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You are here: Home / Archives for Khamenei

Khamenei

The Funding of Terrorism (Part IV) – A Trust Deficit is Undermining the Investigation of Terrorist Financing across MENA

August 9, 2019 by Jack Watling

by Jack Watling

Grand Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei (Image credit: Ayatollah.ir/Wikimedia)

 

The Kingdom of Bahrain sentenced 139 people to prison in April 2019, alleging they were part of a terrorist cell, which the authorities refer to as ‘Bahraini Hezbollah’. The charges in the mass trial ranged from plotting to conduct attacks and the smuggling of arms, to terrorist financing. Specifics however were not revealed, and point to a damaging trend: the use of ‘terrorism’ as a politically acceptable charge with which to implement repression. The consequences of this policy are not just unjust, but in pushing communities to avoid cooperation with the authorities sustains avenues for actual terrorists to finance and carry out their operations.

There are armed groups active in Bahrain, just as there are non-state armed actors, many of which have carried out terrorist attacks, in Iraq, Syria, the Palestinian Territories and Lebanon. Many of these groups are directly supported by Iran in these activities. While sanctions on Iran can be effective in reducing the country’s available resources for financing clandestine activities, limited progress has been made in restricting the routes by which money reaches armed groups. To understand why, it is necessary to appreciate how the Shia community manages its tithes. Although a minority of Shia Muslims are followers of Ayatollah Khamenei, Iran’s religious leadership has ties across the Shia community, and the Iranian government is consequently able to leverage these networks.

Each Twelver Shia Muslim selects an Ayatollah – or religious jurist – as their spiritual guide. They are obligated to follow the scholar who they believe to be most theologically knowledgeable. A follower must pay a fifth of their profits each year to their Ayatollah. The khums is supposed to support the Ayatollah in his research, and to provide subsistence for the Howza: the seminary he oversees. Many Shia give more than the required khums and, in discussion with the cleric or their representatives, make additional donations for him to spend in support of an agreed cause.

The Shia financial system was developed in small communities. Between the collapse of distance brought about by international finance, and a rapidly expanding global population, it now sees donations made by a community of around 220 million people. The volume of money is therefore vast, and far exceeds the immediate needs of the Ayatollahs and the Howza. A far higher proportion of the money is therefore used to support charitable ventures, and to help Shia communities.

What constitutes ‘help’ is contextual. It may mean educational scholarships to students in Mali, or aid to flood victims in Pakistan. It could also mean supporting military activity. When Islamic State seized Mosul in 2014 Grand Ayatollah Sistani declared the fight to defend Iraq a ‘sacred defense’ and large amounts of money from the Marjaiy’ah – the Shia clerical authority – went to the Popular Mobilization Forces, and their families, to support the war effort. The use of religious funds to support the war effort was understandable. It also highlighted how the Shia financial system can support a wide range of political causes, and military efforts.

The capacity for Shia clerics to inject political and financial capital into causes was lamented by the British in the early twentieth century.[1] It has been viewed with hostility by Arab governments since, especially in the wake of the Iranian revolution of 1979. Following the Arab Spring uprisings of 2011 for instance Grand Ayatollah Sistani decided that Bahraini Shia should use their khums locally.[2] Done for humanitarian reasons, this act gave the protest movement both a large amount of money, and the infrastructure for managing it.

Much of that infrastructure is entirely opaque, with local religious representatives receiving cash, and conveying or dispersing it as a matter of trust. The Shia community has a good reason for keeping their finances away from the banking system. In 1991 for instance Saddam Hussein looted the Shrines of Karbala, and actively attempted to seize khums revenues.  The fear that opening the process to scrutiny will see predatory seizures by hostile governments is both persistent within the Marjai’yah, and understandable.

From the point of view of Arab governments like Bahrain or Saudi Arabia however this architecture provides a highly suspicious and invisible flow of funds that goes to both legitimate charity, and to subversive political activities. It is exploited by Iran. The problem is that because it is opaque, finding the evidence trail of the small amount of terrorist financing in the large flow of legitimate funding is hard, especially when those conducting legitimate charity have no incentive to cooperate with the authorities.

Bahraini officials have repeatedly sought to have US counterterrorism investigators endorse their actions against what they see as Iranian subversion in their country. The problem, as a former senior US Treasury official noted in interview, is that ‘they present us with suspicious unknowns – and the opacity of Shia finance certainly represents a threat vector – but they claim it is evidence of terrorist financing. It is not.’[3]

If Bahrain – and other Gulf monarchies – intend to clamp down on the financing of terrorism they need to avoid mass trials and vague charges. They must conduct diligent investigative work, and present detailed cases. Charging five people with specific, evidenced crimes, would be infinitely more credible. It would require a shift from attempting to rule by law, to supporting the rule of law. But until governments across the region are able to build trust with the Shia community, they can expect Shia finance to remain opaque, and so long as it is opaque, it will remain a vector for the financing of subversion from Iran.


Jack Watling is Research Fellow for Land Warfare in the Department of Military Sciences at RUSI. He holds a PhD in history examining the evolution of UK policy responses to civil war. Jack has worked in Iraq, Mali, Rwanda and further afield and has contributed to the RUSI Journal, RUSI Defence Systems, Reuters, The Atlantic, Foreign Policy, The Guardian, Jane’s Intelligence Review, Haaretz and others. He was shortlisted for the European Press Prize in 2016, and won the Breakaway Award at the International Media Awards in 2017. This report was supported with funding from the Pulitzer Centre.


[1] TNA, FO 800/70: Cecil Spring Rice to Edward Grey, 18 July 1907.

[2] Author interviews with officials from Iraq’s clerical establishment, held in October 2017 in Najaf.

[3] Author interview, a former senior treasury official, Washington DC, April 2019.

Filed Under: Blog Article, Feature Tagged With: Arabia, feature, Iran, ISIS, Jack Watling, Khamenei, khums, Mosul, Saddam, shia, terrorism, terrorist funding

Why is Saudi Arabia Helping Iran’s Hardliners?

January 21, 2016 by Alexander Decina

By: Alexander Decina

Iranian_presidential_election,_2009,_protests_(2)
Protester’s in Iran’s presidential elections on 13 June, 2009. Source: Wikimedia

There is an abundance of Middle East analysts and experts drawn to the idea of eternal conflicts. After the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, they learned the words “Sunni” and “Shia” and decided that this “1,400 year-old fight” is the defining conflict in the Middle East, disregarding the nuance of the important issues of the region. As Saudi Arabia and Iran recently rowed over the execution of a prominent Shiite sheikh and the subsequent storming of the Saudi embassy in Tehran, and as the two countries continue their proxy war in Syria, the experts have re-invoked the Sunni-Shia conflict, positing that Saudi Arabia and Iran—the purported champions of Sunnism and Shiism respectively—have always hated each other. This grand sentiment distracts from what is actually a petty fight: Saudi Arabia is giving Iranian hardliners ammunition to undermine the moderates and prevent Iran from getting close to the West, thus protecting Saudi Arabia’s place in the region.

Saudi Arabia and Iran have indeed been rivals since well before the 1979 Iranian Revolution. From the days of the shah, the two countries argued over regional dominance and oil policy—the same issues they continue to squabble over today. But just because these countries have been rivals it does not mean they have always been mortal enemies. Even after the Iranian Revolution, there have been multiple periods in which Riyadh and Tehran have worked to improve relations and attempt rapprochement—all in the midst of ongoing tensions and conflicts.

In the mid-1980s and throughout the 1990s, Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani—a prominent opponent of Supreme Leader Khamenei—worked with then-King Fahd and then-Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia to increase the number of Iranian pilgrims on the hajj and to improve Iran’s relations not only with Riyadh but also with the other countries in the Gulf. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, then-President Khatami made more progress than Rafsanjani, holding amicable talks on oil policy and even forming a security pact in April 2001, pledging to cooperate in fighting terrorism and to keep out of each other’s internal affairs.

As Rafsanjani and Khatami have reached out, they have always been constrained by Iran’s hardliners in the Principalist party and the Supreme Leader. With the Supreme Leader’s veto power over every move they might make, the moderates’ attempts at rapprochement have only existed to the extent that Khomeini and now Khamenei have allowed. The Supreme Leaders’ decisions on this have been based on ensuring their own survival. Today, Khamenei wants to do whatever he can to reduce the level of volatility against him and the clerical establishment in Iran. He balances improving oil policy and Iran’s economy, which keeps protestors off the streets, with appeasing Iran’s hardline Principalists, who have always viewed him skeptically due to his lack of religious credentials.

Khamenei’s biggest appeasement to the hardline Principalists was entering the fray in support of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in the 2005 presidential elections. This backfired after 2009 when demonstrators protested not only against the president but also against the Supreme Leader himself—a rare sight in Iran.

Khamenei could have nullified President Hassan Rouhani’s surprise win in 2013. Rouhani’s plans for moderation and rapprochement with regional neighbours and the West were, and still are, a threat to the hardliners in Iran. But with the combination of the possibility of sanctions relief and fear that quashing Rouhani would lead to demonstrations like the ones in 2009, Khamenei allowed Rouhani to take office. Iranian forces loyal to the Supreme Leader could surely have put down another round of protests, but at what cost? A repeat of 2009 would have led to even more animosity directed at Khamenei and the establishment.

Since coming to power, Rouhani and his foreign minister, Javad Zarif, have made attempts at outreach similar to those of Rafsanjani and Khatami. The two have made requests for official visits and have urged dialogue with the other Gulf countries. And yet Saudi Arabia has been far less receptive to their efforts than it has been towards the previous Iranian leaders—especially since King Salman took power. Rather than entering talks in earnest as it did in decades past, Saudi Arabia has taken more aggressive Syria and oil policies to bleed Iran. The Gulf monarchy has also engaged in an extensive campaign in Yemen to open a new front against its rival (though Tehran’s support of the Houthi rebels in Yemen has always been fairly inexpensive, so the Saudi-led campaign does very little to actually hurt Iran).

Why is Saudi Arabia rebuffing Rouhani and Zarif? After last year’s nuclear deal, Saudi Arabia believes that Iran, for the first time since 1979, stands a real chance to reintegrate into the international community—possibly giving the United States and the West the option of another powerful ally in the Middle East besides Saudi Arabia. The likelihood that Iran’s moderates will be able to accomplish this is still quite low. Nonetheless, Saudi Arabia perceives this as a real enough possibility that it is willing to act on it to protect its standing.

Calling reform and moderation in Iran an uphill battle is an understatement. The Saudis, of course, know this and are using it to their advantage. In its aggressive Syria, Yemen, and oil policies, and now in executing Shiite cleric Nimr al-Nimr, Riyadh is strengthening the position of Iran’s hardliners, giving the clerical establishment ammunition to undermine Iran’s moderates without inciting protests against it like the ones in 2009.

This ammunition gives the hardliners good footing for the upcoming Majlis and Assembly of Experts elections on February 26. They are able to frame the moderates’ efforts to improve Iran’s relations with the world as weakening the country at a time when the region is more unstable than ever before. Furthermore, if lower oil prices undermine the benefits of sanctions relief on the economy, they can argue that the moderates have weakened Iran’s position with no real payoff. The announcement that Iran’s Guardian Council—which is controlled by the hardliners—has just disqualified an unprecedented number of moderate and reformist candidates, including the late Supreme Leader Khomeini’s grandsons, Hassan Khomeini and Morteza Eshraghi, shows the hardliners are feeling particularly bold—a bad sign for Iran’s moderates.

The Saudis are all too happy to strengthen Iran’s hardliners and have shown they can do so successfully, but they do this at their own peril. If Saudi Arabia continues its aggressive Syria and Yemen policies, it will create more radicalism and more terrorism that will spill out of those countries and will affect not only other countries and the West, but also the kingdom itself. According to the IMF last October, if Riyadh continues its aggressive oil policies and keeps the price below $50 per barrel, it will run out of cash reserves in fewer than 5 years. Earlier this month, crude fell below $30 per barrel, the lowest it’s been since 2003. Saudi Arabia’s new direction under King Salman is recklessly shortsighted and is making its traditional allies in the West and in the region uncomfortable—even if they’re not ready to voice this publicly yet. If Riyadh is truly worried about maintaining its positioning, it should look on itself rather than Iran.

 

 

Alexander Decina is a research associate at the Council on Foreign Relations, where he focuses on U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East. He previously worked for the Tripoli, Libya-based Sadeq Institute and for the Sustainable Democracy Center in Beirut, Lebanon.

Filed Under: Blog Article Tagged With: Diplomacy, Iran, Khamenei, King Salman, Nimr al-Nimr, Saudi Arabia

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