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You are here: Home / Archives for caribbean maritime security

caribbean maritime security

Is the Enhanced Counter Narcotic Operations a Model for Sea Power in the Caribbean in the Years to Come?

May 11, 2021 by Rafael D. Uribe Neira

The Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Pinckney (DDG 91) at an undisclosed location in the Caribbean or Eastern Pacific in July 2020. Author: Petty Officer 3rd Class Erick Parsons.

This article is a part of our 2021 Series on Caribbean Maritime Security. Read the Series Introduction at this link.


The US deployment of several warships and high-end naval platforms as part of the Enhanced Counter Narcotics Operations is not only about interdicting illicit narcotics but also about deterring geopolitical rivals in the region like Venezuela and its foreign backers. The surge of U.S. Navy vessels for counternarcotics in the Caribbean since 2020 asks for some questions about the nature of the U.S. maritime footprint in both the Caribbean and the Pacific. This post argues that the Enhanced Counter Narcotics Operations may be setting a trend in how the U.S. may deal with specific geopolitical tensions also felt in Latin America: on behalf of the War on Drugs.

The U.S. Navy in counternarcotics in the Caribbean

US Navy vessels patrol the Caribbean as part of counter narcotics operations in “ebbs and flows,” and routinely pass through the Caribbean enroute to other missions around the world. When naval vessels pass through the Caribbean they often embark Coast Guard detachments which can perform law enforcement duties. This allows the ‘grey hull’ Navy vessels to help supporting ongoing deployments of the US Coast Guard’s ‘white hulls,’ but generally they are not dedicated to law enforcement missions.

The Coast Guard is the lead for counter narcotics because they are the U.S. maritime law enforcement agency, not only do they have law enforcement authorities, but they also have much more affordable platforms optimized for this type of work. They are also specialized in less-than-lethal tactics and are optimized for dealing with the challenges of maritime policing.

Since the late 1980s when the US military was directed to help support other agencies in counter narcotics as part of the War on Drugs, it has not been unusual to see military assets supporting the Coast Guard, particularly with surveillance and intelligence. Usually this is contingent upon the Navy having assets to enforce counter narcotics operations that are free from other missions but on occasion military assets have supported counter narcotics like the B-1 ‘Lancer’ bomber and even a Virginia-class attack submarine.

The Enhanced Counter Narcotic Operations: What changed in 2020?

The scale of the military presence in the recent over the last year is unprecedented. On April 1, the Trump administration announced the beginning of Enhanced Counter Narcotics Operations which rised the military and civilian assets allocated to ongoing counter narcotics operations in the Caribbean. The arrival of additional equipment increased the size of US aerial and naval forces in the region by at least 60%. US Southern Command received an unspecified number of Navy destroyers, littoral combat ships, and a variety of surveillance aircraft as well as additional Coast Guard cutters. All of this was coordinated with increased efforts by US allies and partners in the region, further enhancing the impact.

Officially, the increased presence has two goals - it responds to the increase in drug smuggling during the coronavirus pandemic and it targets the network of traffickers operating from Venezuelan territory, which help finance the Maduro regime. Southern Command has been vocal in pointing out the increasing Iranian, Russian and Cuban presence in Venezuela and the need to counter their influence in the Western Hemisphere. US intelligence agencies have tracked flights of gold, drugs, cash, arms and even troops between Russia, Iran and Venezuela. And precisely this geopolitical anxiety makes the case for increased counter narcotics operations noteworthy. Counter narcotics operations in Latin America have usually been a tool for the United States to to strengthen allies and partners in the region against insurgencies and transnational drug organizations. Plan Colombia supported the Colombian government in their fight against drug cartels and the long-running FARC insurgency, and the Mérida Initiative still supports Mexico and other Central American countries to counter cartels operating in the region. In contrast, Enhanced Counter Narcotics Operations are being used as a tool against a Latin American government and their international backers.

But the presence of warships in the Caribbean has had in praxis another, more prominent target than narco-traffickers. The deployment directly targeted the Venezuelan state itself, in spite of previous statements by the Southern Command to the contrary. This focus on Venezuela can be seen in how the United States supported Guyana in the territorial dispute over the Esequibo region. On June 23, an Arleigh Burke-class guided missile destroyer, the USS Nitze, conducted a so-called “freedom of navigation operation” in Esequibo waters close to Venezuela’s shores, a clear challenge to Venezuelan claims over the area. On July 15, another Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer, USS Pinckney, repeated the same exercise outside of Venezuela’s 12 nautical-mile territorial waters in the Caribbean.

So far, no US warships in the region have been involved in seizing fuel shipments from Iran to Venezuela, but as long as the United States has capable assets positioned in the Caribbean it sends a strong message that this is possibility as already seen at the example of the US Justice Department has seizing tankers bound for Venezuela in the Strait of Hormuz.

In other words, counter narcotics is a façade to deter rivals in the region. However, stopping drugs still represents a powerful driver for the militarization of Caribbean waters, even before the Venezuelan crisis started. Southern Command has, since 2007, repeatedly requested more naval assets because “the sheer volume of illicit trafficking events far outmatches the force packages available to deal with them.” In 2020, the command reported some local successes in the form of million-dollar drug busts by both the Coast Guard and Navy vessels. Guided-missile destroyer USS Kidd seized US$30 million worth of drugs in September and three months later, the Independence-class littoral combat ship USS Gabrielle Giffords seized a shipment worth US$106 million. But apart from an increase in seizures, it is not clear that the surge is countering trafficking networks or is on the way to achieving long-term measures of success.

A model for future threats in the region?

What is clear is that the demands by Southern Command for additional assets were not only met, but even exceeded. In 2018, former Southern Command Admiral Kurt W. Tidd requested a force package should include “a non-ballistic missile capable US Navy Destroyer or Littoral Combat Ship, or a US Coast Guard Cutter.” With the Enhanced Counter Narcotics Operations in 2020 Southern Command got all three plus an array of surveillance aircraft from the Navy and Air Force. And those assets have been instrumental not only to stop drug-trafficking, but to exert pressure directly on the Venezuelan state without any need to call it even ‘pressure’. Enhanced Counter Narcotics Operations as executed in the Caribbean may become a model for exerting diplomatic pressure under the guise of maritime law enforcement. A strategy that could come into fruition specifically against China by claiming a link between drug trafficking and illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing near the Galapagos archipelago. By resorting to this argument -and the huge assets the U.S. and its regional allies devotes to the the mission-, Southern Command may be in the capacity to counter another “malign” presence. All of this, however, comes at the cost of undermining the very normative claim of the War on Drugs: the saving of American lives.

Filed Under: Blog Article, Feature, Series Tagged With: caribbean, caribbean maritime security, Caribbean Maritime Security Series, Counter Narcotics, Rafael D. Uribe Neira, seapower

The Venezuelan Navy: The Kraken of the Caribbean?

May 10, 2021 by Wilder Alejandro Sanchez

An undated photo of the patrol boat Naiguatá (GC-23), which sunk after ramming a cruise ship on March 30, 2020. Photo Credit: Wikipedia

This article is a part of our 2021 Series on Caribbean Maritime Security. Read the Series Introduction at this link.

While much of what is written about the strength of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela’s military is true, its capabilities should not be exaggerated. One illustrative example is the Bolivarian navy of Venezuela (Armada Bolivariana de Venezuela), which operates a particularly old fleet of ships and submarines.

During the lengthy presidency of the late Hugo Chavez (1999-2013), the Venezuelan government spent billions of dollars to acquire state-of-the-art military equipment, particularly from the Russian Federation, to strengthen the Venezuelan armed forces and protect the country from aggression it believed might come from either the United States or Colombia. The Venezuelan army, air force, national guard and paramilitary units received copious amounts of new equipment, such as the S-300 surface-to-missile system, Mil helicopters, Sukhoi Su-30 warplanes and small weapons, but the navy did not.

The Armada has two subs, the Type 209/1300 Sabalo (S-31) and Caribe (S-32), both manufactured in the 1970s. Caribe has been in a dry dock for over a decade undergoing repairs; meanwhile Sabalo’s Twitter account posted photos of the sub on dry land on 3 January 2019 stating that the platform was undergoing maintenance. Since then, there have been no reports or photos, that show Sabalo back in water. In other words, for all intents and purposes, Venezuela has no submarine fleet, a critical component of maritime deterrence and strategic operations. During the Chavez-era there were reports that Caracas was looking to buy Russian Kilo-class submarines, this, however, did not occur.

As for surface vessels, the tip of the spear are Mariscal Sucre-class frigates, manufactured in Italy in the 1980s, and the British-made Constitucion and Federacion-class patrol boats, manufactured in the 1970s. The rest of the fleet is composed of a variety of transport vessels, logistics ships and auxiliary craft. In the past decade, the navy acquired the Guaiqueri-class offshore patrol vessels, manufactured in Spain; and Los Frailes-class transport vessels, manufactured by the Dutch shipyard Damen. The latter are based on Damen’s Stan Lander 5612 design.

The Venezuelan navy occasionally carries out live-fire exercises with them, which include launching Otomat missiles. One example is exercise Bolivarian Shield-Caribbean (Escudo Bolivariano Caribe 1), which took place on May 2020 at La Orchila Island in the Caribbean.

The bad news for the navy is that the country’s ongoing economic crisis means that Caracas does not have the financial resources to a carry out major repairs and upgrades to its ships or subs, let alone acquire new equipment. The international isolation and sanctions that the Maduro government has had to endure do not help the situation, as Caracas cannot send its ships to be repaired abroad.

Moreover, this international isolation means that the navy has few partners with which to train, as most Latin American and Caribbean governments do not recognize the Maduro regime. Venezuela’s only remaining allies in the Caribbean are Cuba and Nicaragua, two nations that themselves have small fleets and very limited naval capabilities. For example the Cuban navy’s heaviest warship is a trawler-turned-patrol boat (complete with a helo deck), the Rio Damuji (BP 391), and the shadowy, domestically-manufactured small submarine Dolphin.

Interestingly, in August 2019 Caracas and Moscow signed a ports agreement so that their respective navies can dock in the ports of the other country to refuel. This agreement is primarily aimed at helping Russian ships, which occasionally travel to the Western Hemisphere to visit Russia’s allies in the region. It is highly doubtful that Venezuelan ships, apart from the training vessel Simon Bolivar (BE-11) will travel outside Venezuelan territorial waters, let alone outside the hemisphere to Russian waters, anytime in the near future.

The precarious state of the fleet was laid bare in March 2020, when the patrol boat Naiguatá (GC-23) intercepted the cruise ship RCGS Resolute that was navigating either in international waters in the Caribbean or in Venezuelan waters, depending on conflicting accounts. After firing warning shots at Resolute to force it to alter its course, Naiguatá rammed the civilian ship. The problem with this tactic was that Resolute is an ice-class cruise liner with a reinforced hull that has previously operated in Antarctica. Thus, after ramming Resolute, Naiguatá sank.

The true state of the Venezuelan navy these days is at odds with the propaganda coming out of Caracas. President Nicolas Maduro and military commanders routinely highlight the readiness of the Venezuelan military, arguing how powerful it is, and how troops are prepared to defeat any invader. Moreover, government officials routinely make provocative and inflammatory comments, like the 2019 statement by a senior politician that Venezuela’s Pechora missiles were able to reach downtown Bogota, the Colombian capital – in reality, these missiles do not have the necessary range.

Similarly, while naval commanders and state-run social media accounts routinely praise the status of the fleet, the Naiguatá incident does not help the Venezuelan navy appear as a powerful force. Indeed, now not only does the navy have an aging fleet with a non-existent submarine force, but it has also lost one of its patrol boats.

Looking forward, it is likely tensions will continue between the Maduro administration and the Biden presidency in the United States as well as neighboring Colombia. Last year there were some provocative maneuvers carried out by US warships that angered Caracas: in 2020 the Arleigh Burke-class destroyers USS Nitze (DDG 94) and USS Pinckney (DDG 91), on separate occasions, challenged Venezuela’s maritime claim in international waters during a successful freedom of navigation operation. “The illegitimate Maduro regime improperly claims excessive controls over those international waters, which extend three miles beyond the 12-mile territorial sea, a claim that is inconsistent with international law,” explained US Southern Command at the time. Hence, it is possible that a Venezuelan warship may attempt to shadow a US vessel carrying out another freedom of navigation operation at some point in the future as a way for the Armada to showcase its capabilities.

Similarly tensions between Venezuela and Guyana over a border dispute may provoke maritime incidents. Case in point, in January 12 Guyanese fishermen were arrested for fishing in Guyanese waters, which Venezuela claims as part of its territory. While the fishermen were ultimately released and the incident did not escalate, it is likely that there will be similar incidents in the future as a way for Caracas to show its military capabilities. However, close defence relations between Georgetown and Washington will likely serve as a dissuasive element to deter Caracas from acting more aggressively.

The Venezuelan navy would like to showcase itself to the rest of the Western Hemisphere, particularly Washington and Bogota, as a Kraken, a legendary sea monster. In reality, the Armada has very limited capabilities when it comes to power projection, as exemplified by its non-existent submarine fleet, the loss of Naiguatá, and voyages by US warships through waters claimed by Venezuela. Rather, the navy’s main tasks are to carry out internal security operations in Venezuela’s exclusive economic zone and harass the militarily weak Guyana. While the Armada Bolivariana does have some powerful weapons, such as the Otomat missiles, and several functioning warships, the fleet is no Caribbean Kraken.

Filed Under: Blog Article, Feature, Series Tagged With: caribbean maritime security, Caribbean Maritime Security Series, Venezuela, venezuelan navy, Wilder Alejandro Sanchez

Caribbean Maritime Security Series: Introduction

May 9, 2021 by Walker D. Mills

USS Jason Dunham (DDG 109) conducts maritime security operations. Photo credit: Official U.S. Navy Imagery, licensed with CC BY 2.0

Despite its critical position as the crossroads of the Western Hemisphere, the Caribbean is often overlooked in conversations about conflict, defense and security. When it is discussed, the conversation is invariably about illegal narcotics trafficking and counter-narcotics operations. However, the Caribbean basin has a unique array of maritime security issues that merit discussion. This series of seven short essays by maritime security professionals who all have experience working in the Caribbean, intends to open a discussion on some of the most pressing issues in Caribbean maritime security. The tension and dialogue between the pieces highlight the complicated nature of these issues and makes clear that there are no easy answers.

There are two primary questions or tensions that these pieces illuminate. The first is the conflict between the United States and Venezuela, which lies at the northern and southern ends of the Caribbean respectively. The near-total collapse of the Maduro regime has made Venezuela into a font of regional insecurity through mass migration, chronic fuel shortages and support of other illegal activity. In response, the United States surged military and law enforcement assets to the Caribbean, but the situation has only worsened. This conflict is playing out in oil sanctions, counter narcotics and old boundary disputes that threaten pull in other nations and spill escalate tensions.

The second question is over the very character of maritime security in the Caribbean – should regional navies and coast guards be more focused on conventional naval operations or take a constabulary role that focuses on counter-narcotics, counter-terrorism and sanctions enforcement? The United States is perhaps the best case study for this tension because it has recently employed both Navy and Coast Guard assets to the Caribbean. But should it? Or would those assets be better used on other global hot spots? Other regional navies from Mexico and Colombia have also evolved in recent decades but still face questions about their future role.

Series Publication Schedule

  • Monday, 10 May 2021: The Venezuelan Navy: The Kraken of the Caribbean? By Wilder Alejandro Sanchez
  • Tuesday, 11 May 2021: Diplomatic Pressure in the Caribbean Under the Guise of Counter Narcotics? By Rafael D. Uribe Neira
  • Wednesday, 12 May 2021: Venezuela, Illegal Fuel and Maritime Security in the Caribbean by Dylan Phillips-Levine
  • Thursday, 13 May 2021: The Elusive Prey: ‘Narco Submarines’ In The Caribbean by HI Sutton
  • Friday, 14 May 2021: The Caribbean Test Case for the Coast Guard’s Tri-Service Commitment by Joshua Tallis
  • Saturday, 15 May 2021: Arm the Coast Guard with More Drones in the Caribbean by Walker D. Mills
  • Sunday, 16 May 2021: The Evolution of the Mexican Navy Since 1980 by Christian J. Ehrlich

Filed Under: Blog Article, Feature, Series Tagged With: caribbean maritime security, Caribbean Maritime Security Series, Walker D. Mills, Walker Mills

Call for Papers: Caribbean Maritime Security Series

February 1, 2021 by Strife Staff

Strife is pleased to announce the call for contributions to its ‘Caribbean Maritime Security’ Series.

This series is looking to publish on a range of topics and perspectives related to Caribbean maritime security. There is no restriction as to period, nor is there a requirement to include a broader regional perspective. Articles can focus on a single theme related to Caribbean Maritime Security like a specific country within the region. The themes could include but are not limited to:

  • Regional Navies and Coast Guards
  • Emerging Maritime Threats in the Caribbean
  • ‘Great Power Competition’ in Caribbean Maritime Security
  • Port and Panama Canal Infrastructure Security
  • Caribbean History and Maritime Security
  • Illegal Narcotics Trafficking as a Maritime Issue

Articles should be around 1000-1200 words in length and meet with all of the submission guidelines. Articles will be subject to a review by the Series Editor and the Blog Coordinating Editor prior to acceptance to the series articles that do not meet referencing and formatting guidelines risk being rejected for publication.

Articles should be submitted by 19 February 2021. If you are interested in submitting an article for publication, or have an idea or query you wish to discuss, please contact our editorial team at: [email protected].

Filed Under: Call for Papers Tagged With: Call for Papers, caribbean maritime security, maritime security, series CFP, Strife series

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