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The limits of US security cooperation in Jordan

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By: Peter Kirechu

Barack_Obama_and_Abdullah_II
President Barack Obama Meets with King Abdullah II of Jordan in the Oval Office on 26 April, 2013. Source: Wikimedia.

The most notable feature of President Barack Obama’s partnership-based counterterrorism doctrine­–roughly defined–is its central focus on training and arming local security services to independently deal with emerging terrorism threats. The President’s doctrine is unfortunately fraught with inconsistent performance of US-trained security services, especially among fragile states in the Middle East and beyond. Whether in Iraq, Yemen, or Afghanistan, singular focus on capacity building within the security sector has failed to remedy the governance failures that fuel instability within the region.

In Jordan, the United States (US) enjoys a long history of sustained political, economic and military cooperation which dates back to 1951. However, since the self-styled Islamic State established a cross-border presence in Syria, concerns with the contagion of trained militants across Jordan’s borders have led to substantial increases in US security assistance. In February 2015, the United States expanded its annual aid to Jordan from $660 million to $1 billion. The funds were directed towards core counterterrorism priorities (border protection, C4ISR, quick-reaction airlift capabilities) and also the immediate humanitarian demands incurred by the Syrian refugee crisis.

Though the US-Jordanian security relationship is less fraught with discord when compared with other states in the region, this assessment slightly deceives a growing angst within the Jordanian public. Since the brutal loss of Jordanian pilot, Muath al-Kasaesbeh, to the Islamic State in 2014, the public is increasingly apprehensive of its government’s support of US policy prerogatives. The pilot’s death stood as a stark reminder of the costs paid by the Jordanian military–and the public writ large–in small part due to the government’s role within the US-led anti-Islamic State coalition.

Despite this fomenting anxiety, the United States appears squarely focused on the more proximate security threats borne by the Syrian conflict. But as the Salafi-Jihadist landscape evolves throughout the region, Jordan will remain an attractive target due to the available reservoir of disenchanted locals eager for a brighter economic future and resentful of the government’s stunted reforms. Unless the United States adopts a more balanced security assistance approach, one that emphasizes comprehensive governance reforms, the current policy will remain inadequate to the underlying causes of domestic instability. 

Jihadist entreaties on a vulnerable public

Since 2013, Jordan has served as the training and staging ground for Syrian rebels battling the Islamic State in Southern Syria. This training effort has slowly expanded and now includes the provision of Anti-Tank Guided Missiles (ATGM) to various US-supported rebel factions. This covert effort proceeded under limited public scrutiny until the Islamic State’s capture and subsequent beheadings of several western journalists and aid workers. These gruesome executions ultimately triggered the US-led aerial bombing campaign against the jihadist group in both Iraq and Syria.

The Jordanian government joined the US effort, viewing its participation as a necessary measure aimed at shoring up Jordan’s national security. At the outset, the public’s response was initially quite supportive but subsequent research polls conducted by the Arab Center for Research and Studies revealed that a majority of respondents viewed the campaign as more beneficial to the United States, Israel and Iran, rather than to Jordan’s security and stability. Though Jordanians expressed early support for their government’s role within the coalition, many did not consider the country’s security interests under direct threat.

But once Lt. Muath al-Kasasbeh was captured and gruesomely executed, his death elevated formerly muted discontent with Jordan’s role within the coalition. Those who not normally involve themselves with the ebbs and flows of foreign affairs found themselves participants in a growing conversation on the merits of their government’s continued involvement in the US-led coalition.

Nonetheless, the participation of roughly 2,200 Jordanian citizens in active battlefronts in Syria and Iraq underscores the government’s concerns with the return of trained militants who may seek to undermine the current governing order. As such, the government’s participation in the US-led coalition appears to be a reasonable response to the rising threat of both domestic and foreign militancy.

On the domestic front, Jordanian authorities have banned cleric that are sympathetic to the Islamic State from delivering public sermons. Other measures include the release of some prominent Salafist clerics with the intent of enlisting their assistance in combatting jihadist rhetoric within the public domain. The government has also adopted a more repressive approach to public dissent, detaining Muslim Brotherhood members and introducing new amendments to the Anti-Terrorism Law. These changes have criminalized the criticism of foreign countries and their leaders while permitting the prosecution of journalists and activists for speech-related crimes–as widely interpreted by the State Security Court.

The crackdown on public speech under the cover of combatting terrorism weighed heavily on Jordan’s decline from a ‘Partially Free’ to a ‘Not Free’ State according to the Freedom’s House  Freedom in the World rankings. This ranking has endured since 2010 and is not likely to improve under current conditions. Unfortunately, the government’s embrace of these policy prerogatives harms the state’s long-term security by ignoring legitimate public grievances and broadening public apathy with stagnated reforms that were once viewed as a bulwark against domestic instability.

Crises of Socio-Economic Patronage

The Hashemite Kingdom’s most urgent economic ails are grounded in the patronage and subsidy system which secures the monarchy’s rule. Regime loyalty underscores the long-running history of generous welfare benefits accorded to East Banker tribes and the pervasive use of personal friendships and tribal relationships to secure professional positions throughout the government. The patronage system is particularly acute within some sectors of the security services, where political and personal relationships often supersede professional conduct and competency.

The unprecedented nine to ten percent increase of the overall Jordanian population as a result of Syrian refugees has pushed the import-heavy Jordanian government into further reliance on foreign financial aid. Through IMF, EU, and US financial support, the country’s budget deficits have narrowed though public debt remains at 90 percent and unemployment increased from 14 percent to 22 percent in 2014. Due to the government’s overdependence on a politically motivated patronage system, systemic reforms are anathema to those who have historically thrived under public benefits. Thus efforts to curb this reliance ultimately undermine the Monarchy’s ability to institute meaningful economic changes. Nonetheless, progress towards this difficult objective remains a worthwhile goal for Jordan’s overall security.

The international community’s traditional responses to Jordan’s precarious economic position often focus on broadening the country’s financial reserves through infusions of foreign aid. But as long as foreign direct investments serve as the preferred model of external financial support, the government should channel these funds towards economic activities that utilize the immense labor reserves offered by the refugee population and Jordan’s unemployed youth.

By adopting economic policies that target this readily available labor pool, the government can provide opportunities for a highly vulnerable population in the low-skill manufacturing, agriculture, and construction sectors. Due to the widespread destruction of Syria’s manufacturing output, and the slow disappearance of formerly productive commercial centers and trade routes, the Jordanian government has the opportunity to develop these lost capabilities within its borders. Such an approach similarly coopts the potential diversion of marginalized youths and refugees into criminality or radicalization.

This approach not only addresses the socio-economic grievances that threaten the government’s long-term stability, but also changes public perceptions of the government’s commitment to meaningful reforms.

Due to the inflamed crises that characterize the Jordan’s neighborhood, the opposition movement has so far restrained itself from overt agitation for regime change. This patient resolve is perhaps rooted in the hopes that meaningful change might emerge through cooperation with the monarchy, rather than the revolutionary violence that has resulted in widespread human suffering elsewhere in the region. Unlike other places in the region, the government has the unlikely benefit of a relatively subdued opposition movement. It should capitalize on this level of calm agitation for change and dedicate more of its foreign assistance toward addressing the full breadth of opposition grievances.

The Limits of Narrow Counterterrorism Approaches

It is likely that the more visible results of effective counterterrorism support occur on the operational theater. Local security services elevate their targeting, surveillance, and response capabilities and gain an operational edge against insurgents and terrorist networks through US training and equipment support. However, when partner states accept US assistance, these transactions are also de facto political decisions with immense implications on the governed.

Recipient governments that focus their enhanced counterterrorism capabilities on regime survival or personal enrichment, as seen in Iraq, are unlikely to survive in the long-term. For others, security assistance and cooperation becomes a publically poisonous symbol of US encroachment on state sovereignty as seen in Yemen and Pakistan. In these environments, security-centered assistance is commonly squandered and US national interests harmed in the long-term.

The United States must therefore balance its security-dominant engagement with the Jordanian government and dedicate more resources to the socio-political and economic factors addressed herein. Placing governance and economic reform conditions on US security assistance, is the first step towards changing the United States’ reception within the Jordanian public. These conditions also incentivize the Jordanian government to balance security-based expenditures with the socio-economic investments that target the governance roots of instability. Over time, it is these investments that build economic, political, and social resilience throughout the Jordanian public and prevent radicalization among the most vulnerable sectors of the general public.

 

 

Peter Kirechu is a graduate student at the Mercyhurst Institute for Intelligence Studies where he focuses on civil strife, insurgencies and counterterrorism. Mr. Kirechu was also a 2013 Boren Scholar to Jordan where he studied the security and humanitarian effects of Syria’s civil conflict. Twitter: @PeterKirechu

Putin’s sleight of hand in Syria

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By: Peter Kirechu

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Russian Su-25 Fighter Jets taking-off in Latakia. Source: Wikimedia

On March 14, Russian President Vladimir Putin unexpectedly announced the withdrawal of Russian forces from Syria as UN-sponsored peace talks began in Geneva. Putin’s withdrawal–however partial–challenged the Obama administration’s long-held quagmire sentence on the Russian role inside Syria. Putin showed that a limited military campaign could preserve the regime from collapse without committing to a costly ground campaign. Taking stock of the Russian intervention thus far, current evidence suggests that Russian influence is unlikely to diminish.

In deciding to intervene militarily in Syria, Putin concluded that an Assad victory (or accommodation) would likely buttress Russian interests in the region. He secured his current advantage by capitalizing on a divided armed opposition usurped by Salafi-jihadists and what many in the international community perceive as an incoherent US strategy.

As such, an assessment on where Russia’s influence has mattered the most unveils great insights as to Putin’s end-state agenda. Putin’s Syria strategy is tightly wedded to the eventual outcome of the war, and thus a commitment to an eventual negotiated settlement. Russia intends to maintain a pliable government in Damascus; one that ensures Russian military access inside Syria as a balance to other international powers.

Forcing a Rebel “Reset” to Russia’s Advantage

When the last round of UN-sponsored peace talks on the Syrian conflict collapsed in early February, members of the International Syria Support Group (ISSG) scrambled to arrest the spiraling violence through the cessation of violence agreement completed in Munich on February 11. This accord set the conditions for a tenuous peace that has so far held despite numerous violations largely attributed to the Assad regime.

Significantly, the Munich agreement attempted to force a wedge between moderate and hardline Islamist groups­–principally between the Al-Nusra Front and other close affiliates. Since Russia vowed to continue its aerial campaign in territories occupied by both hardline and moderate groups, observers suggested that the truce was perhaps designed to force division within rebel ranks. Though  evidence suggests that the ties between the Nusra Front and some of its allies such as Ahrar al-Sham­ are often fluid, the Munich agreement was a significant step towards addressing what role (if any) certain powerful Islamist groups may have in Syria’s future.

Through the Munich agreement, Putin ostensibly bound the United States in ipso facto agreement to the Russian perspective on the fractured opposition. By simply defining all opposition groups as irreconcilable terrorists, the Russian position advanced only two non-negotiable options: continued bombardment or a reprieve under ceasefire conditions; roughly 100 armed rebel groups joined the truce before implementation day on February 27. Ultimately, Russia’s discriminate targeting of the moderate opposition, combined with the regime’s collective punishment, exacted the desired concessions from the rebels and their external supporters.

Putin accurately assessed that the likelihood of the US-led coalition mounting a direct challenge to Russia’s aerial advantage was quite unlikely. Meanwhile, the regime parleyed its victories in Latakia, Deraa, and Aleppo to bolster its territorial gains in the event that the truce collapsed. Washington’s most viable relief to the beleaguered opposition rested on escalating arms provisions as an incentive for greater collaboration and unity among the rebels. This option, however, bore minimal benefit given Russian air superiority and the possibility that it would scuttle the developing ceasefire agreement.

But since the brokered ceasefire went into effect roughly one month ago violence has decreased by nearly 90 percent. This relative calm has also opened the space for peaceful protest as hundreds of thousands of local Syrians have again flowed into the streets demanding Assad’s departure. This return to peaceful assembly, however, occurs at a time when the moderate opposition is beset by dwindling prospects of an outright victory, or a favorable negotiating position in Geneva. This is precisely the outcome desired by Russia as peace talks resume: a militarily waning moderate opposition, undermined by the prominence of Salafi-jihadist groups, and thus pliable in any forthcoming settlement.

Managing Assad’s Potential Return to Intransigence

Prior to the withdrawal announcement, the regime was insulated in western Syria and the moderate opposition was increasingly battered and fractured as Assad appeared to have his way militarily. Assad’s resurgence translated into his regime’s growing intransigence on the diplomatic front. Days before talks resumed in Geneva, regime representatives revived the poisonous question of Assad’s political future, stiffening their position on Assad’s surviving role as head-of-state. Perhaps emboldened by their increasing military leverage, the representatives veered outside the primary focus of the talks, which is largely focused on developing a workable transition process.

These developments and the timing of the Russian withdrawal suggests that Putin’s drawdown may to some level curb regime behavior in Geneva. A slight panic within the regime may prove beneficial, though the fidelity of this particular claim is hard to discern. What appears clear is that the extent of Russia’s withdrawal will remain opaque for several weeks.

A complete departure of the Russian military presence is quite unlikely since the naval base at Tartus and the air base at Hmeimim will remain operational. The Syrian battlefield has certainly served as a testing ground for Russian military hardware. And it was (and will likely remain) an excellent proving ground for Russia’s execution of a high intensity aerial and ground campaign; allowing these capabilities to recede would be a gross error in Putin’s eyes.

The Russian Approach Post-Palmyra

Evidence from Russia’s military operations inside Syria revealed the disproportionate targeting of non-Islamic State aligned rebel groups. Nonetheless, Russian air raids have provided the necessary aerial cover for government troops to advance and retake the historic city of Palmyra which was seized by the Islamic State last May. Meanwhile, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), a coalition of Kurdish, Arab, and Turkmen militias has in recent months wrested away swathes of territory from the Islamic State in a push towards the group’s de-facto capital in Raqqa.

The United States is intently focused on advancing negotiations between the regime and Syria’s main opposition bloc. Such an outcome, if appropriately harnessed, also provides the elusive ground component required to decisively challenge the Islamic State throughout Syria. That Russia floated the possibility of a federal post-war Syria is quite significant, though such an outcome is contingent on an elusive agreement between all parties involved. Given the current conditions, any power-sharing agreement that sets the outlines of a grand security infrastructure will likely be led by the regime, to Russia’s benefit.

The regime’s recent progress in Palmyra opened a new offensive corridor into Deir al-Zor which may extend north into the Islamic State heartland of Raqqa as conditions warrant. Russia calculates that a regime victory in both Raqqa and Deir al-Zor will secure remnants of the regime if Assad leaves in a transition settlement, however unlikely. What remains unclear is whether the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) has the manpower to effectively achieve this objective without substantial reinforcements from surrogate Shia militias from Iraq and beyond. But as Iran deepens its Syria involvement beyond the Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) the regime’s manpower deficits will benefit from these reinforcements.

On the other hand, the United States will continue to face a tough challenge in galvanizing Sunni rebel resistance as regime forces move eastward. And despite the regime’s manpower shortages, Russia is likely to exploit this handicap to maintain its footprint inside Syria. That Russian commitment has slowly transitioned from fighter jet squadrons to close air support via attack helicopters suggests that Russian ground presence will continue.

In the past several days, the weeks-long ceasefire has fallen under immense pressure and mutual violations by both the regime and the armed opposition threaten to tear the deal asunder. Whether the ceasefire survives or falters, Russia’s military role inside Syria is unlikely to recede.

 

 

Peter Kirechu is Graduate Student at the Mercyhurst Institute for Intelligence Studies where he focuses on civil strife, insurgencies and counterterrorism. Mr. Kirechu was also a 2013 Boren Scholar to Jordan where he studied the security and humanitarian effects of Syria’s civil conflict. @PeterKirechu

A ‘Second Hezbollah’: The strategic value of Iran’s proxy warfare policy in Syria

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By: Robert Andrea

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Qassem Suleimani – commander of the IRGC’s Quds Force. Source: Wikimedia

Throughout the past thirty years, Iran has arguably been the world’s foremost expert in the use of so-called ‘proxy’ warfare as a tool of statecraft. Whether in Lebanon, Gaza, Yemen, or Iraq, Tehran has displayed a degree of discipline about its use of ‘proxy’ sponsorship hitherto unmatched by few, if any, other states. Furthermore, Iran seems to have learned, far better than anyone else, that proxy warfare is most strategically valuable when used as a tactic of statecraft and not as a general foreign policy strategy.

And now today, the utilization of this tactical-strategic relationship between ‘proxy warfare’ and macro-level foreign policy by Iran is once again on display- this time in Syria.

Iran in Syria

As of this writing, the fifth year of the Syrian Civil War is now nearly a month old. With casualty figures approaching 500,000, a tenuous ceasefire is seemingly near to a collapse and portending a fresh round of fighting. And with seemingly no party with the capability to secure a victory on the battlefield, all signs point to both a military, and a diplomatic stalemate.

However, by replicating a strategy of ‘proxy warfare’ it has used in the past, Iran seems to have positioned itself better than any other actor. It is thanks to this strategy that Tehran will likely be able to emerge from any kind of endgame in Syria with their strategic interests in the region intact.

Generally, the narrative holds that Iran’s interests in the Syrian Civil War are tied directly to the survival of Syrian president Bashar al-Assad.[1] The Iranians themselves, at least publicly, seem to have confirmed this. In a December 2015 statement, Ali Akbar Velayati (top foreign policy adviser to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei) reaffirmed that the fate of Assad was a ‘red line’ for Iran. This seems to indicate that any diplomatic solution to the war in Syria would, from the Iranian perspective, be assessed as a zero-sum appraisal.

In other words, if Assad stays, Iran ‘wins’, but if he were to be forced out, the general consensus would be that Iran would ‘lose’.

Regarding the long term fate of Assad, Brett McGurk (U.S. Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL), said in a March interview, ‘there is no way conceivable that Assad’s writ will ever extend throughout the country again. It’s just not realistic after everything that’s happened’. If this is assumed to be true, the prevailing assumptions would also suggest that it’s no more realistic that Iran will be able to secure its foreign policy goals in Syria.

Unfortunately, this narrative overlooks the more long-term geopolitical goal that Iran has in Syria.

The Beirut-Damascus highway

Masked with rhetoric about protecting Shi’a shrines and fighting terrorism, the reason Iran has been so invested in the survival of Assad is that, until now, he has been the guarantor of Iran’s supply lines, through Syria, to Hezbollah in Lebanon.[2] With its ally Hezbollah being the only real apparatus (in the absence of Assad) with which Iran is able to project power in the Levant (particularly via-à-vis Israel), the relationship between Hezbollah and Iran is, by any metric, much more vital to Tehran’s long-term foreign policy in the region than is their relationship with Bashar al-Assad. It is therefore incorrect to assess Iran’s success or failure in Syria relative to the survival of Assad. Rather, ‘success’ on a strategic level for Iran in Syria ultimately depends on whether or not the supply conduit to Hezbollah is maintained.

To that end and through the use of ‘proxy’ by armed organizations, Iran has provided itself with a strategic fallback for their long-term interest in the Levant. This fallback retains its strategic value for the Iranians even if Assad and/or his regime were to be removed from power, either militarily or as part of a diplomatic agreement.

A ‘Second Hezbollah’

This fallback revolves around the creation of pro-Assad and, more importantly for this discussion, pro-Tehran militias. These militias, a myriad of whom exist, each go by different names and are based in different regions of Syria. Often (for brevity’s sake), these militias are collectively referred to as the National Defense Forces (NDF) and are estimated to have a combined strength of anywhere between 100,000-120,000 fighters.[3] It’s not always clear to whom these militias report, Assad or their Iranian Revolutionary Guard (IRGC) sponsors, but it is clear that they have been instrumental in bolstering/supporting Syrian government forces.[4] These paramilitary militias, as well as the IRGC and Hezbollah, have been critical to the preservation of the SAA due to the latter’s struggle with attrition and reliability.[5]

This proxy warfare policy replicates a previous Iranian policy used, beginning with Hezbollah in 1982-83, throughout the past three decades. The comparison of the NDF to Hezbollah is not an idle one. IRGC general Hossein Hamedani (since killed in Syria) was reported to have said in 2014 that Iran had created a ‘second Hezbollah’ in Syria.[6]

Although many factions of the NDF are multi-ethnic and cross-sectarian, some of them are comprised of only Allawi and/or Shi’a fighters, from inside or outside Syria. The amalgamation of militias that comprise this ‘second Hezbollah’ do, in fact, bear striking organizational and ideological resemblances to Hezbollah in Lebanon and many of the Shi’a militias in Iraq, both of whom are assisting Iran in training these NDFs and in actual combat operations in Syria.[7] Most of these Shi’a groups fight under the banner of Liwa Abu al-Fadhl al-Abbas, commonly referred to as the LAFA network or, simply, the al-Abbas Brigades.[8]

It is through their sponsorship of these proxy militias, Shi’a or otherwise, that Iran is seeking to ensure the future of their foreign policy goals in Syria and the Levant.

As tactically successful as this militia sponsorship policy has been in preserving the survival of Assad, none of the NDF militias, not even the LAFA network, provide Iran or Assad any sort of military dominance at the moment, or even in the foreseeable future.[9] So how does Iran’s sponsorship of these militias on a tactical level afford it strategic value with respect to their foreign policy objectives in Syria?

Militia diplomacy

The strategic value lies in the diplomatic leverage that Iran has obtained through its sponsorship of the various militias, NDF or otherwise.

Assuming any hypothetical peace negotiations would be earnestly conducted, none of the anti-regime actors can realistically hope to ignore the strategic considerations Iran has in Syria, as Tehran now essentially commands a force of 100,000 strong on the ground. Obviously, it is highly unlikely that all NDF factions would remain loyal to Iran in a negotiated endgame scenario. However, even if only 1%-2% of NDF members maintained their links to Tehran, this would still be more than enough fighters to seriously destabilize any peace efforts. Thus, the Iranians wield a favorable negotiating position. Of course, how much influence the NDF provides Iran at the negotiating table is certainly debatable. It would seem, however, that Iran believes that it will be enough to bargain for, at minimum, a post-Assad regime that isn’t hostile towards Tehran. Combined with the fact that Iran would have thousands (perhaps tens of thousands) of loyal fighters on the ground, its strategic foreign policy imperative – the supply line to Hezbollah in Lebanon – would be secure.[10] While this hypothetical outcome wouldn’t be optimal for Iran, their understanding of using ‘proxy’ capabilities to pursue foreign policy goals on the strategic level would still provide them with a result they could live with in Syria- with or without Assad.

 

 

Robert is an incoming student at King’s College Department of War Studies and will begin pursuing an MA in War Studies this September. His research interests include U.S. and Iranian foreign policy, diplomatic strategy, and proxy warfare. He can be found on Twitter at @Bob__Andrea

 

 

 

Notes:

[1] Diehl, Jackson. “Why Iran Won’t Give up Syria.” The Washington Post, August 2, 2015. Accessed April 6, 2015. https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/why-iran-wont-give-up-syria/2015/08/02/b9269fa2-360c-11e5-9d0f-7865a67390ee_story.html.

[2] Fulton, Will, Joseph Holliday, and Sam Wyer. Iranian Strategy in Syria: A Joint Report by AEI’s Critical Threats Progect & Institute for the Study of War. Report. May 2013. Accessed April 5, 2016. http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/IranianStrategyinSyria-1MAY.pdf. pg. 21.

[3] Lund, Aron. “Who Are the Pro-Assad Militias?” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. March 2, 2015. Accessed April 5, 2016. http://carnegieendowment.org/syriaincrisis/?fa=59215

[4] Ibid.

[5] Kozak, Christopher. “An Army in All Corners”: Assad’s Campaign Strategy in Syria. Institute for the Study of War’s Middle East Security Report. Report. April 2015. Accessed April 5, 2016. http://understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/An Army in All Corners by Chris Kozak 1.pdf. pg. 4.

[6] Chandler, Adam. “An Iranian General Is Killed in Syria.” The Atlantic. October 9, 2015. Accessed April 6, 2016. http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/10/an-iranian-general-killed-in-syria/409963/.

[7] Smyth, Phillip. “How Iran Is Building Its Syrian Hezbollah.” – The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. March 8, 2016. Accessed April 5, 2016. http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/how-iran-is-building-its-syrian-hezbollah.

[8] Anzalone, Christopher. “Zaynab’s Guardians: The Emergence of Shi`a Militias in Syria | Combating Terrorism Center at West Point.” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point. July 23, 2013. Accessed April 6, 2016. https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/zaynabs-guardians-the-emergence-of-shia-militias-in-syria.

[9] McInnis, J. Matthew. “How Many Iranian Forces Are Dying in Syria?” Newsweek. October 28, 2015. Accessed April 06, 2016. http://www.newsweek.com/how-many-iranian-forces-are-fighting-and-dying-syria-388004.

[10] Fulton, Holliday, and Wyer. Iranian Strategy in Syria. pg. 21.

PROXY Capabilities – The History and Future of Russian Private Military Companies

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This is the second of a series of articles we will be featuring on Strife in the coming week looking at the role of Proxy Warfare in the 21st century by Series Editor Cheng Lai Ki. Previous articles in the series can be found here.

By: Gregory Wilson

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Source: Russia Today

On the eve of the Russo-Georgian War of 2008, it became apparent that Russia was furthering its path towards resurgence. Harshly criticizing Western actions, Russia began a series of interventions, notably in Syria and Ukraine. At home, President Vladimir Putin continues to solidify his rule, dominating elections and polls alike, while Russian nationalism and ultra-nationalism surges. In Europe, Russia has fanned the flames of populist nationalism, heavily supporting right-wing fringe groups in an apparent quest to destabilize Europe’s economic and political unity. Embroiled in a variety of conflicts, it comes as no surprise that Russian private military companies (PMC) have begun to operate not only in Russia, but across the globe. The real question lies in whether or not Russian PMCs will expand in the future, or remain as a sidelined player in Moscow’s arsenal.

In a 2011 address to the State Duma, Putin expressed support for the use of Russian PMCs as a tool for expanding government influence.[1] Despite this admission of support, the legal status of Russian PMCs straddles something of a grey area. Multiple Russian owners of PMCs have addressed these issues in interviews, claiming that Russia inherited their legal system from the Byzantine Empire, thus anything that isn’t explicitly prohibited is allowed.[2] This, however, has not stopped legislators from introducing bills that would fully legalize PMC groups in Russia, particularly of their use for the Russian government. A bill, submitted in 2014 by MP Gennady Nosovko of the Fair Russia party, was recently rejected by the Russian cabinet, citing security and legal issues.[3] While some follow voluntary regulations, PMCs in Russia will remain in the grey zone, neither legal nor prohibited. The future legality of PMCs in Russia is yet still unclear, as the same Nosovko promised future legislation.[4]

Regardless, this legal grey area has not prevented Russian PMCs from advertising their services in Russia and abroad. Overall, the use of PMCs worldwide has been varied. It was not until the 2003 Iraq War that PMCs began to massively grow. On the Russian side, PMCs have largely been confined to operations involving private Russian companies in Africa, the Middle East, and international waterways. The largest of the Russian PMCs, the RSB Group, has a detailed history, boasting operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, Tajikistan, the North Caucasus, and Serbia.[5]

The most recent and notable example of Russian PMC operations occurred in Syria, 2013. The PMC group in question was the Slavonic Corps Limited, a Hong Kong registered company led by Director Sergei Kramskoy that primarily employed ex-Russian soldiers.[6] The Slavonic Corps heavily advertised in Russia, coordinated by Vyacheslav Kalashnikov, a lieutenant colonel in the FSB (Russia’s Federal Security Service) reserves who also happens to be the head of another PMC, the Moran Security Group.[7] The origins of this fighting force in Syria is massively convoluted, bearing ties with two separate PMCs and an officer in the FSB. In Moscow, the ex-soldiers were reassured on the legality of the operation, as their new role protecting key assets for the Syria regime was sanctioned by the FSB and the Russian government.[8]

Despite these assurances, the situation on the ground in Syria was far from adequate, with the soldiers severely underequipped and managed by Vadim Gusev, the deputy director of the Moran Security Group.[9] After a number of mishaps and a total of six wounded, the ex-soldiers mutinied and returned after battle with elements of the Syrian rebels.[10] However, once back in Russia, the men were apprehended by FSB, arresting Gusev and an Evgeny Sidorov, both members of the Moran Security Group, on charges of mercenary employment.[11] In the end, the story of the Slavonic Corps is almost unbelievable. A Russian PMC with ties to the FSB hires another Russian PMC to send forces to protect assets in Syria, who in turn are arrested upon return in Syria. With all parties denying or refusing to comment, the situation may never truly become clear. Regardless, these events must be seen as an example of the grey legality of Russian PMCs and the absolute mess that results.

With this turbulent history of Russian PMCs, it is now imperative that we look to the future of these organizations. Today, our understanding of what may come lies within the modern Russian-Ukrainian Conflict. Despite their initial denial, the Russian government had deployed unmarked Russian soldiers, not PMCs as far as it is known, in operations seizing the Crimean Peninsula and supporting Ukrainian separatists, sparking a massive outcry and souring relations with the West.[12] While this narrative may be well known, another element is critical in understanding the future of Russian PMCs. The ‘Night Wolves’ are Russia largest biker gang and the rabid supporters and exporters of Russian ultra-nationalism. In 2014, it was confirmed that the biker gang participated in the seizure of Crimea, assaulting a Ukrainian naval base and gas facility on the Black Sea, and has now created local chapters in Eastern Ukraine supporting the separatists there.[13] The most significant aspect of the Night Wolves is their relationship to President Putin. Alexander Zaldostanov, leader of the Night Wolves, has strong personal ties with Putin, who happens to be an honorary member and has provided over $1 million in grants to the gang.[14]

How exactly do the Night Wolves relate to the future of PMCs? Ultimately, the Night Wolves serves as a greater advantage to Putin and the Russian government than PMCs ever could. Officially, it is difficult to establish a direct tie between the government and the biker gang. With this plausible deniability at hand, the Kremlin has the assurance that the Night Wolves will continue their ideological operations in ways deemed acceptable or crucial to the overarching policies of the government. Furthermore, groups like the Night Wolves can operate offensively whereas official PMCs cannot, otherwise they are branded as mercenaries, something explicitly outlawed in Russian and the international community. In other cases where ideological militias or paramilitary elements cannot reach, Russian troops, whether or not they are marked as so, are more than appropriate. Thus, Russian PMCs are likely to remain on the backburner, unutilized by Putin and the Kremlin, remaining stagnant in their role as private security guards.

 

Gregory Wilson is a MA Candidate in Intelligence and International Security at King’s College London, specializing in the field of Russian/Soviet intelligence and regional security.

 

 

 

Notes:

[1] http://archive.premier.gov.ru/eng/events/news/18671/

[2] http://www.france24.com/en/20150728-video-russia-pmc-private-military-companies-mercenaries-slavonic-corps-ukraine-syria

[3] https://www.rt.com/politics/316276-government-rejects-bill-to-introduce/

[4] Ibid

[5] http://rsb-group.org/about

[6] http://www.interpretermag.com/st-petersburg-sends-contractors-to-syria/

[7] http://www.interpretermag.com/the-last-battle-of-the-slavonic-corps/

[8] Ibid

[9] Ibid

[10] Ibid

[11] Ibid

[12] https://news.vice.com/article/the-surgeon-we-spoke-with-the-leader-of-putins-favorite-biker-club-the-night-wolves

[13] http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jan/29/russian-biker-gang-in-ukraine-night-wolves-putin

[14] http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/jun/15/night-wolves-biker-gang-a-key-element-in-vladimir-/?page=all

ISIS and the Flood: the hydro-politics behind the rise (and fall) of Daesh

by

EDITORS NOTE: This is the fourth and final article in a four-part series which explores the role of water in human conflict and politics. The series marks (though is not affiliated with) World Water Day 2016, a UN initiative to promote awareness of water issues. More information on World Water Day can be found here. The first, second, and third, articles in the series can be found here,  here, and here, respectively.

By: Harris Kuemmerle

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The Euphrates River edging against the desert. Source: Wikimedia

The average person can only survive 3-7 days without water before ultimately (and inevitably) succumbing to a painful death. Likewise, there is not a single nation-state on earth whose day-to-day existence is not entirely and utterly dependent upon the economic, agricultural, political, cultural, and fundamentally life giving qualities of that all-important molecule. Water is the lowest common denominator. There is no substitute, and there is no cure for its absence. In a very real sense, governments live by the tap, and die by the tap; and the so called Islamic State are no exception.

After all, their rise occurred against the backdrop of profound underlying hydrological factors and issues in the run-up to the destabilisation of Syria in 2011, namely one of the worst droughts in half a century. A drought which was primarily the result of a confluence of factors mainly including climate change, and ineffectual and short-sighted hydrological management and agricultural policies on the part of the Assad government. Make no mistake, droughts are very bad for business, and a recent report by UN-Water (the inter-agency UN organisation designed to assist states promote water quality and availability) suggested that as many as four-fifths, or about 78%, of all jobs globally are moderately or heavily dependent upon a stable supply of water.[1]

This is especially true in the rural Syrian north east where the traditional reliance on agriculture is made possible by the large areas of arable land, compared to the rest of Syria. Indeed, the area of Al-Hasakeh in particular is responsible for around 75% of Syria’s total wheat production.[2] This bounty, however, also makes the north east region heavily dependent upon reliable water supplies for life and living. Therefore, it seems likely that such a major drought would have hit Syrian employment hard as agricultural falters in its traditional regions. And indeed, the result of this drought was the large scale unemployment of around 800,000 people; which in turn resulted in thousands of young men moving from the rural areas to the cities in search of work.[3] This arguably both added to existing stresses and tensions and had the unintended consequence of creating a large and desperate pool of young men for groups like Daesh to exploit.[4] While it would be simplistic to claim that the drought caused the Syrian uprising and resultant civil war by itself, it was an undeniable stress multiplier which Daesh were deftly able to exploit. However, water issues have also been an integral factor in the rise of Daesh beyond just fuelling destabilisation and providing the environment for a large pool of willing recruits to join their state-building project.

Water as a weapon of war

The brutality and savagery of Daesh tactics are well documented, with their latest attack in Brussels sending shock waves around the world. However, probably their least well known (and arguably most effective) strategies have been their attempts to control the dams and waters of the Tigris and Euphrates; rivers which constitute the vast majority of habitable and arable land in Iraq and Syria. Since their inception Daesh have at one time or another taken control of five dams along the Tigris and Euphrates; the Samarra, Nuaimiyah, Haditha, Mosul, and Tishrin.[5] This has given them the capabilities to drown entire cities such as Baghdad or shutoff the water or electricity to whole communities as a means of instilling psychological terror or controlling populations. Capabilities which have been turned into actions on numerous occasions. For example, in April 2014 Daesh closed the gates of the Nuaymiyah Dam and the resulting flooding successfully unseated government forces in the area and caused water shortages for millions, and thousands to lose their homes.[6] Furthermore, in August 2014 Daesh successfully captured Mosul Dam, the control of which put Baghdad and almost half a million Iraqis in direct danger of flooding and electricity blackout. The danger was deemed to be so great that the Iraqi government committed considerable resources (including US assistance) to its successful recapture.[7]

However, Daesh is still in control of a number of other dams in Syria and Iraq and their control has given Daesh not only an effective means of combating government forces, it has also given them a powerful and coercive tool for both instilling dread and loyalty among populations.[8] In the words of Michael Stephen at RUSI, ‘the control of water supplies gives strategic control over both cities and countryside. We are seeing a battle for control of water. Water is now the major strategic objective of all groups in Iraq. It’s life or death. If you control water in Iraq you have a grip on Baghdad, and you can cause major problems. Water is essential in this conflict.’[9] Indeed, in a 2014 issue of Dabiq (Daeshs’ official magazine) the group claimed that ‘it’s either Islamic State or the flood’, making clear their willingness to use water as a weapon of war.[10]

Water as a tool of peace

However, when the guns fall quiet and the warriors go home the prevailing state must be able to provide for the basic services of its people, including its vanquished. That ability to provide basic services is one of the most common tests of a state, and Daesh is not exempt from this. Adding to that, in the case of arid Syria and Iraq, the supply of water is of particular importance and according to one intelligence official, ‘if ISIS has any hope of establishing itself on territory, it has to control some water.’[11] However, this control also comes with responsibilities; and crucially, costs.

If Daesh intends to survive as a state in the traditional sense then it must invest heavily in the building, upgrading, and management of new and current water works infrastructure and delivery projects while also ensuring that the supply is sustainable. This investment will likely require substantial financial and political costs in their newly conquered regions as their inherited infrastructure becomes unfit for purpose. While at the same time Daesh will also need to be able to evolve its institutional structure in order to have the organisational bodies necessary to oversee these developments and manage the system while also making sure they are well staffed with trained personnel.

Going hand in hand with this management and governance will be dealing with issues pertaining to the equal use of the waters and Daesh will have to have systems put in place to mediate disputes over fresh water use domestically in order to prevent tensions. While also having the diplomatic presence necessary to fight for the fresh water interests of their new state among their neighbours in one of the driest regions on earth. These realities will necessitate cooperation (particularly internationally), and while there are some limited examples of this occuring, it remains unclear if Daesh will be pragmatic enough to be able to put aside ideology and cooperate long-term with those they may deem their enemy in order to keep the taps flowing.

This is a daunting list of tasks for any state, especially a new one. So how well is the new so-called Islamic State getting on with functioning as a state? While it is hard to say for sure, all indications suggest that things are not going as well as hoped. A 2014 report suggested that Daesh seemed to be unable to provide even basic services, with water only available for 3-4 hours a day in Raqqa.[12] Likewise, a later report from August 2015 suggested that services had improved in some areas, however, that the conflict was also taking a heavy toll on the infrastructure and the medium to long-term sustainability of those services was in doubt.[13]

In response the group have taken steps to ensure they meet water and electricity demands, including paying for Syrian and Iraqi government water infrastructure staff to remain at their jobs in Daesh controlled territory, taxing water, and bringing in outside assistance.[14] However, these are short-term solutions and will likely not by itself be enough to provide for the basic needs of the people in the longer term and much more investment in infrastructure and cultivation of domestic talent will be required to provide an adequate supply moving forward.

Indeed, the fact that Daesh appear to be relying so heavily on short-term water management solutions seems to suggest that the group still lacks both expertise in this area, and a dedicated governing body for managing the system and developing long-term policies. While also underlying all of this, is what appears to be a fundamentally unstable cultural dichotomy. With Daeshs’ primary ideological drive seemingly to expand the state through war, at the expense of their civic ambitions to establish a civil Caliphate becoming more secondary.

Concluding remarks

Ultimately, with waters importance in war, also comes its inseparability from peace. And in order for Daesh to survive as a state they must have in place robust and effective agricultural, hydrological, and infrastructure policies to keep the waters flowing and the people alive. While also working to mediate fresh water inequalities within and without their borders. This responsibility (on top of their other duties as a de facto state) will place great strain on Daesh leadership and it seems that they still lack the expertise and stability necessary to effectively deliver on key public services and move beyond short-term solutions.

This matters because while water politics and the use of water as a weapon seem to have been a key asset of Daesh in their early years. As time moves on they will likely find water issues to be much more of a problem than an asset. Indeed, while the inability to provide basic services is not always in in of itself enough to topple governments, and the Daesh regime may indeed be popular with some. Daesh must also know all too well that fresh water shortages can still be a significant contributing factor to instability in a once prosperous region. Despite that, the situation in their territory seems to indicate that Daesh are largely failing both at providing those services in the short-term and in building a system which can ensure stable supplies of water and other services in the long-term, making their future as a state seem as uncertain as the waters of the rivers that support them.

 

 

Harris Kuemmerle is a doctoral researcher in the Department of War Studies and the Department of Geography at King’s College London. His research focuses on the role of provincial engagement in the formulation and implementation of national security and management policies along the Indus River. Twitter: @HarrisKuemmerle

 

 

 

[1] 2016, The United Nations World Water Development Report 2016: Water and Jobs

[2] 2013, Impact of the conflict on Syrian economy and livelihoods, Syria Needs Analysis Project, ACAPS

[3] Aron Lund, 2014, Drought, Corruption, and War: Syria’s Agricultural Crisis, Carnegie Endowment

[4] Ian Sample, 2015, Global warming contributed to Syria’s 2011 uprising, scientists claim, The Guardian, 2 March, 2015

[5] John Vidal, “Water supply key to outcome of conflicts in Iraq and Syria, experts warn,” The Guardian, 2 July, 2014

[6] Ibid.

[7] Saira Khan, 2016, The Islamic State and Water Infrastructure, Tel Aviv Notes, Volume 10, Number 3

[8] 2014, Iraq insurgents use water as weapon after seizing dam, Reuters

[9] John Vidal, “Water supply key to outcome of conflicts in Iraq and Syria, experts warn,” The Guardian, July 2, 2014

[10] The Islamic State, “The Flood,” Dabiq, Issue 2, 1435 Ramadan

[1] John Vidal, “Water supply key to outcome of conflicts in Iraq and Syria, experts warn,” The Guardian, July 2, 2014

[12] Liz Sly, The Islamic State is failing at being a state, The Washington Post, December 25, 2014

[13] Laith Alkhouri and Alex Kassirer, 2015, Governing the Caliphate: The Islamic State Picture, Combating Terrorism Center, West Point Military Academy

[14] Saira Khan, 2016, The Islamic State and Water Infrastructure, Tel Aviv Notes, Volume 10, Number 3