Strife

The Academic Blog of the Department of War Studies, King's College London

You are here: Home / Archives for Strife series

Strife series

Strife Series on British Security Post-Brexit, Part I – Brexit, Empire and British Security

by

By: Dr Samir Puri

The end of its Empire was Britain’s last seismic rearrangement of its alignments and alliances. Today, Britain is slowly and painfully disentangling itself from the European Union. Of course, the two processes are incomparable in all but the most analogical, journalistic terms. Or are they?

“As I look out upon the future of our country in the changing scene of human destiny, I feel the existence of three great circles among the free nations and democracies”, said Winston Churchill in 1948. “The first circle for us is naturally the British Commonwealth and Empire… Then there is also the United States… And finally, there is United Europe.”

Britain’s defence and security has been underpinned by positioning itself at the centre of these three overlapping circles. Doing so has conferred to this Sceptred Isle a uniquely advantageous geopolitical position throughout the tumult of the Cold War and beyond.

While Britain has continued to provide a lynchpin between the USA, Europe and many parts of the wider world, what this means has changed a lot in the last 70 years. Britain’s relationship with the United States has experienced its peaks and troughs but has remained constant. Britain’s accession to the European Economic Community in 1972 led to economic interdependence but stalled any notion of a common currency or political union. But it is the last of the three circles that merit attention here.

In anticipating Brexit’s unfolding, it is the end of Empire that is instructive. There is, as The Economist wrote, an art to leaving in evidence after decolonization, of “breaking up and staying friends”. The Empire was dismantled “as haphazardly as it began, with different territories gaining independence in different ways,” wrote Piers Brendon in The Decline and Fall of the British Empire 1781-1997. The piecemeal manner of its dismantling is striking. Britain’s hold in the New World was diminished by the independence of the United States in 1776. A later iteration of Empire, with its focus on Asia, was eroded by World War Two. The wartime loss of Singapore to the Japanese in 1942 presaged India’s independence five years later. The Suez Crisis of 1956 dealt a blow to British influence in the Middle East. There was, for a time, an aspiration to relocate the Empire’s centre of gravity to Africa, but these colonies became independent throughout the 1960s.

Today, it feels almost otherworldly to conjure up any sense of what the Empire meant. It can also seem immoral, given how out of step much of imperial ideology was in relation to contemporary norms. But to reflect on the defence and security implications of the breakup of the Empire is fruitful. The dismantling of a globe-spanning Empire that had existed in one form or another for centuries was transformative. There was a horrific amount of violence in some theatres of decolonization. But in others, relatively amicable arrangements were made, with security networks underpinning relations between Britain and these former colonies.

The transition from Empire to Commonwealth reminds us that a realignment does not necessarily mean severance. Brexit does not mean the end of Britain’s role in Europe. Rather, it reimagines a relationship that will not suddenly vanish, no matter the dramas of the rupture yet to come.

In a RAND Europe report on ‘Defence and security after Brexit’, the authors observe that “the decision to leave the EU arguably looks likely to have minimal impact on Britain’s conventional defence apparatus in the near term”. In other words, the upheaval for Britain’s military will be moderated by the fact that the EU has never offered a major platform for cooperative military action, and because NATO will remain Britain’s preeminent multilateral military ‘club’. But, RAND opines, “Brexit may pose more immediate practical challenges for security than defence.”

Security, rather than defence, is indeed where Brexit’s impacts will be intricate. The transnational nature of criminality and terrorism and the security implications arising from huge migration flows are for Britain inherently European-facing issues. The Brexit in-tray of UK-EU cooperative policing arrangements is considerable. Policing, serious crime investigations and intelligence work simply cannot be done in the vacuum of a nation-state, given the informational revolution and the relative ease and speed of international travel. The myriad of treaties to be renegotiated will make Brexit akin to uprooting a tree that has had several decades to lay its roots.

The biggest imperial connotation of all, however, is the mindset that led to Brexit in the first place. The essence of British exceptionalism has its roots in the fact that Britain was for so long a globe-straddling superpower. It is perilously hard to argue about the often subconscious impact of the Empire on current British foreign and security policy thinking. Generationally, the impact of the Empire is now much less direct than before. However, a grandiose sense of destiny and purpose – which need not be negative qualities if harnessed in the name of order – still pervade Britain’s sense of global identity.

All national histories are exercises in selective amnesia. The myths that parts of Britain hold of itself – as a plucky nation able to survive on its own wits – are part of the Brexit story. And they spring from the defensive conundrums of bygone ages.  Even in its darkest days, such as after the fall of France in 1940, Britain was able to stand alone and survive a horrific onslaught, while Churchill began ensuring Britain’s survival and longevity as a global player through a realignment with the USA. David Reynolds has called 1940 “the Fulcrum of the twentieth century”. It is not difficult to see why the fall of France began a turn towards the Atlantic – and why this still matters today. The release of Christopher Nolan’s film Dunkirk has almost too much significance to bear.

The Empire and the wars that were fought in its name are essential components of Britain’s sense of global identity. History tells the story that explains Britain’s geopolitical positioning today. Looking historically, and thinking self-reflectively, will be the only way to navigate the humbling that Brexit is sure to spell in relation to British influence in Europe. To imperil British security during the coming realignment is a fate that must be avoided.


Dr Samir Puri is a Lecturer in War Studies where he teaches the MA module on Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism. He is also serving as a strategy adviser to the Commonwealth Secretariat in the establishment of its Countering Violent Extremism unit. Before joining King’s, Dr Puri worked for the Foreign Office (2009-2015) and for RAND (2006-2009). In 2016 his book, ‘Fighting and Negotiating with Armed Groups’, was released by the IISS; and he has extended this analysis to the war in Syria for the Telegraph and Observer newspapers. 

This Strife series focuses on British Security Post-Brexit and will have contributions by Dr Samir Puri; Felix Manig on the security implications of post-Brexit asylum laws; Christina on the UK-USA relationship; and Alfonc Rakaj on British defence commitments. 

Strife Series on Intelligence in the digital age, Part II – Surveillance, data protection and the right to privacy

by

By: Felix Manig

Security camera installations are seemingly ubiquitous in our modern lives.

Counterterrorism efforts in the digital age are characterized by the ability of certain governments to systematically intercept, collect and analyze metadata and private information worldwide. Through the disclosure of classified information on covert global surveillance programs in 2013, the ex-NSA contractor Edward Snowden initiated an important debate on the balance between national security and civil liberties. While proponents of extensive surveillance legislation argue that these measures are necessary in the 21st-century fight to uncover and neutralize terrorism plots, the indiscriminate interception and retention of personal data poses serious challenges to international human rights law.

Surveillance and human rights law

Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights asserts the right to privacy and prohibits states from unlawful and arbitrary interference with the privacy of individuals within their jurisdiction. The Covenant clearly states that any search, surveillance or collection of data about a person must be lawful and authorized. Furthermore, once personal information is collected, states and their relevant agencies must ensure the protection of data against unlawful or arbitrary access. It is evident that governments have an obligation to develop legitimate counterterrorism measures and the rights of victims of terrorism should be the focal point when discussing the proportionality of such strategies.  However, governments with the necessary capabilities have institutionalized operations and legislation which is simply not compatible with the Right to Privacy under article 17.

And we do not have to look far for drastic examples. In November 2016, the British government passed the Investigatory Powers Bill, better known as ‘The Snooper’s Charter’, which is arguably the most extreme surveillance law in the western world today. The bill provides British intelligence agencies with extensive powers of snooping, recording and hacking of communications data, forces service providers to store details of customer online movement for 12 months, and makes this information accessible to dozens of public authorities. This bill, which astoundingly attracted little public outcry, effectively removes the right to online privacy and was scrutinized by the European Court of Justice.

Tensions between intelligence agencies and private technology enterprises

Despite the introduction of such worrying legislative measures, intelligence agencies have voiced concern that they are losing the technological edge over potential terrorists as tech companies are increasingly focusing on developing sophisticated encryption tools and software to reassure their customers’ privacy concerns. The rift between agencies and tech giants surfaced publically when Apple rejected an FBI order to unlock the iPhone used by the San Bernadino shooter Syed Farook. Other companies like Google and Facebook consequently doubled down on statements denying law enforcement agencies a backdoor access to their servers and products. Understandably, those with bad intentions can equally access proprietary encryption software and drop off the radar to avoid eavesdropping. Yet, it appears that major companies have formed a consensus to place a premium on user privacy and security, and warned of the potential implications of providing agencies with access to virtually any of their products. This move is likely to spread through companies dealing with vast amounts of user data as their customers are becoming increasingly wary about privacy concerns. Many messaging services such as ChatSecure or WhatsApp have options to encrypt content its users write and share. By using a virtual private network (VPN), users can circumvent geo-restrictions, censorship, and increase their security when online. Lastly, so-called ‘proxy servers’ hide the online traffic of devices and provide anonymity.

The road ahead

In their fight against terrorism, it is crucial for governments to take this balance seriously. The Investigatory Powers Bill flies in the face of the principle of proportionality and fails to protect individuals from arbitrary targeting. Ben Emmerson, Special Rapporteur on counterterrorism and human rights for the UN, has made important recommendations for the way forward. He calls for detailed and evidence-based public justification for the systematic surveillance of the online community, stresses the need for strong and independent oversight bodies to assess existing programs, and proposes case by case decision-making on the proportionality of interfering with an individual’s data.

If unchecked, the current technological capabilities of intelligence services have serious negative impacts on the privacy of everyone relying on modern technology in their daily lives. In the end, the question of surveillance and privacy falls in line with the greater theme of balancing liberty and security. There is an argument to be made that sacrificing more freedoms to ensure our security is a false choice. The NSA itself has failed to provide compelling evidence that its programs had directly thwarted any terrorist attack, thereby posing serious questions about effectiveness.

The question of liberty versus security is clearly an ideological one with no easy answers. Nonetheless, this debate is now more necessary than ever. Until this debate takes place in a meaningful and serious way, all that ordinary citizens can do is take small steps to protect themselves and their data when accessing the internet.

Felix (@felix_manig) is a postgraduate in International Relations at King’s College London. He focuses on conflict resolution strategies, political violence, and human rights. Outside of academia, he is Series Editor at Strife and advocates for human rights defenders across the world at Peace Brigades International. 

This Strife series focuses on intelligence in the digital age and will have contributions by Jessica Malekos Smith on Russian intelligence operations; on TOR and the challenges around anonymity by Charlie Campesinos; on Proprietary vs Open source encryption by Hemant S; on digital surveillance by Felix Manig and finally an interview with Prof David Omand of King’s College London on intelligence reforms in the UK. 

Image credit: http://www.riams.org/2012/10/31/changes-to-ripa-removal-of-surveillance-powers-2/

Feature image credit: http://bordc.org/news/baltimore-polices-secret-surveillance-comes-light/

Strife Series on Intelligence in the digital age, Part I – The Information Doppelgänger in Warfare

by

By: Jessica “Zhanna” Malekos Smith

MOSCOW, RUSSIA. DECEMBER 23, 2014. Russia’s president Vladimir Putin (C) arrives at a session of the Collective Security Council of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) at Moscow’s Kremlin. Ilya Pitalev/TASS [Photo via Newscom]

“Why, what’s the meaning of it?” he thought with vexation.

“Why have I really gone out of my mind, or what?” – The Double

The Russian military’s conception of psychological operations is eerily similar to Fyodor Mikhailovich Dostoyevsky’s 1866 novella, The Double. In fact, this story is an insightful teaching device for anyone who wishes to understand Reflexive Control.

Reflexive Control is a psychological warfare technique that was developed by the Soviet military to influence enemy commanders in their decision-making processes. To promote an understanding of this technique across the U.S. armed services, this article offers a creative approach. And why not? According to this Soviet military doctrine, “[c]ontrol of an opponent’s actions is a creative character.”

But first, let’s begin with the story

Dostoyevsky was a 19th-century Russian novelist who possessed a remarkable talent for probing the depths of human psychology. His novella, The Double, is about a government bureaucrat, Mr. Golyadkin, who one day encounters his sinister doppelgänger (“a ghostly double or counterpart of a living person”). Shortly after befriending his double, Mr. Golyadkin is incessantly plagued by him and has difficulty distinguishing between reality and his paranoid fantasies. In the end, he is overtaken by his madness. So how does this relate to psychological operations?

Similar to Mr. Golyadkin’s disorienting experiences, psychological operations also serve to mislead the adversary with false information, thereby impairing their cognition and objective decision-making process. Lest the reader think that a physical doppelgänger is coming for them like poor Mr. Golyadkin, this piece is about Reflexive Control in the guise of an ‘Information Doppelgänger.’

The concept is simple: Based on your adversary’s unique proclivities and implicit biases, the aim is to construct a tantalizingly misleading ‘Information Doppelgänger’, that will deceive them and hamper their efforts to discover your true strategic objectives.

Targeting Military Commanders – The Reflexive Control Method

Military commanders are prime targets of Reflexive Control. This method, as defined by Timothy Thomas is “a means of conveying to a partner or an opponent specially prepared information to incline him to voluntarily make the predetermined decision desired by the initiator of the action.” This aspect of Soviet military doctrine is based on three pillars: (1) influencing the enemy commander’s perception of the situation, (2) shaping their mission objectives and planning procedures, and (3) impairing effective decision-making processes. The idea being, if one can indirectly control the enemy military commander’s decision-making process, then the aggregate effect is control over their troops and the combat environment. To influence an opponent, however, it first requires developing a comprehensive understanding of the target’s deductive decision making processes and constructing an Information Doppelgänger to mislead the target: “In warfare control of an opponent’s actions is achieved by deluding him as to one’s own intentions, capability, state, and actions of troops and concealment of their actual position[.]”

While intelligence has traditionally been divided into two basic categories of collection and analysis, perhaps it is time to augment this conventional framework with a third category – the propagation of intentionally false information.  Intelligence, as Mark Lowenthal describes in Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, encompasses not only military information, but also ‘political, economic, social, environmental, health, and cultural[.]’

Information Warfare

But has Russia applied Reflexive Control in recent years?

According to Maria Sngovaya of the Institute for the Study of War, Russia has used this technique in the ongoing Ukrainian conflict: “Moscow has used this technique skillfully to persuade the U.S. and its European allies to remain largely passive in the face of Russia’s efforts to disrupt and dismantle Ukraine through military and non-military means.”

As a subset of information warfare, the Russian military leverages psychological operations to misinform enemy military commanders. As the Russian Major General Art M. Ionov wrote, false information is thoughtfully constructed based on the adversary’s personal “skill and experience” the operator’s estimation of the “effectiveness of the device utilized,” and surrounding political and social factors. Such methods of psychological artifice help conceal the Russian military’s true strategic objectives. This is achieved by establishing a psychosis in the target to “shape the enemy’s initial situation estimate” and ultimately influence their objective-planning process.

Further, to achieve its strategic objective, Russia’s military will first employ information operations to paralyze the adversary and then, if necessary, apply tactical force to overwhelm and consume it. The rationale being, once information superiority is achieved, the path to attaining the strategic objective will be less perilous. For as Russian Colonel S.G. Chekinov and Lieutenant General S.A. Bogdanov explain in Military Thought  “[n]o goal will be achieved in future wars unless one belligerent gains information superiority over the other.” Another benefit to this approach is that it allows one to maintain the key element of surprise. It also reduces the risk of physical harm to the warfighter by first disorienting the adversary and then striking at it from a relatively safe distance.

Overall, false information campaigns – to include the use of an Information Doppelgänger –  are part and parcel of achieving information superiority over an adversary. And as the effects of psychological warfare become more pronounced in our digital Information Age, the concept of an Information Doppelgänger is an excellent teaching device for educating others about Reflexive Control. Thus, whether you are a civilian or member of the armed services, Dostoyevsky has much to teach us about ourselves; for as he sagely wrote, as “profound as psychology is, it’s a knife that cuts both ways.”

Jessica “Zhanna” Malekos Smith is an M.A. candidate at King’s College London, Department of War Studies. Previously, she was a Postdoctoral Fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at the Harvard Kennedy School. This article was earlier published in RealClearDefense on 13 January 2017.

This Strife series focuses on intelligence in the digital age and will have contributions by Jessica Malekos Smith on Russian intelligence operations; on TOR and the challenges around anonymity by Charlie Campesinos; on Proprietary vs Open source encryption by Hemant S; on digital surveillance by Felix Manig and finally an interview with Prof David Omand of King’s College London on intelligence reforms in the UK. 

Image source: http://dailysignal.com/2015/01/07/insiders-account-putin-uses-media-brainwash-russians/

Strife Series on Counterterrorism and Human Rights, Part V – A perpetual state of emergency: the case of France

by

By: Silvia Sclafani

© AFP / Lionel Bonaventure | Police patrol in Paris on November 14, 2015 at the Eiffel Tower, which has been closed to the public following a series of coordinated attacks in and around Paris late November 13, that left at least 128 people dead.

In times of crisis, governments often impose a state of emergency in which national security takes priority over individual rights originally safeguarded by the state. A state of emergency and the ensuing heightened security measures are intended to last for a short period, during which the government attempts to secure the state and restore order after facing imminent danger. In the case of France, a state of emergency is declared by the President with approval by the Council of Ministers in cases of ‘imminent danger arising from grave attacks on the public order, or circumstances demonstrating public calamity.’ [1] However, the renewal of the state of emergency in France has had a minimal effect on averting terrorist threats and has had disproportionately affected citizens of migrant backgrounds as the extended powers of search, seizure and detention have led to profiling and potential abuse.

Current State of Emergency in France

Since the terrorist attacks in Paris (in 2015) and in Nice (in 2016), France has been under a continued state of emergency with no clear end in sight. After the initial Charlie Hebdo attacks in January 2015, President François Hollande declared a state of emergency in Paris. This was then extended to a nationwide state of emergency in November 2015 after the second terror attack on various locations throughout Paris, which killed 130 people.[2] Since the Nice attacks in 2016, this nationwide-state of emergency has been maintained and recently extended by French lawmakers until after the 2017 elections.

The current state of emergency law allows the government greater policing powers and the ability to conduct searches without warrants, ‘shut down demonstrations, impose curfews, confiscate weapons, and put people under house arrest.’ Given the increasing frequency of terror attacks, France has tightened existing counter-terror measures to decrease the likelihood of yet another terrorist attack against the nation. The French government voted to write the state of emergency law into the constitution as of February of 2016 which expands policing powers even further. The ensuing proposal to ban individuals holding double citizenships of their French one – if convicted of terrorism-related offences – also sparked serious debate. Considering that most French citizens with dual citizenship come from migrant backgrounds, fears that this could lead to higher incidences of migrants being treated as ‘second-class citizens’ rose. President Hollande withdrew this proposal after it caused much backlash and controversy.

Implications for human rights

The state of emergency has proven to have negative effects on human rights. Most notably, these negative consequences affect French Muslim and North African populations, as they make up the majority of those who have been subjected to searches and placed under house arrest. This has led to increased profiling as well as tensions between ethnic French and Arab communities. According to Human Rights Watch, ‘This abuse has traumatized families and tarnished reputations, leaving targets feeling like second-class citizens.’ Bernard Cazeneuve, the French Interior Minister released a statement after the November 2015 attacks condemning the abuse of these expanded powers: some restaurants and homes near Paris were raided and had their doors broken by the police. In another report, the police broke into the home of a couple in the Barbés district in Paris and began beating two men. The police detained the couple and claimed they acted because they heard them use the term ‘Daesh.’ The use of violence and increased suspicion deny these people basic rights such as security and due process.

Effects on security remain questionable  

Despite the dramatic efforts of the French government to identify terror suspects through its emergency measures, only 7 percent of 4,000 searches under the emergency laws have led to court proceedings. Furthermore, post-November 2015 attacks, between 350 and 400 people were placed under house arrest; yet, the Paris counter-terrorism office only opened five terrorism-related investigations during the same period. In reality, French legislation offers favourable powers to its judiciary to proceed with prosecutions against terrorist suspects. The low percentage of court hearings resulting out of measures from the state of emergency laws poses serious questions about their effectiveness. A study conducted by a Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry found the continued state of emergencies as having a ‘limited impact’ on security. In terms of the deployment of soldiers at heritage and religious sites, the committee has questioned their usefulness as well. Under operation ‘Sentinelle’, combat troops are deployed to patrol and protect heritage sites as well as religious sites, streets, and art galleries. With over 10,000 troops across France, 6,500 have been deployed in the Paris area alone. Their presence and effectiveness in combatting terrorism have come into question. For some, uniformed soldiers with guns normalise a militarised state. While their presence provides more comfort to the locals as well as tourists, it does not help counter-terrorism efforts, as groups like ISIS have proven to be more sporadic rather than symbolic in their targets.

The populations most affected by these extended policing powers reside in France’s suburbs or banlieues. The term ‘banlieue’ has become a pejorative term referring to poorer suburbs that are located on the outskirts of French cities contain majority migrant as well as Arab populations. These populations find themselves increasingly isolated and stigmatised by society. As these heightened policing measures are increasingly used in the banlieues of France, there is a deterioration of trust between the French-Arab communities and law enforcement. Without a positive relationship between these communities and the government, it makes it more difficult to gather intelligence concerning radicalisation. Therefore, the continued usage of the state of emergency is not effective if the government fails to develop adequate community-based preventive measures. The persistence of the state of emergency is normalising extreme security measures in the name of national security while stripping some citizens of their basic constitutional rights. In their counter-terrorism efforts, lawmakers place too much focus on stricter security without regard for ameliorating social divisions and problems. Instead, the government should focus on the de-stigmatisation of the banlieues, ensure outreach to local Mosques, and increase prison imams. The state of emergency and its policies are exacerbating societal divisions and must change in 2017.

Silvia Sclafani (@ssclafani24) is completing a master’s degree in International Conflict Studies at the Department of War Studies at King’s College London. She has a bachelor’s degree in International Affairs from the George Washington University and can be reached at ssclafani24@gmail.com.

Notes:

[1] Daniel Severson. ‘State of Emergency: How the Paris Attacks Expanded France’s Police Powers,’ Lawfare. November 15, 2015.

[2] Ibid.

Image Source: http://www.france24.com/en/20151115-what-does-france-state-emergency-mean

Strife Series on Counterterrorism and Human Rights, Part IV – Balances, trade-offs and divisions of labour in the strategy of countering terrorism

by

By: Samir Puri

Perhaps a division of labour will arise, in which the credible agents of countering violent extremism will be within society itself

Balance. It takes just one word to convey the strategic essence of a national effort against terrorism. Trade-offs are inherent in its implementation. Policy responses to terrorism rest on tough judgement calls. One such dilemma is that of potential intrusion into privacy in order to boost the reach of security agencies. This debate has been indelibly shaped by the coincidence of 9/11 occurring at the dawn of the information revolution. The age of mass casualty suicide terrorism and the age of massive data arrived in quick succession. Their juxtaposing has indelibly shaped 21st-century counterterrorism debates.

Contrastingly, the dilemma of human rights infractions occurring in the pursuit of security has perhaps more continuity with the past. Amartya Sen pointed out the contrast between ‘national security’ and ‘human security’. The security interests of people are not necessarily always synonymous with that of the state. The UN declaration of human rights, adopted in 1948, in which “everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person”, remains a vital coda to the horrors of the wars that it followed. Its relevance to the age of mass casualty terrorist attacks is ground that is being explored with every passing day.

The tension is relatively straightforward to explain. The ‘softer’ responses to terrorism that, for example, reassure alienated populations to reduce their vulnerability to recruitment by terrorists, unfold concurrently with ‘harder’ security responses against the terrorists themselves. This juxtaposition is inescapable. As is the friction, incoherence and provocation that follows its wake.

Phillip Bobbitt, in Terror and Consent: The Wars for the Twenty-First Century, contends that the relationship between law and strategy had to adapt to the unique exigencies of the modern terror threat. Bobbitt takes it seriously that: “the objective of these wars is not the conquest of territory or the silencing of any particular ideology but rather to secure the environment necessary for states of consent and to make it impossible for our enemies to impose or induce states of terror”.

Counterterrorism (CT) is the basis of the response. In an age in which terrorism is so often aimed at soft civilian targets, whether in the Paris attacks of November 2015, or the New Year’s Day massacre in Istanbul, stopping an attack that is already underway often means that it is already too late. Intelligence-led investigative efforts by the security forces must try to pre-empt the plotters and conspirators before their attack plans reach fruition. This is an incredibly difficult art to achieve with consistency.

But it is vital to get right, both for human security and for privacy. Imagine the horrors facing a country that experiences a brace of mass casualty terror attacks: suicide bombers and marauding gun attacks, one after the other, striking several cities over the course of days. The urgency of the security imperative to respond to murder on such a scale could tip the balance towards becoming a police state.

Indeed, Orwell’s ‘1984’ retains its relevance in the modern age of terrorism precisely for painting its vivid picture of a dystopian police state. Absolute security requires reaching into the minds of citizens. Nobody would want the thought crimes, the torture and the mass imprisonment that might accompany such an expansive programme to root out of enemies of the state.

The balance to be struck is, therefore, the critical matter. It is also highly subjective, given that it is dependent on the nature and severity of the threat that a country faces, as well as its legal and humanitarian norms. Turkey is a case in point. Over the course of 2016, Turkey’s government has – unwisely perhaps – waged war against the Islamic State (IS) while renewing its war with the Kurdish Workers Party (PPK). In attack after attack, IS has tended to strike civilian targets, while attacks claimed by the PKK affiliate TAK have often struck the security forces. And, after a failed coup by disgruntled members of the state apparatus, the government has clamped down on the multitude of threats it faces with an uncompromising response involving mass arrest, detention and allegedly torture.

The tendency towards overreaction is inherently tied to the human instinct for revenge, as well as a succumbing to fear. These tendencies are part of the human condition and, as result, contribute to political realities. What unfolds in one country can be unfathomable to even its closest allies. Guantanamo Bay, in which terrorist suspects are interred within the confines of America’s Cuban naval base, is a testament to the loss of legitimacy that flows from detaching the immediacy of security objectives from law.  Set up in the haze of outrage that followed 9/11, now former US President Obama has failed to close the facility. In a worrying portent, Turkey incarcerated PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan on a prison island in the Mamara Sea in 1999 – and there he still remains today. The UN declaration on human rights implores that: “all are entitled without any discrimination to equal protection of the law”. What to do with captured terrorists, actual or suspected, remains a burning issue.

Respect of human rights is intrinsic to the response to terrorism. CT should always be the preserve of the government. On the spectrum of responses to terrorism, CT denotes the most securitized and invasive. Pursuit, arrest or – in extremis – forceful action to restrain or injure, ought to be directed only at those who are mounting terrorist attacks. Ought is the relevant word here. Mistakes and miscalibration can occur as the security forces contend with plotters and attackers who prepare their attacks in secret. Every mistake can add fuel to the terrorist cause by eroding human dignity.

Countering violent extremism (CVE), called preventing violent extremism by the UN, starts from the other end of the response spectrum. It is aimed at dissuading those who might be vulnerable to the attraction of extremist rhetoric from setting down a path that could lead to terrorist violence. Perhaps a division of labour will arise, in which the really credible agents of CVE will be within society itself. Not to police itself, nor for people to spy on each other, but for the people of the polity to exercise the very courageous restraint expected from the security forces, and to reject the attitudinal pulls of extremist ideologies. Civil society organisations may well be the more credible transmitters of the societal response to terrorism than governments. Such is one possible division of labour.

To think seriously about responding to terrorism is to reject absolute positions. To argue that democratic ideals are sacrosanct in all instances is to ignore the complexity of the security effort required to disrupt terrorist plots. Conversely, to argue for an unfettered security response is to ignore how delicate the ideals of democratic state and society are. And there the debate sits; along a scale that awkwardly tips first in one direction and then in the other, reflecting a perpetual and irresolvable tension.

Dr Samir Puri is a lecturer in International Relations at King’s College London. He has researched and written extensively on counterterrorism and counterinsurgency, international security, as well as diplomacy and peace processes. His most recent book is called Fighting and Negotiating with Armed Groups: the Difficulty of Securing Strategic Outcomes.

Image source: https://www.pexels.com/photo/people-walking-on-gray-pavement-42384/