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PROXY Capabilities – The History and Future of Russian Private Military Companies

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This is the second of a series of articles we will be featuring on Strife in the coming week looking at the role of Proxy Warfare in the 21st century by Series Editor Cheng Lai Ki. Previous articles in the series can be found here.

By: Gregory Wilson

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Source: Russia Today

On the eve of the Russo-Georgian War of 2008, it became apparent that Russia was furthering its path towards resurgence. Harshly criticizing Western actions, Russia began a series of interventions, notably in Syria and Ukraine. At home, President Vladimir Putin continues to solidify his rule, dominating elections and polls alike, while Russian nationalism and ultra-nationalism surges. In Europe, Russia has fanned the flames of populist nationalism, heavily supporting right-wing fringe groups in an apparent quest to destabilize Europe’s economic and political unity. Embroiled in a variety of conflicts, it comes as no surprise that Russian private military companies (PMC) have begun to operate not only in Russia, but across the globe. The real question lies in whether or not Russian PMCs will expand in the future, or remain as a sidelined player in Moscow’s arsenal.

In a 2011 address to the State Duma, Putin expressed support for the use of Russian PMCs as a tool for expanding government influence.[1] Despite this admission of support, the legal status of Russian PMCs straddles something of a grey area. Multiple Russian owners of PMCs have addressed these issues in interviews, claiming that Russia inherited their legal system from the Byzantine Empire, thus anything that isn’t explicitly prohibited is allowed.[2] This, however, has not stopped legislators from introducing bills that would fully legalize PMC groups in Russia, particularly of their use for the Russian government. A bill, submitted in 2014 by MP Gennady Nosovko of the Fair Russia party, was recently rejected by the Russian cabinet, citing security and legal issues.[3] While some follow voluntary regulations, PMCs in Russia will remain in the grey zone, neither legal nor prohibited. The future legality of PMCs in Russia is yet still unclear, as the same Nosovko promised future legislation.[4]

Regardless, this legal grey area has not prevented Russian PMCs from advertising their services in Russia and abroad. Overall, the use of PMCs worldwide has been varied. It was not until the 2003 Iraq War that PMCs began to massively grow. On the Russian side, PMCs have largely been confined to operations involving private Russian companies in Africa, the Middle East, and international waterways. The largest of the Russian PMCs, the RSB Group, has a detailed history, boasting operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, Tajikistan, the North Caucasus, and Serbia.[5]

The most recent and notable example of Russian PMC operations occurred in Syria, 2013. The PMC group in question was the Slavonic Corps Limited, a Hong Kong registered company led by Director Sergei Kramskoy that primarily employed ex-Russian soldiers.[6] The Slavonic Corps heavily advertised in Russia, coordinated by Vyacheslav Kalashnikov, a lieutenant colonel in the FSB (Russia’s Federal Security Service) reserves who also happens to be the head of another PMC, the Moran Security Group.[7] The origins of this fighting force in Syria is massively convoluted, bearing ties with two separate PMCs and an officer in the FSB. In Moscow, the ex-soldiers were reassured on the legality of the operation, as their new role protecting key assets for the Syria regime was sanctioned by the FSB and the Russian government.[8]

Despite these assurances, the situation on the ground in Syria was far from adequate, with the soldiers severely underequipped and managed by Vadim Gusev, the deputy director of the Moran Security Group.[9] After a number of mishaps and a total of six wounded, the ex-soldiers mutinied and returned after battle with elements of the Syrian rebels.[10] However, once back in Russia, the men were apprehended by FSB, arresting Gusev and an Evgeny Sidorov, both members of the Moran Security Group, on charges of mercenary employment.[11] In the end, the story of the Slavonic Corps is almost unbelievable. A Russian PMC with ties to the FSB hires another Russian PMC to send forces to protect assets in Syria, who in turn are arrested upon return in Syria. With all parties denying or refusing to comment, the situation may never truly become clear. Regardless, these events must be seen as an example of the grey legality of Russian PMCs and the absolute mess that results.

With this turbulent history of Russian PMCs, it is now imperative that we look to the future of these organizations. Today, our understanding of what may come lies within the modern Russian-Ukrainian Conflict. Despite their initial denial, the Russian government had deployed unmarked Russian soldiers, not PMCs as far as it is known, in operations seizing the Crimean Peninsula and supporting Ukrainian separatists, sparking a massive outcry and souring relations with the West.[12] While this narrative may be well known, another element is critical in understanding the future of Russian PMCs. The ‘Night Wolves’ are Russia largest biker gang and the rabid supporters and exporters of Russian ultra-nationalism. In 2014, it was confirmed that the biker gang participated in the seizure of Crimea, assaulting a Ukrainian naval base and gas facility on the Black Sea, and has now created local chapters in Eastern Ukraine supporting the separatists there.[13] The most significant aspect of the Night Wolves is their relationship to President Putin. Alexander Zaldostanov, leader of the Night Wolves, has strong personal ties with Putin, who happens to be an honorary member and has provided over $1 million in grants to the gang.[14]

How exactly do the Night Wolves relate to the future of PMCs? Ultimately, the Night Wolves serves as a greater advantage to Putin and the Russian government than PMCs ever could. Officially, it is difficult to establish a direct tie between the government and the biker gang. With this plausible deniability at hand, the Kremlin has the assurance that the Night Wolves will continue their ideological operations in ways deemed acceptable or crucial to the overarching policies of the government. Furthermore, groups like the Night Wolves can operate offensively whereas official PMCs cannot, otherwise they are branded as mercenaries, something explicitly outlawed in Russian and the international community. In other cases where ideological militias or paramilitary elements cannot reach, Russian troops, whether or not they are marked as so, are more than appropriate. Thus, Russian PMCs are likely to remain on the backburner, unutilized by Putin and the Kremlin, remaining stagnant in their role as private security guards.

 

Gregory Wilson is a MA Candidate in Intelligence and International Security at King’s College London, specializing in the field of Russian/Soviet intelligence and regional security.

 

 

 

Notes:

[1] http://archive.premier.gov.ru/eng/events/news/18671/

[2] http://www.france24.com/en/20150728-video-russia-pmc-private-military-companies-mercenaries-slavonic-corps-ukraine-syria

[3] https://www.rt.com/politics/316276-government-rejects-bill-to-introduce/

[4] Ibid

[5] http://rsb-group.org/about

[6] http://www.interpretermag.com/st-petersburg-sends-contractors-to-syria/

[7] http://www.interpretermag.com/the-last-battle-of-the-slavonic-corps/

[8] Ibid

[9] Ibid

[10] Ibid

[11] Ibid

[12] https://news.vice.com/article/the-surgeon-we-spoke-with-the-leader-of-putins-favorite-biker-club-the-night-wolves

[13] http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jan/29/russian-biker-gang-in-ukraine-night-wolves-putin

[14] http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/jun/15/night-wolves-biker-gang-a-key-element-in-vladimir-/?page=all

ISIS and the Flood: the hydro-politics behind the rise (and fall) of Daesh

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EDITORS NOTE: This is the fourth and final article in a four-part series which explores the role of water in human conflict and politics. The series marks (though is not affiliated with) World Water Day 2016, a UN initiative to promote awareness of water issues. More information on World Water Day can be found here. The first, second, and third, articles in the series can be found here,  here, and here, respectively.

By: Harris Kuemmerle

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The Euphrates River edging against the desert. Source: Wikimedia

The average person can only survive 3-7 days without water before ultimately (and inevitably) succumbing to a painful death. Likewise, there is not a single nation-state on earth whose day-to-day existence is not entirely and utterly dependent upon the economic, agricultural, political, cultural, and fundamentally life giving qualities of that all-important molecule. Water is the lowest common denominator. There is no substitute, and there is no cure for its absence. In a very real sense, governments live by the tap, and die by the tap; and the so called Islamic State are no exception.

After all, their rise occurred against the backdrop of profound underlying hydrological factors and issues in the run-up to the destabilisation of Syria in 2011, namely one of the worst droughts in half a century. A drought which was primarily the result of a confluence of factors mainly including climate change, and ineffectual and short-sighted hydrological management and agricultural policies on the part of the Assad government. Make no mistake, droughts are very bad for business, and a recent report by UN-Water (the inter-agency UN organisation designed to assist states promote water quality and availability) suggested that as many as four-fifths, or about 78%, of all jobs globally are moderately or heavily dependent upon a stable supply of water.[1]

This is especially true in the rural Syrian north east where the traditional reliance on agriculture is made possible by the large areas of arable land, compared to the rest of Syria. Indeed, the area of Al-Hasakeh in particular is responsible for around 75% of Syria’s total wheat production.[2] This bounty, however, also makes the north east region heavily dependent upon reliable water supplies for life and living. Therefore, it seems likely that such a major drought would have hit Syrian employment hard as agricultural falters in its traditional regions. And indeed, the result of this drought was the large scale unemployment of around 800,000 people; which in turn resulted in thousands of young men moving from the rural areas to the cities in search of work.[3] This arguably both added to existing stresses and tensions and had the unintended consequence of creating a large and desperate pool of young men for groups like Daesh to exploit.[4] While it would be simplistic to claim that the drought caused the Syrian uprising and resultant civil war by itself, it was an undeniable stress multiplier which Daesh were deftly able to exploit. However, water issues have also been an integral factor in the rise of Daesh beyond just fuelling destabilisation and providing the environment for a large pool of willing recruits to join their state-building project.

Water as a weapon of war

The brutality and savagery of Daesh tactics are well documented, with their latest attack in Brussels sending shock waves around the world. However, probably their least well known (and arguably most effective) strategies have been their attempts to control the dams and waters of the Tigris and Euphrates; rivers which constitute the vast majority of habitable and arable land in Iraq and Syria. Since their inception Daesh have at one time or another taken control of five dams along the Tigris and Euphrates; the Samarra, Nuaimiyah, Haditha, Mosul, and Tishrin.[5] This has given them the capabilities to drown entire cities such as Baghdad or shutoff the water or electricity to whole communities as a means of instilling psychological terror or controlling populations. Capabilities which have been turned into actions on numerous occasions. For example, in April 2014 Daesh closed the gates of the Nuaymiyah Dam and the resulting flooding successfully unseated government forces in the area and caused water shortages for millions, and thousands to lose their homes.[6] Furthermore, in August 2014 Daesh successfully captured Mosul Dam, the control of which put Baghdad and almost half a million Iraqis in direct danger of flooding and electricity blackout. The danger was deemed to be so great that the Iraqi government committed considerable resources (including US assistance) to its successful recapture.[7]

However, Daesh is still in control of a number of other dams in Syria and Iraq and their control has given Daesh not only an effective means of combating government forces, it has also given them a powerful and coercive tool for both instilling dread and loyalty among populations.[8] In the words of Michael Stephen at RUSI, ‘the control of water supplies gives strategic control over both cities and countryside. We are seeing a battle for control of water. Water is now the major strategic objective of all groups in Iraq. It’s life or death. If you control water in Iraq you have a grip on Baghdad, and you can cause major problems. Water is essential in this conflict.’[9] Indeed, in a 2014 issue of Dabiq (Daeshs’ official magazine) the group claimed that ‘it’s either Islamic State or the flood’, making clear their willingness to use water as a weapon of war.[10]

Water as a tool of peace

However, when the guns fall quiet and the warriors go home the prevailing state must be able to provide for the basic services of its people, including its vanquished. That ability to provide basic services is one of the most common tests of a state, and Daesh is not exempt from this. Adding to that, in the case of arid Syria and Iraq, the supply of water is of particular importance and according to one intelligence official, ‘if ISIS has any hope of establishing itself on territory, it has to control some water.’[11] However, this control also comes with responsibilities; and crucially, costs.

If Daesh intends to survive as a state in the traditional sense then it must invest heavily in the building, upgrading, and management of new and current water works infrastructure and delivery projects while also ensuring that the supply is sustainable. This investment will likely require substantial financial and political costs in their newly conquered regions as their inherited infrastructure becomes unfit for purpose. While at the same time Daesh will also need to be able to evolve its institutional structure in order to have the organisational bodies necessary to oversee these developments and manage the system while also making sure they are well staffed with trained personnel.

Going hand in hand with this management and governance will be dealing with issues pertaining to the equal use of the waters and Daesh will have to have systems put in place to mediate disputes over fresh water use domestically in order to prevent tensions. While also having the diplomatic presence necessary to fight for the fresh water interests of their new state among their neighbours in one of the driest regions on earth. These realities will necessitate cooperation (particularly internationally), and while there are some limited examples of this occuring, it remains unclear if Daesh will be pragmatic enough to be able to put aside ideology and cooperate long-term with those they may deem their enemy in order to keep the taps flowing.

This is a daunting list of tasks for any state, especially a new one. So how well is the new so-called Islamic State getting on with functioning as a state? While it is hard to say for sure, all indications suggest that things are not going as well as hoped. A 2014 report suggested that Daesh seemed to be unable to provide even basic services, with water only available for 3-4 hours a day in Raqqa.[12] Likewise, a later report from August 2015 suggested that services had improved in some areas, however, that the conflict was also taking a heavy toll on the infrastructure and the medium to long-term sustainability of those services was in doubt.[13]

In response the group have taken steps to ensure they meet water and electricity demands, including paying for Syrian and Iraqi government water infrastructure staff to remain at their jobs in Daesh controlled territory, taxing water, and bringing in outside assistance.[14] However, these are short-term solutions and will likely not by itself be enough to provide for the basic needs of the people in the longer term and much more investment in infrastructure and cultivation of domestic talent will be required to provide an adequate supply moving forward.

Indeed, the fact that Daesh appear to be relying so heavily on short-term water management solutions seems to suggest that the group still lacks both expertise in this area, and a dedicated governing body for managing the system and developing long-term policies. While also underlying all of this, is what appears to be a fundamentally unstable cultural dichotomy. With Daeshs’ primary ideological drive seemingly to expand the state through war, at the expense of their civic ambitions to establish a civil Caliphate becoming more secondary.

Concluding remarks

Ultimately, with waters importance in war, also comes its inseparability from peace. And in order for Daesh to survive as a state they must have in place robust and effective agricultural, hydrological, and infrastructure policies to keep the waters flowing and the people alive. While also working to mediate fresh water inequalities within and without their borders. This responsibility (on top of their other duties as a de facto state) will place great strain on Daesh leadership and it seems that they still lack the expertise and stability necessary to effectively deliver on key public services and move beyond short-term solutions.

This matters because while water politics and the use of water as a weapon seem to have been a key asset of Daesh in their early years. As time moves on they will likely find water issues to be much more of a problem than an asset. Indeed, while the inability to provide basic services is not always in in of itself enough to topple governments, and the Daesh regime may indeed be popular with some. Daesh must also know all too well that fresh water shortages can still be a significant contributing factor to instability in a once prosperous region. Despite that, the situation in their territory seems to indicate that Daesh are largely failing both at providing those services in the short-term and in building a system which can ensure stable supplies of water and other services in the long-term, making their future as a state seem as uncertain as the waters of the rivers that support them.

 

 

Harris Kuemmerle is a doctoral researcher in the Department of War Studies and the Department of Geography at King’s College London. His research focuses on the role of provincial engagement in the formulation and implementation of national security and management policies along the Indus River. Twitter: @HarrisKuemmerle

 

 

 

[1] 2016, The United Nations World Water Development Report 2016: Water and Jobs

[2] 2013, Impact of the conflict on Syrian economy and livelihoods, Syria Needs Analysis Project, ACAPS

[3] Aron Lund, 2014, Drought, Corruption, and War: Syria’s Agricultural Crisis, Carnegie Endowment

[4] Ian Sample, 2015, Global warming contributed to Syria’s 2011 uprising, scientists claim, The Guardian, 2 March, 2015

[5] John Vidal, “Water supply key to outcome of conflicts in Iraq and Syria, experts warn,” The Guardian, 2 July, 2014

[6] Ibid.

[7] Saira Khan, 2016, The Islamic State and Water Infrastructure, Tel Aviv Notes, Volume 10, Number 3

[8] 2014, Iraq insurgents use water as weapon after seizing dam, Reuters

[9] John Vidal, “Water supply key to outcome of conflicts in Iraq and Syria, experts warn,” The Guardian, July 2, 2014

[10] The Islamic State, “The Flood,” Dabiq, Issue 2, 1435 Ramadan

[1] John Vidal, “Water supply key to outcome of conflicts in Iraq and Syria, experts warn,” The Guardian, July 2, 2014

[12] Liz Sly, The Islamic State is failing at being a state, The Washington Post, December 25, 2014

[13] Laith Alkhouri and Alex Kassirer, 2015, Governing the Caliphate: The Islamic State Picture, Combating Terrorism Center, West Point Military Academy

[14] Saira Khan, 2016, The Islamic State and Water Infrastructure, Tel Aviv Notes, Volume 10, Number 3

ISIS and its conduct of war: interview with Professor Dr. Albert A. Stahel

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By: Annabelle Vuille

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Professor Dr. Albert A. Stahel is the founder and head of the Swiss think tank Institut für Strategische Studien [Institute for Strategic Studies]. He has taught strategic studies at the Military Academy of the ETH Zürich and holds the title of honorary professor in the same field at the University of Zürich. His research findings have been featured in over 400 publications of Swiss and international scientific journals, as well as in specialised literature and book chapters.

Annabelle Vuille: What would you say is the primary factor making ISIS such a severe threat?

Prof. Dr. Albert Stahel: I would say that it is no single, but rather a triad of factors. Firstly, there is the Caliphate that has a profound impact on the Islamic world. Secondly, ISIS has been able to seize control of significant swaths of territory in Iraq and Syria. Finally, its reach goes far beyond the borders of the Middle East and has spread to various regions across the globe. It is this combination that makes ISIS such a real threat.

In a recent lecture at the University of Zurich, you mentioned that ISIS is a symbiosis between Saddam Hussein’s Ba’ath Party and Al-Qaeda in Iraq. How should we imagine the evolution of this connection?

The starting point was 2010. Following the death of its leaders, Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) was left without a functioning command structure. On the other side were the former officers of Saddam Hussein’s Ba’ath regime. Lacking a formal base they were looking for an organization that would not only grant them influence in Iraq but also enable them to wage real war. This opportunity presented itself in the prison cells of Abu Ghraib, where they learned a lot about AQI and could subsequently assume control. Leadership of this new Islamic State was to be given to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi – a possible member of the Prophet’s tribe and someone with a good reputation as being highly knowledgeable of Islam. On a side note, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi is not his real name but merely an alias.

Ba’athism is a secular ideology and yet, ISIS is officially led by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi who was appointed Caliph Ibrahim. One of your hypotheses is that ISIS exploits religion for the purpose of expanding its powerbase – Realpolitik + Religion. Could you explain how ISIS instrumentalises religion?

The foundation of Al Qaeda in Iraq was Islam in the form of Salafism and Wahhabism. This element remained even when the organization evolved into the Islamic State. Today, ISIS exploits religion to influence the people in their surrounding environment, and to attract believers not only in Iraq and Syria, but also in Europe. Whether or not such a strategy will prove successful will depend on the ability of ISIS to stabilise itself in the form of an internationally recognised state.

How does the aspect of religion influence ISIS’ conduct of war?

War is something that is not related to religion. Waging war is embedded in the tradition of humanity and has its roots in Greek philosophical thought. ISIS uses a combination of terrorism, guerrilla warfare, and conventional manoeuvre warfare. When confronted with a real army ISIS employs conventional warfare, but it can also turn to guerrilla warfare to target the logistics of its enemies. Additionally, terrorism is the means most used within cities against the Shia regime in Iraq, or against the people in Europe.

You touched on these three dimensions of warfare, which is a point also made by Jessica Lewis from the Institute for the Study of War (ISW). She argues that ISIS employs a form of hybridized warfare, which, as you mentioned, is comprised of terrorism, guerrilla warfare, and conventional manoeuvre warfare. Where do you see its greatest advantage?

The combination of these three dimensions is not a novel strategy but one that has frequently been used in history, for example in the Second World War. Success in war does not solely hinge on having a powerful conventional army. One also needs the ability to disrupt the logistics of the opposing force and, potentially, terrorise the enemy’s population and its regime. The recognition of this fact and the effective use of these three modes of war are that make ISIS such an agile opponent.

Let us delve a bit deeper into the aspect of guerrilla warfare. In April 2015, you published an article highlighting that Saddam Hussein had been inspired by the concept of guerrilla warfare coined by the Brazilian Carlos Marighella. How did it impact Saddam Hussein’s strategy in the 2003 Iraq War and has it transcended to the Islamic State?

In an interview given just before the U.S. invasion of Iraq, Saddam Hussein mentioned that he was fascinated by the writings of Carlos Marighella. One of Marighella’s main ideas is for the creation of small, militia-like forces that are capable of operating behind enemy lines. This is exactly what Saddam Hussein intended when he created the Fedayeen – the only forces that actively resisted the intervention of the Americans and their Coalition of the Willing. What is interesting is that the Fedayeen not only survived the occupation, but have now also become an integral part of the new armies under the Islamic State.

How would you assess the influence of Marighella in guiding the operations and tactics of ISIS? Is this what gives ISIS its operational strength?

According to Marighella, there are three phases of guerrilla warfare strategy: phase one is releasing urban guerrilla forces in large cities; phase two is releasing guerrilla forces in the hinterland; and phase three is fighting the opposing army with your own conventional forces. These three phases are, however, not mutually exclusive and can be applied simultaneously and in various combinations. In Syria, for example, ISIS is currently engaged in phases one and two, whereas in Iraq one can witness all three phases. It is not necessarily this phase-centric strategy that gives ISIS its operational strength, but rather the fact that its leaders are highly intelligent military minds. They know how to wage war, how to organize their forces, how to establish and run a government, how to finance their war efforts, and how to control their subjects. Most importantly, however, the leaders of ISIS are capable in clearly assessing the situation in each theatre of war and tailoring their strategies accordingly.

ISIS has expanded its bases from Iraq, Afghanistan and Syria to Yemen and, most recently Libya. With each sphere hosting unique terrain and opposing forces how do you judge ISIS’ strategies in these differing domains?

Firstly, the main bases of ISIS remain in Iraq and Syria. However, with its most important enemy the United States focusing on combatting the situation in these two domains, ISIS has recognised an opportunity to divert attention to its satellites in Afghanistan, Libya and Yemen. Therefore, this expansion is intended to ensure that the Americans are engaged on multiple fronts. Concerning its strategies, ISIS differentiated between its main and secondary theatres of war. Thus, Afghanistan and Libya terrorism is the most frequent means of combat, whereas in Iraq ISIS employs conventional manoeuvre warfare.

In your experience, how can such an agile opponent be weakened or even defeated? How would the US-led coalition have to adapt its approach and strategy?

Currently, ISIS controls approximately one third of Iraq and half of Syria. The only way that the US-led coalition could defeat or even weaken ISIS is therefore to seize and subsequently reoccupy these territories. This can, however, only be achieved through a huge conventional army and the problem is that the United States remains reluctant to put boots on the ground. In all of the decisions submitted to Congress, Barack Obama excludes the possibility of engaging ground troops and instead, looks towards mercenaries like the Kurds to get the job done. However, they are not the real army that is needed; ISIS can only be defeated with a conventional army – any other approach will prove ineffective.

Saudi Arabia recently announced that it is willing to send ground troops to Syria in the fight against ISIS. How effective do you think such a strategy would be in securing an operational advantage?

I think it would certainly be a good idea. However, it is important to note that by sending troops to Syria, Saudi Arabia is ultimately engaging in a realm that is not particularly friendly toward its regime. Thus, the effectiveness of such a strategy will depend on the support extended by the Americans, both politically and militarily. Whether or not Barack Obama will give his blessing is very difficult to assess. By backing Saudi Arabia, the United States would prove itself willing to take the risk of a direct confrontation not only with the regime of Bashar al-Assad, but also with Russia.

In one of your recent lectures you mentioned that ISIS might be a factor that the international community will have to accept and live with for another decade. Why is this so and what impact will it have on the Middle East?

That is correct. Essentially, one must recognise that ISIS has a government, a territory, and citizens. Thus, according to international law and the three-element-doctrine of George Jellinek, ISIS constitutes a state. If the international community and the United Nations accept this fact, it would not only nullify the famous Sykes-Picot Agreement but also ultimately lead to the disintegration of two artificial states: Iraq and Syria.

Is there any other relevant aspect or issue pertaining to ISIS and its conduct of war that we haven’t discussed today, and that you would like to mention?

I would say that we are currently at a crossroads. Either the situation will further deteriorate and ISIS will continue to exist or, if the coalition makes a definite decision to commit ground troops, then we could see ISIS defeated. The man who will ultimately decide on the future fate of ISIS sits in Washington DC.

 

Professor Dr. Albert Stahel was interviewed by Annabelle Vuille, a series editor at Strife and MA candidate in the Department of War Studies, in Zurich in February 2015. This is an edited version of the transcript.

The Impact of TOW Missile Supplies in Syria: Boom or Bust?

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By: Jacob Beeders

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In response to the Syrian government and allied forces offensives last October that coincided with the onset of Russian airstrikes, armed groups opposing the government reported an increased uptick in the supply of weapons by their patrons. Most noteworthy was the provision of US-made tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided (BGM-71 TOW) anti-tank missiles [1]. The TOW anti-tank missile has become a major symbol of foreign support to the armed opposition. As an easily transportable, extremely accurate, and exceptionally potent weapons system, the TOW has helped a selection of rebel groups overcome a qualitative disadvantage in heavy weaponry vis-à-vis the Syrian Army.

The TOW missile is neither the only nor the most numerous weapons system the US and its allies have purportedly delivered to opposition groups, but it is likely the most advanced [2]. While the TOW can be distinguished from other armaments due to its effectiveness, it also bears the distinction of being by far the most documented. Because of the clandestine nature of the CIA and allied programs in Syria, only a select few know the true extent of their country’s support. Built into the requirements of the CIA Train and Equip program is the provision that groups vetted to receive TOWs must record video confirmation of the use of each missile, as well as to return spent ammunition to their sponsors [3]. With many of these videos being available on open sources (Youtube, Liveleak), a picture can emerge of the groups which have received them, the quantity of TOW use, and their effect on the battlefield [4].

Using available video evidence, observers have identified forty-two rebel groups have received TOW missiles since the beginning of 2014 [5]. Of these groups, the majority either align with the Free Syrian Army, or are roughly affiliated with the political aims of the organization. The groups are active in almost every theatre of operation, barring the Kurdish majority regions. The TOWs likely do not directly originate from the United States, instead coming from Saudi Arabia, who purchased 15,000 missiles in 2013 [6]. Conforming to the Arms Export Control Act, US authorities must approve the transfer of these missiles to a third party, meaning all recipients in theory possess some form of official American clearance [7]. To receive missiles, groups must go through a CIA-run vetting process, with TOW operators receiving training in friendly neighboring countries [8].

TOWs have had a pronounced impact on the battlefield, with missiles causing significant and sustained destruction of Syrian Army vehicles. For example, in the first days of the October government offensive in northern Hama, reports indicated that TOWs destroyed over 15 vehicles in what rebels titled a ‘tank massacre’ [9]. The attrition of vehicles, despite massive Russian aerial bombardment, helped to stall and ultimately reverse the Hama offensive, with rebels recapturing the strategic town of Morek on November 5th [10][11]. TOWs are considered to have provided similar strategic advantages in the most successful rebel campaign of 2015, the April to June Idlib offensive, by targeting government supply lines and entrenched vehicles [12]. While they have failed to stem recent government offensives, it appears their effect has been important enough to necessitate Russian deployment of T-90 tanks with advanced countermeasures to compensate for TOW use in key battlefields such as South Aleppo [13].

The tactical advantages produced by TOWs have also yielded larger strategic effects. With the rise in prominence of Islamist and Jihadist groups, particularly in Syria’s north, mainstream rebel groups have struggled to maintain relevancy. The ability of TOW-supplied groups to provide significant value in rebel operations has created a niche in which the rebels can persevere. TOW-supplied groups such as the First Coastal Division and the Knights of Justice Brigade have gained prominence targeting armored vehicles in larger, Islamist dominated offensives [14]. Battlefield effectiveness has helped some mainstream rebel groups overcome their largest domestic criticism, that they are largely corrupt and ineffectual [15][16]. This value has translated into tacit acceptance by hardline rebel factions, such as Jabhat al-Nusra, who in the past have targeted Western-backed groups [17].

Acceptance does come with drawbacks to Western sponsors, as TOW-operators facilitate directly and indirectly the advance of hardline and al-Qaeda affiliated groups. In some instances, such as 2014 the siege of Wadi al-Deif, Jabhat al-Nusra was able to dictate the employment of TOW missiles to their benefit, while allowing vetted-groups to maintain the veneer of independence [18]. While missile supplies have created a key role for vetted-groups, it has not allowed many to overcome the strategic necessity of collaboration with powerful jihadist factions.

As with past programs supplying advanced arms to disparate rebel groups, concerns exist regarding whether TOWs could fall into the hand of extremist groups. Over the course of time that TOWs have been supplied, several recorded cases of the weapons falling into ISIS or al-Qaeda affiliates have emerged [19] [20]. Most prominent was the yield of dozens of missiles from Jabhat al-Nusra’s capture of the TOW-supplied group Harakat Hazm’s main base of operations [21]. Of the thousands of missiles provided in total, only several dozen have been documented in the hands of extremists, with most captured in inter-rebel fighting. In contrast, vast quantities of Russian-supplied Kornet, Fagot and Konkurs anti-tank missiles have made their way from Syrian government stocks to a variety of rebel groups, with several hundred captured in the 2013 raid on Yabroud alone [22]. While continued TOW supplies runs the risk of unintended proliferation, it appears that the rigid system of documentation and control has limited that effect, especially when compared to similar weapons delivered to the government.

While the TOW missile is no silver bullet, it has been able to provide notable value on the battlefield, allowing the Western-backed opposition to counterbalance their shortcomings in armored vehicles. This benefit has allowed TOW-supplied groups to gain strategic leverage within a deeply fractured and often hostile collection of rebel factions. To the missile providers, the perceived success of the program will hinge on the ability of to guide the course of events in Syria in their favor. This may not depend on the increasingly tenuous prospect of victory on the battlefield; rather the US and its allies are pushing for a negotiated peace in Syria, with the onset of the Geneva Talks. The viability of these talks depends on the prevalence of ‘moderate’ groups open to political compromise, as well as the ability of weapons suppliers to exercise control over their clients. The TOW may then play a contributing role, propping up vetted ‘moderate’ groups, while giving missile-providers the ability to withhold crucial supplies in the event of non-compliance.

 

Jacob Beeders is a former Policy Fellow at the US House of Representatives and a MA Candidate in Intelligence and International Security, Department of War Studies at King’s College London.

Review: 'The Tail Wags the Dog: International Politics and the Middle East' by Efraim Karsh

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Reviewed by: Bradley Lineker & Samar Batrawi

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Efraim Karsh. The Tail Wags the Dog: International Politics and the Middle East. London & New York: Bloomsbury/ Continuum, 2015. ISBN: 978-14-72-91046-2. Pp. 236. Hardcover. £21.99.

The Tail Wags the Dog: International Politics and the Middle East is the latest book from Efraim Karsh, professor of political studies at Bar-Ilan University and King’s College London. While situated in his wider project of challenging the supposed orthodoxies inherent in the study of the region, Karsh’s core argument in this book is the alleged need to shift explanations for the region’s instability away from external pressures and instead place them squarely upon ‘Middle-Easterners’[i] themselves.[ii]

While the simplicity of the book’s title intimates that this argument is embedded into a straightforward package, the ambiguity of the subtitle (for the uninitiated, it reads: ‘a complex discourse in a complex geographical region’) hints at the dichotomy between the stated aim and the text’s actual structure and content. On the one hand, Karsh manifestly fails to give a voice to the apparent orthodoxy inherent to scholarship on the Middle East – which considerably weakens his claim to disprove it – and on the other hand, Karsh, instead of taking an approach based on assessing the work of other scholars, chooses to try and prove how this other position is incorrect by retelling the history of the modern Middle-East across a paltry 192 pages of generously-spaced text. While these two dichotomies would be themselves enough to mar the text, together, with the book’s polemical style, Karsh’s blithe historical determinism, the use of a narrow selection of English-orientated sources, and the seemingly random selection of chapter topics, they mortally undermine any attempt to construct a convincing platform to change approaches to the Middle East.

Situated within the same paradigm of Karsh’s other work, then, this book is at best a  sketch of the professor’s reading of the formation and present make-up of the modern Middle East, book-ended between an argument that does not explicitly resonate in the detail of the text; at worst, it is a disjointed collection of chapters written to support a charged political stance without enough meaningful evidence-based discussion, aesthetically covered by a singular-deterministic narrative on a region known for its complexity. Indeed, ‘Middle Easterners’ (as Karsh calls them[iii]) are subject to sweeping and unverifiable generalisations, such as the following assessment:

‘[f]or Western observers, the passage “from dark into light” that was the “Arab Spring” meant transition to a liberal, secular democracy. For Middle Easterners it meant a return to the Islamic sociopolitical order that had underpinned the region for over a millennium[,] as the schizophrenic state system established in its place after World War I failed to fill the void left by its destruction.’[iv]  Perhaps the most toxic misunderstanding of ‘Middle Easterners’ and Muslims in Karsh’s book is illustrated by his casual replacement of the word ‘Islamist’ by ‘Islamic’, equating the collective, organised, and political Islam, denoted by the word ‘Islamist’, with the personal religious devotion designated by ‘Islamic’.[v]

The book begins in the early 20th century[vi] and is thereafter divided thematically into 8 other chapters that follow a loose chronological structure and which range from the Israel/Palestine conflict,[vii] American policy in Iran,[viii] Soviet engagement in the Middle-East,[ix] an assessment of American policy since 2001,[x] as well as a breezy chapter on today’s Middle East. While historical in scope, the book is stylistically a right-leaning polemic tentatively based in international relations discourse. Indeed, one of the core historical premises used by Karsh is that Islam was born in fire[xi] and that this ‘imperial aggressiveness,’[xii] and the wider predisposition towards violence,[xiii] survived the fall of the Ottoman Empire ‘to haunt Islamic and Middle Eastern politics … [in] the twenty-first century.’[xiv]

However, at times, it appears that Karsh has constructed – with a remarkably fine-tooth comb – a specific historical narrative, coloured by patterns of thinking that have emerged in the post-American intervention world, to support his own political stance on the modern Middle East. His own narrative, as he openly admits, is to expel the influence of foreign powers on the Middle East;[xv] to thereby pointedly blame indigenous groups for the relative instability. This is mirrored in the detail used to prove fairly basic points, which does not, as he surmises, facilitate reader understanding but rather seems self-serving and out of place. This is certainly evident in his discussions of the birth of Israel and the conflict with the Palestinians: the former is accorded significant attention and detail – to promulgate a specific founding narrative – whereas, in the case of the latter, he makes no mention of the forced displacement in 1948, excepting one cryptic defensive paragraph that makes the bold claim that Palestinians left despite the wishes of the Jewish forces.[xvi] Moreover, in the sub-section ‘Courting Hitler’, Karsh lists every Arab overture to the great enemy of ‘perfidious Albion’[xvii] in the 1930s and 1940s in a way that is inescapably spiteful, especially upon reflection of the way his argument unfolds in the rest of the book. For instance, while Arab overtures towards Hitler are judged in moral terms,[xviii] Karsh upholds the same patterns of behaviour – of playing one great power off against another – as the accepted norm in international relations in his depictions of the Cold War (he essentially glorifies Egypt on this regard)[xix]. Finally, Karsh often criticises the Middle East’s preponderance to harmful religious exclusivism, while, often within the same sentence, arguing that Israel is an example against this trend – despite evidently being an entity enthused with patterns of institutionalised religious exclusivism.[xx]

While ultimately lop-sided to Karsh’s political paradigm, the book does manage to provide a decent overview of some of the events that it covers: such as the politics behind the post-First World War fragmentation of the Ottoman Empire’s possessions in the Levant and ancient Mesopotamia, as well as a good American-based summary of the intelligence failure during the Iranian Revolution. However, even the book’s strongest sections are marked by the fact that the issues they cover are always better covered elsewhere in more specialised studies.

 

Bradley Lineker is currently a fully-funded ESRC doctoral candidate in the War Studies Department, King’s College London, where he studies refugee shelter provision in Jordan. He has extensive experience working as a consulting research analyst with the UN and the private sector on contexts like Israel/Palestine, Jordan, Kenya, Somalia and Syria. Follow him @BradleyLineker.

Samar Batrawi is a doctoral candidate at the Department of War Studies at King’s College London, where she studies social movements in Palestine. She has worked for the Women’s Centre for Legal Aid and Counselling in Palestine, the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation in London, and the Clingendael Institute for International Relations in The Hague. Follow her at @SamarBatrawi.

 

 

Notes:

[i] Karsh, The Tail Wags the Dog, p. 2, p. 157.
[ii] Ibid., pp. 1-2.
[iii] Ibid., p. 157.
[iv] Ibid., p. 183.
[v] Ibid., p. 188.
[vi] Ibid., p.9.
[vii] Ibid., pp. 31-48, pp. 49-62.
[viii] Ibid., pp. 63-80.
[ix] Ibid., pp. 81-102.
[x] Ibid., pp. 153-174.
[xi] Ibid., p. 188.
[xii] Ibid., p. 155.
[xiii] Ibid., p. 187.
[xiv] Ibid., p. 155.
[xv] Ibid., p. 2.
[xvi] Ibid., p. 59.
[xvii] Ibid., p. 19.
[xviii] Ibid., pp. 35-37.
[xix] Ibid., pp. 1-2.
[xx] Ibid., p. 189.