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You are here: Home / Archives for wargaming

wargaming

Enhancing Cyber Wargames: The Crucial Role of Informed Games Design

January 11, 2021 by Amy Ertan and Peadar Callaghan

by Amy Ertan and Peadar Callaghan

“Risk – Onyx Edition (Ghosts of board games past)” by derekGavey.
Licensed under Creative Commons

 

‘A game capable of simulating every aspect of war would become war.’

Martin Van Creed, Wargames: From Gladiators to Gigabytes, 2013.

 

The launch of the MoD’s Defence Science and Technology Laboratory first Defence Wargaming Centre in December 2019 is an opportunity for future wargaming design. While current games do enable some knowledge transfer, the tried-and-tested techniques employed by the serious games community would enhance these exercises with more effective strategising and training mechanisms.  This article highlights how the characteristics of cyberspace require a distinct approach to wargames, and provides recommendations for improved development and practice of cyber wargames by drawing on established games design principles.

The use of games in educational settings has been recognised since the 4th century BC. Wargames, however, are a more recent invention. Wargaming first emerged in modern times via the Prussian Army. Kriegsspiel, as it was called, was used to teach tactics to officers as part of the Prussian Military Reforms in the wake of their devastating defeats at the hands of Napoleon. Ever since, military wargames have become a feature of training military personnel. The UK Ministry of Defence’s (MoD) Red Teaming Guide defines a wargame as ‘a scenario-based warfare model in which the outcome and sequence of events affect, and are affected by, the decisions made by the players’. These games, as noted by the MoD’s Wargaming Handbook, can be used to simulate conflicts in a low-risk table-top style setting across all levels of war and ‘across all domains and environments’. Wargames have repeatedly proved themselves a reliable method in communicating and practising military strategy that can be applied to explore all varieties of warfare.

As cyber becomes an increasingly important warfighting domain, both by itself and in collaboration with other domains, cyber wargames have begun to be played with the same frequency and importance as the traditional domains. Since 2016, the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE) has annually coordinated Crossed Swords, focusing on technical training, while NATO’s annual Cyber Coalition focuses on goals including information-sharing and collaboration and the Atlantic Council’s Cyber 9/12 focuses on strategic policy-making. Military examples include the U.S. Naval War College’s Defending Forward wargames, where, in its simplest form, cyber defenders (‘blue teams’) defend against cyber adversaries (‘red teams’). While these games are a great step forward in understanding, analysing, and preparing for the problems of cyberwarfare, these exercises tend to draw on existing conceptions of traditional serious games. This represents a missed opportunity; the cyber domain differs from traditional conflict in ways that warrant a fresh look at the design of wargames.

By design, wargames create an abstracted model of reality containing primary assumptions and simplifications that allow the model to be actionable. Underlying assumptions include: that the enemy is known, rational and ruthless; that the conflict being modelled is zero-sum in nature; that the games are effective tools even without specifically conceptualising how knowledge transfer takes place; and that the scope of the game should mirror reality as closely as possible. While these assumptions are appropriate for—or at least not detrimental to—traditional models of kinetic warfare, they are problematic for cyber wargame design. The challenges with each underlying assumption are described in turn.

The Known, Ruthless, and Rational Enemy

As Larry Greenemeier noted a decade ago, in cyberspace, the fog of war is exacerbated. While traditional warfare often limits available knowledge on an adversary’s location, in the cyber domain the reality is that defenders may not know who the enemy is nor their goals. When the enemy is an unknown, they can appear to act in an irrational way, at least from the perspective of the defender. This is due to the inherent asymmetry of the attacker. Through reconnaissance, the attacker will more than likely hold more information about intended targets than the defenders. Each of these issues, individually and collectively, are typically under-emphasised in most rigid wargames.

A Zero-Sum Nature of Conflict

Rigid wargames use a unity of opposites in their design, the goals of one side are diametrically opposed to the other. This creates a zero-sum game in which the goal of both the red and blue teams is the destruction of the other side. However, cyber conflict holds features of non zero-sum games, such as how the victory of one side does not always come with an associated loss to the other. Additionaly, there is an asymmetry introduced that should be addressed in the game design stage.

Knowledge Transfer: What is Actually Being Taught?

Another assumption made in the deployment of wargames is that they teach. However what is being taught is not as closely examined. In general, serious games can be categorised into two broad types: low road (or reflexive transfer) games; and high road (or mindful transfer) games. Low road transfer games are concerned with direct training of a stimulus and a response in a controlled environment that is as similar as possible to the context that the player is presented with in real life. For example, a flight simulator. The second type high road games are designed to encourage players to mindfully make connections between the context of play and the real world. Reflexive games are more likely to emphasise speed whereas mindful transfers are more likely to emphasise communication between players. Games must be designed using the knowledge transfer type most appropriate to the intended learning outcomes of the game.

Overenthusiastic Scoping

Cyber operations do not exist in isolation from traditional models of warfare. The integration of cyber operations with kinetic warfare, however, dramatically increases the complexity. Even attempting to capture the whole cyber landscape in a single game runs the real risk of detail overload, decision paralysis, and distracting the player from the game’s intended learning objectives. The longer it takes to learn to play, the less time the player has available to learn from the play. In reality, one cannot accurately simulate the real-world threat landscape without sacrificing effective learning (unless the learning point is simply to illustrate how complex the cyber threat landscape might be). For example, if the cyber wargame is focusing on the protection of critical national infrastructure, then side-tasks focusing on several other industries are likely to confuse, rather than assist, participants in achieving the desired learning goals.

Recommendations

How should we best approach the challenge of effective cyber wargame design?

We propose that designed cyber wargames must be in line with the following four principles:

  • Include ‘partial knowledge’ states.If the cyber wargame player has full knowledge of the game state, the game becomes nothing more than an algorithmic recall activity where a player can predict which actions are likely to result in successful outcomes. Certain ludic uncertainties can be included to induce ‘partial knowledge’, simulating the fog of war as required for each game.
  • Include ‘asymmetric positions’ for the players.The character of cyberwar is better modelled through asymmetric relationships between players. Cyber wargame designers need to consider the benefits to having this asymmetry inside the game.
  • Confirm learning objectives and knowledge transfer type before commencing design.Both low road and high road transfer games are valuable, but they serve different functions in the learning environment. A conscious choice for whether the game is attempting to promote low road or high road transfer should be confirmed before game design commences to ensure the appropriateness of the game.
  • Clearly scoped game to explore specific challenges.A well-scoped smaller game increases players’ willingness to replay games multiple times, allowing players to experiment with different strategies.

Conclusion

As both cybersecurity and wargames increase in importance and visibility, so does research on the use of cyber wargaming as a pedagogical tool for practitioners, policymakers, and the military. Existing principles within the games design profession around clear scoping of goals, game narratives, and appropriate player capabilities may all be applied to enhance existing cyber wargame design. The inclusion of partial knowledge states and asymmetric player capabilities both reflect crucial aspects of the cyber domain, while explicit attention to a game’s desired learning objectives and scope ensures that the resulting designs are as effective as possible. In a world in which cyberspace is only expected to become a more common feature of modern conflict, it is strongly advised that the MoD’s Defence Wargaming Centre leverages these tools and training opportunities. In the asymmetric and unpredictable field of cyber warfare, we need all the advantages we can get.

 

Amy Ertan is a cybersecurity researcher and information security doctoral candidate at Royal Holloway, University of London, and predoctoral cybersecurity fellow at the Belfer Center, Harvard Kennedy School. She is an exercise designer for cyber incident management scenarios for The CyberFish Company. As a Visiting Researcher at the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Center of Excellence, Amy has contributed to strategic scenario design for the cyber defence exercise, Locked Shields 2021. You can follow her on twitter: @AmyErtan, or via her personal webpage: https://www.amyertan.com

Peadar Callaghan is a wargames designer and lectures in learning game design and gamification at the University of Tallinn, Estonia. His company, Integrated Game Solutions, provides consultancy and design services for serious games and simulations, with a focus on providing engaging training outcomes. You can find him at http://peadarcallaghan.com/

Filed Under: Blog Article, Feature Tagged With: amy ertan, cyber domain, cyber war, cyber wargames, Cybersecurity, Cyberwar, cyberwarfare, military, NATO, peadar callaghan, Red Teams, UK Ministry of Defence, war games, wargaming

Dice, Hexes & History: Can Wargaming Save Estonia?

May 30, 2017 by Camlo Kalandra

By Camlo Kalandra

Source: David A. Shlapak and Michael Johnson. Reinforcing Deterrence on NATO’s Eastern Flank: Wargaming the Defense of the Baltics. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2016.

A new nightmare scenario is haunting the minds of NATO policymakers. The successes of the Russian ‘hybrid warfare’ model – used in Georgia and Ukraine – have stoked feverish speculation that NATO itself may be vulnerable to such an attack, and that the potential ramifications for Western powers could be catastrophic. While President Obama’s 2014 pledge to protect all members of the alliance was symbolically made in the Estonian capital of Tallinn, the security of the tiny Baltic nation is far from assured. Estonia is considered uniquely susceptible to both Russian hybrid and conventional operations. It was caught by surprise when Russia orchestrated crippling cyber-attacks against Estonia’s i digitised governmental infrastructure in 2007, and the country’s more than 20% ethnic Russian minority seem fertile for a Kremlin-led campaign of agitation and e-propaganda – similar to that during the Crimean operations. The conventional military situation is bleaker, with the RAND corporation’s recent wargaming exercises predicting that without significant NATO reinforcements the entire Baltic could be overwhelmed in under sixty hours by Russian forces. Yet while this gloomy prediction seems to have resigned Estonia to its fate, could wargaming be used more creatively to rescue Estonia from its strategic quagmire?

Though RAND’s report provides a detailed insight into the force composition and numbers NATO would require to fight a conventional confrontation with Russia in the Baltic, the central revelation that Estonia needs reinforcements will surprise no one. And while it is true a small scale build-up of NATO forces has already begun, the political and economic reality of austerity and cutbacks makes it highly unlikely that the number of troops recommended by the RAND report will ever be deployed. Wargaming can, therefore, take on a new role, not simply as an analytical modelling tool but as a practical force multiplier which seeks to ‘do more with less’ in a restricted economic environment. This can be achieved by exploring two alternative types of wargaming namely: the historical and the asymmetrical.

The historical model of wargaming seeks to learn specific tactical and strategic insights from past battles, and in the Estonian case, it is hard to imagine a country more replete with examples. The much touted ‘Narva scenario’, in which Russia attempts to seize control of the Estonian border city of Narva which hosts a 90% ethnic Russian majority has gained widespread acceptance as Russia’s most likely new strategic move. Yet in reality, this new move is Russia’s old strategic move – one with a three-hundred-year history stretching back to Peter the Great and the foundation of St Petersburg as a staging post for his efforts to gain control of Narva and the wider Baltic in the Great Northern War of 1700-1721. While some may be sceptical that modelling such antiquated campaigns could teach us much about contemporary defence, a much more salient example exists. In 1944, heavily outnumbered Axis forces held the Soviet advance at Narva for several months by mounting an expert defence which utilized local geography, superior tactics and the stoic morale of units defending home territory to inflict an estimated 500,000 casualties on the attacking Soviets.

Herein lies the true military value of historical wargaming: as is so often the case the battlefields of the past once again become the potential battlefields of the future. Battles are fought again and again on the same ground, often for the same unchanging strategic reasons. The importance of the Crimean peninsula remains much the same as it was in the 1850s, and Britain may well soon be looking to historical lessons on the defence of Gibraltar. Thus, when historical battles are modelled, it is not simply that they teach abstract lessons about strategy – as games of chess do; rather, they can impart to participants’ specific knowledge of real world geography, favourable and unfavourable ground for battle, and tactical lessons on how the few can defeat the many. When viewed from the historical perspective the challenge of wargaming is not estimating the scale of forces needed to mount a viable defence, but rather learning from those who already did it. Therefore, creating accurate historical wargaming models of Narva’s defence whether in 1700 or in 1944 may yield invaluable insights for the NATO planners of today.

The second prong of this reimagining of wargaming is the asymmetrical case. RAND’s analysis focuses on the capabilities Estonia would need to repel a conventional Russian invasion; yet, Estonia may not need to fight a conventional conflict at all. While many analysts seem to assume Russia’s will to sustain military casualties is monolithic and endless, the Chechen Wars of the 1990s demonstrated that Russian public opinion can rapidly turn against wars that incur mounting losses, just as is the case in the West. Russia’s greatest defeat in living memory was not wrought by conventional forces, but at the hands of the insurgent Mujahedeen in Afghanistan. It follows that wargaming should seek not only to model conventional war but also should be designed to train participants in insurgent, guerrilla and asymmetric thinking – a process which Estonian military training is already adopting. The Forest Brothers were indigenous Baltic resistance to Soviet occupation and operated throughout the 1940s and 1950s. While they were ultimately defeated, such partisan and insurgent tactics may be much more fruitful when used against a modern-day Russia that does not possess the Soviet Union-like unwavering acceptance of casualties.

In conclusion, while RAND’s use of wargaming is a useful starting point,  alternative models of historical and asymmetrical wargaming of NATO and Estonia may create cost-effective analyses that can train individuals in specific tactical and strategic thinking, and build on the lessons of history to fight the wars of the future. Just as the first wargame Kriegspiel prepared a generation of Prussian officers in the practical art of war, we must develop models that can do the same and act as a force multiplier for NATO’s smallest and most vulnerable members.


Camlo Kalandra is pursuing his MA in War Studies at King’s College London. His research interests include Wargaming and the American Civil War.


Feature Image source: http://newsbalt.ru/reviews/2017/04/glupost-ili-izmena-v-kaliningrade/

Image 2 source: https://chesstrend.wordpress.com/2012/07/05/twelve-kriegsspiel/

Filed Under: Blog Article Tagged With: estonia, feature, Future of NATO, ma, NATO, Russia, wargaming

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