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Greco-Turkish Relations: Two Centuries of Constant Competition

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Greek painting of the Battle of Velestino during the Greco-Turkish War, 1897 – Public Domain

There are few fraught relationships of international politics that are purely recent phenomena. There is almost always a deeper, historical basis for the hostility experienced between two states. The poor relations between Greece and Turkey are not simply the product of recent competition over natural gas in the eastern Mediterranean, but rather the latest chapter in two centuries of animosity. The 21st of March of this year marks the bicentennial of the Greek declaration of independence and the beginning of its bloody war of liberation against the Ottoman Empire, the historical predecessor of the modern Turkish state. In the years since Greek victory in this war, there have been six conflicts [1] in which Greece and Turkey have been enemies, with numerous crises and war scares in between. With the current Turkish government displaying neo-Ottoman characteristics, history is being brought to the forefront of their foreign policy. In order to understand the current animosity between Greece and Turkey, it is vitally important to look at the history of their relationship and the constant competition between the two states.

From the moment that Greek independence was confirmed in the London Protocol and Treaty of Constantinople, relations between the new kingdom and the Ottomans would be defined by tension and competition. Despite its small size, the new Greek state considered itself a successor state to the Byzantine Empire and therefore a direct rival to the Ottoman Empire. Throughout the nineteenth century, Greece sought to create a ‘greater’ kingdom, uniting the ethnic Greek population. This was pursued through various claims to Ottoman territory, initially with failed interventions against the Ottomans such as in the Crimean War (1853-56). However, their greatest successes came between 1912 and 1921, during the final demise of the Ottoman Empire and the birth of the modern Turkish state. Through success in the First Balkan War (1912-13), the Kingdom of Greece roughly doubled in size, entirely at the expense of the Ottomans. Greece would also go on to fight against the Ottomans during the First World War and the new Turkish state during their own war of independence. The latter of these conflicts, saw a large scale population exchange as well as atrocities committed by both sides against ethnic Greeks and Turks. Given the brutality of this conflict, relations between Greece and the new republican Turkish state began with deeply held feelings of distrust and an instinct to compete rather than co-operate. In the last two hundred years, Greece and Turkey have only fought on the same side of a conflict one, the Second Balkan War (1913). This was as co-belligerents not as allies and while both states are today part of the NATO alliance, this has not produced a new era of Greco-Turkish cooperation.

While the current Greek state may not have any Byzantine aspirations, throughout the past two centuries the Hellenic kingdom and subsequent republic has sought to replace the Ottoman-Turks as the dominant power in the Eastern Mediterranean. The key to achieving this dominance would be through naval power, controlling the routes from the Mediterranean to the Aegean.

Both Greece and the then Ottoman Empire considered themselves seafaring states, the former with a large number of islands to defend and the latter with a long, vulnerable coastline in Anatolia. During both the Greco-Turkish War (1897) and the First Balkan War (1912-13), Greece enjoyed its greatest successes against the Ottomans through the deployment of superior naval force. A powerful Greece at sea is therefore an understandable anxiety for the Turkish state as policymakers are all too aware of the historic difficulty there has been in defending the Anatolian coast. The current naval arms race between Greece and Turkey, with both sides expanding their surface and sub-surface capabilities, will only exacerbate these strategic concerns.

Throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, successive Greek governments sought to expand their territory further into the Mediterranean and the Aegean. This was first seen through the peaceful transfer of the Ionian Islands from Britain in 1864, followed by aggressive expansion through several conflicts including the Balkan Wars and the First World War. The end of the Second World War saw the transfer of the Dodecanese Islands from Italy, bringing Greek territory even closer to the Turkish coast, now only twenty-five miles away. While Turkey does not dispute Greece’s holdings in the Aegean, the current tension is a new variation of the historic competition for control of the Eastern Mediterranean.

The current dispute over access to natural gas in Eastern Mediterranean demonstrates the continued relevance of the historic themes that have characterised Greco-Turkish relations. While the competition over these resources also includes Egypt, Israel and Cyprus, at its heart it is a dispute between Athens and Ankara. The possibility of access to new mineral wealth is a hugely important opportunity for any state, especially two that have suffered recent economic woes. While it is Turkey that have taken the far more aggressive approach, with extensive exploration and deployment of naval assets, the Greeks have shown their willingness to engage in brinkmanship.

In the eyes of the governments of Greece and Turkey, in order to profit from these new resources, the other state must backdown. There is to be no mutual benefit, no cooperation. Whichever state gains access to these new natural gas deposits will be able to establish a vast zone of economic control over the Eastern Mediterranean, effectively achieving the long desired maritime dominance in the region. To some Turkish analysists, the current dispute is being viewed as another opportunity for Turkey to reverse some of the losses from the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. This is through the establishment of a ‘blue homeland’, with a clear zone of Turkish maritime control in the Mediterranean and the Aegean, a neo-Ottoman vision endorsed by Erdogan which would help to redress some of the losses to Greece and Cyprus in the post-independence era.

The Ottoman Empire may have collapsed ninety-nine years ago but the legacy of its demise is still alive and well in modern Greco-Turkish relations. Whether it be in the continued disputes over the Turkish occupation of Northern Cyprus or the competing claims over the natural resources of the Mediterranean, it is the most recent chapter in a two-hundred-year-old relationship defined by tension and rivalry. Too often analysts treat current diplomatic problems as purely modern phenomena, ignoring the historical trajectory within which they sit. This does not mean that crises suddenly become resolvable when policymakers understand their historical origins, but in the case of Greece and Turkey it means that one can appreciate that this goes far deeper than merely a tug of war over natural gas deposits. Nonetheless, we should not be wedded to historical determinism when looking at modern international relations. The tension which has dominated Greco-Turkish relations demonstrates that any lasting solution must be a compromise which can satisfy some, but not all, of each side’s aims. As long as both opt for a winner takes all approach, the hostility of centuries past will continue to define the present.

[1] Emmanuel Karagiannis, ‘The Coming Arms Race in the Eastern Mediterranean’ Royal United Services Institute (July 2021)

[2] Wars in which Greece and Turkey/Ottomans were on opposing sides: Crimean War, Greco-Turkish War, First Balkan War, First World War, Turkish War of Independence, Turkish Invasion of Cyprus

[3] Christopher Clark, Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914 (Penguin, 2012)

[4] Vasileios Th. Meichanetsidis, ‘The Genocide of the Greeks of the Ottoman Empire, 1913–1923: A Comprehensive Overview’ Genocide Studies International, Vol. 9, No. 1 (2015)

[5] Peter Kincaid Jensen, ‘The Greco-Turkish War, 1920-22’ International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 10, No. 4 (November 1979)

[6] Vassilis K. Fouskas, ‘Uncomfortable Questions: Cyprus, October 1973-August 1974’, Contemporary European History, Vol. 14, No. 1 (February 2005)

[7] Galip Dalay, ‘Turkey, Europe, and the Eastern Mediterranean: Charting a way out of the current deadlock’ Brookings Institute (January 2021)

[8] Patrick Wintour, ‘How a rush for Mediterranean gas threatens to push Greece and Turkey into war’ The Guardian (September 2020)

Power Game in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea and the Implications for the U.S.

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By Sena Namlu

(The Abraham Lincoln and John C. Stennis carrier strike groups are conducting carrier strike force operations in the U.S. 6th Fleet area of responsibility. Photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Jeremiah Bartelt/U.S.)

“Each of the carriers operating in the Mediterranean as this time represent 100,000 tons of international diplomacy,” – Jon Huntsman, Former U.S. Ambassador to Russia

Sitting at the junction of three continents and main international trade routes, the Mediterranean Sea has been of capital importance for both littoral states and international powers. The name of Mediterranean itself, originating from the Latin term (mediues terra) and meaning “the sea in the middle of the earth,” illustrates its significant place in international affairs. While for regional powers, such as Italy, Greece, and Turkey, the Mediterranean Sea determines their national security and prosperity, it equally has strategic implications for states outside of the basin with regards to furthering influence over different regions and connection with other parts of the world.

The United States has been engaged in the region since the 19th century. America’s involvement reached its apogee during the Cold War; a time when two superpowers vied for control over the Mediterranean region, encompassing an immense maritime zone between the Straits of Gibraltar, the Dardanelles and the Suez Canal. The Mediterranean Sea has witnessed many examples of coercive naval diplomacy, historically known as Gunboat Diplomacy, which involves the application of naval forces to compel or deter a state. By the end of the Cold War, the United States had achieved unity in the Mediterranean, for the first time since ancient Rome, through bilateral and multilateral political arrangements; transforming the Sea into an almost a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) lake or a Mare Nostrum for the Alliance.

The emerging threats and complex regional challenges of the post-Cold War era brought renewed attention to the Mediterranean and forced states to engage in the region, notwithstanding the United States’ gradual retreatment. The American policy of withdrawal was initiated with the Obama Administration, but was taken further in the Trump era. Rising regional and international powers are eager to fill this expanding void left in America’s wake, seeking to gain as much control as they can in such a promising maritime area.

Russia, which has historically had strong incentives to access the warm watersof the Mediterranean, has successfully exploited the long-lasting conflicts in the Mediterranean as well as the current power gap, leading to the establishment of a permanent presence through heavy investments in the Syrian Port of Tarsus, where now it has both an air base and naval facility.

China has adopted a relatively peaceful method of further its influence in the Mediterranean through weaponization of its global supply chain. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), of which the Mediterranean is a crucial part, led to the country investing in the high-tech industries of Europe such as aerospace and artificial intelligence, and connecting said ventures through an immense supply chain comprised of many Mediterranean ports in which Chinese state-owned companies have significant holdings. Following the acquisitions of ports in several coastal states such as Italy, Malta and Greece, Chinese state firms now have significant influence in one-tenth of all European port capacity. Beijing is orchestrating every instrument at its disposal, including political, economic, and security creating a symphony in the words of Chinese Foreign Minister, in order to expand Chinese influence and presence around the world. One of the major concerns is of the possibility that China may not hesitate to use its civilian port facilities to the military end as it has done so in the past. Furthermore, Beijing’s previous experience of dispatching one of its most impressive-looking warships, the 689-foot-long amphibious transport dock Jinggangshan to Syria” to participate in Russian coercive diplomacy in the Eastern Mediterranean, makes the menace even greater for Europe and the United States.

Turkish claims based on the Blue Homeland doctrine and enforced through the dispatch of the seismic research vessel Oruç Reis raised the unresolved issues in the Mediterranean relating to maritime delimitation and jurisdiction in the Eastern Mediterranean. As the country with the longest coastline in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea, Turkey regards drilling activities on the continental shelf as its fundamental right and disregards any solution that “confines Turkey to the shores.” Turkish foreign policy objectives relate the region directly to national security, rights, and interests. Additionally, Turkey’s perception of being left out in the Eastern Mediterranean based on the regional cooperation efforts excluding Turkey such as EastMed Gas Forum aggravates the tension and induces Ankara to resort more to coercive naval diplomacy. The successful outcome of natural gas reserve exploration in the Black Sea also strengthened Turkey’s commitment towards drilling operations in the Mediterranean.

Countries opposed to Turkey’s actions in the region gathered around France, whose expectations for further political and military supports towards the European Union and NATO remain unmet, have agreed on seeking regional cooperation. France that has been the most vocal European power in opposing Turkey’s regional claims so far, backed by Greece and Cyprus with joint military drilling operations and deployment of the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle to the Eastern Mediterranean. France’s President, Emmanuel Macron seems quite determined to resist resurgent Turkish moves in the Mediterranean and has closed the ranks with its regional partners at all costs as being lacked of concrete support from the European Union and NATO members in its battling with Turkey.

Meanwhile, Turkey similarly seeks to strengthen its hand through bilateral arrangements with another regional actor. Ankara signed two memoranda of understanding with Libya’s United Nations-recognized Government of National Accord (GNA), one of which regulates maritime boundaries in the Mediterranean Sea in line with the Turkish claims and the other envisaging further security and military cooperation. These agreements are followed by a similar deal between Greece and Egypt.

In pursuit of the Greece-Egypt deal, Prime Minister of Greece Mitsotakis and the President of Egypt Sisi reflected their expectation of more decisive U.S. involvement in the region under a Biden Administration. Nevertheless, given the other prominent challenges facing America such as extreme domestic polarization and the rising Chinese threat in the Pacific region, it is hard to predict whether the election of “Joe Bidenopoulos”, as he introduced himself to a group of Greek Americans will result in a rotation of American attention towards the region and to what extent this shift will change the course in the Mediterranean. Biden will likely give more weight to international organizations, beginning with enhancement of the EU and NATO’s downsized role in the region. However, geopolitical challenges require further engagements. Besides Russia’s permanent return to the area, China’s rapprochement with America’s most important strategic partner in the region, Israel puts American regional and international interests at higher risk. Similarly, Huawei’s expansion based on the Digital Silk Road Initiative accordingly to ports-buying strategy raise the caveat of filching data from NATO allies and friends in the region.

There is little doubt that the President-elect Biden will find himself in the middle of various complex and entrenched issues related to the Eastern Mediterranean Sea once he takes the oval office. It is clear that defusing tensions, restoring once-existing U.S. and NATO’s influence, and countering the rise of Russia and China as the alternative strategic partners for the region will occupy the top of the lists of American policies in the area. Any help and support provided by the regional partners will be beneficial for the United States. Although the hard task of gathering regional NATO allies France, Greece and Turkey, around a table has become more challenging than it has been before, Biden Administration can bring a breath of fresh air in relations and create incentives for each party to bolster dialogue. Depending on the new American leader’s ability to manage sensitive and tangled regional relations and find a common ground among highly divided and determined actors, it will soon be seen whether this glimmer of hope may blaze out or rapidly fade away.

 

Sena Namlu is a youth and women’s right activist. She has actively partaken in social profit organizations working on particularly girls and youth empowerment — their inclusion in policy-making, conflict resolution, and peace-building processes, and initiated social projects. She is a board member of YCDC, the representative institution of Youth 20 in Turkey, and attended the Y20 Summit in Argentina and G(irls)20 Summit in Japan as Turkey’s delegate. She is also a fellow of the Women in Conflict 1325 Fellowship Programme. After graduation, she worked within Doctors of World Turkey Office as a Grant Officer. Sena is currently a graduate student in the Intelligence and International Security MA Program at the War Studies Department of KCL. Her research interests include processes of foreign policy-making, providing and analyzing information for decision-makers, as well as the role of women and non-governmental actors in conflict resolution and peace-building.

Turkish Claims and the Oil Crisis in the Eastern Mediterranean

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by Rafaella Piyioti

The RV MTA Oruç Reis, named after the Admiral in the Ottoman Navy and chief governor in the Western Mediterranean, near the coast of Antalya, Turkey (Image credit: AP)

Over the past decade, discoveries of large amounts of natural gas in the Levant Basin as well as in the territorial waters of Israel and Cyprus show that the area is rich in resources. Their successful exploitation potentially holds enormous economic benefits. For this reason, a strong alliance between Cyprus, Israel, Greece, and Egypt led to the signing of maritime boundary agreements, establishing an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) for each country. The presence of these resources, however, also presents a challenge for regional stability. Turkey, for example, is left excluded from this initiative. As a result, tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean are growing. The roots of this dispute over energy resources, nevertheless, is part of the conflictual histories of the actors involved, thus holding wider implications for the international community.

In January 2020, Cyprus, Greece, Israel, Egypt, the Palestinian Authority, and Jordan formed the EastMed Gas Forum to establish the basis for cooperation and exploration of the natural resources in the Eastern Mediterranean. France made an official membership request while the US asked to become a permanent observer of the forum. At the same time, Turkey officially criticised the forum as an organised attempt to exclude Ankara. Part of the reason why, however, is that Turkey did not sign the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. According to the UNCLOS, the territorial waters of a nation extend up to 12 nautical miles from its shore and up to 200 nautical miles from the shore of its EEZ. Natural resources found within this territory belong exclusively to that country. Contrary to UNCLOS, Turkey formed its own continental shelf theory, which excludes islands, and states that a country’s EEZ extends underwater only to the very edge of its continental shelf. The absence of formal agreements between Turkey, Greece, and Cyprus on their maritime borders, leads to competing claims on the extension of their territorial rights at sea made by Cyprus and Greece, and Turkey and Northern Cyprus.

(Image credit: FT)

With Northern Cyprus under Turkish control since the 1974 invasion, Turkey officially does not recognise the Cypriot Republic to the South. As such, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan rejects any Cypriot drilling activities in the region and refuses to recognise Cyprus’ agreements with Israel, Greece, and Egypt over the exploitation of natural resources found in the Eastern Mediterranean. Instead, Turkey considers the maritime territory of Northern Cyprus to be part of its EEZ and following its own continental shelf theory the exploitation of hydrocarbons found in the region is a Turkish legal right. Northern Cyprus, however, is not recognised by any country other than Turkey itself and Erdoğan’s actions are deemed illegal by the international community.

More recently, tensions over the ownership of the natural resources under the seabed of the Mediterranean between Turkey and Cyprus escalated, with Turkey holding military exercises in the Mediterranean. In May 2019, Turkey sent its first drilling ship to conduct exploratory drillings off the north coast of Cyprus. The European Union (EU), in response, imposed economic sanctions on Turkey. Erdoğan refused to de-escalate tensions stating that European sanctions will not affect Turkey’s determination to continue exercising what it sees as its legal rights in Cypriot waters. At present, two Turkish ships, Yavuz and Barbaros Hayrettin Paşa, are in territorial waters around Cyprus searching for natural resources.

Tensions between Greece and Turkey are more complicated. The two countries find themselves in an ongoing dispute over Kastellorizo, a Greek island located to the east of the Aegean Sea close to Turkey’s Anatolian coast. Greece insists that, according to UNCLOS, the island enjoys a full EEZ of 200 miles leaving Turkey with a very small EEZ relative to its coastline. Turkey rejects Athens’ claims and has continued to conduct drilling south of the island. In response, Greece has attempted to push for additional sanctions against Turkey but there is little appetite for such a response at the European level. German attempts to mediate between Greece and Turkey called for official negotiations, which failed to reach a mutual agreement over the EEZ of Kastellorizo. A maritime-boundary agreement between Greece and Egypt, viewed by Turkey as a move of aggression violating its maritime territory, thereby ending the negotiation process.

Renewed illegal drillings by Turkey in August 2020, this time with the presence of Turkish Navy warships in the area. Greek warships often shadow them creating a tense and potentially escalating situation. As Erdoğan renews his aggressive rhetoric, the Greek PM, Kyriakos Mitsotakis, introduced a new defence plan, increasing the country’s military capabilities. But as Turkey and Greece are NATO allies a push towards a new phase of negotiations seems more appealing than a military confrontation. France condemns Erdoğan’s violations of Greek and Cypriot maritime rights offering military assistance to Greece. Germany attempts to mediate between Greece and Turkey and the rest of the EU is still indecisive.

(Image credit: FT)

Turkey’s behaviour in the Eastern Mediterranean is part of Erdoğan’s ‘neo-Ottoman’ foreign policy, which aims at renewing Turkish influence in neighbouring countries, formerly part of the Ottoman empire. With the Turkish lira facing one of its lowest recorded values, the President is attempting to turn people’s attention away from the economic problems, by emphasising Turkish influence in the region. Turkey’s isolation from its NATO allies over their conflicting interests in the Eastern Mediterranean also pushed Erdoğan towards adopting a rather more Islamist tone, promoting himself domestically as the protector of all Muslims. After his long-lasting military presence in Syria since 2011, Erdoğan turned his attention to Libya. Turkey and Libya signed a maritime accord in November 2019 violating the Greek EEZ. To escalate things further Erdoğan sent military aid to the UN-recognised government (GNA) in Tripoli to help Fayez al-Sarraj defeat General Haftar’s Libyan National Army.

Turkey’s involvement in Libya could lead to further destabilisation in the region and draw the involvement of additional international actors. France, Greece, Egypt, Israel, and the UAE publicly backed Haftar, with the latter two signing a historic peace deal. Paradoxically, the U.S. did not take a clear position on Libyan tensions despite its’ close ties with General Haftar who holds U.S. citizenship. Turkey’s recent involvement in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is another example of Erdoğan’s assertive foreign policy. Amid recent increases of violence in the region Erdoğan pledged his nation’s support for Azerbaijan. The Azerbaijani forces are using Turkish-made drones in their fight against Armenians. Turkey is growing into a major drone player but the use of Turkish drones in Nagorno-Karabakh received international scrutiny.

Erdoğan envisions Turkey as a regional power and pursues an assertive foreign policy to extend its regional influence. Turkish claims at a sea, as well as its pursuits on land, fall within the scope of its neo-Ottoman vision, which sees Turkey advancing its influence in the region. The EU remains indecisive on how to approach Turkey; Germany acts as the mediator whilst France takes a tougher stance, pledging military support to Greece. Without the U.S. in its traditional, since the 1974 Turkish Invasion in Cyprus, mediating and stabilising role in the region, it is time for the EU to decide on a new approach to handle this crisis. The U.S. under President Donald Trump reduced its foreign involvement and distanced itself from its NATO allies. Under the future President Joe Biden, the USA might wish to think anew of taking up its traditional role in NATO and its presence in the Eastern Mediterranean. Turkey is a strategic partner of the EU but if Erdoğan continues his aggressive behaviour in the Eastern Mediterranean, tensions could escalate further jeopardising the future of EU-Turkey cooperation.

Rafaela is a part-time MA student in the Conflict Resolution in Divided Societies programme at King’s College London. She received her BA in War Studies and Philosophy and is a Staff Writer for Strife Blog, Shield, and writes for a Cypriot newspaper. Currently, she is a Research Analyst for London Politica. Her main academic interest is on the role of intelligence in policymaking. Rafaella also has a passion for Human Rights and has interned at the Cyprus Refugee Council. Rafaella enjoys travelling and learning about new cultures in her free time.