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Strife Series on National Perspectives in North-East Asian Rivalries, Introduction – One Region, Different Standpoints

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By Andrea Fischetti

 

Northeast Asia is a region of crucial importance, from a strategic and economic point of view.

 

East Asia is home to one fifth of the world’s population, and some of the global economic powerhouses. In particular, the second and third world largest economies, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Japan, are located in Northeast Asia. The region may subsequently be characterised as one of crucial importance for international affairs not only for the size of its economy, but also from a strategic point of view.

In this area, North Korea in particular has been in the limelight during the past year due to its aggressive nuclear program and tests, which resulted in strategic and diplomatic tensions.  This country, however, is not the only cause for disputes in Northeast Asia. The whole region is deeply divided in terms of culture, ideology, and politics, resulting in some cases, in inter-state relations characterised by “hot economics, cold politics”.[1]

Although current tensions in East Asia are considered of increasing importance by the international community, many of the Northeast Asian divisions and rivalries are primarily fuelled by historical roots. Amy King and Brendan Taylor identify a “history spiral”[2] in this region: a competitive approach to “re-remembering”[3] and rewriting history, common to all regional actors. The lack of effective international multilateral organisations is a further reason why this region is “ripe for rivalry”.[4]

Therefore, the purpose of this series is to explore the national perspectives of Northeast Asian countries. Understanding what Pyongyang’s priorities are, how Japan sees itself, what worries China, and where do the differences between Taiwan and China come from, can help to understand regional disputes as well.

In the first article, Ashley Ryan takes us to Pyongyang, where the North Korean thought and perspective on international affairs is unveiled. She analyses the strategic thinking of Kim Jong-un and explains what is the ultimate goal of Pyongyang, arguing that what North Korea has been doing so far is both rational and coherent in strategic terms.

In the second article, Andrea Fischetti explains why Japan is a pacifist country, and how Japan’s pacifism affects Tokyo’s approach to disputes with its neighbours such as China and South Korea. According to Fischetti, the post-war period largely shaped culture and society of Northeast Asian countries, and the differences in culture and society now encourage rivalries as countries have different perspectives on the same issues.

In the third article, Dean Chen explores the Taiwan issue and the nature of cross-strait relations, analysing Taiwan’s national perspective. The author argues that Taiwan and China have mismatching identities, which from an ontological security perspective, results in a rivalry characterised by misunderstandings.

Lastly, in the fourth article, Riccardo Cociani analyses the strategic and political challenges that the North Korean tensions pose to Beijing. Adopting a Chinese perspective, he explores China’s approach to tackling these challenges, with an eye to regional security.

This series offers a unique opportunity to explore the ideas and points of view of some of the main regional actors in Northeast Asia. Thanks to Ryan, Fischetti, Cociani, and Chen, these different perspectives come together in one place, and all contribute to further our understanding of Northeast Asian rivalries.

Andrea (@A_Fischetti) is a MEXT scholar and conducts research on Japan’s national identity and East Asian Security at the University of Tokyo. He is also a Series Editor for Strife. He recently earned his MA in War Studies from King’s College London, following a BA with First Class Honours in International Relations, Peace and Conflict Studies. He worked for a year in the House of Commons. A recipient of the JASSO Scholarship (日本学生支援機構), he was a visiting student at the Hiroshima Peace Institute of Hiroshima City University. More information about Andrea can be found at www.about.me/afischetti

Notes:

[1] Dreyer, J. T., 2014, pp. 326-341.

[2] King, A. and Taylor, B., 2016, p. 113

[3] King, A. and Taylor, B., 2016, p. 112

[4] Friedberg, A. L., 1994, pp. 13-14

Image source:

Here at https://spfusa.org/chairmans-message/flurry-of-east-asia-summits-signals-thawing-of-icy-relations/ 

Bibliography: 

  • Dreyer, J. T. (2014) China and Japan: ‘Hot Economics, Cold Politics’. Orbis, vol. 58, no. 3, pp. 326-341.
  • Friedberg, A. L. (1994) Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar Asia, International Security, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Winter 1993/94), pp. 5–33
  • King, A. and Taylor, B. (2016) Northeast Asia’s New ‘History Spiral’. Asia & the Pacific Policy Studies, vol. 3, no. 1, pp. 111–119.

Strife Series | Complicated relationships – History’s Influence in Estonia-Russia Relations

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By Neil Siviter

Despite its relatively small population and size, Estonia – the northernmost Baltic state bordering Russia and Latvia – has been increasingly viewed by experts as a zone of possible confrontation between Russia and the West. In light of heightened tensions in this region, how can history help us understand contemporary Estonia-Russia relations?

The British Army’s 16th Regiment Royal Artillery, shown here deployed to Estonia under NATO’s Trans-Atlantic Capability Enhancement and Training (TACET) initiative. Source: Wikimedia Commons

Conjoined by geography, separated by strategy

The hazardous nature of Estonia’s geography – ensconced between a multiplicity of larger and stronger neighbours in Northeastern Europe – is reflected in its storied history as a battleground for great powers in Northeastern Europe. Through a period of national awakening (1850-1914) and a War of Independence in the aftermath of World War I (1918-1920) against primarily Bolshevik Russian forces, contemporary Estonia was formed. Shortly thereafter, Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union invaded and occupied Estonia during World War II. The Soviet Union occupied Estonia from 1945 until the dissolution of the USSR allowed Estonia to reassert its independence in 1991. To mitigate its inherent geographic insecurity, Estonia subsequently sought safety under the umbrella of the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), both of which provide(d) a bulwark against Russian influence through political, economic, and military integration with the West.

During the period of Soviet hegemony, the USSR exerted maximum influence in Eastern Europe through the Kremlin-installed regimes of the Warsaw Pact. The collapse of the Soviet Union assailed both the security and international standing of Russia, as swaths of previously Soviet-dominated states reoriented to the West. Modern-day Russia continues to view the EU and NATO as barriers to the projection of its power. Accordingly, Russia has sought to frustrate or prevent the expansion and influence of these regional orders through various means – including exploiting the dependence of Europe and smaller peripheral states on Russian energy, and coercive threats or actions. Stymying the advance of the EU and NATO has been the raison d’etre of Russian support for frozen conflicts in its near abroad. This strategy has been evident in Russian actions towards Moldova’s Transnistria, Georgia’s Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and most recently Ukraine through the seizure of Crimea and the destabilization of its Russian-bordering Eastern region.

Implications for contemporary Estonia-Russia relations

The Council of the European Union’s rotational Presidency is currently held by Estonia. This has positioned Estonia to reduce its dependence on Russian natural gas – an aspect that resonates with the broader EU agenda while threatening Moscow’s leverage over Europe. The deployment of NATO battle groups across the Baltics indicate a significant commitment among NATO allies to live up to the Alliance’s collective defence obligations. However, they do not entirely remedy Russia’s escalation dominance in this region. In the wake of Russian power projection in Ukraine, and the devastating cyber attack on Estonian networks perpetrated by Russian hackers in 2007, Estonia’s security continues to be buttressed by support from NATO and the EU. However, its vulnerable geography and historically tense relationship with Russia continue to make for relative insecurity.

Ultimately Russia’s strategy relies on the weakness and disunity of Western-led regional orders, whereas Estonia relies on their strength. These two diametrically opposed positions are a consequence of their geography and history.

Neil Siviter is the Editor of the Journal of Political Risk. In addition to this role, he is currently pursuing his Master of Arts in War Studies at King’s College London on a Global Grant Scholarship from Rotary International. Neil has previously worked as a Junior Professional Fellow at the NATO Association of Canada where he wrote articles in the Arc of Crisis program – a segment of the publication focused on eastern and southern security of the NATO Alliance. Neil has also held various internship positions with the Canadian Government, U.S. Consulate General Toronto, and the United Nations in New York City.

This article is part of a series curated by MA student Ashley Pratt on the intricate historical relationships between nations and people that shape current events. Each piece of this four-part series contextualizes and provides a primer to better analyze developments around these relationships.

Strife Series on British Security Post-Brexit, Part V – Brexit Defence Implications: Mind the Gap

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By Alfonc Rakaj

Divorces are messy. They separate families by turning parents against each other as they negotiate over their assets and determine child custody rights. Furthermore, children often have to make uneasy decisions and can find themselves pitted against one of their parents while siding with the other. Such actions resemble the British attempt to divorce from the European Union (EU) following the Brexit referendum. Commentators have rushed to consider the political and economic implications of the decision while shying away from potential security and defence effects. Economic strains imposed by Brexit and the transition-related hurdles stood up by the EU will further challenge Britain’s military status and defence role in Europe and beyond.

Internal political quarrels over the nature of the Brexit are in full steam. First, it was the High Court that challenged the pathway to Brexit, then the House of Lords on specific amendments, and now, the devolved government of Scotland led by the Scottish National Party (SNP) has made clear its intention to hold a second independence referendum. While political complexities regarding the nature of the divorce get worked out, Britain’s focus shifts more towards domestic issues. In this regard, its defence objectives and capabilities face tough political and economic challenges.

As Brexiteers celebrated, financial markets panicked. The British pound lost 10 per cent of its values against the U.S. dollar, a 31-year-low for the currency and its biggest daily loss in history, as investors weighed over the uncertainties related to the decision to leave the EU. The FTSE 100, London’s Stock Exchange, fell by £120 billion overnight. A report released shortly after the referendum by the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) pointed the potential negative effects of such an economic downturn on UK’s defence spending powers. The report stated that the cost of procuring military hardware by the Ministry of Defence is estimated to increase by as much as £700 million annually starting in 2018-19. That is the equivalent of 2 percent of the current defence budget. This, according to the report, will force the UK government to reconsider its budget commitments with the likelihood of needing to delay or reduce its planned acquisitions. At the time the report was published, sterling was trading at £1 per $1.30. In the period between June 2016 and March 2017, the pound has declined against its US counterpart, its value ranging between $1.20 per 1£ to $1.27. This illustrates, that the figure provided by the report could even be higher than its initial estimates.

On the bright side, Britain boasts a large defence budget, the fifth largest in the world and second only to the US among NATO members. It is one of the few NATO members able to uphold its pledge to spend at least 2 percent of its GDP on defence and it recently recommitted itself to that promise. In addition, Britain’s National Strategy and Strategic Review stated its intent to increase its equipment investment by 1 per cent annually up to 2020-21, while procurement spending is expected to reach £178 billion in the next ten years. In addition, the UK government has committed itself to exempt the defence budget from further government cuts.

However, as it is often the case, the devil is in the details. Such estimates will be impacted if the UK economy slips into recession caused by a hard Brexit; further, if the sterling slips against its rivals, the purchasing powers of the UK Ministry of Defence will decline. As the UK triggers Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty, starting the negotiation to leave the EU, the Sterling’s resolve against other currencies will be tested leaving the affordability of Britain’s acquisition plans in question.

Meanwhile, a second referendum in Scotland poses challenges for the political cohesion of the United Kingdom and tests the status of Britain as a global power, and could have negative ramifications for its economy. A Scottish exit from the United Kingdom would diminish the influence of Britain as its size, its population and its market shrink. Even Britain’s core defensive capabilities would be put to test. The Scottish Nationalist Party (SNP) has made clear its intention to free Scotland from stocking nuclear weapons. Considering that the UK’s nuclear deterrents are all located in Scotland, this would significantly challenge the status of Britain as a nuclear power. Besides that, political consequences of an independent Scotland would impact the UK’s shipbuilding industry which is located in Clyde, Scotland. A relocation of such an industry is estimated to cost the UK government £3.5 billion.

Markets are wary to huge risks. A second Scottish referendum, and possibly a breakaway of Scotland would have a negative impact on the economy and the sterling currency itself. If Scotland leaves, then the UK would have experienced a breakaway from a market of over 400 million in the EU, to a single market of less than 60 million. Still, even if Scoxit does not materialise, Brexit is likely to have a profound effect on Britain’s global outlook. Even if the UK does not change its defensive commitments in the future, leaving the EU could diminish UK’s status. There’s already speculation that France could take over its position as the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander in NATO. As negotiations progress, the effects will become clear while sterling and the UK economy will be severely tested. The UK defence budget will surely be impacted, the question is how much and to what extent.

Alfonc Rakaj is a student in the War Studies Program and is a Chevening Scholar pursuing an MA in International Relations at King’s College London.

Image credit: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/brexit-uk-security-will-we-be-more-or-less-safe-a7058551.html

 

 

 

Strife Series on British Security Post-Brexit, Part IV – Hard Brexit & Europe’s Foreign Policy Challenges

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By Aaron Burnett

“We are leaving the European Union, but we are not leaving Europe” – British Prime Minister Theresa May. Photo credit: Jason Alden/Bloomberg

 

“We are leaving the European Union, but we are not leaving Europe,” British Prime Minister Theresa May declared in her lengthy Brexit speech before heading to Washington, where she tried to secure Donald Trump’s support for the NATO Alliance he called “obsolete” only weeks before. Indeed, as Mrs. May sets out her plans for “a Global Britain” while paradoxically announcing that the UK would leave the world’s largest single market, i.e. the European Union (EU), she emphasized her wish for continued UK-EU security cooperation.

Coming to practical terms with such an agreement is both complex and unprecedented. The EU has signed ten Strategic Partnerships Agreements (SPA) with countries like Canada and Brazil. But negotiations for a similar SPA between the UK and EU will not involve deepening existing diplomatic ties, but loosening them— with profoundly negative implications for British foreign policy.

As May’s early White House visit suggests, the UK remains resolutely committed to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) even as it stumbles out of the EU. Other than the UK, 21 NATO states are also EU members, allowing Britain to retain multilateral military cooperation with its European allies even in a post-Brexit era. However, many foreign policy decisions are increasingly made at the EU-level. These include European sanctions against Russia for its invasion of Crimea, sanctions against Iran for its nuclear weapons program, and visa liberalization for Georgian citizens to incentivize that country towards greater democratization and political reform. The monthly meetings of the EU’s Foreign Affairs Council will soon function without the UK in the room. Britain will also lose its vote in the council meetings once Article 50 — Britain’s exit clause from the EU – is triggered on 29th March 2017. As such, major decisions regarding European security will likely be made in Paris or Berlin in the future. The question is the degree with which London will be consulted when its agreement is no longer required to carry an EU-level vote.

The “Canada Model,” referring to the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) recently agreed to by both the EU and Canada following seven years of negotiations, is often cited as a potential template for a future EU-UK free trade deal. Similarly, the EU-Canada SPA gives us some clues as to what the future EU-UK security cooperation might look like. The EU-Canada SPA outlines common positions on Weapons of Mass Destruction, the International Criminal Court, counterterrorism, and other areas of declared mutual interests. It also establishes bilateral consultation mechanisms such as an annual EU-Canada Summit and Joint Ministerial Committee co-chaired by the Canadian Foreign Minister and EU High Representative. Unlike Canada however, the UK maintains the sixth-strongest military in the world, a permanent UN Security Council seat and, rather obviously, remains geographically part of Europe. Thus, EU-UK security cooperation will remain higher than the EU-Canada level.

Months after the UK’s referendum decision to leave the EU, Prime Minister Theresa May followed in the footsteps of previous British prime ministers vowing to veto increased EU military cooperation. It’s a rather peculiar statement from May especially considering that she will lose that veto right as soon as Article 50 is triggered. For its part, the remaining EU-27 will maintain that any deal the UK receives post-Brexit will have to leave it worse off than if it was an EU member. “Whoever wishes to leave this family cannot expect to give up all its obligations while holding on to its privileges,” German Chancellor Angela Merkel declared before her Parliament shortly after the June referendum, receiving widespread applause. To achieve pragmatic security cooperation, the UK will have to accept an EU that makes decisions without it—including choices it may have vetoed had it still been a member. That may be difficult for a government that sees itself as implementing a referendum decision won on the basis of “taking back control”. On the continental side, one can expect increased influence from France, Spain, and Italy. Germany, as the EU’s reluctant leader, will be expected to increase its foreign policy leadership further yet.

On security cooperation, the UK is likely to continue sharing intelligence with its European allies to thwart terrorist attacks, implying that Britain will retain membership in Europol. The UK has made the decision to opt into Europol even after  Brexit, despite Denmark’s recent withdrawal from the agency. It would be unprecedented for a non-EU member to enjoy full Europol membership, but British withdrawal from Europol would be a setback for counterterrorism in Europe. One estimate holds that Britain is involved in sharing intelligence for nearly 40 percent of all cases that pass through Europol. Non-EU states also maintain liaison offices with Europol. The United States liaison office boasts around 20 officers, while it’s estimated that Norway enjoys roughly 80 percent of the agency’s membership benefits. Although not guaranteed, negotiations on internal security are less likely to descend into acrimony than other aspects of the Brexit talks.

All this considered, Brexit is highly unlikely to make Europe safer. The UK is set to lose a major source of its global influence and it’s not clear yet exactly how the remaining EU-27 will step in to fill that vacuum. Common decision-making and even counterterrorism coordination are likely to be more difficult in the future. On foreign policy especially, Brexit negotiations will not be about creating a stronger security partnership, but about minimizing the damage from the current arrangements.

Aaron Burnett is a current International Peace & Security MA student at King’s College London. He has previously interned with the European Commission’s Service for Foreign Policy Instruments, United Nations, and German Council on Foreign Relations. He also holds a Master in Public Policy from the Hertie School of Governance in Berlin and a Bachelor of Journalism.

Notes:

“Brexit: The Security Dilemma”. Dr. Charles Tannock, MEP, Conservatives in the European Parliament (ECR Group). February 2017.

Strife Series on British Security Post-Brexit, Part III – Security implications of post-Brexit asylum laws

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By: Felix Manig

The United Kingdom has remained largely unaffected by the refugee crisis which has rocked the Middle East and much of Europe over the last few years. As the UK has one of Western Europe’s most stringent refugee policies in place already, the Guardian recently placed Prime Minister Theresa May ahead of Donald Trump in her attempts to undermine the global refugee system.  Now, post-Brexit negotiations and political messaging of an anti-refugee nature have the potential to further shift European refugee policy to the right and result in tangible security risks for Britain’s military and counterterrorism strategies.

‘Refugee’ System in the United Kingdom

The United Kingdom has always retained opt-out clauses for most EU asylum policies, including the 2016 relocation quota of 160,000 asylum seekers from Syria, Iraq and North Africa. Post-Brexit statements by Theresa May on asylum policies now point to a clear refusal to accept more refugees from the Middle East and North Africa, pledging a meagre number of 20,000 resettlements into Britain over the next four years. Instead, the PM believes that strengthening capacities and resources directly in the affected regions would help refugees more than bringing them to Europe. This February, the Government ended its commitment to the so-called ‘Dubs’ scheme, an agreement under which Britain pledged to take in vulnerable lone child refugees from camps in France, Italy and Greece. May also announced a campaign to leave the European Court of Human Rights, a separate entity from the EU, but representing a move which would discharge Britain from the special appeal rights and legal protections the Court extends to refugees.

Shifting European Refugee Policy

Perhaps the more far-reaching implications for refugees will manifest themselves in how Britain’s departure from the EU has the potential to further shift asylum and immigration legislation to the right of the political spectrum in remaining member states. A particular danger lies in the scapegoating and conflating asylum seekers and refugees, who are protected by international law under the 1951 UN Refugee Convention vis-a-vis more structural European problems such as economic marginalisation of rural areas and questions of national identity. Politicians in Europe already cater heavily to nationalistic and identity-driven sentiments to gain votes. This year, it is likely that far-right populists will gain votes in important elections such as in Germany, the Netherlands, and particularly in France. Most EU states have already passed sweeping legislation to strictly limit refugee inflows for the next few years. Anti-immigrant sentiments and hate crimes against refugees have reached all-time highs throughout the EU. A recent European-wide Chatham House study found that 55 per cent of respondents would like to see all future migration from Muslim-majority countries stopped. The prime victim of such developments is inevitably the asylum seekers who flee armed conflict and persecution.

UK Security risks for military and counterterrorism strategies

From a strict national security perspective, barring refugees from entry and catering to islamophobic sentiments in the population may create both immediate and more long-term security risks for Britain in its military operations overseas and counterterrorism efforts.  In August 2016, the BBC obtained pictures showing British special forces operating in Syria. While the UK Ministry of Defence declined to comment on the presence of personnel in the region, it should not come as a surprise to see limited ground operations taking place to complement the air campaign against Islamic State in Levant (ISIL) and other jihadist groups. However, the success of such missions often hinges on effective intelligence sharing and cooperation with local partners from host governments and their respective intelligence agencies. Extreme anti-immigration laws and the appeasement of nationalistic constituencies will lead partners to question the sincerity of their cooperation and the sustainability of their relationships with the United Kingdom.

On a more basic level, soldiers may also depend on translators and guides, who put themselves and their families in danger for assisting foreign troops. In 2015, a number of MPs warned that Britain will struggle to recruit interpreters in future conflict zones if it declines them shelter and asylum after completing their missions. Should tighter immigration and asylum legislation result in a culture of suspicion and alienation, the repercussions for the British military and the success of their operations would be considerable.

Constricting refugee flows and engaging in political messaging of an anti-refugee rhetoric nature also directly plays into the hands of groups like ISIL in two distinct ways. For one, refugees fleeing the region represent the inherent failure of the Islamic State and its envisioned society. By closing avenues and opportunities to escape violence and persecution, keeping civilians confined to the territory of ISIL will allow the group to continue to target non-combatants and extort money for arms and recruitment through taxes.

According to the UK’s counterterrorism strategy CONTEST, individuals within the United Kingdom who are at risk of radicalisation currently pose the biggest threat to national security. ISIL and other jihadist terrorist organisations directly benefit from Western anti-refugee rhetoric and legislation because it appears to reinforce their narrative of ‘Islam versus the West’. Adding fire to the propaganda messages of ISIL by contributing to the marginalisation and implicit criminalisation of mainly Muslim communities may pose a serious danger and contribute to radicalisation at home.

Accepting well-vetted refugees can have national security benefits when dealing with global terrorism as it pushes back against the idea of a cultural and religious war between the West and Islam. Incoming individuals may become part of a counter-narrative which is needed to push against transnational terrorist networks and their developing recruitment strategies.

Felix (@felix_manig) is a postgraduate in International Relations at King’s College London. He focuses on conflict resolution strategies, political violence, and human rights. He is Series Editor at StrifeBlog and advocates for human rights defenders across the world at Peace Brigades International. 

This Strife series focuses on British Security Post-Brexit and will have contributions by Dr Samir Puri; Felix Manig on the security implications of post-Brexit asylum laws; Christina on the UK-USA relationship; and Alfonc Rakaj on British defence commitments. 

Image credit: https://cdn.pixabay.com/photo/2016/09/14/19/49/barbed-wire-1670222_960_720.jpg