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Strife Series on United Nations Peacekeeping, Part V – The Future of UN Peacekeeping Operations

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By Felix Manig

UN Unmanned/Unarmed Aerial Vehicle (UAV) is prepared for take-off (Credit Image: UN Dispatch)

The nature of conflict is changing and so must UN peace operations if they are to remain an indispensable and effective tool in promoting international peace and security. What then UN Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon stated in 2014 echoes even louder today, given the ever more politically complex and high-risk environments UN peacekeepers operate in. While there is no one-size-fits-all peace operation, adopting a number of priorities can help all UN missions to move toward necessary reform. The future peacekeeping architecture should build on strategic and regional partnerships, strengthen conflict prevention capacities and harness emerging technologies to effectively sustain peace in the twenty-first century.

 

Strategic and Regional Partnerships

 A key challenge for UN Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKOs) is to compel states with more advanced military capabilities and technical expertise to contribute more meaningfully to missions in the future. Perhaps the most promising path for this lies in building on the strategic partnership with the European Union (EU), which vowed to cooperate more closely with the UN on peacekeeping and crisis management. The EU is uniquely qualified to aid the UN in capacity building for the maintenance of international peace and security, especially in complex operations for which regular troop contributing countries are ill-equipped. In fact, EU member states collectively represent the largest financial contributor to UNPKOs and UN peace operations also address key EU foreign and security policy priorities in counterterrorism, the rule of law and promoting the role of women in peace and security. The initial results of increased policy coherence, joint training exercises and EU engagement in support of UN peacekeeping over the last years appear promising. In Mali, EU military and civilian support helped MINUSMA to strengthen local internal security forces. In the Central African Republic, the EU’s EUFOR RCA operation set the foundation for the later UN-led MINUSCA mission.

In Africa, where the UN currently conducts the majority of its peacekeeping missions, building on partnerships means strengthening collaboration with the African Union (AU) and other regional and sub-regional organisations such as ECOWAS or IGAD. While the UN already cooperates with the AU in conflict prevention, mediation and peacekeeping, simultaneous or complementary deployments by the UN and AU will likely feature more prominently in the future. These hybrid mandates can add important political capital to operations and prove valuable during peace negotiations, such as in the Central African Republic, where local and regional knowledge may be indispensable.

 

Strengthen Conflict Prevention

In his vision statement, Secretary-General António Guterres stressed his commitment to a “culture of prevention” to bring about peace, political solutions and sustainable development to crisis hotspots. One major strategy to promote stability and prevent conflict is to include more women in UN peacekeeping, both as security sector officials within operations and in critical decision-making bodies for conflict resolution. Passing UN Security Council resolution 1325 on women, peace and security was a historic and important step. However, the UN must act more decisively to build up women’s participation and turn the resolution’s pledges into a reality. Given that it is the responsibility of UN member states to commit peacekeeping personnel, the organisation should feature its gender mainstreaming strategy more prominently and boost the reach and responsibility of its Gender Advisers to encourage troop contributing countries to increase the share of female staff. Strong evidence shows that women’s participation in peace and security processes improves the safety of peacekeepers, leads to more successful radicalisation prevention programmes, and improves the economic recovery in conflict-affected regions. Perhaps most importantly, peace agreements in which women participated meaningfully are 35% more likely to last at least 15 years than agreements which were concluded by male-only signatories.

 

Harnessing Emerging Technologies 

The reform agenda introduced by the Secretary-General equally calls for scaling up the technological capabilities of UNPKOs to make peacekeepers more flexible and mobile. In 2015, an independent Expert Panel on Technology and Innovation found that many UN field operations were lacking the technological tools considered necessary by militaries and law enforcement agencies to operate effectively. The report also drew a direct connection between these deficiencies and the reluctance of developed countries to meaningfully contribute troops to existing operations.

An improved understanding of operating environments as well as the presence or intent of adversaries are key components for risk reduction in conflict. Harnessing emerging technologies such as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) is one way to move into this direction. Unarmed UAVs were first used by the UN MONUSCO operation in December 2013, helping peacekeepers to improve their situational awareness, monitor migration movements and track armed groups in the mountainous terrain of the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo. Since then, camera and sensor-equipped UAVs have become increasingly common in other UNPKOs, including in Mali and the Central African Republic, and their use should be expanded to other operations as needed.

The UN should also push for more intelligence gathering and monitoring tools within UNPKOs of the future. From satellite reconnaissance to ground surveillance radars and acoustic or seismic sensors, the cost of such once exclusive technologies has now fallen so dramatically that even the small peacekeeping budget allows investment in them. The collection and analysis of data about movements, crime and conflict can then produce intelligence which in turn can be used to shorten warning and response times for peacekeepers on the ground. Systematic and data-driven monitoring and mapping of crises can also promote patterns and models to make the prevention of human rights abuses or cease-fire violations more efficient and cost-effective.

 

Looking Forward

 A meaningful implementation of the above recommendations depends, as always, on the necessary funding and political will of UN member states. Threats by the US administration to cut its share of the already meagre $6.8 billion peacekeeping budget, which is less than half of one per cent of world military expenditures, sends a troubling sign to multilateral efforts at maintaining peace and security. For UNPKOs, gaining the necessary political will largely depends on the strategic interests of P5 members in conflict regions. In this sense, geopolitical competition and the current stalemate at the UN Security Council around humanitarian crises such as in Syria or Yemen represent major challenges to the UN peacekeeping architecture.

However, the UN is not in an existential crisis. Since taking office, the Secretary-General has made reform a priority for the UN and the organisation is responding to the justifiable criticisms. The UN realised the changing nature of conflict and is in the process of adapting its prevention and peacekeeping missions to this new threat landscape. Although the UN may sometimes seem like a relic of the 20th century, it has the ability and necessary vision under its current leadership to evolve and remain irreplaceable for promoting international peace and security.

 

Felix Manig is a postgraduate in International Relations at King’s College London. He focuses on global governance, conflict resolution strategies, and cybersecurity. Outside of academia, he is Series Editor at Strife and writes for the Peacekeeping Project at the United Nations Association of Germany. You can follow him on Twitter @felix_manig

Image Source:  https://www.undispatch.com/un-learning-love-drones/

Strife Series on United Nations Peacekeeping, Part IV – Lessons Through a Gender Lens: The Efforts and Failures of UNMISS

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By Caitlyn OFlaherty

UN peacekeepers control South Sudanese women and children before the distribution of emergency food supplies in a PoC site in Juba (Credit Image: Adriane Ohanesian/Reuters)

Shockingly gruesome violence has defined South Sudan since civil war broke out in 2013, only two years after it gained independence. Over 50,000 people have been killed since, including tens of thousands of civilians. Over 4 million have been displaced.

The United Nations peacekeeping mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) was established in 2011 to foster development but has faced broader responsibilities. The evolution of UNMISS’ role presents an opportunity to understand the changing demands and challenges facing peacekeepers today. UNMISS grapples constantly with the difficulty of operationalizing its mandate to protect civilians—especially women. Its presence has been controversial but has brought the needs of and the need for women to the forefront of peacekeeping efforts.

Women and girls are disproportionately affected by violent conflict, and this civil war is no exception. One in four women in South Sudan experience some form of gender-based violence on a daily basis. Thousands of women have been raped by government and opposition forces.

Though women only represent three percent of soldiers and ten percent of police deployed to UN missions worldwide, the numbers are slightly higher in South Sudan. As of August 2017, four percent of UNMISS’ military forces—14 percent of police personnel and 26 percent of civilian personnel—were women. From inception to 2014, the mission was led by a woman, Hilde Johnson. Two women have been contingent commanders: Adzo Sowlitse, the first woman to command a Formed Police Unit, and Lt Col Katie Hislop, Commander of the UK Engineering Task Force.

UNMISS has grown to include 16,987 troops but still cannot  seem to control the chaotic growth of PoC camps. Over 200,000 internally displaced civilians are sheltering in UN bases turned into “Protection of Civilian” (PoC) sites. The mission’s quick growth has perhaps outstripped its capabilities, exacerbating anti-UN sentiment among civilians, and the strained relationship with government.

Although arguably innovative, the PoC sites cannot guarantee residents’ safety. Four PoC sites have been overrun or shelled, over 180 internally displaced persons have been killed during attacks on the sites, and hundreds of women have been raped on or near UN-protected territory. Doctors Without Borders found that three-quarters of those surveyed living in PoC sites had lost trust in UNMISS. Safety in PoC sites has been unreliable, and site management has demanded a majority of mission resources. This has prolonged the time women spend surviving—and raising families—in tents, in such persistent states of vulnerability.

Notably though, UNMISS was the first UN mission to deploy Women’s Protection Advisors across the country. UNMISS former gender adviser Major Bettina Stelzer emphasised women peacekeepers are able to access communities in ways men cannot. To capitalise on this, UN police train women leaders in community watch groups to gather sensitive information about sexual abuse in the camps. Along with serving as mentors and role models, it is critical to understand how women peacekeepers can provide necessary support and open up channels of communication that could inform UNMISS activities.

There remains a deficient connection between UNMISS and the community. This was placed in stark relief during an attack in July 2016.  Over 300 people were killed in the capital city, Juba, with foreigners and locals assaulted alike. The UN compound, less than a mile away, refused to respond. Peacekeepers abandoned posts, according to the UN’s fact-finding mission. Retired Major General Patrick Cammaert, who led the investigation, concluded that troops were risk-averse and inward-looking—regularly staying in camp rather than going out on foot patrols.

Another incident exemplifying deficiencies of response and diffusion of accountability came in February 2018, when 46 UNMISS peacekeepers were recalled following allegations of sexual exploitation of sheltering women. Without prosecutory mechanisms, the UN cannot effectively prevent or punish misconduct. Complaints of sexual assault by government soldiers in or near camps are also common. Growing resentment among residents towards the UN mission is evidence of slow and inefficient action by authorities. A small, wooden “jail” has been established in a PoC in Malakal to hold alleged rapists awaiting investigations that may never occur.

Even without systematic reforms to the Department of Peacekeeping, creative efforts to make environments safer could mitigate threats. These should include the reduction of masculine military tactics and the expansion of desecuritised peacekeeping—strategies like digging nearby wells to prevent unguarded walks to distant water or developing 911 numbers for civilians and providing cell phones. These must also include purposeful recruitment of women into peacemaking, -keeping, and -building efforts.

In terms of policy, UN Security Council Resolution 1325 calls for more women involved in peace agreements and peacekeeping operations. However, according to a 2015 review, fewer than three percent of signatories to peace agreements are women, and women are frequently kept out of high-level negotiations. Judging from the consistently low levels of participating women, the UN has not taken seriously recommendations to incentivise the appointment of more female troops.

Embedded in these simple suggestions is a danger of further burdening women by essentialising them as inherently peaceful. Such justification for women’s participation is laden with specific expectations rather than based in their fundamental right to participate.

Evidence shows that security efforts are more successful when women are included in peace processes. Involvement of women’s organisations makes peace agreements 64 percent less likely to fail. Peace agreements on the African continent which failed to maintain peace for even a single year—in Uganda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Sudan—all had in common a complete lack of women at the negotiating table.

The UN should focus on protection strategies for women made vulnerable in PoC sites. PoC sites are, as evidenced by the number of IDPs who continue to voluntarily reside within them, an important, if imperfect, tool. Along with strengthening practical protections for civilians, UNMISS should continuously increase involvement of female troops, whose nuanced perspectives are a necessary part of peacekeeping. Their unique access will allow for the equally necessary elevation of the experiences of local women, whose participation, safety, and empowerment are critical to the sustainability of peace.

 

Caitlyn OFlaherty is an M.A. candidate in Ethics Peace and Global Affairs at American University. Her particular research interests center on issues of migration, displacement, and human security. She is a freelance journalist and a member of the administrative support team for the Out of Eden Walk Project. You can follow her on Twitter @COFlaherty44

Image Source: https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2016/09/failed-peacekeepers-sudan-160908091206526.html

Strife Series on United Nations Peacekeeping, Part III – Bystanders for 7 years – is the UN ready for a peacekeeping mission in Syria?

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By Diego Salama and Ortrun Merkle

Military personnel of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) on security detail of the observation post at the Golan Heights. (Credit Photo: UN Photo/Gernot Maier)

Seven years into the war , Syria has seen over 400,000 casualties and more than five million refugees. Those still in the country suffer from chemical attacks and brutalities from all belligerent actors, with  no end in sight. The question after so many years of bloodshed: isn’t it time for the UN to step in? The political answer –coming from Moscow–, is a resounding ‘No’, which would likely be echoed by the other permanent members of the Security Council (P5), albeit for different reasons. The practical answer  might well have to be ‘there is no alternative’. Therefore, we must discuss how this arguably most difficult endeavour in the history of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) could be a success.

 

Peacekeeping has never been harder

On December 7, the UN Peacekeeping Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), experienced the worst attack on UN forces in 24 years, killing 15 Peacekeepers and wounding 53. This act of violence was not an isolated incident but just the latest example of the increased hostility ‘Blue Helmets’ face.

Over the past few months, many of the UN’s 15 Peacekeeping missions have taken a turn for the worse. Peacekeepers are deployed in hostile terrains where they face asymmetrical threats from rebel groups and terrorist organisations. 2017 was a very tough year for peacekeeping, not only in terms of casualties but also due to political challenges, such as the politicization of troop contributions, the reluctance of host countries to cooperate with the missions and the national interests of the Security Council members.

This is a dangerous trend. First, major Troup Contributing Countries (TCCs) are likely to become even more risk-averse and impose greater limits, or ‘caveats’, to what their troops may do during deployment. These caveats hinder the ability of field commanders to make tactical decisions and thus jeopardise the success of mandates. Second, this trend can also be politicised by the UN’s critics who may call for even bigger budget cuts to DPKO by virtue of its ‘ineffectiveness’. Third, the increase in violence Peacekeepers are involved in –either because they were mandated to or because they were attacked– evaporates the notion that peacekeepers are neutral, putting troops and civilian staff in danger.

Despite these conditions, it is important to see what DPKO could learn from its existing operations for a mandate in Syria. Such a peacekeeping mission would require three main components: A hybrid setup, a mandate to fight against terrorism and a strong political strategy.

 

Hybrid is the future

First, any such peacekeeping operation would necessarily have to be co-administered with a regional organisation, i.e. have a hybrid mandate. This wouldn’t be the first of its kind, together with the African Union (AU), DPKO currently runs a mission in Darfur (UNAMID). The results, so far, have been mixed, but having the AU as an equal partner gave the mission considerable political capital within the region, streamlined contributions from African countries and helped smooth the political dialogue as it was not seen as a ‘Western’ intervention.

The mission needs to not only have the blessing of the region but long-term commitment to provide troops, equipment and political support. In addition, Western countries ought to support the mission in different ways, including logistical coordination, equipment and intelligence capabilities. As this support will not translate into many troops, more pressure will be on the Arab League to step up their commitment. 

 

Stabilize first, keep the peace second

Even with a brokered cease fire, the mission would deploy in a hostile region and therefore the mandate must allow troops to actively engage terrorist organisations. Deploying stabilisation missions into active conflict and hostile territories with broader and more robust mandates represented a drastic shift in peacekeeping. One of the strongest examples of this new area of peacekeeping is the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission Mali (MINUSMA), which had been deployed in an active conflict, in the midst of multiple terrorist organisations, with a mandate that could be considered a counter-insurgency operation.

MINUSMA has been one of the deadliest missions in UN history and observers expressed doubt that 2018 will be a more peaceful year. Much of the complex security environment in Mali, and the failures to address it can be lessons learned for a potential mandate in Syria.

The Syrian context is incredibly complex, involving a plethora of actors. Already there is a fundamental disagreement among the P5 on which actors should be considered terrorist organisations, which as could be seen in Mali can jeopardise peacebuilding in the long-term. The hostile environment and variety of actors also requires better training and equipment for the TCC countries from member states. Lastly, resilience is of the outmost importance. Attacks on MINUSMA have shown that especially Western TCCs are not willing or able to provide long-term commitment when troops are at risk. Without increasing resilience of TCCs, however, a mission in Syria cannot be successful.

 

Political dialogue

At the end of the day, sustainable peace requires political concertation and a complete rebuilding of civil society, likely taking generations. The UN has to support a conversation, provide technical expertise and political credibility to the process and foster coherence between both foreign and domestic actors.

The UN can draw on experience from other political missions where it has been successful, e.g. the UN Mission in Somalia. There UN involvement has helped the national government develop a long-term agenda, bring other sub-national actors to the table and plea to the IMF to continue to engage in debt relief

 

Conclusion

A potential peacekeeping mission in Syria would have to be hybrid and have a strong mandate which enables it to not only go after terrorist organisations but also ensure stabilisation of the country. In addition, there needs to be considerable political capital which fosters dialogue within Syrian society and, at the same time, limits the intrusion of external actors looking to further their own national interests.

In a climate of budget cuts, paralysis at the Security Council and lack of commitment from the region, this seems like a very tall order. However, it is essential for the UN to prepare itself and, to the best of its ability, work towards the peaceful resolution of the Syrian conflict should it be asked to do so.

 

Diego Salama is a communications officer at the United Nations University (UNU-MERIT) and a PhD candidate in history of international relations at Leiden University. His PhD focuses on history of the United Nations and Peacekeeping in the Middle East. He worked as a research assistant to the academic director at UNU-MERIT and at the United Nations Information Centre in Lima. Diego holds a BA in international relations from University College Maastricht and a MA in international relations (cum laude) with an emphasis on history from Leiden University.

Ortrun Merkle is a PhD Fellow at the United Nations University (UNU-MERIT). Her PhD thesis focuses on the relationship of gender and corruption. Challenging the one-dimensional approach most corruption research takes on gender, she argues that one must understand underlying gender norms to truly comprehend how corruption is rooted in society. She holds a MA in Economics, a MA in International Relations and a Certificate of Advanced Stud in Security Studies from the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs at Syracuse University, NY and a B.Sc. in Business Administration and Economics from the University of Passau, Germany.

Image Source: https://news.un.org/en/story/2014/08/476322-un-peacekeepers-golan-come-under-renewed-attack 

Strife Series on United Nations Peacekeeping, Part II – Security Challenges in UN Peacekeeping Operations: How Best to “Fight Back”?

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By Lenoy Barkai

A view of two of United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) Pakistani peacekeepers who arrived in Che, Ituri province, DRC, with reinforcements of troops and ammunition to secure the area following the recent brutal militia fighting and massacres of the local population. 30/Jan/2005. (Credit Image: UN Photo/Christophe Boulierac)

 

On 7 December 2018, fifteen Peacekeepers from the United Nations Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO) were killed when armed rebels attacked one of their forward operating bases in North Kivu.[1] The attack raised the estimated death toll of UN Peacekeepers killed in malicious attacks in 2017 to 53, with the vast majority of deaths emanating from the UN’s missions to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Somalia and Central African Republic.[2] In response to the escalating security situation, the UN’s Departments of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and Field Support (DFS) commissioned an independent study into the security protocols for UN Peacekeeping operations.[3] While the study’s key recommendations centred on enabling a more emphatic use of force amongst UN Peacekeeping personnel, the implications thereof are fraught with ethical landmines.

 

A worrying trend

Although a key tenant of UN Peacekeeping Missions is the “non-use of force except in self-defence and defence of the mandate,”[4] certain missions operating in more hostile regions, such as MONUSCO in the DRC, have received the extended mandate of using “all necessary means”, which includes the use of force to fulfil their missions. Nevertheless, security continues to be one of the UN Peacekeeping Mission’s greatest challenges. Since its first mission in 1948, the UN has lost over 900 Peacekeepers due to malicious attacks.[5] While isolated conflicts in the past have marked temporary spikes in Peacekeeper fatalities, a worrying gradual uptick has emerged since 2007:[6]

The blue helmet no longer offers “natural protection”

The independent study into UN Peacekeeping security protocol was published in December 2017, and its authors found much room for improvement. Criticisms included: a proclivity for inaction in the face of bureaucracy and operational inertia, lack of training, poor understanding of the threat environment, resistance to culture-change and a lack of accountability. Perhaps the most stand-out criticism pertained to the outdated “mind-set” of UN Peacekeepers and their leaders. “Overall,” conclude the authors, “the United Nations and Troop- and Police-Contributing Countries need to adapt to a new reality: the blue helmet and the United Nations flag no longer offer ‘natural’ protection’”. Nowadays, UN Peacekeepers face security threats from groups and individuals who do not distinguish between soldiers, civilians and Peacekeepers in selecting their targets. In fact, the report suggests, the UN Peacekeeping Mission’s essential non-combative and ostensibly apolitical nature, makes it a more attractive target for indiscriminate militant groups.

 

Meeting force with force, and the ethical tug-of-war

The remedy to this, conclude the authors, is a drastic change in the mind-sets of UN Peacekeeping Mission personnel and leadership. This mind-set shift comprises a move away from the organisation’s current defensive and restrained posture. Rather, when faced with security threats, UN Peacekeepers should adopt an active willingness and readiness to use “overwhelming force” so as to bring an end the “impunity” of their attackers. Unless they do so, claim the authors, UN Peacekeepers will continue to be regarded as soft targets by terrorists, militias and other hostile groups. They therefore recommend that UN bases be demarcated by “clearly-defined security zones”, sending a strong message to local communities and other regional actors that there will be “zero tolerance” for security threats in these areas.

In identifying this security “failure” on the part of UN Peacekeeping Missions, the authors place the UN at the heart of the dilemma faced by governments the world over when it comes to asymmetric warfare. How does one deal with a threat actor whose “rules of engagement” directly challenge the norms of war that one takes to be the fundamental principles thereof? Ronald Kuerbitz[7] asserts that traditional warfare is determined by two such principles: “military necessity and humanitarianism.” While conventional war is subject to such “prescriptive norms,” terrorist groups and armed militia frequently shift this normative paradigm by attacking soft targets such as civilians and Peacekeepers. In this way, they are able to strategically relocate the “terms of war” into a normatively problematic arena for their opponents, be they states or multinational organisations such as the UN. This is particularly problematic for the members of Peacekeeping Missions, where the absence of war constitutes their very mandate.  In the tug-of-war for moral high-grounds, it is at the very point when the militant group is able to draw its adversary into committing acts on par with its own that it gains the upper hand in terms of delegitimising its opponent. By following the authors’ recommendations, UN Peacekeeping Missions risk falling into this very trap. While great care may be taken to ensure the use of force by Peacekeepers is situationally justified, the grey areas, and room for error, are likely to be significant. Before changing course in this way, the UN should consider the long-term implications for UN Peacekeeping legitimacy should a cultural mind-set shift take place which sees Peacekeepers become trigger-happy versus trigger-shy.

 

An intelligence-first approach

However, this is not to say that Peacekeepers should continue operating in high-risk environments under the status quo. Before resorting to “overwhelming force”, the security implications of improving the UN’s understanding and application of their threat environment should be fully explored. One of the primary criticisms of the report was that UN Peacekeeping Mission intelligence is “unable to provide timely information that could help prevent, avoid and respond to attack.” The authors describe UN Peacekeeping Mission intelligence as frequently “incomplete”, with knowledge gaps pertaining to the presence, intent, and capability of regional threat actors. Furthermore, where threat assessments do exist these are rarely translated into “operational/tactical activities”.

A thorough overhaul of extant intelligence gathering and risk analysis protocols, replaced with robust, ongoing reporting and intelligence briefings combining both Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) and Human Intelligence (HUMINT) sources, is likely to significantly improve both the safety of on-the-ground personnel and the ability for leadership to take swift, informed and considered action in the face of security threats. Such an approach has the added advantage of enabling Peacekeeping operations. While increasing the use of force risks alienating local communities and delegitimising the Peacekeeping mandate, an enhanced understanding of the threat environment can only work to improve and optimise the efficacy of Peacekeeping operations. With this in mind, the UN may be far better served by developing a robust, relevant and timely intelligence and risk analysis apparatus before encouraging their Peacekeepers to shoot-to-kill.

 

UN Peacekeeping: most fatal missions from malicious attacks[8]

 

Mission Name Region Total Fatalities by Malicious attack (as at Feb 2018) Date of Operation
ONUC, MONUC, MONUSCO (Democratic) Republic of Congo 203 1960 – 1964; 1999 – present
UNOSOM Somalia 114 1993-1995
MINUSMA Mali 99 2013 – present
UNIFIL Lebanon 93 1978 – present
UNPROFOR Croatia and in Bosnia and Herzegovina 74 1992-1995
UNAMID Darfur 73 2007 – present
UNEF Egypt/Gaza/Israel 35 1956 – 1967; 1973 – 1979
MINUSCA Central African Republic 28 2014 – present
UNTSO Middle East 26 1948 – present
UNTAC Cambodia 25 1992 – 1993
UNAMSIL Sierra Leone 17 1999 – 2006
MINUSTAH Haiti 15 2004 – 2017
UNFICYP Cyprus 15 1964 – present
UNAMIR Rwanda 14 1993 – 1996
UNMISS South Sudan 13 2011 – present
UNMIK Kosovo 12 1999 – present
UNOCI Côte d’Ivoire 11 2004 – 2017

 

 

Lenoy Barkai is an Associate at S-RM, a risk consulting firm specialising in the management of security, operational, regulatory and reputational risks. Prior to joining S-RM, Lenoy completed her MA in International Relations at the Department of War Studies at King’s College London, where her research focused on political violence, counterterrorism and human rights.

Notes

[1] ‘At least 15 U.N. peacekeepers killed in attack in Congo’, The Washington Post, 08 December 2017.

[2] Source: https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/principles-of-peacekeeping

[3] ‘New Improving Security Peacekeeping Project’, UN, 01 August 2017.

[4] ‘New Improving Security Peacekeeping Project’, UN, 01 August 2017.

[5] Source: https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/statsbyyearincidenttype_5_7.pdf

[6] Source: Improving Security of United Nations Peacekeepers: We need to change the way we are doing business’ UN Commissioned Independent Report, 19 December 2017.

[7] Kuerbitz, R. (1988) The bombing of Harrods: Norms against civilian targeting. In Reisman, W. M. & Willard, A. R. (eds.) International incidents: The law that counts in world politics. Princeton, Princeton University Press, pp. 238-262.

[8] Source: Peacekeeping.un.org/en/fatalities

 

Image Source: here

Strife Series on United Nations Peacekeeping, Part I – The Fate of UN Peacekeeping and the Changing Tides of Geopolitics

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By Dr Samir Puri

The UN Security Council (Credit Image: UN Photo/Mark Garten)

The UN’s viability to act as a peacekeeping force for good is always constrained by geopolitics. When the geopolitical tides change – as they evidently are in the twenty-first century, with the rise of China, the resurgence of Russia, and other developments – the UN feels the impact. When it comes to peacekeeping, the UN risks being lost at sea.

We tend to associate UN peacekeeping with interventions in war-ravaged countries. The UN’s blue helmets have deployed to countries like Yugoslavia in the 1990s, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in the 2000s, mitigating the cataclysms of these wars.

In fact, keeping the peace between countries was the UN’s original mission. Today, the convulsions of a changing balance of power between major world powers are starting to be felt. As such, the UN’s original mission may become much more relevant once again.

“The Parliament of Man”, wrote historian Paul Kennedy, never mentioned the word “peacekeeping” in its Charter: “In 1945, the term meant keeping the peace among nations and checking those that threatened their neighbours or countries further afield”. Indeed, when the UN Charter was signed in San Francisco on 26 June 1945 by 50 countries, the atomic bombs were yet to fall on Japan. The UN formally came into existence on 24 October 1945, mere weeks after the Second World War ended.

It is from the theme of Kennedy’s seminal work, “The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers”, that the UN was born. Since its origins, the number of UN member states has almost quadrupled to 193. But the five permanent members of the UN Security Council (U.S., UK, France, China and Russia) have stubbornly retained their places around the famous horse shoe table in the UN headquarters in New York.

The UN Security Council is where peacekeeping dreams can die. There is no better demonstration than the UN’s inability to prevent Syria’s civil war from entering its eighth year. The carnage in Aleppo in 2016, or Ghouta in 2018, can make us ask what the point of the UN is. Ever since Russia’s military intervened in 2015 to prop up Bashar al-Assad’s regime, Russia’s diplomats have wielded their Security Council veto to help Assad’s forces win on the battlefield.

The UN’s “Geneva Process”, run by Staffan De Mistrua, has repeatedly stalled. If it did not have enough obstacles already, Russia has convened its own talks in Sochi and Astana to exclude the anti-Assad rebels and undermine UN attempts to negotiate an end to Syria’s civil war. Russia simply will not allow the UN to set the pace and tone of conflict management over Syria.

Nevertheless, the UN will never be written out of the script entirely. UN agencies, like the UNDP and the UNHCR, may still be useful when it comes to clearing up messy post-conflict situations.

Even after US President George W. Bush famously circumvented the Security Council to invade Iraq in 2003, the UN still played a nascent role after the invasion.  The UN sent its best man for the job, Sergio Vieira De Mello, to try to broker a political deal amongst Iraq’s newly liberated factions after Saddam Hussein had been toppled. On 19 August, 2003, Al Qaeda militants killed De Mello in a suicide truck bombing. Cowed, the UN withdrew its field presence from Iraq at a time when it was badly needed. Bush condemned the bombing. Even if his invasion of Iraq had undermined and divided the UN, then-Secretary General Kofi Annan had still tried to support Iraq’s reconstruction.

Wars such as in Iraq and Syria involve high geopolitical stakes for major world powers. In such wars, the UN’s ability to intervene and stabilise conflicts tends to be low. Conversely, the UN will always remain a much more viable platform for interventions in conflicts with lower geopolitical stakes.

As Peter Rudolf noted in a 2017 article for Survival, “peacekeeping operations have undergone considerable change since the turn of the century. Peacekeepers are deployed in a greater variety of scenarios, ranging from monitoring ceasefires to complex peace operations. The protection of civilians has become an important focus, and operations have become more robust in their use of force to defend their mandate. Despite these changes, the UN continues to champion its original peacekeeping principles, specifically the consent of the parties. Peace operations, like the evolving MONUSCO mission in the DRC, and MINUSMA in Mali have “blurred the line between peace keeping and peace enforcement”, according to Rudolf.

Elsewhere in the world, the UN provides all manner of bespoke conflict interventions that fall short of peacekeeping. In Colombia, after President Juan Manual Santos agreed to a peace deal with the FARC, ending over five decades of guerrilla war, UN observers supervised the FARC’s handover of weapons in 2017. This is vital work for which the impartiality of the UN’s personnel is an asset.

Then there is mediation and UN good offices. As Roxaneh Bazergan of the UN’s Mediation Support Unit explains, the UN provides technical support to regional organisations that try to manage wars, like the African Union in the DRC, and the OSCE in Ukraine. In 2018, Secretary-General Antonio Guterres appointed a new envoy to the Yemen conflict, charging Martin Griffiths to broker peace in the war-torn country. The odds may be stacked against Griffiths, but the UN should at least try.

Wherever there is a conflict, the UN is sure to be providing or offering some sort of specialist service. From full blown peacekeeping missions, to disaster relief, to mediation support and envoys. It is hardly fair to accuse the UN and its agencies of shirking the challenge.

Rather, the real question is whether the geopolitical winds are blowing favourably for the UN to make an impact. The pride of the great powers will often be the UN’s first hurdle. The UN could either be set up to fail, or simply not be invited in the first place.

The rise and the fall of great powers always sets the overall tone, which is why we should pay attention to the changes that are clearly afoot in the international order. The U.S. is slowly shifting from being the world’s undisputed heavyweight champion, to the world’s disputed heavyweight champion.

China will back the UN when its national interests allow it. For example, if the UN can stabilise an African country that China does business with, Beijing will not stand in the way. Otherwise, China will certainly block UN processes that intrude on its great power space. For instance, China prevented the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) from being applied in disputes in the South China Sea.

For the great powers, the UN has always been useful when convenient, and an obstacle when in the way of national interest. We should expect to witness much more of this as the world enters a new phase of rivalry and geopolitical competition.

 

Dr Samir Puri is a lecturer in War Studies at King’s College London. His most recent book is called Fighting and Negotiating with Armed Groups: the Difficulty of Securing Strategic Outcomes. In 2017, his article, “The Strategic Hedging of Iran, Russia, and China: Juxtaposing Participation in the Global System with Regional Revisionism”, was published by the Journal of Global Security Studies.

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https://news.un.org/en/story/2013/09/451502-un-security-council-agrees-rid-syria-chemical-weapons-endorses-peace-process