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A Matter of Survival: How the Trade War will Shape China’s Future

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By Francesca Ghiretti and Lloyd Yijue Liu

2 May 2019

The trade war between the US and China is just the tip of the iceberg of deeper differences that will have complex ramifications (Manufacturing.net)

 

The trade war between the US and China is more than what meets the eye, and this is not a mystery. In fact, besides the trade deficit, there are multiple aspects at stake: intellectual property rights, the opening of the Chinese market and most of all, the political-economic system of China. The economic aspects appear to be laden with heavy political values for both actors. For Trump the trade war is a political means aimed at reinvigorating his political message with the eye on re-election, while for Xi Jinping it is a matter of survival, both his and that of the Communist Party of China (CPC).

Although negotiations are ongoing, the deeper political issues on the table risk triggering a mutation of the trade war. During the current state of affairs, an open armed conflict is highly unlikely. However, it is probable that the conflict between China and the US may spread to other countries and areas of interest, thus creating a complex matrix of entangled elements. The fight for technological advancement appears to be the most notorious battlefield, leading many to believe that in the near future the trade war could take on the shape of a technology war. The case of Huawei and the debate on AI are only two early examples of what such a conflict might look like. One wonders: why technology? Technological advancement is fundamental for the survival of the American primacy in the world and of the CPC in China. Both powers are aware that those who will lead the technological revolution that is unfolding under our eyes will lead the world in the coming years. After all, Britain would have hardly had the capacity to build an empire without the advantage of the first industrial revolution, and the West would have looked very differently and occuped a very different global position were it not for the industrial (and technological) revolutions.

Thus, both China and the US interpret the ongoing power struggle as a matter of survival, and technological development appears to be the main arena in which the battle is fought. In the long-run, instances for the US and China to face each other and present their contrasting models will not be lacking in number. However, in the short term, an agreement might be reached. It is for this reason that we propose three different scenarios each consisting of a possible outcome of the current negotiations between the two countries. In scenario one, an agreement is reached, and all tariffs are dropped. Scenario two describes the current situation– a state of limbo where some tariffs are in place but there is still space for communication and for a sudden turn in any direction. In the third scenario the US and China are unable to get a significant deal, leading to the prolonging and worsening of hostilities.

There is a perceivable division between the motives of President Donald Trump and those of the American strategists. The former needs a victory in view of the upcoming elections, even more so following the failure of the negotiations with North Korea. American strategists, on the other hand, appear to be seeking a more radical change in China’s way of doing business. Trump’s goal is to obtain an agreement which has the aspect of a victory for the US, with China expected to open its market to more American investments and firms, protect intellectual property and balance the trade deficit. Such objective seeks only a superficial change which would mean sizeable but not system-changing concessions by China.

The adoption of a Foreign Investment Law by China and the reform of the law on Intellectual Property suggests China’s propension to implement a few changes in order to find an agreement with the US, at least formally. On the other hand, the broader aims of the strategists seek deeper changes which ultimately would strip the CPC of its absolute centrality. This might be a real deal-breaker, should they be seriously pursued. In fact, Xi understands the importance of achieving an agreement for the sake of the Chinese economy. However, the survival of the CPC and its control over the entire Chinese society will always remain the first priority. All in all, what is to be expected is a temporary deal where China makes some quantitatively significant concessions but leaves structural changes to an unknown future.

Scenario 1. Trade deal (Tariffs at 0%)

In the first scenario the trade war ends with the US and China reaching an agreement which leads to the abolition of all the tariffs. However, this scenario envisages not a peace treaty but a regulated and extended truce. The deeper issue however, the nature of the Chinse political system, will not have been resolved. The basis of the Chinese government’s actions lays firmly with the doctrine of the ‘party leads everything’ (党是领导一切的) and is expected to remain. Here, the CPC would keep on centrally managing all aspects of China’s life, including areas which in the West are usually private or independent, such as academia and the judiciary. If the US is seeking a change in such approach, this issue is destined to come to the surface again at some point in the future and spur a conflict between the two.

In the short run, however, China will certainly be more collaborative with the US and the West. This would not mean a return to Deng Xiaoping’s ‘hide and bide’ paradigm, but a purely rhetorical switch to a more low-key and friendly campaign to present the ‘rise of China’ to the world, while creating more skillful ways of attracting foreign talent and importing technology and know-how from developed countries to develop China itself. Moreover, forging new strategic partnerships in the Western sphere would be easier with the blessing of the US and China’s renewed collaborative attitude.

Scenario 2. Further extending the deadline for a deal (Tariffs at 10%)

Currently, we are likely to be living the last moments of this transition scenario, which is probably advantaging China more than the US. The longer the negotiation lasts, the more uncertainty to the global economy and pressure on Trump’s credentials it will bring. The CPC is not immune to the political repercussions of a slowing economy, but unlike Trump, Xi does not have to face elections in a few months. Were it not for these looming elections, Trump too would have highly benefitted from a longer period for negotiations, as it would have allowed him to test whether China’s promises turned into reality. In such a scenario, a full-fledged deal (Scenario 1) would still be on the table, but China would have time to consider and perhaps test other alternatives. To force the Americans to reach a suboptimal deal and to protect their own economy from future repercussions, the Chinese might try to intensify their transactions with other trading partners. They might also try to explore possible fractures between the US and its allies, such as the EU, while exploiting the disruption of the global supply chain of goods manufactured in the country, such as tech components, to increase the pressure on the reaching of a deal and preparing for more negative alternative scenarios.

Scenario 3. No deal (Tariffs at 25%)

This is not the most likely outcome. However, with Trump and Xi, two stubborn leaders leading the discussions, this option cannot be ruled out. In this case, China and the US would become more assertive in implementing their own plans and fulfilling their geopolitical interests. Thus, multiple actors and areas of interests, such as technology, geopolitical claims and multilateral settings, would be involved in the disputes which is likely to take place simultaneously in different arenas, an example of which was the run for technological advancement previously mentioned. If the conflict becomes further politicised; China will make it difficult for the US to reach its goals in any international issues which China has influence on (such as in North Korea, the South China Sea or instances presented to the UN Security Council). At the same time, China would actively strengthen its already existing alliances, seek new allies and leverage any possible dispute between the US and its allies.

At home, the CPC would further devalue the Renminbi (RMB) to maintain China’s competitive edge while promoting stronger nationalism. In fact, it is believed that after 1979, the way in which the CPC maintained the level of legitimacy it needed to govern has slowly shifted from a nationalistic rhetoric to a more pragmatic promise of future wealth for Chinese people. Now that growth is slowing, and the West is becoming more hostile to China’s economic power, the CPC is attempting to transform the public’s economic grievances into a nationalistic feeling of an imminent external threats, which would grant the Party more space of maneuver. Interestingly, although often thought otherwise, it has been shown that the younger generations are at the same time materialistic and nationalistic, the use of an emergency rhetoric might override their materialistic need and help them endure economic difficulty in time of perceived external threats.

Regardless of the outcome of the trade war, the Chinese government could use its tax policy and the control of property price to encourage consumer spending. Furthermore, the CPC is likely to implement more large-scale infrastructure construction projects to keep the economy running in an attempt to mitigate the impact of the trade war and the slowing economy. An excellent example of this is the outcome of the recent Belt and Road Forum where China has strongly reaffirmed its commitment to the realisation of the project, robustly responding to the increasing skepticism towards the feasibility of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). In China, more openness of the market has oftne been followed by a tightening effort for societal control to avoid a Soviet-style system collapse, this is likely to remain the case in the foreseeable future. Abroad, as in Scenario 2, China would seek new allies. However, according to the outcome of the trade war, the degree of assertiveness used by China to pursue such goal will change.

In conclusion, none of the scenarios presented rules out a future clash between the US and China, as the power struggle between the two will endure even after reaching a potential agreement. Their embodiment of different, and in certain aspects antithetical, models of governance and development will impede the complete appeasement between the two, leaving the world politics and economy in an uncertain state of affairs. In the long-run, this is likely to end with a drastic change in one of the two actors and the subsequent victory of one and loss of the other.

Francesca Ghiretti is a doctoral candidate at department of War Studies and European and International Relations at King’s College London where she has been awarded the Leverhulme scholarship ‘Interrogating Visions of a Post-Western World: Interdisciplinary and Inter regional Perspectives on the Future in a Changing International Order’. The focus of her thesis is the political response of the EU to Chinese foreign direct investments. Follow her @Fraghiretti.

Lloyd Yijue Liu is currently working as a research assistant for the China part of the research project Mapping Elite Networks and Governance in the 21st Century at the Department of Political Science at VU University of Amsterdam. He holds an advanced master’s degree in International Relations and Diplomacy from Leiden University and previously studied History and Modern European Studies at the University of British Columbia.

Militarization and Accountability on the United States-Mexico Border

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By Carly Greenfield

28 December 2018

A U.S. Border Patrol agent stands near a section of the U.S.- Mexico border fence while on patrol in La Joya, Texas. (John Moore/Getty Images)

 

On 21 November, a jury in Arizona found Border Patrol Agent Lonnie Swartz not guilty in the involuntary manslaughter of José Antonio Elena Rodríguez, a Mexican teenager shot and killed by Swartz in October of 2012. Swartz fired from the United States side of the border in Nogales, Arizona, into Nogales, Mexico, killing 16-year-old Elena Rodríguez. Elena Rodríguez is not the first teenager to be killed by U.S. law enforcement along the border; a similar situation occurred with another Mexican national, 15-year-old Sergio Hernández Guereca. When he was killed in 2010, however, his killing did not result in a lawsuit. Both cases raise questions surrounding authority in border zones.

While the majority of shootings along the border have been by U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) agents, the military has also been involved in a similar incident. The killing of 18-year-old U.S. citizen Esequiel Hernández by U.S. marines deployed to the border in 1997, which resulted in no indictments for the marines involved, remains a blight on military involvement along the border. As active-duty troops are set to be deployed through the new year, the decades old case continues to inform military engagement in the region. The Elena Rodríguez case is not isolated, and the lack of clarity over who is responsible to whom in a national and joint-authority international space like the U.S.-Mexico border, now with both law enforcement and military bodies present, should bring considerable disquietude.

The role of the military on the border

In the wake of President Trump’s deployment of over 5,000 active-duty troops to the U.S.-Mexico border at the end of October, many pundits and commentators started mulling over the legality of the order in reference to the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878. This act is a misunderstood and largely non-enforced doctrine that enshrines, in the minds of many Americans, the separation between military and law-enforcement roles within U.S. territory.[i] The act itself, however, has many exceptions, and a 1981 reform further restricted its application. For starters, the law initially only applied to the Army, as it was created as a means to remove the Army from its role in the post-Reconstruction South.[ii] A 1956 reform brought the Air Force into the act, and a 1992 Department of Defense regulation folded in the Navy and the Marine Corps.[iii] The Posse Comitatus Act still includes allowances for National Guard forces operating under state authority, the role of the Coast Guard in peace time (through which the Navy can play a support role without breaching the Posse Comitatus act) or the Presidential power to use troops pursuant to subduing domestic violence.[iv] All of this to say Posse Comitatus has so many holes, and so few court cases holding up its authority, that it has had little influence on the use of the military in the interior.

The reform in 1981, called the Military Cooperation with Law Enforcement Officials Act, was in many ways a death knell for the Posse Comitatus Act as it relates to border security.[v] The 1981 act created space for the military to cooperate with law enforcement as it related to the growing ‘War on Drugs.’ This quickly ballooned into aiding enforcement or supplying intelligence as it relates to immigration and customs offenses.[vi]

However, the myth persists that this act keeps the military from taking part in law enforcement roles like border security management and enforcement. A New York Times piece ran last month concluded that ‘[t]he Posse Comitatus Act, a Reconstruction-era law, prevents active-duty troops from engaging in law enforcement activities within the United States.’ This is patently false — or else the 1997 killing of Esequiel Hernández by active-duty marines, sent to patrol the border as part of an anti-narcotics mission, would have raised further consequences past the shooting of an American. The U.S. military has the legal and historical precedent to support law enforcement missions on the U.S.-Mexico border. The larger query is whether or not these deployments are effective; due to the 1997 case, most troops are unarmed and aid in constructing barriers. The purpose of their current deployment on the border, then, remains in question, as they are instructed not to come into contact with migrants or patrol with Border Patrol agents. Journalists have noted that while troops were rapidly deployed prior to the midterm elections in ‘Operation Faithful Patriot,’ the name surreptitiously changed to the much less inflammatory ‘border support’ post-election, reinforcing critics claims of performed militarization and misuse of the military. The politically fraught nature of their presence contributes to a hyper-charged environment along the border, which adds to the misconception of a crisis on the U.S.-Mexico border. This ‘crisis’ perception makes violence, including fatalities, all the more likely, and easier to justify.

The U.S.-Mexico border as a non-combat zone

Active duty troops currently deployed on the U.S.-Mexico border are not receiving combat pay as they are not taking part in a combat mission. As mentioned, the rules of engagement for the deployed troops have resulted in most soldiers and marines not carrying weapons and instead taking part primarily in constructing additional security barriers. Yet the border continues to be militarized even without armed, active military missions. Of the nearly 20,000 border patrol agents employed in fiscal year 2017, more than 16,000 served on the southern border,[vii] compared to fewer than 5,000 agents in the entire agency in 1992.[viii] Notwithstanding, CBP is a civilian law enforcement agency, meaning they are meant to be held to account in the U.S. civilian court system, which handles cases involving U.S. agents on U.S. land. This is complicated when dealing with the area between the U.S. and Mexican fences and the distance a bullet can travel — namely, across a border.

The ramifications of an agency accountable to the U.S. government shooting and killing non-nationals on non-U.S. territory, then, remain unclear. In June 2017, the U.S. Supreme Court dismissed the case of Sergio Hernández Guereca, the Mexican 15-year-old killed on Mexican territory by a border patrol agent, upholding the U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals decision that the teenager’s parents did not have a right to pursue the case in U.S. courts.[ix] This contrasts with the decision made in the case of Elena Rodríguez, where the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that Elena Rodríguez’s mother did have the right to sue. The conflicting decisions create an uneven application of the law at the border, one that recognizes U.S. responsibility in some cases and not others.

Rights of non-Americans on non-American soil

In the oral arguments made in Hernández Guereca’s case before the Supreme Court in February 2017, the petitioners’ lawyer Robert Hilliard claimed that the case was meant to:

‘(…) address the ongoing problem along the southwest border that has resulted in at least ten cross-border shootings and six Mexican national deaths. And every time the Constitution, according to the government, turns off at the border, even though all the conduct happens in the United States.’[x]

The justices, however, were skeptical of extending Constitutional rights to someone shot and killed on non-U.S. soil as it would cloud understanding over who has access to Constitutional protections.[xi] The conversation reached into hypotheticals comparing the space between the U.S. and Mexico border fences to Guantanamo Bay, the piloting of a drone strike from U.S. soil, or whether the case would be distinct if a military officer had shot and killed Hernández Guereca. This reveals the military and foreign policy implications for border shooting decisions, even if CBP is officially a civilian law enforcement agency. Ultimately, with Hernández Guereca’s case dismissed, the uneven application of the law stands.

It should also be noted that the agent involved was charged in Mexico for Hernández Guereca’s death — yet the U.S. government refused to extradite him, even with extradition agreements in place between the U.S. and Mexico.[xii]

So if the Constitution does not apply beyond U.S. international borders, and the U.S. government refuses to extradite border patrol agents charged in Mexico for the shootings, then what options do victims’ families in Mexico have to access a fair day in court? In the current system, very few.

Law enforcement accountability

The implications for allowing a case against border patrol agents into U.S. courts reach past border enforcement and risk granting victims of U.S. military missions abroad access to Constitutional rights in lands far beyond U.S. control. Still, the militarization of the border does not aid in preventing such cases— there continue to be border deaths with little recourse for border patrol agents. Like in other parts of the United States, calls for law enforcement accountability are occurring along the border, too. But since the population in question is primarily non-American and border patrol agents oftentimes work in barren areas with few possible witnesses, change is slow. The route to justice continues to be hazy as appeals drag on and cases are unable to move forward in Mexico.

What develops on the border has significance beyond the border — for military missions, Constitutional rights, and U.S.-Mexico relations. The dynamics of the U.S.-Mexico border raise large questions around how militarization contributes to violence and a lack of accountability for border patrol agents. When President Trump and the government espouse unfounded levels of fear around border work, agents are more likely to respond to incidences lethally and then be protected from prosecution by their government. The current dynamics should remind Americans that the armed forces are not required to militarize a space, and that tragic situations ensue on the border even when media attention is not focused on it. With President Trump escalating the rhetoric and looking to recruit more border patrol agents, the shared U.S.-Mexico border will likely become deadlier and hold less consequence for those who patrol it.

Carly Greenfield is a Dual Degree masters candidate between Sciences Po and the London School of Economics, currently studying international security at Sciences Po. She completed her BA in International Relations at King’s College London and is a former BA Representative for Strife. Her research focuses on securitization, migration, and the conceptualization of borders, particularly in the Americas. You can follow her on Twitter @carlygreenpeel.

Notes:

[i] Lindsey P. Cohn, “Come What May,” Bombshell, Podcast Audio, 20 November 2018: https://warontherocks.com/2018/11/bombshell-come-what-may/.

[ii] Charles Doyle, “The Posse Comitatus Act and Related Matters: The Use of the Military to Execute Civilian Law,” Congressional Research Service, (1 June 2000).

[iii] Eric V. Larson and John E. Peters, “Appendix D: Overview of the Posse Comitatus Act,” from Preparing the U.S. Army for Homeland Security, (2001): RAND Corporation.

[iv] Nathan Canestaro, “Homeland Defense: Another Nail in the Coffin for Posse Comitatus,” Washington University Journal of Law & Policy Vol. 12, (January 2003).

[v] Paul Jackson Rice, “New Laws and Insights Encircle the Posse Comitatus Act,” Individual Study Project, U.S. Army War College, (26 May 1983).

[vi] Richter H. Moore, “Posse Comitatus revisited: The use of the military in civil law enforcement,” Journal of Criminal Justice Vol. 15, (1987).

[vii] United States Border Patrol “Border Patrol Agent Nationwide Staffing by Fiscal Year,” Customs and Border Protection, (2017).

[viii] Christine Stenglein, “Struggling to hang on to 20K officers, Border Patrol looks to hire 5K more,” Brookings Institution, (7 July 2017): https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2017/07/07/struggling-to-hang-on-to-20k-officers-border-patrol-looks-to-hire-5k-more/.

[ix] U.S. Supreme Court, “582 U. S. Hernandez v. Mesa,” Slip Opinion (2017).

[x] U.S. Supreme Court, “No.15-118 Hernandez v. Mesa,” Oral Arguments (2017).

[xi] Ibid.

[xii] “Extradition Treaty Between the United States of America and the United Mexican States,” (25 January 1980).

Image source: http://www.powerhousebooks.com/books/undocumented-immigration-and-the-militarization-of-the-u-s-mexico-border/

NATO is wounded, this Summit could break it

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By Dr Zachary Wolfraim

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg ahead of the Summit (Credit Image: NATO HQ)

In light of the recent chaos consuming British politics and the looming NATO summit, I revisited an article I wrote on the eve of the US election in 2016 hoping it would outline a worst-case scenario, rather than reality. At that time, NATO was heading into uncertainty with the reality of Brexit and the Conservative Party’s significantly reduced majority in Parliament just starting to sink in. Turkey was moving steadily towards autocracy and Donald Trump was a long-shot, but nonetheless threatening Presidential candidate. This scenario has since come to pass and with the critical ongoing summit (on the 11th and 12th July 2018), NATO has again been pushed into a corner and forced to defend its existence. This is a frequent occurrence for the alliance, particularly since the end of the Cold War. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, rather than disbanding, the alliance found new purpose both as a vehicle for promoting US interests in Europe but also as a security organisation capable of undertaking coordinated multilateral interventions. In occupying this role, NATO has reinvented itself from collective defence organisation established to prevent Soviet expansionism into one able to execute complex, coordinated multilateral military interventions. In doing so it has responded to crises in the Balkans, Afghanistan, Libya and has now reoriented back towards countering Russian aggression in Eastern Europe. The threat it faces now is not from an external crisis, however, but internal within the alliance and the effect of radical realignments in policy both in the US and the UK.

As a backdrop to current events, suspected Russian interference into both countries have undermined mechanisms of political campaigning and cast doubt on democratic outcomes while delivering policies that dramatically upend decades of Western international security policy. President Donald Trump and specifically his transactional view of international alliances and a complete lack of consistency in policymaking present an existential threat to the organisation and consequently, creates another way of undermining US influence in Europe. Concurrently, Britain has been rendered politically unstable, consumed with Brexit which adds to years of austerity that have diminished much of its defence capability. Both countries play a central role in providing military support and a diplomatic vision to NATO and are struggling to define their respective relationships within the broader international order.

In the UK specifically, both major parties, the Conservatives and Labour, are completely riven by Brexit with the Conservative party engaging in open conflict over the UK’s future relationship with the EU, most recently losing its Foreign Secretary and its Brexit minister. This has not yet spilled into the UK-NATO sphere but nonetheless has planted seeds of doubt in the minds of allies over the type of reliable member the UK will continue to be. Despite the country’s position as a framework nation contributing to vital capabilities and forces alongside meeting its 2% budgetary commitment, it has continued to under invest in maintaining its military capabilities and by extension limiting its ability to act as a capable partner in NATO operations. This is now reaching a point where its future effectiveness could be called into question. Stagnant economic realities mean that future defence investment decisions are likely to be pushed down the road until there is a clearer UK-EU relationship. As a result, one of Europe’s critical NATO members is effectively in a holding pattern for the next few years.

The US, on the other hand, presents an even more fundamental question. President Trump has made it relatively clear that he does not believe the values that underpin NATO are sufficient to justify its existence. Trump’s sole emphasis has been on the disparity between US defence spending and the continuing 2% spending target, disregarding the agenda setting influence this spending has bought. While this has often been a point of contention in NATO, the President’s willful misunderstanding of how this spending target works has only compounded his sense of grievance with NATO allies. Fundamentally, the President seems willing to dismantle the security architecture that has underpinned the safety and security of Europe, the North Atlantic and the West more broadly since the end of the Second World War over the issue of spending and budgets. Despite reassurances from the US Permanent Representative to NATO and US Defence Secretary, James Mattis, about the alliance’s central role to US defence priorities, no one actually knows what President Trump will say as he has no defined priorities or identifiable value structure when it comes to international relations.

Regardless of what happens in this summit, NATO remains in serious trouble during the tenure of the Trump presidency and until Britain has decided its future relationship with the EU. For the time being NATO member states must remain defensive about their continued increases in spending, proactive in their policymaking and vocal about what NATO’s value added is to international security. The 2% spending goal, while admirable, should be adapted to place emphasis on effectiveness and thus increase coordination between Allies to enhance the capability of NATO as a whole. Though the UK has made its commitments to NATO clear, its ability to follow through on them is variable and thus the ability to coordinate with similarly effective NATO forces creates a way of preserving influence and capability. Ultimately, despite the UK’s diminished international presence, NATO can potentially continue to limp along with US disengagement until the next presidential election. However, there is no doubt that this is one of the lowest points for the transatlantic relationship since the beginning of the Iraq War. At that time, major NATO members both publicly rebuked the US invasion of Iraq and refused to support US efforts in mobilising NATO to defend Turkey. This previous rift in the alliance seems minor in hindsight, however, it nonetheless demonstrated that the organisation can endure difficult diplomatic relations and carve out a relevant international role.

During this summit and beyond, Canada and European NATO Allies will need to prioritise the relevance of NATO, invest in maintaining the organisation and prepare to speak up in its defence. There remains considerable support for NATO in the US and Allies should make every effort to maintain links with aligned US Senators and Representatives to continue making the case for NATO. In terms of operations, NATO must continue its presence in Eastern Europe and continue to be a proactive force in international affairs, driven by the initiative of Canada and European members, otherwise it runs the risk of becoming a discussion forum rather than an active force for stability and progress. More generally, NATO member states will need proactive strategies to deal with Russian disinformation and spend time on reaffirming and rebuilding trust with voters. With time and perhaps a different administration, the alliance will recover somewhat, however, the damage that has already occurred will take time and dedication, particularly on the part of the US, to recover.

 

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Dr. Zachary Wolfraim graduated from the War Studies department where he examined how narratives shape foreign policy behaviours. He has previously worked in NATO headquarters on operations in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya as well as political risk and intelligence sectors in London.

Image source: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_156597.htm

How much is enough? The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review and the value of nuclear parity

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By Alexandria Reid

 

The underwater Baker nuclear test, Bikini Atoll, 25 July, 1946 (Credit Image: Wikimedia Commons)

The release of the Trump Administration’s Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) on 2nd February marks a decisive shift from the Obama Administration’s approach to nuclear weapons. Responding to a ‘dramatic deterioration of the strategic environment’ since the last review was published in 2010, this NPR contains a particularly notable departure in US nuclear strategy: the intention to further develop low-yield non-strategic nuclear capabilities. Unsurprisingly, the Pentagon’s determination to supplement the already extensive US arsenal with lower-yield warheads has stimulated a fierce debate on the logic of nuclear deterrence. Most importantly, it has raised questions about whether the world’s preeminent military power really needs a like-for-like arsenal to credibly deter a nuclear opponent.

This calculation is fundamental to the everyday practice of deterrence. Since the advent of the nuclear age at the end of the Second World War, debates about the trade-offs between the quantity and quality of weapons required to deter an adversary have dominated discussions about the composition of the ideal arsenal. Overall, estimates about the number of nuclear weapons required to deter an opponent have generally become more conservative since the end of the Cold War. Times have changed since in the crudest of Cold War calculations, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara once judged that the US would need the capacity to eliminate between 20 and 25 percent of the Soviet population, and destroy 50 percent of its industry in order to deter the USSR from a first strike. Contemporary advocates of ‘minimal deterrence’ now hold the position that because of the unambiguously destructive quality of nuclear weapons, very few weapons are actually required to deter a rational opponent. Unsurprisingly, universal consensus on the ideal recipe for deterrence remains to be found.

Estimates of the number of weapons necessary still vary between single digits to hundreds, or even thousands of warheads. Crucially, advocates of minimal deterrence assert this small arsenal must survive a second strike so that a retaliatory threat of punishment is credible in the event of a first strike. To retain second strike capability, the nuclear platforms generally recommended are a combination of ballistic missile equipped submarines (SSBN), mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and strategic bombers carrying a variety of missiles (ALCMs). The US nuclear triad continues to be built on this model.

Yet many critics have long been concerned that the deterioration of the global threat environment means that a small number of weapons is not large enough to fulfil the multiple responsibilities assigned to the US arsenal. After all, US nuclear deterrence extends to both allied territories and the central deterrence of the American homeland. Keith Payne therefore argues that a credible minimum deterrence approach is based on ‘ideologically driven arguments’ that collapse when confronted by ‘cold reality.’ Yet as evinced by the NPR, the Trump Administration is less preoccupied with the US ability to achieve overall parity in nuclear weapons at a strategic level, and more concerned with a lack of like-for-like parity in low-yield nuclear weapons, sometimes referred to as ‘tactical nukes’.

It is clear from the NPR that the development of these low-yield warheads is mainly aimed at deterring any limited use by Russia in a regional conflict. Citing numerous Russian statements, the NPR refers to the fact that since 2000, Russian doctrine has reserved the right to employ low-yield weapons in a ‘de-escalation’ strike ‘in situations critical to the national security of the Russian Federation and its allies’. This includes a scenario in which Russia finds itself losing in a conventional regional conflict. In 2010, this doctrine was refined to only allow the use of nuclear weapons when ‘the very existence of the state is placed under threat’. Ironically, this mirrors the Flexible Response strategy adopted by NATO at the height of the Cold War in 1967. Motivated by its inferiority in terms of conventional forces, NATO’s strategy was to meet any Soviet aggression in Europe ‘with a credible threat of escalation in response to any aggression below the level of a major nuclear attack.’

With Russian revisionism back on the cards, the Trump Administration’s policy shift is motivated by the belief that the US force structure should be able to credibly deter this ‘de-escalation’ strike with a proportionately lower-yield weapon. Washington therefore intends to introduce two new capabilities into its arsenal: a low-yield warhead for the existing Trident D-5 (a submarine-launched ballistic missile, or SLBM), as well as the development of a new submarine launched cruise missile (SLCM). The NPR explicitly links this procurement drive to ‘correcting’ the Russian perception that there is a ‘coercive advantage’ in using nuclear weapons at lower – i.e. tactical — levels of conflict. Whilst maintaining a commitment that these weapons are not meant to enable nuclear war-fighting, this NPR clearly considers the use of non-strategic nuclear weapons to be politically viable as they appear to be a more proportionate response. Some have therefore suggested this development lowers the nuclear threshold in international politics today.

The merits of a low-yield nuclear response to a de-escalation strike make for a polarised discussion. The Trump Administration is by no means the first to recognise the strategic rationale for the development of non-strategic nuclear weapons. Indeed, several theorists in the eight years since the 2010 NPR was published have advocated this position, worried that the US would find itself ‘self-deterred’ in the event of a limited nuclear strike. With an arsenal equipped with only disproportionately large-yield nuclear weapons, some believe the US would be cornered into a situation of ‘surrender or suicide’.

Others are less enthralled with the idea. Nuclear theorist Adam Mount suggests that it would be in the US interest not to respond with nuclear retaliation even in the event of a limited nuclear strike by Russia. Instead, he suggests that the US would be better served by utilising its overwhelming conventional strength in battle, therefore strengthening the nuclear taboo and proving that there can be no political utility in the use of nuclear weapons for coercion. Meanwhile, although Survival’s Matthew Harries concedes that the Trump Administration’s assessment of the threat landscape is understandable, he argues that it would be a ‘thoroughly stupid idea’ for Russia to be the first country to deploy nuclear weapons since 1945. If Russia really were to use a nuclear weapon in Europe, it would surely become an unrivalled pariah state. In line with Harries’ argument, it’s easy to see it would be a thoroughly stupid idea for America to become the second country to use a nuclear weapon since 1945. A retaliation by nuclear counterattack would surely do more to undermine American global leadership than all of Trump’s foreign policy combined.

 

Alexandria Reid is a recent graduate of Conflict, Security and Development at King’s College London, funded by a Sir Evelyn de Rothschild Scholarship. She was recipient of the Sir Michael Howard Award for Best Graduate in BA War Studies, 2016. Alex currently works for Strife Blog as Communications Manager, and as a research assistant for Professor Michael Rainsborough. Twitter: @AlexHREID.

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https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/0/09/Operation_Crossroads_Baker_Edit.jpg

Strife Series on National Perspectives in North-East Asian Rivalries, Part IV – Pyongyang: The View From Beijing

by

 

By Riccardo Cociani

Xi Jinping, General Secretary of the CCP & President of the PRC, and Kim Jong-un, ‘Supreme Leader’ of the DPRK (Credit Image: Getty)

There is nothing easy regarding Beijing’s strategic calculus about North Korea (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, DPRK). China’s difficult relationship with the DPRK rests upon balancing its vital interests: first, peace and stability on the Korean peninsula; second, its denuclearization; third, the preservation of its influential relationship with DPRK; fourth, crisis-prevention[1]. In short, China seeks to balance the maintenance of the status-quo, while simultaneously trying to change it. By changing it, China aims to maintain the upper hand. A cost-benefit analysis of the losses and gains resulting from the pursuit of each of its interests mentioned above would require China to adopt a more assertive military stance.

Of critical importance to any strategic calculations is context: not just the territory involved, in this case the Korean Peninsula, but also the global strategic landscape. Any Chinese military strategy involving the DPRK must also take into account China’s other priorities. How should China balance its security stance vis-à-vishe DPRK while simultaneously trying to provide a stable global landscape to allow its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to grow? How to balance foreign and domestic security concerns? What is the best strategy to allow China to reach its ‘New Normal’? This article will first highlight the major factors influencing China’s perceptions of the DPRK threat; and second, it will contend that China is adopting a more assertive military stance. Ultimately, this paper will argue that the likelihood of a Chinese military intervention on the Korean peninsula has now increased, and moreover, that Beijing would benefit from a tougher military stance.

 

Security ‘with Chinese Characteristics’

China’s East Asian insecurity rhetoric blames United States (US) troops, bases, and regional allies for surrounding China with a ‘containment by alliance’ coupled with efforts to undermine China from within[2]. Of greater importance for China is the proliferation of nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula. Conventional scholarly wisdom held that, should the DPRK acquire nuclear weapons, other states like Japan, South Korea and even Taiwan also would have pursued their own nuclear program. This has not been the case and it remains unlikely. China’s concern of a ‘nuclear containment’, therefore, only rests in theory. There is also the risk of proliferation of nuclear material and weapons to non-state actors, such as terrorist groups. Xi Jinping cannot afford this; the BRI must remain unthreatened and its economy must grow according to its ‘New Normal’[3]. This complicates China’s pursuit of its interests and begs the question: will China intervene? The increasing securitisation of the Sino-DPRK border[4] [5], the opening of China’s first overseas base in Djibouti[6], and the most recent report of a military base in Afghanistan[7] indicate an increasingly assertive China, raising the perspective of Chinese interventionism[8]. While it is noted that China has historically breached its policy numerous times[9], the DPRK may bring the official birth of Chinese interventionism. By no means will this situation create a stable Korean peninsula and increased pressure from the international community will test China’s non-interference sustainability[10].

For China to reach some of its most important vital interests, it may have to reconsider its relationship and alliance with Pyongyang. At the same time, the Sino-DPRK alliance comes with its own benefits, too: a buffer zone. This provides Beijing with faster access to North-Korea, thereby allowing China to reach and secure the DPRK’s nuclear reactors and weapons before the US and its allies could. Furthermore, this middle-ground impedes the American military from reaching China’s border. It also allows China to project its political, economic and diplomatic outreach to the North. Of critical importance to the DPRK are Chinese energy exports. This buffer zone therefore presents a Chinese political extension covered by Beijing’s economic and diplomatic power, with the possibility of military action.

 

China, the US, and the DPRK: The Future of the Korean Peninsula

Only time can tell what Beijing’s next significant move will be. China’s strategic calculus, more than ever, must also find a balance with ‘Xi Jinping Thought’ (XiJinping xindai zhongguotese shehui zhuyi sixiang). China’s pursuit of the status quo[11] appears to be trickling down to its end. For the time being, it appears that China is biding time to create enough room for political, diplomatic, and strategic manoeuvre to rebalance the strategic calculus on the Korean peninsula. This does not signify a particularly decisive shift when historically compared. Nevertheless, the stakes appear higher than ever not only for China, but for the US too.

US President Donald Trump’s rhetoric against the DPRK misguided; evoking military action without clear end goals will not solve anything. In fact, Trump’s rhetoric is accompanied by an inappropriate military approach: limited strike against DPRK nuclear facilities will not lead to limited conflict.[12] Only time would be limited, before DPRK and China would intervene militarily. Limited strikes, therefore, may lead to unlimited war. Their post-9/11 military interventions point to this lesson.

Trump’s threats are more likely to upset Beijing, ultimately raising hostility between the US and China, while simultaneously pushing one another further away. Instead, they should seek military rapprochement, which unfortunately appears unlikely for the time being. Furthermore, as Oriana Skylar Mastro points out, the deterioration of Sino-DPRK relations over the past two decades would lead Beijing not to intervene to protect itself, but to “secure its own interests”[13]. In addition, during Xi Jinping’s most recent visits to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), he called for them to be ready to fight, to win any war, and to “neither fear hardships nor death”[14]. The PLA’s current modernization and restructuring further indicates this: by practising joint warfare capabilities, the CCP expects its armed forces to fight and win on its own. Yet, following the current Sino-American strategic mistrust, this would bring the US and China closer to war rather than closer to peaceful cooperation. Therefore, should Trump’s brinkmanship rhetoric cause conflict, the US and the rest of the world should not expect China to come to their help: China’s self-interests will trump American and global worries.

The deployment of the US’s Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system to South Korea in 2017 represents just this. China has strongly opposed its deployment[15]. The anti-ballistic missile defence system is currently deployed to counter the DPRK’s ballistic missiles. Although THAAD’s effectiveness [16] in the Korean peninsula is disputed, China feels particularly threatened by its capabilities, most critically its radar performance. THAAD can detect airborne objects over 1000km away, which is well within Chinese airspace. In addition, THAAD could strengthen the US alliance system in East Asia “by virtue of [its] technical characteristics”[17] by allowing American and South Korean radars, and even Japanese ones if it also acquires THAAD, to be connected. Not only would this improve the alliance’s cohesion, but also improve the chances of hitting targets. Lastly, increased detection and response capabilities signify that any Chinese offensive would have very little surprise effect, thereby hindering its chances of military success. To check and balance THAAD, China may expand its nuclear arsenal and target South Korea “should hostilities erupt between China and the US”[18].

 

Conclusion

Today, China would be better positioned to open its ‘lips and teeth’[19] and tell DPRK that it will “show your strength, carpe diem” instead of “hide your strength, bide your time”[20]. Xi cannot afford a conflict over the Korean peninsula. He has already stated that China will not rescue the DPRK if it causes a conflict[21]. The US has shown its willingness to fight directly against North Korea, meaning US boots on the ground and closer to China’s border, with North Korean refugees attempting to cross into China’s mainland. Xi must carefully and simultaneously balance China’s pursuit of stability on the peninsula, the strengthening of China’s national security, and the pursuit of Korean peace. Currently, China appears to be attempting to wedge into the DPRK via diplomatic, political, and economic channels in order to restrain Kim Jong-un[22]; any serious escalation will witness a Chinese military response to protect itself. Time is of the essence.

Riccardo Cociani graduated in BA War Studies from King’s College London in 2017. He was the President of the KCL Crisis Team, and held research and manager positions on projects related to China, Japan, and NATO. He is currently pursuing a Double MSc in International Affairs at Peking University and the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE). His research focuses on international security, strategy, East Asian security, and China. You can find him at: https://www.linkedin.com/in/riccardo-cociani-32558587/

Notes:

[1] Yinhong, 2015, p.18

[2] Chung, 2011, p.100

[3] Zhang & Chen, 2017

[4] Channel News Asia, 2018

[5] “Every time China-North Korea relations worsen, there’s always a report of China moving troops around the border.” in Zheng, 2017

[6] Zheng, 2017

[7] Toktomushev, 2018

[8] Neriah, 2017

[9] Brown, 2013

[10] Brown, 2013

[11] Chung, 2011, p.108

[12] Most recent military threats only indicate a tactical reaction to an eventual DPRK provocation. It remains difficult to assert with confidence what the US’s end goals in a war against DPRK would be. This only raises doubts whether the US has an actual military strategy intended to reach those goals.

[13] Skylar Mastro, 2017

[14] Phillips, 2018

[15] The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, 2017

[16] Cirincione, 2017

[17] DeVore, 2017, p.70

[18] Devore, 2017, p.69

[19] Mao Zedong described the Sino-DPRK relationship to be as close as ‘lips and teeth’

[20] Famously put by Deng Xiaoping, this has shaped Chinese foreign policy and military strategy for the past three decades

[21] Skylar Mastro, 2017

[22] Daekwon, 2017

 

Image Source: Here

 

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