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Influence on the Arabic world by Macron’s Al Jazeera interview

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By Clara Didier

 

What the Article I of the 1958 French Constitution has never been that threatened in decades and even more recently with the beheading of the French teacher, Samuel Paty. The Article I is at follows: ‘France shall be an indivisible, secular, democratic and social Republic. It shall ensure the equality of all citizens before the law, without distinction of origin, race or religion. It shall respect all beliefs.’ In this article, we are going to analyse how France is fragilized between respecting all religions and denouncing religious extremism. For this purpose, a survey has been conducted, regrouping 24 answers from 87.5% being students both French or English, between 20-30 years old, 57.1% of woman, all from different religious backgrounds or none. 

The three simultaneous terrorist attacks which happened the 13th of November 2015 in Paris, killed 130 people and injured 413. But not only they have hurt people, but they also explicitly attacked freedom and freedom of expression written in the articles 10 and 11 of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen of 1789. Since then, a campaign against Islamism was ordered by François Hollande, the former French president. This fight against extremism, violence, reinterpretation of Islam is now continued by Mr Macron. Nonetheless, he is being misunderstood and we can ask ourselves if his policies towards Islamism are the right ones. 

President Macron has enacted several controversial laws and actions. The first law on separatism at school and the second one being the authorization – or at least letting it happen – of circulating cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad in schools. It happened in a context of national mourning, with the death of the French teacher Samuel Paty, decapitated because he showed those cartoons in class. But this authorization created an outrage among the Muslim community, both French and abroad. Boycotts were implemented against France and the French President has been severely criticized by numerous leaders and populations, it involved Turkey, Bangladesh, Jordan, Qatar, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan etc. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan even said that ‘Macron needs mental treatment’. 

In this context, Mr Macron delivered an interview with Al-Jazeera, a Qatari satellite television channel. French newspaper Liberation, talks about a ‘well-calibrated clarification operation’. Not only because of the Qatar-based channel’s notoriety and extensive Arabic-speaking audience, but because it has been at the forefront of relaying anti-French criticism across Arab-Muslim countries. The interview was given a day after the attack in Nice’s church. What can be remembered from his speech is his feeling of being widely misunderstood. Indeed, the Arab-Muslim world understood that he was the one authorizing cartoons to be showed to children. The cartoons of the Prophet were not published at the initiative of the government but by ‘free and independent newspapers’, he explained. He underlined, ‘I understand that one can be shocked by cartoons, but I will never accept that violence can be justified. Our freedoms, our rights, I consider that it is our vocation to protect them.’ Translations of his speeches were incorrect and as his interviewer Salam Kawakibi explains: ‘It is a lesson that is necessary in countries where all expression is locked by power and where people cannot imagine that a newspaper publishes what it wants without a green light from above’.

Through the survey I have made, I analysed the repercussion of this interview. I noticed a clear divergence of opinion, on the one hand some people thought that the speech was ‘inflammatory’, ‘unnecessary’ or even ‘paternalist’. On the other hand, some people thought it was a ‘straightforward communication from Macron’, ‘he clearly distinguishes between Islamist terrorists and moderate Muslims who practice their faith peacefully’ and that ‘any accusations of Islamophobia regarding Macron’s speech are totally unwarranted (and unfortunately politically motivated)’. 54.2% think that the last law from the French government regarding separatism and secularity is not Islamophobic, against 41.7% who think it is. Subsequently, 62.5% do not believe that showing cartoons of the Prophet in schools is Islamophobic. Almost all of those interviewed, knew the difference between Islam and Islamism. Furthermore, 70.8% condemn the boycotts against France.

Through the analysis of this survey, it has come to my understanding that it is still unclear for people how Macron is handling Islamism in France. Answers by French individuals were more straightforward and informed contrary to English ones. So, was his interview understood by everyone? And more importantly by the Arabic world? According to Qatari newspaper, the French president’s interview was ‘a world-class media event’.

Probably one of the most spectacular reactions is from the UAE Foreign Minister, Anwar Gargash. In the German daily Die Welt, he said: ‘You should listen to what Macron really said in his speech: he doesn’t want the ghettoisation of Muslims in the west, and he is absolutely right’. He added: ‘with his attacks on France, Erdogan is manipulating a religious issue for political purposes’, Muslims ‘are in need to be integrated in a better way; the French state has the right to search for ways to achieve this in parallel with combating extremism and societal closure.’ The Egyptian editorialist Waël Qandil wrote in the columns of the Qatari website Al-Araby Al-Jadid ‘Macron: more than a step back, almost an excuse’. According to him, ‘he has completely changed his language and adopted a conciliatory tone’. This statement is to be put in contrast with his last column before the interview, calling Mr Macron an ‘obsessive racist’ who ‘shoots hate bullets’ at Muslims. This reaction from some Arab media outlets suggests that this interview did have a positive impact, even if considered as an ‘excuse’, the Arabic world (for most countries), better understand Macron’s policies now. 

Nonetheless, when we look at the other end of the Arab political spectrum, with Hakem Al-Mutairi for example, one of the founding members of the Salafist movement in Kuwait, reacted on his Twitter account: ‘Macron’s retreat on Al-Jazeera is a diabolical ruse. The Islamic boycott must continue until the official stop of the exhibition of the drawings and until there is a real apology for this serious aggression against Islam’. 

On Monday 7 December 2020, Mr Macron met with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah Al-Sissi. The latter told the press at the Elysée that religious values must have supremacy over human values and that ‘human rights come second’. His French counterpart replied: ‘The value of man is superior to everything’. Once again, the French president shows his determination to govern a secular country that respects everyone. However, the award of the Legion of Honour given to the Egyptian president was a sensation, once again questioning the words and convictions of President Macron. 

To conclude, France is attacked on all its fronts, on all its borders and on all its values but will never stop to respect everyone.

 

My name is Clara Didier, I’m a 20 years old French International Relations MA student at King’s College. I would like to become a war reporter in the future and work especially in two regions, the Middle-East and South America. I’ve always been interested in war related subjects as my father taught history and geography when I was younger. And more recently, since the Bataclan’s attacks as a family member was in the front line, in terrorism. Regarding war I am particularly interested in secret wars, secrecy, hidden intelligence, what is happening backstage and the results of it, sometimes leading to dirty consequences. Regarding terrorism, it’s a human and sociological curiosity that pushed me in studying how someone (especially citizens in democratic countries) can decide to enroll, radicalise and use violence.

An ‘Islamic State of Al-Andalus’: a too distant dream?

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By Georgina McDonald

Figure 1 The Mosque-Cathedral of Córdoba (Image credit: Author’s own, G.M.)

Cementing and expanding the Islamic State is of the utmost importance to its leaders and supporters of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) who, broadly, advocate for the destruction of the West, a return to traditional Wahhabism for all Muslims and the restoration of an Islamic caliphate to unite Muslims worldwide under their leadership. ISIL rejects traditional nation-state identities, instead favouring an absolutist Islamist identity. This was reflected in a 2014 speech by former ISIL leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi upon the declaration of the Caliphate, who exclaimed ‘Syria is not for the Syrians, and Iraq is not for the Iraqis’.  Consequently, multiple branches of ISIL have emerged across the world. Most recently and ferociously in Africa, where the Islamic State of the Central African Province, Islamic State of Somalia, and the Islamic State in Greater Sahara, for example, have appeared to spread their influence. However, if ISIL yearns for a restoration of the Caliphate, then why has Andalusia, or Al-Andalus, the region which holds the ‘Ka’aba of the West’, been neglected from this vision? Why have we not seen an ‘Islamic State of Al-Andalus’? 

Historical Background

The region of Andalusia spans nearly 90,000 square kilometres across the southern most land of Spain. It boasts incredible mountain ranges such as the Sierra Nevada and stunning beaches along the Costa del Sol. However, it is in the architecture in the cities of Seville, Granada and Córdoba where the history of the region comes to light. This history is rich in culture and by walking the city streets one is easily able to identify Andalusia’s historic rulers.

In 711 CE, under the leadership of Tariq ibn Ziyad, an Islamic army crossed the Strait of Gibraltar from Tangier. Within seven years they had conquered the region of Andalusia, ending Visigoth rule, and beginning an 800-year Muslim rule which eventually expanded as far as the borders of León, Castille, Navarra and Barcelona. During this period, the region became known as Al-Andalus. The invasion is generally viewed as an extension of the Muslim conquest of North Africa and a successful attempt to expand territory and influence. 

Stability was henceforth brought to the region by the Umayyad Caliphate in 756 CE. Amir Abd al-Rahman I had travelled from Damascus to Córdoba where he united the various Iberian Islamic factions under his rule. Later, in 929 CE, Abd al-Rahman III became Caliph and so, the Caliphate of Córdoba emerged. Arabic architecture and influence can be found in almost every city and town in Andalusia as a result. In Córdoba, the mosque, or mezquita, was converted from a Visigoth place of worship by al-Rahman in 786 CE, and is the main tourist attraction, known for its hidden Christian cathedral within. In Seville and Granada, the Giralda and the Alhambra respectively, evidence the intensifying rule which swept through Al-Andalus. 

The significance of Al-Andalus to the Islamic State has not been completely lost, however. After the 2017 Barcelona attacks claimed by the Islamic State, for the first time the terrorist organisation released a propaganda video in Spanish. One of the men in the video identifies himself as Al Qurtubí, the Arabic name for ‘the Córdoban’. Al Qurtubí threatened Spanish Christians, claiming that Al-Andalus will once again belong to the caliphate. Despite this acknowledgement, ISIL and its affiliates have not used terrorist tactics in the major cities of the region such as Seville, Málaga, Granada or Córdoba. Instead, their attacks have been focused on Barcelona and Madrid.

Barriers to retaking Al-Andalus

Theoretically, and historically, Andalusia should have great significance for Islamists. Reconquering the region would represent a remarkable step towards the return to the caliphate to unite Muslims worldwide. However, there are significant barriers to this vision. Firstly, the reason that ISIL was able to gain such large ground in Iraq and Syria was a direct result of existing political instability in the region. ISIL remarkably exploited the power vacuum which the US invasion and the capture of Saddam Hussein created in Iraq. Similarly, post-2011 saw ISIL exploit the collapse of the Assad regime and eventually control an area larger than the size of Great Britain. However, as an economically stable, democratic, western nation, Spain and the Spanish government have fortunately not experienced political strife on the level of that in Iraq and Syria. Without a power vacuum, ISIL could not take advantage of a lack of stable government in the same way it has done previously. Furthermore, many Iraqis and Syrians joined the ISIL citing economic reasons. In their war-torn communities where work was scarce, and with ISIL paying recruits, some felt they had no option. And some did not have an option at all. Many men were forced to join the terrorist organisation or face certain death. Fortunately, the inhabitants of Andalusia do not face the same difficulties, therefore are less likely to feel forced to seek aid from a terrorist organisation. 

In Europe, ISIL has mainly targeted major cities such as London, Paris, Barcelona and Brussels. This is more than likely a strategic move, to attract attention to their cause from politicians, the press and the public. Due to not being capital cities, the cities of Andalusia are less likely to draw as much attention. However, if ISIL was to attack Córdoba, for example, and it was framed in such a way that the attack indicated a resurgence of the old Muslim Caliphate, this then may draw more European eyes and instil more fear than any attack on London or Paris. Using a historical connection to the region as reasoning for attacks would potentially add legitimacy to their stake in the land in the eyes of their believers. Fortunately, this would not stand with the Spanish government nor with any Muslim who did not hold extremist Islamist views in Spain. Therefore, any attempt at resurgence into the area would undoubtedly be suppressed by Spanish civil and military authorities. 

Finally, Andalusia, while once a flourishing Muslim Caliphate, today does not have a large Muslim community in comparison to countries where ISIL thrived at its peak. In 2020, out of a total 8.4 million inhabitants in Andalusia, there were approximately 149,000 Muslims in the region with Spanish nationality, and a further 145,000 with Moroccan nationality. While a large Muslim population is of course not necessary for ISIL to commit terror attacks, it is perhaps more necessary, or at least helpful, for a realistic takeover of the region and formation of an Islamic State as seen in Iraq and Syria. ISIL attempts to use Islamic teachings in order to justify its actions, and while it could encourage a minority of those of the Muslim faith to join the cause, it is more likely fall on deaf ears of Andalusians as the majority are of different faiths or no faith at all.

Conclusion

Despite the fact that the region of Andalusia in the past has flourished under Muslim rule for an 800-year long period, it seems today that the Islamic State are not interested in developing an ‘Islamic State of Al-Andalus’. Perhaps they do not see the value of expending resources to commit terror attacks in a region in order to reclaim it as they know the Spanish civil and military authorities would quickly thwart their efforts. In addition, committing attacks in major European capital cities draws more attention to their cause. At this stage in the Islamic State’s existence, perhaps just gaining attention from the western world is more important than attacking with the aim to conquer. And in order to rule, having the popular support of the population, or at least marginal support, is significantly beneficial. Spain’s stable economy means its inhabitants are not forced to turn to extreme ideas and with only a marginal Muslim population, the Islamic States reliance on old Islamic scripture will not persuade the numbers they need to succeed in a resurgence. For these reasons, it seems an ‘Islamic State of Al-Andalus’ will likely remain a distant dream for Al Qurtubí and the Islamic State. 

 

Georgina is a recent graduate of King’s College, London where she studied for an MA in Terrorism, Security and Society, for which she achieved a Distinction. This article is Georgina’s first contribution to Strife but she hopes to write further blogs on topics including terrorism, international relations and foreign and domestic policy.

Should Female Foreign Fighters be Repatriated?

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While as devoted as their male counterparts, female Jihadis are an underexplored topic of analysis in understanding racidalisation (Image credit: AFP)

It is a woman who teaches you today a lesson in heroism, who teaches you the meaning of Jihad, and the way to die a martyr‘s death … It is a woman who has shocked the enemy, with her thin, meager, and weak body … It is a woman who blew herself up, and with her exploded all the myths about women‘s weakness, submissiveness, and enslavement.

-Al-Sha’ab editorial, February 2002

Since the decline of Islamic State (IS), national governments are faced with the dilemma of leaving the remaining Jihadi foreign fighters and their families in Syria or repatriating them for prosecution in their home countries. This article focuses on the choice of the British Government to leave these individuals in Syria. It does so by discussing the associated difficulties to reintegrate jihadi women within society and its impact on existing counterterrorism (CT) strategies and de-indoctrination processes in the United Kingdom. Specifically, the role of female foreign fighters within the culture of Salafi-Jihadism remains underestimated, particularly with regards to their devotion to the cause and survival of the terrorist network.

Historically, a large participation of women in terrorists networks can be seen. According to Jessica Davis, female suicide bombers counted between twenty-eight to thirty-one per cent in Chechnya, while these numbers stand at fifty-four per cent in Nigeria. Similarly, during the 1970s and 1980s in the German Red Army, women counted for one third of the overall number. In the meantime, between 1986 and 2005, of the seventeen terrorist organisations which used suicide-bomb as a tactic, women were active in half of them. The article concludes that due to the lack of access to terrorist networks and their affiliated organisations, experts generally focus on male foreign fighters, as they cover positions of relevance within the organisation. In this sense, opting for repatriation of these individuals could result in a unique opportunity to advance the knowledge on rehabilitation and de-indoctrination procedures.

In terms of numbers, in 2017, there were over 40,000 jihadi fighters who travelled to Syria to fight under the banner of IS. Of the total number, thirteen per cent (or 4,761) were women, with another twelve per cent (4,640) were minors, who joined the terrorist grouping between 2013 and 2018. Since its defeat, around four-hundred foreign fighters, among them about fifty to sixty women, could or have returned to the United Kingdom (UK). A number of these women have not been able to return as Downing Street exercised its power to strip such citizens of their British nationality. This power, granted by the Immigration Act 2014, states that the British Government reserves the authority to deprive a person of their citizenship should that individual have conducted himself or herself in a manner that could compromise the UK’s interests.

One example of a female foreign fighter stripped of her British citizenship is Shamima Begum, a case which British newspaper put in the spotlights. The problem, however, is larger than her. Causing devastation on multiple occasions, the UK confronts a long history of home-grown terrorists which keep CT agencies in constant pursuit. One of the most prominent and famous cases is Samantha Lewthwaite also named the White Widow, the wife of the London 7/7 attacker, Germaine Lindsey, and currently on Interpol’s most-wanted list. Lewthwaite fake her detachment from her husband’s actions and beliefs and convinced the prosecutors of her innocence. She escaped British and European authorities disappearing shortly after. Lewthwaite is also linked to a series of other terror plots including the 2012 bombing in Kenya and in the Westgate Mall in Nairobi in 2013.

At present, the British government decided that foreign fighters should remain in Syrian prison camps. However, the terrorist threat continues, with al-Qaeda’s increased activity in the region could potentially see remaining IS fighters join, detainees released, and both groups absorbed into the Base’s operations. According to the head of MI6: ‘They are likely to have acquired both the skills and connections that make them potentially very dangerous and also experienced extreme radicalisation.’ In this sense, IS’ weaker presence in the region does not reflect a decrease in the overall influence of terrorist organisations, which are likely to benefit from the situation. At the same time, repatriating these individuals would likely result in a higher investment of resources for monitoring and de-indoctrination purposes. Such a development would add further pressure on the criminal justice system and counterterrorism units.

What makes female jihadi fighters so significant in light of such debates? Academics tend to focus primarily on the role of men in terrorist organisations as they cover positions of relevance. The lack of ample information regarding female fighters makes them equally dangerous, and all the more important to understand. Lacking the most up-to-date information on women’s ‘path to Jihad’ makes it difficult for Counterterrorism experts to produce appropriate de-indoctrination procedures fitting these profiles. However, from the available information on radicalisation and focusing on case studies in which women were the subjects, it is possible to understand this important element.

Women often cover ‘less visible,’ albeit critical roles within terrorist organisations. They are educators of the next generation, facilitators, and perpetrators of the jihadi cause through recruitment and management of finances displaying a deep devotion to the cause and a continuation of the religious struggle. The level of indoctrination they have been subjected to in their homes or in camps, but also due to the nature of the motivations for joining the organisations contests to this fact. Multiple psychologists including Yoram Schweitzer and Farhana Ali identified these causes as being much more personal for women. Indeed, they can be with the ‘Four Rs:’ Revenge (the loss of a dominant male in their lives such as husband, father or brother), Redemption (due to alleged or real sexual misconducts), Respect (inability to conceive children or being considered marriageable), and Relationship (being daughters, wives or sisters of well-known insurgents).

Based on their analysis, it is crucial to consider the individual’s unique path to radicalisation and indoctrination. Such a path is clearly based on personal experiences via the justification of events happening to them, their families, and their community. Specifically, each individual justifies the use of violence and the adoption of Islamic extremism based on how they interpret their familiar links to terrorists, often citing hatred against those who killed their family members, and even societal pressure. In a nutshell, ‘terrorist behavior is a response to the frustration of various political, economic, and personal needs or objectives.’ Therefore, this link between personal experiences and an individual’s personality transform women, who choose to follow the path of radicalisation, becoming strong believers in violent jihad and demonstrating extreme devotion to the cause.

To conclude, whether to support or criticise the British government on its decision to deny the return of these individuals depends on an in-depth and accurate analysis of the pros and cons of such decisions. The long history of home-grown terrorism in the United Kingdom constitutes an important element of analysis in the choice to repatriate or leaving these individuals in Syria. The example of Samantha Lewthwaite, for example, shows the difficulties associated with the processes of de-indoctrination. In this sense, women have demonstrated to cover essential roles in the fields of recruitment, finance, and perpetration of terrorism, showing a new way to interpret the figure of the ‘terrorist.’ Such a shift inspired scholars to coin an alternative version named the ‘female jihad,’ to understand female fighters’ unique path to radicalisation and, thus, creating a new window of analysis. In this context, repatriation ought to be seen as an opportunity to develop more rigorous de-indoctrination processes which are currently still in the pioneering stage, while using the protection of these individuals as examples to disillusion prospective foreign fighters.

Francesco Bruno is a full-time first-year PhD Candidate in Defence Studies Department at King’s College London, focusing on the organisational practices and choices of terrorist organizations with al-Qaeda as a primary case study. He received a BScEcon in International Politics from Aberystwyth University in 2016 before moving to the University of Manchester where he obtained a MA in Peace and Conflict Studies in 2017. During his studies, he took part in research trips in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Rwanda where he conducted fieldwork regarding the pacification and peace processes. Francesco’s main areas of interest span from Peace processes to state-building as well as counterterrorism and counterinsurgency with a focus on Afghanistan and Iraq

Strife Series on Counter-Terrorism in Modern Warfare (Part II) – Deradicalisation and its Effectiveness: A Study of Saudi Arabia and Yemen (Part 2)

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by Anahad Kaur Khangura

Men learn how to use computers in a classroom at the Mashal de-radicalisation centre run by the army in Gulibagh in Pakistan’s Swat valley on April 13, 2012 (Image credit: Reuters/Mian Khursheed)

 

The first part of this contribution to Joanna Lancashire’s Strife Series discussed new approaches towards deradicalisation and how they emerged in Saudi Arabia and Yemen. In this second part, Anahad Khangura takes a critical look at the limitations of such programmes while also offering some brief conclusions on how to move forward.

Limitations of deradicalisation programmes

The critical limit of deradicalisation programmes is the inability to measure the scope and efficiency of such programmes. The lack of metrics of measurement makes it hard to assess the actual impact of the soft approach of counterterrorism on imprisoned terrorists. A variety of programmes, adopted in diverse political settings, have yielded distinct outcomes. The results of such programmes could manifest over an extended period, which limits the reliability of deradicalisation programmes. The success of deradicalisation policy depends upon the structuring of the agenda and objectives of the programme. Additionally, the socio-economic and political conditions of a state are directly proportional to the efficiency of the deradicalisation programme.

Normative and cultural factors, in the political setting, can determine the public response to risk reduction measures. Success also requires some degree of social cohesion and public mandate to support the programme. For instance, in Saudi Arabia, the societal unification and widespread public support to the programme contributed to the success of the programme. The effectiveness of a deradicalisation programme is context-specific and depends upon three factors: the nature and elements of radicalisation; the willingness and resources possessed by the political authority to counter the emerging threat; and the response of the public and the direct impact of the programme upon the society.

The success of deradicalisation programmes is heavily derived from low recidivism rates. It is hard to claim that deradicalisation programmes are the sole reason behind the alteration in the behaviour of a former terrorist. It could be that denouncement of violent techniques was not due to the success of the programme but due to personal circumstances. For instance, the outcome of the Saudi deradicalisation programme claimed to maintain a recidivism rate of merely two per cent. However, such rates could also be achieved due to the direct impact of changing the personal conditions of the detainees. The decision against re-offending could emerge from circumstances external to the scope of deradicalisation programmes. The claim that deradicalisation programmes are successful due to low recidivism rates is inadequate and misleading.

Another significant flaw in the structure of deradicalisation programmes is the clause concerning early release. Early release may provide an incentive to detainees to only appear deradicalised or to behave the way the state demands. In cases of deradicalisation programmes in Yemen and Saudi, the successful completion of the programmes could lead to the early release of the detainees. However, early termination is not applicable to hardcore prisoners such as detainees from Guantanamo Bay. Therefore, detainees may appear to be deradicalised or physically disengaged from terrorist ideology and methodology just to be granted early termination of their sentence. In such cases, it is hard to assess the actual extent of deradicalisation of the individual and the concomitant alteration of their ideology. In cases of deradicalisation programmes granting early release, it is difficult to identify whether the individual actually denounced their extremist perceptions or they chose to behave a certain way that would be acceptable to meet the criteria for early discharge.

Conclusion

The hard approach of counterterrorism has been hotly criticised as it undermines the significance of the involvement of civil society in eliminating terrorism. Outside the realm of security concerns, the state should aim to escalate the potency of deradicalisation programme by strengthening the socio-economic conditions of the society. The success of deradicalisation programmes demands the provision of necessary services, basic utilities and safeguarding the rights of the populace. There is therefore an urgent need to involve civil society in the process of deradicalisation.  Adoption of such programmes at the national level may prove effective, but their legitimacy would likely improve if civil society agents and organisations are involved. It was partially due to sustainable political support to the scheme in Saudi Arabia, that the programme was capable of attaining its established objectives.

In the instances of Saudi Arabia and Yemen, issues regarding staffing of the programme also occurred. Both programmes demanded the credibility of religious interlocutors to ensure to the detainees that the clerics were not instruments of interrogation of the state. In the case of the Dialogue Committee in Yemen, the clerics were afraid to participate in the programme as it could undermine their reputation. The Yemen programme was heavily understaffed in comparison to the number of detainees. Deradicalisation programmes also appeared to be demanding heavy financial investments into the programme which limits their accessibility only to resource-rich states.

The adoption of the soft approach to radicalisation may seem like a more sustainable response to extremism. However, deradicalisation programmes pose major challenges in their conduction. Religious re-education and counselling may prove to be insufficient to mitigate the outcomes of radicalisation. A major drawback of adoption of deradicalisation programmes is that to yield positive outcomes, the need to changes one’s beliefs must be self-motivated and should not be fully state-driven.

The results derived from deradicalisation programmes in Saudi and Yemen depend upon the form of governance, objectives of the programme and the public response to it. It is important to note that positive results in Saudi’s programme are based on low recidivism rates. The actual modification of the mindsets of former detainees may become apparent over a long period and problems concerning their evaluation and quantification would occur. Questions regarding re-engagement remain unresolved through deradicalisation programmes. Deradicalisation programmes have been unable to address the issues regarding recidivism and reignited alliance with terrorist organisations. The scope of deradicalisation programmes, in both cases of Saudi and Yemen, is limited due to the restricted transferability of these programmes. Additionally, the success of the programme in Saudi is derived from its unique structuring which is in direct proportion to its political setting. Consequently, the Saudi programme has been specifically tailored to curb the terrorist threat and cannot be replicated in other countries which might be facing terrorism in a different form.

Considering the limitations of deradicalisation programmes, sole reliance on deradicalisation programmes might not effectively deter the threat of terrorism. The process of eliminating radicalisation demands an equilibrium between both hard and soft instruments of counterterrorism. A more holistic adoption of deradicalisation programmes demands that the structure of such programmes is customised to help restrain the nature of terrorist activity in a particular nation. Keeping in mind the programmes adopted in Saudi and Yemen, it is essential to address that programmes with highly similar structures have the capability to generate distinctive results. Therefore, deradicalisation programmes can rectify extremist behaviour only if the programme is adopted in consideration of the political setting and socio-cultural factors of the country. Additionally, deradicalisation programmes can contribute to risk reduction by altering extremist ideologies but such programmes can only be adopted considering their key limitations. Deradicalisation programmes are innovative and relatively newer components of counterterrorism strategies which are likely to evolve with time to yield more positive outcomes.

Anahad Khangura has recently received her Master’s degree in International Peace and Security from the War Studies Department at KCL. Her academic interests are inclined towards types of political violence and counterterrorism strategies. For her Master’s dissertation, Anahad evaluated the adaptability of terrorist organisations in light of a comparative analysis between Lashkar-e-Taiba and Hezbollah. You can follow her on Twitter @Anahad15.

Strife Series on Counter-Terrorism in Modern Warfare (Part II) – Deradicalisation and its Effectiveness: A Study of Saudi Arabia and Yemen (Part 1)

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by Anahad Kaur Khangura

Innovative approaches to extremist rehabilitation in Saudi Arabia allow former terrorists to engage in a range of activities, in an attempt to speed up their inclusion into society (Image credit: Getty)

 

The continual transformation of terrorism demands an equally changing methodology of Counter-Terrorism (CT). In the 21st Century, CT strategies embraced both ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ power instruments. More holistic approaches to understanding terrorism now directly engage with the ideological driving agents. The adoption of deradicalisation programmes, a constituent of the soft power approach, is being popularised to replace the ‘war on terror’ with the ‘war on ideas.’ Such programmes are significant components of CT policy, focusing on the use of non-coercive methods to disengage individuals from violent ideology and its operational slaughter.

Before 9/11, an active debate in the CT realm criticised the ‘kinetic approach’ towards terrorism, which treated terrorism as an immediate phenomenon and undermined the significance of socio-economic and political underpinnings. The primary challenge with the hard power approach of containment is that it only allows the disruption of the physical process of terrorism, but completely ignores the urgent need to dismantle the ideology which usually serves as the foundation of terrorist organisations. Consequently, deradicalisation programmes, which directly engage with the ideological substructures of terrorism, are now being incorporated as significant aspects of counterterrorism initiatives.

Deradicalisation can be defined as ‘the social and psychological process whereby an individual’s commitment to…violent radicalisation is reduced to the extent that they are no longer at risk of involvement and engagement in violent activity.’ Therefore, the primary aim of deradicalisation programmes is to bring about a cognitive modification in the mindset of terrorists with consideration of the ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors. The former drivers might make an individual quit the group due to adverse reasons (disillusionment with the agenda and the leadership of the organisation); the latter are relatively positive factors such as the establishment of new social relationships and financial incentives.

This piece will identify the fundamental elements of deradicalisation programmes, evaluate and identify their limitations, and assess initiatives adopted in Saudi Arabia and Yemen.

A variety of CT programmes

Even though deradicalisation programmes are being widely adopted by countries, there is a lack of formal conceptualisation about the framework and scope of such programmes. Most programmes engage with risk reduction by focusing on different methods such as deradicalisation, counter-radicalisation, and anti-radicalisation. The aim of deradicalisation programmes is ‘reverse radicalisation’ which implies that it is only applicable to individuals where the process of radicalisation has been completed. The adoption of a particular programme completely depends upon the exclusive elements and the socio-political setting of the terrorist organisation. Before such programmes can be assimilated into a counterterrorism strategy, the structure should be precisely demarcated in accordance with the problem at hand.

Deradicalisation programmes gained momentum in their function of acknowledging the critical grievances of the society which might have been abused by terrorist groups to bolster recruitment. As a part of the soft power approach, deradicalisation programmes deem the ideology of terrorist organisations as illegitimate and distorted. Additionally, they can also engage with the sense of alienation, perpetuated by an ‘in-group versus out-group’ ideology, which in turn is utilised by terrorist organisations to expand their network. Deradicalisation programmes can address the issues of a fragmented society and subsequently encourage social cohesion and unification.

Broadly speaking, deradicalisation programmes are tailored to ensure the smooth return of the incarcerated terrorists to mainstream society, reconfiguring to the societal norm their extreme mentality, dissociating them from their violent behaviourism, and providing them with a stable network of support. Deradicalisation programmes also heavily rely on the significance of personal relationships of former terrorists to convince detainees to rectifying their extremist behaviour. Deradicalisation programmes are therefore an amalgamation of religious re-education, cultivation of personal relationships, and vocational training to ensure the smooth reintegration of released terrorists into society.

Case study 1: Saudi Arabia

In 2004, a deradicalisation programme was adopted in Saudi Arabia in response to the escalation of terrorist-related activities in the period between 2003 and 2004. The programme originated with the government’s realisation that deviant interpretations of Islam cannot be combated by conventional security methods alone. The Kingdom adopted a soft power approach to tackle and mitigate the consequences of violent extremism. The programme requires dialogue between terrorists and religious clerics to impart educational discourse which can alter and subsequently replace the perception of their distorted ideology with the correct fundamentals of Islam.

The first phase of the programme is the al-Munasah (information) stage, which includes dialogue between credible religious clerics and prisoners. During this initial stage, the clerics attempt to initiate debate regarding the prisoner’s perceptions of Islam and his justifications for the same. The chief aim of the dialogue is to impart information on topics such as ‘takfir (apostasy), walaah (loyalty), bayat (allegiance), terrorism, the legal rules of jihad, and psychological courses on self-esteem.’ The second stage of the programme is the transfer, of those detainees who cooperate and renounce violence, to the Mohammed bin Nayef Centre for Counselling and Care. In this part of the programme, detainees engage in recreational activities which could ease the transition of prisoners back into society. This aspect of the programme is critical, as such activities could contribute to the deradicalisation process because they promote teamwork, which in turn encourages the notions of acceptance and inclusion.

Through the involvement of educational discourse and vocational training, the Care Centre aims to maintain low levels of recidivism by directly engaging with the grievances of the detainees. Once a detainee displays modification in his extremist mindset, assistance is provided to find a job and acquire accommodation. A successful element of the programme is the involvement of family networks in the deradicalisation process of the individual. By relying on traditional family networks and broader notions of social responsibility, the programme enhances its legitimacy and credibility.

The deradicalisation programme of Saudi fuelled debate about the efficacy and transferability of such programmes. The programme has reported that ninety per cent of its participants renounced their radical views at completion. Additionally, the recidivism rates remained low at just two per cent, in which none of the violent attacks was conducted within Saudi Arabia. However, this has raised criticism that the programme could only prove effective within the confines of Saudi territory and would not contribute to tackling the global escalation of terrorism.

Another issue with the effectiveness of the programme is that even though the percentage of deradicalised individuals is impressive, the remaining ten per cent of prisoners represent a gravity of these cases. These are the detainees who were ‘hardcore militants with entrenched deviant beliefs,’ who rejected cooperation with the rehabilitation process, and declared the clerics as illegitimate due to their allegiance to the ‘West-aligned Saudi government.’ Most of these detainees, who have been previously imprisoned in Iraq and Guantanamo Bay, reached that stage of radicalisation which surpasses the extent of any deradicalisation programme. Therefore, the figures suggest that the programme is unable to reach the most intransigent extremists, from whom the highest risk emerges, which taints the overall success of the programme and limits its capacity to individuals who are minor offenders

Case study 2: Yemen

The deradicalisation programme in Yemen, called the Dialogue Committee (DC), was launched in the aftermath of the 9/11. Similar to the agenda of the Saudi programme, the primary objective of the DC was to convince the most extremist members of al-Qaeda to alter their perceptions of Islam. The agenda of the Yemeni programme was to dismantle the core ideology of the Base, which was identified as the root cause of terrorism. Therefore, this programme intended to reform the extremist outlooks of the hardcore terrorists which could eventually de-escalate potential recruitment. The organisation of the programme relied on three prominent religious clerics who engaged in dialogue with detainees on the principles of Islam, the responsibilities of a Muslim leader, the significance of jihad, and relations with Western states.

The Dialogue Committee relied on sacred texts such as the Quran to facilitate dialogue. The detainees, however, consistently criticised the Yemeni government as a tool of Western allies and therefore declared the state to be contradicting the interests of the Muslim populace. The lead cleric, judge al-Hitar, compared the texts of the Quran and the Yemeni constitution to prove their alignment and correspondence. The sole impetus of the programme was not only to mitigate radicalisation, but also to achieve political objectives such as increasing the legitimacy of the Yemeni government in the eyes of the people.

In addition to religious reorientation, the DC also encourages family participation in the process of deradicalisation of the detainee. The involvement of family was entrenched in the programme, as family members could exert social pressures on the detainees which could encourage them to denounce their radical values. Social and monetary incentives were also provided to detainees to ensure their smooth reintegration into mainstream society. The programme also encouraged the development of personal relationships and also provided aid to acquire employment.

The successful completion of the programme was followed by the decision regarding the early release of erstwhile extremists. If a detainee was released, then he was made to sign a pledge to ensure that he would refrain from participating in terrorist-related activities against the state. This aspect of the programme has been highly criticised. The drawback, which was intrinsic to the structure of the programme, was that this programme solely focused on containment of extremism within the borders of Yemen. Therefore, the Yemeni programme did not contribute to risk reduction at a global level. Another critical drawback of the Yemeni programme is that the programme digressed from its main agenda of deradicalisation to attaining narrow political objectives of expanding government credibility. The programme implicitly targeted ‘political expediency’ rather than altering the extremist mindsets of detainees.

The second part of this Strife Series’ contribution was published on Wednesday 18 November 2020.

Anahad Khangura has recently received her Master’s degree in International Peace and Security from the War Studies Department at KCL. Her academic interests are inclined towards types of political violence and counterterrorism strategies. For her Master’s dissertation, Anahad evaluated the adaptability of terrorist organisations in light of a comparative analysis between Lashkar-e-Taiba and Hezbollah. You can follow her on Twitter @Anahad15.