Syria

Financing Terror, Part IV: Charities and terrorism in the Middle East

February 2, 2015 by Strife Staff

By Drew Alyeshmerni:

Rockets fired from gaza by the military wing of Hamas. Photo: Zoriah (creative commons) — Rockets fired from the Gaza Strip by the military wing of Hamas. Photo: Zoriah (creative commons)

In Judaism, it’s tzedakah. In Islam, it’s zakat. In Christianity, it’s tithing. Each major religion sees the importance of giving charity, whether for the sake of doing good or as a religious obligation. Other influences on an individual’s propensity for charitable donations include political affiliation, religion, race, sexual orientation, country of origin, interests or concerns.

Charities provide local or international assistance and are often regulated by government entities such as the Internal Revenue Service in the United States and the Charity Commission 1 in the United Kingdom. These organisations try to make sure that charities operating in conflict zones do not have ties to terrorism. Charities diverting money towards terrorist groups has happened in the Syrian Civil War and in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Due to the large number of local and international organizations raising funds for Syrian relief efforts, the Charity Commission issued an alert in April 2013 titled ‘Safer Giving Advice for Syria’. Their concerns have proved prescient. In February 2014, British citizen Abdul Waheed Majid joined an aid convoy heading to Aleppo with the Birmingham-based ‘Children in Deen’ organization. While in Syria, he abandoned his convoy, joined the Al Qaeda-linked al-Nusra Front, and drove a truck full of explosives into a prison wall. His suicide mission – partially funded by unsuspecting individuals’ charitable contributions – caused dozens of civilian deaths and allowed hundreds of dangerous prisoners to escape.2

Events such as Majid’s suicide mission have sparked great concern over the destination of funds raised by charities who claim to be doing humanitarian work but are actually directly or indirectly supporting terrorist groups. Since February 2014, the Charity Commission has opened an investigation into 86 aid groups suspected of supporting extremists, including 37 charities involved in providing aid to war-torn Syria.3 In addition to Children in Deen, these charities include Aid Convoy, Syria Aid, and Al-Fatiha Global. The investigations are still underway and dozens of other charities are being monitored for their fundraising activities in the UK.4

This phenomenon – the use of charities as funding fronts for terrorist activities – is not new. After the September 11, 2001, attacks the United States government initiated the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program (TFTP) in order to identify, track and pursue terrorist groups’ sources of funding.5 Through the TFTP, the US government has uncovered and shut down over 40 designated charities used as Potential Fundraising Front Organizations, or PFFOs.6 In August 2010 the US entered a TFTP agreement with the European Union.7 This agreement enables the sharing of intelligence between the US and the EU, although there are limits to the efficiency of the US in preventing the flow of funds to terrorist organizations. Prime examples of these limits are the attitudes and actions by other countries against organizations such as Hamas, a US-designated terrorist organization that operates throughout the Levant, Israel, and the Palestinian territories.

Charitable organizations identified as PFFOs for Hamas in the US are not designated as such in the EU and UK. One such organization is Interpal, the Palestinian Relief and Development Fund. Interpal, a UK-based charity, is allegedly designed to hide the flow of money to Hamas.8 According to the US Treasury, Hamas raises tens of millions of dollars per year throughout the world by using charitable fundraising as a cover.9

While Hamas supports a wide array of humanitarian projects in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, their work is also a primary recruiting tool for the organization’s military wing,10 which is responsible for carrying out acts of terrorism against Israel. These include the June 2014 kidnapping and murder of three Israeli teens, the firing of 11,000 rockets since 2005 upon southern Israel’s civilians, and the use of cross-border tunnels to carry out attacks within Israel. In stark contrast to the findings of ongoing investigations into organizations feared to be funding terrorist operations in Syria, the UK’s Charity Commission claims that Interpal does not support terrorism.11 Additionally, the EU has actually removed Hamas from its list of designated terrorist organizations.12

What is the effectiveness then of the Charity Commission’s policy aimed at eradicating the abuse of charitable organizations by Syrian-based terror groups when potential fundraising front organizations for other groups such as Hamas, still considered a terrorist organisation in countries such as Egypt and the United States, are allowed to freely operate on British and European soil?

In the case of Hamas and Interpal, the joint EU-US TFTP agreement and system of checks erected in the UK’s Charity Act of 2006 to audit charities suspected of abuse are proving to be tools influenced by public opinion surrounding the political climate on any given day. In the case of the few dozen Syrian-linked charities in the UK being investigated by the Charity Commission, one has to wonder if the only reason they are being investigated is because of the intense publicity surrounding events that relate Syria to Britain, like Majid’s suicide mission, the beheading of a British aid worker, and the migration of 500 British jihadists to the Islamic State. Would those charities have even been flagged for review if not for these events? And if not for these events, would the Islamic State or the al-Nusra Front have been considered terrorist organizations, or would they have been considered nationalist liberation organizations for the Sunnis of the Middle East, much like Hamas for the Palestinians? The point is that public opinion seems to determine the policy of those organisations charged with investigating charities suspected of funding terrorist groups.

After exploring these two different cases in Syria and Palestine, we must ask ourselves the following questions: Are the policies used to oversee and investigate charities indeed founded on justice, or are they simply based on political interest and public opinion? Is it important for individual donors to do their due diligence when determining where to make their international charitable contributions, or must donors simply put their trust in governmental bodies that may potentially be influenced by politics and public opinion?

In order to ensure that your charitable contributions go directly to supporting the cause you care about, dig a little deeper with your research. Look at other countries’ information on charities to which you are considering making a contribution, and consider whether there is a correlation between the activities of such charities and the operations of terrorist organizations. Your generosity is surely heartfelt, but unless you do the necessary research, you may unwittingly be supporting a cause other than the one you intended.

Drew Alyeshmerni has an MA in Public Policy from Tel Aviv University and certification in Middle Eastern Studies from the University of Arizona. While in Israel she coordinated international humanitarian aid projects for the Palestinian population of the West Bank under the Civil Administration and worked in a variety of Human Rights groups, including the Hotline for Refugees and Migrants, Hiddush: Freedom of Religion for Israel, and the Center for Jewish Arab Economic Development. Drew currently lives in Los Angeles, California, where she focuses on reconciliation between Arabs and Jews on college campuses. Find her on LinkedIn.

This article was the final part of a Strife series on terrorist financing. Over the last four weeks authors have examined different methods of terrorist financing, using modern and varied case studies, offering a new look at who and what is funding today’s terror activities. In Part I Arne Holverscheid discussed the role of private Kuwaiti donors in financing rebel groups in Syria affiliated with terror organisations and blurring the lines between good and bad, friend and foe. In Part II Claire Mennessier examined the involvement of Pakistan in financing terror groups, and the motivations and challenges presented by this involvement. Last week, in Part III, Samuel Smith addressed the frightening trend of kidnapping for ransom as a source of finance for terror groups through a case study of the Abu Sayyaf Group in the Philippines and Southeast Asia.

NOTES

1 The Charity Commission is responsible for registering eligible charitable organisations in the United Kingdom and investigating cases of malpractice or misconduct by charitable organisations. See the following page for further information: https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/charity-commission/about

2 Sophie Jane Evans, “Investigation Launched into Birmingham Charity Used by ‘British Suicide Bomber’ to Travel to Syria and Carry out Attack,” Mail Online, March 3, 2014, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2571460/Children-Deen-used-British-suicide-bomber-travel-Syria-carry-attack.html.

3 Tim Ross et al., “Charity Commission: British Charities Investigated for Terror Risk,” The Telegraph, November 1, 2013, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/islamic-state/11203569/Charity-Commission-British-charities-investigated-for-terror-links.html

4 Ibid

5 “Terrorist Finance Tracking Program (TFTP),” U.S. Department of Treasury, May 5, 2014, http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/terrorist-illicit-finance/Terrorist-Finance-Tracking/Pages/tftp.aspx.

6 “Protecting Charitable Organizations – E ,” U.S. Department of Treasury, August 21, 2007, http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/terrorist-illicit-finance/Pages/protecting-charities_execorder_13224-e.aspx .

7 “Terrorist Finance Tracking Programme,” European Commission, December 12, 2014, http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/crisis-and-terrorism/tftp/index_en.htm.

8 “Protecting Charitable Organizations – E” – Listed under Interpal

9 ibid- listed under H- Hamas Fundraising

10 ibid -Listed under H- Hamas Fundraising

11“UK Charity Commission: Interpal Not Supporting Terror Groups,” Charity and Security Network, April 9, 2009, http://www.charityandsecurity.org/news/UK_Charity_Commission_Interpal_Not%20Supporting_Terror.

12“EU court takes Hamas off terrorist organisations list,” BBC, December 17, 2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-30511569

Financing Terror, Part I: Private Kuwaiti donors in Syria's Civil War

January 12, 2015 by Strife Staff

By Arne Holverscheid:

Fighters from Islamic State in Raqqa, northern Syria. (Photo: Ogbodo Solution - Flickr) — Fighters from Islamic State in Raqqa, north Syria. (Photo: Ogbodo Solution – Flickr)

What happened to President Bashar al-Assad? When Syria descended into civil war in 2011, he was the perfect enemy for the Western public: supported by his ally Iran, he preferred watching his people die and his country be torn apart than give in to demands for freedom, democracy and civil rights. The line between good and evil, between friend and foe seemed clear: it was the Syrian people and their democratic ambitions against Bashar Assad and his powerful friend, Tehran.[i]

Now, after almost four years of fighting, this clear line has become more and more blurred. The Syrian opposition has radicalized: extremists, among them jihadist and Islamist groups, seem to have become the dominant actors.[ii] The Free Syrian Army (FSA), once bearer of hope for Syria in the Western world, is weaker than ever. States from the Arabian Peninsula, considered allies of the United States and Western countries, have joined the fight and have been financing rebel groups in Syria. Many of these rebel groups allegedly belong to the spectrum of Islamic extremism, which is arguably just as opposed to liberal democracy as is Assad.[iii]^,[iv] But in this complex conflict, private donors from the wealthy state of Kuwait have played a significant part in further blurring the lines in a manner which is much less conspicuous yet leaves a lasting impact.

According to the Koran, giving alms is ordained by Allah. Donations are meant for ‘the poor and the needy…for those in bondage and in debt, in the cause of Allah, and for the wayfarer’ (Sura 9.60). Kuwaiti donors have taken their religious duty very seriously during the on-going conflict and have made substantial humanitarian contributions to ease the suffering of the Syrian population.[v] The Kuwaiti government has so far refused to go beyond financial contributions and arm Syrian rebels. But many private donors and fundraisers have decided to do exactly this, and the fairly liberal Kuwaiti political system has allowed them to advocate and conduct fundraising activities freely among the Kuwaiti public.[vi] Many within the Sunni majority even openly criticize the government for not arming the Syrian opposition, and influential Salafi figures have joined the efforts to raise money for the Syrian cause.[vii]

Donations are mostly collected using Twitter and other social media networks and are delivered personally by couriers who travel to the Turkish-Syrian border. Hundreds of millions of dollars are estimated to have entered the Syrian civil war in this way, and the proportion of funds that goes to radical groups is hard to determine. However, donors tend to support and actively encourage those rebels who are specifically aligned with their own religious or ideological beliefs. The Kuwaiti fundraising scene is dominated by extreme religious figures, and it has become clear that large donations were sent to prominent groups in the jihadi spectrum. Particularly close connections have been established with Ahrar al-Sham and Jabhat al-Nusra. The latter is known to be an al-Qaeda affiliate, and both groups are reported to have recently come to an agreement with the Islamic State (IS), halting the fight against each other in order to challenge common enemies. In addition, the Sunni majority in Kuwait have recently developed a more sympathetic view toward the IS, resulting in a rift between donors about who to support (Al Qaeda/Al–Nusra or IS) and reflecting the overall competition between al-Qaeda/al-Nusra and IS.[viii],[ix]

In a 2013 report, Human Rights Watch identified individuals responsible for the funding of an attack on villages and civilians in the countryside of Latakia, Syria’s most prominent seaport. Fighters of Ahrar al-Sham, IS and Jaish al-Muhajireen wal-Ansar killed around 190 people and abducted over 200 civilians during the attack. Among the six primary figures who financed and organised the ambush were three Kuwaitis who actively used Twitter and YouTube to fundraise for the planned attack. One of them, Sheikh Hajjej al-Ajami, even travelled to the Latakia region and met the jihadists for whom he was fundraising. This journey suggests a high degree of cooperation between private donors and rebel groups and the possibility that donors are able to exercise control over the rebel groups they support.

Examples like this show the effect private donors are having on the Syrian civil war. Under the protection of Kuwait’s liberal and constitutional monarchy, they raise funds for extremists and jihadists who are aligned with their ideological beliefs and who are reportedly linked to acts of terrorism. By supporting these groups and strengthening their position, the donors implant their radical Salafi view of Islam into the conflict, fostering sectarianism among the Syrian opposition and reducing the chances for moderate forces to gain the upper hand. They also exacerbate the on-going competition between al-Qaeda and the IS over support from such donors, and are arguably partly responsible for the recent upswing in sympathy for the IS among the Sunni community in Kuwait. With the increasing friction between rebel groups and the apparent rivalry between two of the largest terrorist organizations involved in the conflict, a peaceful reunification seems less and less likely.

Now, after almost four years, who is the enemy in Syria? For the Western world, “Assad” no longer seems to be the only enemy. The conflict lines in Syria have blurred, extremists and terrorists have multiplied and the Alawite regime almost seems like a good alternative. The exemplary case of Kuwaiti private donors shows that when determining friend and foe, the situation is extremely complex. Syria has become far more than a proxy war between world powers. Private self-interests as well as opposing religious and ideological beliefs play an increasingly significant role in determining Syria’s conflict lines, conflict lines which must be understood in a wider regional context.

Arne Holverscheid is an undergraduate student of Political Science, Middle Eastern Studies and History at Ludwig Maximilians University Munich. He is currently interning for the International Center for Counter-Terrorism in Herzliya, Israel. His interests include terrorism funding, radical Islamic ideologies and the history of terrorism. Twitter: @AHolverscheid.

This article is part of a Strife series on financing terror. Over the next few weeks Strife will feature other articles that focus on different ways of financing terrorism. Next, Claire Mennessier will examine the involvement of Pakistan in financing terror groups, and the motivations and challenges presented by this involvement.

NOTES

[i] “The long road to Damascus: There are signs that the Syrian regime may become still more violent”, The Economist, February 11, 2012. http://www.economist.com/node/21547305.

[ii] Jonah Schulhofer-Wohl, “How the U.S. fragmented Syria’s rebels”, The Washington Post, September 22, 2014. http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/09/22/how-the-u-s-fragmented-syrias-rebels/.

[iii] Jamie Dettmer, “Syria’s Saudi Jihadist Problem”, The Daily Beast, December 16, 2013. http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/12/16/syria-s-saudi-jihadist-problem.html.

[iv] Mariam Karouny, “Saudi edges Qatar to control Syrian rebel support”, Reuters, May 31, 2013. http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/31/us-syria-crisis-saudi-insight-idUSBRE94U0ZV20130531.

[v] “Kuwait launches Syria relief campaign”, Al Arabiya English, January 13, 2014. http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2014/01/13/Kuwait-s-emir-appeals-for-Syrian-relief-aid.html.

[vi] Sylvia Westall and Mahmoud Harby, “Insight: Kuwaitis campaign privately to arm Syrian rebels”, Reuters, June 27 2013. http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/06/27/us-syria-kuwait-insight-idUSBRE95P0TG20130627.

[vii] Lori Plotkin Boghardt, “The Terrorist Funding Disconnect with Qatar and Kuwait”, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, May 2, 2014. http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/the-terrorist-funding-disconnect-with-qatar-and-kuwait.

[viii] Joby Warrick, “Private donations give edge to Islamists in Syria, officials say”, The Washington Post, September 21, 2013. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/private-donations-give-edge-to-islamists-in-syria-officials-say/2013/09/21/a6c783d2-2207-11e3-a358-1144dee636dd_story.html.

[ix] Elizabeth Dickinson, “Kuwait: the crisis in Syria comes home”, European Council on Foreign Relations, October 2, 2014. http://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_kuwait_the_crisis_in_syria_comes_home323.

Obama offers some humility; this can be a good thing

May 29, 2014 by Strife Staff

By Zachary Wolfraim:

President Obama sought to outline a vision for US foreign policy in his commencement speech to West Point graduates on 28 May and once more highlighted the role of American leadership in global affairs. While he noted that the US was the ‘indispensible nation’, the new dangers to the international system were neither to be underestimated, nor should the US be complacent about its place in this system. Indeed, President Obama noted the rising challenges coming from a rapidly developing world and outlined the continued need for American leadership in tackling future crises. Moreover, despite the blows struck against al-Qaeda, he also highlighted the still dangerous and diffuse threat of international terrorism.

What exactly does this mean for the role of the US as primus inter pares? Perhaps most notably, Obama’s speech sought to balance optimism with a dose of humility. The heavy toll of Iraq and Afghanistan has certainly given pause for reflection over the use of force as an immediate solution for major foreign policy crises. Indeed as he noted, “just because we have the best hammer doesn’t mean that every problem is a nail.” Similarly, Obama sought to highlight the importance of restoring America’s moral leadership – again vowing to close Guantanamo, revise protocols on intelligence gathering and support the broader cause of international justice. Of course, this was balanced by his continued support for drone strikes as a vital counter-terrorism tool.

Critics of the President may see this speech as broadly kowtowing to international public opinion and damaging US ability to project its power and protect its interests internationally. However, in many ways the speech betrays a realism that has been a long time coming. America’s ‘unipolar moment’ is long past and the dynamics of international power continue to change; however, to suggest that the US has less of a role in world than it did in the past is also wrong. Indeed, as noted already, the US remains first among equals and will for some time yet, despite previous missteps or errors like the drawing of ‘red-lines’ with regards to Syrian chemical weapons.

As outlined in the speech, redoubling efforts to reinforce legitimacy-building institutions enhances American power far beyond military adventures or one-off diplomatic initiatives. The recognition that military power does not exist in a vacuum recognizes the important lessons learned from Afghanistan. As demonstrated by the shaky progress in Afghanistan, development and diplomacy need to be critical components of any future intervention or counter-terrorism initiative from the very beginning. Utilising appropriate international organizations will help achieve this by building the capabilities of allies reinforcing partnerships.

Nonetheless, the foreign policy as outlined carries dangers if followed through half-heartedly. If the US is to truly try and reform and reinforce the components of the current international order it needs to be done so with zeal, commitment and genuine follow-through to prevent its efforts from being bogged down in a bureaucratic quagmire. Taking on deeply entrenched bureaucracies such as the UN will require serious diplomatic commitment on the part of the US and its allies. This echoes many of the same issues that the US has faced in NATO in the past with regards to free-riding and burden sharing. Any optimism about the US trying to embed itself deeper in the system of international institutions should be tempered by the recognition that its partners and allies must match or at least share in this commitment. Indeed, US leadership is all well and good, but not all nations will see this renewed engagement as a positive step. Rather, this move can open the door to restrict, contain or otherwise hamper the exercise of American power internationally. Additionally, the increased engagement of the US in these organizations can also open them to criticism that they are only instruments of Western power. Perhaps most vitally, the international community should not expect the Obama administration or future administrations to sacrifice the ability to act on some issues on the altar of international legitimacy.

While Obama has outlined this ‘new’ approach to foreign policy, the international community should not expect any dramatic, immediate changes. He has already shown a hesitancy to use military force; largely reflecting the tentativeness of the American public to avoid another prolonged entanglement abroad. Rather this likely signals a greater effort to support existing areas of US influence within international organizations. NATO, ever starved for summit deliverables, will likely have a raft of possibilities for counter-terrorism cooperation, alongside cyber-defence and other joint activities to bolster European defence. With regards to the UN, IMF and World Bank, it will be interesting to see new American initiatives in these organizations and what these entail.

The announcement of new priorities in US foreign policy certainly deserves attention. It is naïve, however, to think that this will dramatically change any of the numerous challenges facing the international community. That said, if executed properly this sets the stage for US foreign policy over the next decade. It serves Obama and any future administrations well to recognize that the international system is changing, as is the position of the US within it. Terrorism, Syria, and challenges posed by Russia all present continuing threats to the international order. In order to stay relevant, US foreign policy must adapt and learn the lessons of the past decade’s military adventurism. We should all hope that Obama’s speech, if followed through and implemented, represents a step in the right direction.

________________
Zachary Wolfraim is a third year PhD student in the War Studies Department, King’s College London, where he focuses on the role of narratives in shaping foreign policy in relation to NATO operations. He previously worked as a consultant in NATO Headquarters on operations in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya. You can follow him on Twitter @ZachWol.

Barrel bombs in Fallujah – a crime against humanity?

May 13, 2014 by Strife Staff

By Dr. Victoria Fontan, with additional editing by Joana Cook and Thomas Colley:

Dr. Victoria Fontan has been spending time in Fallujah since July 2013, one of the only Westerners to do so. She wrote this piece from the ground at the date of publication.

On 21 April, two barrel bombs were dropped from an Iraqi air force MI8 helicopter in the mechanic shops area of Fallujah, close to the government protester demonstration sites.[1] An additional barrel bomb was dropped onto the al-Rashad village near Garma. This is the first such instance of their use in Iraq under the current government, though they have denied their use.[2] Barrel bombs have made themselves known recently with the Syrian government’s assault of Aleppo.[3] These bombs are artisanal; their weight and the amount of their devastation differ according to the circumference of the barrel used. They are filled with incendiary agents, explosives and bolts, and have a devastating effect on the populations on which they are launched. The impact this may have in terms of international law, as well as the ability of the citizens of Fallujah to exercise their newly won political freedoms with barrel bombs landing around the city are critical and diverse. Not only are these bombs destructive, their use against a targeted group may constitute a crime against humanity. Moreover, the international community’s complacence towards the Iraqi government in relation to the population of Fallujah and greater Anbar province may make it an accessory to this crime.

International Humanitarian Law (IHL) has made critical advancements for humankind. It regulates the use of weapons in situations of conflict. It presses for rules of engagement to be respected, and for some weapons to be used over others to reduce civilian casualties and suffering. Since it has legalized some forms of killing but not others, International Humanitarian Law has, in its own way, made killing legitimate. Mankind has managed to sanitize the inadmissible, so that states can both assert their sovereignty and exert their monopoly of power over their population.

There are certain places in this world where IHL appears not to apply. In the forsaken city of Fallujah, in the Anbar province of Iraq, the Baghdad government has been systematically repressing its own population since January 2013 under the pretext of terrorism, used by Prime Minister Maliki. Not only has the Iraqi government been killing civilians under the narrative of counter-terrorism, but the United Nations Assistance Mission to Iraq (UNAMI), as well as Secretary General Ban Ki Moon, have also seemingly bought into it. The International Crisis Group condemns how both parties ‘endorsed and backed the [Iraqi] government’s struggle against terrorism [while] shunning criticism of its heavy-handed approach’.[4]

In the past few years, Fallujah has been emphasized as a stronghold of resistance against the US occupation in Iraq. More than 60% of Fallujah was destroyed in the two sieges of the city in 2004, and, ten years on, it seems to be running the same course.[5] This time, it started with the same Occupy-style demonstrations seen in the US, with Iraqi’s protesting against the central government, perceived to be favoring the Shi’ite population over its Sunni counterpart.[6] As demonstrations progressed, the government tried to block popular dissent on several occasions, culminating in an Iraqi army crackdown of the mainly Sunni populated Anbar province in late December 2013. Since then, scores of civilians have been killed, wounded or displaced and more anti-government sentiment has spread beyond the Anbar province as a result.[7]

Contrary to other cities in Anbar, Fallujah was organized against the government from the start. When the Iraqi army began to move into the Anbar province, a Shura, or council was established, comprised of tribes and social groups from the demonstrations in Fallujah.[8] Its mission was to repel, at all costs, government forces. A city known for its unwillingness to surrender, it was not going to fall this time. Prime Minister Maliki had always been very quick to dismiss the Occupy Fallujah demands as mere support for al-Qaeda, even though a closer look at the demonstration showed their clear political undertone. Protesters were demanding an end to talks of federalism in Iraq, no discrimination of one part of the Iraqi population over another, and the resignation of Prime Minister Maliki.[9]

As the Maliki government’s troops attempted to enter Fallujah on several occasions in January 2014, the terrorist organization Islamic State in Iraq and Sham (ISIS) also saw an opportunity to assert its power within the region.[10] This came at a time when it was momentarily weak in Syria, and Iraq offered an opportunity to strengthen its influence where it had originated. While the Fallujah Shura originally tolerated ISIS, fearing a similar situation to that of 2004, where foreign agents of al-Qaeda escalated violence there, all outside observers of Maliki’s Anbar campaign exaggerated its influence over the city.[11] These same observers also did not understand ISIS’s clear departure from al-Qaeda strategy, rendering most media reports on Fallujah grossly inaccurate.[12] Al-Qaeda had never taken over Fallujah, and calls in Washington DC ranged between blindly supporting Maliki and a US-intervention in Iraq, could not have been less opportune. As Maliki strengthened his armed repression on Fallujah, claiming not to enter the city to spare the population, he began a relentless shelling of Fallujah in January 2014, from various strategic points surrounding it.[13] It was not long before the Shura made a deal with ISIS to defend its city against a perceived Shi’ite invader.

UNAMI never set foot on the demonstration sites and is now failing in its moral mission to monitor the Baghdad government’s actions against its own people. This, even after countless invitations were made on behalf of its leader Sheikh Hamoudi, who was executed by members of the government-friendly group Hamas al-Iraq two weeks before the December 2013 crack down.[14] Since January 2014, countless missiles, mortar rounds and Katiusha rockets have been launched against the civilian population of Fallujah, yet what is happening at present is far more disturbing than anything seen before.[15]

An Iraqi air force helicopter pilot, who in the 1980’s also launched chemical agents on the city of Halabja in Iraqi Kurdistan, explained in a conversation with the author: ‘The bombs are still in their developing phase, these two rounds on 23 April were experimental. We are trying to copy what Bashar did in Aleppo, and Fallujah is the perfect place for it.’[16] None of the bombs launched onto Fallujah detonated; in Garma, the bomb exploded and made a hole five meters wide and three meters deep. It took two more weeks to try to perfect the mechanism, and on 10 May, twenty more barrel bombs were launched onto Fallujah.[17] While many did not detonate, the Iraqi army will no doubt perfect its technology to be even more deadly next time.

Barrel bombs are not distinctly mentioned in any international arms convention, they are simply invisible.[18] UNAMI will not likely object to their use, as it is the complacence of its representative Nicolas Mladenov in relation to the Anbar campaign, that has seemingly emboldened Maliki enough to resort to using barrel bombs, among other weapons, with impunity against its own population. Overall, mainstream media has also been silent in relation to the issue, while at the same time condemning Bashar al Assad for the same deeds against his population in Syria.[19] For the moment, barrel bombs can only be seen in blogs around the internet, and on Fallujah-related social media, restricting international attention from this critical development.[20]

On 10 May, Fallujah’s infrastructure, alongside its power and water stations, was targeted in the government’s most ferocious reprisal yet. Civilian casualties which have resulted from these attacks between January 2014 and today amount to 40 dead and 60 wounded.[21] Adding insult to injury, 10 mosques have also been destroyed, all Sunni.[22]

The perceived Shi’ite war against the Sunni population of Fallujah may well have become a reality due to these extreme acts of violence. Under the circumstances, it could be questioned whether the use of barrel bombs and the indiscriminate use of force against the population of Fallujah constitutes a crime against humanity. According to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, a crime against humanity can be defined as the “[P]ersecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender as defined in paragraph 3, or other grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under international law.”[23] If, in fact, Sunnis in Fallujah are being specifically targeted by the government, then this could be interpreted as a crime against humanity.

If anyone, entity or government, assists in the political persecution of a group of people, would this not make them accessory to this crime? The UN’s support of Nuri al-Maliki, the US government’s impending renting of F16 airplanes to the Iraqi government, the international media’s hate speech against the people of Fallujah: in a perfect world, this could all be prosecuted.[xxiv] Yet while International Law and International Humanitarian Law are meant to be universal, they appear to neglect the people of Fallujah.

_________________

Dr. Victoria Fontan is a Professor of Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of Duhok, in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, and author of “Decolonizing Peace” (2012) and “Voices from Post-Saddam Iraq” (2008). She is now undertaking a PhD in the Department of War Studies, King’s College London. Her thesis title is: “The Resilience of Insurgencies in Fallujah.” You can find more information on Victoria Fontan’s research on her website: http://www.victoriacfontan.com

NOTES
[1] Telephone conversation with an Iraqi air force officer 27 April and 10 May 2014. The name is being withheld as they are not authorized to speak on the matter.
[2]World Bulletin, ‘Iraq Denies Using Barrel Bombs’. 13 May 2014 http://www.worldbulletin.net/news/136196/iraq-denies-using-barrel-bombs-in-fallujah
[3] See BBC News, ‘Syria conflict: Barrel-bombed Aleppo ‘living in fear” 28 April 2014 athttp://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-27180006 and http://brown-moses.blogspot.de/2013/12/syrias-barrel-bomb-technology-relative.html, accessed on 12 May 2014.
[4] See Group, I. C. (2014). Iraq: Fallujah’s Faustian Bargain. Middle East Report. Headquarters. Brussels, International Crisis Group. 150.
[5]Fontan, V. (2006). ‘Polarization between occupier and occupied in Post-Saddam Iraq: humiliation and the formation of political violence’, Terrorism and Political Violence, 18(2): 217-238.
[6]Fontan, V. (Forthcoming in 2014). Out beyond Occupy Fallujah and the Islamic State in Iraq and Sham, there is a field. Researching Terrorism, Peace and Conflict Studies: Interaction, Synthesis and Opposition. H. Toros and Y. Tellidis. London, Routledge.
[7]Group, I. C. (2014). Iraq: Fallujah’s Faustian Bargain. Middle East Report. Headquarters. Brussels, International Crisis Group. 150.
[8]Fontan, V. (Forthcoming in 2014). Out beyond Occupy Fallujah and the Islamic State in Iraq and Sham, there is a field. Researching Terrorism, Peace and Conflict Studies: Interaction, Synthesis and Opposition. H. Toros and Y. Tellidis. London, Routledge.
[9] See http://www.counterpunch.org/2013/07/24/occupy-fallujah/, retrieved on 12 May 2014.
[10] See http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/01/iraq-government-loses-control-fallujah-20141414625597514.html, accessed on 12 May 2014.
[11]Group, I. C. (2014). Iraq: Fallujah’s Faustian Bargain. Middle East Report. Headquarters. Brussels, International Crisis Group. 150.
[12]Caillet, R. (2013). The Islamic State: Leaving al-Qaeda Behind. Canergie Endowment for International Peace.
[13]Group, I. C. (2014). Iraq: Fallujah’s Faustian Bargain. Middle East Report. Headquarters. Brussels, International Crisis Group. 150.
[14] On 1 December 2013, militant group Hamas al-Iraq claimed responsibility for the murder of Sheikh Hamoudi online. On the assassination and Hamas al-Iraq’s relationship with the Maliki government, see http://paxinnuce.com/2013/12/09/sheikh-al-hamoudi-and-the-right-to-peace/, accessed on 12 May 2014; on the Occupy Fallujah invitation of UNAMI, see Fontan, V. (Forthcoming in 2014). Out beyond Occupy Fallujah and the Islamic State in Iraq and Sham, there is a field. Researching Terrorism, Peace and Conflict Studies: Interaction, Synthesis and Opposition. H. Toros and Y. Tellidis. London, Routledge.
[15] Telephone and Viber conversations with Fallujah residents, names withheld, between January 2014 and now.
[16] Ibid. On the Halabja chemical attack, see: http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/march/16/newsid_4304000/4304853.stm, accessed on 12 May 2014.
[17] See http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/05/iraq-army-using-barrel-bombs-fallujah-2014511134023608197.html, accessed on 12 May 2014, the article says ‘alleged’ use of Barrel Bombs since it has not been confirmed by any Human Rights organization, however Fallujah residents testimonies concur, as well as that of Mohammed F. Iraqi Air force pilot. The allegation has since been corroborated by eyewitness reports and the helicopter pilot.
[18] The Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the use of Certain Conventional Weapons does not mention Barrel bombs, yet it bans the use of incendiary weapons. Iraq, however, is not a signatory to this particular convention, hence cannot be held accountable for its use of barrel bombs as an incendiary weapon. See: http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/INTRO/500?OpenDocument, accessed on 12 May 2014.
[19] See http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/american-can-stop-the-barrel-bombs-in-syria/2014/05/07/f3a24554-d498-11e3-95d3-3bcd77cd4e11_story.html, or http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-27180006, both accessed on 12 May 2014.
[20] See http://www.r4biaplatform.com/content/news-story/iraq-army-used-barrel-bombs-fallujah-chieftain, or http://brown-moses.blogspot.de/2014/05/is-iraqi-air-force-using-improvised.html, accessed on 12May 2014.
[21] Telephone and Viber conversations with Fallujah residents, names withheld, between January 2014 and now.
[22] Ibid.
[23] See http://www.preventgenocide.org/law/icc/statute/part-a.htm, accessed on 12 May 2014.
[24] See http://complex.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2014/05/08/exclusive_iraq_in_a_major_shift_might_want_some_us_troops_back?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_term=%2AMorning%20Brief&utm_campaign=MB%200509, accessed on 12 May 2014.

Syria, foreign fighters and the Met's new campaign

April 25, 2014 by Strife Staff

In response to the April 24^th launch of a national campaign aimed at starting the conversation about protecting young people from the dangers of travelling to Syria by the Metropolitan Police, Jill S. Russell discusses the role of academia in such initiatives, while Joana Cook analyses the implications of focusing on women.

Not the wrong people for Counter-Radicalisation and British Jihad

By Jill S. Russell:

The Senior National Coordinator for Counter Terrorism policing, Deputy Assistant Commissioner, MPS, Helen Ball unveiled an effort to enlist the support of female family members to stem the flow of British fighters to Syria. Within minutes of the announcement, our own Shiraz Maher critiqued the policy in an interview on BBC Radio 4, noting that the police were “the wrong people to be launching this type of campaign.” Citing concerns regarding community fears of criminalisation and the legacy of previous aggressive approaches by the police on this issue, he argued instead that this should be a matter for community and government leaders. While I understand the concerns, and I have no illusions regarding the tensions in Police-Community (“Po-Co”) relations in the target audience, to make the first and most quotable response to this effort a ringing negative serves little policy purpose.

Many areas of academia enjoy the luxury of operating beyond the constraints of real life requirements. However, in War Studies, particularly as it is so broadly conceived here at King’s, the relationship with policy and policymakers is a critical component of our work.

As I watched the news of this effort emerge this morning I was intrigued. I have speculated with colleagues regarding Po-Co relations generally that an appeal to the female community structures – mothers, aunts, grandmothers, sisters – and the development of trust between them and the police could serve well to counter many areas of criminality, particular amongst at-risk youth. As I see it, such an approach would provide a more productive, less confrontational means to interact with the community to the benefit of all in the reduction of violence and crime. And so, for policing I think this is a useful first step. More than that, I appreciate the philosophy that stands behind such efforts. In a world where responses to crime, violence and the use of force are increasingly forceful and kinetic in their own right, policies and tactics which rely upon alternative foundations, which eschew escalation, which are cognizant of the alienation caused by “robust responses,” are as valuable as they are rare.

I do not doubt that the details of the critique are correct. I agree that the police will have struggle to implement the policy. And hence it is our responsibility as scholars, as keen and intelligent observers of these issues and events, to offer not simply a critique of the efforts of the institutions with which our work is associated. Rather, if we are not to be ivory tower naifs and empty critics, then we must consider our commentary wisely and correctly. If the police have not quite perfected the implementation of the current tactic – and I suspect that it is entirely true – then we should offer our own insights in remedy. I also worry that to highlight the distance between the police and community as a reason not to pursue the effort simply hardens the divide. Thus, to dismiss the entire effort because of its defects serves little purpose, except perhaps to alienate the police from academia.

British policing has taken an interesting and innovative step today. It is a possible bridge to improved relations between the authorities and critical communities. We in academia could offer much in the way of expertise to improve the likelihood the effort to succeed, which would serve not only the direct security needs but also the more general issue of how the police interact with society. Unless our purpose is to maintain the discord and distrust, then it is incumbent upon those of us in relevant scholarly endeavours to offer our wisdom in support.

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Jill S. Russell is a regular contributor to Strife, Kings of War and Small Wars. She is currently a doctoral candidate at King’s College London, researching military history. You can follow her on Twitter @jsargentr.

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What’s in a word? How the Mets appeal falls short

By Joana Cook:

Today the Metropolitan Police announced a new appeal in its counterterrorism focus, which urges women to dissuade family members from travelling to Syria. What this appeal has acknowledged is the important role that women can play in this, and why they should be part of the broader security conversation. Where the initiative has failed however, is by framing women as unique actors separate from those in the family or wider community as opposed to integral actors within, and excluding the roles that women may have in this extremism itself.

The Met’s announcement (in unspoken terms) acknowledges that there are unique, complex threats emerging, and that traditional, law enforcement methods previously engaged to counter extremism and terrorism are not enough. Gone are the days when threats could be seen and dealt with as emanating from abroad, amongst those of different unfamiliar backgrounds and value systems, rather than from our own (families) backyards. The issue of foreign fighters is more personal and is being demonstrated and appealed to by the police in a much more familiar way as the language engaged shows by tying this issue to our everyday lives. This is a ‘proactive measure to keep families together’. They are ‘idealistic young people not would-be terrorists’ who, if they travel to Syria even for humanitarian reasons ‘risk being preyed on by terrorist groups’ and ‘we are trying to protect them’. We are ‘encouraging women to take an active part in their child’s lives’. This is as personal as targeted messaging gets.

The efforts that the Met are taking have both positive and negative ramifications. They humanize and personalize those (our children, our husbands) who may become foreign fighters and indeed threaten our safety, and appeal to the different ways we may be involved in preventing this. They engage us as citizens in the security process as well as positively target early stage intervention, showing an understanding that motivations to become involved in certain activities may be carried out under misguided youthful ambitions (even if for the right reasons), and proactive actions can prevent future tragedies and more reactive, serious consequences which may face these individuals we care about in the future. However, what the Met risks doing by specifically targeting women as mothers and wives in the Muslim community and appealing to their roles as intimate family members, endangers alienating the important roles that others may play in this same process. It also suggests that it is only young men which should be focussed on in these efforts.

When singling out certain groups (women, Muslims) and focusing on their capacity in the family, the Met risk reducing the roles that women may play to the private sphere and ignores others they may play as, for example, teachers or community leaders who may also have influence over these youths lives. Without stating in the same breath that all family members, including fathers, husbands and brothers, also have a critical stake in this as well, may unintentionally delegate these figures to seemingly less significant, impactful roles. By pointing out that the nurturing and safeguarding roles that mothers can play in preventing their sons (and daughters) from becoming foreign fighters risks side-lining other components that are present in this radicalisation process which families may also have a stake in, some of which may not be solved simply by a mother’s love.

The impacts of foreign fighters from Syria have been said to last the next decade and have the potential to cause severe security implications throughout. What today’s initiative has acknowledged is that this is an issue we should all be concerned about and have an interest in addressing.

Women, as mothers, sisters and wives, have important roles to play in this. What should not be forgotten however, is that not only can these same women we are appealing to in fact support or carry out these extremist activities themselves as recent cases have shown, but both men and women, Muslim and non-Muslim, within the family and community, all have positive and varied roles in countering this. These should not necessarily be singled out as disparate and the language used in such initiatives should reflect this.

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Joana Cook is a PhD student at the Department of War Studies at King’s College London researching the role and agency of women in counter-terrorism in Yemen. She is also a researcher at the Canadian Network for Research on Terrorism, Security and Society (TSAS). You can follow her on Twitter @Joana_Cook

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