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Parsing the Safe Passage

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by Matthew Ader

“They can’t fight!” by Frederick Burr Opper, January 1896, originally published in Puck. (Image credit: National Archives)

Scholars and policymakers around the world are turning to history to understand how to navigate the onrushing collision between the ailing United States of America and an increasingly assertive China. The most famous example, expounded upon at length in Graham Allison’s Destined for War, is the clash between Sparta and Athens as documented by Thucydides. However, the most recent hegemonic transition, that of Britain to the United States, deserves significant attention – it is well-sourced, exhaustively documented, and involves national actors still relevant today. That makes it a valuable case study.

However, little work has yet been done to model this period in a way, which would allow the clean transfer of lessons learnt to the modern context. Even Kori Schake’s Safe Passage, written explicitly with the intent of informing Sino-American competition, is an excellent history before it is a work of political science. The relative paucity of overarching models means that policymakers must either fall back on heuristics or delve into intricate historical details.

This article attempts to split the difference by deriving a broader model of hegemonic transition from the circumstances of the Anglo-American case, with the hope that it will ease comparative work between the historical and contemporary situations.

I argue that the transition can be broken down into five distinct phases:

  1. Potential for competition (1756 – 1823) – the United States begins to grow in capability, but Britain is not yet aware of the potential threat.
  2. Recognition (1823) – Britain recognises the United States as a potential threat.
  3. The window of opportunity (1823 – 1914) – Britain conducts policy to (in most cases) conciliate the United States as the two nations move towards parity.
  4. Moment of transition (1916) – the United States surpasses Britain, as a result of British losses and American industrial growth during the First World War.
  5. Settling into a new order (1917 onwards) – the United States becomes the new global rule-setter, and Britain adjusts its position accordingly.

The United States’ growth in power began before the American Revolution, with the Seven Years War and American independence, but a combination of internal weakness and British distraction with eastern conquests and ambitious Corsicans – not to mention America’s poor performance in the War of 1812 – meant that it took until the 1820s for senior British officials to directly recognise the future potential of the United States as a major disruptive influence. Notably, and seemingly uniquely in terms of hegemonic transitions, this was recognised long before the United States even began to approach military parity with Britain. This may be due to traditional British lack of confidence in its own power, and also the naval character of said power – as Lord Palmerston observed in 1858, the simple reality of American geography rendered it invulnerable to British domination even in the absence of a major US force.

Given that Britain recognised the potential for competition relatively early, they had a large window of opportunity to apply policy. Instead of launching a preventive war, which would have been ineffective given the fact that Britain could not achieve lasting dominance over the United States, they pursued a consistent policy of conciliation. During the Oregon boundary dispute (1846), the Trent Affair (1861), and the Venezuelan Debt Crisis (1895), among other crises, Britain de-escalated even when it held the upper hand in coercive force. British bankers and merchants were encouraged to invest in the United States, even as propaganda about a joint Anglo-American destiny, linked by shared Anglo-Saxon heritage, percolated into American culture.

This was sagacious policy and was enabled in large part by the early recognition of the potential threat the United States posed and subsequently extensive window of opportunity. Given 80 years, most diplomatic relationships can be transformed in major ways – this is much less viable over shorter time frames. The result was that at the moment of transition, towards the end of the First World War – as British policymakers acknowledged that American industrial power so outmatched their own that America held the upper hand in any interaction, as was evidenced by the Paris Peace Conference and the 1922 Washington Naval Treaty – the United States looked on Britain not as a weakened rival, but as a culturally, economically, and at least somewhat strategically aligned partner. Debate persists, however, on the specifics of the Anglo-American transition of power, with many scholars placing it in 1945. However, I would argue that the passage happened in 1916 and was already visible at Versailles. Nevertheless, Britain continued to play a global role arguably disproportionate to its means. The USA, in turn, did not emerge as a hegemon until after the Second World War.

Why A Model?

Given that the historical record exists, why would a model of that transition be helpful? Principally because it allows clearer comparative analysis and the codification of lessons learnt.

First, in terms of comparative analysis, we can transfer this model to Sino-American relations relatively clearly. The potential for competition existed throughout the 1990s and 2000s as China grew in power, but the distracted United States only recognised the threat in 2009 with the Pivot/Rebalance to Asia. Others would argue that this recognition came even later, with the American declaration of China as a near-peer competitor. The United States is now in the window of opportunity vis a vis China, as the relative gap between the powers narrows, and must implement policy to forestall or cushion its decline. If current trends continue unabated, there will be a moment of transition, either when China peacefully surpasses American power; or when its aggressive moves run into a mutual red line.

Rather than attempting to draw difficult comparisons based on historical events in the Anglo-American relationship, the existence of the model allows references to history without getting lost in the details. Similarly, the model allows a clearer discussion of lessons learnt. British success stemmed in large part, I would argue, from early recognition of the American potential as a competitor. Others might suggest it was the result of effective policy within the window of opportunity. A model equips us with a common vocabulary to discuss a difficult topic.

This is not, of course, perfect. The model itself is applicable to Anglo-American hegemonic transition, and I believe Sino-American too, but it carries with it the weight of hindsight – assuming as it does that China will at some point fight the United States or move past it in some peaceful yet vital way. Equally plausible is the idea that China may fall short of hegemony, not due to American action within the window of opportunity, but internal socioeconomic weakness. Another possibility not fully incorporated in this model is that the United States and China may reach parity and remain there for a long period, with neither able to act as a hegemon. And, of course, in the general sense, having an avowedly simplifying model often makes things more complex, not less.

Despite that, given the growing importance of hegemonic transition, it is important to ensure rigour and clear communication in debates around it. This model, or something like it, may go some way towards helping in that effort.

Matthew Ader is an undergraduate student in the Department of War Studies at King’s College London with an interest in climate change and grand strategy. He tweets occasionally from @AderMatthew.

 

 

Does the History of Britain’s Relationship with Europe mean that Brexit was Inevitable?

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by Ryan Chan

The European flag, a contentious issue in Brexiting Britain (Image credit: Flickr)

 

In most analyses regarding the 2016 Referendum, Britain’s legacy of Exceptionalism and Empire is commonly cited as a crucial reason for the 2016 Referendum by critics and proponents alike. Yet this article will problematise the claim that Brexit was historically inevitable as it dismisses crucial explanations on the historical development of British Euroscepticism and marginalises the plethora of reasons as to why ordinary Britons voted as they did in the referendum.

The French saying ‘l’Angleterre est insulaire’ summarises the idea that Britain is an ‘island nation’, geographically and geopolitically detached from Europe, able to choose between the ‘continent or the open seas’. In his veto against British membership in what was then the European Economic Community, Charles de Gaulle asserted in 1963 that Britain is unfit to join: “She is unlike other European countries […] linked by her markets […] to the most diverse and farthest-flung nations.’ This view of an ‘insular Britain’ was not limited to De Gaulle’s time: Stephen George’s An Awkward Partner, for instance, argues that Britain had always preferred a ‘special relationship’ with the United States, and given Britain’s legacy of empire and ‘rehearsal of historical anti-French and German attitudes,’ it led to a ‘disdainful’ relationship between Britain and the EU, seeking for a ‘looser relationship based on free-trade’ rather than a political union.

Critically, the idea of Britain as an ‘island nation’ was a phenomenon that preceded a united Europe or the existence of Great Britain. After the loss of her French possessions following the Hundred Years War, Britain (then England) was more concerned with empire-building overseas rather than within Europe unlike the continental European powers. When Britain did engage with Europe however, her role as a ‘balancer’ coerced her into ‘difficult relationships’ and rivalries with most of her neighbours. Allusions to this history were prevalent in the rhetoric of the Leave Campaign. Many referenced the re-establishing of a Britain formulated on the ‘island nation’ concept: a Britain that once ruled the waves and through its Parliament opposed the evil continental European powers. For Eurosceptics, the EU is a German-led ‘fourth Reich’ and Brexit is a return to ‘global Britain’ and British sovereignty.

Over the centuries, there was little change to what ‘Britain’ was, and as a consequence, Britain placed less importance on being ‘European’ than her counterparts on the continent who experienced devastation from war and tyrannical rule. However, one does not need to look too far into British history in order to substantiate De Gaulle’s view. The inevitability of Brexit is also reflected in how Britain ‘tumbled’ into the European Community in 1973. Unlike founding members of the Community (like France, Germany and the Benelux Countries) who stress the importance of the European Union as a ‘historic success’ that brought a lasting peace to a region embroiled in centuries of conflict, Britain entered the Community during a decade of economic turmoil and the decline of empire, keen to re-establish her influence within Europe: She viewed the Community (and Europe) in economic, transactional and intergovernmental terms. Because of this history, Britain was a peripheral member within the Union, unwilling to compromise on sovereignty, strongly detested integration initiatives and only desired access to the single market. Britain’s historical legacy therefore does De Gaulle’s claim justice: Britain never belonged in Europe – she sought to redefine the Union in her own terms and was therefore first and foremost incompatible with EU values. Along with staggeringly low participation rates in European Elections, the decision to leave in 2016 seemed inevitable.

Yet, if Britain was too ‘insular’ and did not belong in the European Union, surely the decision to join the Community in 1973, the ratification of Maastricht in 1992 which founded a politically united Europe, or British support for EU expansion in the early 2000s would logically not have occurred? Could these instances dispute the claim that Brexit was historically inevitable? Such a claim overlooks Britain’s ‘Europhilic’ history, as Tim Oliver and Daddow highlight, Britain championed many European causes such as advocating for EU enlargement to central European states and was closer to EU policy decisions than generally ‘pro-European’ states like France, Holland or Ireland.

But what changed by 2016? It is important to acknowledge that British Euroscepticism was not given by virtue of history, but a ‘development’ against a perceived encroachment on British sovereignty and can be clearly demonstrated through Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher’s legacy. In her Bruges Speech of 1988, although she questioned the direction of European integration, she clearly states that ‘Britain’s future is in Europe’ and campaigned for Community policy reforms. This tone is unrecognisable after the Maastricht Treaty negotiations. In response to the prospects of a monetary union, Thatcher declared in 1992 that she could not support the ratification of Maastricht as it ‘conflicted with British democratic institutions and the accountability of Parliament’. British Euroscepticism was a development against an increasingly integrated Europe, as it was no longer, as Thatcher stated, in Britain’s interest to remain in a ‘federal Europe.’

Indeed, many Britons felt so as well – subsequent European policies that pushed Britain into a direction without the consent of the British electorate did much to exacerbate public opinion about Integration. A prominent case would be Prime Minister Blair’s premature push for free movement expansion to ‘A8’ EU countries in 2004, compromising support for core EU values. This would have serious repercussions in the following decade, where areas in which immigration drastically increased between 2001 and 2014 would experience a ‘94% chance of voting leave.’ These considerations therefore compromise the claim that the Referendum’s outcome was inevitable by virtue of history: the vote to leave was instead dealing with recent developments in European Integration, rather than premises of nationalistic nostalgia.

Yet, if we are to discern the core reasons for the vote to leave, we must acknowledge one fundamental truth: the ‘identity of Britain’ in relation to Europe is socially constructed and decided by the British people. Given that the vote to leave won by a mere margin of four percent and not a unanimous consensus, it is inaccurate to claim that ‘Leave’ was a product of historical nostalgia and a rejection of Integration. While some may have voted on grounds of nostalgia, it is equally probable that there are those who have voted for mundane reasons, such as immigration or political detachment from Brussels. It is also probable that many voted on pro-European issues, where some, although not a majority, voted on the premise of a shared ‘European Identity’. How British people perceive the Union could change within the near future, potentially altering the result of another Referendum as evidenced by the ever-changing opinions of Brexit polls, thus rendering the Brexit vote anything but historically inevitable or a universally shared sentiment.

Crucially, the vote to leave was not determined by Britain’s historical relationship with Europe, but more so by the attitudes of ordinary Britons towards the European Project which could significantly change in the near future given that the ‘remain’ vote was heavily concentrated among younger generations. Although it is established that Brexit was not historically inevitable, European policymakers cannot ignore that increasing retaliation against the process/direction of integration that won the vote to leave. This is an issue not exclusive to Britain, but also elsewhere in Europe like France, where the perceived loss of ‘sovereignty’ has given credence to Hard-Eurosceptic parties. Perhaps Macron’s proposal of a European Renaissance to stress the importance of Europeanism, or the creation of a European Constitution and greater representation of National Parliaments within the EU may be necessary solutions in order to quell sentiments of Euroscepticism or prevent future ‘exits’. These solutions to the problems of the EU can only be appreciated if it is established that Brexit was not historically inevitable, but a reaction.

Ryan Chan is a third year History and International Relations student at King’s College London and an opinion writer at King’s College London’s award-winning tabloid Roar News. He is interested in Modern 20th Century World History, particularly the Global Cold War, European Integration and Communist Chinese history. This article is the first of two winning essays of a writing competition jointly organised by the convenors of the module “Contemporary Issues in International History” and the Strife Blog.

Event Review — The Future of UK Grand Strategy

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By Harrison Brewer

4 January 2019

Georgina Wright, Cllr. Peymana Assad, and Dr. Charlie Laderman spoke at a Strife-PS21 event, which was moderated by Peter Apps (left to right). (Image credit: Kayla Goodson)

 

Strife and PS21 joined forces to present a fascinating panel discussion on the future of the UK’s grand strategy. We live in an uncertain world that gets more uncertain by the minute, as the United Kingdom flails around Brexit, Trump’s America turns away from Europe, and Europe looks to redefine what it means to be in the Union. All the meanwhile, the UK avoids the aging imperialist elephant in the room: who are we, what are we doing, and how can we do it? PS21 brought in an expert, an academic, and a practitioner to help disentangle the UK’s approach to grand strategy in the 21st Century.

Dr. Charlie Laderman, a lecturer in International History at King’s College London, first explained his definition of grand strategy, believing it to be the intellectual architecture that forms foreign policy. It is a historically British concept — although Dr. Laderman questioned whether Britain ever got it right — and is predicated on balancing peacetime goals with war and using limited resources to achieve a state’s goals. Dr. Laderman suggested that British foreign policy experts have a ‘maddening pragmatism’ that is borne out of Britain’s historical pole position in global politics but argued that it is imperative for the UK to break out of this mould and to reassess.

The UK has long been perceived as the facilitator and bridge between the US and Europe, but this relationship is at risk. Trump’s de-Europeanisation policy and Merkel’s and Macron’s attempts at firming the bonds of European fraternity leave the UK out of the loop post-Brexit; therefore, Dr. Laderman believes the UK must engage in the business of trade-offs. Britain must consider how it can use its limited yet still formidable capabilities in defenCe, soft power, and international development to continue to be a reliable partner, as well as a global player. Lastly, Dr. Laderman noted that the UK needs a stable EU in order to thrive. Therefore, despite leaving the union, the UK must look to fortify it relationships with EU states and support the EU as best as it can.

Cllr Peymana Assad, a defence and international development expert, as well as a local councillor in the London Borough of Harrow, discussed how the UK must address its relationship with its imperialist and colonialist past to improve its foreign policy. Assad underlined the need for the UK to champion equality in its foreign policy, acknowledging that the UK could use soft power to correct some of its mistakes made under colonialism. Assad referenced her work in Afghanistan and recalled a conversation she had with Afghan tribal leaders about the Durand Line, the internationally accepted border between Pakistan and Afghanistan. The Afghan people were absent in this international decision-making process, she noted, which showed a disregard for the people directly affected by this decision. She argued that the UK’s grand strategy needs to be founded on principles of equality for all actors, both international and local, and it needs to address Britain’s imperial history and the suffering it caused.

To summarise, she stated the focus should be on the following points:

1) The key to establishing ourselves in the world is seeing all as equals. In order to do this, we must understand the real impact of colonisation and imperialism on the countries we left behind, and we must understand how some of those actions of the past haunt us today.

2) The UK needs to consider and seek opportunities with non-western powers like China and India, but also continue to facilitate between European and other allies, such as the United States — it’s too important not to do both. We should not solely focus on Europe.

3) Britain must use its soft power and understand that the world has changed; we can command more influence through art, culture and education by way of exchange and scholarships. India currently leads through music, film and education, for example in the South Asian region.

Finally, Assad stated that in order to achieve this, we need to bring the British public with us, on the ride and convince them, that engaging with Europe and the non-western world, brings us benefits and also stops us being swallowed up in a world of constant changing super powers.

Georgina Wright, a research associate in the Europe Programme at Chatham House, began by stating that British foreign policy must be separate from the Brexit process. Britain has a privileged position in global affairs — it is both one of the leaders in official development assistance and a strong partner of both the US and the EU — and the UK should not forgo this position as a consequence of Brexit. Rather than turning further inwards, the UK should take the opportunity to engage more meaningfully and extensively with its allies. This change, however, must be managed carefully and swiftly to prove the UK’s commitment to the international community.

Wright outlined three risks the country faces post-Brexit: a more inward-looking Britain that is fully consumed by Brexit; incoherent external policy that is driven commercially rather than politically; and a failure to grapple with the changing international context, evidenced by the rise of China and Russia, as well as rising levels of inequality and popular insurgency.  Wright then proposed five areas the foreign office should focus on to form its foreign policy. First, the foreign office needs to clearly articulate the vision for Global Britain. Second, the UK must figure out how to do more with less and avoid commitment without impact. Third, without the stage of European Union politics for alliance building, the UK must prioritise how it uses the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and where. Fourth, the government must mobilise the entire British population, not just London, behind any grand strategy to ensure its success. Finally, the foreign office needs to be consistent. Wright ended by pointing out that Brexit will only become more intense with trade negotiations on the horizon and a plethora of actors and interests that will need to be balanced at home and abroad. Above all, the UK needs to ensure that it builds a strong, deep partnership with the EU despite its departure.

Editor’s note: This event review was also published by PS21. 

Harrison Brewer is pursuing an MA in Conflict, Security, and Development. He recently graduated from McGill University in Montréal, Canada with a degree in Classics, Political Science, and Art History. Harrison has previously worked for Deverell Associates, a security consultancy firm in London, specialising in crisis preparedness and leadership training. He is now working for Boxspring Media, a tech-driven learning disruptor for corporate firms. Harrison’s interests include strategic analyses of paramilitary violence in the Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa with a focus on gendered violence, insurgency patterns, and conflict simulation. Harrison has designed and produced a simulation modelling the urban warfare of the Iraqi Army’s campaign for Mosul in 2016-2017 that is being developed for commercial use. You can follow Harrison on twitter at @_HarrisonBrewer.

The Role of History in the British and German Army Officer Corps: Training, Attitudes and Identity

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By Dr Sarah Katharina Kayß

 

German soldier of the Gebirgsjägerbataillon 232 (Credit Image: Bundeswehr / Andrea Bienert)

 

“Each nation steps into the future carrying the heritage of its own past. This past leaves its mark on the development of society, and on the way people think, including the way the military staff thinks.”

(Vladimir Rukavishnikov 2007, 24)

 

The Study – the book

In the past few years (during my work at the War Studies Department at King’s College London) I have concerned myself with the significance of history perceptions in the British and German forces. The following article gives you a glimpse insight of the results of the research undertaken and what to expect in my book which was just published by Routledge. The main purpose of my study was to draw attention to under-researched and yet extremely important aspects in military studies, namely: the detection of professional identity in the British and German forces and the role of history within the enlistment process of aspiring officers in both countries. Modern-day Britain and Germany are Western liberal democracies whose armed forces, (which are both NATO members and under civilian control,) recruit professional soldiers and officers for territorial defence and foreign deployment. Despite many cultural similarities, British and German societal perceptions towards their military pasts seem to differ substantially.

History is essential if you want to understand the power of traditions and the building up of the national image and what history can do in a nation’s psyche.

[British officer cadet]

 

The Argument

In the book I argue that officers have a strong relationship with the history of their country because the history of their country is identical to the history of their employer. Consequently, soldiers and officers are inevitably more connected to the history of their country than other professional groups. The data results clearly show that the officer cadets’ decision-making was influenced by their interpretation of their professional role, which in turn was heavily dependent on their understanding of history and alleged lessons learned from the past. The study therefore provides insights into the British and German army officer cadets’ understanding of the world that they were surrounded with, and illustrates how far their understanding of history was influenced by the culture in which they grew up in.

I think history was a huge part of my motivation. Obviously, (…) the whole history of Britain is completely intertwined with its armed forces’ history (…) So it connects to pride joining the British Army, because you are linked towards a history that civilians wouldn’t be.

[British officer cadet]

 

Data and identity studies

The formation of identity, particularly in the field of work identity, has generated a great deal of interest (e.g. Vest 2012; Ben-Shalom and Benbenisty 2016; Franke 2000; Broesder et al. 2014; Pratt et al. 2006; Schott et al. 2016), yet still very little is known about the professional identity formation of army personnel in general and that of officers in particular. I therefore designed a questionnaire covering topics such as the cadets’ motivation to enlist, attitudes towards war and combat, army training and perceptions about the officer profession in the past, present and future. In Britain, 481 British officer cadets who started their training at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst in 2014 completed the survey. Additionally, 49 of those cadets were interviewed. In Germany, 274 cadets who were going through basic officer training at the Officer School of the Army in Dresden (to proceed with a degree course in Munich or Hamburg) in 2014 filled out the questionnaire. Fifty-four of those cadets were also interviewed.

 

Significance and innovation

Detecting the professional identity of young cadets is important for a multitude of reasons. First and foremost, the cadets’ awareness of their future profession provides information about ideals which the cadets connected to the officer profession. Although not all of those ideals necessarily correspond with reality, they are insights into what the cadets’ expected from their future profession (comp. Wiik 2010: 58; Remley and Herlihy 2005: 22).

The study demonstrates that developing an understanding of how young British and German officers perceive their profession and the world around them provide some indicators on how those officers might act in the future. Additionally, in 1993, Dandeker and Strachan (282-283) requested more research into what army recruits think about the armed forces, their social characteristics and their perceptions of their role within the army as a way of optimising recruitment methods and gaining an overall understanding of future military leaders’ ways of perceiving the world. My book answers this request in two ways: First, it offers insight into the British and German officer cadets’ thinking by analysing their professional identity, and second, it adds a new incentive for enlistment to the field of recruitment studies by introducing history-oriented reasons for enlistment.

As a result of increased multinational military operations after 1990, the British and German armies began working side by side. An intercultural understanding of future officers’ thinking, perceptions and attitudes are undoubtedly vital for effective, functional and successful cooperation in the years to come. It is important to keep in mind that the cadets are not isolated from their respective societies. Consequently, their way of dealing with the past by either approving or rejecting common history narratives within their culture is also likely to be shared with civilian society.

 

The Contents

The overall analysis undertaken in the book enables a rigorous understanding of the preconditions for officer enlistment in Britain and Germany. The examination of the cadets’ motivation to enlist focuses in particular on how cadets have aligned their knowledge of the past with their occupational decision-making. A short introduction into the history of the British and German Army until 2014 and the officer training courses in Britain and Germany at the beginning of the book already demonstrate that many differences go back to a different dealing with the shadows of the past.

The book also deals with the cadets’ social and educational background and points out how different experiences in history have not only led to different military systems in Britain and Germany, but also to different external stimuli which influenced the cadets’ decision to enlist. The sections on the British cadets discuss the impact of heritage and education, linkages between the social and educational background of the cadets and their regimental allocations, preconditioning through funding or cadet training (at British schools and universities) and the cadets’ professional perceptions about the officer profession. The sections on German cadets focus on compulsory and voluntary military service and differences between officer cadets which go back to regimental allocations, their attitudes towards the degree course integrated into the officer training and their professional outlook towards a career in the military. Additionally, the social composition of the British and German army officer corps is contrasted followed by a discussion about whether different training systems in Britain and Germany have led to a certain type of officer. The data results clearly oppose popular statements made by prominent researchers of the military sphere such as Karl Haltiner’s (2003) argument that the British and German (Spartans vs. Athenians) forces employ a different type of soldier as a result of the different army training systems to name just one example.

 

Some results

Along with the two world wars, the British Empire and German reunification stood at the centre of the British and German cadets’ historical awareness. A study from the Swedish National Defence College concluded that historical analogies used by young people usually refer to recent events, or to events that have had a great psychological impact on the individual or the society to which he or she belongs (Brändström et al. 2004: 208). Both the British Empire for the British cadets and German reunification for the German cadets fell into those categories. Although those events vary significantly, they helped a vast majority of the British and German cadets to develop a positive outlook towards history.

The results from the empirical data analysis reveal that the cadets’ perceptions about the British and German armies were incorporated as a part of their professional identity to motivate them in the present by either acknowledging or rejecting what preceding officers in both armies have done. This comparison highlighted many factors which are responsible for most differences between the British and German cadets’ outlook towards their profession. One of those factors was the different dealing with lessons learned from the past and its impact on the military systems in the two countries. Considering that the majority of the British and German cadets were heavily influenced by their perceptions of history – not only in regards to their initial interest in the military and a number of value-related incentives for enlistment, but also in regards to their very decision to serve their countries in the armed forces – clearly demonstrates that history-oriented reasons for enlistment should not take a backseat in future recruitment research.

The study’s results stress that soldiering is not just what one does, but who one is: the professional role identity of the British and German cadets can therefore be seen as a basis from which they will act and respond to their environment during missions in the future (Broesder et al 2014: 522). The officer corps has always been a vital component in the armed forces as it determines the military mind-set and upholds and revises the military ethos (Caforio 2006: 255). Since the surveyed and interviewed cadets are most likely going to impact on all-encompassing developments in all sectors in the British and German armies in the near future, my study has also acted as research on the current military culture in Britain and Germany.

It is important to recognise that the officer intake of 2014 will influence following generations of officer cadets, because it seems likely that the new cadets will identify with the 2014 intake’s thinking more than with the thinking of the older generations. Consequently, the British and German cadets who started their training in 2014 will socialise future generations of officers and transmit their traditions and perceptions of history to them.

Multilateralism and interoperability are deeply engrained in NATO doctrine and both can only function if the forces who work together have at least a basic understanding of each other (comp. Hedlund 2017). Understanding each other on a deeper level will allow officers and soldiers to successfully adapt to external forces and difficulties in their missions to come. The book does therefore not only enable a rigorous understanding of British and German military history and its impact on the training and attitudes of officers in Britain and Germany, it also provides key knowledge for intercultural competence which will be key in the missions to come.

 

Kayß received her PhD at the War Studies Department at King’s College London. For her large-scale study, she conducted more than a hundred interviews and surveyed almost 900 British and German Army Officer Cadets between 2014 – 2015. All research results can be found in her book “Identity, Motivation and Memory: The Role of History in the British and German forces” which has just been published by Routledge (2018): https://www.routledge.com/Identity-Motivation-and-Memory-The-Role-of-History-in-the-British-and/Kayss/p/book/9781138589155. Please feel free to contact Sarah if you require further information about the study and the book at academia.edu: http://kcl.academia.edu/SarahKatharinaKay%C3%9F

Image Source: https://www.flickr.com/photos/bundeswehrfoto/22202153424

Literature

 

U. Ben-Shalom; Y. Benbenisty, ‘ Coping Styles and Combat Motivation During Operations: An IDF Case Study’, in Armed Forces & Society 42:4 (2016), 655-674

Brändström, A.; Bynander, F. and ’t Hart, P. (2004): “Governing by looking back: historical analogies and crisis management” in Public Administration 82:1, 191–210.

Broesder, W.A.; Op den Buijs, T.P.; Vogelaar, L.W.; Euwema, M.C. (2014): “Can Soldiers Combine Sword and Ploughshares? The Construction of the Warrior-Peacekeeper Role Identity Survey (WPRIS)” in Armed Forces & Society 41:3, 519-540.

Caforio, G. (2006): “Military Officer Education” in Caforio, G. (ed.), Handbook of the Sociology of the Military. New York: Springer, 255-278.

Dandeker and Strachan 1993 | C. Dandeker; A. Strachan, ‘Soldier Recruitment to the British Army, A Spartial and Social Methodology for Analysis and Monitoring’, in Armed Forces & Society 19:2 (1993), 279-290.

V. C. Franke, ‘Duty, Honor, Country: The Social Identity of West Point Cadets’, in Armed Forces & Society 26:2 (2000), 175-202.

Haltiner, K.W. (2003): „Spartaner oder Athener? Die europäische Offiziersberufsausbildung vor neuen Herausforderungen“ in Collmer, S.; Kümmel, G. (eds): Soldat, Militär, Politik, Gesellschaft, Facetten militärbezogener sozialwissenschaftlicher Forschung. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 35-48.

Hedlung, E. (2017): ‘Team Learning and Leadership in Multinational Military Staff Exercises” in Armed Forces & Society 43:3, 459-477.

Kayss, S.K. (2018): Identity, Motivation and Memory: The Role of History in the British and German forces. Oxon/New York: Routledge.

M. G. Pratt; K. W. Rockmann; J. B. Kaufmann, ‘Constructing Professional Identity: the Role of Work and Identity learning Cycles in the Customization of Identity among medical residents’, in Academy of Management Journal 49:2 (2006), 235-262.

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The Cyber Hangover: British cyber strategy before and after WannaCry

by

By Clément Briens

This article is a follow-up to my previous blog entry, that examined French national cyber strategy, and which can be found here.

The UK Prime Minister, Theresa May (Photo Credit: AFP)

More fear than harm

The WannaCry ransomware that plagued the National Health Service (NHS) in May 2017 served as a wake-up call for many, as it demonstrated the vulnerability of the UK’s critical infrastructure. Public dialogue concerning the state of the British cyber policy and security has ensued following this attack, with the USA pointing fingers at North Korea for the aggression and many British news outlets questioning the government’s cyber defence capabilities. While WannaCry was relatively harmless, and it is still unclear if it was an intentional attack on the UK or simply a viral malware, one can imagine the potentially disastrous consequences of future cyber-attacks on other parts of the UK’s national infrastructure.

Fortunately, UK policymakers have heeded this warning, and have allocated an extra £21 million “to increase the cyber resilience of major trauma sites as an immediate priority”. This response is a first real-world application of the UK’s 2016–2021 National Cyber Security Strategy paper, and the first successful application of its principles. This article will argue that such a strategy paper is a leading example of how to deploy a national cyber strategy, although it is not perfect.

The strategy’s main strengths are that it seeks to build up resilience rather than just blindly upping the offensive ante; to raise public awareness and initiate a public dialogue; and to invest in the country’s youth to find the solutions to future problems. The first part of this article will be spent examining how these aims have successfully been translated into practice. However, the second part of the paper will observe how the UK is failing to secure its election infrastructure, which is a major shortcoming in its national strategy.

 

Reaffirming resilience

As mentioned above, government responses have sprung relatively quickly following the WannaCry intrusion of the NHS to give it the tools it needs to fend off future attacks and malware. This rapid cure to the national security hangover demonstrates one of the tenets the application of the main principles outlined in the paper, the “3-D” strategy: defend, deter, and develop.

Excerpts from the National Cyber Security Strategy paper

Developing resilience is an objective that involves all three aspects of this 3-D strategy. Indeed, UK businesses should collaborate with public actors to develop security solutions for both sectors in order to help defend companies and public organisations more effectively, which hopefully will deter future attacks.

This strategy has been taken very seriously by Chancellor Phillip Hammond, who in 2016 had pledged £1.9 billion in support of these cyber initiatives. Such an effort provides resources for the main UK actors such as the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) and Government Communication Headquarters (GCHQ); and it also supports the creation of the Cyber Security Research Institute (CSRI).

 

Policy Parley

Another crucial aspect of the 2016–2021 National Cyber Security Strategy paper is public engagement and training.  To this extent, a plethora of government initiatives have been enforced, with the objectives to raise awareness and construct dialogue with the individuals, companies and academics. Two of these campaigns are known as Cyber Aware and Cyber Streetwise, the former of these being explicitly aimed towards small businesses:

The Cyber Streetwise campaign

Furthermore, efforts have been made to keep academics in the loop. The NCSC’s Cyber Security Body of Knowledge initiative, dubbed CyBOK, has united an academic consortium including professors from Oxford, Imperial, UCL and others, with their aim being “to codify the cyber security knowledge which underpins the profession”.

Screenshot from the Cyber Accelerator website

Meanwhile, the NCSC is debuting its “Cyber security academic startups programme”, which aims to provide academic startups with grants up to £16,000, GCHQ are also holding their Cyber Accelerator programme to challenge the cyber-security startup community to “ develop new tools and prototypes that enhance or enable security on existing devices”.

 

Training Teens

Another of the key points of the National Strategy is to tap into the vast potential of young adults and others that have benefited from the democratisation of cyber tools and refine this raw talent into a key asset. Efforts have been made to recruit imaginative youths with coding skills: the development of interactive websites such as the Cyber Discovery website acts as an assessment tool for the Cyber Schools programme, which aims to recruit teenagers from ages 14–18.

Screenshot from the Cyber Discovery website

 

 The Catch

The conclusion of the first part of this article is that the UK is excelling in building resilience and investing in cyber security, two edges of the same cyber-sword that provides protection to the country.

Campaigners hold placards for ‘Britain Stronger in Europe’, the official ‘Remain’ campaign group seeking to avoid a Brexit, ahead of the forthcoming EU referendum, in London on June 20, 2016 (Photo credit: JUSTIN TALLIS/AFP/Getty Images)

However, there is a significant flaw in the National Cyber Security Strategy: the absence of a classification of voting technology and the electoral process at large as part of the country’s Critical National Infrastructure (CNI). This prevents voting technology from benefitting from CNI-grade cyber security. The WannaCry blunder has demonstrated how actors can easily paralyze the UK’s health system, which is why Britain urgently needs to secure other aspects of its critical infrastructure, such as its democratic institutions.

Cyber-crime poses a major threat to Western democracies, as official reports are accusing foreign groups of interference in the recent American, French, German, Spanish, and British elections via cyberspace. The risk for upcoming elections in Italy in March and the  EU Parliament next year is genuine. Theresa May has already expressed her concerns with the meddling in the Brexit referendum in particular.

However, in practice, not much has been done to bolster cyber security in regards to voting technologies. For example, a May 2017 Parliamentary Office of Security and Technology (POST) report analyses foreign involvement in British CNI. However it only identifies such involvement in two sectors: supply chain involvement (Chinese hardware being used by various critical sectors) and foreign investment and direction.

Furthermore, a US Senate Committee of Foreign Relations report published January 10th examining the impact of Russian interference on Western democracies holds a particular statement concerning the UK:

“British officials stated after the poll that there was ‘‘no successful Russian cyber intervention’’ into the election process seen and asserted that systems were in place to protect against electoral fraud at all levels, though it is unclear the extent to which the lack of meddling may have also been due to a shift in the Kremlin’s approach.”

Over-confidence in capabilities has never been a good sign in military history; cyber security is no exception. Projects of introducing online voting by 2020 will only exacerbate the risk that foreign governments or independent actors will seek to influence the outcome of British democratic processes. Voter identity theft is now a frightening possibility, as hackers can purchase massive datasets of voter information on the dark web in order to usurp voter identities online and alter votes. The modification of voter locations, hence making their votes void, is also a concern. While the rise of blockchain technology may be the solution for both transparency and security in online election processes, a reverse trend can be found in other European countries such as the Netherlands and France that are in fact abandoning online voting.

 

Curbing the Hubris

Introducing online voting would be a step in the wrong direction towards safeguarding British democracy, as it would expose voting to the same risks as other CNI sectors that are now controlled though the internet, without putting it under security standards that CNI benefits from. Placing British election infrastructure under CNI security standards would be the better option in this matter.

Another broad conclusion that we can make is that this 2016 paper may already be outdated. Five-year plans in the age of cyber security may not be the best answer, as the boundaries of cyber criminality and foreign interference are being pushed every day. Regular updates must be publicly and periodically published to address recent developments such as the WannaCry attack, the alleged Russian interference in US elections, and how the British government plans on dealing with these developments.

 

Clément Briens is a second year War Studies & History Bachelor’s degree student. His main interests lie in cyber security, counterinsurgency theory, and nuclear proliferation. You can follow him on Twitter @ClementBriens

Image Credits

Banner: https://www.welt.de/politik/ausland/article170410006/Was-die-Regierung-derzeit-macht-ist-ein-einziges-Chaos.html

Image 1: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/567242/national_cyber_security_strategy_2016.pdf 

Image 2: http://arenaillustration.com/blog/steve-may-cyber-streetwise-website-billboards/ 

Image 3: https://wayra.co.uk/gchq/

Image 4: https://joincyberdiscovery.com/ 

Image 5: https://www.politico.eu/article/why-we-lost-the-brexit-vote-former-uk-prime-minister-david-cameron/