terrorism

‘Secret Diplomacy’. Should we engage with Boko Haram?

May 23, 2014 by Strife Staff

By Ifesinachi Okafor-Yarwood:

“All wars represent a failure of diplomacy”

According to Tony Penn, wars occur as a result of lack of diplomacy or the failure/unwillingness of both state and in the case of terrorist’s, non-state actors, to engage in lengthy negotiation – be it the traditional way i.e. secret diplomacy or the new way i.e. open diplomacy/negotiations as the case may be. This article explores the potency of “secret diplomacy” in averting conflicts and or wars, and recommends that it be taken seriously in tackling insurgency and terrorism in West Africa. This recommendation is in reaction to the often-too-cited mantra of ‘we do not negotiate with terrorist’ adopted by western countries, and which has also become a common dictum in Nigerian political discourses. Following a brief definition of what constitutes secret diplomacy in the next section; case studies from past international events will highlight the need to employ secret diplomacy as a means to ameliorate the threat of Boko Haram insurgency in Northern Nigeria.

According to Berridge (2012) secret diplomacy entails keeping secret all or any of the following “the contents of a negotiation, knowledge that negotiations are going on at all, the content of any agreement issuing from negotiations, or the fact that agreement has been reached” (2012: 336). This means of resolving disputes is proven to be effective as it has and continues to be utilized by states in resolving difficult international political problems.

Secret diplomacy has been identified as a potent instrument in dealing with many domestic and international crises in the past. For instance, it is no secret that secret negotiations between the government of the United States and former Soviet Union, was instrumental in averting the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 (Stern 2003:33). Similarly, the “Good Friday Agreement” of April 1998, that saw an end to the crisis in Northern Ireland (BBC 2004, online), did not happen because the British government were so strong or kept to their words of not negotiating with terrorists (as the Irish Republican Army (IRA) at the time were seen as a terrorist organization). Rather, secret negotiations between the British government and members of IRA were instrumental to an agreement being reached (Fisher et al 2003, 57). What is more, despite the United States stance in negotiating with terrorists, there is evidence to suggest that they had and continue to have secret negotiations with the Taliban and Hezbollah on possible solutions to ending the crisis in Afghanistan and Syria respectively (Chandran 2011:60-61; RT 2014). These negotiations have almost always occurred hand in hand with a conventional (open) diplomacy, with the latter acting as the front for the real negotiations, while the back channel negotiations are on going (Roberts 2009:516).

Since the new wave of destruction fomented by radical Islamists group Boko Haram is threatening the very existence of nationhood in Nigeria, this author suggests that one possible way of addressing this menace is to have meaningful (secret) dialogue with their leaders. Notably, Islamic radicalism is not a new phenomenon especially in Nigeria, however the recent terror campaigns including the kidnap of over 250 girls by “Jamã’atu Ahlis Sunnah Ladda’awatih wal-jihad – meaning people committed to the propagation of the prophet’s teaching and jihad” otherwise known as “Boko Haram” –has brought Nigeria to the focus of international community. Although the history of this organization remains shrouded in controversy (Alao 2013:73-73), there is no denying that they have some influence in Northern Nigeria, and that influence is fast spreading beyond the borders of Niger and Cameroon.

Understandably, the incessant terror attacks by Boko Haram have led to public outcry for the government to do more. Some of the recent attacks including the kidnap of over 200 schoolgirls come with demands from the terrorist group – such demand includes the release of their imprisoned members in exchange for the release of the kidnapped girls (Abubakar & Jon 2014). In addition, since the Nigerian government, like United Kingdom and United States government, insists that they do not negotiate with terrorists, the prospects for ending the fatalities inflicted by Boko Haram looks dim. If precedence is anything to go by, then the best way of curtailing the activities of these dangerous terrorists is to engage with them and make some compromises.

Based on the evidence presented above, it is obvious that if the Nigerian government is willing to put an end to the problems of Islamist insurgency in their country, then they must be open to the option of secret negotiations. This is important because although Boko Haram has been identified as a terrorist organization, regrettably, like the Taliban in Afghanistan, and Al-Shabab in Somalia (Tarzi 2009:306-308; Hansen 2013:2), Boko Haram have significant influence among residents in communities where they operate – as demonstrated by the facts that people are willing to provide shelter for them in their undercover operations.

Although it remains impossible to meet the core demand of Boko Haram, which is the Islamisation of Nigeria (Adenrele 2012: 21), the Nigerian government can engage in secret negotiations with them to figure out ways of ameliorating the unending murders and destructions to properties. While some people might argue that it is unethical to engage in any sort of negotiation with terrorist organizations, it is important to recognize that without engaging with Boko Haram, their influence would continue to grow. In addition, contrary to the belief that any engagement with terrorists undermines a state’s integrity, adopting secret diplomacy could boost a government’s ability to protect its citizens, especially when it matters most. Disengaging with terrorists’ in this case, Boko Haram increases their resolve to seek attention. Engaging with them militarily also put the state at a disadvantage, since terrorists have no rules of engagement. The surest hope of addressing the threat posed by Boko Haram is to have meaningful engagement with them and this author believes that this can be achieve through secret diplomacy.

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Ifesinachi Okafor-Yarwood holds an MA in Conflict, Security and Development and is an Alumni scholar with the African Leadership Centre, Kings College London and University of Nairobi. Her Primary research interests include diplomacy, African security and development, The Gulf of Guinea, maritime and human security.

FURTHER READING

Abubakar, A. & John, H. (2014). ‘Blasts at Market kill 118 in Central Nigeria, Officials say’. CNN, 21 May. Available: http://edition.cnn.com/2014/05/21/world/africa/nigeria-blasts/. Accessed: 21th May 2014.
Adenrele, A.R. (2012). ‘Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria as a Symptom of Poverty and Political Alienation’. Journal of Humanities and Social Science: Vol. 3 (5), 21-26.
Alao, C.A. (2013). ‘Islamic Radicalization and Violence in Nigeria’. In Gow, J. et al. (eds.) Militancy and Violence in West Africa: Religion, Politics and Radicalization. Oxford: Routledge, 43-89.
BBC online, (9 December, 2004). ‘The Good Friday Agreement in full’. Available on: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/northern_ireland/4079267.stm. [Accessed: 24thMarch, 2012].
Chandran, D.S. (2011). ‘Armed Conflict in FATA and NWFP: Continuing Violence’. In Chandran, D.S. & Chari, P.R. (eds.) Armed Conflicts in South Asia, 2010: Growing Left-wing Extremism and Religious Violence. India: Routledge, 44-66.
Fisher J. et al, (2003). Central Debates in British Politics. England; Pearson Education Limited.
G.R. Berridge, (2005). Diplomacy Theory and Practice. 3rd ed. United Kingdom: Palgrave Press.
Hansen, S.J. (2013). Al-Shabab in Somalia: the History and Ideology of a Militant Islamist Group, 2005-2012. United Kingdom: Hurst Publishers.
Helander B, (1999). ‘Somalia’. In Westerlund D. & Svanberg I, (eds.), Islam outside the Arab World. New York; St. Martin’s Press,
Reuters. (2014). ;Kenya Defends Security Efforts After Weekend Bombings’. VOA News, 5 May. Available: http://www.voanews.com/content/reu-kenya-defends-security-efforts-after-weekend-bombings/1908334.html. Accessed: 20th May 2014.
RT. (2014). ‘US in secret talks with Hezbollah – Israeli reports’. Russia Today, 29 April. Available: http://rt.com/usa/155728-hezbollah-cyprus-us-talks/. Accessed: 21st May 2014.
Stern S.M, (2003). Averting “the Final Failure”: John F. Kennedy and the Secret Cuban Missile Crisis Meetings. California; Stanford University Press.
Tarzi, A. (2009). ‘The Neo-Taliban’. In Crews, R.D. & Tarzi, A. (eds.) The Taliban and the Crisis of Afghanistan. United States of America: Harvard University Press, 274-310.
Wilson, G.H. (2013). Ilham Portrait of a President. United States of America: AuthorHouse Publications.

Syria, foreign fighters and the Met's new campaign

April 25, 2014 by Strife Staff

In response to the April 24^th launch of a national campaign aimed at starting the conversation about protecting young people from the dangers of travelling to Syria by the Metropolitan Police, Jill S. Russell discusses the role of academia in such initiatives, while Joana Cook analyses the implications of focusing on women.

Not the wrong people for Counter-Radicalisation and British Jihad

By Jill S. Russell:

The Senior National Coordinator for Counter Terrorism policing, Deputy Assistant Commissioner, MPS, Helen Ball unveiled an effort to enlist the support of female family members to stem the flow of British fighters to Syria. Within minutes of the announcement, our own Shiraz Maher critiqued the policy in an interview on BBC Radio 4, noting that the police were “the wrong people to be launching this type of campaign.” Citing concerns regarding community fears of criminalisation and the legacy of previous aggressive approaches by the police on this issue, he argued instead that this should be a matter for community and government leaders. While I understand the concerns, and I have no illusions regarding the tensions in Police-Community (“Po-Co”) relations in the target audience, to make the first and most quotable response to this effort a ringing negative serves little policy purpose.

Many areas of academia enjoy the luxury of operating beyond the constraints of real life requirements. However, in War Studies, particularly as it is so broadly conceived here at King’s, the relationship with policy and policymakers is a critical component of our work.

As I watched the news of this effort emerge this morning I was intrigued. I have speculated with colleagues regarding Po-Co relations generally that an appeal to the female community structures – mothers, aunts, grandmothers, sisters – and the development of trust between them and the police could serve well to counter many areas of criminality, particular amongst at-risk youth. As I see it, such an approach would provide a more productive, less confrontational means to interact with the community to the benefit of all in the reduction of violence and crime. And so, for policing I think this is a useful first step. More than that, I appreciate the philosophy that stands behind such efforts. In a world where responses to crime, violence and the use of force are increasingly forceful and kinetic in their own right, policies and tactics which rely upon alternative foundations, which eschew escalation, which are cognizant of the alienation caused by “robust responses,” are as valuable as they are rare.

I do not doubt that the details of the critique are correct. I agree that the police will have struggle to implement the policy. And hence it is our responsibility as scholars, as keen and intelligent observers of these issues and events, to offer not simply a critique of the efforts of the institutions with which our work is associated. Rather, if we are not to be ivory tower naifs and empty critics, then we must consider our commentary wisely and correctly. If the police have not quite perfected the implementation of the current tactic – and I suspect that it is entirely true – then we should offer our own insights in remedy. I also worry that to highlight the distance between the police and community as a reason not to pursue the effort simply hardens the divide. Thus, to dismiss the entire effort because of its defects serves little purpose, except perhaps to alienate the police from academia.

British policing has taken an interesting and innovative step today. It is a possible bridge to improved relations between the authorities and critical communities. We in academia could offer much in the way of expertise to improve the likelihood the effort to succeed, which would serve not only the direct security needs but also the more general issue of how the police interact with society. Unless our purpose is to maintain the discord and distrust, then it is incumbent upon those of us in relevant scholarly endeavours to offer our wisdom in support.

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Jill S. Russell is a regular contributor to Strife, Kings of War and Small Wars. She is currently a doctoral candidate at King’s College London, researching military history. You can follow her on Twitter @jsargentr.

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What’s in a word? How the Mets appeal falls short

By Joana Cook:

Today the Metropolitan Police announced a new appeal in its counterterrorism focus, which urges women to dissuade family members from travelling to Syria. What this appeal has acknowledged is the important role that women can play in this, and why they should be part of the broader security conversation. Where the initiative has failed however, is by framing women as unique actors separate from those in the family or wider community as opposed to integral actors within, and excluding the roles that women may have in this extremism itself.

The Met’s announcement (in unspoken terms) acknowledges that there are unique, complex threats emerging, and that traditional, law enforcement methods previously engaged to counter extremism and terrorism are not enough. Gone are the days when threats could be seen and dealt with as emanating from abroad, amongst those of different unfamiliar backgrounds and value systems, rather than from our own (families) backyards. The issue of foreign fighters is more personal and is being demonstrated and appealed to by the police in a much more familiar way as the language engaged shows by tying this issue to our everyday lives. This is a ‘proactive measure to keep families together’. They are ‘idealistic young people not would-be terrorists’ who, if they travel to Syria even for humanitarian reasons ‘risk being preyed on by terrorist groups’ and ‘we are trying to protect them’. We are ‘encouraging women to take an active part in their child’s lives’. This is as personal as targeted messaging gets.

The efforts that the Met are taking have both positive and negative ramifications. They humanize and personalize those (our children, our husbands) who may become foreign fighters and indeed threaten our safety, and appeal to the different ways we may be involved in preventing this. They engage us as citizens in the security process as well as positively target early stage intervention, showing an understanding that motivations to become involved in certain activities may be carried out under misguided youthful ambitions (even if for the right reasons), and proactive actions can prevent future tragedies and more reactive, serious consequences which may face these individuals we care about in the future. However, what the Met risks doing by specifically targeting women as mothers and wives in the Muslim community and appealing to their roles as intimate family members, endangers alienating the important roles that others may play in this same process. It also suggests that it is only young men which should be focussed on in these efforts.

When singling out certain groups (women, Muslims) and focusing on their capacity in the family, the Met risk reducing the roles that women may play to the private sphere and ignores others they may play as, for example, teachers or community leaders who may also have influence over these youths lives. Without stating in the same breath that all family members, including fathers, husbands and brothers, also have a critical stake in this as well, may unintentionally delegate these figures to seemingly less significant, impactful roles. By pointing out that the nurturing and safeguarding roles that mothers can play in preventing their sons (and daughters) from becoming foreign fighters risks side-lining other components that are present in this radicalisation process which families may also have a stake in, some of which may not be solved simply by a mother’s love.

The impacts of foreign fighters from Syria have been said to last the next decade and have the potential to cause severe security implications throughout. What today’s initiative has acknowledged is that this is an issue we should all be concerned about and have an interest in addressing.

Women, as mothers, sisters and wives, have important roles to play in this. What should not be forgotten however, is that not only can these same women we are appealing to in fact support or carry out these extremist activities themselves as recent cases have shown, but both men and women, Muslim and non-Muslim, within the family and community, all have positive and varied roles in countering this. These should not necessarily be singled out as disparate and the language used in such initiatives should reflect this.

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Joana Cook is a PhD student at the Department of War Studies at King’s College London researching the role and agency of women in counter-terrorism in Yemen. She is also a researcher at the Canadian Network for Research on Terrorism, Security and Society (TSAS). You can follow her on Twitter @Joana_Cook

From Syria to Sochi: The increasing role of women in terrorism

January 31, 2014 by Strife Staff

By Joana Cook

As the opening ceremony to the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi quickly approaches, the security of both athletes and attendees remain at the forefront of international scrutiny in the wake of three recent bombings which killed 37 people.

Last weekend in Geneva, peace talks began in an attempt to negotiate an end to the three-year Syrian civil war that has culminated in a humanitarian disaster which has left over 130,000 dead.

What these two seemingly unconnected events have in common is the recent prominence of women, specifically in carrying out or supporting activities, related to terrorism. Examining the roles that women are taking in Syria and Sochi provides two unique and independent case studies that broaden the investigation of the positions that women are taking up in connection to terrorism, and how this is playing out in wider prevention and response.

In Russia, following three separate bombings in the town of Volgograd since October 21, 2013, information has started to surface on those responsible for the attacks and their motivations. The suicide bombers referred to as black widows, or shahidka’s, have seemingly returned. A female was cited as the perpetrator in the October attack on a public bus, and though reports released January 30, 2014 indicated it was two males that carried out the two subsequent attacks on a public trolley bus and train station, women were initially suspected in these cases. Police are also distributing posters seeking three other women at large in Sochi who were trained to ‘perpetrate acts of terrorism’.

Active in Russia since 2000, these largely Chechan and Dagestani female suicide bombers have been responsible for a significant portion of attacks in the Northern Caucasus since. A 2013 article by The Daily Beast stated that 46 women over the last 12 years have been involved in suicide attacks in the region. While fundamentalist Islamic motivations are often publicly cited, other sources point to independence aspirations, personal traumas, or revenge of the deaths of their sons, brothers or husbands and even romanticising love with ‘Islamic warriors’.

In the British media, over the last week there have been two separate cases involving a total of four female individuals detained en route to Syria. Two women aged 26 and 27 were charged with making funds available to terrorism after being caught with €20,000 cash, trying to leave Heathrow airport travelling to Turkey. Perhaps more shockingly, two girls aged 17 who were allegedly ‘inspired by jihad’ were also intercepted boarding a plane to Syria in a separate case. Recent reports have also indicated that there are growing numbers of women who are seeking al-Qaeda fighter husbands amongst British men in Syria.

While there are distinctly different roles presented here, that of suicide bomber, financier, jihadist fighter and potential wife, what this does point to is increasingly visible and potentially diversifying functions of women in terrorist organisations.

There are three key areas of particular concern when assessing gender in terrorism: actions, motivations and approach. While these areas certainly affect both men and women, it is worthwhile to ask if, and how, they may differ in their responses.

Do the actions of these women differentiate them from their male counterparts in terms of tactics, or ease with which they are able to carry out their activities? For example, are women screened less when travelling abroad and targeted by groups for these actions? What are the motivating factors that drive these women to become supportive of, attracted to, or involved in terrorist activities? How are these factors differentiated by their sex, age, life events or other factors? How do you effectively deter and prevent engagement in these illicit activities when trauma or romanticising of fighters is involved? Do we understand the social constructions and contexts associated with one’s gender and how these may cause one individual to act differently than another?

It is far beyond the scope of this article to ‘genderise’ how we approach security, nor is it the intent. It would, however, be apt to note the traditional descriptions of security, and arguably more specifically counterterrorism, are largely dominated by traits often viewed as masculine. Strength, heroism, bravery and protection are words that would comfortably fit into everyday public narratives which surround security. This then begs the question: have traits or actions associated with femininity yet had their due examination in the security sector which these cases have highlighted? This consideration should be used to call attention to gendered aspects of security, rather than challenge how security is structured more broadly.

We should use these two recent examples from Sochi and Syria to examine the robustness and depth of our understanding of, and approach to, security and specifically its impact on preventing terrorism. How and why terrorism appeals to different groups has critical implications to the prevention and deterrence of future participation, as well as extensions to the judicial framework and policy practice in place to manage them. If women are being left out of the wider security scope, this would, I suggest, require us to question just how comprehensive our approach to security is, and who or what else is being overlooked. This may also have critical, wider impacts on how our security approaches discriminate against, alienate or even harm, those it may be seeking to protect.

If we want to ensure that the most pressing security concerns of our day are met with comprehensive, thoughtful and, most importantly, preventative approaches which do not perpetuate situations which may encourage further acts, we need to take a closer look at how terrorism is perceived by and reacted to all groups, including women.

'Still violent, vulnerable and vital'. Pakistan's prospects for 2014

January 10, 2014 by Strife Staff

by Zoha Waseem

In Pakistan’s 67^th year of existence, living with violence in contested spaces appears to have become a norm. Since 2003, over 50,000 Pakistanis have been killed in terrorism-related violence. An estimated 5,366 people were killed last year alone; over half of them reportedly in urban violence in Karachi. In the beginning of 2013 the Pakistani army finally altered its stance on militancy and recognised that internal terrorism was the biggest threat to its national security. But the civilian government has yet to devise a strategy to tackle this monster. As the world enters 2014 it carries with it ghosts of conflicts past and Pakistan’s baggage is perhaps one of the heaviest. This is a brief analysis of developments that shaped the country in 2013 and what is in store for the year ahead.

Pakistan Goes to the Polls

Perhaps the greatest milestone last year was a smooth transition of power; the landmark elections of May 2013 celebrated the first completion of a democratic government’s tenure. While clouded by riots and rigging, it was a watershed moment for Pakistanis who came out in scores to campaign and vote, demonstrating the country’s resilient street power. Unfortunately, almost customarily, Pakistan voted in a previously tried and tested government, that of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif.

Sharif’s third term in the position under Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz (PML-N) has succeeded in undermining the role of President Mamnoon Hussain, contrary to the authority previous president Asif Ali Zardari held. Sharif’s agenda focuses on three core elements: economy, energy and extremism. Sharif will have his hands full this term with Afghanistan, India, Iran, domestic militancy and rising sectarianism, economic instability, and volatile political eruptions in the province of Sindh.

The May elections also saw the rise of Imran Khan, Chairman of political party Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), which has over the months witnessed diminishing popularity following Khan’s statements criticising drone strikes; blocking NATO supply routes; calling for negotiations with the terrorist group Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP); creeping further to the right by allying with Jamaat-e-Islami, and attempting to vindicate Bangladeshi war criminal Abdul Quader Mullah. Eight months on, PTI has yet to deliver as Khan appears to be stuck in campaign gear. In 2014 Pakistanis will watch closely how his government performs in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa (the northern province of Pakistan that borders the Federally Administrative Tribal Areas and Afghanistan, and has been home to both Afghan and Pakistani Taliban).

The months leading up to the election period coincided with the return of former president and army chief, Pervez Musharraf, from London. Now on trial for treason for imposing emergency rule in 2007, and trying to avoid the court on medical grounds, Musharraf faces death penalty or life imprisonment if convicted. While Musharraf maintains that the army is on his side, his prosecution could be demoralising for the entire institution – perhaps the strongest in Pakistan – and risk complicating the slowly mending civil-military relations.

Negotiating with the TTP

One of the most debated subjects in Pakistani media was the dialogue with the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). When TTP chief Hakimullah Mehsud was killed in a drone strike in November, the government criticised the United States for hampering negotiations. Little importance was given to the fact that members of the TTP denied that these talks had begun. The killing of Hakimullah in a drone strike put the TTP under the leadership of Mullah Fazlullah, a militant notorious for lashing out over the radio against the Pakistani government, education, and anti-polio drives. Staunchly against negotiations, Fazlullah is said to be close to the Afghan Taliban, having taken shelter in the country following a military operation in Swat (2009), and his appointment may indicate warming relations between the Afghan and Pakistani Talibans.

The year ended with the government appointing chief of Jamiat Ulema-i-Islami, Sami-ul Haq, to initiate dialogue with the TTP. The group has three core demands: (i) withdraw the armed forces; (ii) implement TTP’s brand of Sharia; (iii) eradicate democracy. Sharif insists the TTP must disarm and accept the Pakistani constitution, but Sami-ul Haq is known to be supportive of TTP’s demands. Pakistan’s current strategy of negotiation – with the appointment of said middleman – already appears feeble.

Besides uncertainty over how or with whom to negotiate, Pakistan must remember previous violations of ceasefire agreements by the TTP. While these are beyond the ambit of this article, it suffices to say that continued targeting of civilians calls into question TTP’s sincerity for peace. The July jail break that led to the escape of 250 prisoners from Dera Ismail Khan (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa); the church attack in Peshawar that killed over 80 people followed by one in Qissa Khwani bazaar claiming 40 lives; the attacks on anti-polio drive workers across the country; the attacks on female students in Quetta; and the massacre of 10 foreign mountaineers in Nanga Parbat are but some reminders of the audacity of the group which, at this rate, is likely to continue operating with scant regard for the writ of the state.

Operation: Karachi

Karachi suffered from one of its deadliest years in history. 2013 started with waves of target killings, now almost the city’s trademark, including Parveen Rehman, a devoted social worker, and Zahra Shahid, vice-president of PTI. In August 2011, the Supreme Court took a suo motu notice of the increasing crime and violence in the city. It took two years before law enforcement agencies were finally instructed to crack down and begin an operation against criminals and terrorists. Over 14,000 suspects have been arrested since September, but violence continues unabated.

Alongside 3,000 civilians killed in violence in Karachi (compared to 143 in Islamabad), more than 172 police officers were targeted last year (1 every 2 days), making it the worst year for city police fatalities. Assassinations of police officials have continued into 2014, with the recent suicide attack on SSP (Crime Investigation Department) Chaudhry Aslam, a distinguished officer recognised for his counter-terrorism efforts in Karachi, especially against the TTP. The group retaliated in broad daylight, theatrically demonstrating their increasing presence in the city.

The previous summer saw Altaf Hussain (chief of Karachi’s leading ethnic political party, Muttahida Quami Movement (MQM)) under fire from the British media after Scotland Yard took notice of his money laundering activities, his alleged involvement in the murder of Imran Farooq (a senior member of the MQM in London), and for inciting violence in Karachi. Presently, media reports are again hinting that Hussain’s recent statements may cause Scotland Yard to investigate the case this year. Should this happen, and if Karachi is disturbed by developments in London that demoralise MQM activists, Islamabad may pressure the British to temporarily take a softer approach to Hussain in order to gain time to stabilise Karachi and allow the on-going operation to continue. This will be a particularly sensitive subject in the first half of 2014, ahead of the local body elections due to take place.

Escalating Sectarian Strife

Pakistan further suffered the loss of 500 civilians to sectarian violence, 96 percent of whom were Shia Muslims. Systematic killings of the Shia Hazara minority continued (over 125 were killed in 2012, whereas the first two months of 2013 saw more than 200 Harazas targeted). Responsibilities for these attacks have been claimed by both the TTP and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (both pro-Sunni, anti-Shia groups). Sectarian minorities (including Ahmedis) in Balochistan and elsewhere, blame the federal government for its lack of dedication to the plight of minorities.

Of Foes and Friends

Drone attacks remained a crucial aspect of Pakistan’s rocky courtship with the US. In response to the droning out of Maulvi Nazir and then Mehsud (senior TTP commanders), PTI rashly responded by blocking NATO supply routes to Afghanistan via Pakistan, hurting not only civilians for whom the supplies were intended, but also other NATO countries not responsible for drones. Sharif received no justification on this subject during his sit-down with Obama in Washington DC in October, 2013. Sources on the ground suggest the attacks will continue this year, though perhaps with reduced frequency post-NATO withdrawal, and that supply routes will remain open through backdoor diplomacy. Despite feelings of betrayal and subordination, Islamabad will continue relying on the US for financial support.

Backdoor diplomacy also appears to be the preferred tactic on the question of Afghanistan. Pakistani media is relatively quiet on how the state intends to deal with Afghanistan ahead of coming elections. Analysis suggests that the Pakistani establishment remains divided: some within the establishment will back the Afghan Taliban, whereas other will seek to resist it. Regardless, the complete disregard by the Taliban for the Durand Line suggests Pakistan’s porous border will remain tense and open to militant activities.

Pakistan’s policy vis-à-vis Afghanistan will be considered with India in mind. Pakistanis still feel uncertain about Narendra Modi, the leading prime ministerial candidate in India’s upcoming elections, and his agenda for Islamabad. Sharif’s campaign emphasised bettering relations with India, opening dialogue, and ending visa restrictions. But Modi has thus far hinted towards a hard-line approach in dealing with its nuclear neighbour. With Kashmir and Afghanistan still circling the room like two giant elephants, the tense relationship and dialogue will remain vulnerable to breaches and violations. There were 400 cease-fire violations on the line of control in the disputed territory of Kashmir and the much-awaited Director General Military Operations (DGMO) meetings took off in December 2013 to discuss these violations. The fact that the DGMOs met for the first time since the 1999 Kargil War is a positive development. Nevertheless, it is likely that while talks and meetings continue, behind-the-door arms build-ups, border skirmishes, and indirect support for low-scale conflicts on opposing sides, will continue with all guards geared for defence.

Pakistan is also faced with a strict deadline of completing the Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline by the end of 2014, which is crucial for Sharif’s desire to address the energy crisis. Though dedicated to the project, Islamabad feels the heat of US pressure and threats of sanctions should it continue. Iran has already suspended the loan for Pakistan’s side of the pipeline, and if unable to follow through with the deal, Pakistan will face severe financial repercussions as well as risk jeopardising ties with Tehran.

The Year of Appointments

2013 was also a year of new appointments in Pakistan. The retirement of former Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry was met with mixed feelings. Once renowned for judicial activism and recognised as the face of the Lawyer’s Movement, Chaudhry soon became notorious for judicial dictatorship and addressing personal vendettas. The decline of judicial activism welcomed the appointment of Tasadduq Hussain Jilani who, in a remarkable contrast to Chaudhry, is mild-tempered, nicknamed ‘the gentleman judge’, and indifferent to the media.

Former chief of army staff Ashfaq Kayani also stepped down in 2013. The antithesis to Musharraf, he was respected for keeping the military outside of the civilian government’s domain, tolerating extreme criticisms in the media, and recognising the threat posed by domestic terrorism. His successor, Raheel Sharif, has been hand-picked by Nawaz Sharif (no relation), with indifference towards merit-based selection (Raheel Sharif was third in line). Raheel is close to the PM, but Pakistani history indicates that a selection that does not respect seniority or merit does not bode well for Pakistani politicians. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto appointed Zia-ul-Haq who hanged him; Nawaz Sharif previously appointed Musharraf who overthrow his government in a coup. Both were low in seniority.

Pakistan will have a full plate in 2014 with too many hungry appetites. Power struggles in the centre between government and opposition will continue trickling down to provincial and local levels, gathering arms and soldiers as they ripple on. Like in Afghanistan, where the future is up for grabs, in Pakistan, power and space will be contested through violence and chaos. This is unlikely to present a picture much different from the previous year.

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Zoha Waseem is a PhD researcher in the Department of War Studies at King’s College London. You can follower her on Twitter @ZohaWaseem.

‘O Hush the Noise Ye Men of Strife’

December 28, 2013 by Strife Staff

by Thomas Colley

As the centenary of the start of the First World War approaches (2014), thoughts will likely turn this holiday season to the uplifting Christmas football match that supposedly occurred during a truce between Germany and the Allies on the Western front. Such a heart-warming episode provided a symbolic reminder that humanity could stand morally above the awful conflict in which Western civilisation was embroiled. That sworn enemies agreed a truce and celebrated a mutual religious festival together is one of the most emotive mythologies of war at Christmas.

Perhaps surprisingly, honouring the religious festivals of others is not as commonplace as one might think. For centuries, the Jews across the Christian world experienced persecution at Easter. Half a century before the First World War, the American Civil War saw continued fighting over Christmas, with the festival used for a major propaganda battle. At this time of joy, happiness and perhaps a little sober reflection for those who are less fortunate it may not readily occur to us that, for some, religious festivals are not sacrosanct. Instead, they are a strategic opportunity to press their agenda, be it ideological indoctrination, the incitement of fear or military victory.

Wars are fought on a physical and a symbolic level. On a physical level, religious festivals provide a strategic military opportunity to take advantage of the distraction of one’s opponent with a surprise attack. That may sound controversial. But if moral considerations are removed from the equation in line with strategic theory, the use of a religious festival to attack opponents at their moment of greatest distraction is a rational decision. The Yom Kippur War was one such example, when an Arab coalition used the holiest Jewish day of the year to launch an attack against Israel in 1973. The Tet Offensive of 1968 was another notable example, when the North Vietnamese Army and Vietcong used New Year celebrations to launch surprise attacks against the US and their allies during the Vietnam War. Militarily, whilst both offensives eventually faltered, they achieved strategic surprise, and both attackers made significant early gains that had previously eluded them. In Vietnam of course, the Tet offensive was seen as the pivotal catalyst for US public opinion to turn against the war, a spectacular success for North Vietnam in the long term.

However, it is on the symbolic level that using religious festivals for strategic gain is most significant. Of all strategies concerning the use of force to achieve political objectives, terrorism relies most on the effects of symbolism. US embassies in Yemen and elsewhere in the Arab world were closed this year due to the threat of Islamist terrorist attacks on Eid. Some commentators in the US excoriated the terrorists being so immoral as to choose their own holy day to launch attacks. Yet clearly such an attack could have great symbolic impact, potentially galvanising the support of those sympathetic to the terrorist cause. Though one speculates whether other Muslims would feel the same way about the use of their day of celebration for such ends. An Eid attack might minimise Muslim casualties as more people may be at home with their families. On the symbolic level though it might backfire, alienating more Muslims than it would attract.

As well as military and terrorist acts, Christmas has also been instrumentalised for the projection of soft power. In 2011, North Korea was fuming at South Korea’s construction of several giant Christmas trees along the border with the demilitarised zone. A Christmas tree could symbolise welcoming, celebration, family, an invitation. Yet to the North it could be seen as a cultural threat; a Christmas tree could also symbolise plenty, feasting, religious freedom (let alone a consistent power supply), all things that are rarely experienced by the people of North Korea. Indeed the North Korean government was so upset as to threaten to shoot the trees down, such were their symbolic power. Actually this could perversely be seen as cause for optimism. If North Korean elites feel that threatened by the propaganda effect of a Christmas tree, then North Korea’s cultural borders must be more open than one might think.

This sense of optimism is important at Christmas. Much of the world is not free from strife. Peace on Earth remains an ideal rather than a reality. But let us hope that, regardless of faith, this holiday season brings as many people together as possible in togetherness rather than suffering. We should not have to look back a hundred years for poignant examples of when enemies come together, even briefly, in peace and goodwill. As the popular Christmas Carol ‘It Came Upon a Midnight Clear’ proclaims: ‘O hush the noise ye men of strife and hear the angels sing.’

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