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The new Cold War: The birth of a resurgent conflict

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By: Kyle R. Brady

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The Berlin Wall may be gone and the Cold War over, but the old and familiar patterns are quickly returning.

Twenty-five years after the end of the Cold War and the associated collapse of the Soviet Union, an exceedingly probable conclusion may be drawn from the interactions of the United States and the Soviet successor state of Russia:  a New Cold War has begun.[1]

Roughly since the turn of the 21st Century, the United States and Russia – a superpower state and a state seeking both superpower and empire status, respectively – have increasingly opposed each other’s efforts and interests. Notably, the Obama-Putin period has been more fraught and hostile than ever before, despite the so-called reset.[2] As of October 2016, a number of seemingly interconnected events have occurred that indicate an increasingly hostile disconnect, with Russia consistently opposing the increasing alignment of diplomatic and military relationships between the United States and Europe.[3]

Since the turn of the millennium, Russia has invaded a number of neighboring states – including Georgia and Ukraine – occupying several unrecognized foreign territories as a result.[4] Their military power has been projected abroad in foreign conflicts and is currently most visible in Syria.[5] Additionally, the Russians have also directly and intentionally engaged in nuclear destabilization efforts.[6] One of the unfortunate results of these developments has been the damaging of relationships between Russia and several member states of the European Union with close energy-security and resource dependencies with the federation.[7]

Recently, China has become increasingly aligned with Russia, visible through the publicly acknowledged military, security, and cyber joint-initiatives.[8] Russian intelligence services have frequently engaged in cyber-espionage and cyberwarfare in attempts to covertly influence domestic politics and the internal functions of targeted states, including the United States.[9] Moreover, Russia regularly undertakes every opportunity to denigrate, degrade, and destabilize the reputation, interests, and abilities of both the United States and the rest of the Western world.[10] Shockingly, Russia may have even poisoned American diplomats, a clear precursor to the resurrection of the KGB, a Soviet-era intelligence agency.[11] When considered both in total and in context, these do not seem to be the behaviors of a non-aligned or internationally participatory state – much less a friendly one. Rather, these are the behaviors of a state with little respect for its own pacts and agreements, a disdain for international institutions, a contradictory approach to foreign affairs, and a great desire to force itself onto the international stage.[12]

Throughout the original Cold War, the Soviet Union employed military and sociopolitical efforts – also known as hard power and soft power – in an effort to spread communism, expand Soviet territory, create a buffer-zone along its borders, and counter-balance Western efforts. Modern Russia has since resurrected strategies and practices of its Soviet past through the use of propaganda, aggressive, escalatory rhetoric, and dangerous flirtations with its Western enemies – strategies easily traced from the post-war period of the 1940s through the USSR’s collapse in 1991.[13] If there was a way in which to extend influence or oppose the West, the Soviet Union was more than willing to make an attempt.

This aggressively anti-West, self-interested, and consolidated approach has seen a remarkable resurgence in Putin’s Russia.[14]  While frustrating to diplomats and those who seek the normalization or improvement of relations, the rise of Putin’s Soviet-esque state is not entirely unexpected. Putin was a former KGB agent who rose to political power only to praise the fallen Soviet Union and instill his former coworkers in positions of power. [15]  As such, his consistent efforts to retool, rebirth, or wholesale replicate Soviet attitudes, behaviors, methods, and institutions seem only appropriate. Moreover, this New Cold War has not suddenly appeared but has rather been part of a slow but predictable process that began years ago.[16]

It seems unlikely that Putin will voluntarily relinquish power in the future, regardless of his formal title or relevant Russian law. Therefore, it should be assumed that Russia will proceed down the authoritarian, confrontational, and domineering path that was established long ago. In order to address several realities – military, social, political and economic – of the New Cold War and avoid repeating mistakes of the past, Western states need to acknowledge and formalize their devolving relationship with Russia. The lack of an open or nuclear conflict in the twentieth century’s Cold War does not preclude the outbreak of one in the New Cold War: this an important difference to understand when comparing between the two periods. The New Cold War need not be a zero-sum conflict across all realms and theatres. Both history and modern experience can provide substantial insight on how to redress differences and grievances, without threatening the safety of the entire world.

 

Note: Any opinions expressed are directly and expressly the author’s own; they do not represent — unless stated — his employers (past, present, or future) or associated/affiliated institutions.

 

 

Kyle R. Brady is a postgraduate student at King’s College London in the Department of War Studies, holds a Masters in Homeland Security from Pennsylvania State University, and has primary interests in terrorism, law enforcement, and contextualizing security concerns. Previously, he graduated with Departmental Honors from San Jose State University’s undergraduate Political Science program, where he focused on both international relations and political theory. All of Kyle’s work can be found online through http://docs.kyle-brady.com; he can be reached by email at brady.k@gmail.com or kyle.brady@kcl.ac.uk, on Twitter as @KyleBradyOnline, or on Facebook as /KyleBradyOnline; and he occasionally blogs at http://blog.kyle-brady.com.

 

 

Notes:

[1] Jones, Sam. “Dmitry Medvedev Warns of ‘New Cold War.’” Financial Times, February 13, 2016. https://www.ft.com/content/a14e8900-d259-11e5-829b-8564e7528e54.

[2] Kelly, Mary Louise. “Amid Deteriorating U.S.-Russia Relations, Questions Grow About Cyberwar.” NPR, October 4, 2016. http://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2016/10/04/496543317/amid-deteriorating-u-s-russia-relations-questions-grow-about-cyberwar;

Mankoff, Jeffrey. “The Tricky U.S.-Russia ‘Reset’ Button.” Council on Foreign Relations: Grand Strategy, February 18, 2009. http://www.cfr.org/grand-strategy/tricky-us-russia-reset-button/p18551.

[3] Kramer, Andrew E. “Russia Calls New U.S. Missile Defense System a ‘Direct Threat.’” New York Times, May 12, 2016. http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/13/world/europe/russia-nato-us-romania-missile-defense.html.

[4] Kofman, Michael. “The Crimean Crisis and Russia’s Military Posture in the Black Sea.” War on the Rocks, August 19, 2016. http://warontherocks.com/2016/08/the-crimean-crisis-and-russias-military-posture-in-the-black-sea/

[5] Roth, Andrew. “Syria Shows That Russia Built an Effective Military. Now How Will Putin Use It?” Washington Post, March 18, 2016. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/syria-shows-that-russia-built-an-effective-military-now-how-will-putin-use-it/2016/03/17/aeaca59e-eae8-11e5-a9ce-681055c7a05f_story.html?tid=a_inl

[6] “Russia Deploys Nuclear-Capable Missiles in Kaliningrad.” BBC News, October 8, 2016. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-37597075;

“Russia Suspends Weapons-Grade Plutonium Deal with US.” BBC News, October 3, 2016. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-37539616.

[7] Henderson, Niall. “A Literal Cold War: The EU-Russian Struggle Over Energy Security.” Council on Foreign Relations: Politics, Power, and Preventive Action, October 6, 2016. http://blogs.cfr.org/zenko/2016/10/06/a-literal-cold-war-the-eu-russian-struggle-over-energy-security/.

[8] Ide, William. “China-Russia Drills Highlight Converging Interests; Undercurrents Remain.” Voice of America, September 19, 2016. http://www.voanews.com/a/china-russia-drills-highlight-converging-interests/3515350.html.

[9] Limnéll, Jarno. “The Use of Cyber Power in the War Between Russia and Ukraine.” Council on Foreign Relations: Net Politics, January 11, 2016. http://blogs.cfr.org/cyber/2016/01/11/the-use-of-cyber-power-in-the-war-between-russia-and-ukraine/.

Gonzales, Richard. “U.S. Accuses Russia Of Election Year Cyber-Meddling.” NPR, October 7, 2016. http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/10/07/497093001/u-s-accuses-russia-of-election-year-cyber-meddling.

[10] Burns, Robert. “Ash Carter Blasts Russian Aggression.” U.S. News, September 7, 2016. http://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2016-09-07/ash-carter-clear-ambition-by-russia-to-erode-world-order.

[11] Eckel, Mike. “Two U.S. Diplomats Drugged In St. Petersburg Last Year, Deepening Washington’s Concern.” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, October 3, 2016. http://www.rferl.org/a/russia-u-s-diplomats-drugged-st-petersburg/28028782.html. Soldatov, Andrei. “Putin Has Finally Reincarnated the KGB.” Foreign Policy, September 21, 2016. http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/09/21/putin-has-finally-reincarnated-the-kgb-mgb-fsb-russia/.

[12] Lucas, Edward. The New Cold War: Putin’s Russia and the Threat to the West. 2nd ed. New York: St. Martin’s Griffin, 2009.

[13] Courtney, William, and Christopher Paul. “Firehose of Falsehoods:” U.S. News, September 9, 2016. http://www.usnews.com/opinion/articles/2016-09-09/putins-propaganda-network-is-vast-and-us-needs-new-tools-to-counter-it.

Roth, Andrew, and Dana Priest. “Putin Wants Revenge and Respect, and Hacking the U.S. Is His Way of Getting It.” Washington Post, September 16, 2016. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/russian-hacking-a-question-of-revenge-and-respect/2016/09/15/8bcc8d7e-7511-11e6-9781-49e591781754_story.html.

Gibbons-Neff, Thomas. “Russian Fighter Makes ‘Unsafe Close Range Intercept’ with U.S. Anti-Submarine Aircraft.” Washington Post, September 7, 2016. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2016/09/07/russian-fighter-makes-unsafe-close-range-intercept-with-u-s-anti-submarine-aircraft/.

[14] Sanger, David. “What Is Russia Up To, and Is It Time to Draw the Line?” New York Times, September 29, 2016. http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/30/world/europe/for-veterans-of-the-cold-war-a-hostile-russia-feels-familiar.html.

[15] Applebaum, Anne. “How He and His Cronies Stole Russia.” New York Times Review of Books, December 18, 2014. http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2014/12/18/how-he-and-his-cronies-stole-russia/.

[16] Tisdall, Simon. “The New Cold War: Are We Going back to the Bad Old Days?” The Guardian, November 19, 2014. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/nov/19/new-cold-war-back-to-bad-old-days-russia-west-putin-ukraine;

Trenin, Dmitri. “Welcome to Cold War II.” Foreign Policy, March 4, 2014. http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/03/04/welcome-to-cold-war-ii/;

Legvold, Robert. “Managing the New Cold War.” Foreign Affairs 93, no. 4 (July–August 2014). https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2014-06-16/managing-new-cold-war.

Image Credit: https://pixabay.com/en/berlin-city-wall-graffiti-346977/

Find the money-pot: Interagency budgetpolitik and American foreign policy

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By Jackson Webster

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Gee, I wonder how much partner capacity we can build with the gold at the end of that rainbow!

 

In policymaking, as in politics, it’s usually wisest to ‘follow the money.’ This famous tagline of All the President’s Men was of course referring to corruption within the Nixon administration, but the key role played by money-matters in policymaking nonetheless finds its way into the conduct of American foreign policy.

The White House has three main tools at its disposal when dealing with the outside world: The Department of State (DoS), USAID, and the Department of Defense (DoD). Traditionally, State deals in diplomacy, USAID deals in development, and Defense deals in war, however these roles are becoming increasingly intertwined in today’s dynamic environment abroad.

Since the authorization of military assistance to Greece and Turkey in 1948, a process which has come to be known generally as ‘security cooperation’ has, through both accident and design become a mainstay of America’s presence abroad. This ‘security cooperation’ has been authorized by Congress on a piecemeal basis over the decades, and it currently consists of over 80 separate legal ‘authorities’ for delivering assistance to various parts of foreign countries’ security services. Each of these authorities has a separate pot of money from which it receives funding, and the amount of congressional control over each operation varies greatly. Over the past two administrations, this set of programmes has been included in a broader diplomatic initiative which has become a cornerstone of American foreign policy: ‘building partner capacity,’ or BPC. This process is intended to allow “like-minded regional partners” to share the burden of international security in an era of fiscal tightening in the United States.

What these trends amount to is a marked difference in the character of American foreign policy, particularly in terms of the agencies involved in its execution. Immediately following the Second World War, and well into the 1950s, the focus of American foreign policy outside of Korea was the reconstruction of Europe and the extension of Washington’s trade influence through strong Bretton Woods institutions (IMF, World Bank, etc.). Much of this was a ways-and-means issue. The Department of State had a great deal of money in its pockets due to the implementation of the Marshall Plan, as well as the burden of postwar diplomatic initiatives, and had a great degree of federal —especially congressional— attention paid to it as a result.

Since 9/11, the counterterrorism initiatives of the Bush and Obama administrations have caused funding to flow into the Department of Defense. State, on the other hand, has not received an authorization for its operations in 14 years, and thus its budget and responsibilities have remained relatively stagnant. The last time the purse strings for State were examined there was no Facebook, Saddam Hussein was still in power in Iraq, and Donald Trump was only a mediocre businessman without a reality TV show. Broadly speaking, this trend has caused significant mission creep away from the Pentagon’s traditional role and into what the armed forces call “military operations other than war.” The idea of the American arms industry being leveraged as a tool of diplomacy is nothing novel, however what has been a revolutionary change in our foreign policy is the centralization of a major part of our interaction with our allies overseas under the DOD rather than under the diplomatic bureaucracy at Foggy Bottom. While State was once America’s primary instrument abroad, this role has moved across the Potomac into the Pentagon, and DOD has now assumed much of the day-to-day work of maintaining our global network of alliances, in part due to its significantly larger piece of America’s budgetary pie.

The US Senate is currently entertaining a defense authorization bill, sponsored by Senator John McCain (R-AZ), to reform security cooperation and assistance programmes. The reforms contain a near-ludicrous 92 pages of legal jargon which, among other things, diverts a significant amount of money to the direct control of the Secretary of Defense for the purpose of ‘security cooperation’ with our allies. The current estimate is $10 billion for 2017, but during future appropriations and authorizations processes, that number will probably increase.

What this means in terms of US foreign policy is, as noted, an issue of ways-and-means. Should an administration wish to strengthen relations with a given country, solve a diplomatic problem, or confront an adversary, it will use the tool with the most resources at its disposal. In today’s budgetary climate, that’s the DOD, which means the military will continue to be America’s leading method of interaction with the outside world, not State and its civilian foreign service. This disconnect between what the military and its bureaucracy are designed to do and what they’ve recently been asked to accomplish both reinforces and is symptomatic of the funding prioritization of Defense over State. This effects all levels of Defense’s activities, from the Marine asked to “shoot with one hand and pass out aid with the other” to the 4-star combatant commanders asked to accomplish what were once considered diplomatic or development goals with the often blunt instrument of the military. Congress is giving the DOD a lot of money to execute a set of responsibilities of questionable effectiveness for which the military was not designed and which the military itself doesn’t necessarily want to do.

While debate continues inside the Beltway over the strengths and weaknesses of the Senate’s proposed reforms, the most important takeaway from describing this process is the key role played by the congressional appropriations and authorizations process in the conduct of foreign policy. After all, a programme or policy without a large pot of money attached, for all intents and purposes, does not exist. Regardless of whether President Obama chooses to veto this year’s authorization bill or not, the fierce nature of the debate and its eventual consequences for policy are telling of the impact of budgets and bureaucracy on America’s foreign relations. Every programme needs a pot of money, and the politics behind agencies getting their hands on these funds are worthy of study for those wishing to understand why and how the United States does what it does overseas.

 

 

Jackson Webster is a graduate of the Department of War Studies and is currently based in Paris where he is reading for a master’s degree in international security policy from SciencesPo.

 

 

 

Notes:

1) All the Preseident’s Men, Alan J Pakula,1976.  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Kq_4Zlhoj4k

2) Aftergood, Steven. “Assessing “Security Cooperation”, 2015. https://fas.org/blogs/secrecy/2016/04/security-cooperation/

3) “What is ‘Building Partner Capacity'”, 2015. https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R44313.pdf

4) De Long, Bradford, and Barry Eichengreen. “The Marshall Plan: History’s Most Successful Structural Adjustment Program,” National Bureau of Economic Research, 1991. http://www.nber.org/papers/w3899

5) Vinik, Danny. “The State Department Hasn’t Been Authorized in 13 Years.” Politico, Sept. 2015.

6) Graham, David. “The Many Scandals of Donald Trump: A Cheat Sheet.” The Atlantic, Jun. 2016.

7) The bill can be accessed here: https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/senate-bill/2943

8) Schubert, Frank. Other Than War. NSC Joint History Office, Washington, DC, 2013.

Image Credit: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/2/2a/Washington_Monument_Rainbow.JPG

 

After the DNC: Hillary Clinton and the discontent of the Sandernistas

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By: Andrew Smith

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Image Credit: http://www.shutterstock.com/pic-386144416.html

 

The Democrats need to unite their party or risk conceding the White House to Mr. Trump

The DNC is over and yet again the Democrats showed that they know how to put on a show. From the highly personal speech of former president Bill Clinton, who presented his wife and current presidential nominee Secretary Hillary Clinton in a very human manner, to the emotional addresses of both Obama’s, the most notable theme throughout the four day convention was the optimistic manner in which the convention presented the United States. This stood in stark contrast to the Republican convention the week earlier which mainly concentrated on denouncing Clinton and promoting Trump’s agenda of fear.[1] Given the differing political rhetorics of both presidential nominees this perhaps came as no great surprise.

Throughout the four-day convention however it was Secretary Clinton’s ex-rival, Senator Bernie Sanders, and his supporters, who arguably had one of the most significant impacts, as he is – and they are – also likely to do so in the coming months. Day one of the convention in particular highlighted the polarisation that currently exists within the Democratic party and within American politics more widely. Die-hard Sanders supporters protested on the streets of Philadelphia, the host city of the DNC, and within the convention hall itself at the prospect of a Clinton presidency.[2]

These types of images are unusual for a party convention which are more traditionally seen as one last grand celebration of each party’s presidential nominee, culminating with the formal nomination and acceptance speech, before the final toils of the campaign in the months leading up to election day. They are also about setting the agenda and the tone of the campaign for the closing months and beginning to make decisions on which issues will be prioritised, and will create the more appealing headlines in an effort to convince the undecided voters. More importantly conventions are about unification. Whilst most Democratic officials have rallied around Clinton’s campaign, the 2016 DNC showed a raucous minority of the electorate certainly has not.

What the DNC brought to the fore was that, seemingly, the Sandernistas are as defiant in their acceptance of Clinton as Trump supporters are in their ignorance of any logical narratives suggesting that just perhaps he is not the man to ‘make America great again.’[3] Sanders supporters depict Secretary Clinton as the quintessential candidate of the establishment they despise. Someone who represents those at fault for wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya and Syria; who colludes with Wall Street for political funding, leverage and progression and; stands for those whom are in favour of neoliberal policies which Sanders supporters feel have neglected the poorest in American society for the past three to four decades. She is also portrayed as a president who will assure the prolongation of the in-fighting of party politics which has characterised much of the Obama administration and has hindered progress on an array of issues; gun control being debatably the most infamous. In short the die-hard Sanders supporters want to see large scale overhauls in the American political system. It is in this divergence of opinions where the division within the party resides. Clinton needs to address this disunity and quickly. If she is to become the first female president of the United States it could ultimately be down to her ability to convince these hard-line Sanders supporters to vote for her.

For Hillary Clinton the principal concern is not that these voters will vote for Donald Trump but that they will not vote at all. Many Sanders supporters, and many party unaffiliated voters – who make up the majority of the electorate – are reluctant in having to choose between the lesser of two evils. In an election of such importance Clinton needs as much of the US public as possible to go to the polls for her. Senator Sanders could play a crucial role in ensuring this.

His powerful delivery on day one of the DNC was his most convincing speech to date whereby he proclaimed his support for Secretary Clinton and where he endorsed her stance on some, although notably not all, issues including: the economy, health care, climate change, the Supreme Court and more.[4] His speech’s recurring phrase of ‘Hillary understands’ was significant and suggested real progress was made during the party’s platform in the weeks prior. It was the second day however where Sanders’ impact was most felt when he ended the roll call vote with his acclamation for Secretary Clinton from his Vermont delegation.[5] This hugely symbolic gesture was a clear stride towards party unification and should not be devalued.

Secretary Clinton’s response to the division in the party during her acceptance speech was typically Clinton-like and yet untypical at the same time.[6] Whilst she did not acknowledge her criticisms directly, she also did not go on the defensive, as seems to have become her norm, and addressed the fact there are many people who just don’t know what to make of her. She also returned the compliments Bernie Sanders paid to her by directly commenting on the economic and social issues that gave the Sanders campaign so much momentum during the primaries and assured his voters that she has heard them, and that she needed their ‘ideas, energy and passion’ to ensure real change in America. She may not have had the poetry and natural public speaking ability of Barack Obama or her husband but this was an effective speech that left no stone unturned. A delivery that accurately reflected the type of politician she is and potential president she could become.

Regardless of all the statements made by Clinton herself, the generous motions by Sanders and the endorsement of high profile politicians and celebrities alike, Clinton will know she faces an uphill struggle in the months ahead if she is to convince the Sandernistas to vote for her on November 8th. Most worryingly is that the gap between her and this minority is one she may be powerless to bridge. She could attempt to smooth relations; starting perhaps by accepting some degree of responsibility for the email scandal, although this has become ever the less likely after the FBI ruling.[7] Nevertheless even if the potential trade-offs, where they do exist, see her gain ground it may still not be enough to help her claim the White House.

One thing that can be said for Donald Trump is that he may not have the backing of many of his own party but at least he has his hardline voters in order, and as the recent British EU referendum has shown, it is they, the voters, who will decide the direction in which the country will progress, regardless of how small the margin.[8]

 

 

Andrew is currently pursuing his MA in Conflict, Security & Development at King’s College London after attaining his BA in Criminology. Andrew has a specialist interest in private military and security companies, and natural resources & armed conflict, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa. He has previously interned as a political and security risk analyst within the private extractive industries for both BP and Halliburton. You can follow him on Twitter @agsmith_93.

 

 

 

Notes:

[1] ‘2016 Republican national convention: a look back – in pictures,’ The Guardian (24 July 2016), http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/ng-interactive/2016/jul/24/republican-national-convention-look-back-in-pictures

[2] ‘Bernie Sanders Backers March Against Hillary Clinton in Philadelphia,’ International New York Times (24 July 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/25/us/politics/protests-convention-bernie-sanders-philadelphia.html?_r=1

[3] ‘33 Percent of Bernie Sanders Supporters Will Not Vote for Hillary Clinton. Here’s Why,’ The Huffington Post (16 March 2016), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/h-a-goodman/33-percent-of-bernie-sanders-not-vote-hillary_b_9475626.html

[4] ‘Sen. Bernie Sanders’ full speech from the DNC,’ Politico (26 July 2016), http://www.politico.com/video/2016/07/sen-bernie-sanders-full-speech-from-the-dnc-060086

[5] PBS NewsHour. “Bernie Sanders surprises crowd, moves to nominate Clinton by voice vote at the 2016 DNC.” Youtube video, 4:45. July 26, 2016, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q9tMnZKsRPY

[6] ‘Hillary Clinton Begins Building Her Coalition,’ The Atlantic (29 July 2016), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/07/live-coverage-of-the-democratic-national-convention-day-4/493385/

[7] ‘Statement by FBI Director James B. Comey on the Investigation of Secretary Hillary Clinton’s Use of a Personal E-Mail System,’ Federal Bureau of Investigation, 5 July 2016.

[8] ‘EU Referendum Results,’ BBC News (24 June 2016), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/politics/eu_referendum/results

Polska Walcząca: Poland and the United States at NATO

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By: Jackson Webster

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Source: Reuters, via Voice of America

On July 8th, heads-of-state and government figures from the 28 member-states of the world’s strongest military alliance will meet in the Stadion Narodowy in Warsaw, Poland. The NATO Summit occurs on an ad hoc basis and acts as a steering conference where the alliance’s leaders meet, discuss and decide on NATO’s new initiatives and primary goals. While recent Summits have focused on either the War in Afghanistan or on alliance expansion, this year’s Summit will likely concentrate on the status of NATO’s conventional forces in Central and Eastern Europe. This shift in alliance policy will likely amplify the role of NATO in European security, in line with changing American assumptions about the European relationship with Russia since the outbreak of the Ukrainian Crisis.

While the eleven NATO Summits held during the Cold War focused entirely on the threat to Western Europe posed by the Warsaw Pact, the fifteen summits held since the fall of the Soviet Union have reflected NATO’s steadily broadening mandate. The alliance has moved away from conventional and nuclear deterrence to anti-piracy, counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, and cyber warfare. Furthermore, the alliance has expanded to encompass many former Warsaw Pact member-states. Unsurprisingly, time at each NATO Summit is scarce, and heads-of-state are very busy people. Thus, the summit agendas have become crucial, directly reflecting the changing balances of power within the alliance. There is usually a single issue around which each summit revolves, such as defense spending ‘burden-sharing’ in the case of 2014’s Wales Summit. Two governments are likely to be key players in this year’s agenda-setting process: Poland and the United States. Warsaw and Washington have both indicated renewed interest in Eastern European security under their current administrations. Additionally, these states each possess, in their own ways, important roles in the new power balance within NATO. This shifting balance has seen Western European states with ailing defense budgets begin to lose influence to Eastern member-states who face direct threats to their territory and have accordingly invested in their militaries. Washington’s role in the alliance has remained the largely same, with the Americans possessing the final word on most alliance policy given their outsized contribution to NATO forces. Polish interests, or more accurately the Baltic region’s interests, will come to define the NATO of the coming decade, and that the United States would benefit from investing time and energy in these newly loyal Eastern partners.

Eastern European member-states, particularly Poland, have a strong argument to make in favor of increased NATO involvement in their region at this year’s Summit. This argument is rooted in the emerging military strength of the Polish state, and in the willingness Poland has shown to cooperate with Brussels and Washington on intervention and conventional deterrence over the past decade. “Polska Walcząca,” or “Fighting Poland,” was first used as a slogan of the Polish resistance (Armia Krajowa) during the Second World War. The symbolic acronym “PW” has become a part of Polish nationalism and military culture since the fall of the communist government in 1989, and the significance of this national legacy of resilience is not lost on the current right-wing Polish government which seeks to portray Poland as a rising military and economic power. For the past decade, Warsaw has occupied, perhaps for the first time in two centuries, an enviable position in the European balance of power. Poland has been one of the only major European Union member-states which has raised its defense spending since the 2009 Eurozone debt crisis. This spending is directed at a massive modernization process which will replace Cold War-Era hardware manufactured in communist Poland and the USSR with modern equipment, procured both domestically and from foreign contractors, namely American and German defense companies. In 2009, Poland made the transition from a conscription-based army to a smaller, more nimble professional force of around 70,000 personnel. This expensive modernization process is possible because Poland essentially avoided the Eurozone’s financial crisis due to a savvy national banking strategy, a robust commercial banking sector, and the free-floating Polish Złoty. Additionally, public support for increased defense expenditure remains high, and more importantly the Polish public has one of the highest approval ratings of NATO of any alliance member-state at 70%.

Poland seeks to use its new capabilities to push for a greater NATO footprint in Poland and her Baltic neighbors. Polish President Andrzej Duda has repeatedly indicated in speeches and interviews that Warsaw seeks a stronger conventional presence for NATO in Eastern European member-states. Stemming from fear of Russia’s increasing military assertiveness, Duda’s statements reflect the desires of NATO’s Eastern members for the alliance to engage in stronger territorial defence. Russia’s so-called ‘hybrid warfare’ techniques have worried NATO’s eastern flank since the 2007 attacks on Estonia’s Internet infrastructure, and these fears multiplied exponentially after the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014.

Both Poland and its Baltic neighbors are concerned over the vulnerability of the “Suwałki Gap”, a small stretch of land along the Polish-Lithuanian border running between Belarus and Russian’s Kaliningrad exclave. Kaliningrad, formerly the Prussian city of Königsberg, is home to Russia’s Baltic Fleet and is one of the most heavily militarized areas in Europe. NATO military planners believe that exploitation of this gap to cut off the Baltic states from the rest of Europe, followed by the Baltic Fleet denying NATO access to the Baltic Sea, would be the first Russian move should a conventional shooting war break out in Eastern Europe.

Since the end of the Cold War, as Western European states have become reliant on the US military for European territorial defense, Washington has held somewhat of a veto power over decisions in European security policy. The European community’s largely unsuccessful experiments in defense planning over the past two decades have resulted in the EU’s Security Policy naming NATO as the organization responsible for European territorial defense, not the EU itself. This status quo is unlikely to change, given that two of NATO’s largest contributing members —Turkey and the United States— would likely not support transferring defense responsibilities over to the EU, an organization in which they have no treaty rights. While American politicians often publicly decry European states for ‘free-riding’, the United States will remain committed to NATO for the foreseeable future because the (albeit very large) American contribution to the alliance guarantees American influence in European security strategy. This logic applies to Turkey as well, which has little continuing hope for EU membership. Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu indicated in remarks given to a NATO conference in Antalya that Turkey remains committed to NATO’s role in conventional defense and even discussed the possibility of enlargement, likely as a jab at Russia given Ankara and Moscow’s recent divisions over Syria.

The United States has the unique position of being able to pick its winners in regional power struggles. This ability, courtesy of the unrivalled depth of American military and economic power, is the primary tool used by American administrations in building alliances. Washington, particularly the State Department, has been wise enough in the past to use this ability to fundamentally overhaul previously problematic states. The liberal world order has been remarkably effective at bringing rising powers into the fold of the international community. In the 1950s, the United States took two devastated former adversaries —Germany and Japan— and turned them into both economic powerhouses and loyal allies.

Those who oppose strengthened ties with Poland often cite the current Prawo i Sprawiedliwość  (Law and Justice) government’s authoritarian tendencies and its stances against refugees, but the short-term political implications of this party’s power needn’t be confounded with the long-term viability of the Polish state and its contribution to collective defense. While the economic and military benefits for Washington of investment in geopolitically key partner states are obvious, the secondary benefit has been a transfer of values. Though it took decades, the market pressures caused by by increased trade brought down the authoritarian government of South Korea and replaced it with what is now one of Asia’s most robust democracies. South Africa’s reliance on the American financial sector was eventually used as leverage over the apartheid government, and the pressure of financial boycotting helped bring about the transfer of power and the end of racial segregation in that country. Though economic connectivity does not always bring about democratization —Saudi Arabia is the obvious example— these exceptions often have more to do with the characteristics of rentier states than with the given state’s relationship with Washington. This pattern, where the United States finds a given country is vital to its geo-strategic interests, invests in a military and trade relationship with this country, and turns it into a significant regional actor with liberal democratic values is likely to repeat itself in the case of Poland. As Washington redeploys conventional ground assets to the Baltic to balance Russian deployments in that region, American interests will be best served in the long-term by building up the capacities of Eastern European NATO members, namely Poland.

The United States and NATO will increasingly look to their emerging partners. Estonia has built formidable cybersecurity infrastructure since 2007 and is now the home of NATO’s cybersecurity think tank, Poland is poised to become a major conventional military player in Eastern Europe, and Turkey has maintained high defense spending due to the proximity of threats to its security. By contrast, the investment of Western European states in their own continent’s security has weakened dramatically in recent decades. So, too, will their influence within the alliance continue to fade. The three major Western European states —Germany, France, and the United Kingdom— are either distracted by security commitments out-of-theatre, or have cast themselves into isolationism. Today, the French are largely uninterested in Eastern European territorial security, the Germans are largely uninterested in their military, and Britons appear increasingly uninterested in the rest of the world altogether. Eastern European states, largely supportive of American interests in balancing Russian influence in former Soviet states, are the most viable partnerships for Washington given the current political situation in Europe.

What the rising influence of both Poland and Turkey likely means for NATO, given recent antagonism between both of these states and Russia, is a more assertive alliance stance in Eastern Europe. The Warsaw Summit provides, both practically and symbolically, the best venue to discuss this new focus on deterrence. The restraint and political engagement NATO sought under Western European influence in the 1990s are likely a thing of the past. Warsaw 2016 is set to see a second re-imagination of the alliance’s role in Europe, one which prioritizes the territorial defense sought by NATO’s newly-influential Eastern members.

 

 

Jackson Webster, a native of Los Angeles, is in the final year of a degree in International Relations at King’s College London, and will be continuing on to a master’s degree in International Security at Sciences Po, Paris. His dissertation research focused on Turkey’s relationship with NATO under President Recep Erdoğan.

 

 

NATO, State (Re)emergence, and Military Capabilities and Commitments: the Terms of the Debate

by

By: Alex Calvo

USS John Fitzerald Kennedy entering Tarragona Harbour in 2002. The city could be an alternative to Rota as a home port for the US Navy missile defence destroyers in the Mediterranean. https://www.flickr.com/photos/imcomkorea/3047221282/in/photolist-5DgNHY
USS John Fitzerald Kennedy entering Tarragona Harbour in 2002. The city could be an alternative to Rota as a home port for the US Navy missile defence destroyers in the Mediterranean. https://www.flickr.com/photos/imcomkorea/3047221282/in/photolist-5DgNHY

 

The possible (re)emergence of states within NATO, at a time of renewed international tensions and widespread concern over the capabilities and commitments of existing member states, means that any such country seeking recognition will have to answer a fundamental question: will the combined capabilities and commitments of the two resulting successor states be greater or smaller than those of the existing parent state? In the run up to the Scottish referendum last year for instance, this was discussed, with some voices in the United States expressing their concern at the possible impact on the military capabilities of Washington’s first and foremost partner.  The Atlantic Council, a US-based think-tank published a comparative study of Scotland and Catalonia, which praised the latter, emphasizing plans for naval specialization which fit with perceived US and NATO needs. At the political level, US President Barack Obama expressed his hope that voters would support Scotland staying in the UK, while remaining silent on Catalan independence and deploying USS Philippine Sea (CG 58) to Barcelona a few days before the 9 November semi-official referendum.

The report by the Atlantic Council, and President Obama’s different attitude towards Scotland and Catalonia, are a reminder that each case is different. The (re)emergence of a state within NATO is neither good nor bad in and of itself. It would be as irresponsible to oppose any such internal expansion without a detailed look at the particular case as it would be to blindly welcome it without applying the same careful examinatio. The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the debate, both in general and abstract terms, drawing on the case of Catalonia and Spain as a reference.

GDP. A state’s investment in defence is a measure of its total GDP multiplied by the coefficient determined by its political institutions. The division of an existing state can affect the size of the two resulting economies in different ways. On the one hand, it can lead to smaller and thus less efficient domestic markets. On the other, it can prompt more agile, dynamic, outward-oriented economies. Separation can put an end to the so called “rational underdevelopment” of some regions and to hard-to-justify discriminatory policies in areas like infrastructure, and regional and industrial policy.

A split can have a negative impact, at least in the short run, on both resulting economies if political risk assessments rise, or uncertainty remains over aspects such as the allocation of the national debt. If one of the successor states used to be a net payer to the common treasury (that is, it paid more in taxes than it received in public spending) and the other was a net recipient (it used to pay less than it received), then some questions arise. The short-term question is whether the additional post-independence growth in the net payer will compensate for the drop in the net recipien. In the longer run, the issue is whether the latter will benefit from more rational economic policies and an improved work ethic once it no longer enjoys funds from the former. Both Spain proper and Scotland are net recipients, while Catalonia’s yearly net fiscal transfers to the former are estimated at around 8 percent of the GDP in the last 15 years.

In the case of Catalonia, in 2000, 57 percent of Catalan exports were bound for the Spanish market, with the remaining 43 percent sent abroad; while in 2014, the percentages had reversed. In previous years, boycotts against Catalan products have been organized in Spain proper. The idea behind the boycotts was to prompt Catalan businesses and trade unions to oppose moves for further devolution (in particular the 2006 reform of Catalonia’s “Statute of Autonomy”, a law defining the powers of the regional authorities), for fear of losing market share in Spain proper, with the resulting negative impact on employment. However, rather than diminishing support for independence, such moves have largely backfired, while providing added momentum to the drive for internationalization.Regulated industries (such as banking) still under Madrid’s yoke remain shy when it comes to expanding abroad, but the myriad small and medium-sized enterprises accounting for much of Catalonia’s economic tissue less so, with quite a few having become “pocket multinationals”, that is not very large corporations which are nevertheless present in a wide range of countries. A post-independence boycott by consumers in Spain proper remains a possibility, and would have a negative short-term impact on Catalan GDP, however this would not translate into lower longer-term economic growth, rather the contrary. The reason is that, just like with the boycotts against the 2006 reform of the “Statute of Autonomy”, they would prompt businesses to expand in other countries, thus gaining size and competitiveness. Furthermore, in an independent Catalonia this trend would also involve those industries currently regulated by Madrid, such as infrastructure management and banking, which to date have internationalized to a very small degree. We should also remember that, while Spain’s Castilian core may remain hostile to the new state, Valencia and the Balearic Islands are likely to take a much more nuanced approach. In addition to sharing a language with Catalonia, their economic structure is similar. They also suffer a large fiscal deficit (difference between taxes paid and public spending received) and a lack of infrastructure investment, while their economy is based on small and medium-sized enterprises, which have been excluded by successive Spanish governments from the defence industry and related sectors such as airspace. A third consideration is that the value of Catalan exports to Spain proper include the value added by exporters plus the value of the intermediate goods used to produce them (that is, commodities, energy, and components, bought in Catalonia or abroad by Catalan companies to produce goods bound for Spain proper). Thus, taking the latter out, the effective percentage of Catalan GDP included in exports to Spain proper is lower, 22.5% of the GDP.

Concerning Spain proper, there are no Catalan plans for a boycott, and the independence movement has rather been careful and stress its desire to see good bilateral relations after separation. In that event, as Catalonia opens up further to world trade, and Spanish enterprises lose their current advantage in terms of common legislation and considerable overlap in the mass media sphere, they will face stronger competition from third-country producers in the Catalan market. This could be beneficial for Spanish companies, by forcing them to become more competitive. It would also promote their internationalization in two ways: thanks to this greater competitiveness forced by greater competition in the Catalan market, and due to a loss of market share in Catalonia pushing them to seek alternative markets.

In the short term, however, it is the loss of Catalan subsidies that may have the strongest impact on the economy of Spain proper, which has become structurally dependent on easy money from Catalonia and could suffer a significant GDP loss as these funds dried out. Although the EU and the IMF may push for a gradual easing out of financial flows, with some transitional agreements, Catalan independence would sooner or later mean that the more than 16 billion euros transferred to Spain proper every year would not longer be there. This would not necessarily be bad in the longer term. It could release Spanish entrepreneurial spirits and force a more rational set of economic policies, with for example greater infrastructure spending in industrial areas, more business-friendly tax regulations, and greater competition. Having said this, it is however likely to prompt further defence cuts in the short run. Ideally, this should prompt a fundamental transformation of Spain’s Armed Forces into a smaller, but non-political, agile, and better prepared military. Section 8.1 of Spain’s 1978 constitution reads “The mission of the Armed Forces … is … to defend its territorial integrity and the constitutional order”. This passage, believed to have actually been drafted by the military themselves, is widely understood to mean that Spain’s Armed Forces can be used to prevent Catalan independence, and seemed to be on Defence Minister Pedro Morenes’ mind when he said, in the run up to the 27 September election to the Catalan Parliament, that there would be no military intervention “as long as everybody does their duty”. If to the possibility of a military intervention in Catalonia we add the regular harassment of Gibraltar at sea, we can observe two very serious distractions for the Spanish Armed Forces.

Pyrenees Regiment No. 1 on training exercises. https://www.facebook.com/606201522730252/photos/pb.606201522730252.-2207520000.1445134712./606640706019667/?type=3&permPage=1
Ski Company, First Pyrenees Regiment, training during the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939). This elite unit was set up by mountain sports enthusiasts and served under the Catalan Government.†

Defence investment and procurement. Due to economies of scale, it could be argued that successor states will need to invest more simply to achieve the same capabilities as the parent state. In some cases, it could even be argued that some or all successor states will not be able to afford expensive hardware. On the other hand, this may facilitate greater integration and coordination with allies, with less duplication and fewer prestige projects. It may also lead to a renewed emphasis on maintenance and training, stressing not nominal capabilities, but real, deployable capabilities (which a country can effectively transport, deploy, and maintain).

In the case of Spain, procurement is deeply imbalanced, with the country embarking on expensive projects mainly motivated by a mixture of prestige and industrial policy, rather than operational considerations. The result: a large gap between nominal and real capabilities, problems in deploying and sustaining forces far from her shores, and a lack of funds for training, maintenance, and operations, with the bulk of defence spending going into personnel and procurement. To be fair, these problems are not unique to Spain. For example, the German deployment in Afghanistan was plagued by equipment failures, with a 2014 official report explaining that “only 42 of Germany’s 109 Eurofighters are available for immediate use because of fuselage defects. The navy faces similar problems with only 4 of its 22 Sea Lynx helicopters and 3 of its 21 Sea Kings currently operational.” However, the case of Spain is perhaps even more extreme, going beyond a lack of proper maintenance. A study on “Southern Europe Defence in Times of Austerity” noted that “[t]he Spanish military industrial base ranks tenth in the world and sixth in Europe thanks in part to its stake in EAD, one of the leading global aircraft companies. This means that any major cut in military investment projects in Italy and Spain directly affects their national economies and aggravates the domestic economic crisis environment. This disparity could explain why the Spanish and Italian governments chose to primarily reduce personnel and operations/maintenance programmes rather than investment programmes, whereas the Portuguese and Greek governments reduced defence expenditures across the board.”

Catalonia’s national security community is keenly aware of such problems, as reflected in successive unofficial white papers by the Military Studies Society (SEM). Its latest on defence budgets, published in June, lays down a set of serious, realistic budgetary guidelines for an independent Catalonia, based on the experience of NATO allies. The text stresses that operations (expenditures covering costs for deployed operations outside member state’s territory) and equipment maintenance have “been a problem common to many Western armed forces” due to a lack of “available resources in this area” of maintenance, prompted by the “excessive costs of acquisition programs.” The white paper strongly emphasizes that “The Catalan Defence Forces (CDF) cannot make these mistakes,” and recommends that “the percentage of the defence budget devoted to operations and maintenance should be between 35 and 40 percen.” For Catalonia, starting from scratch after 300 years without her own armed forces, this is a golden opportunity to avoid past mistakes, by both the Spanish military and those of many allies. The result should be a more agile, balanced military, where equipment is purchased according to perceived needs, rather than by industry lobbying, and then properly maintained.

Turning to the legitimate question of whether Catalan defence budgets will be large enough to sustain acquisition programs in areas like strategic airlift, a quick look at the numbers shows this should not be a problem. Catalonia currently accounts for roughly 20 percent of Spanish GDP, Madrid in turn spending 0.6 percent on defence. An independent Catalonia following NATO guidelines, as suggested by the SEM, would thus be spending the equivalent of 0.4 percent of current Spanish GDP. Adding in the expected long-term greater economic growth from the end of fiscal transfers, irrational economic policies, and sabotage to key infrastructures, it is not easy to imagine total Catalan defence spending surpassing the figure for today’s Spain. Spain may well find herself unable to sustain current levels of defence spending, however, since much of these capabilities are either not being properly maintained and used in training, or are directed towards fellow NATO member states (UK) or American allies (Morocco), it is not something that should concern alliance planners much.

Intra-alliance conflict (between successor states, or between the existing parent state and other partners). Concerning post-independence relations between successor states, at one end of the spectrum we could imagine two good neighbours leaving behind tensions and now able and eager to work together, both bilaterally and within wider permanent alliances and ad-hoc coalitions. At the other end of the spectrum, two hostile states with unresolved disputes and at least one failing to rule out a resort to force, prompting most of their capabilities to be addressed at each other rather than available to allies.

When the parent state has persistently been employing non-lethal force against a fellow NATO member state, the question arises whether once reduced in size it will persist in this policy, now with fewer resources, or whether it will abandon such an approach. In the latter case, the impact on the alliance’s capabilities will be doubly positive, since capabilities devoted to intra-alliance conflict will now be available to NATO, as will be those employed by the other member state to defend itself.

In Spain’s case, the country seems able to work with some of her former colonies, as shown by the successful incorporation of some 30 Portuguese commandos in the Spanish Legion’s detachment deployed in Iraq in a training and mentoring capacity. Unfortunately, this seems to be the exception rather than the rule, with Madrid unable or unwilling to recognize Gibraltar’s right to decide her own future, and the ensuing policy of constant harassment. In 2015, from 1 January to 23 June, the Spanish Navy had engaged in 23 violations of British territorial waters, while absent from BALTOPS201 , in a reminder that in a world with limited resources, failing to rule out the use of force against a fellow ally puts a dent on any potential contribution to NATO. It also has an impact on that ally’s contribution. Thus, when measuring Spain’s net contribution to the Atlantic alliance, we should subtract all the assets and capabilities devoted to the harassment of Gibraltar, plus the corresponding British assets and capabilities employed to defend the people of the Rock. Catalonia, having excellent relations with Gibraltar and the United Kingdom, which the national security community sees as a key partner, does not suffer such handicap. The new state will not have to spend a cent on disturbing the life and property of her Majesty’s subject

Ceuta and Melill, two cities located in North Africa, the former right in front of Gibraltar, administered by Spain but claimed by Morocco, also merit a mention. While this conflict is more low key, a significant portion of Spanish forces are deployed with their defence in mind. Since Morocco is a US Ally, again we would have to subtract them when measuring Madrid’s potential contribution to NATO. Not a problem for Catalonia, which is not party to any territorial conflict with the North African country. To add insult to injury, Ceuta has become the main logistic support base for the Russian Navy in the Mediterranean and North-East Atlantic, with Madrid blatantly disregarding Western sanctions in the wake of the Crimean crisis. In 2014 for instance, Russian warships docked at Ceuta on 13 occasions, while nine such visits have taken place in the first six months of 2015. By opening up Ceuta to Moscow, Madrid has forfeited the claim that it is in NATO’s interest to see Catalonia, including key ports like Tarragona and Barcelona, remain in Spanish hands.

Pyrenees Regiment No. 1 on training exercises. http://webs.racocatala.cat/cat1714/milicies2.htm

Defence industrial policy and international defence industry cooperation. Smaller domestic weapons markets can be cited as having a potentially negative impact. On the other hand, in those states where the dominant nationality has excluded another from the defence industry, the resulting end to the defence industry “apartheid” may enable weapons development and production to take root. In particular, where the excluded territory used to have an arms industry earlier in its history, and retains a significant civilian industrial base, as is the case in Catalonia.

The issue for third countries — in particular those involved in international consortia featuring the existing parent state — is the net impact. This may depend on possible synergies with existing civilian industries in the territory previously excluded from arms production.

Successive Spanish governments have excluded Catalan enterprises from the defence industry and many dual sectors, while subsidizing production in areas like Seville (Airbus Group), with little or no industrial tradition. A 2015 official report on Spain’s security and defence industry provides details of 47 companies, none of which is based in Catalonia, with only three in Valencia Region. Madrid has also strived to keep Catalonia isolated from southern France, home to most of the country’s aircraft industries. An end to this defence policy “apartheid” would allow Catalan enterprises to expand into the defence—and dual—industries, in a move which would benefit maritime democracies, including partners in the F-35 consortium. Spanish industry would contract, but this would liberate the country’s partners from the extra costs involved in manufacturing in regions with no industrial traditio. A look at FDI (foreign direct investment) reveals a completely different geography from that of the defence industry programs jointly sponsored by Spain’s Defence and Industry Ministries. In the second quarter of 2015, 35.1 percent of Spain-bound industrial FDI went to Catalonia, while none of Spain’s at least 300 8×8 wheeled infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) based on General Dynamics’ Piranha 5 will be manufactured in Catalonia. The initial order is expected to be worth EUR1.5 billion.

The location of Airbus Group’s plant in Seville, in the southern region of Andalusia, where there is little private industry, does not make sense. From a French perspective, a Catalan town would seem more logical, since French aeronautical industry is concentrated around Toulouse, close to Catalonia. This would also benefit UK taxpayers, given the significant connection between the Spanish and British defence industries, to a large extent due to the two countries’ cooperation in aircraft projects. According to the official Spanish report on 2014 weapons exports, the United Kingdom ranked first among the country’s customers, with purchases worth 862.7 million euros, 26.9 percent of the total. The report explains that three aerial refuelling tankers accounted for 573,9 million euros and a transport airplane for 121.8 million euros, with a portion of the balance coming from parts for the EF-2000 fighter and the A400M military transport plane. As we can see, this is not trade in finished weapons systems, but rather intra-industry trade among countries cooperating in joint projects, where the distribution of the work involved is often related to the volume of orders from each defence ministry. Therefore, by excluding Catalan industry and imposing manufacture in areas like Seville, with little tradition of private industry, Madrid is raising the total cost of production of these aircraft.

Cohesion, internal security. When an existing state resorts to force, or the threat of force, to retain its present territory and population, a portion of its security and defence capabilities will have to be devoted to this task, and thus unavailable to NATO. Distracted by the need to coerce part of their population into remaining, collective defence may not be a priority.

This is the case in Spain, where the military granted itself the duty and right to employ force to keep the country together in the 1978 Constitution. The 2006 Statute of Autonomy, Catalonia’s last attempt to find a reasonable accommodation within Spain, also prompted sabre rattling, and on 17 May 2015 Catalan police caught three Spanish soldiers stealing an independence flag in Figueres. Stealing flags is obviously not the best way to train for NATO operations, while wasting Catalan police’s time does not contribute to the fight against Jihadist terrori. Every minute spent by Catalan police officers investigating such deeds is a minute not spent fighting against international terrorism and organized crime. The extent to which the resort to force to prevent Catalan self-determination distracts and perverts Spanish defence policy is clear from available statistic. While the defence budget has shrunk by 32 percent since 2008 (68 percent according to some sources, but this may not fully take into account defence spending from other departments’ budgets, for example the Industry Ministry to fund weapons programs involving domestic manufacturing, as well as extra-budgetary liabilities), that of the National Intelligence Centre (CNI) grew by 9.7 percent in 2015. Details may not be available on open sources, but it is suspected that the bulk of this increase is devoted to the “dirty war” against the Catalan independence movement.

Catalonia, on the other hand, has made clear from the outset that Val d’Aran, with her own language and culture, was free to join the new state or go her own way. No Catalan military capabilities will be needed to keep inside those who want out. Whether Spain without Catalonia will stop seeing the military as a political actor is not clear at this stage. Ideally this change should take place, releasing military capabilities currently not available to the Atlantic alliance.

Citizens’ loyalty: Draft and reserves. If some citizens within the parent state feel little loyalty, or even a measure of hostility towards it, for whatever reasons (justified or otherwise), there may be a gap between its theoretical manpower pool and the actual number of deployable citizens, be they regular or reserve. While the parent state may resort to a purely professional military to avoid this problem, it may then translate into a lower degree of political support for defence policies.

This is clearly the case in Spain, where there is little love between the state’s Castilian core and many of her non-Castilian citizens, leading to a downward spiral where the more the centre uses—or threatens to use—force against those wishing to leave, the less the latter feel bound to support the former’s resort to force as a legitimate instrument of foreign policy. Many Catalan citizens who feel alienated by the Spanish military may well wish to support their Catalan counterpart, for example by joining the reserves, making the combined manpower pool available to the two successor states larger.

Transitional issues: Inheriting defence assets and personnel. Downsizing and building one’s military. In addition to wider economic issues, the transition from parent state to successor states also features some aspects specific to the military. Among them, the distribution of existing defence assets and personnel and the accompanying downsizing of the parent state’s and (re)creation of the successor states’ armed forces.

Concerning the distribution of Spanish military assets, preliminary defence planning in Catalonia has featured two views, with some analysts favouring the taking over of some naval and air assets, while others prefer to avoid systems not necessarily best suited to Catalan and allied needs. With regard to Spanish military personnel wishing to join Catalonia’s Armed Forces, the issue is highly sensitive and has not been publicly discussed by the Catalan Government. However, both the Catalan Government and parties have stressed that Spanish Government employees in Catalonia will keep their jobs after independence, and in so doing they have not excluded any category. The Advisory Council on the National Transition, a government agency tasked with preparing a number of white papers to prepare for independence, also refers to Spanish Government workers without excluding the military, although again without referring to them explicitly. Some members of the Spanish military may have discreetly enquired about the possibility of joining Catalonia’s Armed Forces, but they are unlikely to do anything which may put their jobs at risk until this possibility is a real one. We could also mention that when Catalan Police, the Mossos d’Esquadra, began to expand in the 1980s to become responsible for most public security duties, Spanish Police and Civil Guard (a constabulary-type force) officers in Catalonia were given the chance to join. Catalonia may also need to provide for those members of the Spanish military who do not wish to follow this route but who refuse to follow orders contrary to international law and fear subsequent reprisals.

Conclusions. The factors discussed are only a sample of those that may have an impact on state succession within NATO, resulting in greater or lesser capabilities and commitments towards the alliance. This work should ideally be followed by more extensive research and case studies, but should at least serve the purpose of underlining that, no matter how distressing the (re)emergence of states can sometimes be, the consequences to defence policy should be approached rigorously. It is also a reminder that any new state wishing to be recognized by existing states will have to explain to the international community how it will not only defend itself but also its allies and partners. Even more so at a time of increasing tensions, a country’s contribution to collective security is bound to be one of the main factors determining its recognition, or lack thereof, by the international community.

In the case of Catalonia, preliminary defence planning is geared towards the creation of a modern, capable, and agile military, ready to protect the country’s territory and population and make a powerful, positive contribution to NATO. This scenario could also give Spain the chance to reform her own military, in which case the Atlantic alliance would gain two net security contributors. However, it is still too early to say whether Catalan independence will prompt a rationalization of Spanish defence policy and thus a positive contribution to NATO from Madrid.

 

Alex Calvo, a guest professor at Nagoya University (Japan), focuses on security and defence policy, international law, and military history, in the Indian-Pacific Ocean Region. He tweets at Alex__Calvo and his work, which includes “China’s Air Defense Identification Zone: Concept, Issues at Stake and Regional Impact”, Naval War College Press Working Papers, No 1, US Naval War College,  23 December 2013, is available at http://www.usnwc.edu/Publications/Working-Papers/Documents/WP1-Calvo.aspx, can be found at https://nagoya-u.academia.edu/AlexCalvo

† http://www.facebook.com/606201522730252/photos/pb.606201522730252.-2207520000.1445134712./606640706019667/?type=3&permPage=1