Italian press. Do you agree with it?

BDV: This impression may be appropriate for the current government. Prime Minister Gentiloni has surely been very ‘friendly’ towards London – and rightly so. Personally, I am convinced that the relation between Italy and the UK should consist in an outspoken friendship. Outspokenness in mutual relations should not prevent cooperation between the two countries – on the contrary, it can be conducive to that. Actually, my dream is to set a way to have the UK not leave the European Union. Having said that, those who say that ‘Brexit is Brexit’ are right: it is a serious and historical move that we simply cannot ignore. Surely, it is impossible to have ‘business as usual’ after this referendum. The fundamental point that must be clarified in Europe now, in the Brexit negotiations and in general, is that the European single market, its flows, and its positive consequences could not survive the end of political integration. It is impossible to imagine a real single market without its governing institutions: economic and political integration support each other. For them, the Latin brocard aut simul stabunt, aut simul cadent [they will either stand together, or fall together] applies. This must be reaffirmed, of course, to fight nationalism, which is an enemy of both political and economic integration, as it often implies the adoption of protectionist policies. It should also be reaffirmed, however, to Central European countries.

AV: In this regard, how should the EU deal with the more sceptical position of some Central European member states, like the Visegrád Four [Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic]?

BDV: With the Central European countries, we need to engage in a political confrontation that should be solved in political terms. Of course, inside the Union each country is free to make a choice regarding the type of policies that they want to implement internally. But it should be clear that belonging to the single market means sharing not only its rights, but also all the duties and responsibilities that follow from them. From this point of view, the refusal of some member states to share the burden of migrant hospitality is inacceptable. Central European countries receive, and rightly so, structural funds that helped and still help them to reach a level of development that is comparable to that of Western Europe. As for structural funds, Italy is a net contributor. Benefitting from the EU budget through structural funds, however, entails the need to take part in the Union’s common efforts, including sharing the burden of immigration policies. The two things are inseparable: accepting the former means accepting the latter too.

This article has been translated in Italian by Andrea Varsori. The Italian version is available here.

Images Sources

Feature image: here (credit image: ANSA)

Image 1: Picture taken by Mr Benedetto Della Vedova’s staff during the interview.

Intervista con Benedetto Della Vedova, Sottosegretario agli Affari Esteri del Governo italiano - Il difficile cammino dell’Europa

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Andrea Varsori, Strife’s Editor-in-Chief discusses with Benedetto della Vedova, the Italian Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs (Credit Image: Benedetto della Vedova’s staff)

Benedetto Della Vedova è Sottosegretario di Stato agli Affari Esteri e alla Cooperazione Internazionale dal 28 febbraio 2014, nei governi di Matteo Renzi e Paolo Gentiloni; è Senatore della Repubblica dal 2013. È attualmente candidato per la lista pro-europeista “+Europa”, assieme all’ex-ministro agli Esteri Emma Bonino, per il collegio uninominale di Prato. Andrea Varsori, Editor-in-chief di Strife, gli ha parlato al King’s College, dove della Vedova ha partecipato al dibattito “The Road towards the United States of Europe”, organizzato dalla King’s Italian Society. Nell’intervista, si è discusso delle future prospettive dell’Unione Europea, delle sue divisioni interne, e della posizione italiana riguardo a Brexit.

 

AV: Col 2017, ci siamo lasciati alle spalle quattro grandi elezioni nazionali: Paesi Bassi, Francia, Germania, Austria. Lei pensa che l’UE ne sia uscita più forte?

BDV: Sicuramente sì. È uscita più forte soprattutto dalle elezioni francesi. Vorrei sottolineare, però, che si tratta di vittoria in una battaglia, magari quella principale, ma non nella guerra. E questa guerra consiste in uno scontro politico sostanziale: quello tra i fautori dell’apertura e i fautori di varie modalità di chiusura. A questo proposito, le elezioni austriache ci hanno dimostrato che lo scontro non è finito. Poteva sembrare, all’inizio, che la vittoria di Van der Bellen lasciasse ben sperare per un esito a favore dell’Europa. Alle ultime elezioni politiche, però, l’ÖVP di Sebastian Kurz ha vinto e ha formato un governo che ha come azionista di primaria importanza i nazionalisti dell’FPÖ. La partita, dunque, non è chiusa.

AV: In questo contesto, allora, da cosa può passare un eventuale rilancio dell’integrazione europea? Forse da una decisiva riforma di un settore dell’Unione?

BDV: In realtà credo che a contare di più siano le elezioni. Con tutti i difetti che possono avere. Dobbiamo tenere conto di come si vota in Polonia, in Austria, in Francia, dove l’esito è stato decisivo, e ovviamente in Italia, dove c’è da avere preoccupazione. Soprattutto, dobbiamo accettare il fatto che l’Unione Europea sia oggetto delle campagne elettorali nazionali. Da un lato, è oggetto di critiche da parte delle varie narrative nazionaliste. La necessità è quella di costruire una contro-narrativa efficace, soprattutto sul piano politico e simbolico.

AV: Lei vede degli esempi di questa contro-narrativa in questo momento in Europa?

BDV: Sicuramente la campagna elettorale di Macron è uno di questi. Soprattutto, il presidente francese ha continuato a dire le stesse cose anche dopo essere stato eletto, ad esempio nel discorso che ha fatto alla Sorbona. Macron ha vinto proprio perché ha affrontato direttamente il nazionalismo, sostenendo, contro la vulgata comune, la necessità di costruire una sovranità condivisa, l’unico tipo possibile di sovranità.

AV: Sicuramente una mossa controversa. Una parte consistente dei cittadini europei probabilmente vede l’espressione “sovranità condivisa” come un controsenso.

BDV: In questo, penso che la responsabilità decisiva nella diffusione di questa idea sia delle leadership politiche. Spesso, hanno deciso di cavalcare l’emotività, nella falsa convinzione che una tale mossa potesse pagare ben al di là del voto. Così spesso non è stato, ma le idee propagandate in campagna elettorale sono rimaste e hanno attecchito tra i votanti. Brexit ne è un esempio.

 

Benedetto Della Vedova has been Italian undersecretary for Foreign Affairs since February 2014 (Credit Image: ANSA)

AV: Parlando di Brexit, lei cosa pensa dello stato attuale dei negoziati tra Gran Bretagna e Unione Europea?

BDV: Trovo molto positivo l’atteggiamento tenuto dall’Unione Europea sinora. Per ora, a Bruxelles ci si è mossi senza prestare il fianco a troppe divisioni interne. Ovviamente, all’interno dell’Unione le posizioni sono differenziate tra diversi Paesi. Nonostante questo, la posizione coesa dell’Unione nel negoziato è rispettata da tutti. Il punto della questione, in realtà, è il Regno Unito. È Londra che deve decidere che obiettivo vuole raggiungere. Su un continuum che va dal Canada alla Norvegia, il Regno Unito deve decidere dove posizionarsi.

AV: L’Italia ha un esito preferito dei negoziati in corso sulla Brexit?

BDV: Io le posso dire quale esito preferirei io. Personalmente, io vorrei che i negoziati sulla Brexit finissero in modo da lasciare spazio e modalità per un ripensamento. Questo ripensamento può avvenire con una modalità uguale e una decisione contraria a quella avvenuta nel giugno 2016. Sono convinto che una grande democrazia come quella britannica possa benissimo ritornare sui propri passi.

AV: In questo contesto, la posizione dell’Italia, soprattutto nella stampa domestica, è spesso descritta come simpatetica alle istanze britanniche nel negoziato. Lei è d’accordo con questa visione?

BDV: Questa impressione può essere adeguata per il presente governo. Il Primo Ministro Gentiloni è sicuramente molto friendly nei confronti di Londra - ed è giusto così. Personalmente, sono convinto che il rapporto tra Italia e Regno Unito debba essere una amicizia nella franchezza. La franchezza nei rapporti reciproci non deve impedire, ma anzi può aiutare la collaborazione tra i due Paesi. Il mio sogno, in realtà, è quello di impostare delle modalità per ottenere un esito diverso dall’uscita del Regno Unito dall’Unione. Detto questo, ha ragione chi dice che Brexit is Brexit: è una cosa seria, di portata storica, che è impossibile ignorare. Sicuramente, dopo il referendum non è possibile avere del business as usual. La questione fondamentale che va riaffermata in questo momento in Europa, nell’ambito dei negoziati su Brexit ma non solo, è che il mercato unico europeo, i suoi flussi e i suoi benefici non sopravvivrebbero alla fine dell’integrazione politica. Non è possibile immaginare un vero single market senza un complesso di istituzioni che lo governi: integrazione economica e politica si sostengono a vicenda. Per esse, vale la formula latina simul stabunt, simul cadent. Questo va ribadito, ovviamente, per combattere il nazionalismo, che è un nemico sia per l’integrazione politica, sia per quella economica, dato che spesso implica il protezionismo. Ma andrebbe ribadito anche ai Paesi dell’Est.

AV: A questo proposito, come affrontare le posizioni più scettiche di certi Paesi dell’Europa Centrale, come quelli del Gruppo di Visegrád (Polonia, Ungheria, Cechia, Slovacchia)?

BDV: Quello con i Paesi dell’Europa Centrale è uno scontro politico da affrontare in termini politici. Ovviamente, all’interno dell’Unione tutti i Paesi sono in condizione di fare una scelta riguardo al tipo di politiche che essi preferiscono condurre internamente. Però il punto che va chiarito è che l’appartenenza al mercato unico implica una condivisione totale dei diritti, ma anche dei doveri e delle responsabilità che ne conseguono. Da questo punto di vista, è inammissibile che certi Paesi si siano rifiutati di partecipare alla condivisione dei migranti. Le nazioni dell’Europa Centrale ricevono, giustamente, fondi strutturali dall’Unione che le hanno aiutate e le stanno aiutando a raggiungere livelli di sviluppo economico comparabili a quelli dell’Europa Occidentale. Per i fondi strutturali, l’Italia è un contributore netto. Beneficiare di voci di bilancio europee quali le politiche di sviluppo strutturale, però, significa anche dover prender parte agli sforzi comuni dell’Unione, inclusa l’accoglienza di migranti. Le due cose si accompagnano: accettare una significa accettare anche l’altra.

 

This article has been translated in Italian by Andrea Varsori. The English version is available here

Images Sources

Feature image: here (credit image: ANSA)

Image 1: Picture taken by Mr Benedetto Della Vedova’s staff during the interview

Italy’s Referendum: Another one bites the dust?

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By: Andrea Varsori

The Italian PM Matteo Renzi submitted his resignation in the aftermath of the referendum. (Franco Origlia/Getty Images)

On 5th December 2016, Italy voted in a referendum to decide whether to accept or reject a sweeping reform of the country’s Constitution. The constitutional reform was promoted by Prime Minister Matteo Renzi, who had come to power in February 2014 promising to bring much-needed change to the economy and the labyrinthine political system. While earlier media polls consistently argued that rejection of the reform was a likely outcome, the final results that arrived later in the night showed an emphatic refusal that was not foreseen - nearly 60 percent of the voters chose to reject the proposed reform. As a consequence, Matteo Renzi resigned briefly after 11pm GMT.

This vote has been the latest among a spate of electoral outcomes that have reemphasized a rising tide of populism in the West. The Brexit referendum was the first of these events, with British voters leaping into the dark by choosing to leave the European Union. At the end of a deeply polarising campaign, six months after Brexit, Donald Trump won the presidential elections in the United States, propelling into the most powerful political office on the planet. The rejection of the constitutional reform in Italy could signal the fall of another domino with similar populist movements gaining more thrust in France, the Netherlands, and Germany. However, this is a simplistic reading of the facts. First, the overriding success of populism is unlikely in the Netherlands and in Germany - both countries are parliamentary democracies where right-wing populism is not only far from a majority but can be easily isolated by the rest of the political system. Second, Italy’s referendum outcome and the fall of Matteo Renzi do not yet indicate an overarching victory for populism in Italy.

First, the end of the Renzi government does not mean that elections will follow suit. In Italy, the President can decide to dissolve the Parliament only if political parties cannot agree on a substitute. The current electoral law prescribes two turns of voting, with the two biggest political forces disputing a strong majority prize at the lower house in a second turn. Recent polls have consistently shown that the Five Star Movement (5SM), Italy’s main populist formation, would currently win the second turn against the Democratic Party (DP), Renzi’s left-of-centre party. The Democratic Party, who now holds a large majority in the lower house, is unlikely to place its bets on elections after such a crushing political defeat. The odds are now in favour of a new coalition executive, likely headed by Democratic Ministers Dario Franceschini or Graziano Delrio, or a caretaker government headed by a technocrat, such as Finance Minister Pier Carlo Padoan.[1] The new government will likely draft a new electoral law: the existing one, in fact, only applies to the lower house, as the upper house (the Senate) has ended up with an entirely different method. Every new electoral law will significantly lower the possibilities of the Five Star Movement taking control of the government in the future.

The rush to declare an end to Renzi’s political career should also be avoided. Renzi is still one of the foremost politicians in the country, and his political proposals still retain an appeal among that 40% of ‘Yes’ voters. At present, it is not clear if Renzi’s resignation as PM will entail his resignation as party leader. The minority of the Democratic Party supported the ‘No’ at the referendum and may be willing to trigger an internal leadership contest. Most of its leaders, however, have been marked by past political defeats (against Renzi himself, in 2013); anyway, that part of the political spectrum offers little appeal to the moderates who supported Renzi at the 2014 European elections. As for the other political forces, their unity in the referendum campaign was an exception. The radical-left remain in the margins and the centre-right is divided between Forza Italia, Silvio Berlusconi’s party, who still has no viable successor and lacks long-term political strategy, and the Northern League, which struggles to be at par with other right-wing European parties, such as Marine Le Pen’s FN.

Then, there is the Five Star Movement (5SM) that was born in 2008. The 5SM has reeled from its defeat in the 2014 European elections.[2] However, it pushed forth a few young political figures - the 30-year old Luigi Di Maio as vice-president of the Lower House. Earlier last year, the 5SM won the mayoral elections in the capital city of Rome, and in Turin, Italy’s fourth-largest urban centre. Building on these successes, and despite recent scandals, the 5SM is trying to gain credibility as a national force capable of governing the country. After last night’s results, the party’s founder, Grillo announced that the Movement will soon select the names for a future cabinet, and launched an internal discussion for a government programme on energy.[3]

The 5SM will profit in the aftermath of the referendum result, but prospects of gaining more power remain unclear. Elections could be postponed to late 2018 and the problems encountered by other populist movements in the West may choke popular enthusiasm towards the 5SM. Moreover, its current venture into local governance in Rome has been plagued by a resignations and an inability to handle them, signalling problems in the management of power.[4] The referendum has highlighted constituencies in which Matteo Renzi has relatively low popularity: early analyses show the distribution of ‘No’ votes among young people (81% among 18-34 year olds), students (79%), the unemployed (64%), and the highly educated (61%).[5] The widest margins regionally have been registered in the North-East and in the South - historically difficult regions for Renzi. The 5SM is likely to exploit these constituencies; however, it is not alone in doing so, as the radical left and the Northern League will try to dent into these groups.

The international consequences of this referendum, like the potential spread of populism from Italy outwards, remain to be seen. The most probable outcome of Matteo Renzi’s resignation is the creation of a political or caretaker government, with the hope that the popularity of the 5SM and the Northern League dies down. Moreover, the main opposition to government parties is fractured and coping with problems of its own. Further, Renzi is still a figure to be reckoned with; if a provisional government is created in the next days, it is likely that he will try to come back as a leader at its end, which may coincide with the end of this Parliament (May 2018).

Economic matters will also prove more decisive: if the national banking crisis deepens as a result of political uncertainty, the whole nation will suffer, dragging down growth as a consequence. This may reflect itself on the new government and on the DP, which will most likely be part of it. If the next government tries to cope with financial woes, it will need to introduce unpopular measures, thus stoking the fire of anti-establishment anger. It is the cycle of lesser growth and political frustration that may make of this referendum the potential first domino to fall, in Italy’s spiralling into populism, instability, and polarisation.

Andrea Varsori is a PhD candidate at the Department of War Studies, King’s College London, and a Senior Editor at Strife. He holds an MA in International and Diplomatic Sciences from the University of Bologna, Italy. His research project focuses on organised violence in Southern megacities; his research interests include insurgency, urban terrorism, organised crime, and civil wars. You can follow him at @Andrea_Varsori.

Notes:

[1] Il Post, E adesso che succede?, December 5, 2016, available on http://www.ilpost.it/2016/12/05/conseguenze-sconfitta-referendum/ (retrieved December 5, 2016).

[2] In those elections, Renzi’s DP reached 40.82% of the votes, with the 5SM stopping at 21.16%. See the Ministry for Internal Affairs’s Historical Archive of Elections at http://elezionistorico.interno.it/index.php?tpel=E&dtel=25/05/2014&tpa=I&tpe=A&lev0=0&levsut0=0&es0=S&ms=S (retrieved December 5, 2016).

[3] See http://www.beppegrillo.it/2016/12/il_programma_di_governo_del_movimento_5_stelle_lenergia.html (retrieved December 6, 2016).

[4] Gavin Jones, Italy’s 5-Star aims to reform as Rome fiasco threatens its future, Reuters, September 18, 2016, available on http://www.reuters.com/article/us-italy-rome-5star-idUSKCN11O0KF (retrieved December 5, 2016).

[5] SkyTg24, I giovani hanno votato No, December 5, 2016, available on http://video.sky.it/news/politica/referendum-quorum-per-sky-tg24-i-giovani-hanno-vitato-no/v314289.vid (retrieved December 5, 2016); Riccardo Saporiti, Referendum: a dire no sono stati giovani, disoccupati e meno abbienti, Il Sole 24 Ore, December 5, 2016, available on http://www.infodata.ilsole24ore.com/2016/12/05/referendum-dire-no-stati-giovani-disoccupati-meno-abbienti/?refresh_ce=1 (retrieved December 5, 2016).

Image credit: https://static01.nyt.com/images/2016/12/04/nytnow/05ambriefing-europe-slide-ZKJZ/05ambriefing-europe-slide-ZKJZ-facebookJumbo.jpg

Organised crime and terrorism Part II: Negotiating with bombs - The Sicilian mafia’s attempts at intimidating the Italian state

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This is the second piece in Strife’s four-part series exploring the relationship between organised crime and terrorism in a 21st century security environment. The First part can be found here.

By: Martin Stein

The devastating effects of the Milan car bomb, 28 July 1993. Source: Wikimedia.

In the night between 26 and 27 May 1993, a wide deflagration stuck Florence, seemingly from its medieval centre. A car bomb, loaded with 277kg of explosives, had detonated in via dei Georgofili, a narrow road behind the world-known Uffizi art gallery. The bomb destroyed the Torre dei Pulci, a tower built during the Renaissance. There were five victims: in the Torre, in fact, Angela Fiume (36 years old), the warden, lived with his husband, Fabrizio Nencioni (39), and their two daughters, Nadia (9) and Caterina (2 months). The bomb also, in addition, caused a fire that killed Dario Capolicchio (22), a college student. There were 48 injured alongside heavy damages to the nearby Uffizi building. Around 25% of the paintings in the area were damaged, some of them beyond any possibility of repair[1].

Three other bombings occurred exactly two months after the Florence attack. Two car bombs detonated in Rome, in front of two different churches (San Giorgio al Velabro and San Giovanni in Laterano), injuring 22 people but with no casualties. A third car bomb was placed in Milan, Italy’s financial centre. The blast damaged the Contemporary Art Pavillion and killed a traffic inspector, three firefighters and a Moroccan migrant. In Italy, the shock from the incidents was immediate. Most of the population were unprepared, as Italians believed that terrorism had ended in the “Seventies” otherwise known as the “Lead Years”[2].

Bloodshed, however, was not uncommon in those years. In 1992, three events stood out for importance: this time, they all happened in Sicily. On 12 March, the passenger of a passing motorbike shot the Christian Democrat politician Salvo Lima in Palermo. On 23 May, a bomb exploded under the official car of Judge Giovanni Falcone, one of the recent protagonists of the struggle against the Sicilian Mafia. The explosive device killed Falcone, his wife and his three police-officer escort. Finally, on 19 July, a car bomb placed under the house of Judge Paolo Borsellino, the other protagonist of the recent Mafia prosecutions. The blast killed the Judge and five police servicemen.

These assassinations could have been the ultimate setback for the struggle against the Mafia. It had taken decades, for Italy at large and for the Sicilian society in particular, to acknowledge openly even the existence of this criminal organisation[3]. Its workings and its activities were, for most of the Cold War period, secret and unnoticeable. Mafiosi composed local disputes, imposed their protection racket, and collected their own taxation (the pizzo)[4]. Most importantly, local Families controlled a sizeable portion of votes. This meant that they were able to strike a deal with local politicians, mostly from the Christian Democrat party, to exchange electoral success for state inaction and distribution of public money[5]. Thus, Mafiosi and their political allies were often in charge of providing key public services, including hospitals and transportation. Then, even if Mafia violence sometimes exploded in savage wars for internal predominance, until the 1980s, its overarching infiltration of the local authority went largely unnoticed.

This began to change in the 1970s. The Mafia Families had suffered a backlash from the State in the previous decade, due to a massacre occurred during the first Mafia war. The “Lead Years”, instead, brought a new opportunity: the heroin trade. Some Mafiosi had already been engaged in smuggling[6], but, after the start of the “War on Drugs”, prominent bosses turned their organisation to trafficking on a larger scale, also by exploiting their connections with the American Cosa Nostra. Important leaders like Stefano Bontate and Tano Badalamenti started making estimated millions of dollars. In the meantime, however, they ignored a dangerous menace to their domination. From the town of Corleone, near Palermo, a group of prominent killers rose up. Their first leader was Luciano Leggio, who then transmitted his power to two main associates, Totò Riina and Bernardo Provenzano. The Corleonesi, as they were known, started encroaching on the whole organisation, by investing money in making allies and acquiring loyalties, instead of buying luxury goods. Even if Bontate and Badalamenti were much richer, the Corleonesi rapidly became militarily more powerful. By 1977, they managed to expel Badalamenti from the Commission, the general ruling organ of the Mafia. In 1981, they started the second Mafia war, by directly killing Badalamenti and Bontate[7].

In the following three years, the Corleonesi successfully achieved the Mafia equivalent of a coup d’état. They showed that military power and support from the Families was more important than wealth and drug trade connections. They stepped up the number of killings, eventually murdering more than 200 affiliates to the rival families. They effectively turned a war into a slaughter, as their enemies were too astonished by the series of attacks to react in any manner. The Corleonesi also showed a never before seen eagerness to inflict harm and with that guiding mentality they irredeemably damaged the old Mafia tenets. Mafiosi from Corleone spared no relative, when they carried out their assassinations. In one case, a “man of honour” managed to escape from an assassination attempt, and they retaliated by killing 35 of his relatives.

By the end of 1983, Totò Riina, then the leader of the Corleone group, had taken over the whole organisation. The Mafia came under the dominion of this aggressive and harsh élite, which spelled its subsequent crisis. Riina, in fact, did not stop with the utter defeat of the rival Families. Soon, he started ordering killings based on suspects only, and he quickly ended up eliminating his own allies and associates. By those years, however, a new group of judges had united in Palermo, including judges Falcone and Borsellino[8]. The climate of fear established by the Corleonesi ultimately convinced some of the most desperate Mafiosi to surrender to the State, exchanging insider information for a reduced sentence. These figures were the pentiti, “repented ones”. In September 1984, Tommaso Buscetta decided to turn into one of them. This decision was critical, as he became the highest-ranked Mafioso collaborating with justice[9].

Buscetta’s witnessing, along with the contribution from other pentiti, helped the team of Judges to set a “maxi-trial” against 474 Mafiosi in February 1986. This trial ended on 31 January 1992 with a judgement by the Court of Cassation. The Court upheld the sentences and, for the first time, declared the Mafia to be a single organisation, with the Commission responsible for its murders. Riina used to scorn the Italian state, as it did not support those who tried to fight organised crime[10]. With the maxi-trial final sentence, however, the authorities had inflicted a significant blow on his affiliates. He answered in the way that he knew best: by murder.

Riina and some of his followers believed that the Italian State would ultimately back down. They felt betrayed by the Christian Democrat party, their old partner for embezzlement and corruption operations. They even felt betrayed by the Catholic Church, which had begun to denounce in earnest the Mafia’s violence. They were convinced that they could coerce the Christian Democrats and the Church into submission and force them to ignore the Mafia, as it happened before. This, however, was not possible anymore. The Corleonesi succeeded in killing Falcone and Borsellino and in enacting the bombings in Florence, Milan, and Rome. However, the very political system that had protected them was tumbling down. The collapse of the Soviet Union spelled the end of the Communist Party; a wave of corruption scandals effectively dissolved the Christian Democracy and the Socialists. In this atmosphere of unforeseen political transformation, the tide turned against the Mafia. The years of the car bombs were the years when fundamental legal measures were approved. Among them, pentiti started to enjoy a witness protection scheme, a new anti-Mafia authority was established, the police were given the option to infiltrate the organisation, and tougher prison conditions were made available for high-ranking Mafiosi[11].

By the mid-1990s, the bombing campaign had largely receded. Far from intimidating the Italian state, terrorist tactics had backfired tremendously. As the Italian political system changed, the Sicilian Mafia had decided to act violently in the moment when their erstwhile protectors were disappearing. The whole organisation seemed hijacked by its Corleonesi core. This exercised an immense pressure on the Mafia, and many of its affiliates turned to cooperating with the state. The syndicate had lost its ancient rules and most importantly, its lost focus of its main reason to exist, - making money. After the arrest of Riina, in 1994, Bernardo Provenzano became the new “boss of bosses” and, as he was a more cautious man, he patiently tried to regain control of the Sicilian territory. After its imprisonment, in 2006, Matteo Messina Denaro, a relatively young leader, has probably decided that preserving the protection racket and getting a share of the drug trade was more than enough. Without car bombs and targeted killings, the Mafia transformed into a wider, untraceable organisation, whose laundered money has reached all of Italy and the wealthiest parts of the European continent.

Martin Stein is an LLM (Master in Laws) student from University College London. His research interests include transnational organised crime, international illicit trade, and international police cooperation.

 

Notes:

[1] F. D’Emilio, Car Bomb Blast Damages Florence’s Uffizi Gallery; Explosion Kills 5; Glass Shields Save Most Paintings, Washington Post, May 28, 1993, p. A31.

[2] Longrigg, C., Boss of Bosses. A Journey into the Heart of the Sicilian Mafia, New York, NY, Thomas Dunne Books, pp. 120-121.

[3] Stille, A., Their Thing, The American Scholar, Vol. 64, No. 2 (Spring, 1995), p. 292.

[4] Gambetta, D., The Sicilian Mafia: the business of private protection, Cambridge, MA., Harvard University Press, 1993.

[5] Shelley, L. I., Mafia and the Italian State: The Historical Roots of the Current Crisis, Sociological Forum, Vol. 9, No. 4 (Dec., 1994), pp. 668-669.

[6] Antonino Calderone, a “repented” member of the Mafia, writes in his memoirs of the transformation from smuggling cigarettes to dealing heroin. In P. Arlacchi, Men of dishonor: Inside the Sicilian Mafia, New York, NY, Morrow Pub., 1995.

[7] Dickie, J., Cosa Nostra. A History of the Sicilian Mafia, NY, Palgrave Macmillan, 2004, pp. 284-289.

[8] Dickie, pp. 298-9.

[9] He, in fact, was one of the founders of the Commission, back in 1957. Dickie, p. 236.

[10] Dickie, p. 297.

[11] Dickie, p. 315.

Italian Elections stalemate: Berlusca Bunga Bunga, Rigor Mortis, A Retired Priest, the Communist and a Clown. An Analysis.

by

By Pablo De Orellana

This is not a joke. These are the nicknames of the principal politicians participating in the election, except for the priest and the clown. The latter cannot participate in person, but has been the underestimated wildcard in this this shuffle of Italian fortunes.

On Sunday, three women hurled themselves naked at Silvio Berlusconi howling “Basta Berlusconi” [“Enough Berlusconi”], in one of many and desperate signs of the overdrawn exhaustion of the Italian political class and the loathing that it has garnered among voters. Berlusconi is still politically alive and kicking in yet another election campaign. This is because of the incredible challenges facing Italy and especially the deep unpopularity of the Monti technocrat government. The difficulties and brutal cuts of Italy’s latest austerity drive cannot be overstated. The trouncing of Monti’s hopes in this election is proof of this clearly expressed resentment.

This is not a common election. At first sight the results (see below for detailed breakdown) appear to reflect the old right-left divide, with reincarnations of the old DC (Christian Democratic Party) and PS (Socialist Party) –the originals died drowned in the embezzled funds of the Tangentopoli scandal in the 1990s. There are, however, a number of new wildcards complicating the equation. Most importantly, Italy has not seen circumstances so dire for a generation with a stagnant economy, record unemployment and rapidly falling living standards.

Mario “Rigor Mortis” Monti is the loathed bogeyman of this election. Most political discourse in this campaign has been written and spoken in reference Italy’s financial credibility, which Monti has promised to fix with increasing doses of austerity bloodletting. The proverbial straw was the IMU tax, a levy on the value of a household’s primary property. This has caused exasperation in a country where low and middle earners are already very heavily taxed, with horror stories of bankrupt families due to the IMU. In some regards, Monti too has been an unconventional saviour of Italian finances. In Italy’s past debt scares (they happen every decade) una tantum (‘once only’) taxes were levied on luxury properties such as second and third homes, luxury cars, capital gains, bonuses. Monti, on the other hand, can be credited with importing European Neo-Conservative economics, with the resulting faith in public service cuts and increased taxation of the most numerous part of the population - who on average make little more than 900 per month (INSEE data) - rather than higher earners or corporations such as Berlusconi’s own Mediaset Group. Not unlike George Osborne, Monti’s entire programme is ostensibly designed to uphold the credibility of Italy’s credit ratings. Monti has run in this election as leader of a coalition of small centrist parties, although their parliamentary weight is negligible at just over 10% of the vote. This is clear proof of the great resentment that austerity measures have elicited in Italy.

Italy’s centre-left party grouping, the Partito Democratico (PD) led by Pier Luigi (aka “ex-Communist”) Bersani, has been a great disappointment both in campaign and in today’s results. PD promised to keep the course and spirit of Monti’s reforms - albeit with a few concessions to the need for growth measures - and indeed looked likely to form a coalition with Monti. This unexciting passive acceptance of the austerity dogma has alienated many supporters and has allowed other protest candidates to trounce its advantage in polls over the last few weeks. In last night’s results, PD is basically tied in voting percentages with Berlusconi’s alliance of conservative parties and only just ahead of Beppe Grillo’s 5-Star Movement. Italy’s puzzlingly complex voting laws give the PD bloc extra bonus seats, which should make the lower house just about governable.

Then come the rogues: the ones defined by opposition to the Monti administration and austerity policies. The most puzzling aspect of this election, and one that foreign analysts seem to miss, is that Silvio “Bunga Bunga” Berlusconi has, in an incredible piece of high-speed historical reframing, recast himself as a rebel, a transgressor to the Merkel-imposed austerity dogma and calling into question Euro membership, the EU, Mario Monti’s reforms and budget cuts. Most spectacularly, only a few days ago Berlusconi made the extraordinary promise of returning paid IMU tax to taxpayers if elected. He is now at the head of the second biggest group in the Lower House.

Machiavelli was right in decrying his indignation at Italy being saddled with the Papal Curia, and the Vatican has had varying policies in its involvement with Italian democracy, from sometimes banning the faithful from voting, to sanctioning specific parties. Yet another unusual factor, one that might be overlooked is the Pope’s resignation. Whilst in recent years the Church has not attempted to excommunicate stray voters and has adopted subtler means, its influence cannot be underestimated. It is likely that the Vatican’s temporary distraction has been to the disadvantage of conservatives and especially Mario Monti’s group.

Finally, the greatest surprise to those not accustomed to Italy’s political volatility and unfamiliar with recent economic woes is the success of the party led by comedian Beppe “Clown” Grillo, the 5-Star Movement. It has exceeded all projections, and is now the single largest party in the lower house (although it is outdone by the centre right and centre left alliances). It stood on a simple basis: reforming the overpaid, corrupt, rentier, clientelist and mafia-tainted nature of Italian politics by “sending the old [politicians] home”; reforming Italy’s economic course towards fairer taxation, limiting the rampant tax evasion of the richest individuals and corporations, removing austerity policies and encouraging higher employment and stemming Italy’s tragic graduate brain drain.

Considering Monti’s very poor showing, this Movement’s surprise showing is all the more important: The 5-Star Movement now holds the balance of power in the lower house. Grillo has declared that he wants no alliance with the old parties, and this is further complicated by the Movement’s staunch anti-austerity policy. I suspect that, barring fresh elections to resolve this stalemate, PD will have to make concessions to the Movement to be able to govern; but considering Bersani’s strongly-worded disapproval of the comedian’s protest party and its policies, this seems unlikely.

This election is not only a stalemate, but speaks of the worldwide dilemmas of democracy, finance, debt and the economic future of Europe. Sadly, the stalemate is fodder for market instability, political instability and stagnation. It is not clear who has won this election; what is clear is that there is one loser: Italy.

Dante Alighieri put it better than I ever could. Reader, I will let you translate these sad verses.

Italia, poi che se’ sì grande
che per mare e per terra batti l’ali,
e per lo ‘nferno tuo nome si spande!
Tra li ladron trovai cinque cotali
tuoi cittadini onde mi ven vergogna,
e tu in grande orranza non ne sali.

Dante, Inferno, XXVI, 1-6

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Detailed election results in full as well as the fine detail of Italy’s complex electoral laws can be found on <http://elezioni.interno.it/camera/scrutini/20130224/C000000000.htm> [last accessed 26 February 2013]