Strife

The Academic Blog of the Department of War Studies, King's College London

You are here: Home / Archives for Future of NATO

Future of NATO

NATO’s 21st Century Agenda: In Conversation with Paul King

by

by Hélène Kirkkesseli

On 11 March 2020, Strife had the pleasure of welcoming Paul King, Programme Officer/Editor at NATO’s Public Diplomacy Division, to discuss the Alliance’s history, as well as its current agenda. The event, which was well attended by MA and PhD students, was chaired by Strife Senior Editor Stanislava Mladenova, currently a PhD Candidate at the Department of War Studies and former member of the NATO international staff.

Just months after NATO’s seventieth anniversary, this event served as an opportunity to discuss the evolving security threats the Alliance must face. It looked at how, seventy years after its founding, NATO has learned to adapt to emerging challenges, beyond the physical and visible threats outlined in its Article 5, by tackling hybrid warfare and countering international terrorism through shared intelligence. The need to adapt to this new reality was clearly demonstrated by the 2007 cyberattack against Estonia, or the international terrorist attacks in the Alliance’s own capitals. These threats have to lead to NATO improving its awareness, preparedness, and response capabilities through, for example, the standing up in 2017 of the Joint Intelligence and Security Division in its Headquarters.

In terms of the Alliance’s enlargement, King highlighted the Alliance welcoming its thirtieth, and newest member – Northern Macedonia. NATO’s ‘open door policy’ under the Washington Treaty welcomes any country willing and able to meet accession requirements. NATO’s many partners have played an integral part in NATO’s political agenda, and its military missions. But this continued strength, and physical expansion, especially in the last three decades, have sometimes been perceived as threats, especially by Russia, with which the Alliance had cultivated a crucial relationship. This abruptly ended with Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 – an act, which violated international law, as it changed borders by force.

Among the several questions from the audience and particularly one about China’s defence expansion, King reiterated what NATO Secretary-General expressed in December of 2019, that ‘There’s no way that NATO will move into the South China Sea, but we have to address the fact that China is coming closer to us, investing heavily in infrastructure.” King emphasised that NATO is a collective defensive alliance, and it has no interest in a conflict with China, which is undoubtedly a significant player in the world

This event reaffirmed that despite some criticism of the Alliance, and questioning its strength in the current global security climate, NATO’s agenda for the 21st Century is busier than ever. It is continuing to strengthen its ability to deal with old threats, most recently exhibited by more countries reaching 2% GDP of defence spending, but also evolving to meet the challenges of cyber, terrorism, and the shifting geopolitical military strength of China.

Hélène is currently pursuing an MA in International Peace and Security within the War Studies department of King’s College London. Prior to this, she graduated from the double Law degree program between the universities of Paris-Nanterre in France and Essex in the UK, specializing in international public law and EU law. Having previously interned at the DG for External policies of the European Parliament and the US Embassy to France, she is now focusing her studies particularly on the South Caucasus region. You can follow her on Twitter: @hkirkkesseli

Europe’s Greatest Gamblers: Anticipating Wars of the Future and Why European Leaders Are Choosing to Ignore Such Possibilities

by

Anticipating war is out of fashion, yet the potential destruction and impact on global society of a major war are huge.

 

By James M R Thorp

 

Soldiers from Poland’s 6th Airborne Brigade and the U.S. 82nd Airborne Division, during The Poland-led multinational exercise Anakonda-16 (Credit image: KACPER PEMPEL/REUTERS)

Back in February, Elisabeth Braw wrote an article for POLITICO titled, ‘Europe isn’t ready to face modern threats’. Braw’s case is that NATO is ‘preparing for the wrong war’ and needs to ‘become more creative in defending against hybrid attacks’. ‘[H]ybrid’, a term coined by Frank Hoffman, is defined as incorporating ‘a full range of different modes of warfare, including conventional capabilities, irregular tactics and formations, terrorist acts… and criminal disorder’ acting at ‘all levels of war.’[1] Braw’s point that Russia and China have the will and ability ‘to bring a country to a standstill long before a conventional war takes place’ is one that is only just being heeded; for a start, the rate of cyber-attacks has increased dramatically in the last couple of years.[2] But Braw’s article misses the greater issue at hand: Western policies, economics, and its way of life all rely on the notion that war between the leading states of the world is no longer a real possibility. So, not only is the West unprepared for modern ‘hybrid’ threats, as Braw states, but it is almost entirely unprepared for any type of modern major conflict, even a conventional one.

But how likely is such a war and why has that possibility been ignored? Firstly, the world today is increasingly unstable: it faces a resurgent Russia, an unpredictable North Korea, and a ‘Thucydides Trap’ in the form of an increasingly dominant China, which is expanding its power and influence through measures such as building artificial islands in the South China Sea. Secondly, it may be that the US is globally dominant, and any major war would inevitably involve it, but it is rare to find someone who would solidly wager that such a major war (involving the US) would break out in the next five, or even ten, years. Yet, by looking at the case of the UK in the 1860-1910s – like the US now – the UK was globally dominant yet its share of global GDP was declining compared to its rivals, leading to a competition that culminated in the First World War – it is only rational to assume a similar situation could arise by the late 2020s.[3] Despite this, we continue to live in an age where the idea of ‘permanent peace’ is prevalent.

The moral, ethical, economic, and systematic structures that were formed after 1945, a world system dominated by the US and the West, has led to a decrease in conventional war and direct military confrontation; which in turn has led to a widespread global illusion – in the West especially – that the peace is prevalent and violence has been mostly eliminated. In reality, violence has been suppressed; human psychology has not changed enough since we formed as a species for us to have suddenly become incapable of violence. We have and always will be biologically and psychologically capable of both violence and peace, regardless of our moral and ethical systems.[4]

Europe unequivocally relies on the stability of this post-1945 order to remain safe and prosperous. Yet, with President Trump’s unpredictability, largely unknown agenda and open condemnation of NATO, Europe can no longer rely on the US to lead and remain a bastion of deterrence. The US itself stands highly divided, to the extent that the small, but genuine, chance of a second American civil war has become a talking-point amongst some security experts.[5] Similarly, Europe and the EU also stand divided, with waves of nationalism sweeping through, particularly in Austria, France, Italy, Spain and the UK. If one is to consider global issues that will greatly impact Europe, climate change is an existential threat that has the potential to violently destroy not just the post-1945 order, but our global society as we know it.[6] But, after the US pulled out of the Paris Climate Accord in 2017, neither can Europe rely on the US to lead us through that, nor is there much evidence to show that anyone in Europe is realistically stepping up to the challenge.

Then, in spite of these weaknesses among its members, NATO on the one hand is a powerful alliance with over three million troops and around ten thousand tanks, making it a force that is certainly to be reckoned with. But on the other hand, this force is significantly weakened by certain factors. As a fighting force weapons systems are disparate, for example 20 different types of fighter aircraft are used; in-theatre hierarchies and command systems are unclear [7]; and most importantly, there exists an adversary with capability to exploit NATO’s ‘Article 5’, by obfuscating whether a member state has been attacked by another state[8]. Then, despite NATO’s European Reassurance/Deterrence Initiative and the very recently announced ‘Four Thirties’ Plan, defence spending across member states has dramatically reduced over the past decade or two and it remains to be seen whether defence spending promises will be kept.

Perhaps most important of all is one of the key lessons taught to us by the father of modern military strategy, Carl von Clausewitz: that chance is an intrinsic feature of war[9], and because war is, in his words, a ‘continuation of policy with other means’, so too then is politics affected by chance[10]. If chance cannot be eliminated, it follows that the possibility of any type of war can never be eliminated from political interaction. On top of that, wars of a more ‘hybrid’ or ‘grey zone’ nature have become, and will continue to be, an even greater possibility.[11]

Some European leaders may have taken certain measures to prepare for a major modern war, including promises to achieve or come close to the two percent of GDP expenditure benchmark on defence. But are such promises little more than lip-service to NATO and the USA, with only four nations in Europe achieving the benchmark last year?[12]  If one considers that the world’s population has grown faster than exponentially[13], leading to massive urbanisation – two-thirds of the world’s population in cities by 2040 –, it becomes entirely probable that a modern major war would be indiscriminate and catastrophic.[14] Then consider what this article has highlighted regarding the likelihood of such a war. Taking this combined consideration, it then follows that despite NATO’s usually significant efforts, defence measures by European leaders are not nearly enough, that most politicians are repeatedly betting on war not occurring and the European public are kept blissfully unaware of a perilous future. Meanwhile, the stakes remain high, and the gamble is at the greatest level.

 

James is a recent MA Intelligence & International Security candidate at the Department of War Studies, King’s College London. He graduated in January 2018 and is currently based in both Suffolk and London. You can find him on LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/james-thorp-280595/

 

Notes: 

[1] Frank Hoffman, Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars, (Arlington, Virginia: Potomac Institute of Policy Studies, December 2007), p. 8.

[2] Cyber-attacks increased by double in 2017, with Russia the main source of activity, see ‘Cyber-attack Volume Doubled in First Half of 2017’, Infosecurity, 11 August 2017.

[3] Look at the graph on page 335 and then go to pages 338-340, see Ian Morris, What Is War Good For: The Role of Conflict in Civilisation, from Primates to Robots, (London: Profile Books, 2015), p. 335 & pp. 338-340.

[4] Steven Pinker, in his seminal work, ‘The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined’, highlights this inner battle within humans, who ‘are equipped with five distinct motives of violence, and four faculties that allow them to inhibit or avoid violence’, see Steven Pinker, ‘Frequently Asked Questions about The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined’

[5] See Chris Arkenberg, ‘What a new U.S. civil war might look like’, Foreign Policy, 10 October 2017 & Lt. Col. Robert F. McTague, ‘Some thoughts on how we might get from where we’re at now to a Second Civil War’, Foreign Policy, 10 October 2017.

[6] For the NATO special report on this, see ‘Special Report: The Importance of Climate Change for Transatlantic Security’, NAOC, 29 November 2017, also see Steven Jermy, ‘Perfect Storm?’, Russian International Affairs Council, 12 August 2013.

[7] This was displayed very clearly within ISAF in Afghanistan: ISAF was a coalition made up from NATO members and due to inequal commitments, cultural differences and (often) incompatible caveats a potentially unified command structure was fractured – information taken from lecture by Lt. Gen. (Ret.) Jonathan Riley, King’s College London, 17th November 2016. See also Kathleen J. McInnis, ‘Lessons in coalition warfare: Past, present and implications for the future.’ International Politics Reviews, 1.2 (2013), pp. 78-82.

[8] Russia’s ‘little green men’ in Ukraine being a case in point, see Robert R. Leonhard and Stephen P. Philips, “Little Green Men”: A Primer on Modern Russian Unconventional Warfare, Ukraine 2013-2014 (Fort Bragg, NC: US Army Special Operations Command, 2015), p. 3 & 43.

[9] Carl von Clausewitz, ‘On War’, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 7. University Press

[10] ibid, p. 30.

[11] For “grey zone” see United States Special Operations Command White Paper: The Gray Zone, September 2015, p. 1.

[12] Only France, Greece, Poland and Romania spent over 2% of GDP on defence in 2017, see ‘SIPRI Military Expenditure Database’.

[13] Simon Lewis & Mark Maslin, The Human Planet: How We Created the Anthropocene, (London: Penguin, 2018), pp. 6-7.

[14] ‘The Future of War: the new Battlegrounds’, The Economist, 25 January 2018.

Image Source: https://www.newsweek.com/europeans-are-quietly-preparing-war-russia-487307

NATO is wounded, this Summit could break it

by

By Dr Zachary Wolfraim

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg ahead of the Summit (Credit Image: NATO HQ)

In light of the recent chaos consuming British politics and the looming NATO summit, I revisited an article I wrote on the eve of the US election in 2016 hoping it would outline a worst-case scenario, rather than reality. At that time, NATO was heading into uncertainty with the reality of Brexit and the Conservative Party’s significantly reduced majority in Parliament just starting to sink in. Turkey was moving steadily towards autocracy and Donald Trump was a long-shot, but nonetheless threatening Presidential candidate. This scenario has since come to pass and with the critical ongoing summit  (on the 11th and 12th July 2018), NATO has again been pushed into a corner and forced to defend its existence. This is a frequent occurrence for the alliance, particularly since the end of the Cold War.  With the collapse of the Soviet Union, rather than disbanding, the alliance found new purpose both as a vehicle for promoting US interests in Europe but also as a security organisation capable of undertaking coordinated multilateral interventions. In occupying this role, NATO has reinvented itself from collective defence organisation established to prevent Soviet expansionism into one able to execute complex, coordinated multilateral military interventions. In doing so it has responded to crises in the Balkans, Afghanistan, Libya and has now reoriented back towards countering Russian aggression in Eastern Europe. The threat it faces now is not from an external crisis, however, but internal within the alliance and the effect of radical realignments in policy both in the US and the UK.

As a backdrop to current events, suspected Russian interference into both countries have undermined mechanisms of political campaigning and cast doubt on democratic outcomes while delivering policies that dramatically upend decades of Western international security policy. President Donald Trump and specifically his transactional view of international alliances and a complete lack of consistency in policymaking present an existential threat to the organisation and consequently, creates another way of undermining US influence in Europe. Concurrently, Britain has been rendered politically unstable, consumed with Brexit which adds to years of austerity that have diminished much of its defence capability. Both countries play a central role in providing military support and a diplomatic vision to NATO and are struggling to define their respective relationships within the broader international order.

In the UK specifically, both major parties, the Conservatives and Labour, are completely riven by Brexit with the Conservative party engaging in open conflict over the UK’s future relationship with the EU, most recently losing its Foreign Secretary and its Brexit minister. This has not yet spilled into the UK-NATO sphere but nonetheless has planted seeds of doubt in the minds of allies over the type of reliable member the UK will continue to be. Despite the country’s position as a framework nation contributing to vital capabilities and forces alongside meeting its 2% budgetary commitment, it has continued to under invest in maintaining its military capabilities and by extension limiting its ability to act as a capable partner in NATO operations. This is now reaching  a point where its future effectiveness could be called into question. Stagnant economic realities mean that future defence investment decisions are likely to be pushed down the road until there is a clearer UK-EU relationship. As a result, one of Europe’s critical NATO members is effectively in a holding pattern for the next few years.

The US, on the other hand, presents an even more fundamental question. President Trump has made it relatively clear that he does not believe the values that underpin NATO are sufficient to justify its existence. Trump’s sole emphasis has been on the disparity between US defence spending and the continuing 2% spending target, disregarding the agenda setting influence this spending has bought. While this has often been a point of contention in NATO, the President’s willful misunderstanding of how this spending target works has only compounded his sense of grievance with NATO allies. Fundamentally, the President seems willing to dismantle the security architecture that has underpinned the safety and security of Europe, the North Atlantic and the West more broadly since the end of the Second World War over the issue of spending and budgets. Despite reassurances from the US Permanent Representative to NATO and US Defence Secretary, James Mattis, about the alliance’s central role to US defence priorities, no one actually knows what President Trump will say as he has no defined priorities or identifiable value structure when it comes to international relations.

Regardless of what happens in this summit, NATO remains in serious trouble during the tenure of the Trump presidency and until Britain has decided its future relationship with the EU. For the time being NATO member states must remain defensive about their continued increases in spending, proactive in their policymaking and vocal about what NATO’s value added is to international security. The 2% spending goal, while admirable, should be adapted to place emphasis on effectiveness and thus increase coordination between Allies to enhance the capability of NATO as a whole. Though the UK has made its commitments to NATO clear, its ability to follow through on them is variable and thus the ability to coordinate with similarly effective NATO forces creates a way of preserving influence and capability. Ultimately, despite the UK’s diminished international presence, NATO can potentially continue to limp along with US disengagement until the next presidential election. However, there is no doubt that this is one of the lowest points for the transatlantic relationship since the beginning of the Iraq War. At that time, major NATO members both publicly rebuked the US invasion of Iraq and refused to support US efforts in mobilising NATO to defend Turkey. This previous rift in the alliance seems minor in hindsight, however, it nonetheless demonstrated that the organisation can endure difficult diplomatic relations and carve out a relevant international role.

During this summit and beyond, Canada and European NATO Allies will need to prioritise the relevance of NATO, invest in maintaining the organisation and prepare to speak up in its defence. There remains considerable support for NATO in the US and Allies should make every effort to maintain links with aligned US Senators and Representatives to continue making the case for NATO. In terms of operations, NATO must continue its presence in Eastern Europe and continue to be a proactive force in international affairs, driven by the initiative of Canada and European members, otherwise it runs the risk of becoming a discussion forum rather than an active force for stability and progress. More generally, NATO member states will need proactive strategies to deal with Russian disinformation and spend time on reaffirming and rebuilding trust with voters. With time and perhaps a different administration, the alliance will recover somewhat, however, the damage that has already occurred will take time and dedication, particularly on the part of the US, to recover.

 

If you have come to the end of this piece, we are interested in what you think about our Blog. We have launched our first readers survey just so that you can tell us how we are doing and what we can do better. You will find the survey here. It takes just a few minutes, but your help will be much appreciated. Thanks in advance!

Dr. Zachary Wolfraim graduated from the War Studies department where he examined how narratives shape foreign policy behaviours. He has previously worked in NATO headquarters on operations in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya as well as political risk and intelligence sectors in London.

Image source: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_156597.htm

Dice, Hexes & History: Can Wargaming Save Estonia?

by

By Camlo Kalandra

Source: David A. Shlapak and Michael Johnson. Reinforcing Deterrence on NATO’s Eastern Flank: Wargaming the Defense of the Baltics. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2016.

A new nightmare scenario is haunting the minds of NATO policymakers. The successes of the Russian ‘hybrid warfare’ model – used in Georgia and Ukraine – have stoked feverish speculation that NATO itself may be vulnerable to such an attack, and that the potential ramifications for Western powers could be catastrophic. While President Obama’s 2014 pledge to protect all members of the alliance was symbolically made in the Estonian capital of Tallinn, the security of the tiny Baltic nation is far from assured. Estonia is considered uniquely susceptible to both Russian hybrid and conventional operations. It was caught by surprise when Russia orchestrated crippling cyber-attacks against Estonia’s i digitised governmental infrastructure in 2007, and the country’s more than 20% ethnic Russian minority seem fertile for a Kremlin-led campaign of agitation and e-propaganda – similar to that during the Crimean operations. The conventional military situation is bleaker, with the RAND corporation’s recent wargaming exercises predicting that without significant NATO reinforcements the entire Baltic could be overwhelmed in under sixty hours by Russian forces. Yet while this gloomy prediction seems to have resigned Estonia to its fate, could wargaming be used more creatively to rescue Estonia from its strategic quagmire?

Though RAND’s report provides a detailed insight into the force composition and numbers NATO would require to fight a conventional confrontation with Russia in the Baltic, the central revelation that Estonia needs reinforcements will surprise no one. And while it is true a small scale build-up of NATO forces has already begun, the political and economic reality of austerity and cutbacks makes it highly unlikely that the number of troops recommended by the RAND report will ever be deployed. Wargaming can, therefore, take on a new role, not simply as an analytical modelling tool but as a practical force multiplier which seeks to ‘do more with less’ in a restricted economic environment. This can be achieved by exploring two alternative types of wargaming namely: the historical and the asymmetrical.

The historical model of wargaming seeks to learn specific tactical and strategic insights from past battles, and in the Estonian case, it is hard to imagine a country more replete with examples. The much touted ‘Narva scenario’, in which Russia attempts to seize control of the Estonian border city of Narva which hosts a 90% ethnic Russian majority has gained widespread acceptance as Russia’s most likely new strategic move. Yet in reality, this new move is Russia’s old strategic move – one with a three-hundred-year history stretching back to Peter the Great and the foundation of St Petersburg as a staging post for his efforts to gain control of Narva and the wider Baltic in the Great Northern War of 1700-1721. While some may be sceptical that modelling such antiquated campaigns could teach us much about contemporary defence, a much more salient example exists. In 1944, heavily outnumbered Axis forces held the Soviet advance at Narva for several months by mounting an expert defence which utilized local geography, superior tactics and the stoic morale of units defending home territory to inflict an estimated 500,000 casualties on the attacking Soviets.

Herein lies the true military value of historical wargaming: as is so often the case the battlefields of the past once again become the potential battlefields of the future. Battles are fought again and again on the same ground, often for the same unchanging strategic reasons. The importance of the Crimean peninsula remains much the same as it was in the 1850s, and Britain may well soon be looking to historical lessons on the defence of Gibraltar. Thus, when historical battles are modelled, it is not simply that they teach abstract lessons about strategy – as games of chess do; rather, they can impart to participants’ specific knowledge of real world geography, favourable and unfavourable ground for battle, and tactical lessons on how the few can defeat the many. When viewed from the historical perspective the challenge of wargaming is not estimating the scale of forces needed to mount a viable defence, but rather learning from those who already did it. Therefore, creating accurate historical wargaming models of Narva’s defence whether in 1700 or in 1944 may yield invaluable insights for the NATO planners of today.

The second prong of this reimagining of wargaming is the asymmetrical case. RAND’s analysis focuses on the capabilities Estonia would need to repel a conventional Russian invasion; yet, Estonia may not need to fight a conventional conflict at all. While many analysts seem to assume Russia’s will to sustain military casualties is monolithic and endless, the Chechen Wars of the 1990s demonstrated that Russian public opinion can rapidly turn against wars that incur mounting losses, just as is the case in the West. Russia’s greatest defeat in living memory was not wrought by conventional forces, but at the hands of the insurgent Mujahedeen in Afghanistan. It follows that wargaming should seek not only to model conventional war but also should be designed to train participants in insurgent, guerrilla and asymmetric thinking – a process which Estonian military training is already adopting. The Forest Brothers were indigenous Baltic resistance to Soviet occupation and operated throughout the 1940s and 1950s. While they were ultimately defeated, such partisan and insurgent tactics may be much more fruitful when used against a modern-day Russia that does not possess the Soviet Union-like unwavering acceptance of casualties.

In conclusion, while RAND’s use of wargaming is a useful starting point,  alternative models of historical and asymmetrical wargaming of NATO and Estonia may create cost-effective analyses that can train individuals in specific tactical and strategic thinking, and build on the lessons of history to fight the wars of the future. Just as the first wargame Kriegspiel prepared a generation of Prussian officers in the practical art of war, we must develop models that can do the same and act as a force multiplier for NATO’s smallest and most vulnerable members.

Camlo Kalandra is pursuing his MA in War Studies at King’s College London. His research interests include Wargaming and the American Civil War.

Feature Image source: http://newsbalt.ru/reviews/2017/04/glupost-ili-izmena-v-kaliningrade/

Image 2 source: https://chesstrend.wordpress.com/2012/07/05/twelve-kriegsspiel/

Strife Feature – Trudeau’s First Year: The Fundamental Shifts in Canadian Foreign Policy

by

By: Marc-Olivier Cantin

President Obama and Prime Minister Trudeau review the troops. (Official White House Photo by Chuck Kennedy); Source: https://medium.com/@WhiteHouse/in-photos-the-official-canadian-state-visit-94db196bedc8#.7kqrem8j9; 10 March 2016
President Obama and Prime Minister Trudeau review the troops. (Official White House Photo by Chuck Kennedy)

‘We’re back!’ It was with this unequivocal assertion that, in his inaugural speech, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau reclaimed Canada’s seat at the international table, hinting at the fundamental foreign policy overhauls he intended to implement. Indeed, a year has passed since Trudeau settled in Ottawa and it appears that the lines of fracture are manifold between the genuinely Westphalian conception of the world of former Conservative Prime Minister Stephen Harper and Justin Trudeau’s uninhibited internationalism. Over the last twelve months, under the leadership of the new prodigy of world politics, the legacy of the Conservatives’ intergovernmental and hard-power oriented foreign policy has dramatically withered in favour of a truly transnational approach. In this context, this article endeavours to underscore the chief manifestations of these foreign policy shifts and to shed a light on their implications for the international landscape.

The revamping of Canada’s international agenda has been ubiquitously observable in the country’s most recent global endeavours. The shift that is perhaps the most evident is the reaffirmation of Canada’s commitment to multilateralism. Stephen Harper, in his decade-long reign at 24 Sussex Drive, fostered a sincere repugnance for international rostrums, favouring bilateral channels over what he perceived as ineffective and corrupted platforms. By contrast, Trudeau appears to lean closer to the promise of transnational organisations and has repeatedly reasserted Canada’s adherence to the core values of such organisations, particularly the United Nations and NATO.

This reengagement was evident in Trudeau’s first NATO summit where he pledged that Canada would assemble and lead the organisation’s new battalions. These will be stationed in the Baltic countries and in eastern Poland to deter the exponential boldness of Russian interventionism in the region. This renewed commitment to multilateralism is equally apparent in Canada’s utilisation of the UN as the paramount catalyst for its international aspirations. Concurrently, Trudeau’s administration has undertaken significant diplomatic efforts over the past year to acquire one of the rotating seat on the Security Council in 2020, a bet that could improve the clout of the country’s international voice and that would simultaneously provide a potent source of political leverage for this middle power that can struggle in translating its wishes into deeds.

Irrefutably, the Liberals aim to foster a truly pivotal role for Canada within these organisations. This trend reflects a sharp contrast to the traditional scepticism towards the prospects of multilateralism from the former Conservative-led government. With this aim in mind, Ottawa has been overhauling the hierarchy of its international priorities while simultaneously rethinking its strategic approaches. Indeed, Trudeau has been prioritising “low politics” and “soft power” in attempting to realign the country’s actions to its actual political, economic and military capabilities. Canada has, for example, renewed focus on its traditional areas of expertise including increased emphases on human rights, environment, promotion of equality, peacekeeping missions and humanitarian aid. Such issues are more compatible, in Trudeau’s mind, to the inherent identity of Canada’s progressivism.

Comparatively, Stephen Harper adhered significantly more to the potentialities of “hard power” and increasingly turned his back on Canada’s traditional prudent on the world stage to bet on a more muscular foreign policy posture. After a year in office, Trudeau appears to be opting for persuasion rather than for coercion and has abandoned Harper’s “boots on the ground” strategy to embrace an approach focusing on peace keeping. This fundamental shift was evident in the recent launch of the Peace and Stabilization Operations Program (PSOS), in which Canada pledged $450 million CAD and more than 600 soldiers to promote peace building and stability worldwide. This new programme is a clear manifestation of Trudeau’s desire to “address the causes and the effects of conflicts, to prevent their escalation or recurrence and to work on early warnings, prevention, dialogue and mediation (Government of Canada, 2016)” rather than to rely on mere military deterrence. Hence, by committing to train, assist and advise their allies around the world instead of fighting alongside them on the battlefield, Trudeau and his Foreign Minister Stéphane Dion are betting on Canada’s operational expertise and are capitalising on its reputation as a Blue Helmets pioneer to enhance the international visibility of Canada as a whole.

US Secretary Kerry and Canadian Prime Minister Trudeau toasting to the US-Canada relationship on March 10th, 2016. Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Secretary_Kerry_and_Canadian_Prime_Minister_Trudeau_Raise_a_Toast_to_the_U.S.-Canada_Relationship_at_a_State_Luncheon_(25680800665).jpg; (Accessed 15 November 2016)
US Secretary Kerry and Canadian Prime Minister Trudeau toasting to the US-Canada relationship on March 10th, 2016.

Canada’s Emerging Security Role

This new perspective on Canada’s role in global security is also manifest in the way Trudeau grounded its planes in Iraq to prioritize the training and equipping of regional forces. It is also found in peacekeeping training programs implemented in key West African states such as Senegal, Ghana and Mali. Additionally, the central role Canada plays in the actual refugee crisis similarly highlights Trudeau’s reliance on alternative means of influence enhancement in his attempt to bolster the country’s international credentials.

Indeed, by pledging to welcome more than 25,000 refugees in the first few months of his mandate, Trudeau aimed at positioning Canada in the foreground of the world’s most critical issues. Thus, Justin Trudeau seems to be disavowing the compartmentalized approach of his predecessor by opting instead for an integrated approach that combines foreign policy, defence, development and national security in one converging international direction. Moreover, in terms of a commitment to humanitarian assistance, the Trudeau administration appears to be diametrically opposed to its Conservative forerunners as Harper was known to be rather parsimonious in his approach to foreign aid while the current government is indubitably untying the purse’s strings. Ottawa will be spending $1.1 billion in humanitarian assistance over the next three years, supporting programs such as emergency relief, health and sanitary operations, educational programs and infrastructure schemes. In this instance as well, this renewed commitment to humanitarian principles underscores Trudeau’s soft power-oriented foreign policy and his quest to seduce to world rather than to compel it. Thereby, restoration of Canada’s reputation as a principled and compassionate actor in world politics is undoubtedly a key priority of the Canadian PM.

Furthermore, the new Liberal government appears to be utilising commerce as a power leverage to further the country’s credibility and to revamp its international “brand”. However, in comparison to the former administration, the difference is one of kind not of degree since the reliance on international trade isn’t significantly different in quantitative terms between both eras of Canadian foreign policy. Yet, while Stephen Harper largely favoured bilateral channels and intergovernmental agreements, Justin Trudeau is undeniably privileging larger multinational covenants. Particularly exemplified by his commitment towards the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), Trudeau’s new trade policy appears to be an attempt to fortify relationships with key partners around the world and to showcase Canadian leadership in negotiations of vital importance.

As a patent manifestation of the fraternal relationship and the ideological overlaps that have developed between Justin Trudeau and U.S. President Barack Obama, the Canadian PM also seems to be mirroring the United States’ “pivot to Asia” initiated by his American counterpart. Indeed, since the November 2015 elections, the commercial focus of Ottawa has largely shifted towards Asia-Pacific, a region that will be incrementally interested in Canadian natural-resources. This reorientation is particularly conspicuous in regards to China since, after just a few days in office, Trudeau sought to put Canada’s relationship with the country on sounder footing. In comparison, the Conservatives were relying substantially more on European states and on its North American partners inside NAFTA (North America Free Trade Agreement) when it came to doing business outside Canada’s borders. Therefore, it is the nature and the regional focus of their international trade policy that differentiate Trudeau and Harper.

Finally, another fundamental shift in regards to the way Justin Trudeau conducts his foreign policy is the considerable thawing of Canada’s relationships with both Russia and Iran. Indeed, in the wake of Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, the ties between the two countries were severely damaged and tensions reached a critical apex. Similarly, the nuclear uncertainty surrounding Iran in Harper’s years in office dramatically impaired the diplomatic channels between both nations. Reflected through the closure of Canada’s Teheran embassy in the fall of 2012. Conversely, Trudeau capitalized on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA, i.e. Iran Nuclear Deal) that reinstated Iran as an acceptable interlocutor, and on the growing influence of Russia in global issues such as the Syrian War, to normalise the relations with both countries.

If one can criticize the moral malleability of these partnership choices, the Trudeau administration appears to be thawing these relationships though a rational mind frame, being conscious of the inescapable necessity of cooperating with these exponentially influential actors and of the potential to further Canada’s national interests through them. Regarding Iran, this reconciliation was embodied by Ottawa’s decision to entirely lift the economic sanctions and trade embargo that, for many years, poisoned the bilateral relations between the two countries. Additionally, this decision might also pave the way towards an eventual improvement of their political, diplomatic and military cooperation. As for Russia, Trudeau’s appeasement policy towards the Kremlin appears to be propelled by more pragmatic incentives since both countries are compelled to cooperate in a vast array of issues including the fight against Daesh and the management of the Arctic. Hence, the thawing of the Russo-Canadian relationship is significantly more attributable to a rationalized understanding of their shared interests than a genuinely symbiotic perception of world affairs.

President-Elect Donald J. Trump during his election campaign in Arizona.
President-Elect Donald J. Trump during his election campaign in Arizona.

THE ‘TRUMP’ EFFECT

Certainly, the arrival of the White House’s new tenant in January 2017 will have meaningful implications for the implementation of these new foreign policy commitments. The international agenda which President-elect Donald J. Trump seemingly intends to institute is, in many regards, an antithesis of the one favoured by Trudeau. Under such circumstances, should Trump advance with his electoral promises of isolationism, the prospects of multilateralism will likely become increasingly appealing to the Canadian administration. America’s potential negligence towards the issue generates incentive for the Canadian administration to collaborate with alternative partners from the European Union, forming multilateral relationships to compensate for a weakening privilege originally shared with its southern neighbour. Hence, by engaging on the path to political seclusion, the Trump administration would inadvertently promote Canadian commitment to multilateralism and to establish more international anchorages to substitute its faltering American support.

This tendency might also materialize in terms of security if the United States develops an autarkic strategy and treat NATO with contemptuousness. In this scenario, Canada could benefit from an eventual leadership vacuum within the military alliance and becoming an indispensable pole of strategic influence on the American continent. Trudeau might be obliged to rely, politically as well as militarily, on alternative partners and allies to respond to the waning of the American support – further solidifying the need for broader Canadian-International partnerships.

As for the economic landscape, the professed isolationism and protectionism of the Trump administration might also benefit Canada insofar as the country might become a landing strip for eventual investors eager to have a foothold in North America. This consideration will be particularly true for the European Union, which has just signed a free trade agreement (Comprehensive and Economic Trade Agreement; CETA) with Canada. Within this context, Trudeau’s commercial shift towards the EU and the Asia-Pacific region will most likely be amplified since Donald Trump has been rather vocal about his disdain for the NAFTA agreement and about his intention to refocus on American domestic economy rather than on international commerce. These trends will undeniably consolidate Trudeau’s reliance on commerce and on alternative sources of influence to counteract the potentiality of an increasingly unreliable America. It thus seems evident that the Trump presidency will present both opportunities and challenges for Canada in the upcoming years, despite the numerous uncertainties it implies.

The Long Road Ahead

Ultimately, the fundamental shifts in Canadian foreign policy are tangible and are showcasing the evolving international trajectory that Justin Trudeau has set out for the country. Certainly, this new approach will have genuine implications for the world in the next few years, as Canada might become a vital ally in the safeguarding the values that are under threat by the current proliferation of far-right movements, religious fundamentalism and populist politics. Essentially, as Trudeau prophesied in his inaugural speech, these changes mean that Canada is back, back to its historical roots as a principled and progressive actor in international politics, back as a pacifist and moderate player in global issues, and back as a nation opened to the world.

 

 

About the Author:

Marc-Olivier Cantin is a postgraduate student in International Relations at King’s College London. He focuses on Canadian foreign policy, Middle Eastern affairs and security matters.

 

 

 

AUSTIN, I. (2012). “Canada Closes Tehran Embassy and Orders Iran Envoys to Leave”. The New-York Times. September 7th 2012. URL: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/08/world/middleeast/canada-closes-its-embassy-in-iran.html. Consulted on November 3rd 2016.

BBC. (2016). “TPP: What is it and why does it matter?”. BBC. July 27th 2016. URL: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-32498715. Consulted on November 3rd 2016.

GOVERNMENT OF CANADA. (2015). “The Peace and Stabilization Operations Program”. Government of Canada. 2015. URL: http://international.gc.ca/world-monde/world_issues-enjeux-mondiaux/psop.aspx?lang=eng. Consulted on October 16th 2016.

GOVERNMENT OF CANADA. (2016). “Canada to Support Peace Operations”. Government of Canada. 2016. URL: http://news.gc.ca/web/article-en.do?nid=1117209. Consulted on October 16th 2016.

LEBLANC, D., ZILIO, M. and STONE L. (2016). “Canada’s Changing Role in the Fights Against the Islamic State”. The Globe and Mail. July 20th 2016. URL: http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/canadas-changing-role-in-the-fight-against-islamicstate/article28659664/. Consulted on October 16th 2016.

STANDISH, R. (2016). “Can Justin Trudeau Use the U.N. to Rebrand Canadian Foreign Policy?”. Foreign Policy. September 2016. URL: http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/09/20/can-justin-trudeau-use-the-u-n-to-rebrand-canadian-foreign-policy-unga-obama/. Consulted on October 16th 2016.

THE GUARDIAN. (2016). “Canada meets target to resettle 25,000 Syrian refugees”. The Guardian. March 1st 2016. URL : https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/mar/01/canada-target-resettle-25000-syrian-refugees. Consulted on November 3rd 2016.

THE GUARDIAN. (2016). “EU and Canada sign CETA free trade deal”. The Guardian. October 30th 2016. URL: https://www.theguardian.com/business/2016/oct/30/eu-canada-sign-ceta-free-trade-deal-trudeau-juncker. Consulted on November 3rd 2016.

Image 1 Source: https://medium.com/@WhiteHouse/in-photos-the-official-canadian-state-visit-94db196bedc8#.7kqrem8j9; (Accessed: 10 March 2016)

Image 2 Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Secretary_Kerry_and_Canadian_Prime_Minister_Trudeau_Raise_a_Toast_to_the_U.S.-Canada_Relationship_at_a_State_Luncheon_(25680800665).jpg; (Accessed 15 November 2016)

Image 3 Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Donald_Trump_presidential_campaign,_2016#/media/File:Donald_Trump_(27150683144).jpg; (Accessed 12 August 2016)

*An earlier variant of Marc’s article can be found on Global Policy Journal: http://www.globalpolicyjournal.com/blog/19/10/2016/year-under-trudeau-fundamental-shifts-canadian-foreign-policy