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Counter Narcotics

The Elusive Prey: ‘Narco Submarines’ In The Caribbean

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Photo Credit: Todd Huffman, licensed under CC BY 2.0

This article is a part of our 2021 Series on Caribbean Maritime Security. Read the Series Introduction at this link.

Laura was small, but she wasn’t innocent. ‘Laura’ was the name given to the first Narco Submarine, discovered abandoned near the Caribbean island of San Andrés, by Colombian authorities in 1993. This unusual vessel was constructed from two fiberglass sailing boat hulls glued together, one on top of the other, to form a submersible pressure hull. It had a deep keel to keep it stable and compensate for the tall radar mast which also acted as the snorkel when it was running submerged. Clearly it was a somewhat experimental vessel and the, undoubtedly, unique design has not been seen since. Yet, Laura ushered in the age of the ‘Narco-Submarine’ throughout Caribbean smuggling routes.

Narco Submarines are drug smuggling boats which attempt to use special design features to help evade detection. Some are ‘true submarines,’ meaning that they can operate completely submerged, but most are just extremely low-profile vessels (LPVs). This is enough to make them extremely hard to see or detect on radar and their continued use is a testament to their effectiveness.

Nearly 30 years after ‘Laura’ the Caribbean remains a major cocaine smuggling route. Narco Subs have become a major means of transporting drugs and have spread from the Caribbean to the Pacific, and even across trans-Atlantic routes. The most recent Narco Submarine incident reported in the Caribbean occurred on February 19, 2020. Panamanian forces interdicted a LPV near Bocas del Toro at the northern tip of Panama. While, in many ways, typical of so-called Narco Submarines the vessel was unusually large, with two marine diesel motors and carrying 5 metric tons of cocaine. The increased payload appears to be part of a recent trend. Despite this notable case, today, the vast majority of reported Narco Submarines are on Pacific smuggling routes.

Why are Narco Submarines less common in the Caribbean than the Pacific?

Recently Narco Submarines have become more common in the Eastern Pacific, while “Go-Fast” vessels have tended to predominate Caribbean smuggling. Go-fast vessels (GFVs) are just power boats (or up-engine fishing boats), whose lack of stealth is made up for by their extreme speed . Go-slows are similar again but, as the name implies, have less speed. Go-fasts are much cheaper than Narco Submarines and are easier to source because they are commercially available. They can also blend in with local fishing fleets and do not require special boat handling or navigations skills to operate (often times they are crewed by local fishermen). However, they are much less optimized for their illicit role than Narco Subs, which are custom-built for trafficking cocaine. The intuitive view is that, overall, Narco Submarines are better for smuggling. Despite this, in the Caribbean Go-Fast boats and Go-Slow boats appear more common. Despite their lack of stealth they still retain some advantages over Narco Submarines.

One factor is distance. Trips from Colombia to Caribbean islands, or Central America are much shorter than trips from Colombia’s Pacific Coast and there are intermediate stopping points where traffickers can rest or refuel. Traffickers using Go-Fast boats usually load the boat with barrels of extra fuel and about 0.5-1 metric tons of cocaine. The boat then makes a run for it, hoping to spend as little time at sea as possible. Sometimes to reduce the chance of detection they stop and drift during the day, pulling a blue plastic tarpaulin over the boat to act as camouflage. Also, larger fishing vessels can act as mother ships, towing one or more Go-Fasts (or Go-Slows) which increases their range.

Another major factor in why Caribbean trafficking routes see fewer Narco Subs may be the relative difficulty in setting up the clandestine boat yards to manufacture them. Narco Subs are usually custom built in remote, jungle shipyards near rivers giving them discrete access to the ocean. Colombia’s Pacific coast is relatively uninhabited, there are very few settlements and virtually no major infrastructure, so such sites can usually stay unobserved (or at least unreported). Because the Pacific coast is more remote the Colombian government has less control over it and the adjacent areas than other parts of the country, leaving drug smuggling organizations more of a free hand. Additionally, much of the land on the Pacific coast is not privately owned. This means that there are fewer land owners who might object to Narco Subs being built on their land. By comparison Colombia’s Caribbean coastline is much more populated and better policed. It also has fewer river outlets to allow Narco Subs sea access.

Beyond Colombia: Venezuela and the Caribbean Islands

Not all Caribbean Narco Submarines are built or launched from Colombia. There have been attempts to build smuggling vessels on Caribbean islands, and Narco Submarines have been found in several other South American countries like Guyana, Suriname and Venezuela. Increasingly, Venezuela is becoming an permissive environment for cocaine traffickers and may be a launch point for Narco Subs.

A Narco Submarine found in Venezuela in October 2019, and seized by the Maduro Government, was unusually compact. It could be carried on a boat trailer, pointing to a different modus operandi to the Pacific Coast where Narco Submarines are built on the coast.

The Maduro regime frequently interdicts aircraft suspected of trafficking cocaine and makes a show of displaying destroyed aircraft, often publicly placing the blame on Colombia. But it seems likely that some Venezuelans are also involved in these aspects of the drugs trade and it is suspected that other traffickers are permitted to operate by the Maduro government, and last year the US Department of Justice charged Maudro himself with a “decades-long narco-terrorism and international cocaine trafficking conspiracy.” Whether Narco Submarines are operating from Venezuela in any number, and the degree of government involvement, remains to be seen.

Why we might see an increase in Narco Submarines in the Caribbean

Drug trafficking organizations are run as businesses and make pragmatic decisions when choosing smuggling methods. Profit and risk are weighed, and routes are optimized as much as possible. While they generally maintain diverse means of smuggling, one method can proliferate as others wane. So, the advantages of Narco Submarines may become more compelling if the relative profitability of Go-Fasts, or other means, declines.

The most conspicuous reason why this might happen is due to increased law enforcement pressuring the go-fast routes. Since April U.S. Southern Command has been conducting ‘Enhanced Counter Narcotics Operations’ in the Eastern Pacific. This has significantly increased U.S. law enforcement presence and brought down Navy assets with advanced capabilities, in addition to U.S. Coast Guard cutters. Local navies and law enforcement, plus European navies supporting their Caribbean territories are also persistently active. If this increased enforcement makes the easier to detect Go-Fast and Go-Slow vessels untenable, traffickers may increase their use of Narco Subs in the Caribbean.

Traffickers may also be attracted to the increased payloads observed in Narco Submarine incidents in 2020. Versions of Narco Submarines, which typically carry 1.4-1.6 metric tons of cocaine are now being intercepted with 2-3 tons and some larger models are carrying 5-6 tons. It is possible that this increase in cargo-size is the impact of COVID-19 restrictions on other means of smuggling such as air travel and shipping. It may also be influenced by the increased law enforcement activity.

Only time will tell how this confluence of factors impacts the relative distribution of Narco Submarines and smuggling routes between the Pacific and the Caribbean. But an increase in Caribbean activity, specifically an increase in Narco Submarines is not only possible, it may be coming,

Is the Enhanced Counter Narcotic Operations a Model for Sea Power in the Caribbean in the Years to Come?

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The Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Pinckney (DDG 91) at an undisclosed location in the Caribbean or Eastern Pacific in July 2020. Author: Petty Officer 3rd Class Erick Parsons.

This article is a part of our 2021 Series on Caribbean Maritime Security. Read the Series Introduction at this link.

The US deployment of several warships and high-end naval platforms as part of the Enhanced Counter Narcotics Operations is not only about interdicting illicit narcotics but also about deterring geopolitical rivals in the region like Venezuela and its foreign backers. The surge of U.S. Navy vessels for counternarcotics in the Caribbean since 2020 asks for some questions about the nature of the U.S. maritime footprint in both the Caribbean and the Pacific. This post argues that the Enhanced Counter Narcotics Operations may be setting a trend in how the U.S. may deal with specific geopolitical tensions also felt in Latin America: on behalf of the War on Drugs.

The U.S. Navy in counternarcotics in the Caribbean

US Navy vessels patrol the Caribbean as part of counter narcotics operations in “ebbs and flows,” and routinely pass through the Caribbean enroute to other missions around the world. When naval vessels pass through the Caribbean they often embark Coast Guard detachments which can perform law enforcement duties. This allows the ‘grey hull’ Navy vessels to help supporting ongoing deployments of the US Coast Guard’s ‘white hulls,’ but generally they are not dedicated to law enforcement missions.

The Coast Guard is the lead for counter narcotics because they are the U.S. maritime law enforcement agency, not only do they have law enforcement authorities, but they also have much more affordable platforms optimized for this type of work. They are also specialized in less-than-lethal tactics and are optimized for dealing with the challenges of maritime policing.

Since the late 1980s when the US military was directed to help support other agencies in counter narcotics as part of the War on Drugs, it has not been unusual to see military assets supporting the Coast Guard, particularly with surveillance and intelligence. Usually this is contingent upon the Navy having assets to enforce counter narcotics operations that are free from other missions but on occasion military assets have supported counter narcotics like the B-1 ‘Lancer’ bomber and even a Virginia-class attack submarine.

The Enhanced Counter Narcotic Operations: What changed in 2020?

The scale of the military presence in the recent over the last year is unprecedented. On April 1, the Trump administration announced the beginning of Enhanced Counter Narcotics Operations which rised the military and civilian assets allocated to ongoing counter narcotics operations in the Caribbean. The arrival of additional equipment increased the size of US aerial and naval forces in the region by at least 60%. US Southern Command received an unspecified number of Navy destroyers, littoral combat ships, and a variety of surveillance aircraft as well as additional Coast Guard cutters. All of this was coordinated with increased efforts by US allies and partners in the region, further enhancing the impact.

Officially, the increased presence has two goals - it responds to the increase in drug smuggling during the coronavirus pandemic and it targets the network of traffickers operating from Venezuelan territory, which help finance the Maduro regime. Southern Command has been vocal in pointing out the increasing Iranian, Russian and Cuban presence in Venezuela and the need to counter their influence in the Western Hemisphere. US intelligence agencies have tracked flights of gold, drugs, cash, arms and even troops between Russia, Iran and Venezuela. And precisely this geopolitical anxiety makes the case for increased counter narcotics operations noteworthy. Counter narcotics operations in Latin America have usually been a tool for the United States to to strengthen allies and partners in the region against insurgencies and transnational drug organizations. Plan Colombia supported the Colombian government in their fight against drug cartels and the long-running FARC insurgency, and the Mérida Initiative still supports Mexico and other Central American countries to counter cartels operating in the region. In contrast, Enhanced Counter Narcotics Operations are being used as a tool against a Latin American government and their international backers.

But the presence of warships in the Caribbean has had in praxis another, more prominent target than narco-traffickers. The deployment directly targeted the Venezuelan state itself, in spite of previous statements by the Southern Command to the contrary. This focus on Venezuela can be seen in how the United States supported Guyana in the territorial dispute over the Esequibo region. On June 23, an Arleigh Burke-class guided missile destroyer, the USS Nitze, conducted a so-called “freedom of navigation operation” in Esequibo waters close to Venezuela’s shores, a clear challenge to Venezuelan claims over the area. On July 15, another Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer, USS Pinckney, repeated the same exercise outside of Venezuela’s 12 nautical-mile territorial waters in the Caribbean.

So far, no US warships in the region have been involved in seizing fuel shipments from Iran to Venezuela, but as long as the United States has capable assets positioned in the Caribbean it sends a strong message that this is possibility as already seen at the example of the US Justice Department has seizing tankers bound for Venezuela in the Strait of Hormuz.

In other words, counter narcotics is a façade to deter rivals in the region. However, stopping drugs still represents a powerful driver for the militarization of Caribbean waters, even before the Venezuelan crisis started. Southern Command has, since 2007, repeatedly requested more naval assets because “the sheer volume of illicit trafficking events far outmatches the force packages available to deal with them.” In 2020, the command reported some local successes in the form of million-dollar drug busts by both the Coast Guard and Navy vessels. Guided-missile destroyer USS Kidd seized US$30 million worth of drugs in September and three months later, the Independence-class littoral combat ship USS Gabrielle Giffords seized a shipment worth US$106 million. But apart from an increase in seizures, it is not clear that the surge is countering trafficking networks or is on the way to achieving long-term measures of success.

A model for future threats in the region?

What is clear is that the demands by Southern Command for additional assets were not only met, but even exceeded. In 2018, former Southern Command Admiral Kurt W. Tidd requested a force package should include “a non-ballistic missile capable US Navy Destroyer or Littoral Combat Ship, or a US Coast Guard Cutter.” With the Enhanced Counter Narcotics Operations in 2020 Southern Command got all three plus an array of surveillance aircraft from the Navy and Air Force. And those assets have been instrumental not only to stop drug-trafficking, but to exert pressure directly on the Venezuelan state without any need to call it even ‘pressure’. Enhanced Counter Narcotics Operations as executed in the Caribbean may become a model for exerting diplomatic pressure under the guise of maritime law enforcement. A strategy that could come into fruition specifically against China by claiming a link between drug trafficking and illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing near the Galapagos archipelago. By resorting to this argument -and the huge assets the U.S. and its regional allies devotes to the the mission-, Southern Command may be in the capacity to counter another “malign” presence. All of this, however, comes at the cost of undermining the very normative claim of the War on Drugs: the saving of American lives.