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Managing an epidemic: Security implications of the Ebola outbreak. Interview with Edwin Trevathan M.D., M.P.H.

August 19, 2014 by Strife Staff

By Joana Cook, Managing Editor, Strife
Interview conducted on 19 August 2014

Edwin Trevathan, M.D., M.P.H. is Dean of the College for Public Health and Social Justice at Saint Louis University (SLU), and Director of the Institute for Global Health and Wellbeing, where he is also Professor of Epidemiology, Pediatrics, and Neurology. He was Director of the National Center on Birth Defects and Developmental Disabilities at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) in Atlanta, where he was responsible for many of the CDC’s activities in areas of maternal and child health as well as neurological, developmental, and genetic disorders. Under his leadership, the CDC engaged in several productive collaborations in China, Latin America and Africa. He was the CDC’s Strategic Lead for the pediatric response to the 2009 H1N1 flu pandemic, and was a senior investigator for epidemic investigations of Nodding Syndrome in Uganda. Dr. Trevathan was previously Professor and Director of the Division of Pediatric and Developmental Neurology at Washington University in St. Louis, and Neurologist-in-Chief at St. Louis Children’s Hospital. He has published widely in public health, epidemiology, neurological and developmental disabilities, multi-center clinical trials, and child health. His new research interest, working under experts at King’s College London, focuses on Global Health Diplomacy in conflict-affected countries. You can follow Edwin Trevathan at @edwintrevathan.

* * *

Joana Cook: What would you suggest are the key security implications related to the Ebola epidemic for international actors, in particular, governments around the world?*

Dr. Trevathan: There have been more deaths from other ‘expected’ causes (malaria, malnutrition, childhood diarrheal diseases) than from Ebola in theses poor countries of West Africa over the past several months. However, Ebola poses a risk of becoming more widespread, disrupting the life of a city, closing borders, and provoking unrest. Ebola uncovers the weakness of public health systems, which will need to be addressed; a disease-specific approach to control will not be sufficient.

In your view, have global health bodies like the WHO been able to coordinate with affected countries in an adequate fashion?

The coordination of epidemic responses is often most difficult in epidemics that cross borders of resource poor countries, or poor countries that simultaneously are involved in armed conflict. One of the great challenges in these responses is the often poor coordination between the local health authorities and the national Ministry of Health of these developing countries. Poor in-country coordination delays requests by the national Ministry of Health (MOH) for assistance from the World Health Organization (WHO) and organizations like the U.S. Centre for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). These problems of coordination within countries are further exacerbated when disease outbreaks occur in rural areas in border regions, as occurred in this Ebola outbreak, and then extend into densely populated cities.

Why has the international response been so seemingly slow?

It is always difficult to analyze a response to an epidemic in the middle of a response. After control of this outbreak, there will certainly be investigations that will lead to recommendations for future action. These are some preliminary thoughts.

Although some of the initial response may have been somewhat delayed by poor in-country coordination, I do not perceive that the response has been significantly slower than previous outbreaks (i.e., Uganda, South Sudan, Eastern DR Congo). However, the efforts to control spread of Ebola have been less effective for a variety of reasons, primarily related to the local efforts of health workers. These reasons include:

The local authorities and health systems have been less well-equipped to prevent disease spread. For example, some local healthcare providers to not even have access to basic hygiene measures such as rubber gloves.
The local tradition of handling the bodies during funerals (large numbers of people embracing the body and kissing the bodies) has amplified the spread of Ebola in some areas.

International NGO responses seem to have been relatively rapid. Yet by the time they set up their response teams the disease has spread further for reasons more related to inadequate local initial responses.

Can you comment on the health system responses from the countries most affected by Ebola?

A few thoughts:

The outbreak has occurred in an area of relatively high population density close to borders, but with low density of physicians and other healthcare workers trained in how to recognize Ebola and use basic methods (gloves, gowns) to prevent disease spread when in contact with patients who may potentially have Ebola.
People with the initial symptoms of Ebola look much like the other people in the community with malaria or other diseases. Traditional management of these other infectious diseases in communities do not include measures to prevent transmission of Ebola.
Local health officials and public health officials have not implemented infectious disease precautions (“universal precautions”) in routine care before the diagnosis has been confirmed.
The prior Ebola outbreaks were easier to control because of remote and rural nature of the communities that were impacted, and by the local health authorities more coordinated response while working within a single country.

Have we seen previous Ebola outbreaks of this scale before?

No.

Is the US worried about the potential threat posed to its security by Ebola?

Ebola should not be a threat to the health of residents in the U.S. Universal disease precautions in hospitals and clinics should be effective in preventing disease spread. The security of the U.S. and of Europe is indirectly threatened by Ebola-exacerbated threats to security in West Africa.

Do you think Obama’s initiative to set up an African Centre for Disease Control is useful in responding to diseases such as Ebola?

Yes. The establishment of the China CDC has been very helpful in responding to epidemics in Asia. Most importantly, the nations of Africa will need to focus on epidemic and pandemic preparedness in order to best equip their countries to deal with Ebola and other emerging infectious disease threats.

Thank you very much.

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* The recent Ebola epidemic has thus far caused a recorded 1,069 deaths and infected 1,975 others around the world, with victims largely from West Africa, but these numbers are stated to ‘vastly underestimate the magnitude of the outbreak’. Ebola has a fatality rate of up to 90% and though Canada has now sent 1,500 doses of a new, experimental vaccine, there remains no proven cure.

The strategic aims of Chinese cyber industrial espionage

June 3, 2014 by Strife Staff

By Christy Quinn:

The recent indictment of several People’s Liberation Army (PLA) officers linked to the 61398 Unit, accused of industrial espionage against several US private companies and trade union bodies on the behalf of Chinese state industries, has pushed the issue of ‘cyber warfare’ to the front pages of global media. What for decades was the mutterings of government officials in anonymous briefings with journalists and high-level diplomatic meetings, has been pushed firmly into the level of public diplomacy, with the spokespeople of rival foreign ministries engaging in slander matches and finger pointing. There are key perceived differences, however, in the motives and strategic goals of the “Five Eyes”, the formal alliance between the signals intelligence (SIGINT) agencies of USA, UK, Canada, Australia & New Zealand that are responsible for intercepting communications, and the Chinese PLA’s cyber units. This is summed up by investigations firm Kroll’s managing director Timothy Ryan’s statement in an interview for Bloomberg TV, in which he asserted that, ”The US government is concerned primarily with geopolitical conditions in the world [and that]… The Chinese are doing (cyber espionage) primarily to make money, to give their state owned corporations an unfair advantage.”

This is a potentially misleading representation of Chinese motives for two main reasons. Firstly, for strategists in the Chinese Communist Party, it is impossible to overlook that Western industrialisation in the 19th and 20th centuries was buttressed by state power and often military force. The need to secure cheap raw materials such as cotton to support the burgeoning private industries in northern England was a key motivator for British imperialist adventurism in India and Africa. Forced entry into Chinese markets through the humiliating concessions made by the Qing dynasty during the Opium Wars provided Western imperial powers with access to Chinese trade and a huge export market for manufactured goods. ‘The Century of Humiliation’, the period between 1839 and 1949 under which China’s territorial integrity and sovereignty was ripped asunder by unequal treaties, port concessions and violent interventions by Western imperial forces, still has huge resonance amongst party cadres. This reinforces the view that they are simply righting historical wrongs that have given Western corporations a huge starting advantage at the expense of Chinese national sovereignty and dignity. It is only natural that the Chinese military work in tandem with the needs of Chinese national industry, without regard for the protestations of Western business, privileged by centuries of state protectionism and economic imperialism. This nationalist narrative of re-asserting national honour is gaining credence within the PLA and tapping into it offers a key means for the Party to keep control over its military as it becomes an increasingly professional force.

Secondly, this view does not provide a complete picture of the motives of the state owned enterprises (SOEs) that are still central to the Chinese ‘socialist market economy’ model. Whilst on the surface these businesses operate on a profit-driven corporation, rather than the provision of mass-employment during the Maoist era, they are still dominated by the strategic needs of the Party State. The huge role that SOEs still play in the Chinese economy, representing over a third of all business activity in the country by one measure, are a means of keeping the market economy under party discipline, avoiding commercial actors seizing political power to serve their own interests, for example the Russian oligarchs created in the privatisations of the Soviet economy in the 1990s. Their CEOs are party-appointed cadres that are recipient to party discipline and must be seen to be contributing to the State’s strategic objectives in order to progress up the political ladder within the Party. Whilst increasing profitability within the SOE sector is a key area of reform being considered by President Xi Jinping, it is by no means the only or even first priority for SOEs.

The unnamed SOEs referred to in the US Department of Justice (DoJ) indictment as the recipients of stolen intellectual property and confidential data, from Unit 61398, all operate in strategic sectors of the Chinese economy such as energy and steel. ‘SOE-1’, which builds and operates nuclear power plants in China, is alleged to have benefited from stolen design specifications for pipe designs and strategy documents from a US firm they were partnering with to build four nuclear power plants in the mainland. By sub-contracting industrial espionage to the PLA unit, they are supporting the Party’s strategic aims of reducing their dependence on foreign sources of technological expertise and speeding up China’s drive towards energy independence in the long term. This is quite different from the more mercenary terminology of simply ‘making money’ and seeking commercial advantage in the global marketplace. There is much less evidence to suggest the PLA unit is simply selling their expertise to private commercial businesses in China who simply want to win market share.

The role of the PLA in this is also worth discussing. The Peoples’ Liberation Army is the military arm of the Communist Party, and its responsibilities to the Party come before its responsibilities to the state. In this way, it is similiar to SOEs in that its political responsibilities take precedent to its own institutional strategic objectives. SOEs commissioning a PLA unit to carry out cyber espionage against commercial partners and rivals is much more of an internal secondment of duties within the Party bureaucracy, rather than the PLA being a ‘gun-for-hire’ for Chinese businesses. The activities of Unit 61398 have been well known within government and IT security circles for some years as perhaps the most prolific hacking unit in the world. From the Council of Europe, commercial giants like Morgan Stanley, Google and Exxon Mobil and defence contractors such as Lockheed Martin, the Unit has been tied to massive intrusions to company databases and the ‘hoovering up’ of proprietary data on a global scale. Whilst in comparison, Edward Snowden revealed NSA penetration of SOEs globally, such as Brazil’s state oil company Petrobras, the PLA is alleged to have a ‘no-holds barred’ approach to commercial espionage. Immediate strategic aims are to enhance the Party’s leverage over transnational corporations who want access to Chinese markets, such as Coca Cola’s attempted acquisition of China Huiyuan Juice Group in 2011, and increase the rate of ‘catch-up’ between China’s SOEs and western corporations. This supplements more conventional espionage efforts such as the theft of aerodynamic models of F-35 Joint Strike Fighter from US military defense networks and aerospace companies, to aid in the development of China’s military capabilities.

The real risk for China is that they normalise the process of industrial-scale state-sponsored commercial espionage, to the extent that decades down the line they themselves could become the victim of another emerging economic power. It is entirely foreseeable that in the next few decades India could harness its knowledge base in IT and direct thousands of newly hired state employees to erode China’s competitive advantages through hacking of proprietary data. The heightened risk of loss of intellectual property also lowers incentives for businesses to develop labour-saving technologies, which could have a knock-on effect on economic productivity in the long run by creating a ‘wild west’ where industrial espionage is the norm and there are few ‘secret recipes’ left in business. The US Department of Justice’s indictment is essentially trying to re-assert what it deems acceptable limits on cyber espionage and modify the Chinese leadership’s cost-benefit analysis of its sponsorship of cyber-hacking. However, it is unlikely to make a dent in the juggernaut of cyber malfeasance that the Communist Party has created in Unit 61398.

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Christy Quinn is an incoming student for the MA in Intelligence & International Security at the War Studies Department of Kings College London and is a graduate of International History at the London School of Economics. His primary research interests include cyber security, diplomacy & strategy, economic history and the SE Asia and MENA regions. You can follow Christy on Twitter @christyquinn

Sources consulted

Betz, David. Cyberspace and the State: Toward a strategy for Cyber-Power. Adelphi Series #424,The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS): London, 2011.
Bingham, Kit and Virginia Bottomley, Clare Glackin, Caroline Sands. ‘Cyber Security: What Boards Need to Know.’ Odgers Berndston 1 October 2013http://www.odgersberndtson.co.uk/fileadmin/uploads/united-kingdom/Documents/Cyber_Security_-_What_Boards_Need_to_Know_01.pdf
Bloomberg TV. Why the US is cracking down on Chinese Hackers. 20 May 2014 http://www.bloomberg.com/video/why-the-u-s-is-cracking-down-on-chinese-hackers-VuwjYMuvSPS3Bs9qYNRzWA.html
Bradsher, Keith. ‘China’s Grip on Economy Will Test New Leaders.’ The New York Times. 9 November 2012. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/10/world/asia/state-enterprises-pose-test-for-chinas-new-leaders.html?_r=0
Brenner, Joel. Why Isn’t Cyberspace More Secure? Communications of the ACM 53:11. November 2010 http://joelbrenner.com/why-isnt-cyberspace-more-secure/
Cain, P.J. and Antony G. Hopkins. British Imperialism, 1688-2000. Longman: London, 2002.
Higgins, Kelly Jackson. ”The New Normal’: US Charges Chinese Military Officers With Cyber Espionage.’ Informationweek Dark Reading.19 May 2014 http://www.darkreading.com/government/the-new-normal-us-charges-chinese-military-officers-with-cyber-espionage/d/d-id/1252911
Lee, David. “The hackers hunting for clues about you.” BBC News. 11 February 2013. http://www.bbc.com/news/business-21371608
McGregor, Richard. The Party: The Secret World of China’s Communist Rulers. Penguin Books: London, 2012.
McKinsey & Company. The rising strategic risks of cyberattacks. http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/business_technology/The_rising_strategic_risks_of_cyberattacks
Rid, Thomas. Cyber War Will Not Take Place. Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2013.
Riley, Michael and Lawrence Dune. ‘China’s Comment Group Hacks Europe—and the World.’ Bloomberg Businessweek. 2 August 2012 http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2012-08-02/chinas-comment-group-hacks-europe-and-the-world
Stratfor. Washington Shows It Is Serious About Cyber-Espionage. 20 May 2014 http://www.stratfor.com/sample/analysis/washington-shows-it-serious-about-cyber-espionage
The New York Times. Fine Line Seen in U.S. Spying on Companies http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/21/business/us-snooping.-on-companies-cited-by-china.html
United States Department of Defense. ‘Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security DevelopmentsInvolving the People’s Republic of China 2013.’ Office of the Department of Defense. 2013. http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2013_china_report_final.pdf
United States Department of Justice. ‘U.S. Charges Five Chinese Military Hackers for Cyber Espionage Against U.S. Corporations and a Labor Organization for Commercial Advantage.’ Office of Public Affairs. 14 May 2014. http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2014/May/14-ag-528.html

Obama offers some humility; this can be a good thing

May 29, 2014 by Strife Staff

By Zachary Wolfraim:

President Obama sought to outline a vision for US foreign policy in his commencement speech to West Point graduates on 28 May and once more highlighted the role of American leadership in global affairs. While he noted that the US was the ‘indispensible nation’, the new dangers to the international system were neither to be underestimated, nor should the US be complacent about its place in this system. Indeed, President Obama noted the rising challenges coming from a rapidly developing world and outlined the continued need for American leadership in tackling future crises. Moreover, despite the blows struck against al-Qaeda, he also highlighted the still dangerous and diffuse threat of international terrorism.

What exactly does this mean for the role of the US as primus inter pares? Perhaps most notably, Obama’s speech sought to balance optimism with a dose of humility. The heavy toll of Iraq and Afghanistan has certainly given pause for reflection over the use of force as an immediate solution for major foreign policy crises. Indeed as he noted, “just because we have the best hammer doesn’t mean that every problem is a nail.” Similarly, Obama sought to highlight the importance of restoring America’s moral leadership – again vowing to close Guantanamo, revise protocols on intelligence gathering and support the broader cause of international justice. Of course, this was balanced by his continued support for drone strikes as a vital counter-terrorism tool.

Critics of the President may see this speech as broadly kowtowing to international public opinion and damaging US ability to project its power and protect its interests internationally. However, in many ways the speech betrays a realism that has been a long time coming. America’s ‘unipolar moment’ is long past and the dynamics of international power continue to change; however, to suggest that the US has less of a role in world than it did in the past is also wrong. Indeed, as noted already, the US remains first among equals and will for some time yet, despite previous missteps or errors like the drawing of ‘red-lines’ with regards to Syrian chemical weapons.

As outlined in the speech, redoubling efforts to reinforce legitimacy-building institutions enhances American power far beyond military adventures or one-off diplomatic initiatives. The recognition that military power does not exist in a vacuum recognizes the important lessons learned from Afghanistan. As demonstrated by the shaky progress in Afghanistan, development and diplomacy need to be critical components of any future intervention or counter-terrorism initiative from the very beginning. Utilising appropriate international organizations will help achieve this by building the capabilities of allies reinforcing partnerships.

Nonetheless, the foreign policy as outlined carries dangers if followed through half-heartedly. If the US is to truly try and reform and reinforce the components of the current international order it needs to be done so with zeal, commitment and genuine follow-through to prevent its efforts from being bogged down in a bureaucratic quagmire. Taking on deeply entrenched bureaucracies such as the UN will require serious diplomatic commitment on the part of the US and its allies. This echoes many of the same issues that the US has faced in NATO in the past with regards to free-riding and burden sharing. Any optimism about the US trying to embed itself deeper in the system of international institutions should be tempered by the recognition that its partners and allies must match or at least share in this commitment. Indeed, US leadership is all well and good, but not all nations will see this renewed engagement as a positive step. Rather, this move can open the door to restrict, contain or otherwise hamper the exercise of American power internationally. Additionally, the increased engagement of the US in these organizations can also open them to criticism that they are only instruments of Western power. Perhaps most vitally, the international community should not expect the Obama administration or future administrations to sacrifice the ability to act on some issues on the altar of international legitimacy.

While Obama has outlined this ‘new’ approach to foreign policy, the international community should not expect any dramatic, immediate changes. He has already shown a hesitancy to use military force; largely reflecting the tentativeness of the American public to avoid another prolonged entanglement abroad. Rather this likely signals a greater effort to support existing areas of US influence within international organizations. NATO, ever starved for summit deliverables, will likely have a raft of possibilities for counter-terrorism cooperation, alongside cyber-defence and other joint activities to bolster European defence. With regards to the UN, IMF and World Bank, it will be interesting to see new American initiatives in these organizations and what these entail.

The announcement of new priorities in US foreign policy certainly deserves attention. It is naïve, however, to think that this will dramatically change any of the numerous challenges facing the international community. That said, if executed properly this sets the stage for US foreign policy over the next decade. It serves Obama and any future administrations well to recognize that the international system is changing, as is the position of the US within it. Terrorism, Syria, and challenges posed by Russia all present continuing threats to the international order. In order to stay relevant, US foreign policy must adapt and learn the lessons of the past decade’s military adventurism. We should all hope that Obama’s speech, if followed through and implemented, represents a step in the right direction.

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Zachary Wolfraim is a third year PhD student in the War Studies Department, King’s College London, where he focuses on the role of narratives in shaping foreign policy in relation to NATO operations. He previously worked as a consultant in NATO Headquarters on operations in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya. You can follow him on Twitter @ZachWol.

Drones series, Part IV. ‘May you die in a drone strike’: Yemen, AQAP and the US drone program

April 18, 2014 by Strife Staff

By Dr Victoria Fontan:

Drones are slowly making their way into our modern lives. They can now deliver books, medical marijuana, or beer to sailors at sea. In the next few years, drones will dramatically change our lives. Farea al-Muslimi, a Yemeni youth activist, explains how they have already changed the social fabric of his country.[i] ‘May you die in a drone strike’ has now become people’s favourite curse, and when a parent wants a child to behave, he/she only needs to threaten to ‘call the drones,’ and the child will comply with any request. In the Global North, drones bring modernity to your doorstep. In Yemen, they deliver death.

Competing numbers of casualties

The exact number of drone strikes in Yemen cannot be fully ascertained, due to the covert nature of US operations in the region. While the first strike was carried out in 2002, all others have taken place after President Obama took office in 2009.

The table below summarises the data collected by the Bureau of Investigative Journalism, New America Foundation, the Long War Journal and the Government of Yemen on drone strikes in the country.

In Yemen, drone strikes are only part of the story regarding the targeted killings performed by the United States government against, allegedly, Al-Qaeda in the Arabic Peninsula (AQAP). Other types of attacks can be launched from US Navy warships or army bases in neighbouring Saudi Arabia, whose fighter planes also participate in the US war on AQAP in Yemen.[ii] The public is being reassured that targeted killings are all carefully regulated, and that only terrorists are dying, minus a few collateral deaths that outweigh the potential civilian deaths resulting from an actual act of terrorism.[iii]

Grounds for targeted killings

On what grounds can a targeted killing take place? Al-Muslimi has had a lot of time to reflect on this. His village, Wessab, was targeted by a strike on April 17^th 2013.[iv] Six days later, he testified before the US Senate on the attack. An anti-drone activist since then, he explains that two are types of killings. Under the first type, the United States Department of Justice provided three clear conditions for a killing to take place: the person has to be designated as a person of interest and he or she must represent a direct threat to the US; the target cannot be captured; and, finally, the operation must not target civilians.[v] The other type is the ‘signature strike’, whereby any high-ranking military officer can order the death of anyone displaying suspicious behaviour.[vi] There lies a rather complex problem for any civilian: ‘What is suspicious behaviour in the US is completely normal behaviour here,’ explains Farea. ‘It can represent every single Yemeni in Yemen. If I am with you, going to a wedding outside Sana’a, we will obviously be between the age of 15 and 65, we will be carrying guns [they are part of the Yemeni dress code], and we will be a group, [that’s] enough! It is not even intelligent criteria anymore.’

Questions of effectiveness

These criteria raise many questions. First, if anyone can potentially be targeted, how effective can the strikes be in relation to weakening AQAP in the region? Moreover, are the conditions highlighted by Barack Obama ever being met? Several attacks come to mind, some of them involving drones, others both drones and missiles sent from US Navy ships. The first one is that of al Majaala, on December 17^th 2009, portrayed in Jeremy Scahill’s 2013 documentary Dirty Wars.[vii] The target of this attack was Mohammed al-Qazimi, a former alleged al-Qaeda associate who had spent five years in a Yemeni jail, and had been released shortly before the strike. Since he had returned to Maajala, he had been passing by an army checkpoint morning and afternoon to go and buy his daily bread and khat.[viii] He could easily have been arrested and tried at any time for any crimes he was accused of. Did he represent a known threat to the Yemeni government? It is unlikely that he would have ever been released from prison if he did. Fifty-five people died on that day, including 14 women, seven of which were pregnant, and 21 children.[ix] A second attack of interest is that of Qawlan, on January 23^rd 2013.[x] On that day, a known opponent of former President Ali Abdullah Saleh, Rabieh Hamud Labieh, was travelling by car. Labieh was a democratically elected local councillor who had turned against former President Saleh during the 2011 Arab Spring-related demonstrations. Labieh was notorious for having denounced the smuggling of government weapons between Sana’a and Saleh’s countryside stronghold right after his demise. He had been an opponent to the new regime, arguing that the country was still a dictatorship. Once again, why should he be targeted by the US government, except to contribute to a Yemeni government purge? Eight people died on that day, all civilians with no connections to AQAP.

AQAP, the ‘moderates’ and anti-US sentiment

Al-Muslimi remarks that the strike against his own village in April 2013 has increased anti-US sentiment throughout the region, hence boosting the local support for AQAP by default. The fact that AQAP now occasionally compensates villagers after drone strikes is a politically savvy move, clearly winning local hearts and minds in the process and also undermining the Yemeni government, which rarely offers compensation after strikes. Abdul Rahman Ali Barman, director of HOOD, a Yemeni-based Human Rights NGO, makes a more disturbing assertion regarding AQAP.[xi] Barman argues that moderates within the organization have been purged to the benefit of hardliners, all thanks to drone strikes. He mentions the recent killing of two moderate al-Qaeda officials by a strikes, Fadel Qasr and Mohammed el-Hamda. According to him, Qasr and el-Hamda were members of the AQAP council, the Shura, which decides on operations across the country. They both had withdrawn during the vote on several operations, which they did not agree with. Their names and locations were conveniently given to the Yemeni government, which then forwarded them to the US.[xii] According to Ali Barman, AQAP’s military leader, Qasm al-Raimi, is actually very close to the previous and current governments. If this is indeed the case as Ali Barman alleges, then indirectly, the US government would be aiding and abating AQAP, helping it purging its moderates. Of importance here is the idea that moderates within AQAP and other al-Qaeda related organizations seem to be more inclined towards addressing social justice issues, rather than directly challenging the State into the formation of an exclusive Caliphate.[xiii]

Drone strikes and targeted killings in Yemen are a very complex affair, much more so than the US government would like to admit. All parties involved, except the local population, seem to be benefiting from them. Ali Barman recalls the funeral of the Al-Maajala victims with emotion, especially an old lady who pleaded, referring to the US: ‘They even have laws that protect animals, why can’t they just consider us like their animals?’ Drones and the protection of animals in the US are two great signs of progress. In Yemen, they bear a sinister meaning. If the drone program continues in Yemen, the support from the population towards AQAP is likely to become much stronger, this due to the fact that many more civilians die in strikes than AQAP operatives, and that when AQAP members are targeted and killed, there are many candidates to replace them, often being more radical than their predecessors. Since it is public knowledge that the Yemeni government provides its US ally with the necessary intelligence before a strike, popular support can only go one way, that of AQAP.

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Dr. Victoria Fontan is an MPhil Candidate in the Department of War Studies at King’s College London. She carried out research on drone strikes in Yemen in January 2014. This article is based on a series of stories published on her blog, which can be found at www.victoriacfontan.com. In July 2014, with some families of drone victims, she will contribute to the establishment of a network aimed at the systematic compilation of evidence after new strikes.

NOTES
[i] Interview with Farea Al-Muslimi, Sana’a, Yemen, January 7^th 2014.
[ii] See http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/news/world/americas/article3647656.ece
[iii] See Barack Obama’s remarks at the National Defense University (NDU): http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/05/23/remarks-president-barack-obama
[iv] See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JtQ_mMKx3Ck
[v] See the US Department of Justice White paper for more information: http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/msnbc/sections/news/020413_DOJ_White_Paper.pdf
[vi] President Obama stated in the NDU speech referenced above that this type of strike would be examined. The Wedding Party strike of December 2013 suggests that ‘signature strikes’ are still active, since the wedding convoy was mistaken for an AQAP convoy: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/12/12/us-drone-strike-wedding-party-yemen_n_4434127.html
[vii] For a detailed account of the US government involvement in Yemen and the Majaala attack, see: http://www.thenation.com/article/159578/dangerous-us-game-yemen?page=0,2
[viii]Khat is a locally grown leaf that is chewed daily for its stimulant properties.
[ix] See Al-Karama and HOOD’s report on drone strikes in Yemen for more details: http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:zixkp3osuKQJ:en.alkarama.org/documents/ALK_USA-Yemen_Drones_SRCTwHR_4June2013_Final_EN.pdf+Al-Karama+and+HOOD’s+report+on+drone+strikes+in+Yemen&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=uk&client=safari
[x] Interview with Mohammed al-Qawli, Qawlan, Yemen, January 8^th 2014.
[xi] Interview with Abdul Rahman Ali Barman, Sana’a, Yemen, January 9^th 2014.
[xii] In December 2013, the Yemeni parliament almost unanimously called for an end to drone strikes in their country. The vote was a clear disavowal of Yemeni President Abdo Rabbo Mansour Hadi’s support for and collaboration with the drone program. See: http://edition.cnn.com/2013/12/15/world/meast/yemen-drones/
[xiii] The author has recently initiated a research on the issue of moderate al-Qaeda affiliates in Fallujah, Iraq. For preliminary results, see: V. Fontan, ‘Out beyond Occupy Fallujah and the Islamic State in Iraq and Sham, there was a field’, in Harmonie Toros & Yannis Tellidis (eds.), Researching Terrorism, Peace and Conflict Studies: Interaction, Synthesis and Opposition (Routledge, forthcoming in August 2014).

Drones series, Part II: Daring to use drones. Why targeted killings are a necessary component in modern counter-insurgency campaigns

April 10, 2014 by Strife Staff

By David C. Hofmann:

Fuelled by the global ‘war on terror’ that emerged in the aftermath of the 9/11 and 7/7 attacks, Western democracies have been steadily increasing their use of drone strikes to kill key operational and ideological members within insurgent groups in Yemen, Pakistan, Afghanistan and elsewhere. The state-sanctioned and strategic targeted killing of terrorists/insurgents is a controversial topic, and raises numerous moral and legal issues.[i] However, the realities of war are changing. For the most part, traditional battlefields have been replaced by insurgent campaigns conducted by hardened Islamist groups like the Taliban and al-Shabaab. In order to adapt to the realities and characteristics of this genre of conflict, drone strikes have become a crucial component within larger counter-insurgency strategies, and will likely remain so for the foreseeable future.

Why Drone Strikes are Necessary

Despite valid concerns over the ethics and legality of drone strikes, targeted killings remain one of the best coercive options currently available to combat well-entrenched insurgent movements in lawless areas. The inability and/or unwillingness of local government forces to combat or apprehend insurgent operatives necessitates outside intervention in order to ensure continued international and local security. Counter-insurgency options, however, are limited within this particular context. Traditional military assaults on guerilla fighters who have superior knowledge of the landscape are tactically unsound, as seen in the ongoing conflict in Afghanistan. Non-coercive methods are also limited (but not impossible) due to the ideological, apocalyptic and fanatical nature of most Islamist insurgent groups. The human and material costs of a ‘boots on the ground’ intervention are often prohibitive, and alternatives such as scorched earth tactics are wildly disproportionate and unethical.[ii] Furthermore, many insurgent groups enjoy broad public support. Traditional military invasion provides ample time for important operatives to go ‘underground’ and avoid apprehension. As a result of these and other factors, drone strikes emerge as one of the more practical and tactically sound options within theatres of war such as certain portions of the Pashtun region of Pakistan, the regions of Afghanistan controlled by the Taliban, and other similar locales.

The ability to strike at key players within insurgent groups without the mobilization of large-scale ground forces also has significant domestic and international political ramifications. The evidence suggests that drone strikes are popular with domestic audiences, who want and often demand a proportionate retributive response to terrorism without the need for mass deployment of troops.[iii] Within the international context, the legacy of the post-9/11 invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan have created an environment wherein large scale Western military efforts can be perceived as an illegitimate invasion, an attempt at colonization, or as an economic exploitation of the invaded country (e.g., ‘blood for oil’). The use of targeted killing strikes a balance between these two pressing political concerns by assuaging domestic audiences’ desire for retribution while simultaneously allaying some, but not all, concerns of Western imperialism by avoiding a long term ‘boots on the ground’ conflict.

Why Drone Strikes are Effective

Drone strikes have also proven to be effective at hampering insurgent groups and in hastening the end of their larger campaigns. Recent empirical evidence suggests that when used as a part of larger counter-insurgency strategy, targeted killing decreases operational capabilities, decreases professionalism, and increases the likelihood of organizational death.[iv] The prevailing argument is that repeated strikes against operational and ideologically important members of insurgent groups erodes long-term capabilities to plan and execute attacks by denying them the specialized skillsets of trainers, bomb makers, and ideologues. Furthermore, the use of drone strikes can lead to a deterrent effect by increasing the physical and social costs associated with engaging in armed conflict.[v] Lastly, efforts expended to remain ‘underground’ out of a fear of being targeted by drones diverts energies that would normally go towards the planning and execution of terrorist attacks.

The Future of Targeted Killing and Drone Strikes

As long as belligerents remain entrenched in locales that inhibit practical non-coercive or legal approaches to counter-insurgency, the best option is the proportional and strategic removal of operatives via drone strikes. However, the practice of targeted killing remains generally misunderstood by the public. If targeted killing is to stay as a cornerstone piece in Western counter-insurgency campaigns, efforts must be made by practising governments to address some of the moral and legal concerns surrounding the tactic. This will require the adoption of policies that add elements of transparency, legal review and comprehensive guidelines that determine when, where and how targeted killing can and should occur.[vi] To do otherwise risks sinking to the level of indiscriminate violence practised by many insurgent and terrorist groups.

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David is a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Sociology and Legal Studies at the University of Waterloo, Canada, as well as Editor in Chief of the ‘Canadian Graduate Journal of Sociology and Criminology’ (http://cgjsc.ca). His research focuses on the social dynamics of charismatic authority in terrorist groups, and how relationships between leaders and followers affect the formation, operation, and eventual demise of terrorist organizations. He can be reached at dhofmann@uwaterloo.ca

NOTES
[i] For a summary of both sides of the debate on drone strikes and targeted killing, see: Daniel Byman, ‘Why Drones Work’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 92 (July/August 2013), pp. 32-43; Audrey Kurth Cronin, ‘Why Drones Fail’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 92 (July/August 2013), pp. 44-54. For a discussion of the moral and ethical debate on targeted killing, see: Steven R. David, ‘Israel’s Policy of Targeted Killing’, Ethics and International Affairs, Vol.17, (2003), pp. 111-126; Alan Dershowitz, ‘Targeted Killing Vindicated’, Huffington Post, 2 May 2011, onine at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/alan-dershowitz/targeted-killing-vindicat_b_856538.html; David Kretzmer, ‘Targeted Killing of Suspected Terrorists: Extra-judicial Executions or Legitimate Means of Defence?’, European Journal of International Law, Vol. 16, (2005), pp. 171-212; Yael Stein, ‘By any Name Illegal and Immoral’, Ethics and International Affairs, Vol. 14 (2003), pp. 127-137.
[ii] Byman, ‘Why Drones Work’; David, ‘Fatal Choices’, p. 19.
[iii] Byman, ‘Do Targeted Killings Work?’, p. 102; David, ‘Fatal Choices’, pp. 7-8.
[iv] See: Patrick B. Johnston, ‘Does Decapitation Work? Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership Targeting in Counterinsurgency Campaigns’, International Security, Vol. 36 (Spring 2012), pp. 62-68; Bryan C. Price, ‘Targeting Top Terrorists: How Leadership Decapitation Contributes to Counterterrorism’, International Security, Vol.36 (Spring 2012), pp. 37-42; Alex S. Wilner, ‘Targeted Killings in Afghanistan: Measuring Coercion and Deterrence in Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency’, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Vol.33 (2010), pp. 316-323.
[v] David, ‘Fatal Choices’, 6-7; Wilner, ‘Targeted Killings in Afghanistan’, pp. 314-316.
[vi] Daniel Byman, ‘Do Targeted Killings Work?’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 85 (March – April, 2006), pp. 110-111; Byman, ‘Why Drones Work’; David, ‘Fatal Choices’, pp. 21-22.

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