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Strife Series on British Security Post-Brexit, Part II – Stormy Seas: The UK-US Relationship under Trump

March 18, 2017 by Christina Dutton

By: Christina Dutton

 

People demonstrate during a protest at Downing Street in central London against US President Donald Trump’s immigration ban.

 

The UK has spent the past half-century balancing two primary foreign policy commitments: its membership in the European Union (EU) and its ‘special relationship’ with the United States (USA). Primed and ready to pull the trigger on Article 50, However, Britain seems to be leaning hardest on its American ally at the worst possible time – after the election of President Donald Trump.

Brexit supporters feel validated by President Trump’s support for the country’s exit from the EU, while others worry about his strong “America First” policy.

What does this mean for the future of this historic Anglo-American relationship? Political commentators stand at the ready, critiquing every speech, meeting and tweet coming out of Washington, while UK leaders are forced to play a torturous waiting game. This is a special relationship, indeed. While some may have once cast Britain as the Greeks to  America’s Romans, such a parallel would require some form of veneration for the ailing UK – and Trump has little interest-holding vigil for anyone. His policies and decision-making patterns are proving hard to predict. Nevertheless, both sides seem to have renewed their support of the special relationship. No one is more dedicated to this cause than Prime Minister Theresa May, who seemed to have hurled herself towards her American ally by extending an invitation to the UK in January to welcome President Trump into office and to reaffirm the relationship. Many, including Trump, have been quick to draw a parallel between the close relationship between President Ronald Reagan and PM Margaret Thatcher and future relations between President Donald Trump and PM Theresa May, suggesting that leaders of the two countries will work together quite closely. While Trump may enjoy the historic romanticism of calling May ‘my Maggie’ for now, he is also keenly aware of the position in which he sits, and that May has very few cards to play. Those she does have may just turn out to be irrelevant to his future plans.

Traditionally the US-UK relationship has been maintained between presidents and prime ministers. Trump may choose to change the rules of this game, as we have already seen him engaging and collaborating with other UK political figures ahead of the PM, such as conservative MP Michael Gove and former UK Independence Party leader (UKIP) Nigel Farage. Farage, in particular, has developed a bond with Trump and other American conservatives. He was even invited to speak at this year’s Conservative Political Action Conference where he was greeted with a standing ovation. During his campaign, Trump supported Farage and UKIP’s campaign for Brexit.

President Trump has been quick to set the tone of his administration – ‘America First’. His definition of what ‘America’ includes seems to be highly selective. His controversial executive orders have made quick work of overturning the more liberal initiatives championed by President Obama. Both Brexit and Trump’s election seem to have given a voice to right-wing movements across the world. Some have highlighted that pledging close alliance with the US sends a dangerous message. Rallies, marches, petitions and debates are being held worldwide rebelling these shifts occurring in these ‘liberal’ democracies.

Potentially his most controversial order on immigration, now dubbed the “Muslim Ban,” regardless of its legality, puts Britain in a difficult position. Trump’s views on immigration stand in direct opposition to those of German chancellor Angela Merkel. Aligning too closely with Trump may sever any remaining ties or chances at negotiating new agreements with EU leaders. At present, Britain runs the risk of standing too close and getting scorched by Trump’s options or standing too far and being cast out into the cold.

Trump presented a renewed sense of hope for strengthening trade relations with the UK in contrast to Obama’s position that the UK would be at the ‘back of the queue’ following Brexit. Theresa May seems determined to make things work, while also attempting to keep Trump somewhat in check. The US and the UK worked very closely to impose sanctions on Russia following the annexation of Crimea, and maintain a ceasefire between the Ukraine army and pro-Russian rebels as part of the Minsk Agreement. However, Trump has stated that he could consider doing a deal with Russia, which would result in the lifting of sanctions. May was quick to denounce the idea during their joint press conference at the White House in January, supporting the continuation of sanctions until full implementation of the Minsk Agreement is achieved.

Additionally, during the press conference, May suggested that Trump has reaffirmed his dedication to NATO, which he had previously referred to as ‘obsolete’. Trump’s views on the NATO partnership worry many in the alliance, particularly when it comes to honouring the agreement in reference to Russia. Trump’s recent proposal to increase the US defence budget spending by almost ten per cent will also result in some benefits for NATO. With incremental spending cuts on the UK’s own armed services, the UK would be wise to maintain its longstanding relationship with US armed forces and keep them as their closest military ally.

The future of this special relationship will probably remain vague until the triggering of Article 50 and the UK is formally in a position to negotiate bilateral trade agreements. But until then, it is hard to map out the future of this relationship. By then, Trump may have found a new best friend – be it Russia or another power. At the same time, the legitimacy of Trump’s administration seems to be challenged on a daily basis, with reports of pre-election backroom chats and corrupt advisors shaking the legitimacy of his administration.

As Trump proves to be a volatile force, Theresa May must remain vigilant for now. It is her hand that must steady the rudder of this special relationship.


Christina Dutton(@cbdutton111) is pursuing an MA in Intelligence and International Security at King’s College. She received her undergraduate degree at the University of St Andrews in International Relations, and works at a consultancy in the City of London providing research and risk assessment. 


This Strife series focuses on British Security Post-Brexit and will have contributions by Dr Samir Puri; Felix Manig on the security implications of post-Brexit asylum laws; Christina on the UK-USA relationship; and Alfonc Rakaj on British defence commitments. 

Image credit: http://www.express.co.uk/news/world/763514/Donald-Trump-travel-ban-US-court-rejects-appeal-reinstate-Muslim

Filed Under: Blog Article Tagged With: Brexit, European Security, feature, ma, UK, USA

Extremism, environment, and new security dynamics: Strife in conversation with RUSI Director, Dr. Karin von Hippel

June 2, 2016 by Harris Kuemmerle

Interviewed by: Harris Kuemmerle

Yazidi_refugees
Yazidi refugees in Northern Syria. Source: Wikimedia

Harris Kuemmerle – Where do you see climate change fitting within the wider European security dynamic moving forward? Do you feel that European policy makers adequately appreciate the security risks of climate change? Or is it still seen as somewhat of a secondary security issue?

Karin von Hippel – I think we all need to focus much more on the longer term security impacts of climate change. For example, many scientists have argued that the drought in Syria, which began in 2006, contributed to the civil war as it forced many people (notably farmers) to move to urban areas. We need to prepare for similar challenges in the future, especially in parts of the Middle East and Africa, where scarce resources will cause more people to compete, which in turn, will lead to more conflict.

I cannot say for certain if the Europeans appreciate this more or less than others. While it is common to discuss the threat posed by climate change, I’m not sure we are all doing as much as we can today to prepare for different scenarios tomorrow. That really is the crux of the issue. At RUSI, we are establishing a Futures Programme, looking at issues such as migration, robotics, space, climate change, conflict, etc and where and how they may intersect over the next 15 to 20 years, and what this will mean for our common security. Governments, multilateral institutions, academia and the private sector need new tools to anticipate and plan for such uncertainty.

HK – Is it fair to say then that environmental issues haven’t quite internalised themselves within the primary security paradigms and agendas?

KvH – That’s an interesting question. In the United States the military and intelligence communities are very forward leaning in this space. By contrast, the rest of the U.S. government may be lagging, primarily because so many officials end up being consumed by the crises of the moment and have very little spare time to focus on future threats

HK – The integration of coal markets was one of the founding elements of the European project. With that being said, do you feel that increased energy interdependence among member states has the potential to again be a key driver of European integration moving forward? Or could energy instead serve as a driver of disintegration?

KvH – I think that energy issues in Europe have indeed led to some challenges. For example, some countries have a closer relationship with Moscow, and need to rely on Russian oil; and that has made it very difficult within Europe to have unity over issues such as the Ukraine crisis. Honestly, I don’t see energy interdependence operating as an integrating factor within Europe in the near future. Indeed, energy may be more likely to lead to fracturing because of the reliance of some countries on Russian oil supplies.

HK – How would you define the term radicalisation with regards to people joining terrorist or other extremist groups?

KvH – That’s a good question, and it’s similar with the term “fundamentalist”. The way we [at RUSI], and researchers like myself look at it is by asking whether or not such extreme views lead to violence. You could be radical and fundamental in your beliefs, but if you are not going to channel your radical beliefs into violence (especially violence against civilians) then it’s not a security issue. If you are going to use violence as a tool to try to impose your belief system, then radicalism or fundamentalism is a problem.

Ultimately (provided such groups are not violent) people have a right to their beliefs. We may not agree but freedom of expression is a fundamental tenet of any democracy. This doesn’t mean we should be ignoring extremist, non-violent groups – and in fact – we should be thinking of ways of keeping communication channels open with such groups as they may have individuals who decide to leave precisely because such groups are not violent. Hence communication could help security and other officials identify potential terrorists-in-the-making. The challenge is that these relationships are hard to establish because many extremist groups (on the left or right) often do not trust the authorities or outsiders.

HK – What would you suggest have been the greatest strengths and weakness of current US policy with regards to counter terrorism and counter extremism? Why?

KvH – I think everyone is struggling with understanding what radicalises people, especially with ISIL, which is very different from previous terrorist groups. The numbers of people joining ISIL are much higher than those joining groups like al-Qaeda or al-Shabaab. In the past few years, between 1,500 and 2,000 people a month have travelled to join ISIL. In recent months, these numbers have been reduced significantly, to around 200 a month; though that is still way higher than those joining al-Qaeda or al-Shabaab. There is definitely something else going on with ISIL, be it the so-called Caliphate or the extreme violence they employ – we don’t really understand the appeal of ISIL as well as we should. As a result we are making too many untested assumptions, and throwing a whole lot of money on those assumptions. I’m afraid we still need to do more research to understand this issue better.

Ultimately radicalisation is very location-specific, each recruit will have a very specific set of reasons to join, based on local grievances. Recruits from Iraq, Minneapolis, or Birmingham will all have distinct motivations. So you really need to understand what is happening in these particular areas, in addition to understanding the global appeal of these organisations.

HK – Are there other cases of past or present radicalisation that we can draw upon to help tackle groups like ISIS? For example, the case of gang membership in urban areas?

KvH – Yes, these issues are definitely comparable. I was recently at a conference speaking with Gary Slutkin, the founder of Cure Violence, an organisation that has done some great work in reducing gang violence all over the world (it was launched in Chicago, but has since spread globally because their methodology works). They employ interruptors and former gang members to play a role in preventing violence. They borrow a methodology used by health workers to stop the spread of pandemics. So there are definitely successes out there, and techniques which one can borrow from adjacent fields, provided you are able to tweak it to make it work for your purposes.

HK – Given the importance of an enabling environment in facilitating radicalisation, in your opinion, what would be the best way to prevent such an enabling environment in Syria or other such parts of the world?

KvH –ISIL emerged from the civil war in Syria, I think a more robust U.S. approach to Syria would have helped prevent the country deteriorating as much as it has. I understand why President Obama did not want to do more than he was doing, as he was worried about the unintended consequences, as we saw in Libya. On the other hand, I think the U.S. government by 2014 knew many more Syrians than it did Libyans, and it had lots of relationships with people on the ground, through training programmes and other non-lethal support to opposition activists. Had the US bombed around the time the red lines were crossed, I think it would have made a big difference and ISIL would not have been able to capitalise on the space as they did. Though this is of course all conjecture and impossible to prove, it’s just my personal belief.

ISIL has been able to thrive in Syria primarily because they are experts at filling power vacuums and taking advantage of chaotic situations. ISIL’s territorial holdings have changed frequently since 2014 and they have been in sporadic conflict with a range of militias, including opposition fighters, the Kurds, aL-Qaeda, Hezbollah, the Syrian regime, and recently the Russians. Unfortunately, the longer Western powers essentially watch from the sidelines, with minimal assistance, the worse it’s going to get.

HK – In your experience, do you think gender is a concept that is understood and engaged enough in counterterrorism policy and practice? Can you offer an example to highlight this?

KvH – Women play a role in preventing family members from being radicalised. They also can play a negative role and contribute to radicalisation of friends and family members. The interesting thing about ISIL is that more women are joining ISIL than have joined other groups in the past, and we are doing research to try to understand this issue and ultimately understand the way women perceive the phenomenon.

HK – Finally, in your calculations, would a British exit from the EU have a net positive or negative impact on British and European Security?

KvH – We have been looking at the security implications of Brexit at RUSI, and from this perspective, it makes more sense for Britain to remain (e.g., to enhance/build on the common arrest warrant, sharing of intelligence, etc), but at RUSI we do not take a corporate position on Brexit.

 

 

Dr Karin von Hippel became Director-General of the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) on 30 November 2015. Karin von Hippel joined RUSI after recently serving as Chief of Staff to General John Allen, Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition to Counter-ISIL. Karin has also worked as a Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations and as a Senior Adviser in the Bureau of Counterterrorism at the US Department of State. Prior to that, she worked at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC and at the Centre for Defence Studies at King’s College London. She has also worked for the United Nations and the European Union in Somalia and Kosovo.

Harris Kuemmerle is a doctoral researcher in the Department of War Studies and the Department of Geography at King’s College London. His research focuses on the intra and inter-state hydropolitics of the Indus River. Twitter: @HarrisKuemmerle

Filed Under: Interview Tagged With: #COIN, Al Shabab, al-Qaeda, Brexit, Counter-Extremism, counterterrorism, Energy, Environment, Europe, extremism, feature, foreign policy, ISIL, ISIS, RUSI, Russia, security, UK, USA

Libya’s civil war & the importance of strategic sequencing

May 6, 2016 by Robert Andrea

By: Robert Andrea

Secretary_Kerry_Sits_With_Italian_Foreign_Minister_Gentiloni_and_UN_Special_Representative_for_Libya_Kobler_at_the_Italian_Foreign_Ministry_in_Rome_(23090680244)
US Secretary of State John Kerry at a 2015 meeting for the future of Libya in Rome. Source: Wikimedia

One of the most overlooked aspects in strategic deliberations is that of sequencing. It is much more common for the ‘what’ and the ‘how’ of a policy to receive the lion’s share of analysis. Despite this, the order in which the segments of a strategy are implemented can often be just as important. And while this may not always be the case, the cost of not giving due consideration to sequence can be painfully high. The ongoing Libyan Civil War provides a contemporary case study into how important sequencing can end up being in the pursuit of strategic interests.

Concerning Libya

In the immediate term, Western states appear to see (based on the different types of policy approaches on the table) two broadly defined interests in Libya. One is resolving the civil war that has been ongoing since 2014. The second is counterterrorism, primarily with regard to the increasing presence in Libya of the so-called Islamic State, but also of groups like the AQ-linked Ansar al-Sharia.

In terms of the civil war, the international community (particularly the United States and European Union) is committed to a diplomatic resolution of the conflict via the UN-led peace process. Dealing with the counterterrorism issue, on the other hand, will almost definitely involve a more kinetic approach.

Without the proper sequencing of these respective policies, however, neither issue will be solved effectively. Worse still, the situation on the ground would likely deteriorate significantly if the major actors fail to appreciate this.

Civil war

Following the overthrow of Colonel Muammar al-Qaddafi by NATO-backed rebels in 2011, Libya has struggled to rebuild effective state institutions, culminating in another civil war in 2014. This current conflict has essentially been fought between two rival entities – both claiming to be the legitimate government of Libya – each with their respective loyalists.

On one hand, there is the General National Congress. Often referred to as the Tripoli government or the Libya Dawn Coalition, the General National Congress (GNC) is comprised largely of Islamist militias and political blocs including the Justice and Construction party – considered by some to be the Libyan branch of the Muslim Brotherhood. The GNC and its allied militias are backed by Qatar, Turkey, and Sudan.

The rival of the GNC is the Tobruk-based House of Representatives, alternatively known as the Council of Deputies or the Tobruk government. Comprised of supposedly secular-leaning opponents of the Islamist-dominated GNC, the House of Representatives (HoR) is internationally recognized as the legitimate elected government of Libya. The HoR also maintains the loyalty of General Khalifa Haftar and his loyalists in the Libyan National Army.

In an effort to end hostilities, a U.N.-led diplomatic effort has produced a roadmap towards reconciliation.

In January of this year, a Government of National Accord (GNA) was announced, which, it is hoped, will unite the warring factions. For security reasons, the GNA (led by chairman and prime minister Fayez al-Sarraj) was not able to enter Libya until 30 March of this year, when he landed in Tripoli. In a somewhat surprising move, the Tripoli-based GNC announced shortly thereafter that it would remove itself from power in favor of the U.N.-backed unity government.

As of yet, the HoR has not ratified the agreement, as certain clauses would call for Haftar to step down as their army chief.

New place. Same threat. Same policy.

Taking advantage of the chaos during the civil war, the Islamic State has managed to establish a major foothold in Libya. This presence includes, but is not limited to, control of the coastal city Sirte. Increasingly concerned about these developments, Western states have been mulling more direct military options to combat the growing jihadist threat in Libya.

Earlier this year, a U.S. airstrike against an Islamic State camp in Sabratha, western Libya, killed around 50 people, including Noureddine Chouchane. Chouchane is thought to have been a key player in the two attacks last year targeting a museum and a beach resort in Tunisia. The attacks have been claimed by the Islamic State. However, this was a fairly isolated operation and there has yet to be a sustained Western airstrike programme conducted in Libya.

In terms of ground forces, part of the agreement that led to the GNA includes plans for an Italian-led multinational force of 6,000 troops to be deployed to Libya. It is still unclear what part of that force will be specifically devoted to counterterrorist operations and, for now, it is still a theoretical force. There doesn’t appear to be any reports of conventional Western troops actually in Libya currently, though multiple reports do place U.S., U.K., and French special operations forces in the country.

The foregoing reveals nothing to suggest that the counterterrorism programme in Libya will consist of anything tactically different than the ones implemented (mostly by the United States) in places like Yemen, Syria, or Somalia: Drone/airstrikes as well as occasional direct action raids by special operations forces (SOF). As we have learned time and time again though, airstrikes and SOF operations alone are usually insufficient in countering jihadist insurgencies. In the absence of a sizeable deployment of conventional Western troops, partnership with local ground forces would additionally be required to make these airstrike/SOF programmes effective.

If examined purely at a tactical level, the disparate nature of the two policies (conflict resolution and counterterrorism) would theoretically allow them to be pursued concurrently. That would be a very serious mistake – doing so would essentially ignore sequencing considerations and would likely end in catastrophe.

Enter the role of sequencing

It is critical to the long term effectiveness of both the political solution to the civil war and the West’s counterterrorism programme in Libya that the diplomatic portion of the strategy be conducted first. Only after the civil war has ended and the Libyan factions reach a modicum of unity, should counterterrorist operations against the Islamic State and other groups begin.

Without reaching a settlement to the civil war first, there will not be a single unified Libyan state to serve as a local military partner to foreign-led counterterrorism efforts. Rather, the prevailing status of a martially factionalized Libya would be the environment in which these counterterrorism operations would have to take place. In such a situation, the West would probably be forced to pick a side in the domestic conflict to act as its partner. This would undoubtedly result in an even more protracted civil war. Only now, it would be a civil war in which Western forces might find themselves as a target.

In the event of such a scenario, it’s more than likely that the Western powers would choose to side with the HoR and, specifically, Haftar over the GNC. For one, the HoR and Haftar are favoured by close partners of the West in the Middle East, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates. Furthermore, the Libyan National Army, under the command of Haftar, has proven to be the most capable fighting force in the country and has already shown a willingness to fight the Islamic State.

However, Haftar is also predisposed to fighting Islamists in general. This includes the Islamist-dominated GNC, which he labels (in its entirety) as terrorists. A foreign intervention siding with their chief rival would almost assuredly incense and seriously threaten the GNC.

Not only would this be a death blow to the diplomatic efforts towards national reconciliation, it would also seriously hamper counterterrorism operations. If they were to feel threatened by an HoR backed with Western military support, it is more than conceivable that some of the more hardline elements in the GNC might make common cause with the very jihadist organisations being targeted. This should not be viewed as a hypothetical. Certain GNC-aligned elements already cooperate from time to time with these jihadist groups.

Take the Benghazi Revolutionary Shura Council as an example. The Benghazi Revolutionary Shura Council (BRSC) is one of the primary elements fighting Haftar’s forces in the east and has often allied with the GNC. Comprised of multiple Islamist militias, the BRSC is led by Ansar al-Sharia in Libya (ASL). Both ASL, the group behind the 2012 attack on the US consulate in Benghazi, and the BRSC at large have periodically cooperated with the Islamic State against Haftar’s forces.

This places the GNC only one degree of separation away from the Islamic State. This is not to say that in the event of a foreign counterterrorism intervention that the GNC would swear the bay’ah to the caliphate en masse. It is entirely plausible however, that at least some of these forces decide to enhance their level of cooperation with the Islamic State if they were to perceive the West’s backing of their arch rival, Haftar, as a threat.

Such a strategic blunder would leave foreign counterterrorism forces facing an already capable enemy, but now potentially reinforced with thousands of new fighters.

If the aforementioned scenario were to occur, the chances for a political settlement to the Libyan Civil War would evaporate almost instantly and the jihadist threat that Libya already poses to the West (particularly to Europe) would increase drastically. Or, to put it succinctly: It would be an unmitigated strategic failure for the West.

To their credit, both the Western states and the U.N.-supported unity government are trying their best to properly sequence their strategies in Libya. Italy, who will be leading the eventual international troop deployment, has said it will refuse to lead the operation until the GNA is ratified by all parties and the Libyan military command structure is clarified. Even more recently, the GNA itself called on all military factions to hold off on any military operation against Sirte until a unified military structure is established.

So it would seem that, for now, the policymakers handling the Libya file in the West are aware of the importance of taking sequence into account.

Conclusion

All of this is not to say that utilising proper sequencing will guarantee success in Libya. The road ahead contains a veritable minefield of challenges to reaching some semblance of stability. In such a complicated political and security landscape, there is nothing to say that the peace process and/or counterterrorism operations in Libya might not face serious challenges in the future. That said, while sequencing might not be the most stimulating aspect of policy analysis, as we see in the case of the Libyan Civil War, failure to fully appreciate its necessity could lead to disastrous consequences.

 

 

Robert Andrea is an incoming MA student in War Studies at King’s College London. His research interests include U.S. and Iranian foreign policy, diplomatic strategy, and proxy warfare. He can be found on Twitter at @Bob__Andrea

Filed Under: Blog Article Tagged With: counterterrorism, Daesh, Diplomacy, France, ISIL, ISIS, Libya, strategy, UK, us

PROXY Capabilities – Costs and burden sharing in Draft Investigatory Powers Bill: The battle between the Home Office and communication service providers

April 8, 2016 by Mustafa Batuhan Albas

This is the fifth piece in a series of articles we will be featuring on Strife in the coming week looking at the role of Proxy Warfare in the 21st century by Series Editor Cheng Lai Ki. Previous articles in the series can be found here.

By: Mustafa Batuhan Albas

bnxncn
Data storage towers. Source: Wikimedia

On 4 November 2015, the UK government published a draft bill that aimed to (re)regulate the investigatory powers used by its law enforcement, intelligence, and security agencies. The new Draft Investigatory Powers Bill was quick to create controversy and scrutiny on encryption, the use of equipment interference, and the acquisition of bulk data along with other issues. Most importantly, the bill seeks to create ‘a new statutory basis for the retention and acquisition of communications data’[1] through which the government will require communication service providers (CSPs) to store details of websites accessed by all UK web users for twelve months. These details are called ‘Internet Connection Records’ (ICRs).[2]

Early parliamentary scrutiny revealed that the government estimates the capital cost of collecting and retaining ICRs will amount to £174 million over ten years, it is however not as clear to this day whether the government is willing to cover 100% of the possible costs although it said it would ‘make reasonable cost provision’.[3] The bill since passed its Second Reading on 15 March 2016, but the issue regarding the costs remains in a rather puzzling state. A battle is thus raging silently between service providers and the government.[4] But why has the Home Office gone ahead with publishing the draft bill in the first place?

The UK signals intelligence, a resource constrained domain

The United Kingdom has a robust security apparatus, best exhibited through their efficient intelligence services and their integral role within the Five Eyes Alliance. However, the country has consistently been troubled by one question since the end of Second World War: ‘the growing importance and the rising costs of SIGINT’.[5] Even during its early days, the problem for GCHQ was ‘trying to keep pace with…the NSA, which seemed to have limitless supplies of money’.[6] This problem remains chronic. In 2014, Charles Farr of the Home Office attested that ‘US intelligence agencies are far larger and much better resourced than the [UK] Intelligence Services’ and hence could ‘provide the UK with the intelligence that the UK –with its far more limited resources– could not realistically obtain by itself’.[7] Particularly regarding data retention, the cost of NSA’s Utah Data Centre alone is approximately three times as expensive as the entire complex in which GCHQ currently resides.[8] [9] This reality is one of the driving incentives behind why the government is trying to use CSPs as proxies and share the burden of responsibilities in a domain in which the costs are a legitimate concern.

Cost of ICRs and the Draft Investigatory Powers Bill

According to the Office for National Statistics, 86% of the households (22.5 million) in the UK had internet access in 2015, with 78% of the adults (39.3 million) using it every day.[10] With the use of multiple gadgets (computers, tablets, smartphones, etc.) and multi-tab browsing habits (maintaining more than one connection at a time), collecting and retaining ICRs could prove to be very costly, even in its most basic form. The bill thus contains certain opportunities for the government in its current state, especially regarding cost management. It is also considerably different than the previous legislation, where CSPs were mostly obligated to retain the data they generated to provide their services.[11] A resource constrained UK government could now effectively force service providers to share the burden of collection and retention duties on a much broader scope. Some of these responsibilities are indeed trying to be outsourced to the providers mandatorily. The government ultimately has this ability to coerce, and the MPs have already acknowledged the possibility of such scenario –that is, if someone does not ‘pick up the bill’.[12]

But would it be that easy? Communication service providers are definitely more vulnerable to government coercion than multinational technology firms. Big UK providers have their broadband networks that cross the entire country, and sometimes even provide access to these networks so that the smaller providers can carry their own services.[13] If the business conditions in the UK ultimately become less favourable, they do not seem to have the immediate luxury nor the ability to move the majority of their operations elsewhere.

The retention of ICRs will require the introduction of certain types of equipment such as deep packet inspection tools (DPI) to the CSP networks –a method that is already associated with high technical processing requirements (and consequently, with high financial costs).[14] Furthermore, there is the ongoing cost of maintenance and storage. One might think that the cost of storage has declined over the years, but the actual cost of bulk and enterprise storage is a lot more complicated than a ‘pennies per gigabyte’ approach, especially when the flow of data that needs to be stored is on a multi-terabyte (if not petabyte) scale. Moreover, the upwards trend in the use of data security technologies such as encryption[15] could further complicate defining what qualifies as an ICR. Less network visibility means that the packet inspection used to deliver ICRs needs more computing power and generates far more data. Service provider representatives acknowledge that this technology challenge is ‘not impossible, but it is very expensive’ as it already is.[16] The president of BT Security Mark Hughes said his company worked out £174 million just for themselves, whereas four mobile carriers stated that they alone could spend £247 million on ICRs. [17] The Home Office has been avoiding to make a clear commitment to cost recovery. This attitude was best exhibited when the Home Secretary Theresa May made contradicting references to reimburse both ‘reasonable operational costs’ and ‘100% of the compliance costs’ during the Second Reading. Service providers recently criticised May by saying that her statements ‘do not provide for the same coverage of costs’.[18]

Moving forward

It appears that the government’s attempt to impose these ambiguous terms and costs on the communication service providers is not going to be a linear process. Different committee reports, including that of the Joint Committee that was tasked specifically to scrutinise the bill, came out criticising the initial draft.[19] The issues regarding costs were strongly pronounced in at least two of these reports.[20] While agreeing with CSPs on vague cost projections of the Home Office, the Joint Committee also noted that they ‘do not agree that 100% cost recovery should be on the face of the Bill’.[21]

The scope of new obligations mandated under the bill are much bigger than any previous legislation, so are the possible costs. The Home Office will more likely need to explain better what it expects from the service providers amidst the criticism it is currently receiving. The Joint Committee report also suggested that ‘the Government should provide statutory guidance on the cost recovery models’.[22] This is a sensible recommendation, and the Home Office seems to be slowly taking notice of CSPs’ concerns.[23] It is understandable that the current opportunities the bill poses for the government are tempting, but the long-term viability of the bill lies in clarity and cooperation, not coercion nor alienation.

 

 

Mustafa Batuhan Albas is an MA Candidate in Intelligence and International Security at King’s College London. His research focus is on information security and its applications on intelligence gathering. He can be reach at @8thcolumn on Twitter.

 

 

 

Notes:

[1] Theresa May, “Draft Investigatory Powers Bill,” 2015, 12, https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/473770/Draft_Investigatory_Powers_Bill.pdf.

[2] Home Office, “Investigatory Powers Bill Factsheet – Internet Connection Records,” 2015, https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/473745/Factsheet-Internet_Connection_Records.pdf.

[3] House of Commons – Science and Technology Committee, “Oral Evidence: Investigatory Powers Bill: Technology Issues, HC 573 (Tuesday 8 December 2015)” (UK Parliament, 2015), http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/science-and-technology-committee/investigatory-powers-bill-technology-issues/oral/25740.html.

[4] Alan Travis, “Minister Has Not Fully Made Case for Snooper’s Charter, Says Committee,” The Guardian, February 11, 2016, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/feb/11/ministers-not-conclusive-case-web-snoopers-charter.

[5] Richard J. Aldrich, “Counting the Cost of Intelligence: The Treasury, National Service and GCHQ,” English Historical Review 128, no. 532 (2013): 607, doi:10.1093/ehr/cet067.

[6] Ibid., 610.

[7] Privacy International, “Investigatory Powers Tribunal Case No. IPT/13/77/H,” 2014, 7–8, https://www.privacyinternational.org/sites/default/files/Witness st of Charles Blandford Farr_0.pdf.

[8] US Domestic Surveillance Directorate, “Utah Data Center,” accessed February 16, 2016, https://nsa.gov1.info/utah-data-center/.

[9] Richard Norton-Taylor, “The Doughnut, the Less Secretive Weapon in the Fight against International Terrorism,” The Guardian, June 10, 2003, http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2003/jun/10/terrorism.Whitehall.

[10] Office for National Statistics, “Internet Access – Households and Individuals, 2015 – Statistical Bulletin,” 2015, http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/dcp171778_412758.pdf.

[11] Calum Jeffray, “Understanding the Investigatory Powers Bill,” RUSI, 2015, https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201511_bp_investigatory_powers_bill.pdf.

[12] House of Commons – Science and Technology Committee, “Oral Evidence: Investigatory Powers Bill: Technology Issues, HC 573 (Tuesday 8 December 2015).”

[13] Broadband Genie, “Rated Broadband Providers,” 2016, https://www.broadbandgenie.co.uk/broadband/providers.

[14] Niccolò Cascarano, Luigi Ciminiera, and Fulvio Risso, “Optimizing Deep Packet Inspection for High-Speed Traffic Analysis,” Journal of Network and Systems Management 19, no. 1 (2011): 8, doi:10.1007/s10922-010-9181-x.

[15] Klint Finley, “Encrypted Web Traffic More Than Doubles After NSA Revelations,” Wired, May 2014, http://www.wired.com/2014/05/sandvine-report/.

[16] Joint Committee on the Draft Investigatory Powers Bill, “Oral Evidence: Draft Investigatory Powers Bill, HC 651 (Wednesday 9 December 2015),” UK Parliament, 2015, http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/draft-investigatory-powers-bill-committee/draft-investigatory-powers-bill/oral/25977.html.

[17] Joint Committee on the Draft Investigatory Powers Bill, “Oral Evidence: Draft Investigatory Powers Bill, HC 651 (Wednesday 13 January 2016),” UK Parliament, 2016, http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/draft-investigatory-powers-bill-committee/draft-investigatory-powers-bill/oral/26875.html.

[18] “Written Evidence: Internet Service Providers Association (ISPA) (IPB31),” 2016, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201516/cmpublic/investigatorypowers/Memo/IPB31.pdf.

[19] Travis, “Minister Has Not Fully Made Case for Snooper’s Charter, Says Committee.”

[20] House of Commons – Science and Technology Committee, “Cost of Investigatory Powers Bill Could Undermine UK Tech Sector,” UK Parliament, 2016, http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/science-and-technology-committee/news-parliament-2015/investigatory-powers-bill-report-published-15-16/./

[21] Joint Committee on the Draft Investigatory Powers Bill, “Draft Investigatory Powers Bill Report,” n.d., 68, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt201516/jtselect/jtinvpowers/93/93.pdf.

[22] Ibid., 10.

[23] Home Office, “Communications Data: Draft Code of Practice,” 2016, 96, https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/505411/Communications_Data_draft_Code_of_Practice.pdf.

Filed Under: Blog Article Tagged With: Cost, Home Office, internet, Legislation, SIGINT, UK

Is democratic peace theory undermined on the cyber battlefield?

October 30, 2015 by Strife Staff

By: Archie Jobson

https://c1.staticflickr.com/1/427/18729140824_4ae0fb0574_b.jpg
https://c1.staticflickr.com/1/427/18729140824_4ae0fb0574_b.jpg

Remote Control is a project hosted by the London-based think tank Oxford Research Group, set up to examine changes in military engagement, in particular the use of drones, special forces, private military companies and cyber warfare. They recently hosted an essay competition for participants in response to the question ‘Is remote control effective in solving security problems?’ Both Chad Tumelty and Archie Jobson of King’s College London achieved runner up. Strife is proud to feature them as your long read of the week over the coming two weeks.

Democratic peace is a historically proven and appealing solution to the violent and anarchic nature of international relations. However, much of the statistical proof for claims of a democratic peace rest on constrained and narrow definitions of war. Cyberwar introduces a new method of war that negates many of the principles and parameters of democratic peace theory, subsequently putting the validity of a democratic peace in doubt. In order to conclusively assess whether democratic peace is applicable to cyberspace, I shall, firstly, define cyberwar in reference to current debate and the Clausewitzian understanding of war. Secondly I will contrast the characteristics of cyber war to the framework of democratic peace theory. Ultimately democratic peace theory has little applicability to the realm of cyberspace, but, importantly, to date the democratic peace has held, as two democratic states are yet to engage in cyberwar.

“Cyber war will not happen” and “cyber war will happen!” are, two conflicting arguments posed by Thomas Rid and John Stone respectively. Although, as the titles suggest, both are seeking to establish the likelihood of cyber war, the essential disagreement can be seen as does cyberwar constitute war. Thomas Rid claims that, due to the lack violence in a cyber attack it cannot equate to conventional understandings of war, and thus is not. Rid refers to Clausewitz’s definition,  “war is an act of force to compel an enemy to do our will.” The crucial word for Rid is force, which he defines as violence and thus an action of war must pertain an element of lethality. However this seems to be a flawed understanding of war and, as John Stone points out, is historically unfounded. Stone highlights the 1943 bombings of the Bavarian town of Schweinfurt. The intended aim was to destroy German ball-bearing production capacity. Although over 400 civilians died in these raids, providing Rid’s lethality, it was seen as “incidental to the desired goal”. The proposition is that, these air raids had no aim of lethality but were clearly acts of war, and thus Rid’s requirement of lethal violence is restrictive, even by conventional understandings of war. It is possible to reinforce John Stone’s argument with the logic that, if an action of cyberwar results in the “compel(ling)” of an enemy to do the attackers “will” then it arguably constitutes war, at least by a Clausewitzian definition. Essentially, this means that if cyberwar achieves the same result as traditional warfare, it should be considered as war. This is reinforced by the idea that if “breaking and entering” in cyber space, the theft of personal or corporate information, is registered as an equal if not greater crime as physically breaking and entering, then cyberwar that achieves the submission of the opponents will, must equate to a conventional conflict that amounts to the same.

The cyber attacks on Estonia in April 2007 demonstrate this. As the result of the proposed removal of a Soviet war memorial from the centre of Tallinn, Estonia and its online infrastructure came under attack from computers of Russian origin. In context, Estonia was regularly called the “wired state of Europe”, with 90% of its domestic financial transactions taking place online. By May 19th Hansabank, Estonia’s largest bank, was forced offline. Ultimately to stop these attacks the Estonian government was forced to close down all external Internet traffic, essentially shutting itself off to the rest of the world. Although, clearly, this is not a cyberwar between two democracies, it demonstrates that a state can force another to act against its own will, by the use of a cyber attack. In this case Estonia closing itself off to the world, causing significant disruption and economic damage. Estonia’s cyber space was recognized by Russia as integral to the “wired state”, and was targeted for this reason. It is hard to deny, therefore, that cyberwar does not constitute war; if, as this example shows, it has the potential to achieve the same ends desired in a conventional conflict. The retort could be made that the memorial was still removed, demonstrating Estonia did not bow to Russian desires; but this seems naive to the nature of Russian intentions during this period. The attack on Estonia can be seen as a move by Russia to demonstrate its support of ethnic Russian communities in former soviet bloc states, this is highlighted by the 2008 Russo-Georgian war which also involved substantial cyber attacks. However, it should be noted that a cyber war such as this would not fall under the traditional definition of war utilized by democratic peace theory, the “correlates of war.” Thus the distinction should be established that either the correlates of war are outdated and cannot help in understanding the ever modernizing developments of war, or that cyber war does not constitute as a sufficient example of conflict; it seems on assessment of the above example the later is incorrect.

The logic of democratic peace theory prescribes that democracies do not engage one another in military conflict, due to the nature of democratic systems and the shared cultural norms that reject violence. Cyber warfare introduces several new elements that null these factors, and in so doing raise questions of the validity of democratic peace theory. Democratic peace theory posits that the absence of war between democratic states is a result of “institutional constraints; the restraining effect of public opinion or of the checks and balances embedded in the democratic structures.” In cyber warfare, however, the dynamics of conflict have fundamentally changed, negating these explanations. For example the battlefield of cyber war is not inhabited by soldiers but by servers. This subsequently removes the danger to life, and thus it must remove a strong element of public aversion to conflict. Secondly if the conventional elements of war are either removed entirely, or substantially reduced, it will be accompanied by a significant cost reduction. Thus if a nation will not loose “its treasure” (comparatively to conventional war), and there still remains the possibility of gain from a cyber conflict, in the form of prestige or a stronger global position; the assumption that democracies would be unwilling to commit to a conflict, lacks evidence. Ultimately, if “blood and treasure” were not applicable there would be little, if no, restraining effect. This is because these are two, fundamental, war retardants held by democratic peace theorists.

Christopher Layne points out that democratic peace theorist often argue “that the absence of war between democracies is more important than the absence of threats”. The validity of this argument, as a result of the weaknesses highlighted above, is now under much greater pressure. Democratic states can now threaten another international actor with cyberwar, without the restraints they were contained by before. The comparatively smaller cost of a cyber attack, in terms of “Blood” and “Treasure”, to a conventional one is demonstrated by “struxnet”. This was a virus, planted by the US, which infected the Iranian nuclear facilities’ computer network. This caused an internal explosion by disrupting the separation process of uranium-235. The conventional alternative, that could have caused the same level of damage, would have been an airstrike using special munitions, with estimate costs running into millions of dollars. Struxnet was cheap as it “capitalized on code expertise” that already existed. Furthermore no US personnel were put at risk to carry out the operation. Cyberwar thus challenges the assertion that substantial physical and economic loss prevents elected leaders from taking their countries to war with other democratic states. This is because the weight of public antipathy to these loses, is essentially non-applicable in cyberwar; rebuffing the claims that war will not happen between democratic states.

The transparency and legality of democratic states is also claimed by democratic peace theorist to demonstrate why democratic states are less likely to engage in conflict. As a result of this transparency and conformity to international legal norms it is argued that, democratic states have an innate level of trust amongst each other. However, in the cyber world such faith in another states intentions, especially those towards you, is challenged. This is due to the element of deniability that is possible with cyber attacks, that is not possible via conventional methods. For example, operation “Titan Rain”, as dubbed by the US, was a wide spread cyber attack on multiple US and UK government departments from 2003-07, that came from Chinese origin. The blame was put solely on PLA by British and American government officials; yet the Chinese government was able to plainly deny these claims due to the attacks untraceable nature. Although again this example is not a conflict between two democracies, it clearly shows that transparency and legality do not apply in cyber space. This is because a state could perpetrate an attack to disable a government’s infrastructure, an act that fulfils the parameters of war, but then deny any involvement. As Chinese government did by arguing they had no part in the attack. Crucially America and the UK were restricted in their response on these grounds, and could not pursue a legal course. Therefore, because the burden of proof in the cyber world is so much greater it could fog up the transparency of democratic states and thus trust in one another would dissipate. Cyberspace is therefore a domain in which, a state could attack another and not be held accountable to international legal norms. The situation has arisen where transparency and conformity to legal norms are no longer relevant, because states can act essentially anonymously. Ultimately, this will challenge democracies’ commitment to international law.

Maoz and Russet in “A Statistical Artifact?” state that democratic spirit of “peaceful competition, persuasion and compromise” explains why democracies behave in a “qualatively” different manner towards each other than they do towards non-democracies. As the cyber world continues to develop this idea of peaceful competition, on which democratic peace’s foundations lie, is increasingly challenged. As a result it is possible to conclude that the apparent stability of democratic peace is not foreseeable. This can be demonstrated by the comparison of the 1923 Ruhr crisis with the 2013 United States National Security Agency’s espionage on the state owned Brazilian oil giant Petrobras. Historically the idea that democracies behave towards one another with a mutual respect has been regularly challenged. Christopher Layne in “Kant or Can’t: The Myth of the Democratic Peace” challenged such arguments with the example of the 1923 Franco-German Ruhr Crisis. Essentially Layne claims that, the occupation of the Ruhr valley by France is an example where the inherent respect that democracies have for one another, was not present. The occupation of the Ruhr showed that France’s war objective of crippling Wilhelm Germany remained the same, despite the fact that Germany was now a democratic republic. Up to 1923 France had rejected the idea of a new democratic Germany, as they did not believe their security situation had fundamentally changed. “What mattered to France was Germany’s latent power”, France’s attitude toward Germany “displayed none of the mutual respect based on democratic norms and culture” on which democratic peace theory rests. As a consequence the French PM Poincare had no option, if he was to maintain his prime ministerial position, but to occupy the Ruhr as anti-German sentiment was so high in France. The Ruhr crisis provides two problematic situations for democratic peace theorists.  Firstly it demonstrates that, should it be politically expedient for one democracy to force itself upon another, as it was for Poincare, it will. Secondly, and more importantly for cyber war, when the situation arises that one democracy is inherently weaker than another (Germany 1923) then it becomes a viable target for other democracies. This is arguably the current situation in cyber space and consequently the cyber battlefield.

In September 2013 it emerged that the U.S had been spying on the Brazilian oil company Petrobras. This provides many parallels to 1923 and is essentially an act of corporate cyber espionage by the U.S, against a state owned oil producer. From this it is possible to conclude that the United States, in a similar fashion to France in 1923, does not conform to ideas of mutual respect; instead they sought to understand the “Latent” economic power of Petrobras, and thus the Brazilian government’s oil wealth. At this point it is important to acknowledge Moaz and Russet’s claim that democratic peace is generated by “peaceful competition, persuasion and compromise”, thus the stability of the so called democratic peace, if Moaz and Russet are correct, is on unstable ground, as a result of an increasing turn to the realm of cyber space. The Petrobras incident demonstrates that in cyber space two essential pillars of democratic peace have been removed. This is because the United States has shown that democratic states do not have the inherent respect required of democratic peace theory, when they are operating in the cyber world. Furthermore on the evidence presented it is possible to conclude, if not predict, that democracies such as the U.S would be willing to perform a cyber attack if it enabled some kind of economic benefit. Therefore the growth of the cyber world has simultaneously eliminated the idea of trust between democracies. As a result the likelihood of (cyber)war is much greater.

The counter argument could be made here that Petrobras, despite its majority state ownership, does not amount to a democratic state, hence this example does not undermine democratic peace theory’s requisite that democracies hold mutual respect and compete peacefully. However this is one example of many. If, for example, you examine 2013-14 revelations that the CIA and NSA were exercising a “Special Collections Service”(SCS) unit in Berlin monitoring not only Angela Merkel’s phone conversations, but also the committee rooms of the Reichstag, the future for democratic peace in the cyber realm is bleak. This example demonstrates that not only do democracies not inherently trust democratically elected leaders, but also the legislative bodies within democratic states. Moreover the SCS program has been in operation across Europe operating in other capitals such as Madrid. What this demonstrates, is that if a democratic state has the ability to do something, as the U.S cyber dominance has allowed in this case, it will do it. Furthermore it demonstrates that it will not be restrained by the articulated parameters of democratic peace theory.

Cyberwar presents a decisive challenge to democratic peace theory. The developing nature of warfare allows the logic of the democratic peace to be disputed. This is because cyberwar is not restricted by the confinements of public opinion, this in turn defeats ideas of transparency and trust between democracies. However, as stated, an example of cyberwar, that in itself, disproves the democratic peace cannot be provided; only examples that indicate the likelihood of future cyberwars between democracies. When two democratic states come into collision on an issue divisive enough for them to question the trust on which democratic peace is orientated, the inherent harmony of democracies will collapse. This is beginning to emerge as the U.S utilizes its cyber hegemony to infiltrate other democratic states, in order to understand their intentions, and true capabilities. What cyberwar reinforces, therefore, is that democracy is still in its founding moments and to conclude that it will create a perpetual peace, is to ignore the possibility of development in what we define as peace and war.

Archie is currently a third year undergraduate in the War Studies Department at King’s College London. His dissertation focused on human rights and the war on terror. He is interested in the changing nature of warfare and how it is revealing our rigid definitions of conflict as inadequate and outdated. Archie is hoping to continue his studies within the War Studies Department with an MA in Terrorism, Security and Society.

Filed Under: Blog Article Tagged With: Cyberwar, democracy, Democratic Peace, drones, Petrobras, UK, USA

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