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Just Who Are the YPG?

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By Ed Nash

22 October 2018

 

A Manbij Military Council tank, part of the SDF, engages ISIS positions (Credit Image: Ed Nash)

 

Donald Trump recently praised what he described as the sacrifice of Kurds in the fight against ISIS across Iraq and Syria to the international press. His declaration was made shortly after the State Department removed the previous rather limited reference to the Syrian Kurdish militias known as the Yekîneyên Parastina Gel (Peoples Protection Units – YPG) from its ‘Country Reports on Terrorism 2017’. As a consequence, President Erdogan of Turkey accused the US of breaking its word in agreements reached between the two countries whereby the YPG were to withdraw from the town of Manbij in northern Syria.

A dangerously volatile nexus — composed of a range of disparate groups including the YPG — now exists in Manbij. These disparate groups operate in the same space as Turkish troops, who seek to advance their own, opposing agenda in the region.

If we read into America’s intention[1] to take a more steadfast position on backing the Syrian Kurds, then the US is very much antagonising a long time NATO ally and critical regional partner with whom relations are already at an unparalleled low.

The reasons for these tensions are multiple, and thus can hardly be summarised in a few sentences. The focus of this piece is elsewhere. Indeed, it is perhaps wise to understand a bit more about the YPG, what they stand for and why the Turks are so concerned about them, as they form such a thorny part of the disagreement.

The YPG and Yekîneyên Parastina Jin (Women’s Protection Units – YPJ) are predominantly Kurdish militias which represent the armed wing of the PYD (Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat or Democratic Union Party). The latter organisation subscribes to the ideological, philosophical and historical writings of Abdullah Öcalan, a Kurdish political theorist and guerrilla leader who originally founded the infamous PKK, who have fought a bitter war against the Turkish military on and off for almost forty years.

This connection arguably explains the Turks’ antipathy. For them, the PYD/YPG are simply the same as the PKK and thus represent an intolerable threat to their security (for an interesting refutation of this, see Hurriyet Daily News and Foreign Policy). As the SDF – which the YPG forms the major component of – controls the whole of the north-east of Syria as the Democratic Federation of Northern Syria (generally known as Rojava), the Turk’s concerns are understandable.

Öcalan originally founded the PKK as a Soviet/Stalinist style communist party seeking a socialist Kurdish state but, inspired by the writings of American social theorist Murray Bookchin, has since become focused upon promoting  Democratic Confederalism, a political theory that mixes Marxism-Leninism, Stalinism, anarchism, and libertarian ideals. Broadly, it espouses the idea that the authority of a central government should be kept to a minimum, that power should be highly decentralised, and local issues should be addressed at a local level; that regional, racial, and religious customs should be respected; and greater attention is need to espouse gender equality and ecological issues. The theory also advocates for a fairer redistribution of wealth along similar lines to European social democracy.

Such a mix of political theories would seem to create a rather schizophrenic ideology that, depending on your personal stance, could be interpreted in any way one deems fit. And there are definite, radical contrasts in how the PYD/YPG conducts itself that demonstrate this. On the one hand, areas under their control have brought women’s rights into fact. On the other hand, however, they have been accused of recruiting child soldiers and criticised for their human rights record, as well as persecution of other political parties in the region.

It is in their reaction to these external criticisms that we see the key to the world’s relationship with the PYD/YPG. Complaints against them by external actors are generally addressed and openly rectified, which stands in stark contrast to just about every other faction involved in the Syrian Civil War, the Assad government included.

What motivates this willingness is the wish to be seen to be a better, more democratic society that can engage with the international community, something the council currently running northern Syria understands it needs desperately. Without a powerful backer, the fledgling experiment in local democracy will be mercilessly crushed by either Assad or the Turks, as what took place with the Kurdish canton of Afrin.

And it seems that the sudden interest in America for sponsoring the YPG beyond the defeat of ISIS could be inspired by the realisation that, if it won’t commit to backing the Kurds and their assorted allies in Syria, then others will. Recently the YPG has made overtures to Assad and the Iranians, seeking their support. With , the sudden renewed interest in the Kurds as a local ally makes sense.

There is no denying that continued support for the YPG/PYD is beset with political complexities, including a number of concerns with the movement’s ideology, that will need to be addressed if it is to continue to receive said support. At this time, however, it is probably the best chance for more reasoned, democratic, and ultimately law-abiding governance in the region.

 

Ed Nash has spent years travelling around the world and, on occasion, interfering as he sees fit. Between June 2015 and July 2016 he volunteered with the Kurdish YPG in its battle against ISIS in Syria. His book Desert Sniper: How One Ordinary Brit Went to War Against ISIS was published in September 2018. 

 

Notes:

[1] Which, when concerning Syria, may be best accomplished with a crystal ball.

Image Source: the picture was provided by the author

Strife Series on United Nations Peacekeeping, Part I – The Fate of UN Peacekeeping and the Changing Tides of Geopolitics

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By Dr Samir Puri

The UN Security Council (Credit Image: UN Photo/Mark Garten)

The UN’s viability to act as a peacekeeping force for good is always constrained by geopolitics. When the geopolitical tides change – as they evidently are in the twenty-first century, with the rise of China, the resurgence of Russia, and other developments – the UN feels the impact. When it comes to peacekeeping, the UN risks being lost at sea.

We tend to associate UN peacekeeping with interventions in war-ravaged countries. The UN’s blue helmets have deployed to countries like Yugoslavia in the 1990s, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in the 2000s, mitigating the cataclysms of these wars.

In fact, keeping the peace between countries was the UN’s original mission. Today, the convulsions of a changing balance of power between major world powers are starting to be felt. As such, the UN’s original mission may become much more relevant once again.

“The Parliament of Man”, wrote historian Paul Kennedy, never mentioned the word “peacekeeping” in its Charter: “In 1945, the term meant keeping the peace among nations and checking those that threatened their neighbours or countries further afield”. Indeed, when the UN Charter was signed in San Francisco on 26 June 1945 by 50 countries, the atomic bombs were yet to fall on Japan. The UN formally came into existence on 24 October 1945, mere weeks after the Second World War ended.

It is from the theme of Kennedy’s seminal work, “The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers”, that the UN was born. Since its origins, the number of UN member states has almost quadrupled to 193. But the five permanent members of the UN Security Council (U.S., UK, France, China and Russia) have stubbornly retained their places around the famous horse shoe table in the UN headquarters in New York.

The UN Security Council is where peacekeeping dreams can die. There is no better demonstration than the UN’s inability to prevent Syria’s civil war from entering its eighth year. The carnage in Aleppo in 2016, or Ghouta in 2018, can make us ask what the point of the UN is. Ever since Russia’s military intervened in 2015 to prop up Bashar al-Assad’s regime, Russia’s diplomats have wielded their Security Council veto to help Assad’s forces win on the battlefield.

The UN’s “Geneva Process”, run by Staffan De Mistrua, has repeatedly stalled. If it did not have enough obstacles already, Russia has convened its own talks in Sochi and Astana to exclude the anti-Assad rebels and undermine UN attempts to negotiate an end to Syria’s civil war. Russia simply will not allow the UN to set the pace and tone of conflict management over Syria.

Nevertheless, the UN will never be written out of the script entirely. UN agencies, like the UNDP and the UNHCR, may still be useful when it comes to clearing up messy post-conflict situations.

Even after US President George W. Bush famously circumvented the Security Council to invade Iraq in 2003, the UN still played a nascent role after the invasion.  The UN sent its best man for the job, Sergio Vieira De Mello, to try to broker a political deal amongst Iraq’s newly liberated factions after Saddam Hussein had been toppled. On 19 August, 2003, Al Qaeda militants killed De Mello in a suicide truck bombing. Cowed, the UN withdrew its field presence from Iraq at a time when it was badly needed. Bush condemned the bombing. Even if his invasion of Iraq had undermined and divided the UN, then-Secretary General Kofi Annan had still tried to support Iraq’s reconstruction.

Wars such as in Iraq and Syria involve high geopolitical stakes for major world powers. In such wars, the UN’s ability to intervene and stabilise conflicts tends to be low. Conversely, the UN will always remain a much more viable platform for interventions in conflicts with lower geopolitical stakes.

As Peter Rudolf noted in a 2017 article for Survival, “peacekeeping operations have undergone considerable change since the turn of the century. Peacekeepers are deployed in a greater variety of scenarios, ranging from monitoring ceasefires to complex peace operations. The protection of civilians has become an important focus, and operations have become more robust in their use of force to defend their mandate. Despite these changes, the UN continues to champion its original peacekeeping principles, specifically the consent of the parties. Peace operations, like the evolving MONUSCO mission in the DRC, and MINUSMA in Mali have “blurred the line between peace keeping and peace enforcement”, according to Rudolf.

Elsewhere in the world, the UN provides all manner of bespoke conflict interventions that fall short of peacekeeping. In Colombia, after President Juan Manual Santos agreed to a peace deal with the FARC, ending over five decades of guerrilla war, UN observers supervised the FARC’s handover of weapons in 2017. This is vital work for which the impartiality of the UN’s personnel is an asset.

Then there is mediation and UN good offices. As Roxaneh Bazergan of the UN’s Mediation Support Unit explains, the UN provides technical support to regional organisations that try to manage wars, like the African Union in the DRC, and the OSCE in Ukraine. In 2018, Secretary-General Antonio Guterres appointed a new envoy to the Yemen conflict, charging Martin Griffiths to broker peace in the war-torn country. The odds may be stacked against Griffiths, but the UN should at least try.

Wherever there is a conflict, the UN is sure to be providing or offering some sort of specialist service. From full blown peacekeeping missions, to disaster relief, to mediation support and envoys. It is hardly fair to accuse the UN and its agencies of shirking the challenge.

Rather, the real question is whether the geopolitical winds are blowing favourably for the UN to make an impact. The pride of the great powers will often be the UN’s first hurdle. The UN could either be set up to fail, or simply not be invited in the first place.

The rise and the fall of great powers always sets the overall tone, which is why we should pay attention to the changes that are clearly afoot in the international order. The U.S. is slowly shifting from being the world’s undisputed heavyweight champion, to the world’s disputed heavyweight champion.

China will back the UN when its national interests allow it. For example, if the UN can stabilise an African country that China does business with, Beijing will not stand in the way. Otherwise, China will certainly block UN processes that intrude on its great power space. For instance, China prevented the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) from being applied in disputes in the South China Sea.

For the great powers, the UN has always been useful when convenient, and an obstacle when in the way of national interest. We should expect to witness much more of this as the world enters a new phase of rivalry and geopolitical competition.

 

Dr Samir Puri is a lecturer in War Studies at King’s College London. His most recent book is called Fighting and Negotiating with Armed Groups: the Difficulty of Securing Strategic Outcomes. In 2017, his article, “The Strategic Hedging of Iran, Russia, and China: Juxtaposing Participation in the Global System with Regional Revisionism”, was published by the Journal of Global Security Studies.

Image Source: 

https://news.un.org/en/story/2013/09/451502-un-security-council-agrees-rid-syria-chemical-weapons-endorses-peace-process   

The limits of US security cooperation in Jordan

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By: Peter Kirechu

Barack_Obama_and_Abdullah_II
President Barack Obama Meets with King Abdullah II of Jordan in the Oval Office on 26 April, 2013. Source: Wikimedia.

The most notable feature of President Barack Obama’s partnership-based counterterrorism doctrine­–roughly defined–is its central focus on training and arming local security services to independently deal with emerging terrorism threats. The President’s doctrine is unfortunately fraught with inconsistent performance of US-trained security services, especially among fragile states in the Middle East and beyond. Whether in Iraq, Yemen, or Afghanistan, singular focus on capacity building within the security sector has failed to remedy the governance failures that fuel instability within the region.

In Jordan, the United States (US) enjoys a long history of sustained political, economic and military cooperation which dates back to 1951. However, since the self-styled Islamic State established a cross-border presence in Syria, concerns with the contagion of trained militants across Jordan’s borders have led to substantial increases in US security assistance. In February 2015, the United States expanded its annual aid to Jordan from $660 million to $1 billion. The funds were directed towards core counterterrorism priorities (border protection, C4ISR, quick-reaction airlift capabilities) and also the immediate humanitarian demands incurred by the Syrian refugee crisis.

Though the US-Jordanian security relationship is less fraught with discord when compared with other states in the region, this assessment slightly deceives a growing angst within the Jordanian public. Since the brutal loss of Jordanian pilot, Muath al-Kasaesbeh, to the Islamic State in 2014, the public is increasingly apprehensive of its government’s support of US policy prerogatives. The pilot’s death stood as a stark reminder of the costs paid by the Jordanian military–and the public writ large–in small part due to the government’s role within the US-led anti-Islamic State coalition.

Despite this fomenting anxiety, the United States appears squarely focused on the more proximate security threats borne by the Syrian conflict. But as the Salafi-Jihadist landscape evolves throughout the region, Jordan will remain an attractive target due to the available reservoir of disenchanted locals eager for a brighter economic future and resentful of the government’s stunted reforms. Unless the United States adopts a more balanced security assistance approach, one that emphasizes comprehensive governance reforms, the current policy will remain inadequate to the underlying causes of domestic instability. 

Jihadist entreaties on a vulnerable public

Since 2013, Jordan has served as the training and staging ground for Syrian rebels battling the Islamic State in Southern Syria. This training effort has slowly expanded and now includes the provision of Anti-Tank Guided Missiles (ATGM) to various US-supported rebel factions. This covert effort proceeded under limited public scrutiny until the Islamic State’s capture and subsequent beheadings of several western journalists and aid workers. These gruesome executions ultimately triggered the US-led aerial bombing campaign against the jihadist group in both Iraq and Syria.

The Jordanian government joined the US effort, viewing its participation as a necessary measure aimed at shoring up Jordan’s national security. At the outset, the public’s response was initially quite supportive but subsequent research polls conducted by the Arab Center for Research and Studies revealed that a majority of respondents viewed the campaign as more beneficial to the United States, Israel and Iran, rather than to Jordan’s security and stability. Though Jordanians expressed early support for their government’s role within the coalition, many did not consider the country’s security interests under direct threat.

But once Lt. Muath al-Kasasbeh was captured and gruesomely executed, his death elevated formerly muted discontent with Jordan’s role within the coalition. Those who not normally involve themselves with the ebbs and flows of foreign affairs found themselves participants in a growing conversation on the merits of their government’s continued involvement in the US-led coalition.

Nonetheless, the participation of roughly 2,200 Jordanian citizens in active battlefronts in Syria and Iraq underscores the government’s concerns with the return of trained militants who may seek to undermine the current governing order. As such, the government’s participation in the US-led coalition appears to be a reasonable response to the rising threat of both domestic and foreign militancy.

On the domestic front, Jordanian authorities have banned cleric that are sympathetic to the Islamic State from delivering public sermons. Other measures include the release of some prominent Salafist clerics with the intent of enlisting their assistance in combatting jihadist rhetoric within the public domain. The government has also adopted a more repressive approach to public dissent, detaining Muslim Brotherhood members and introducing new amendments to the Anti-Terrorism Law. These changes have criminalized the criticism of foreign countries and their leaders while permitting the prosecution of journalists and activists for speech-related crimes–as widely interpreted by the State Security Court.

The crackdown on public speech under the cover of combatting terrorism weighed heavily on Jordan’s decline from a ‘Partially Free’ to a ‘Not Free’ State according to the Freedom’s House  Freedom in the World rankings. This ranking has endured since 2010 and is not likely to improve under current conditions. Unfortunately, the government’s embrace of these policy prerogatives harms the state’s long-term security by ignoring legitimate public grievances and broadening public apathy with stagnated reforms that were once viewed as a bulwark against domestic instability.

Crises of Socio-Economic Patronage

The Hashemite Kingdom’s most urgent economic ails are grounded in the patronage and subsidy system which secures the monarchy’s rule. Regime loyalty underscores the long-running history of generous welfare benefits accorded to East Banker tribes and the pervasive use of personal friendships and tribal relationships to secure professional positions throughout the government. The patronage system is particularly acute within some sectors of the security services, where political and personal relationships often supersede professional conduct and competency.

The unprecedented nine to ten percent increase of the overall Jordanian population as a result of Syrian refugees has pushed the import-heavy Jordanian government into further reliance on foreign financial aid. Through IMF, EU, and US financial support, the country’s budget deficits have narrowed though public debt remains at 90 percent and unemployment increased from 14 percent to 22 percent in 2014. Due to the government’s overdependence on a politically motivated patronage system, systemic reforms are anathema to those who have historically thrived under public benefits. Thus efforts to curb this reliance ultimately undermine the Monarchy’s ability to institute meaningful economic changes. Nonetheless, progress towards this difficult objective remains a worthwhile goal for Jordan’s overall security.

The international community’s traditional responses to Jordan’s precarious economic position often focus on broadening the country’s financial reserves through infusions of foreign aid. But as long as foreign direct investments serve as the preferred model of external financial support, the government should channel these funds towards economic activities that utilize the immense labor reserves offered by the refugee population and Jordan’s unemployed youth.

By adopting economic policies that target this readily available labor pool, the government can provide opportunities for a highly vulnerable population in the low-skill manufacturing, agriculture, and construction sectors. Due to the widespread destruction of Syria’s manufacturing output, and the slow disappearance of formerly productive commercial centers and trade routes, the Jordanian government has the opportunity to develop these lost capabilities within its borders. Such an approach similarly coopts the potential diversion of marginalized youths and refugees into criminality or radicalization.

This approach not only addresses the socio-economic grievances that threaten the government’s long-term stability, but also changes public perceptions of the government’s commitment to meaningful reforms.

Due to the inflamed crises that characterize the Jordan’s neighborhood, the opposition movement has so far restrained itself from overt agitation for regime change. This patient resolve is perhaps rooted in the hopes that meaningful change might emerge through cooperation with the monarchy, rather than the revolutionary violence that has resulted in widespread human suffering elsewhere in the region. Unlike other places in the region, the government has the unlikely benefit of a relatively subdued opposition movement. It should capitalize on this level of calm agitation for change and dedicate more of its foreign assistance toward addressing the full breadth of opposition grievances.

The Limits of Narrow Counterterrorism Approaches

It is likely that the more visible results of effective counterterrorism support occur on the operational theater. Local security services elevate their targeting, surveillance, and response capabilities and gain an operational edge against insurgents and terrorist networks through US training and equipment support. However, when partner states accept US assistance, these transactions are also de facto political decisions with immense implications on the governed.

Recipient governments that focus their enhanced counterterrorism capabilities on regime survival or personal enrichment, as seen in Iraq, are unlikely to survive in the long-term. For others, security assistance and cooperation becomes a publically poisonous symbol of US encroachment on state sovereignty as seen in Yemen and Pakistan. In these environments, security-centered assistance is commonly squandered and US national interests harmed in the long-term.

The United States must therefore balance its security-dominant engagement with the Jordanian government and dedicate more resources to the socio-political and economic factors addressed herein. Placing governance and economic reform conditions on US security assistance, is the first step towards changing the United States’ reception within the Jordanian public. These conditions also incentivize the Jordanian government to balance security-based expenditures with the socio-economic investments that target the governance roots of instability. Over time, it is these investments that build economic, political, and social resilience throughout the Jordanian public and prevent radicalization among the most vulnerable sectors of the general public.

 

 

Peter Kirechu is a graduate student at the Mercyhurst Institute for Intelligence Studies where he focuses on civil strife, insurgencies and counterterrorism. Mr. Kirechu was also a 2013 Boren Scholar to Jordan where he studied the security and humanitarian effects of Syria’s civil conflict. Twitter: @PeterKirechu

Putin’s sleight of hand in Syria

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By: Peter Kirechu

Russian_Sukhoi_Su-25_at_Latakia_(2)
Russian Su-25 Fighter Jets taking-off in Latakia. Source: Wikimedia

On March 14, Russian President Vladimir Putin unexpectedly announced the withdrawal of Russian forces from Syria as UN-sponsored peace talks began in Geneva. Putin’s withdrawal–however partial–challenged the Obama administration’s long-held quagmire sentence on the Russian role inside Syria. Putin showed that a limited military campaign could preserve the regime from collapse without committing to a costly ground campaign. Taking stock of the Russian intervention thus far, current evidence suggests that Russian influence is unlikely to diminish.

In deciding to intervene militarily in Syria, Putin concluded that an Assad victory (or accommodation) would likely buttress Russian interests in the region. He secured his current advantage by capitalizing on a divided armed opposition usurped by Salafi-jihadists and what many in the international community perceive as an incoherent US strategy.

As such, an assessment on where Russia’s influence has mattered the most unveils great insights as to Putin’s end-state agenda. Putin’s Syria strategy is tightly wedded to the eventual outcome of the war, and thus a commitment to an eventual negotiated settlement. Russia intends to maintain a pliable government in Damascus; one that ensures Russian military access inside Syria as a balance to other international powers.

Forcing a Rebel “Reset” to Russia’s Advantage

When the last round of UN-sponsored peace talks on the Syrian conflict collapsed in early February, members of the International Syria Support Group (ISSG) scrambled to arrest the spiraling violence through the cessation of violence agreement completed in Munich on February 11. This accord set the conditions for a tenuous peace that has so far held despite numerous violations largely attributed to the Assad regime.

Significantly, the Munich agreement attempted to force a wedge between moderate and hardline Islamist groups­–principally between the Al-Nusra Front and other close affiliates. Since Russia vowed to continue its aerial campaign in territories occupied by both hardline and moderate groups, observers suggested that the truce was perhaps designed to force division within rebel ranks. Though  evidence suggests that the ties between the Nusra Front and some of its allies such as Ahrar al-Sham­ are often fluid, the Munich agreement was a significant step towards addressing what role (if any) certain powerful Islamist groups may have in Syria’s future.

Through the Munich agreement, Putin ostensibly bound the United States in ipso facto agreement to the Russian perspective on the fractured opposition. By simply defining all opposition groups as irreconcilable terrorists, the Russian position advanced only two non-negotiable options: continued bombardment or a reprieve under ceasefire conditions; roughly 100 armed rebel groups joined the truce before implementation day on February 27. Ultimately, Russia’s discriminate targeting of the moderate opposition, combined with the regime’s collective punishment, exacted the desired concessions from the rebels and their external supporters.

Putin accurately assessed that the likelihood of the US-led coalition mounting a direct challenge to Russia’s aerial advantage was quite unlikely. Meanwhile, the regime parleyed its victories in Latakia, Deraa, and Aleppo to bolster its territorial gains in the event that the truce collapsed. Washington’s most viable relief to the beleaguered opposition rested on escalating arms provisions as an incentive for greater collaboration and unity among the rebels. This option, however, bore minimal benefit given Russian air superiority and the possibility that it would scuttle the developing ceasefire agreement.

But since the brokered ceasefire went into effect roughly one month ago violence has decreased by nearly 90 percent. This relative calm has also opened the space for peaceful protest as hundreds of thousands of local Syrians have again flowed into the streets demanding Assad’s departure. This return to peaceful assembly, however, occurs at a time when the moderate opposition is beset by dwindling prospects of an outright victory, or a favorable negotiating position in Geneva. This is precisely the outcome desired by Russia as peace talks resume: a militarily waning moderate opposition, undermined by the prominence of Salafi-jihadist groups, and thus pliable in any forthcoming settlement.

Managing Assad’s Potential Return to Intransigence

Prior to the withdrawal announcement, the regime was insulated in western Syria and the moderate opposition was increasingly battered and fractured as Assad appeared to have his way militarily. Assad’s resurgence translated into his regime’s growing intransigence on the diplomatic front. Days before talks resumed in Geneva, regime representatives revived the poisonous question of Assad’s political future, stiffening their position on Assad’s surviving role as head-of-state. Perhaps emboldened by their increasing military leverage, the representatives veered outside the primary focus of the talks, which is largely focused on developing a workable transition process.

These developments and the timing of the Russian withdrawal suggests that Putin’s drawdown may to some level curb regime behavior in Geneva. A slight panic within the regime may prove beneficial, though the fidelity of this particular claim is hard to discern. What appears clear is that the extent of Russia’s withdrawal will remain opaque for several weeks.

A complete departure of the Russian military presence is quite unlikely since the naval base at Tartus and the air base at Hmeimim will remain operational. The Syrian battlefield has certainly served as a testing ground for Russian military hardware. And it was (and will likely remain) an excellent proving ground for Russia’s execution of a high intensity aerial and ground campaign; allowing these capabilities to recede would be a gross error in Putin’s eyes.

The Russian Approach Post-Palmyra

Evidence from Russia’s military operations inside Syria revealed the disproportionate targeting of non-Islamic State aligned rebel groups. Nonetheless, Russian air raids have provided the necessary aerial cover for government troops to advance and retake the historic city of Palmyra which was seized by the Islamic State last May. Meanwhile, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), a coalition of Kurdish, Arab, and Turkmen militias has in recent months wrested away swathes of territory from the Islamic State in a push towards the group’s de-facto capital in Raqqa.

The United States is intently focused on advancing negotiations between the regime and Syria’s main opposition bloc. Such an outcome, if appropriately harnessed, also provides the elusive ground component required to decisively challenge the Islamic State throughout Syria. That Russia floated the possibility of a federal post-war Syria is quite significant, though such an outcome is contingent on an elusive agreement between all parties involved. Given the current conditions, any power-sharing agreement that sets the outlines of a grand security infrastructure will likely be led by the regime, to Russia’s benefit.

The regime’s recent progress in Palmyra opened a new offensive corridor into Deir al-Zor which may extend north into the Islamic State heartland of Raqqa as conditions warrant. Russia calculates that a regime victory in both Raqqa and Deir al-Zor will secure remnants of the regime if Assad leaves in a transition settlement, however unlikely. What remains unclear is whether the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) has the manpower to effectively achieve this objective without substantial reinforcements from surrogate Shia militias from Iraq and beyond. But as Iran deepens its Syria involvement beyond the Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) the regime’s manpower deficits will benefit from these reinforcements.

On the other hand, the United States will continue to face a tough challenge in galvanizing Sunni rebel resistance as regime forces move eastward. And despite the regime’s manpower shortages, Russia is likely to exploit this handicap to maintain its footprint inside Syria. That Russian commitment has slowly transitioned from fighter jet squadrons to close air support via attack helicopters suggests that Russian ground presence will continue.

In the past several days, the weeks-long ceasefire has fallen under immense pressure and mutual violations by both the regime and the armed opposition threaten to tear the deal asunder. Whether the ceasefire survives or falters, Russia’s military role inside Syria is unlikely to recede.

 

 

Peter Kirechu is Graduate Student at the Mercyhurst Institute for Intelligence Studies where he focuses on civil strife, insurgencies and counterterrorism. Mr. Kirechu was also a 2013 Boren Scholar to Jordan where he studied the security and humanitarian effects of Syria’s civil conflict. @PeterKirechu

A ‘Second Hezbollah’: The strategic value of Iran’s proxy warfare policy in Syria

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By: Robert Andrea

Sardar_Qasem_Soleimani-01
Qassem Suleimani – commander of the IRGC’s Quds Force. Source: Wikimedia

Throughout the past thirty years, Iran has arguably been the world’s foremost expert in the use of so-called ‘proxy’ warfare as a tool of statecraft. Whether in Lebanon, Gaza, Yemen, or Iraq, Tehran has displayed a degree of discipline about its use of ‘proxy’ sponsorship hitherto unmatched by few, if any, other states. Furthermore, Iran seems to have learned, far better than anyone else, that proxy warfare is most strategically valuable when used as a tactic of statecraft and not as a general foreign policy strategy.

And now today, the utilization of this tactical-strategic relationship between ‘proxy warfare’ and macro-level foreign policy by Iran is once again on display- this time in Syria.

Iran in Syria

As of this writing, the fifth year of the Syrian Civil War is now nearly a month old. With casualty figures approaching 500,000, a tenuous ceasefire is seemingly near to a collapse and portending a fresh round of fighting. And with seemingly no party with the capability to secure a victory on the battlefield, all signs point to both a military, and a diplomatic stalemate.

However, by replicating a strategy of ‘proxy warfare’ it has used in the past, Iran seems to have positioned itself better than any other actor. It is thanks to this strategy that Tehran will likely be able to emerge from any kind of endgame in Syria with their strategic interests in the region intact.

Generally, the narrative holds that Iran’s interests in the Syrian Civil War are tied directly to the survival of Syrian president Bashar al-Assad.[1] The Iranians themselves, at least publicly, seem to have confirmed this. In a December 2015 statement, Ali Akbar Velayati (top foreign policy adviser to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei) reaffirmed that the fate of Assad was a ‘red line’ for Iran. This seems to indicate that any diplomatic solution to the war in Syria would, from the Iranian perspective, be assessed as a zero-sum appraisal.

In other words, if Assad stays, Iran ‘wins’, but if he were to be forced out, the general consensus would be that Iran would ‘lose’.

Regarding the long term fate of Assad, Brett McGurk (U.S. Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL), said in a March interview, ‘there is no way conceivable that Assad’s writ will ever extend throughout the country again. It’s just not realistic after everything that’s happened’. If this is assumed to be true, the prevailing assumptions would also suggest that it’s no more realistic that Iran will be able to secure its foreign policy goals in Syria.

Unfortunately, this narrative overlooks the more long-term geopolitical goal that Iran has in Syria.

The Beirut-Damascus highway

Masked with rhetoric about protecting Shi’a shrines and fighting terrorism, the reason Iran has been so invested in the survival of Assad is that, until now, he has been the guarantor of Iran’s supply lines, through Syria, to Hezbollah in Lebanon.[2] With its ally Hezbollah being the only real apparatus (in the absence of Assad) with which Iran is able to project power in the Levant (particularly via-à-vis Israel), the relationship between Hezbollah and Iran is, by any metric, much more vital to Tehran’s long-term foreign policy in the region than is their relationship with Bashar al-Assad. It is therefore incorrect to assess Iran’s success or failure in Syria relative to the survival of Assad. Rather, ‘success’ on a strategic level for Iran in Syria ultimately depends on whether or not the supply conduit to Hezbollah is maintained.

To that end and through the use of ‘proxy’ by armed organizations, Iran has provided itself with a strategic fallback for their long-term interest in the Levant. This fallback retains its strategic value for the Iranians even if Assad and/or his regime were to be removed from power, either militarily or as part of a diplomatic agreement.

A ‘Second Hezbollah’

This fallback revolves around the creation of pro-Assad and, more importantly for this discussion, pro-Tehran militias. These militias, a myriad of whom exist, each go by different names and are based in different regions of Syria. Often (for brevity’s sake), these militias are collectively referred to as the National Defense Forces (NDF) and are estimated to have a combined strength of anywhere between 100,000-120,000 fighters.[3] It’s not always clear to whom these militias report, Assad or their Iranian Revolutionary Guard (IRGC) sponsors, but it is clear that they have been instrumental in bolstering/supporting Syrian government forces.[4] These paramilitary militias, as well as the IRGC and Hezbollah, have been critical to the preservation of the SAA due to the latter’s struggle with attrition and reliability.[5]

This proxy warfare policy replicates a previous Iranian policy used, beginning with Hezbollah in 1982-83, throughout the past three decades. The comparison of the NDF to Hezbollah is not an idle one. IRGC general Hossein Hamedani (since killed in Syria) was reported to have said in 2014 that Iran had created a ‘second Hezbollah’ in Syria.[6]

Although many factions of the NDF are multi-ethnic and cross-sectarian, some of them are comprised of only Allawi and/or Shi’a fighters, from inside or outside Syria. The amalgamation of militias that comprise this ‘second Hezbollah’ do, in fact, bear striking organizational and ideological resemblances to Hezbollah in Lebanon and many of the Shi’a militias in Iraq, both of whom are assisting Iran in training these NDFs and in actual combat operations in Syria.[7] Most of these Shi’a groups fight under the banner of Liwa Abu al-Fadhl al-Abbas, commonly referred to as the LAFA network or, simply, the al-Abbas Brigades.[8]

It is through their sponsorship of these proxy militias, Shi’a or otherwise, that Iran is seeking to ensure the future of their foreign policy goals in Syria and the Levant.

As tactically successful as this militia sponsorship policy has been in preserving the survival of Assad, none of the NDF militias, not even the LAFA network, provide Iran or Assad any sort of military dominance at the moment, or even in the foreseeable future.[9] So how does Iran’s sponsorship of these militias on a tactical level afford it strategic value with respect to their foreign policy objectives in Syria?

Militia diplomacy

The strategic value lies in the diplomatic leverage that Iran has obtained through its sponsorship of the various militias, NDF or otherwise.

Assuming any hypothetical peace negotiations would be earnestly conducted, none of the anti-regime actors can realistically hope to ignore the strategic considerations Iran has in Syria, as Tehran now essentially commands a force of 100,000 strong on the ground. Obviously, it is highly unlikely that all NDF factions would remain loyal to Iran in a negotiated endgame scenario. However, even if only 1%-2% of NDF members maintained their links to Tehran, this would still be more than enough fighters to seriously destabilize any peace efforts. Thus, the Iranians wield a favorable negotiating position. Of course, how much influence the NDF provides Iran at the negotiating table is certainly debatable. It would seem, however, that Iran believes that it will be enough to bargain for, at minimum, a post-Assad regime that isn’t hostile towards Tehran. Combined with the fact that Iran would have thousands (perhaps tens of thousands) of loyal fighters on the ground, its strategic foreign policy imperative – the supply line to Hezbollah in Lebanon – would be secure.[10] While this hypothetical outcome wouldn’t be optimal for Iran, their understanding of using ‘proxy’ capabilities to pursue foreign policy goals on the strategic level would still provide them with a result they could live with in Syria- with or without Assad.

 

 

Robert is an incoming student at King’s College Department of War Studies and will begin pursuing an MA in War Studies this September. His research interests include U.S. and Iranian foreign policy, diplomatic strategy, and proxy warfare. He can be found on Twitter at @Bob__Andrea

 

 

 

Notes:

[1] Diehl, Jackson. “Why Iran Won’t Give up Syria.” The Washington Post, August 2, 2015. Accessed April 6, 2015. https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/why-iran-wont-give-up-syria/2015/08/02/b9269fa2-360c-11e5-9d0f-7865a67390ee_story.html.

[2] Fulton, Will, Joseph Holliday, and Sam Wyer. Iranian Strategy in Syria: A Joint Report by AEI’s Critical Threats Progect & Institute for the Study of War. Report. May 2013. Accessed April 5, 2016. http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/IranianStrategyinSyria-1MAY.pdf. pg. 21.

[3] Lund, Aron. “Who Are the Pro-Assad Militias?” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. March 2, 2015. Accessed April 5, 2016. http://carnegieendowment.org/syriaincrisis/?fa=59215

[4] Ibid.

[5] Kozak, Christopher. “An Army in All Corners”: Assad’s Campaign Strategy in Syria. Institute for the Study of War’s Middle East Security Report. Report. April 2015. Accessed April 5, 2016. http://understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/An Army in All Corners by Chris Kozak 1.pdf. pg. 4.

[6] Chandler, Adam. “An Iranian General Is Killed in Syria.” The Atlantic. October 9, 2015. Accessed April 6, 2016. http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/10/an-iranian-general-killed-in-syria/409963/.

[7] Smyth, Phillip. “How Iran Is Building Its Syrian Hezbollah.” – The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. March 8, 2016. Accessed April 5, 2016. http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/how-iran-is-building-its-syrian-hezbollah.

[8] Anzalone, Christopher. “Zaynab’s Guardians: The Emergence of Shi`a Militias in Syria | Combating Terrorism Center at West Point.” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point. July 23, 2013. Accessed April 6, 2016. https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/zaynabs-guardians-the-emergence-of-shia-militias-in-syria.

[9] McInnis, J. Matthew. “How Many Iranian Forces Are Dying in Syria?” Newsweek. October 28, 2015. Accessed April 06, 2016. http://www.newsweek.com/how-many-iranian-forces-are-fighting-and-dying-syria-388004.

[10] Fulton, Holliday, and Wyer. Iranian Strategy in Syria. pg. 21.