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You are here: Home / Archives for intelligence

intelligence

Deconstructing the panopticon

May 1, 2014 by Strife Staff

By Andreas Haggman:

Anonymous graffiti on the wall of the British Museum, London
Anonymous graffiti on the wall of the British Museum, London

Surveillance is always a contentious issue. Whether in the physical realm (CCTV cameras) or digital realm (phone tapping, electronic snooping), proponents and opponents trade blows over arguments of necessity and efficacy versus invasion of privacy and erosion of liberty. While there are no clear-cut answers as to the ethical and practical utility of public surveillance, it is obvious that the issue sparks passionate debate.

The Snowden leaks have made evident the breadth and depth of digital surveillance techniques available to modern intelligence agencies. The gist of what has been revealed so far is that every electronic device is liable to surveillance intrusion, whether this be at a metadata or content level. The scope of this is somewhat frightening and quite difficult to come to terms with. CCTV cameras have a visible presence which, perhaps, contributes to some sense of security. Digital surveillance techniques, by contrast, are invisible which – it can be contended – makes it more difficult to garner a sense of security from them. In addition, we are treated to the positive effects of CCTV on numerous television programmes (such as Crimewatch) which reinforce their contribution to public security. There is no digital equivalent of this, partly due to classified information and partly because one can’t see electronic signals, so our only options are either media speculation or official reports – neither of which is an overly attractive alternative for reliability.

The surveillance programmes which have come under closest scrutiny are the NSA’s PRISM and GCHQ’s Tempora. Both of these take advantage the fact that the US (primarily) controls the physical backbone of the Internet. In having access to the hardware through which the majority of the world’s Internet traffic passes, the NSA and GCHQ have been able to intercept vast quantities of data using techniques such as tapping fibre optic cables and setting up fake servers. As an example, the Quantum programme, which makes use of the latter technique, intercepts targets’ requests for a webpage and sends a cached version of the page back infected with malware which installs a surveillance programme on the target’s computer (a useful explanation with leaked diagrams can be found on The Intercept).

These revelations have led to accusations of Big Brother states and invocations of Jeremy Bentham’s old construct of the panopticon. Humans instinctively revert to physical metaphors as they are easier to understand and relate to than digital concepts. Often used in relation to incarceration facilities, a panopticon is a building with a focal vantage point from which every cell – arranged around the internal perimeter – can be viewed. While the imagery conjured is certainly powerful, there are also two critical flaws which undermine the applicability of this picture to reality: mutual visibility and constraint.

Firstly, in the traditional panopticon, jail guards stationed in the central tower can view prisoners through their transparent cell door (whether this be made of iron bars or Perspex). Likewise, prisoners can see the guards and so they know when they are being watched. The watchers and the watched therefore have mutual visibility of each other. In the digital realm of Quantum Insert, the prisoner does not know they are being watched because the cell door is not transparent. The door can instead be likened to a screen on which the guards in the central tower project an image. To the prisoner, the image shows the guards having their backs turned, when in reality they are intently watching that particular cell. The lack of mutual visibility is therefore an important difference between the panopticon construct and digital surveillance.

Secondly, a traditional panopticon is a jail in which prisoners are trapped by physical constraints. There are actual impediments like walls which stop the prisoner from moving around within the panopticon to avoid the guards’ gaze and stop them from leaving the panopticon altogether. In the digital world, these physical constraints are not present. Users are free to walk away from or switch off their computers, thus avoiding surveillance. It can be argued that in an increasingly interconnected world, going completely offline is becoming increasingly difficult and it therefore becomes more difficult to avoid surveillance. Whilst this is certainly true, more difficult does not equal impossible. Using a computer, a smartphone, a mobile phone or even a telephone is a choice. Granted, choosing to not do so is a significant disadvantage in the modern world, but it is still a choice over which we ultimately have control. In the panopticon, prisoners do not have a choice and they do not have control. To say that the digital surveillance exercised by intelligence agencies resembles a panoptic state is therefore an illogical attempt at imposing a physical concept on a digital world.

Having deconstructed the panopticon, the problem becomes re-imagining a construct which more accurately reflects the current state of affairs. The great problem for political philosophy is that it has yet to incorporate the technological advancements of the 21st century. The advent of video recording was embraced by thinkers and has been expediently conveyed in works such as Orwell’s 1984 or the film The Truman Show. However, the difficulty of constructing an image from something we cannot see (digital signals) hinders the digital surveillance debate from metamorphosing into an easily relatable concept.

The contentiousness of surveillance will continue to provoke fierce debate. It is clear that new technologies endow authorities with unparalleled tools for monitoring activity in the digital realm. In describing this state of affairs we must be careful, however, of invoking imagery, concepts and constructs offered by our predecessors. Ideas are always conceived in context, so what was applicable in the past does not necessarily translate to the present. Therefore, while we do not live in a Bentham’s panopticon, the time is certainly ripe for the modern generation to critically reflect on the technologies they live with.

____________________

Andreas Haggman is a MA student in Intelligence and International Security at King’s College London. His academic focus is on cyber security, particularly the development of weaponised code and organisational responses to cyber security issues.

Filed Under: Blog Article Tagged With: intelligence, privacy, surveillance

No guts, no glory

April 24, 2014 by Strife Staff

By Matthew Bell:

scotland

Would an independent Scotland be missing some essential body parts?

How do you create a new country? Not a question many of us have had to ask, but one surely on the minds of thousands of Brits worrying what independence would mean for the security we have all come to take for granted.

The Scots now join an exclusive club of peoples who have found themselves charged with picking a course separate from that of its closest neighbour – in Scotland’s case, one it has been bound to for over 300 years.

Devolution has given Scotland a taste of independence, and much debate has understandably focused on whether Scotland could afford to lose the pound and many of the businesses that may prefer to be based across the border.

But the White Paper[1] published by the Scottish government last November also shows the scale of the task it faces in setting up new structures for defence and security.[2]

Or rather, it doesn’t. Because virtually every statement made on defence raised new questions without answering the multitude already posed.

Scotland’s future membership of the EU is far from certain, while the Scottish National Party has gently retreated from an absolute ban on nuclear weapons in its territory, reflecting just how much it values membership of NATO - an alliance underpinned by nuclear deterrence.

Vital organs

But even without descending into those uncertain waters, an independent Scotland would plainly have a plethora of problems to address, with few solutions clear.

Chief among these is how to create the public bodies that will look ahead, gather information, make plans and execute them to ensure Scotland stays safe and secure. All the boring stuff that in reality comprises the vital organs of a country, helps animate its spirit and keeps everything working properly.

The UK government estimates Scotland would need to create over 200 public bodies after independence,[3] including about a dozen that would be essential to secure its borders and protect the new nation.

The Scottish government countered that the list proved how “cluttered” the UK’s public sector had become, and said it would absorb many of the required roles into pre-existing departments and agencies.[4] Even so, the list of essential defence bodies is formidable.

This should not be too surprising for a country vying to break away and go it alone. But astonishingly, the SNP seems to have given little or no thought on how to pay for it.

Settling on an annual defence budget of £2.5 billion is all very well, even if many of the SNP’s stated expectations – including a fleet of at least 12 Typhoon fighters – seem more than a little unrealistic.

But factor in the costs of setting up a sprawling network of highly skilled military and civilian staff to carry out a bewildering array of highly specialised jobs, and you wonder how much money would be left.

At the risk of burdening illumination with detail, this is how the list stands. Bear in mind this is not an exact science, and much of what is currently done in UK hands could indeed be shuffled around quite a bit, as the SNP suggests – but the sheer scale of the challenge is eye-watering:

MI5 – spying for protection of the homeland
MI6 – foreign spying for protection of the homeland and overseas interests
GCHQ – data and signals monitoring
Ministry of Defence – strategic planning, co-ordination and command, troop recruitment and training, essential liaison with other armed forces
Defence Science and Technology Laboratory – scientific and technical research on technologies too sensitive or specialised for the private sector
Defence Nuclear Safety Committee – expertise on nuclear programmes, sites and operations
Defence Scientific Advisory Council – expertise on other areas of engineering and technology
Defence Support Group – essential maintenance of land and aerial vehicles
Advisory Group on Military Medicine – advice on the use of medical treatments on operations
Armed Forces Pay Review Body – independent advice on military salaries

The list does not include the following bodies, whose roles are carried out within the MoD but are significant enough to warrant separate mention:

Defence Intelligence - strategic defence intelligence for the military
Defence Equipment & Support – buys all the MoD’s equipment, annual budget £14 billion

The Scottish government has at least tackled part of the conundrum, settling on the creation of a Security and Intelligence Agency to replace the work currently done by GCHQ, MI5 and MI6.[5]

But even here the strategic planning and costing is woefully inadequate, according to the Royal United Services Institute.[6]

An effective agency would take years to build from scratch, and would probably have paltry access to data and signals intelligence to properly identify and track security threats, says RUSI.

To add to its woes, an independent Scotland would not have automatic access to the ‘Five Eyes’ intelligence pool – shared by the UK, US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand – and could also be left out from the Club of Berne, which enables intelligence sharing between European agency heads.

A familiar new friend

These challenges may push an independent Scotland towards close intelligence co-operation with the remainder of the UK, but the UK would not be in a position to share sensitive information garnered by others without their permission.

All things considered, the rest of the UK would have to decide how secure it would be with the country on its border shorn of useful intelligence and the means to understand it. In defence too, the UK and Scotland may prefer intimate collaboration to ensure the joint security of the island.

This is perhaps the nub of the issue: the extent to which UK co-operation would be desirable or even essential for Scotland in any number of areas, from defence and intelligence to finance and business.

The problem will hit both countries hard, at which point the politicians will really have to earn their pennies by striking acceptable compromises across the board.

Of course, both sides already know what could be coming and are busy installing leverage for what would be hugely important separation negotiations.

But in a worst case scenario, could Scotland really get by on its own if the political battle was lost, and it received minimal aid in defence and intelligence from the remainder UK?

Those working in defence and security already face a sea of uncertainties in their daily toil. Independence without proper planning could bring a whole lot more.

______________________

Matthew Bell is author of ‘Making the Break’ (November 2013) and ‘Separation Anxiety’ (June 2012), articles on Scottish independence and defence published by IHS Jane’s.
www.Matthew-Bell.com
@MatthewAlBell

NOTES

[1]Scottish government White Paper: http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2013/11/9348/0
[2]Scottish government White Paper - international relations and defence: http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2013/11/9348/10
[3]List of 200 public bodies Scotland would need to establish after independence: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-public-bodies-that-operate-in-scotland
[4] BBC coverage of public bodies serving Scotland: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-22993752
[5] Scottish government White Paper - security and intelligence: http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2013/11/9348/11
[6]RUSI on the proposed Scottish security and intelligence agency: https://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/201403_BP_Scotlands_Blueprint.pdf

Filed Under: Blog Article Tagged With: defense, England, independence, intelligence, military, nuclear, public bodies, public sector, referendum, Scotland, UK

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