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Japan’s Role in the North Korean crisis will remain a marginal one

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By Andrea Fischetti

A North Korean Hwasong-12 missile, the model fired on August 29th (Credit: KCNA)

 

The latest missile test conducted by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) on September 15 was the second in a row to directly involve Japan. The Korean intermediate range missile flew over the land of the rising sun for the second time in two weeks, and these tests undoubtedly pose a new challenge to Japan’s institutional pacifism, reawakening the debate on whether Japan needs to possess offensive military capabilities. However, Japan’s role in the North Korean crisis remains limited, and the country is not likely to become a key actor alongside the U.S. and South Korea in tackling the regime of the Kim dinasty.

In the early morning of August 29, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) launched a ballistic missile: Pyongyang’s fourth test in four days (Held, 2017). The country has tested more than fifteen missiles since February (USPACOM, 2017), and their effectiveness gradually improved, a sign that its current weapons program will not stop until it reaches its goal. North Korea’s ultimate objective, is considered to be a nuclear warhead-topped missile capable of reaching the U.S. mainland. Such a weapon would secure the position of the Kim dynasty, as Pyongyang believes it would deter the U.S. from interfering in the Korean Peninsula. The DPRK conducted a further test on September 15, which flew once again over Japanese territories.

The August 29 test was the first to involve a missile going over Japan without being announced or preceded by any warning. The intermediate-range ballistic missile Hwasong-12, known as NK-17, was fired over Japan’s territory, specifically the northern island of Hokkaido. Residents were given a short-notice warning inviting them to take cover, and the missile flew in Japanese airspace for almost  two minutes. The act was condemned by the US and its allies, including Japan and South Korea; while China stated that the North Korean situation had reached a “tipping point”. Pyongyang’s latest missile launch seemed to affect Japan more than any other country, as it passed over Japanese territory.

Nonetheless, the North Korean tensions are far more threatening for other countries than for Japan, and Tokyo’s role in this situation remains only a marginal one compared to that of the U.S. or South Korea. As reporter Kjeld Duits pointed out, since 1998, North Korea’s tests violated Japan’s EEZ and airspace many times, three of which during the last  two months. Pyongyang’s declared  ambition, however, is that of being able to hit U.S. territories. In fact, the NK-17 that travelled over Hokkaido broke up more than 1180 Kilometres from Japan’s mainland, suggesting that the country never was an objective in the first place. The missile’s range has been estimated to be 4000 Kilometres, which potentially makes Guam – and its American military base – a realistic  objective. Furthermore, North Korea has a number of short-range capabilities which can cause significant damage to nearby potential targets such as Seoul in South Korea. Arguably, that is the biggest threat that North Korea poses in the short term, and the reason why the U.S. must be careful in dealing with Pyongyang.

Accordingly, South Korean President Moon Jae-in ordered a show of “overwhelming force” (Crabtree and Kemp, 2017) against North Korea, involving the dropping of bombs near the Northern border and joint drills of four South Korean F-15 fighter jets with four American F-35 stealth fighter jets and two B-1B American bombers, while U.S. President Donald Trump declared that “talking is not the answer”.

On the other hand, Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzo Abe does not have the same freedom of operation. Firstly, although Japan has excellent missile defence systems, taking down high-altitude missiles fired from North Korea to territories beyond Japan – such as Guam – is legally challenging, and it would raise many questions about Japan’s stance on the use of military force for non-defensive purposes. This is due to Article 9 of Japan’s Constitution, especially considering that Japan is not the target of the DPRK’s tests. Secondly, and more importantly, even considering the effectiveness of the modern Air Defence System MIM-104F (PAC-3) acquired by Japan, there would be technical challenges in shooting down Pyongyang’s missiles, as the system is designed to counter inbound offensive missiles at lower altitudes, instead of hitting the bottom part of the missile by chasing it at higher altitudes. In other words, for Japan it would be easier to shoot down a missile that is actually targeting Japan rather than one that is only flying over its territories.

Two days after Pyongyang’s test, Japan’s Defence Ministry requested a budget increase for 2018 (Pollmann, 2017) which would include enough funds for further developing its radar system and acquiring weapons capable of shooting down high-altitude missiles. The North Korea tensions, including the launch of a NK-17 over Hokkaido, come at a time when Prime Minister Abe’s approval rating is decreasing. Also, his plan to amend the Japanese Constitution, in particular its Article 9 which prevents Japan from possessing offensive military capabilities, is far from guaranteed to succeed. In order to meet popular demands of a country with strong anti-militaristic norms (Berger 1993; 1998) and which is more concerned with achieving peace and prosperity than security objectives, Abe’s rhetoric has been focusing on Japan’s role as a ‘proactive contributor to peace’. Whether this role involves shooting down North Korean missiles for non-defensive purposes, however, is unclear.

The decision to expand the country’s military budget and potentially have a more proactive role in Northeast Asian security could be partly justified by Pyongyang’s moves, in the eyes of  the Japanese population, due to the perceived threat to Japan’s security. However, while Japan is involved in the North Korean crisis for geopolitical reasons, it is not Pyongyang’s main concern. Similarly, Abe is capitalising on the increasingly frequent North Korean tests to justify the need of stronger military capabilities, but increasing Japan’s involvement in this situation is not his ultimate goal. The challenge that Abe is facing is achieving a balance between rhetoric  and moderate actions compatible with Japan’s current Constitution and the public opinion’s will.

While Japan’s public opinion has a negative view of North Korea, and this missile launch could influence the debate on Constitutional amendments, Japan’s public is ultimately more likely to support pacifist approaches to resolving this issue, and an overemphasis of the North Korean threat could end up being counterproductive for Abe’s goals. Kim Jong-Un’s behaviour seemed unaffected by the rhetoric of the U.S. and South Korea, their shows of force, and the UN sanctions; therefore, even by stepping up as a more central actor in the North Korea tensions, Japan would not be able change this trend.

In conclusion, Japan will keep honouring its alliance with the U.S., a country directly involved in the North Korea tensions. Abe will also attempt to emphasise the threat posed by Pyongyang for justifying his unpopular constitutional amendments. However, due to technical and legal constraints, it is unlikely that Japan’s role in this situation will significantly change in the short term.

Andrea Fischetti (@A_Fischetti) is an MA Candidate in War Studies at King’s College London specialising in East Asian Security and Japan. He recently earned a BA with First Class Honours in International Relations, Peace and Conflict Studies and worked for a year in the House of Commons. Andrea was a visiting student at the Hiroshima Peace Institute of Hiroshima City University and studied Japanese at SOAS and King’s College London. More information about Andrea can be found at www.about.me/afischetti

 

Notes: 

Berger, T. U. (1993) ‘From sword to chrysanthemum: Japan’s culture of anti-militarism’. International Security 17(4): 119-50.

 

Berger, T. U. (1998) Cultures of Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press.

 

Crabtree, J. and Kemp, T. (2017) ‘South Korean President Moon tells military to toughen up, orders show of ‘overwhelming’ force’. CNBC Defense.

 

Held, A. (2017) ”Restraint’ Appears To Be Over As North Korea Launches Missile Test Again’, NPR. Available at http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/08/26/546344429/restraint-appears-to-be-over-as-north-korea-launches-missile-test-again

 

Pollmann, M. (2017) ‘What’s in Japan’s Record 2018 Defense Budget Request?’ The Diplomat.

 

USPACOM (2017) North Korea Policy, US Pacific Command. Available at http://www.pacom.mil/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/1310112/north-korea-policy/

Strife Feature | Contemporary Russian foreign policy – Examining the Ukraine crisis

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By William Moray

The 2014 Ukrainian Revolution – or Revolution of Dignity – and the subsequent Donbass War (Donbas, in Ukrainian) severely impacted the relations Russia held not only with Ukraine but also the international community. Moscow’s involvement in this conflict holds few secrets. Russian annexation of Crimea and its support provided to secessionist rebels in Donbas provinces has led the USA and its allies to impose a series of sanctions against Russia, in March 2014. Furthermore, the Western press often labels this as an ‘invasion’, which suggests the Kremlin is solely motivated by territorial expansionism. This article will argue that such limited views reflect a lack of understanding Russian politics. This article uses the Ukrainian crisis as a case-study – to examine key factors that arguably drive contemporary Russia’s foreign policy.

The role of ideology

Putin justified Russia’s annexation of or ‘reunification with’ Crimea on 18th of March 2014. Source: Creative Commons BY 4.0 license

According to mainstream Western media and politicians, Russia’s annexation of Crimea and its intervention in Eastern Ukraine allegedly serve a renewed Russian nationalism. Such a claim is as easy as convenient. A referendum took place in Crimea on 16th March 2014, during which 96% of the participants voted in favour of a ‘reunification’ with Russia.[1] Subsequently, President Vladimir Putin gave a speech two days later, and the language used has been qualified as ‘legal rhetoric’[2] as it provides a perfect illustration of the multiple Russian national identity narratives. Vera Tolz argues that there are five definitions of the Russian nation: the Union identity, the Eastern Slav identity, the Russian language identity, the racial identity, and the civic identity.[3] Several of these key concepts can be found in Putin’s speech.

For instance, given that Crimea shares a lot with Russia, Putin emphasised the vote’s result as logical. Religious Orthodoxy allegedly provides a basis for ‘culture, civilisation and human values’ which are shared by Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. This claim alludes to the Eastern Slav identity concept, the ‘community of Eastern Slavs’,[4] that people from these three countries allegedly have in common. Putin also qualifies ‘Kiev [as] the mother of Russian cities. Ancient Rus is our common source and we cannot live without each other’.

Secondly, he describes Crimea as ‘blend of different peoples’ in the same way as Russia itself. This fits in well with the ’Union identity’ which emphasizes the multinational and multi-ethnic dimension of the country.[5] Richard Sakwa also suggests that the word ‘Rossiyanin’, one possible label of a Russian, designates a community of all nationalities living in the ‘Russian Federation and beyond’,[6] a reference to former Soviet states.

Another argument put forward relates to the threats faced by Russian minorities. Putin insists that the Russian community in Crimea became endangered following the Euromaidan Revolution, perpetrated by ‘nationalists, neo-Nazis, Russophobes and anti-Semites’. Consequently, it was the duty of Russia to defend this community, in accordance to the ‘Community of Russian speakers’.[7] The Russian diaspora constitutes ‘an inseparable part of the Russian nation’[8] and defending them is a moral obligation. Russians abroad can be designed as either ‘Russian-speakers’ (‘Russkoyazychnye’) or ‘compatriots’ (‘sootechestvenniki’).[9] Putin also uses this argument to threaten Ukraine, as he underlines that ‘Russia will always defend their interests [Russians living in Ukraine] using political, diplomatic and legal means.’ Therefore, Moscow’s support for the pro-Russian rebels was a matter of protecting fellow Russians.

Another element of Russian nationalism is present in Putin’s speech. He blamed the 1954 unification of Crimea with Ukraine as a ‘personal initiative’ made by the then head of the USSR, Nikita Khrushchev. This gesture was made at the time to consolidate the union between Russia and Ukraine, on the 300th anniversary of their union. Although Sakwa adds another element, arguing that the Soviet Union’s ‘inside borders’ were administrative and thus held no political or ethnic logic.[10] Nonetheless, even at the time, ceding Crimea to Ukraine had been a source of controversy.[11]

These national identity narratives offer an explanation to Moscow’s policy in Crimea and subsequently, Eastern Ukraine. Based on these claims, Russia did not ‘annex’ any foreign territory. Rather, it merely allowed the ‘reunification’ of a region that historically has been part of the Russian empire since the late 1700s. However, this nationalistic rhetoric is insufficient to properly grasp the motives behind Russia’s foreign policy on this matter.

 The limits of the nationalist agenda

Providing support to the Rebels allows Russia to control any resolution of this ‘frozen conflict’ and prevents Ukraine from joining NATO. Source: Wikimedia Commons

Marlene Laruelle argues that the protection of Russian minorities argument is taken from a nationalistic concept – the ‘divided nation’.[12] However, the true influence of the nationalist ideology in shaping Russia’s foreign policy is profoundly debatable. For instance, Laruelle is adamant that far-right organisations ‘have never directly participated in decision-making processes on foreign policy’.[13] Consequently, the nationalist ideas were ‘a tool of Russia’s foreign policy, not its engine’.[14] Luke March similarly argues the Kremlin’s objective ‘is not the expression of nationalism per se, but its control and utilisation for regime goals’.[15] About Ukraine, Laruelle argues that the Kremlin’s actions were not ideology-motivated. Had ideology been an overarching factor, according to her, Russia would have annexed the secessionist provinces.[16] Instead, the rebels established the Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR) and Luhansk People’s Republic (LPR). These self-proclaimed entities, in the likes of Abkhazia, South Ossetia, or Transnistria, can be qualified as ‘de facto states’, as they possess all the classic attributes of a state whilst lacking international recognition. This process results in a given conflict either to remain frozen, as with the Abkhazian-Georgian example;[17] or to fester, such as in Ukraine. Russia is able to use this situation as a lever to maintain pressure against Kyiv. Therefore, the ‘Divided Nation’ narrative remains a justification used by Putin and will not be applied on all countries which include Russian minorities. For instance, Laruelle is adamant that Moscow will not intervene if states such as Kazakhstan, agree to its rules, i.e. stay under its influence.[18]

In other words, the Russian expansionism witnessed in Eastern Ukraine serves a very different purpose. The next part will demonstrate it is their will to be recognized as an equal partner by the West.

Equality as the ultimate objective

From Moscow’s perspective, NATO and EU enlargement, as well as the ‘Color Revolutions’, are tools used by Western powers to expand their interests in Russia’s sphere of influence, namely the Former Soviet Union (FSU), also known as the ‘Near Abroad’. Yevgeny Primakov – the then Minister of Foreign Affairs – qualified in 1997 the first post-Cold War wave of NATO expansion as ‘the biggest mistake in Europe since the end of World War II’.[19] Similarly, Margot Light states that NATO expansion is viewed after 2000 as ‘a fundamental threat’ to Russia.[20] Regarding Euromaidan, Putin was similarly convinced that it ‘was the result of a US-led operation’. This line of thinking was reinforced by the support provided to demonstrators in December 2013, by US Assistant Secretary of State Victoria Nuland and Senator John McCain during a visit to Kiev.[21] The rhetoric used by Russian officials serves the same purpose, to portray NATO as an aggressive alliance against which Russia legitimately needs to defend itself. For instance, Colonel General Nikolai Bordyuzha, the secretary general of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), a military alliance between Russia and five other FSU states, recently accused NATO of wanting to transform the former Soviet space into ‘another Syria’.

The point here is that one could argue Russia genuinely believed it was ‘the victim, not the aggressor’, in regard to the Ukraine crisis, and that its intervention was an act of self-defence.[22] Laruelle takes a slightly different approach in suggesting that Putin’s objective was to punish Ukraine for two reasons. First, she argues that the new post-Revolution government in Kiev attempted to ally with the West and move away from Russia. Secondly, she claims that during the 2014 Revolution, Ukraine demonstrated poor governance and instability, as proven by the ‘Maidan’, which is defined here as demonstrations resulting in regime changes.[23] Laruelle’s theory is more convincing than the ‘victim, not aggressor’ stance as it also takes into consideration the fact that Russia views Ukraine as a part of the Near Abroad. Therefore, Russia is not just a victim, it also defends its status of great power. These two elements are not in opposition but need to be understood as two pieces of a larger picture – the actions Russia feels it must take in order to prevent a perceived Western infringement in the FSU, its traditional sphere of influence [24].

Russia sees this matter as a question of survival, which requires preserving – or rather re-establishing – its status of great power. Indeed, from Moscow’s perspective, the NATO/EU enlargement does not just pose a threat. It also proves the hypocrisy of the international order the West has been imposing since the end of the Cold War. Russia wishes to be considered as an equal, thus it defends an alternative international order. This disconnect between Western and Russian views of international order was underlined on 28 September 2015, when both the then American President Barack Obama and Putin gave speeches before the United Nations (UN) General Assembly. Obama insisted that ‘liberty’ and ‘democracy’ concepts should be the new pillars of international order.[25] Whereas Putin defended a rather conservative approach, as he insisted on the value of ‘equality’; he also criticised that ‘after the end of the Cold War […] a single centre of domination emerged in the world’.[26] Indeed, Putin has constantly accused the West of imperialist views. This reproach was evident after the wars in Kosovo, Iraq [27] and more recently Libya. The defence of ‘liberty’, according to this view, is merely an excuse to justify aggressive expansionism. By contrast, Russia’s alternative international order seeks to respect sovereignty, promote equality and consequently, to preserve international law.  Ironically, this approach to international order does not apply to Russia’s Near Abroad. Hence Ukraine is in Russia’s view as FSU states are its sphere of influence.

Conclusion

Based upon a nationalist-like rhetoric, Russia’s actions were however not necessarily ideologically-motivated, nor based on a desire to acquire territory. Instead, fear of NATO’s enlargement constituted a more important driving factor, and relatedly, the need to stop Ukraine from moving closer to the West, in order to protect its historical sphere of influence. Russia’s also hoped its Ukraine intervention would serve a greater strategic objective: to restore an equal status vis-a-vis the West.

William Moray is the BA representative for Strife Blog and he has just graduated in War Studies BA from King’s College London. He will read the Intelligence and International Security MA at King’s next September onwards. His research interests include intelligence and the history of intelligence, terrorism, nuclear proliferation and the relations between Russia and the West. You can follow him @WilliamMoray

Notes

[1] Putin, Vladimir, Speech on the annexation of Crimea (18 March 2014) http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20603 This speech is referred to several times in the first part of this essay

[2] Roy Allison ‘Russian “Deniable” Intervention in Ukraine: How and Why Russia Broke the Rules’, International Affairs, 90:6 (2014), pp. 1258

[3] Vera Tolz, ‘Forging the Nation: National Identity and Nation Building in Post-Communist Russia’, Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 50, No. 6 (Sep. 1998), p. 995

[4] Ibid, p. 999

[5] Tolz, Forging the Nation, op. cit., p. 996

[6] Sakwa, Russian Politics and Society, op. cit., p. 218

[7] Tolz, Forging the Nation, op. cit., p. 1000

[8] Ibid, p. 1001

[9] Sakwa, Russian Politics and Society, op. cit., p.219

[10] Ibid, p.230

[11] Stephen White, Understanding Russian Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), p.297

[12] Marlene Laruelle (2015) ‘Russia as a “Divided Nation,” from Compatriots to Crimea: A Contribution to the Discussion on Nationalism and Foreign Policy’, Problems of Post-Communism, 62:2, p. 88

[13] Ibid, p.89

[14] Ibid, p.90

[15] Luke March (2012) ‘Nationalism for Export? The Domestic and Foreign-Policy Implications of the New ‘Russian Idea’ ‘, Europe-Asia Studies, 64:3, 402

[16] Laruelle, Russia as a “Divided Nation”, op. cit., p.95

[17] Dov Lynch, ‘Separatist States and Post-Soviet Conflicts’, International Affairs, Vol. 78, No.4 (Oct. 2002), p. 834

[18] Laruelle, p.95

[19] White, Understanding Russian Politics, p. 284

[20] Margot Light, ‘In search of an identity: Russian foreign policy and the end of ideology’, Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, 19:3, p.50

[21] Mikhail Zygar, All the Kremlin’s Men, (NY: Public Affairs, 2016), p. 263

[22] Zygar, All the Kremlin’s Men, p. 292

[23] Laruelle, Russia as a “Divided Nation”, op. cit., p.94

[24] Ruth Deyermond, ‘What are Russia’s real motivations in Ukraine? We need to understand them’ The Guardian, 27 April 2014, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/apr/27/russia-motivations-ukraine-crisis

[25] Remarks by President Obama to the United Nations General Assembly (28 September 2015) https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/09/28/remarks-president-obama-united-nations-general-assembly

[26] ‘Read Putin’s U.N. General Assembly Speech’, The Washington Post, (28 September 2015) https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/09/28/read-putins-u-n-general-assembly-speech/?utm_term=.e3f0817a207a

[27] White, Understanding Russian Politics, p. 281

Military Exercises And The Necessity Of Practice

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By Davis Florick

South Korea and US army top brass watch from an observation post as the likelihood of a real war breaking out grows by the day. Reuters.

As the North Korean crisis mounts, the utility of the joint military exercises in the region involving South Korea and the United States (US) has come under increasing scrutiny. Beijing has gone so far as to propose that Pyongyang could suspend its nuclear and missile activities in exchange for a moratorium on Seoul’s training activities with Washington. Regardless of how much value one may attribute to China’s offer and to North Korea’s credibility, understanding the utility of military exercises is prudent. Given Pyongyang’s history of inflammatory rhetoric and weapon tests in response to training activities, North Korea’s objections to South Korea and US exercises is unlikely to abate. For any government conducting multilateral exercises, at least five overarching reasons underlie its decision to do so: providing technical demonstrations, improving integration and transparency, addressing challenging strategic problems, assuring partners, and deterring adversaries. Exploring the benefits of military drills can provide valuable takeaways for different actors globally.

Military exercises provide an ideal opportunity to demonstrate new technological capabilities. Given long development timelines, the culminating step of utilizing a system in an operational setting carries considerable military and political value. Using new capabilities in a simulated environment helps strategists and operators to plan and train with their equipment. On the one hand, partners have tangible evidence of how their military equipment and training needs are being addressed. On the other hand, potential adversaries are presented with new potential forms of deterrent effects to their strategies and tactics. For instance, during Russia’s Vostok-2014 exercise in its Far East, Moscow test-fired the Iskander-M. While Russia had previously claimed the system had been used during the conflict in Georgia in 2008, this was the first public launch, and doing so near China undoubtedly carried political utility. The spotlight placed on multilateral exercises presents a distinctive opportunity to display new technological capabilities.

While showcasing advanced military technology is a strategic move, just as important are the personal relationships, integration, and transparency through joint training. During a crisis, there is little room to overcome language barriers, technical hurdles, or policy discrepancies. Simulating combat situations allows people and machines to harmonize and to develop ways to overcome natural impediments. Furthermore, by integrating capabilities and improving human communication prior to an actual conflict, forces are much more synchronized during a crisis, thereby reducing potential vulnerabilities that could be exploited by adversaries. In the process of strengthening synchronization, working partners are likely to find that transparency is a valuable by-product of engagement. When states demonstrate the willingness to work with one another such as through the sharing sensitive information, trust can develop. Similarly, leveraging personal commonalities is a unique way of engendering lasting relationships that can serve to benefit all parties involved. Multilateral military exercises thus serve to improve macro-level and micro-level cooperation.

Beyond improving coordination and transparency, addressing serious conceptual and strategic dilemmas is a critical component of multilateral exercises. As international affairs become increasingly complex, the challenges faced by senior officials are becoming more difficult as well. Given that tomorrow’s conflicts may involve multilateral aspects, different cultures and equities will lead partnering states to see problems in disparate ways which, if not addressed, may themselves lead to discord. To minimize the chances of divergence during a conflict, parties should undertake important discussions which may include uncomfortable and challenging scenarios since dialogue during peacetime – including a wider range of whole-of-government options that may incorporate considerations as diverse as economic impediments and nuclear exchange scenarios – and occur at a more measured pace than dialogue during wartime. Conceptually, the different perspectives we all possess increase the likelihood of innovation and reduce the risk of groupthink. Leveraging these qualities can have a profound impact on the options provided to senior officials during a crisis.

Although it may not seem readily apparent, military exercises have an important role in assuring allies and partners of security commitments. By conducting training events abroad, a state can demonstrate its willingness to participate in conflicts, or promote mutual defence elsewhere. Practicing and preparing for various situations signifies that officials are thinking through problems and are taking an active role in preparing for potential scenarios. Beyond the simple act of displaying a regional presence, joint exercises with foreign partners carry a powerful message to those states’ domestic audiences and can display equality in the relationship. Moreover, cooperation signifies that the parties involved are analyzing and preparing for potential conflicts. As a result, should confrontation emerge, a state’s partners can function more securely with the knowledge that they will likely have support. The assurance value of joint exercises comes in the form of day-to-day strategy and acquisition while also serving as a valuable means to reinforce support should conflict occur.

Parallel to its assurance utility, joint military exercises abroad are instrumental in deterring potential aggressors. To a considerable extent, the same qualities that contribute to bolstering ties with partners can also play an important role in shaping adversary perceptions. Practicing how states respond in a conflict scenario demonstrates to potential adversaries that a first strike option may not be in their favor. In conjunction with other opportunities, such as deploying units forward, exercises are an important tool in showing that costs will be imposed and benefits denied if another state(s) chooses an aggressive path. From a political standpoint, exercises serve as an ideal means to demonstrate commitment. Where an adversary to attempt an aggressive act, it would do so with the knowledge that its decision would be forcibly countered. The response may raise the threshold for an aggressive adversary who might otherwise prefer to take decisive action. As an example, the annual US-South Korea Foal Eagle and Key Resolve exercises reminds North Korea of Washington’s presence on the Peninsula – precisely the opposite of the US position prior to the Korean War. Ultimately, by deterring potential aggression, regional and strategic stability are stronger.

Multilateral military exercises play a significant role in shaping decision makers’ perceptions of benefits and costs of their choices. By practicing how partners may respond in the event of a conflict, those states will be more comfortable in their disposition. As a result, they may be less likely to pursue a first strike option. Conversely, a potential adversary may be less inclined to risk a first strike because the likelihood of a successful campaign might be decreased. Alongside the assurance and deterrence utility of multilateral exercises, there is value in cooperating with the militaries of partner states. For instance, collaborating on military strategies could prove invaluable for synchronizing forces during inherently time-sensitive and complex operations. There are even technological benefits to joint exercises as states are able to experiment with new capabilities and improve multilateral communication while reducing technical barriers. Invariably, perhaps one of the best assessments for the utility of multilateral exercises is the degree to which they are criticized and looked at with suspicion by other parties – whether in the context of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s concerns over Russia’s Zapad, China’s objections to the US-India-Japan Exercise Malabar, or the North Korea’s anger over the US and South Korea’s Foal Eagle.

Davis Florick is a strategic policy analyst for the US Department of Defense, a Senior Fellow with the Human Security Centre, and a 2016 WSD-Handa Non-resident Fellow with the Pacific Forum. He earned a Master’s degree in East-West Studies from Creighton University. He specializes in North Korean strategic and human security issues.

 

Strife Feature – Spying on Friends

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By Anastasia Beck

In the aftermath of the allegations of the US National Security Agency (NSA) spying on allied states such as Germany, and accusations from the White House concerning alleged spying by Britain’s GCHQ on Donald Trump during his presidential campaign, moral questions have arisen regarding spying on one’s allies. The gravity of these incidents was further underlined by the moral outrage around such aspects by politicians in these countries. However, are such reactions disproportionate and should countries expect this sort of behaviour due to the tumultuous nature of the international stage?

This article will discern whether it is possible to legitimise the action of spying on one’s allies by first looking at the debate through a theoretical lens, using the Just Intelligence Theory. In the corresponding sections, I investigate the nature of ‘alliances’ and follow it up with an assessment of previous examples of friendly spying that underscores how spying on one’s allies is imperative in the current international system.

As part of the Snowden leaks, a presentation slide was released depicting NSA signals intelligence operations around the world which collect data from many countries, even allies.

The Just Intelligence Theory

From a theoretical perspective, states should not spy on each other.  This view stems from the application of the Just Intelligence Theory to friendly espionage.  ‘By using the Just War tradition as a base it is possible to establish a set of just intelligence principles that can limit the harm intelligence collection causes while outlining what circumstances would be required to justify the harm caused.’[1]  The just intelligence principles include: having a just cause, a legitimate authority to sanction the activity, be conducted for the intended purpose, be proportionate, be used as a last resort, and discriminate between legitimate and illegitimate targets.[2]

The first principle, having a just cause to conduct intelligence, would require there to be a substantial threat to justify any harm caused through the collection of intelligence. As it is the security services’ duty to preserve and maintain national interests, a high-level threat would provide sufficient cause to conduct intelligence activities. For example, during the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, Britain’s secret intelligence service MI6 and USA’s Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) utilised a Soviet spy – Oleg Penkovsky – to relay vital information back to the West regarding Soviet intentions and capabilities. The near possibility of total war occurring between the two super powers justified the use of spying against the Soviet Union. However, when one examines intelligence collection on friendly states, it is hard to justify a similar action. Spying on your allies entails that there is no immediate threat, and is instead being conducted because of a general understanding of the targeted state’s nature and not because of an overt provocation.  However, the just intelligence theory, much like the just war theory, ‘is blind to general information about states and information that does not amount to identifying a concrete threat’ can therefore not be used as a justification for intelligence collection against them.[3]  To be clear, general information would surmount to a state’s religion and political position, so for example, if one were at odds with an allied state’s political system that alone does not justify spying on it.  Thus, from a theoretical perspective, spying on one’s allies does not have a just cause, thereby making the whole activity unjust.

Another principle requires sticking to the stated purposes, and not diverge for political, economic or social objectives.  And yet, spying on your allies often does not meet this condition. Once again, a government’s role is to safeguard the interests of the nation, and this would require knowledge around fiscal, foreign or defence policies of allied states. For example, one could argue that, due to rising tensions within the European Union on spending towards Greece, it would seem appropriate for Germany to keep abreast of any changes in Greek fiscal policy – which the Greeks may not wish to openly disclose.[4]

However, this theory is not a legal doctrine and few states would give up vital information on fellow states to follow such stringent rules.  Furthermore, the international system is extremely competitive and anarchic, with state’s wishing to pursue strategies in consonance with their national interests.

What needs to be therefore examined is what it means to be an ally in the international system and whether the true nature of alliances justifies the use of spying on one another.  Alliances and friendly relationships are merely ‘mutual-defence pacts’ between states that often share and adhere to particular norms and practices.[5]  But states are in competition with one another, with allies pursuing their own national interests above that of others.[6]  As a result, trust among states in the international system is fragile due to the uncertainty surrounding the possibility of opposing views of leaders of governments which may affect their positions abroad.[7] It is this uncertainty surrounding intentions, and the possibility of its translation into policy, that may motivate a state to conduct surveillance on the inner debates and workings of partner countries.  It would be foolish to blindly trust their partners. As history has illustrated, allies often diverge and defect from previously agreed upon policies.

Examining transatlantic alliances

“A friend today can become an enemy tomorrow” is a phrase which can be applied quite successfully towards past and present-day alliances. Due to the competitive nature of the international system at large, allies’ interests may diverge, therefore an understanding of such change is required.  A good example of this would be the alliance between Germany and the US.  Many would agree that these two states – both NATO members – have a warm relationship.  Spying on the Germans has had positive outcomes. In the 1970s, at the time of the Cold War, West Germany, a US ally, had discovered that the East Germans had planted a communist spy in West German Chancellor Willy Brandt’s inner circle.[8]  When the infiltration was revealed, the damage was NATO-wide, with Brandt having to resign after it was found that his letters to President Nixon had been compromised.[9] However, in modern times, Germany has diverged and disagreed with certain US policies, thus undermining US interests.  In 2011, Obama expressed his desire to intervene militarily in Libya but faced opposition from German Chancellor Angela Merkel.  Had the US intervened in Libya, Merkel could have used her influence to reduce NATO’s participation in the conflict.[10]  Additionally, ‘Washington and Berlin have clashed over how to manage the eurozone crisis, the resolution of which have far-reaching implications for the German and US economies’.[11]   The NSA wiretapping Merkel’s mobile phone may seem personal and invasive, but with the power that Germany has today and its ability to undermine its allies’ interests, it would seem logical to maintain a close eye on any developments within.

Close allies for many years, Germany and the US are arguably facing a particularly frosty relationship after allegations of NSA wiretapping of the Chancellor’s personal mobile.

Another close ally of the US who has expressed outrage of being targeted by NSA spying is France, but once again this European ally has also had a tendency to diverge from US policies. Under Charles de Gaulle, France continually turned its back on the US. De Gaulle announced a ‘national independence policy’ that contained a nuclear plan pertaining to ‘a strategy of defence in all directions’ – which also seemed to suggest that the US may one day become an enemy of France.[12]  Also, the French vetoed Britain’s entry into the European Economic Community – that would later advance to become the European Union – thereby weakening its trans-Atlantic ties. ‘De Gaulle even tried to persuade the leader of Western Germany to loosen his ties with NATO, which would have undermined the US-led coalition and damaged the course of the Cold War.’[13]  Thus, as a result of such history of divergence, it would appear logical for the US to spy on its French ally due to France’s history of divergence.

The US and Britain have long been considered the closest of allies, but even these two friends have been known to spy and conduct espionage against each other.  In 1917, the British government wanted the US to join the fight during the First World War, and on Britain’s side.  ‘The British used a whole range of overt and clandestine methods to gather intelligence and run influence operations’ including one example of ‘the surveillance of a US transatlantic cable’ in which Britain’s foreign intelligence service learned of a dubious German plot to win Mexico’s allegiance by promising the country a chunk of US territory.[14]  Masking the source of the information, British foreign intelligence relayed this intelligence to Washington, thus influencing the US to join the war.  During the Cold War, America’s Venona Project ‘revealed that sensitive documents were being sent to Moscow from the British Embassy in Washington.’[15]  By spying on its closest ally, the US were able to discover that there were two British double agents, Donald MacLean and Guy Burgess, working for the Soviets and had just defected.  These agents were compromising American national security, of which its ally had not been able to detect.  Another example of friendly spying was the Suez crisis in 1956.  Former US President Eisenhower, having been left out of the strategic planning of the Anglo-French-Israeli invasion of Egypt, decided that it was imperative to know what his allies were up to.[16]  He utilised his imagery intelligence capabilities through the use of U-2 planes which were sent over British, French and Israeli military sites in the eastern-Mediterranean and the Middle East, and the reconnaisance through the U-2s gave Eisenhower important clues about his allies’ military operations for, and execution of, their invasion of Egypt.[17] From these examples, it is clear that even the closest of allies feel the need to spy on each other for the sake of preserving their own national interests.  Maybe it isn’t so inconceivable that GCHQ wiretapped Trump Tower in the run-up to the presidential elections, considering that he would become the leader of one-half of the “special relationship”.

The relationship between Britain and America has long been considered a close one, but even these two allies have been known to spy on each other.

Spying among friends

If one is caught spying on allies, it is of course damaging. The revelations that the NSA were spying on allied leaders complicated efforts to negotiate a transatlantic trade and investment agreement and gave ‘ammunition to people who are worried about the globalization of information and who would like governments do more to protect privacy and limit governmental data-collection.’[18]  And yet, one must note that when leaders such as the French President François Hollande and Merkel come out in anger against alleged spying, they are often doing so to appease their outraged publics.[19]. The above examples show how volatile and fluctuating alliances can be, thereby justifying why spying on each other is a necessity.

Allies spy on each other so as to know of other’s intentions and changes in policy.  Whilst it may be immoral to conduct espionage on our friends, it would seem damaging not to do so.  If spying has positive outcomes and the interests of a nation, then it is reasonable for a state to pursue such measures.  In light of the above question, one can look to recent developments between Britain and Spain over the long-contested territory of Gibraltar following Britain’s decision to leave the EU.  Spain’s illegal incursion into Gibraltar’s waters is yet another sign that alliances are fragile, with high chances of states undermining another’s sovereign interests, leading to the conclusion that spying can indeed take place amongst friends.

Anastasia Beck is a postgraduate student studying Intelligence and International Security in the Department of War Studies at King’s College London (KCL).  Anastasia’s research areas include counter-radicalization, the role of intelligence in both peace and conflict, and open-source intelligence.

Notes:

[1] Walt, S. ‘News Flash: States Spy on Each Other’, Foreign Policy, Date accessed: 1st April 2017 http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/07/01/news-flash-states-spy-on-each-other/

[2] Ibid.

[3] Fisher, Max. ‘Why America spies on its allies’, http://www.wikiwand.com/en/Global_surveillance_disclosures_(2013–present)

[4] Ibid.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Sims, J. ‘I Spy…’, available here at https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2013-11-06/i-spy

[7] Bucknam, M. ‘The Eisenhower Administration and the Suez Crisis: Spying on Allies and Friends’ National War College (2000) pg. 3

[8] Ibid pg. 5

[9] Bellaby, R. ‘What’s the Harm: The Ethics of Intelligence Collections’ Intelligence and National Security 27:1 (2012) pg. 108

[10] Ibid pg. 109

[11] Bitton, R. ‘The Legitimacy of Spying Among Nations’ American University International Law Review 29:5 (2014) pg. 1020

[12] Stout, M. ‘Can Spying on Allies Be Right?’ War on the Rocks Date accessed 1st April 2017 https://warontherocks.com/2013/11/can-spying-on-allies-be-right/

[13] Colby, E. ‘Why We Must Spy on Our Allies’ The National Interest Date accessed: 29th March 2017 http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/why-we-must-spy-our-allies-9493

[14] Ibid.

[15] Easley, L. ‘Spying on Allies’ Survival 56:4 (2014) pg. 143 DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2014.941545

[16] Fisher, M. ‘Why America spies on its allies (and probably should)’ The Washington Post Date accessed: 1st April 2017 https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2013/10/29/why-america-spies-on-its-allies-and-probably-should/?utm_term=.90f50ccedacc

[17] Ibid.

[18] Sims, J. ‘I Spy…Why Allies Watch Each Other’ Foreign Affairs Date accessed: 20th March 2017 https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2013-11-06/i-spy

[19] Ibid.

Image credits:

Image 3: https://www.pritzkermilitary.org/explore/museum/past-exhibits/american-icons-great-war/side-side-britannia/

Image 2 and Feature: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-4325158/Trump-deflects-wiretap-questions-Merkel-news-conference.htm

Image 1: http://www.wikiwand.com/en/Global_surveillance_disclosures_(2013–present)

War from the skies: The rise of US strategic airpower under Trump

by

By Hemant Shivakumar

The USA’s use of strategic airpower is helping gain political and military dividends for President Trump despite limitations around communicating intent and causing collateral damage.

A few weeks ago, the US military dropped a ten-ton Massive Ordinance Air Blast (MOAB) to purportedly take out ISIS-K militants operating close to the Pakistan border (in Nangarhar province) in Eastern Afghanistan. Employing a high-wattage munition against an asymmetrically weaker group signaled the Trump administration’s unprecedented, high-stakes approach towards tackling non-conventional forces. Analysts termed this as a key tactical shift in US counterterrorism operations. Moreover, far from former President Obama’s reluctance around missile strikes against the Syrian government, the US military’s use of Tomahawk missiles to destroy the Syrian government’s air bases – in response to the alleged use of chemical weapons by Assad in Khan Sheikhoun – underscored a new strategic temperament within the Trump administration. Similar to his predecessor, Trump has, so far at least, indisputably espoused airpower and aerial strikes as the principal method of applying military force by the USA.

As the administration’s unflinching confidence in airpower guides its military policy, the mixed signals it generates around US commitment and credibility is problematic. On the one hand, US air strikes on Syria risked escalation. On the other hand, Washington hardly communicated anything about the administration’s commitment to the region, leading a confused Russia and Iran to issue warnings against repeated attacks in the future. While deploying US marines to Raqqa in Syria implied US resolve, it conceded little latitude into Trump’s strategic goals over such an action. Interestingly, President Trump attested to delegating the tactical decision-making to his military chiefs – unlike his predecessor – generating further confusion about comprehending US goals and actions. Further, whether US’ tactical use of air munitions in Syria or Afghanistan deter countries like North Korea is moot, a point Trump also acknowledged. As countries struggle to assess the credibility and rationale of American actions, such ambiguity ties closely with airpower’s limitations around communicating intent. Despite such inhibitions, US preference for airpower is unlikely to be moderated.

This is because the US administration’s reliance on aerial platforms for counterterrorism and targeted strikes since 2012 has been exceptional, aided by Precision-Guided Weapons (PGWs). Given the increased reliance on PGWs, the number of sorties and strike rates are lower than those conducted during the Gulf War in 1991 and the campaigns against Serbia in 1998 and Afghanistan in 2001. According to US Air Force Lt. General Robert Otto,  the increasing precision of air munitions has rendered such ‘dumb’ large-scale bombing unnecessary. Similarly, US Army Lt. General Mayville noted during initial coalition airstrikes against ISIS in 2014 that 96 percent of munitions used were precision-guided. Soon after the US military scaled down its active fighting presence in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Obama administration set up Special Forces (SOFs) teams for carrying out local training and operations and expanded the use of airstrikes. Under Operation Inherent Resolve, US SOF and coalition forces trained national armies in Iraq and used precision air strikes and drone attacks to guide their tactics. For instance, US SOF often carries out drone-based targeting of militants in western Mosul and in the mountainous regions of Afghanistan to achieve tactical goals. The Iraqi and the Afghan armies are currently assisted by superior US air intelligence capabilities as well – such as aerial reconnaissance, air surveillance; as well as signal intelligence that is supplemented with local human intelligence. As of early 2016, nearly 11,000 airmen were using Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) such as Reaper and Predator drones for Intelligence, Reconnaissance, and Surveillance (ISR) operations. Such increasing range of US airpower against non-conventional forces represents a significant promotion – moving away engaging several ground forces to a high-octane airpower guiding local ops.

Moreover, strategic airpower is providing both political and military dividends for the new administration. The new administration’s missile strike on Syria ratcheted up US involvement in the conflict while attesting to broad Republican consensus around setting up safe zones in Syria. Republican senators John McCain and Jeff Flake agreed with Trump’s decisions to bomb Syria; while earlier in April 2017, Hillary Clinton had also admitted to the necessity of US military involvement in the conflict. Aerial bombing is also seen as a secure, inexpensive intervention tool by the American public as well. In a recent CBS-conducted poll, while 18 percent of Americans approved the use of US ground forces in Syria, 57 percent approved the use of limited airstrikes. President Obama’s drone warfare targeted specific militants using Hellfire missiles, while the precision-based and the technological advancements of delivery systems have expanded the range of air munitions such as MOAB or Hellfire missiles to achieve a wider variety of strategic goals such as denying terrain, bunker bombing, taking out mines, etc. In Iraq (Mosul) and in Afghanistan, remote drone attacks are helping the coalition forces gain key tactical positions against ISIS and thwart advances by the Taliban. Further, should the USA achieve a military victory against ISIS and the Taliban in the future, airpower would unarguably have been an enduring factor. There is little to broker any domestic or military opposition to such a hands-off, low-cost (in terms of American lives) strategy.

The US’ growing conviction in its airpower triumphs has also meant relying less on traditional military allies such as Pakistan to counter terror. Since the 2011 operation by US forces in the Pakistani town of Abbottabad to capture Osama Bin Laden, US aid commitments have stalled and the Trump administration has illustrated little interest (so far) in the relationship. On the other hand, multiple US administrations over the last sixteen years have scaled up? their level of defense commitments with India, much to Pakistan’s chagrin. Further, with the development of well-sized national armies and police in both Afghanistan and Iraq, the US administration is more directly involved in working with local national governments and picking up homegrown intelligence to help with its operations. During his recent visit to Pakistan, the US National Security Adviser McMaster advised Pakistan to tackle terror in all its forms, reflecting assessments that Pakistan is an impediment to the US’ ongoing counterterrorism efforts in Afghanistan.

Lastly, collateral damage and related mixed messaging due to airstrikes remain a concern. In Afghanistan and Syria, coalition airstrikes threaten to collapse the benefits accrued by ground-based counter-insurgency (COIN) forces over the preceding years. The inadvertent bombing of Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF) hospitals in Kunduz and in Aleppo, and the ensuing collateral damage reflect the limitations of airpower as a primary use of force. However, such setbacks seem to have no bearing on moderating the use of strategic airpower in the early days of the Trump administration.

Hemant Shivakumar is an MA student in the War Studies program and is the Managing Editor at StrifeBlog.

Notes:

[1] The ISIS-K (also ISIS Khurasan) is a faction of the militant Islamic State of Syria and the Levant (ISIL) operating in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Image credit: http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/what-%E2%80%98the-mother-all-bombs%E2%80%99-means-trumps-foreign-policy-20180

Feature image credit: http://www.globalresearch.ca/the-mother-of-all-bombs-moab-slated-to-be-used-against-iran/5333811