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Strife Series on Counter-Terrorism in Modern Warfare (Part I) – The Importance of Labels: A Social Psychology Approach to Counterterrorism Policies

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by Lucía Ruiz Vila

Fighters of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) during their retreat from Turkey into Northern Iraq (Image credit: Firat News Agency/AP)

 

Terrorism is constituted through discourse. Understanding that process of construction can provide important insights for policy and practice. This piece will first address how a group’s identity determines the way in which the narrative on terrorism is constructed and how that identity impacts the possible policies in response. The second part is a case study of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê, PKK), in which two actors, in this case: Turkey and the EU, both label this group as ‘terrorist’ but differ in their counterterrorism policies towards it. This divergence is to do with their respective construction and understanding of terrorism, which are radically opposed. Ultimately, this group identity can be considered as the premise for constructing terrorism through language. By analysing the process behind labelling a group as terrorists, the type of counterterrorism policies available to each actor can be better understood.

Social Psychology, Discourse, and Terrorism  

This essay will particularly explore how social behaviour is determined by discourse. Social psychology is concerned with how individual behaviour is affected by social behaviour. Within the field, social psychologists link language with terrorism by arguing that the latter is a ‘naming-making practice,’ which implies that instead of focusing on the terrorists’ motivations, they look at people’s perceptions of those. Therefore, terrorism is a ‘socially constructed’ term, as what the terrorists think of themselves becomes less relevant than what ‘we make of the terrorists.’

It is important to remark that not everyone has equal power to construct this discourse. Bathia refers to the ‘politics of naming’ to explain how influential actors are the ones who impose their perception of reality on others. This imposition on the way in which we refer to reality will develop into the construction of ‘common knowledge,’ that is shared understandings of the reality which ultimately fence in the possibilities for policymakers to step out of that narrative.

Group Identity  

Discourse on terrorism is constituted by referencing, developing, or reassuring the identity of the group that is affected by terrorism. This essay suggests three guiding questions that reveal how this process is made:

  • Who is the ‘Other’?
  • Can we engage in a conversation with the Other’s claims?
  • Does an attack by the ‘Other’ threaten our identity?

Answering the first question allows an understanding of how a group builds its own identity by attributing undesirable characteristics to the opposite ‘Other.’ In the case of a terrorist attack against a specific group, their identity might be reinforced through negation, arguing that no one from the in-group could engage in such violent action. This notion of members of the inner group denying the possibility of ever being like the ‘Other’ resonates with Foucault’s explanation of group belonging and language. The French philosopher argued that groups distance themselves from others who they deem inferior by labelling them as ‘mad.’ Once this perception is built, and sanity is on the side of the group, the use of language will reinforce that perception.

If the ‘Other’ has been constructed as immoral, it is harder for individuals to engage with them in a conversation to try to understand their reasons, as they fear falling into a trap of ‘humanising‘ what is by nature ‘evil.’ In this case, this is even more difficult if the reasons behind a terrorist attack are blurred by media and politicians. For instance, in the United States after 11 September 2001, media and politicians referred to terrorism by reinforcing its irrationality and extremism, which portrayed them as an illogical actor with whom there could be no dialogue. If there is a sense of fear among the population, the practice of othering will become more acute, and the conditions for belonging to the in-group will be more restrained. This is how, to answer the third question, a group will determine if the terrorist attack impacts the core of their identity. This was also the case with the previous example of the post-9/11 USA, as American media spread a sense of fear through a victimising discourse accusing “the other” of threatening their values as a nation.

Limitations on Policies 

The limits on the possible policies in reaction to terrorism will mainly answer two questions:

  • Is this threat inevitably recurring? Or is it an extraordinary event?
  • Are we willing to do whatever it takes to respond to the threat?

If by answering the first question, the group identifies the threat as extraordinary, this will give rise to the ‘politics of exception’ which will allow for the government to have unchecked power in order to answer to the terrorist threat. Media can add to this narrative by fuelling a sense of urgency and fear that encourages governments to take measures that may be considered non-democratic to tackle the issue. Another reason why constructing the nature of the threat is important is because it will determine which departments of government will respond. For instance, because the US portrayed al-Qaeda as a military target, its response inevitably involved the Army and the Department of State; if it had been constructed as a criminal act, it would have been confronted by the police.

Furthermore, this differentiation will determine what type of limitations, if any, that group will set for its policies on terrorism. If the threat is seen as extraordinary, there will be a risk of forsaking civil liberties in exchange for the state to guarantee security. This state of exceptionality can also lead to an erosion of public morality, which will make terrorists seem undeserving of human rights. Nevertheless, perceiving the treat as exceptional does not mean that the group will be willing to set no restrictions on their possible policies in response. This was the case of Spain who decided not to extradite to the US an al-Qaeda cell found after 9/11, as they feared that the terrorists would be sentenced to the death penalty, which under the EU legislation would have been illegal.

Adaptability is also a very important part of the policy limitations on terrorism, as what is framed as extraordinary in a first instance, might become normalised over time. This was the case when the UK labelled migration as a security issue. This label became part of its counterterrorism narrative after 9/11. At present, the government understands migration as a matter of security because it may give rise to social tensions, but not because it is related to terrorism. This shift of perception promoted new democratic channels to tackle the issue instead of justifying political decisions on an overly extended threat or state of exceptionally. In conclusion, by understanding how group identity impacts the construction of terrorism through discourse, important insight can be gained on the types and limitations of counterterrorism policies available to different actors.

Case Study: The Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) as a terrorist group

The case of the PKK in Turkey is a prime example that shows how terrorism is constructed through language and discourse. It demonstrates how two actors, Turkey and the EU, who labelled the PKK as a terrorist group have radically opposed policies, due to their in-group identity, and how they construct the nature of the terrorist group. The Kurds have historically been suppressed by the Turkish state, unable to exercise their right to autonomous government or cultural expression of any kind. In the 1970s, the PKK was founded to defend the Kurds within Turkey, and in 1984 they began engaging in violent action against the government to reclaim their rights as an ethnic group.

The Turkish authorities referred to those Turks who were part of the PKK as ‘children’ who needed to come to their senses and leave their terrorist lifestyle behind. Öcalan, the leader of the PKK, was often referred to by the media as a ‘baby-killer’ whose followers were ‘uncivilized.’ The Turkish government for many years tried to capture the Kurdish leader, who thanks to the Greek authorities’ support, managed to escape Turkey. It was finally in 1999 when the Turkish state captured him. Offended by Greece’s attitude towards Öcalan, the Turkish president demanded that the EU added Greece to the list of countries that supported terrorism.

Leaving aside already existing tensions between Turkey and Greece, the reason why the latter was not seen as being complicit in terrorism was that the West did not perceive the PKK as a terrorist organization per se. At that time, Western media referred to the PKK as an ‘outlawed group’, a ‘rebel group’, or one conducting ‘guerrilla war’. Even the EU itself referred to the Kurds’ cause as a minority struggle and questioned the terrorist narrative around them. Unconcerned about Western opinion, the Turkish judiciary sentenced Öcalan to the death penalty, which caused demonstrations throughout Europe in support of the Kurdish cause. The European Union was clear in its response: if Turkey were to execute Öcalan, the country will never be considered to join the European Union.

Conclusion

Building on the case study, there are two clear processes of othering. On the one hand, the Turkish state identifies the Other as the Kurds, who are subsequently labelled as terrorists. According to Turkish anti-terror legislation, terrorism is an act that threatens the territorial unity of the state, and even non-violent propaganda against said unity is considered terrorism. As it has been mentioned, the Kurds were referred to as infantile and uncivilised, which made them an illogical actor with whom there could be no dialogue, and which ultimately threatened Turkish identity.

On the other hand, at the time Öcalan was captured, the EU did not have a terrorist list until after the 9/11 attacks and did not consider the PKK as terrorists. The decision not to give the terrorist label to the PKK was very significant for the EU’s identity, as they chose to ‘other’ the Turkish government instead of the Kurds. Turkey had long been a point of debate in determining the limits of Europe as a political unit, as the EU characterised itself as a ‘rational’ actor unlike those beyond its borders, as Isin argues. Ultimately, it was the death sentence of Öcalan which set the limits of Europe’s identity.

Interestingly, in 2002, there was a turning point for the PKK terrorist debate. Turkey overturned Öcalan’s death penalty sentence and changed it to life imprisonment, while the EU added the PKK to its terrorism list. The EU’s decision was highly controversial since the PKK had not engaged in violent action since 1999 and also because the procedure for adding the PKK to the list had not been transparent. It was later condemned by the European Court of First Instance. To this day, Turkey is unlikely to join the European Union, and the PKK remains in the EU list of terrorist organisations.

Although both the EU and Turkey now recognise the PKK as the Other and labels them as terrorists, their approaches to the issue and their policies vary. The EU is concerned with preventing terrorism in the first place, which makes them interested in learning about the root causes of terrorism. Following this rationale, they invited in February of 2020 representatives of the PKK to join a European Parliament Session. Yet, because for Turkey there is no possible dialogue with terrorism, Turkish media was outraged by the meeting.

Lucía Ruiz Vila graduated with honours in International Relations from the University of Deusto in Spain and afterwards studied a year abroad in the University of Richmond in the United States. Following this, Lucía completed a MA in Conflict, Security and Development at King’s College London where she researched transitional justice, counterinsurgency campaigns, DDR and SSR, peacekeeping missions, and women’s role in security. You can connect with her via LinkedIn. 

No Way Out: How Four Local Newburgh Men Became ‘Entrapped’ into Plotting an Act of Terror

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by Michel Seibriger

James Cromitie, head of the Newburgh Four, is arrested by federal agents (Image credit: Robert Mecea/AP)

In June 2011, four men from Newburgh, New York State were convicted on 7 counts to plot a terror attack on a synagogue and a US military base with Stinger missiles, and subsequently jailed for 25 years. The men remain in jail to the present day. However, the act of terror that sealed the men’s fate never took place .[1] Theirs was the most prominent example of , in which the four men were entrapped into committing the act of terror by an FBI informant.

Sting operations feature an informant (oftentimes an ex-convict himself) that approaches individuals he deems to be vulnerable to radicalization. This informant then actively fabricates and promotes a specific terror attack before trying the would-be-perpetrator on precisely those terrorist charges.[2] In doing so, the informant not only provides the brainpower of plotting a terrorist attack but frequently also the logistical and organizational support such as artificial weapons and material to build a bomb.[3]

This new counterterrorist technique emerged in the wake of 9/11 when pressure was mounting on the FBI to justify its increased budget with a higher conviction rate of potential terrorists. As such, the Bureau tried to counteract and combat comprehensively what Donald Rumsfeld infamously dubbed the “unknown unknowns”- that is, terror threats the government did not even know existed. The FBI attempted to imagine a catastrophic terror attack in the future before “[making] sure […] that future never happens”, and thereby working toward the desired, albeit unrealistic.[4]

Crucially, stings carry with them substantial moral and legal pitfalls, only some of which have been discussed in popular discourse.[5] In the case of the Newburgh Four, the defendants were consistently instrumentalised, degraded and entrapped.

Instrumentalisation and degradation go against human dignity and, by extension, constitute a fundamental violation of human rights. The concept of entrapment has substantial legal and moral implications. Its common definition is the manipulation of an individual to commit an act he or she would otherwise have been unlikely to commit. the legal definition is more concerned with proving the defendants’ lack of predisposition to carrying out the attack.[6] Both will be applied to make the case that not only moral standards have been violated here.

To start, the initiation of contact alone warrants scrutiny since it demonstrates the instrumentalisation of the sting subjects. The eleven-month-long operation commenced when Shahed Hussain, a Pakistani migrant with a lengthy criminal history of his own, phished outside of a mosque in Newburgh, a poverty-stricken city just north of New York City. Posing as an outwardly wealthy businessman, the FBI informant got the attention of James Cromitie, a local ex-convict who worked at Walmart[7]. Notably, Hussein later stated that he selected Cromitie as the subject of the operation due to his Arab accent alone. Hong and Szpunar have considered this to be a “weak link” due to the constitutional protection of speech.[8]

The arbitrariness of the phishing methods employed by Hussein is testament to the manner in which Cromitie was instrumentalized for his operation. Moreover, the informant selected a mosque to phish for suspects, indicating a general suspicion towards Muslims that he had already displayed in a previous sting operation.[9] This spatial selection, taken together with the choice of the impoverished Newburgh, clearly demonstrates Hussain’s aim: to find any individual vulnerable to exploitation, increasing the chances of radicalisation into a would-be terrorist[10]. Since Kaufmann defines such ‘instrumentalisation’ as one way to violate human dignity, it seems very fitting to span the conceptual link between the would-be terror attack by a Muslim-American and Hussein’s phishing in front of the mosque. Therefore, Cromitie’s human dignity was violated by his random selection and instrumentalisation for the sting operation.

Next, it is important to consider the defendants’ grave financial dependence on Hussain. This dependence consistently degraded them. As per Webster, the taking away of agency and personal autonomy is tantamount to the degradation of an individual, which in turn violates his or her human dignity[11]. As will be shown, the financial dependence of the men on Hussain qualified for precisely this degradation. Throughout the course of the operation, Hussain exploited Cromitie’s financial hardship on numerous occasions in order to expedite his radicalisation [12]. Having served time before, the promise of some  $250,000 in cash seemingly trumped the knowledge of the severity of the crime that Hussein suggested for Cromitie.[13]

That being said, the local man used every chance he had to stall: at one point, he cut all contact with Hussain when his finances would allow him, and only re-established contact after losing his job.[14] This stalling, combined with the fact that he explicitly refused a leading position in plotting the attack,[15] points to the fact that while the man was keen on earning the rewards for his cooperation, he was at the very least hesitant to the proposed plan of blowing up a synagogue.[16] Therefore, by making financial benefits contingent on the carrying out of the terrorist act, Hussein consistently degraded Cromitie because the latter knew he had to, at least incrementally, deliver on promises of radicalisation and jihadism vis-á-vis his “supplier”.[17] The other members were also highly vulnerable and dependent on Hussein. David Williams claimed that the informant promised money to pay for his uncle’s liver transplant and Laguerre Payen was a schizophrenic residing in a crack-house.[18] Hussein was well-aware of the defendants’ hardships and psychological state,[19] yet continued to exploit their vulnerabilities with the lure of financial rewards.[20]

Finally, the case of the “Newburgh Four” provides a textbook example of entrapment. Despite the stalling tactics used by Cromitie, Hussein was adamant about the organisation of the attack and even provided the alleged material to conduct it.[21] The informant even taught the men about jihad and radical Islam in spite of the fact that the Newburgh men (Cromitie had “recruited” the three others) were anything but zealous.[22] Hussain conceived of the plan to attack the synagogue and US military planes alone.[23] At one point, Cromitie explicitly tried to back out, but Hussain responded by falsely claiming that he himself could be killed by fellow jihadists should the attack fail.[24] Even the presiding judge stated that without Hussain’s instigation and planning of the attack, “there would have been no crime here”.[25] Conversely, Cromitie’s actions demonstrate his striking disinclination to carry out a terrorist attack; he would never have done so were it not for Hussain’s coercion to ensure his compliance. Hussain’s tactics thereby fulfill the previously mentioned common definition of entrapment as the manipulation of individuals into committing attacks they would otherwise not have considered, and arguably even the legal definition of a lack of predisposition.[26] As a result, both the violations of human dignity and the way the defendants were entrapped allow for the claim that sting operations are not justifiable as a counterterrorism measure.

Counterterrorism operations are anything but an exact science. Decisions must be made based on incomplete information and the envisioned society of zero risk is arguably still a utopian one. However, in the wake of 9/11, the FBI has consistently attempted to fabricate future crimes by means of so-called sting operations. Preventing a terror attack seems a noble cause prima. Yet, as the case of the Newburgh Four has demonstrated, stings often violate the individuals’ human dignity by instrumentalising, degrading, and entrapping them. In so doing, they run contrary to the stated goal of a more secure country. While this analysis is by no means exhaustive, it aims to provide an important moral discussion of stings that has been astonishingly sidelined in academia. Due to the human rights and legal objections outlined above, it can be said that premeditating future acts by means of sting operations cannot be justified.

[1] Harris, 2011a

[2] Hay, 2005: 390.

[3] Mariani, 2018,

[4] Grusin, 2004: 36.

[5] See, for instance, Harris, 2011a or Greenberg 2011.

[6] Greenberg, 2011.

[7] Ismail, Shah & Prasow, 2014: 23 & 38.

[8] Hong & Szpunar, 2019: 319.

[9] Bartosiewicz et al., 2011: 40; Laguardia, 2013: 193.

[10] Hong & Szpunar, 2019:

[11] Webster, 2011: 79.

[12] Shipler, 2012.

[13] Harris, 2011b.

[14] Laguardia, 2013: 197;

[15] Laguardia, 2013: 195.

[16] Harris, 2011b.

[17] Ismail, Shah & Prasow, 2014: 31.

[18] Bartosiewicz et al., 2011: 44.

[19] Ismail, Shah & Prasow, 2014: 31.

[20] Harris, 2011b.

[21] Laguardia, 2013: 195.

[22] Harris, 2011a; Szpunar, 2017: 376.

[23] Bartosiewicz et al, 2011: 44.

[24] Harris, 2011b.

[25] Ibid.

[26] Harris, 2011a.

Aradau, Claudia, and Rens van Munster. “The Time/Space of Preparedness: Anticipating the ‘Next Terrorist Attack.’” Space and Culture 15, no. 2 (May 2012): 98–109. doi:10.1177/1206331211430015.

Baker, Al, and Javier C. Hernández. “4 Accused Of Bombing Plot At Bronx Synagogues”. Nytimes.Com, May 20, 2009. https://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/21/nyregion/21arrests.html.

Bartosiewicz, Petra, Brian Merchant, Greg Jackson, Tommy Trenchard, David Gordon, and Susan Choi. “To Catch A Terrorist”. Harper’s Magazine, 2011. https://harpers.org/archive/2011/08/to-catch-a-terrorist/.

Greenberg, Karen. „How terrorist ‘entrapment‘ ensnares us all“. The Guardian, December 12, 2011.https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/cifamerica/2011/dec/12/how-terrorist-entrapment-ensares-us-all

Grusin, Richard A. Premediation Affect and Mediality after 9/11. Basingstoke [England] ; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010.

Grusin, Richard A. “Premediation.” Criticism 46, no. 1 (2004): 17-39. www.jstor.org/stable/23127337.

Harris, Paul. “Fake Terror Plots, Paid Informants: The Tactics Of FBI ‘Entrapment’ Questioned”. The Guardian, November 16, 2011a. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/nov/16/fbi-entrapment-fake-terror-plots.

Harris, Paul. Newburgh Four: poor, black, and jailed under FBI’s ‚entrapment‘ tactics. The Guardian, December 12, 2011b., https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/dec/12/newburgh-four-fbi-entrapment-terror

Hay, Bruce. (2005). Sting operations, undercover agents, and entrapment. Missouri Law

Review 70, no. 2 (2005): 387-432.

Hong, Sun-ha, and Piotr M Szpunar. “The Futures of Anticipatory Reason: Contingency and Speculation in the Sting Operation.” Security Dialogue 50, no. 4 (August 2019): 314–30. doi:10.1177/0967010619850332.

Ismail, Tarek Z., Naureen Shah & Andrea Prasow. Illusion of Justice: Human Rights Abuses in US Terrorism Prosecutions. New York: Human Rights Watch, 2014. https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/usterrorism0714_ForUpload_1_0.pdf

Janbek, Dana & Valerie Williams. (2014). Role of the internet post-9/11 in terrorism and counterterrorism. Brown Journal of World Affairs, 20, no. 2 (2014): 297-308.

Norris, Jesse J. & Hanna Grol-Prokopczyk. Temporal trends in US counterterrorism sting operations, 1989–2014, Critical Studies on Terrorism, 11, no. 2 (2018): 243-271, DOI: 10.1080/17539153.2017.1400421

Kaufmann, Paulus, Hannes Kuch, Christian Neuhaeuser and Elaine Webster, eds. Humiliation, Degradation, Dehumanization: Human Dignity Violated. Dordrecht: Springer Science Business Media B.V., 2011.

Laguardia, Francesca. “Terrorists, Informants, and Buffoons: The Case for Downward Departure as a Response to Entrapment,” Lewis & Clark Law Review 17, no. 1 (2013): 171-214

Mariani, Mike. “The Would-Be Terrorist Vs. The FBI”. GQ, November 20, 2008, https://www.gq.com/story/matthew-llaneza-alleged-terrorist-fbi-snare.

Norris, J. J. Why the FBI and the courts are wrong about entrapment and terrorism. Mississippi Law Journal, 84, no. 5 (2015): 1257-1328

Sherman, Jon. (2009). “A person otherwise innocent: Policing entrapment in preventative, undercover counterterrorism investigations”. University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law, 11, no. 5 (2009): 1475-1510.

Shipler, David K. “Terrorist Plots, Helped Along By The F.B.I.”. New York Times, April 28, 2012, https://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/29/opinion/sunday/terrorist-plots-helped-along-by-the-fbi.html.

Szpunar, Piotr M. “Premediating Predisposition: Informants, Entrapment, and Connectivity in Counterterrorism.” Critical Studies in Media Communication 34, no. 4 (2017): 371-85.

Webster, Elaine. “Degradation: A Human Rights Law Perspective.” In Humiliation, Degradation, Dehumanization: Human Dignity Violated, edited by Paulus Kaufmann, Hannes Kuch, Christian Neuhaeuser and Elaine Webster. Dordrecht: Springer Science+Business Media B.V., 2011.

Michel Seibriger holds a degree in International Relations & International Organisation at the University of Groningen and has completed the Honours College at the same university. Funded by the Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation in Germany, he is currently studying an MA in International Peace & Security at King’s College London’s Department of War Studies. His research focus is on Radicalization, Counterterrorism and Human Rights, particularly with a normative lens to it.

The Funding of Terrorism (Part IV) – A Trust Deficit is Undermining the Investigation of Terrorist Financing across MENA

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by Jack Watling

Grand Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei (Image credit: Ayatollah.ir/Wikimedia)

 

The Kingdom of Bahrain sentenced 139 people to prison in April 2019, alleging they were part of a terrorist cell, which the authorities refer to as ‘Bahraini Hezbollah’. The charges in the mass trial ranged from plotting to conduct attacks and the smuggling of arms, to terrorist financing. Specifics however were not revealed, and point to a damaging trend: the use of ‘terrorism’ as a politically acceptable charge with which to implement repression. The consequences of this policy are not just unjust, but in pushing communities to avoid cooperation with the authorities sustains avenues for actual terrorists to finance and carry out their operations.

There are armed groups active in Bahrain, just as there are non-state armed actors, many of which have carried out terrorist attacks, in Iraq, Syria, the Palestinian Territories and Lebanon. Many of these groups are directly supported by Iran in these activities. While sanctions on Iran can be effective in reducing the country’s available resources for financing clandestine activities, limited progress has been made in restricting the routes by which money reaches armed groups. To understand why, it is necessary to appreciate how the Shia community manages its tithes. Although a minority of Shia Muslims are followers of Ayatollah Khamenei, Iran’s religious leadership has ties across the Shia community, and the Iranian government is consequently able to leverage these networks.

Each Twelver Shia Muslim selects an Ayatollah – or religious jurist – as their spiritual guide. They are obligated to follow the scholar who they believe to be most theologically knowledgeable. A follower must pay a fifth of their profits each year to their Ayatollah. The khums is supposed to support the Ayatollah in his research, and to provide subsistence for the Howza: the seminary he oversees. Many Shia give more than the required khums and, in discussion with the cleric or their representatives, make additional donations for him to spend in support of an agreed cause.

The Shia financial system was developed in small communities. Between the collapse of distance brought about by international finance, and a rapidly expanding global population, it now sees donations made by a community of around 220 million people. The volume of money is therefore vast, and far exceeds the immediate needs of the Ayatollahs and the Howza. A far higher proportion of the money is therefore used to support charitable ventures, and to help Shia communities.

What constitutes ‘help’ is contextual. It may mean educational scholarships to students in Mali, or aid to flood victims in Pakistan. It could also mean supporting military activity. When Islamic State seized Mosul in 2014 Grand Ayatollah Sistani declared the fight to defend Iraq a ‘sacred defense’ and large amounts of money from the Marjaiy’ah – the Shia clerical authority – went to the Popular Mobilization Forces, and their families, to support the war effort. The use of religious funds to support the war effort was understandable. It also highlighted how the Shia financial system can support a wide range of political causes, and military efforts.

The capacity for Shia clerics to inject political and financial capital into causes was lamented by the British in the early twentieth century.[1] It has been viewed with hostility by Arab governments since, especially in the wake of the Iranian revolution of 1979. Following the Arab Spring uprisings of 2011 for instance Grand Ayatollah Sistani decided that Bahraini Shia should use their khums locally.[2] Done for humanitarian reasons, this act gave the protest movement both a large amount of money, and the infrastructure for managing it.

Much of that infrastructure is entirely opaque, with local religious representatives receiving cash, and conveying or dispersing it as a matter of trust. The Shia community has a good reason for keeping their finances away from the banking system. In 1991 for instance Saddam Hussein looted the Shrines of Karbala, and actively attempted to seize khums revenues.  The fear that opening the process to scrutiny will see predatory seizures by hostile governments is both persistent within the Marjai’yah, and understandable.

From the point of view of Arab governments like Bahrain or Saudi Arabia however this architecture provides a highly suspicious and invisible flow of funds that goes to both legitimate charity, and to subversive political activities. It is exploited by Iran. The problem is that because it is opaque, finding the evidence trail of the small amount of terrorist financing in the large flow of legitimate funding is hard, especially when those conducting legitimate charity have no incentive to cooperate with the authorities.

Bahraini officials have repeatedly sought to have US counterterrorism investigators endorse their actions against what they see as Iranian subversion in their country. The problem, as a former senior US Treasury official noted in interview, is that ‘they present us with suspicious unknowns – and the opacity of Shia finance certainly represents a threat vector – but they claim it is evidence of terrorist financing. It is not.’[3]

If Bahrain – and other Gulf monarchies – intend to clamp down on the financing of terrorism they need to avoid mass trials and vague charges. They must conduct diligent investigative work, and present detailed cases. Charging five people with specific, evidenced crimes, would be infinitely more credible. It would require a shift from attempting to rule by law, to supporting the rule of law. But until governments across the region are able to build trust with the Shia community, they can expect Shia finance to remain opaque, and so long as it is opaque, it will remain a vector for the financing of subversion from Iran.

Jack Watling is Research Fellow for Land Warfare in the Department of Military Sciences at RUSI. He holds a PhD in history examining the evolution of UK policy responses to civil war. Jack has worked in Iraq, Mali, Rwanda and further afield and has contributed to the RUSI Journal, RUSI Defence Systems, Reuters, The Atlantic, Foreign Policy, The Guardian, Jane’s Intelligence Review, Haaretz and others. He was shortlisted for the European Press Prize in 2016, and won the Breakaway Award at the International Media Awards in 2017. This report was supported with funding from the Pulitzer Centre.

[1] TNA, FO 800/70: Cecil Spring Rice to Edward Grey, 18 July 1907.

[2] Author interviews with officials from Iraq’s clerical establishment, held in October 2017 in Najaf.

[3] Author interview, a former senior treasury official, Washington DC, April 2019.

The Funding of Terrorism (Part I) – Hookahs and Honey: Funding Terrorism through ‘Benign’ Activities

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by Ian Ralby

4 August 2019

Shisha pipes across the Middle East are being filled with charcoal smuggled from Somalia. This seemingly benign but criminal activity nets the terrorist group Al-Shabaab millions, if not tens of millions, of dollars each year. (Image credit: Flickr)

 

Terrorism catches people’s attention, charcoal does not. It is a certitude much like the fact that a bomb blowing up a building will make international news and a fishing boat laden with jerry cans of diesel will not. Over the last decade, terrorist groups have increasingly sought to fund their operations using activities that many consider ‘benign’ and thus undeserving of serious scrutiny. While the trafficking of arms, drugs or humans draws significant law enforcement attention around the world, goods including fuel, charcoal, honey, sugar, fish and antiquities do not occupy prominent positions on most of these agencies’ priority lists – if they feature at all.  Noting how high-profile crimes tend to attract the close watch of national and international authorities, terrorist organisations around the world have found relative ease in recent years by funding themselves through profitable ‘benign’ operations. It is imperative for law enforcement agencies and counterterrorism authorities to increase their coordination on these matters and scrutinise such often overlooked activities as critical sources of terrorist financing.

Perhaps the best-known instance, at least in counterterrorism circles, of seemingly benign economic activity that actually finances terrorist organisations is the trading of Somali charcoal to the Middle East. Acacia charcoal, excellent for use in shisha pipes, has been exported from Somalia for decades. As Al-Shabaab, a terrorist group established in 2006, took over parts of Somalia, it sought to benefit from the lucrative trade in various ways, including through informal taxes and port revenues.  In response, the Transitional Federal Government banned the export of charcoal from Somalia and later the international community imposed an embargo on it. The result has been an extensive smuggling operation in an effort to maintain the income stream. Publicly disclosed estimates from the British Royal Navy suggest that this operation currently yields $7 million per year for Al-Shabaab. Prior to substantial interdiction efforts, that figure was once estimated to be in the tens, or even hundreds, of millions.  Unlike issues like piracy or wildlife trafficking, charcoal has not captured public attention in the same way, and thus has not garnered the same political interest, though recent exposés have sought to change that. While the counterterrorism community is heavily focused on charcoal, many politicians still view it as a low priority, since compared to other goods it still seems relatively benign.  And even if charcoal does gain further visibility, the situation with Al-Shabaab is only one example of a larger phenomenon.

The same apathy towards smuggling of a benign commodity has been a major factor in illicit oil and fuel activities becoming a substantial source of terrorist financing.  The majority of people around the world rely on fuel in their daily lives. Consequently, it is perhaps the most ubiquitous commodity and one which people are most interested in obtaining at a discount.  Too often, widespread and seemingly harmless shopping for discounts equates to a willingness on the part of law enforcement and the political establishment to overlook the sources of cheaper-than-market-price fuel. They disregard what seem to be low-scale illicit operations as not meriting the attention of law enforcement. This salutary neglect of black market fuel trading has become a major point of manipulation for terrorist groups looking for under-the-radar income streams.

Furthermore, the success of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) has inspired groups around the world to adopt a Jihadi-Salafist philosophy and seek to ‘restore’ the early Islamic caliphate.  ISIS-inspired groups, however, are inspired not only by ISIS ideology but also by ISIS methods and it is well-known that ISIS’ principle source of income has been proceeds from illicit oil and fuel activities. It is therefore not surprising that affiliated groups in other regions of the world have turned to fuel smuggling as their primary source of income. In the Philippines for example, Abu Sayyaf used fuel smuggling both to fund itself and to reinforce smuggling routes that supported its movement of weapons and ammunition in the lead-up to and throughout the year-long siege of Marawi.  In Trinidad and Tobago, a similar co-location of ISIS ideology and rampant fuel smuggling has given rise to significant international concern. As with charcoal, a prevalent perception of the commodity itself as being benign has created a blind spot that allows terrorist groups to earn substantial profits with little interference or even interest.

Beyond charcoal and fuel, other goods such as fish, livestock, honey, sugar, minerals and antiquities, depending on their availability, profitability, and relative visibility by law enforcement, have all become sources of income for terrorist groups. Osama Bin Laden used honey trading both to make profits and for money laundering.  Few goods could seem less sinister than honey, and that provided the perfect cover and income stream for one of history’s most ominous terrorists.  Whether the trade is initially illegal, as with fuel smuggling, or technically legal, as with honey or charcoal trading, the very fact that it is being used to fund terrorist organisations makes it illegal.

The point is that terrorist groups are relying on economic activities perceived as benign in order to make, maintain and move their wealth. And wealth is extremely important for terrorism, as evidenced by the direct correlation between the number of attacks perpetrated by a group and its relative financial stature.  In a 2016 interview, Maj. Gen. Amos Gilad, former Director of the Israeli Defense Ministry’s Political-Military Bureau, stated, ‘The financial component of terror organizations is critical, and its indispensability for terror attacks is like fuel for the car’. As true as this statement is, the irony is that the financial component of terror organisations may literally be fuel for the car.

To change this dynamic, law enforcement agencies and counterterrorism units need to become more proactive in identifying their own blind spots and false perceptions.  This means consciously reexamining those matters they have overlooked in the past.  That, however, is not easy to do.  Terrorist groups will continue to seek, find and exploit economic opportunities that occupy lower positions on the priority lists of the authoritaries. Inevitably, as law enforcement approaches change, so, too, will terrorist activities. But, it is imperative that the crimes and trading activities that have been relegated to benign status be reconsidered not just in their own right but for their malignant implications.  The profits accruing from such overlooked criminal goods as shisha charcoal, farm diesel or artisanal honey, may actually be funding deadly bombings, hijackings, or militant offensives.

Dr. Ian Ralby is a leading expert in international law, maritime security and countering transnational organized crime.  He and his team at I.R. Consilium, LLC have world leading expertise in oil and fuel crimes, and the nexus between maritime crimes and both criminal and terrorist activities.  Among other degrees, he holds a J.D. from William & Mary and a Ph.D. from the University of Cambridge where he was a Gates Scholar. 

Strife Series on The Funding of Terrorism – Introduction

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by Alexandra Roberts

1 August 2019

The funding of terrorism, an overlooked but important field of inquiry (Image credit: UK Defence Journal)

 

Editorial

We have all seen the outcome of violent acts of terrorism . The attacks of 11 September 2001 were among the largest coordinated assaults that had ever been carried out. In the near two decades that have since passed, there has been a sustained multi-national effort to curb terrorism and to try to prevent further attacks. Troops have been deployed in kinetic operations around the world and intelligence agencies and analysts have increased in numbers to gather and interpret data and intelligence. An essential, but frequently overlooked, component of stopping terrorism is preventing terrorist groups from raising the funds necessary to enact their plans. The practicalities of such operations are little known and rarely focussed on in the public discourse on terrorism. However, like any other organisation or group, terrorists need to be able to finance their activities in order to carry out their objectives.

This leads to questions of where the money come from, how it is moved and how it can be stopped. We, the public, tend to know its source is something nefarious. Almost certainly illegal. That al-Qaeda probably did not check their credit rating or apply for a larger overdraft facility in order to fund the 9/11 attacks. But, beyond that, we have very little knowledge about their funding. We know that there are laws designed to prevent the financing of terrorist activities, but we do not tend know what they are, how they operate or who applies them. Even where these laws exist, not all countries and governments agree on how or whose should be implemented. Moreover, because of the asymmetric nature of terrorism, a tool that can be used stifle one group, may have no practical application to another, whilst at the same time the methods and modes used by terrorists to finance themselves are evolving. In turn, legal instruments that can be used to stop them must also evolve too.

This Strife series explores the relationship between money and terrorism. The series looks at who funds it, how they do it, what tools we have to prevent it and even how the laws to stop it can be misused. Its purpose is to highlight quite how complex and diverse the issues surrounding terrorism’s funding are. That it is not just a matter of finding the sources of their finance and shutting it down, but rather understanding the multifaceted political web it is entangled in.

Publication Schedule 

In the first article (04/08), Dr Ian Ralby raises concerns about how low profile and seemingly benign criminal activities are used to fund global terrorism. He makes the case that law enforcement agencies need to recognise that terrorist groups will exploit these overlooked, lesser crimes as a way of raising funds and laundering money and must respond.

In the second article (06/08), Dr Vanessa Neumann explores the relationship between Venezuela’s Maduro regime and Hezbollah through long-standing links with post-revolutionary Iran. She tracks the history of the relationship between these groups and argues that ending the Maduro regime will deliver a severe setback for Hezbollah.

In the third article (08/08), Dr Michael Greenwald examines how Section 311 of the Patriot Act that pertains to correspondent banking relationships between the United States and other countries has been used to stop terrorism. He argues that in a new era of great power competition, it needs to be updated to be able to respond to the current global political and economic climate.

In the final article (10/08), Dr Jack Watling looks at how mass trails and vague charges are undermining efforts in the Middle East to stop the Shia system of tithes and its opaque financing practices potentially funding terrorism. He highlights that these questionable prosecutions are not only used as tools of state oppression, but that they are counterproductive in reaching a more transparent financial system.

Alexandra is studying for an MA in Terrorism, Security and Society at King’s College London. She is particularly interested in the role of women in Jihadist terrorism and US foreign security policy. Prior to starting her postgraduate studies, she worked as a political and security researcher, with a particular focus on the MENA region. She also done work focussing on the prevention of IUU fishing. Alexandra has a BSc in Oil and Gas management, with particular focus on the petrochemical industry in Iraq and its potential social, economic and political impacts on the country, using knowledge and experience gained working in the private security sector with a company specialising in the Middle East and Afghanistan.