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Strife Series | Complicated relationships #2 - The Safavid Empire and the historical backdrop of Sunni-Shia relations

August 29, 2017 by Faruk Rahmanovic

By Faruk Rahmanovic

Portrait of Shah Abbas I, the 5th Safavid Kings of Iran and one of Iran’s most influential rulers (reigned AD 1587-1629). Source: British Museum Archives.

The role of the Safavid Empire in understanding Sunni-Shia relations cannot be overstated. Lasting from 1501 to 1722, the Safavid Empire was born in modern-day Iran,[1] just as the political situation in the Middle East began to stabilize after nearly 400 years of various foreign invasions.[2] The remnants of political chaos left much of the Central Asian region semi-autonomous, providing some maneuvering room for political aspirations.[3] On the other hand, Central Asia was sandwiched between the Ottomans in the West, Russians in the North, Uzbeks in the North-East, and Mughals in the East and South-East. Thus, those with political aspirations faced a problem: on what grounds could they declare themselves independent of the empires that were already established and expanding, and how to justify the intra-religious violence necessary for establishing and expanding their empire?[4]

The founder of the Safavid Empire Ismail I (1501-1524) understood the need to differentiate his political establishment from the existing competition. He proclaimed descent from Muhammad and Ali and the 7th Shia Imam, the Aq Quyunlu Turks (a major Turkoman tribe), and Byzantine Emperors.[5] This helped cover the political and divine right to rule on all fronts. However, his stroke of brutal brilliance was the imposition of Shiism on the population. ‘Wherever his edict reached, the choice was fixed: conversion to Shiism or death.’[6] The conversion made the local population theologically different from their neighbors in a political way. More importantly, he managed to merge his political position with the Shia religious hierarchy – becoming the head of church and state and making the obedience to the crown a religious requirement.[7] By the time of his death in 1524, Iran had become fully a Shia state.[8]

The conquests of the Safavid Empire spread Shiism to nearly all the regions where Shiism is found today, explaining the anomalous location of the Shia exclaves in places like Turkey, Bahrain, Afghanistan, and not to mention the anomalous position of the Shia center of Iran entirely enveloped by Sunnis. Over the 200-year Safavid rule, the primary Shia identity became inextricably entangled with the political realities of the oft-embattled empire, turning political contests into theological ones. Drawing on Persian, Islamic, and Shia elements, [9] the identity forged by the Safavids continues to underpin much of the modern Shia and Iranian identity. While individual relations between Sunni and Shia have generally been peaceful, the Shia connection of religious identity with the political makes difficult the Sunni-Shia political relations. The issue arises partly because the Shia population of a Sunni state does not merely signify religious differences, but is likely to identify with a different political entity and ideology altogether.[10] A somewhat similar position is present for Sunnis in a Shia state (e.g. Syria).

Grasping these historical developments provides a holistic and contextualized understanding of the nature of the Sunni-Shia relations, explains the bursts of sectarian violence and the periods of peaceful, cooperative coexistence, and helps clarify the diverse modern political alliances throughout the region today.


Faruk Rahmanovic (@FRahmanovic) holds a Ph.D. in philosophy from the University of South Florida, and teaches at the USF Honors College. His research focuses on the intersection of political and comparative philosophy, applied ethics, and war. He also works on issues of cybersecurity and warfare.


This article is part of a series curated by MA student Ashley Pratt on the intricate historical relationships between nations and people that shape current events. Each piece of this four-part series contextualizes and provides a primer to better analyze developments around these relationships. You can read the first piece here.

Notes

[1] The historical borders of the Safavid Empire were generally centered on what is today’s Iran. Thus, the use of “Iran” is intended here as both a historical regional designation and modern state.

[2] Most notably including the Crusades (1098), Mongol Invasion (1258), and Timurid conquest (1370).

[3] Ochsenwald, William and Sydney N. Fisher. The Middle East: A History. (Boston: McGraw Hill, 2004), Pp. 215-16.

[4] The Ottomans faced the same problem in conquering other Muslim-ruled principalities; which they solved with the creation of the Janissary Corps. loyal to the Sultan alone.

[5] The Shiism of the Safavids seems to have started sometime after 1392, while the claim to the Shia Imamate initially seems to have been started by Ismail’s predecessors in the late 15th century (though that claim was related to being the Hidden Imam of the Twelver Shia position).
Ochsenwald. The Middle East: A History. Pp. 215-16.His HHis

[6] Ibid. Pg. 216.

[7] Unlike the Shia rule of Egypt under the Fatimids (909-1171), the Safavid rule made Shiism mandatory the population. Consequently, the Shia conversion and retention rates were much higher and more persistent than in Egypt, where the difference of faith played no effective part in daily life. Consequently, although the Fatimids lasted longer than the Safavids, modern Egypt has no real Shia population to speak of, while Iran overwhelmingly retained its Shia heritage.

[8] Ochsenwald, William. The Middle East: A History. Pg. 216.

[9] This is not to say that Shia is not part of Islam; it was the rather unique features of Shiism that forged the identity of the people under the Safavid rule.

[10] There is a parallel with the American suspicion of Catholics, viz. their allegiance to the Pope – a foreign political power.


Feature Image credit: Shah Ismail I declares himself Shah by entering Tabriz in the early 1500s. Source: Wikimedia Commons

Filed Under: Blog Article Tagged With: feature, Iran, persia, safavid, shia, sunni

Film Review: Zero Days (2016)

September 21, 2016 by Cheng Lai Ki

Gibney, A. Zero Days, Jigsaw Productions, (2016). (PG-13) More information from: http://gb.imdb.com/title/tt5446858/.

By: Cheng Lai Ki

maxresdefault

“The science fiction cyberwar scenario is here…” This statement comes from members of the United States National Security Agency (NSA), and others in the intelligence community, role-played by actress Joanne Tucker. Zero Days, directed and narrated by documentarian Alex Gibney – who produced the award winning documentaries Enron: The Smartest Guys in the Room (2005) and Taxi to the Dark Side (2007) – explores the evolving nature of computer network exploitations (CNEs). In a world where critical infrastructures (i.e. energy suppliers, telecommunication infrastructures), military communication grids (i.e. US Global Information Grid - GIG) and diplomatic communications are conducted on information-communication technologies (ICTs); the documentary illuminates the uncomfortable realities and vulnerabilities within cyberspace.

Zero Days explores StuxNet, a computer worm developed by a US-Israeli effort to cripple the uranium enrichment capabilities at the Natanz enrichment plant in Iran. The documentary debuted at the 2016 Berlin film festival and was awarded a four-star review by the Guardian’s Peter Bradshaw, who described Gibney’s 2016 documentary as ‘intriguing and disturbing’. Named after the technical term ‘zero day’ that represents a computer network vulnerability that is only known to the attacker, the investigative documentary tells Gibney’s journey in uncovering ‘the truth’ behind StuxNet’s technical capabilities and attributed political motives. Despite discussing a cybersecurity threat, the documentary goes beyond the technical landscape and introduces various geopolitical elements within – such as the Israeli disapproval of Iran cultivating national nuclear capabilities. Given the relative basic nature of its discussions, this documentary appears to be intended for the general public rather than specialists in the field. However, Gibney appears to have followed along an investigative journalistic approach (something he undoubtedly is famous for) and guides the viewer along a path of what essentially is a cyber-attribution journey implicating the US and Israeli agencies. The documentary was constructed with strategically cut interviews from cybersecurity specialists (i.e. Kaspersky; Symantec), former senior-leaderships from ‘three-letter’ government agencies, industrial experts (i.e. Ralph Langner, a German Control System Security consultant) and pioneers within the investigative journalism (i.e. David Sanger) in discussing StuxNet’s discovery and capabilities. In addition to these interviews, Gibney wanted a more ‘real’ source of information. This was where the anonymous NSA intelligence community came in. Collectively using transcripts of these employees (and the help of actress Joanne Tucker), Gibney was able to incorporate an inside-source that gave this documentary a little more power behind its claims.

A collection of Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) that are crucial technological components within most critical infrastructure. The StuxNet worm targeted specficially the Siemens Simatic S7-300 PLC CPU with three I/O modules attached.

The documentary excels in unveiling to the general public that: i) cybersecurity is not purely a software issue, but also a hardware one; and ii) digital-malware can be easily weaponised for intelligence gathering and strike purposes.

First, Symantec Security Response specialist, Eric Chien, states in an interview: ‘…real-world physical destruction. [Boom] At that time things became really scary for us. Here you had malware potentially killing people and that was something that was Hollywood-esque to us; that we’d always laugh at, when people made that kind of assertion.’ Through conducting a simple experiment where Symantec specialists infected a Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) – the main computer control unit of most facility control systems – with the StuxNet worm. Under normal conditions, the PLC was programed to inflate a balloon and stop after five-seconds. However, after being infected with the StuxNet worm, the PLC ignored commands to stop the inflation and the balloon burst after being continuously filled with air. Through this simple experiment, the specialists (and Gibney) managed to reveal the devastating impact of vulnerable computer systems that control our national critical infrastructures or dangerous facilities such as Natanz.

Second, the NSA employees that decided to talk to Gibney revealed who the US cyber intelligence community recruits and more importantly, their capacities to create digital-techniques for intelligence gathering – or in the case of StuxNet, strike purposes. Cybersecurity specialists that were analysing the StuxNet code discovered older versions that were focused on data-collection. It wasn’t until the later versions that more offensive objectives were made more apparent within the code. According to forthcoming NSA employees, this shift within the code was done by the Israeli foreign intelligence services (Mossad) and not the American agencies. Regardless, Zero Days does an excellent job in revealing the highly adaptive nature of cyber ordinances.

national_security_agency_headquarters_fort_meade_maryland
The United States National Security Agency (NSA) at Fort Meade, Maryland. There, information technology experts developed the multiple version of the StuxNet worm at the Cyber Command unit (USCYBERCOM) established in 2009 that was housed wihtin.

However, to security academics, this documentary suffers from several limitations undermining its credibility. Two of its main limitations are: i) over centralization on investigative attribution; and ii) inherently negative portrayal of governmental personnel and activity.

First, as earlier mentioned, the documentary is a journey of cyber-attribution at its core – much akin to the work of investigative journalist, David Sanger. To show this, we need to review the structure of the documentary. It begins with discussing the cybersecurity incident, how the worm was found, and how it baffled cybersecurity specialists. Next, the documentary explains the geopolitical and security tensions between the US, Israel and Iran; in addition to discussing the American position on Iran’s nuclear capabilities. Next, it progressed onto the technical and security domains; explaining the infrastructure of American and Israeli cyber-intelligence capabilities and operations. Finally, Gibney asks harder questions of implications and opinions during his interviews with American intelligence, security and military subjects. Obviously, for national security and secrecy reasons, these could not be answered. It would appear that Gibney wanted to ask these questions to highlight his disgust in the lack of transparency within the security sector. Throughout the late part of the documentary, he supplements various claims with an informal-esque interview with the NSA employees using Joanne Tucker as an avatar. To the general public, this documentary is undoubtedly an interesting journey of exploration and revelation about American and Israeli cyber capabilities. While highlighting several cybersecurity concerns afflicting cybersecurity specialists in governmental and industrial sectors, the documentary quickly narrows its attributive direction towards the United States and Israel - leaving little room for alternative arguments.

Second, to security specialists this documentary leaves out several key areas of consideration, such as the crucial importance of having an effective intelligence collection and pre-emptive strike capabilities for reasons of national security. During interviews with government leaderships, they were either explaining the structure of their national intelligence agencies/capabilities or talking about how certain operations were transferred between presidents – StuxNet was known within the American government community as ‘The Olympic Games’. As such, government interviewees played only an informative role, participating in few discussions. Another comment would be on the NSA employees that decided to be vocal. Playing the devil’s advocate, certain questions about credibility and accuracy can be raised: How do we know these were really NSA employees from their cyber divisions? Do we know if they are really vocalizing because they wanted to? Or were they instructed to? There was a significant amount of blame placed on Mossad for ‘weaponizing’ the StuxNet code when the Americans just wanted to utilise it solely for intelligence collection purposes. Within the realms of intelligence, this sounds more like disinformation rather than truth. To some civil-servants from security or intelligence backgrounds, this documentary appears to portray such government operations in a negative light and perpetuates the concept of transparency with little regard for its ramifications. Sometimes, knowing the ‘truth’ might do more harm than good.

Zero Days is an excellent documentary and investigatory source of information that raises awareness of cybersecurity issues and its importance in our modernized era. First, its innovative and effective use of animations coupled with strategic uses of interviewees from various backgrounds provides it credibility and persuasiveness when discussing StuxNet. Second, it increases awareness about the importance of cultivating a better understanding of cybersecurity and how vulnerable digital and hardware systems can have significantly harmful consequences. However, in his quest to push for transparency behind government intelligence operations, Zero Days promotes a dangerous notion. Operational secrecy is not a negative notion but sometimes vital for national security. The ubiquitous nature of cyberspace, like Pandora’s Box, opens nations to a new dimension of threats that cannot be as easily defended like that of Air, Land, or Sea and increased transparency can deal much more harm. Regardless your position regarding the motives behind Zero Days, it remains an excellent documentary in raising cybersecurity awareness.

Zero Days (2016) Documentary Trailer:

 

Cheng served as an Amour Officer and Training Instructor at the Armour Training Institute (ATI) in the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) and now possesses reservist status. His master’s research revolves around security considerations within the Asia-Pacific Region and more specifically around areas of Cybersecurity, Maritime Security and Intelligence Studies. His Graduate thesis explores the characteristics and trends defining China’s emerging Cybersecurity and Cyberwarfare capabilities. He participated in the April 2016 9/12 Cyber Student Challenge in Geneva and has been published in IHS Janes’s Intelligence Review in May 2016. You can follow him on Twitter @LK_Cheng

 

Notes:

Bradshaw, P. ‘Zero Days review – a disturbing portrait of malware as the future of war’, The Guardian, Available from: https://www.theguardian.com/film/2016/feb/17/zero-days-review-malware-cyberwar-berlin-film-festival, (17 Feb 2016).

Gibney, A. ‘Director Profile’, JigSaw Productions, Available from: http://www.jigsawprods.com/alex-gibney/ (Accessed October 2016).

Internatinale Filmfestipiele Berlin 2016, Film File: Zero Days (Competition), Available from: https://www.berlinale.de/en/archiv/jahresarchive/2016/02_programm_2016/02_Filmdatenblatt_2016_201608480.php#tab=filmStills (2016)

Langer, R. ‘Cracking Stuxnet, a 21st-century cyber weapon’, TEDTalk, Available from: https://www.ted.com/talks/ralph_langner_cracking_stuxnet_a_21st_century_cyberweapon/transcript?language=en, (Mar 2011)

Lewis, J.A. ‘In Defense of Stuxnet’, Military and Strategic Affairs, 4(3), Dec 2012, pp.65 – 76.

Macaulay, S. ‘Wrong Turn’, FilmMaker, Available from: http://www.filmmakermagazine.com/archives/issues/winter2008/taxi.php#.V-A8_Tvouu5, (2008).

Scott, A.O. ‘Those You Love to Hate: A Look at the Mighty Laid Low’, The New York Times, Available from: http://www.nytimes.com/2005/04/22/movies/those-you-love-to-hate-a-look-at-the-mighty-laid-low.html?_r=1, (Apr 22 2005).

Image Source (1): https://i.ytimg.com/vi/GlC_1gZfuuU/maxresdefault.jpg

Image Source (2): https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/8/82/SIMATIC_different_equipment.JPG

Image Source (3): https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/8/84/National_Security_Agency_headquarters,_Fort_Meade,_Maryland.jpg

 

 

Filed Under: Film Review Tagged With: Cybersecurity, Cyberwar, feature, Iran, Israel, National Security Agency, nuclear, Stuxnet

A ‘Second Hezbollah’: The strategic value of Iran’s proxy warfare policy in Syria

April 13, 2016 by Robert Andrea

By: Robert Andrea

Sardar_Qasem_Soleimani-01
Qassem Suleimani - commander of the IRGC’s Quds Force. Source: Wikimedia

Throughout the past thirty years, Iran has arguably been the world’s foremost expert in the use of so-called ‘proxy’ warfare as a tool of statecraft. Whether in Lebanon, Gaza, Yemen, or Iraq, Tehran has displayed a degree of discipline about its use of ‘proxy’ sponsorship hitherto unmatched by few, if any, other states. Furthermore, Iran seems to have learned, far better than anyone else, that proxy warfare is most strategically valuable when used as a tactic of statecraft and not as a general foreign policy strategy.

And now today, the utilization of this tactical-strategic relationship between ‘proxy warfare’ and macro-level foreign policy by Iran is once again on display- this time in Syria.

Iran in Syria

As of this writing, the fifth year of the Syrian Civil War is now nearly a month old. With casualty figures approaching 500,000, a tenuous ceasefire is seemingly near to a collapse and portending a fresh round of fighting. And with seemingly no party with the capability to secure a victory on the battlefield, all signs point to both a military, and a diplomatic stalemate.

However, by replicating a strategy of ‘proxy warfare’ it has used in the past, Iran seems to have positioned itself better than any other actor. It is thanks to this strategy that Tehran will likely be able to emerge from any kind of endgame in Syria with their strategic interests in the region intact.

Generally, the narrative holds that Iran’s interests in the Syrian Civil War are tied directly to the survival of Syrian president Bashar al-Assad.[1] The Iranians themselves, at least publicly, seem to have confirmed this. In a December 2015 statement, Ali Akbar Velayati (top foreign policy adviser to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei) reaffirmed that the fate of Assad was a ‘red line’ for Iran. This seems to indicate that any diplomatic solution to the war in Syria would, from the Iranian perspective, be assessed as a zero-sum appraisal.

In other words, if Assad stays, Iran ‘wins’, but if he were to be forced out, the general consensus would be that Iran would ‘lose’.

Regarding the long term fate of Assad, Brett McGurk (U.S. Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL), said in a March interview, ‘there is no way conceivable that Assad’s writ will ever extend throughout the country again. It’s just not realistic after everything that’s happened’. If this is assumed to be true, the prevailing assumptions would also suggest that it’s no more realistic that Iran will be able to secure its foreign policy goals in Syria.

Unfortunately, this narrative overlooks the more long-term geopolitical goal that Iran has in Syria.

The Beirut-Damascus highway

Masked with rhetoric about protecting Shi’a shrines and fighting terrorism, the reason Iran has been so invested in the survival of Assad is that, until now, he has been the guarantor of Iran’s supply lines, through Syria, to Hezbollah in Lebanon.[2] With its ally Hezbollah being the only real apparatus (in the absence of Assad) with which Iran is able to project power in the Levant (particularly via-à-vis Israel), the relationship between Hezbollah and Iran is, by any metric, much more vital to Tehran’s long-term foreign policy in the region than is their relationship with Bashar al-Assad. It is therefore incorrect to assess Iran’s success or failure in Syria relative to the survival of Assad. Rather, ‘success’ on a strategic level for Iran in Syria ultimately depends on whether or not the supply conduit to Hezbollah is maintained.

To that end and through the use of ‘proxy’ by armed organizations, Iran has provided itself with a strategic fallback for their long-term interest in the Levant. This fallback retains its strategic value for the Iranians even if Assad and/or his regime were to be removed from power, either militarily or as part of a diplomatic agreement.

A ‘Second Hezbollah’

This fallback revolves around the creation of pro-Assad and, more importantly for this discussion, pro-Tehran militias. These militias, a myriad of whom exist, each go by different names and are based in different regions of Syria. Often (for brevity’s sake), these militias are collectively referred to as the National Defense Forces (NDF) and are estimated to have a combined strength of anywhere between 100,000-120,000 fighters.[3] It’s not always clear to whom these militias report, Assad or their Iranian Revolutionary Guard (IRGC) sponsors, but it is clear that they have been instrumental in bolstering/supporting Syrian government forces.[4] These paramilitary militias, as well as the IRGC and Hezbollah, have been critical to the preservation of the SAA due to the latter’s struggle with attrition and reliability.[5]

This proxy warfare policy replicates a previous Iranian policy used, beginning with Hezbollah in 1982-83, throughout the past three decades. The comparison of the NDF to Hezbollah is not an idle one. IRGC general Hossein Hamedani (since killed in Syria) was reported to have said in 2014 that Iran had created a ‘second Hezbollah’ in Syria.[6]

Although many factions of the NDF are multi-ethnic and cross-sectarian, some of them are comprised of only Allawi and/or Shi’a fighters, from inside or outside Syria. The amalgamation of militias that comprise this ‘second Hezbollah’ do, in fact, bear striking organizational and ideological resemblances to Hezbollah in Lebanon and many of the Shi’a militias in Iraq, both of whom are assisting Iran in training these NDFs and in actual combat operations in Syria.[7] Most of these Shi’a groups fight under the banner of Liwa Abu al-Fadhl al-Abbas, commonly referred to as the LAFA network or, simply, the al-Abbas Brigades.[8]

It is through their sponsorship of these proxy militias, Shi’a or otherwise, that Iran is seeking to ensure the future of their foreign policy goals in Syria and the Levant.

As tactically successful as this militia sponsorship policy has been in preserving the survival of Assad, none of the NDF militias, not even the LAFA network, provide Iran or Assad any sort of military dominance at the moment, or even in the foreseeable future.[9] So how does Iran’s sponsorship of these militias on a tactical level afford it strategic value with respect to their foreign policy objectives in Syria?

Militia diplomacy

The strategic value lies in the diplomatic leverage that Iran has obtained through its sponsorship of the various militias, NDF or otherwise.

Assuming any hypothetical peace negotiations would be earnestly conducted, none of the anti-regime actors can realistically hope to ignore the strategic considerations Iran has in Syria, as Tehran now essentially commands a force of 100,000 strong on the ground. Obviously, it is highly unlikely that all NDF factions would remain loyal to Iran in a negotiated endgame scenario. However, even if only 1%-2% of NDF members maintained their links to Tehran, this would still be more than enough fighters to seriously destabilize any peace efforts. Thus, the Iranians wield a favorable negotiating position. Of course, how much influence the NDF provides Iran at the negotiating table is certainly debatable. It would seem, however, that Iran believes that it will be enough to bargain for, at minimum, a post-Assad regime that isn’t hostile towards Tehran. Combined with the fact that Iran would have thousands (perhaps tens of thousands) of loyal fighters on the ground, its strategic foreign policy imperative – the supply line to Hezbollah in Lebanon – would be secure.[10] While this hypothetical outcome wouldn’t be optimal for Iran, their understanding of using ‘proxy’ capabilities to pursue foreign policy goals on the strategic level would still provide them with a result they could live with in Syria- with or without Assad.

 

 

Robert is an incoming student at King’s College Department of War Studies and will begin pursuing an MA in War Studies this September. His research interests include U.S. and Iranian foreign policy, diplomatic strategy, and proxy warfare. He can be found on Twitter at @Bob__Andrea

 

 

 

Notes:

[1] Diehl, Jackson. “Why Iran Won’t Give up Syria.” The Washington Post, August 2, 2015. Accessed April 6, 2015. https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/why-iran-wont-give-up-syria/2015/08/02/b9269fa2-360c-11e5-9d0f-7865a67390ee_story.html.

[2] Fulton, Will, Joseph Holliday, and Sam Wyer. Iranian Strategy in Syria: A Joint Report by AEI’s Critical Threats Progect & Institute for the Study of War. Report. May 2013. Accessed April 5, 2016. http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/IranianStrategyinSyria-1MAY.pdf. pg. 21.

[3] Lund, Aron. “Who Are the Pro-Assad Militias?” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. March 2, 2015. Accessed April 5, 2016. http://carnegieendowment.org/syriaincrisis/?fa=59215

[4] Ibid.

[5] Kozak, Christopher. “An Army in All Corners”: Assad’s Campaign Strategy in Syria. Institute for the Study of War’s Middle East Security Report. Report. April 2015. Accessed April 5, 2016. http://understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/An Army in All Corners by Chris Kozak 1.pdf. pg. 4.

[6] Chandler, Adam. “An Iranian General Is Killed in Syria.” The Atlantic. October 9, 2015. Accessed April 6, 2016. http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/10/an-iranian-general-killed-in-syria/409963/.

[7] Smyth, Phillip. “How Iran Is Building Its Syrian Hezbollah.” - The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. March 8, 2016. Accessed April 5, 2016. http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/how-iran-is-building-its-syrian-hezbollah.

[8] Anzalone, Christopher. “Zaynab’s Guardians: The Emergence of Shi`a Militias in Syria | Combating Terrorism Center at West Point.” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point. July 23, 2013. Accessed April 6, 2016. https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/zaynabs-guardians-the-emergence-of-shia-militias-in-syria.

[9] McInnis, J. Matthew. “How Many Iranian Forces Are Dying in Syria?” Newsweek. October 28, 2015. Accessed April 06, 2016. http://www.newsweek.com/how-many-iranian-forces-are-fighting-and-dying-syria-388004.

[10] Fulton, Holliday, and Wyer. Iranian Strategy in Syria. pg. 21.

Filed Under: Blog Article Tagged With: Iran, Proxy War, Syria

PROXY Capabilities - Proliferation and Patronage: UAV Diffusion as a New Form of Proxy

April 6, 2016 by Rian Whitton

This is the third of a series of articles we will be featuring on Strife in the coming week looking at the role of Proxy Warfare in the 21st century by Series Editor Cheng Lai Ki. Previous articles in the series can be found here.

By: Rian Whitton

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Source: Russia Today

Though having existed for most of the twentieth century, the improved technological capabilities and increased reconnaissance and lethal capacities of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV’s) have raised concern about their proliferation. Through analysing developments in China, Iran and non-state actors like Hezbollah, it becomes clear that regulation is not working, and the diffusion of UAV is providing new avenues for proxy strategies.

China –Interstate proliferation a form of arms competition and proxy

Beijing has been researching unmanned aerial vehicles since the late 1950s.[1] More recently, China’s economic boom has fuelled a substantial programme of military modernisation, one of the fruits of which has been the procurement of some 50 designs. These range from micro-drones to unmanned combat systems (UCAV’s) like the Wing Loong II (Pterodactyl), a platform whose similarities to the MQ-1 Predator led some to believe it was procured through espionage.[2]

While the Chinese rationale for UAV’s relates directly to the patrolling of Beijing’s interests in the contested maritime waters of the South China Sea and East pacific, the most striking development has been the exporting of platforms to other countries.[3] Nigeria, Egypt, the UAE and Saudi Arabia have all purchased the Wing Loong I, with Jordan, a prominent US ally in the fight against IS, also rumoured to have negotiated a deal in May 2015.[4]

A number of factors explain Beijing’s success in selling UAV’s. A recent senate report noted that China was not hindered by the same export restrictions of the two premiere UAV producers; the USA and Israel. While the two countries are bound by the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and the Wassenaar Arrangement, China is not, and thus has been sheltered from competition with its more renowned competitors.[5]

Another driver is the relatively low cost of Chinese systems. The Wing Loong II is believed to cost $1 million in comparison to the $30 million Reaper.[6] Though it lacks the payload, maximum altitude and speed of its US counterpart, such deficiencies are redundant in a market strategy primarily pandering to developing countries in Africa and the Middle-East. At a 2012 air show in Zhuhai, a Chinese official explained that Asian and African countries were “quite interested in the intermediate and short-range UAVs because they are expendable and low-cost.”[7] China also attempted to capitalise on Pakistani frustration at not accessing US UAV technology by supplying Islamabad with the CH-3 Rainbow.[8] This was averted with the indigenous development of the Burraq UCAV.[9]

Worries about Beijing undercutting Washington in the sale of UAV’s led Republican rep. Duncan Hunter to urge the President to provide the Jordanian government with access to the Predator, in response to concerns that China was finalising a deal with America’s regional ally to supply a number of unmanned platforms.[10] That General Atomics (producer of the Predator) is Hunter’s largest campaign contributor should be noted, and in the face of stagnating domestic budgets, American companies are pushing for ever looser export-restrictions. Concomitantly US-aligned countries like Ukraine have begun requesting Reapers.[11] Washington’s current policy has been to help its allies by using UAV’s to provide lethal targeting information, like with French forces in Mali.[12]

With both internal and external pressure, America has eased its restrictions on exports as of mid-2015.[13]Though still abiding by the MTCR agreements, the development suggests an understanding in Washington that their stringent controls have done nothing to stall proliferation, as they risk losing market ground to China.

Iran- Middle Powers can develop significant UAV industries

The proliferation and control of UAV’s is increasingly out of the hands of great powers, with regional players like Iran developing significant capability.

The international embargoes on Tehran have so far limited it to domestic technology, but the programme; spearheaded by the Revolutionary Guard’s Aerospace division, has made considerable progress off the back of reverse-engineering US/Israeli systems.[14] An example of this is the Shahed-129 (based on the Israeli Hermes-450), which is purported to be capable of a missile payload for a non-stop 24-hour flight over 2000km.[15] Iran has also claimed to develop an air-to-air combat drone (Sarir H-110). The ability of Iran, a regional power under international embargo, to develop a thriving UAV industry primarily through the reverse engineering of Western models is impressive.

The effectiveness of regulation or embargos is unlikely to stall this development. The Iranian drone fleet is comprised mainly of small tactical platforms, and thus the majority of necessary components are accessible via the use of middlemen and front companies. In 2009, a US cable published by WikiLeaks warned about Iran trying to obtain German Limbach 550E engines and ship them to an Iranian Aircraft Manufacturing Company with faked shipping labels.[16] Such accessibility to dual-use components and off-the-shelf materials makes UAV’s a difficult category to regulate compared to more expensive systems (vis-à-vis fighter aircraft). Alarmingly, Iran’s success in procuring modern UAV technology is facilitating the diffusion to non-state proxies.

Hezbollah- Non-state proxies have increased access to UAV’s

One of Iran’s key beneficiaries; Hezbollah, has had access to drone technology for a number of years, with a fleet of reportedly 200 platforms.[17] As early as 2004, Iran ferried an update of the Mohajer, the Mirsad, to Hezbollah.[18]

This has exacerbated security concerns for Israel. In2006, Hezbollah launched Ababil UCAV’s allegedly carrying explosives against Tel Aviv. They were promptly shot down by Israeli F-16s.[19] These medium-altitude UAV’s are virtually defenceless against sophisticated air defences, but the main concern for Tel Aviv is that Hezbollah will use large quantities of low-flying miniature drones that are harder to intercept. An example this came in 2014 when a low altitude reconnaissance drone was caught loitering over an Israeli nuclear reactor.[20]

UAV’s provide Hezbollah with a number of advantages; kamikaze-style strikes could have a similar casualty rate to suicide bombings. The unmanned systems could also supply the group with accurate reconnaissance of Israeli movements while potentially directing a 60,000 strong stockpile of projectiles.[21] The psychological impact is also substantive, with insurgents appearing to strike technological parity with the world’s fourth-strongest military. This constitutes a misappropriation of awe regarding the sophistication and strategic impact of UAV’s.

Iran’s patronage of Hezbollah represents the most striking case-study of UAV’s being used as a tool of proxy warfare by competing powers, and the technology is proliferating on multiple fronts. In the ongoing Ukrainian conflict, reports suggest the Donetsk People’s Republic has deployed the Russian-made Eleron 3SV for ISR (intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) campaigns.[22] In turn, Kiev has been using modified and hobbyist UAV’s for ISR support.[23]

Looking forward

The successes of China in undercutting America by exporting cheaper drones, and the ability of Iran, despite embargos, to develop an impressive apparatus and arm its proxies, points to the fact that the stringent US-export controls and wider international regulations are not going to prevent the proliferation of unmanned aerial vehicles.

While the mentioned examples relate to the diffusion of drone technology via state patronage, the economics and feasibility of drones are driving proliferation beyond arms sales.

As Woods notes, non-state actors are trying to build their own UAV’s. In 2013 alone, local law enforcement has uncovered ‘drone workshops’ in three nations.[24] In Iraq and Islamabad, ‘Drone-laboratories’ have been uncovered.[25] As Iran’s procurement through reverse engineering and off-the-shelf purchasing has shown, the acquisition of drone technology is becoming increasingly feasible, so much so that non-state actors may not have to act as a proxy and rely on a generous patron for accessing UAV’s. In 2012, the RAND Corporation study noted the possibility of insurgents and terrorists being armed with substantial fleets of small, rudimentary drones and employing swarm technology.[26] There is certainly no guarantee that even the tightest international regulation of states, or even a ban, would stop terrorist organisations incorporating unmanned systems within their wider arsenals.

Despite these concerns, three considerations should undercut hyperbole regarding the diffusion of UAV’s. Firstly, unmanned systems, though tactically convenient and incorporating multiple capabilities, have yet to prove beyond doubt their strategic war-winning ability.

Second, unmanned systems remain secondary to conventional airpower. During the 2011 intervention in Libya, NATO remote crews carried out 145 strikes, compared to the 7,455 weapons released by manned aircraft.[27] This provides some context of drone usage not as transformative but as a growing development alongside traditional airpower.

Third, the growth in unmanned systems has been mirrored by counter-measures employed by both non-state actors and states. In Mali, a document was discovered which provided practical solutions on how to foil drone strikes.[28] Militants and non-state actors are receiving the military kit, like Russian-made ‘Skygrabber’ transceivers, that can interfere with UAV signals and hack into drone feeds.[29] The Kremlin has also provided its separatist beneficiaries in the Donbass with signal jamming technology.[30] The proliferation of unmanned systems is feeding a simultaneous proliferation of ‘anti-UAV’ technology.

Technologists like Elon Musk have opened a debate on banning autonomous weapons.[31] But when it comes to regulating the systems on which the prophesied artificial intelligence might run, the ship has sailed.

Rian holds a bachelor’s degree in history & politics from the university of Sheffield. He is currently undertaking his MA in science & security at King’s where his academic interests revolve around technological innovation, unmanned systems, remote warfare and strategic culture.

Notes:

[1] O’Gorman, R. & Abbott, C., ‘Remote control war Unmanned combat air vehicles in China, India, Israel, Iran, Russia and Turkey,’ Remote Control Project, Open Briefing, September 20th, 2013, p. 3 http://remotecontrolproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/Remote-Control-War.pdf

[2]Baker, B. ‘Chinese Arms Companies Are Picking Up the Pace in Africa and the Middle East,’ The Diplomat, October 21st, 2015 http://thediplomat.com/2015/10/chinese-arms-companies-are-picking-up-the-pace-in-africa-and-the-middle-east/

[3] O’Gorman, R. & Abbott, C., p. 5

[4] Tucker, P. & Weisgerber, M., ‘China May Be Selling Armed Drones to Jordan,’ Defense One, May 15th, 2015. http://www.defenseone.com/technology/2015/05/china-may-be-selling-armed-drones-jordan/112876/

[5] Hsu, K., ‘China’s Military Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Industry,‘ U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, June 13, 2013, p. 15 http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/China’s%20Military%20UAV%20Industry_14%20June%202013.pdf

[6] Baker, B., ‘Drone Wars: China and US Compete on the Global UAV Market,’ October 25, 2015 ‘http://thediplomat.com/2015/10/drone-wars-china-and-us-compete-on-the-global-uav-market/

[7] Standaert, M. ‘China unveils new drones aimed at buyers in developing countries,’ Global Post, November 15, 2012, http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/asia-pacific/china/121114/china-unveils-newdrones-developing-economies.

[8] Ali Ehsan, M., ‘Drone warfare in Balochistan,’ The Express Tribune, June 14th, 2015 http://tribune.com.pk/story/903100/drone-warfare-in-balochistan/

[9] Baghwan, J., ‘Drone war: ‘Burraq’ turned the tide in Tirah battle, say officials,’ The Express Tribune, March 26, 2015, http://tribune.com.pk/story/859152/drone-war-burraq-turned-the-tide-in-tirah-battle-say-officials/

[10] Tucker, P. & Weisgerber, M.

[11] ‘‘Hostile Drones,’ p. 13

[12] Woods, C., ‘ Sudden Justice, America’s Secret Drone Wars,’ Hurst company, London, 2015, p. 280

[13] Tucker, P. & Weisgerber, M., ‘Obama To Sell Armed Drones To More Countries,’ Defense One, February 17th, 2015 http://www.defenseone.com/technology/2015/02/obama-sell-armed-drones-more-countries/105495/

[14] O’Gorman, R. & Abbott, C., p. 9

[15] Rawnsley, A., ‘Like It or Not, Iran Is a Drone Power: Sanctions have not stopped Tehran’s robot development,’ War is Boring, September 5th, 2014 https://medium.com/war-is-boring/like-it-or-not-iran-is-a-drone-power-e9899c954a3f#.zcv6do9u5

[16] Rawnsley, A.

[17] ‘Hostile Drones,’ Remote Control project, Open briefing, January 2016, p. 12 http://remotecontrolproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Hostile-use-of-drones-report_open-briefing_16.pdf

[18] Dreazen, Y., The Next Arab-Israeli War Will Be Fought with Drones,’ New Republic, March 27th, 2014 https://newrepublic.com/article/117087/next-arab-israeli-war-will-be-fought-drones

[19] ‘Hostile Drones,’ p. 12

[20] Hostile Drones,’ p. 12

[21] Dreazen, Y.

[22] Dreazen, Y.

[23] ‘Hostile Drones,’ p. 13

[24] Woods, C., p. 275

[25] Woods, C., p. 275

[26] Woods, C., p. 275

[27] Woods, C., p. 279

[28] Woods, C., p. 273

[29] Woods, C., p. 273

[30] Hostile Drones,’ p. 13

[31] Roberts, B. & Musgrave, Z., ‘Why Humans Need To Ban Artificially Intelligent Weapons,’ Defense One, August 14th, 2015 http://www.defenseone.com/technology/2015/08/why-humans-need-ban-artificially-intelligent-weapons/119130/

 

Filed Under: Blog Article Tagged With: China, drones, Hezbollah, Iran, UAV

Why is Saudi Arabia Helping Iran’s Hardliners?

January 21, 2016 by Alexander Decina

By: Alexander Decina

Iranian_presidential_election,_2009,_protests_(2)
Protester’s in Iran’s presidential elections on 13 June, 2009. Source: Wikimedia

There is an abundance of Middle East analysts and experts drawn to the idea of eternal conflicts. After the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, they learned the words “Sunni” and “Shia” and decided that this “1,400 year-old fight” is the defining conflict in the Middle East, disregarding the nuance of the important issues of the region. As Saudi Arabia and Iran recently rowed over the execution of a prominent Shiite sheikh and the subsequent storming of the Saudi embassy in Tehran, and as the two countries continue their proxy war in Syria, the experts have re-invoked the Sunni-Shia conflict, positing that Saudi Arabia and Iran—the purported champions of Sunnism and Shiism respectively—have always hated each other. This grand sentiment distracts from what is actually a petty fight: Saudi Arabia is giving Iranian hardliners ammunition to undermine the moderates and prevent Iran from getting close to the West, thus protecting Saudi Arabia’s place in the region.

Saudi Arabia and Iran have indeed been rivals since well before the 1979 Iranian Revolution. From the days of the shah, the two countries argued over regional dominance and oil policy—the same issues they continue to squabble over today. But just because these countries have been rivals it does not mean they have always been mortal enemies. Even after the Iranian Revolution, there have been multiple periods in which Riyadh and Tehran have worked to improve relations and attempt rapprochement—all in the midst of ongoing tensions and conflicts.

In the mid-1980s and throughout the 1990s, Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani—a prominent opponent of Supreme Leader Khamenei—worked with then-King Fahd and then-Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia to increase the number of Iranian pilgrims on the hajj and to improve Iran’s relations not only with Riyadh but also with the other countries in the Gulf. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, then-President Khatami made more progress than Rafsanjani, holding amicable talks on oil policy and even forming a security pact in April 2001, pledging to cooperate in fighting terrorism and to keep out of each other’s internal affairs.

As Rafsanjani and Khatami have reached out, they have always been constrained by Iran’s hardliners in the Principalist party and the Supreme Leader. With the Supreme Leader’s veto power over every move they might make, the moderates’ attempts at rapprochement have only existed to the extent that Khomeini and now Khamenei have allowed. The Supreme Leaders’ decisions on this have been based on ensuring their own survival. Today, Khamenei wants to do whatever he can to reduce the level of volatility against him and the clerical establishment in Iran. He balances improving oil policy and Iran’s economy, which keeps protestors off the streets, with appeasing Iran’s hardline Principalists, who have always viewed him skeptically due to his lack of religious credentials.

Khamenei’s biggest appeasement to the hardline Principalists was entering the fray in support of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in the 2005 presidential elections. This backfired after 2009 when demonstrators protested not only against the president but also against the Supreme Leader himself—a rare sight in Iran.

Khamenei could have nullified President Hassan Rouhani’s surprise win in 2013. Rouhani’s plans for moderation and rapprochement with regional neighbours and the West were, and still are, a threat to the hardliners in Iran. But with the combination of the possibility of sanctions relief and fear that quashing Rouhani would lead to demonstrations like the ones in 2009, Khamenei allowed Rouhani to take office. Iranian forces loyal to the Supreme Leader could surely have put down another round of protests, but at what cost? A repeat of 2009 would have led to even more animosity directed at Khamenei and the establishment.

Since coming to power, Rouhani and his foreign minister, Javad Zarif, have made attempts at outreach similar to those of Rafsanjani and Khatami. The two have made requests for official visits and have urged dialogue with the other Gulf countries. And yet Saudi Arabia has been far less receptive to their efforts than it has been towards the previous Iranian leaders—especially since King Salman took power. Rather than entering talks in earnest as it did in decades past, Saudi Arabia has taken more aggressive Syria and oil policies to bleed Iran. The Gulf monarchy has also engaged in an extensive campaign in Yemen to open a new front against its rival (though Tehran’s support of the Houthi rebels in Yemen has always been fairly inexpensive, so the Saudi-led campaign does very little to actually hurt Iran).

Why is Saudi Arabia rebuffing Rouhani and Zarif? After last year’s nuclear deal, Saudi Arabia believes that Iran, for the first time since 1979, stands a real chance to reintegrate into the international community—possibly giving the United States and the West the option of another powerful ally in the Middle East besides Saudi Arabia. The likelihood that Iran’s moderates will be able to accomplish this is still quite low. Nonetheless, Saudi Arabia perceives this as a real enough possibility that it is willing to act on it to protect its standing.

Calling reform and moderation in Iran an uphill battle is an understatement. The Saudis, of course, know this and are using it to their advantage. In its aggressive Syria, Yemen, and oil policies, and now in executing Shiite cleric Nimr al-Nimr, Riyadh is strengthening the position of Iran’s hardliners, giving the clerical establishment ammunition to undermine Iran’s moderates without inciting protests against it like the ones in 2009.

This ammunition gives the hardliners good footing for the upcoming Majlis and Assembly of Experts elections on February 26. They are able to frame the moderates’ efforts to improve Iran’s relations with the world as weakening the country at a time when the region is more unstable than ever before. Furthermore, if lower oil prices undermine the benefits of sanctions relief on the economy, they can argue that the moderates have weakened Iran’s position with no real payoff. The announcement that Iran’s Guardian Council—which is controlled by the hardliners—has just disqualified an unprecedented number of moderate and reformist candidates, including the late Supreme Leader Khomeini’s grandsons, Hassan Khomeini and Morteza Eshraghi, shows the hardliners are feeling particularly bold—a bad sign for Iran’s moderates.

The Saudis are all too happy to strengthen Iran’s hardliners and have shown they can do so successfully, but they do this at their own peril. If Saudi Arabia continues its aggressive Syria and Yemen policies, it will create more radicalism and more terrorism that will spill out of those countries and will affect not only other countries and the West, but also the kingdom itself. According to the IMF last October, if Riyadh continues its aggressive oil policies and keeps the price below $50 per barrel, it will run out of cash reserves in fewer than 5 years. Earlier this month, crude fell below $30 per barrel, the lowest it’s been since 2003. Saudi Arabia’s new direction under King Salman is recklessly shortsighted and is making its traditional allies in the West and in the region uncomfortable—even if they’re not ready to voice this publicly yet. If Riyadh is truly worried about maintaining its positioning, it should look on itself rather than Iran.

 

 

Alexander Decina is a research associate at the Council on Foreign Relations, where he focuses on U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East. He previously worked for the Tripoli, Libya-based Sadeq Institute and for the Sustainable Democracy Center in Beirut, Lebanon.

Filed Under: Blog Article Tagged With: Diplomacy, Iran, Khamenei, King Salman, Nimr al-Nimr, Saudi Arabia

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