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Strife Series on Cyberwarfare and State Perspectives, Part I – Offensive Cyber Capabilities and Medium Powers: Two Case Studies

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By Andreas Haggman

Credit Image: luzitanija (123RF)

 

Introduction

In recent years, traditional military capabilities have been supplemented by the development of offensive cyber capabilities. Examples of cyber capabilities have proved that effects can be achieved in both the kinetic (e.g. Stuxnet, Black Energy) and information spheres (e.g. Crimea, TV5 Monde). However, discussions in this area are often predictable in the actors that are considered. When commentators, both in the media and academia, talk about offensive cyber capabilities it is usually in reference to a list of usual suspects: the US, Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran are the primary state antagonists, with the UK, Israel, and sometimes France being cast in supporting roles. Anonymous and amorphous organised crime groups are often referenced as non-state actors, though the role of Anonymous seems to have subsided in the past couple of years.

This article seeks to highlight how offensive cyber capabilities augment the traditional capabilities of two lesser-mentioned state actors: Australia and Sweden. Although geographically distinct, both these countries can be classified as ‘medium powers’ who, in the words of Richard Hill, are ‘likely to have few resources to spare for the exercise of power beyond what is necessary to safeguard and, where possible, further its vital interest of territorial integrity, political independence and betterment.’ Importantly, in the context of cyber capabilities, both countries have declared either operational deployment of such capabilities or intent to develop them. This article discusses how cyber capabilities form part of both countries’ official policies and how these might be deployed for operational effect in their geopolitical contexts.

 

Australia

Australia published its first Cyber Security Strategy in 2016, which formally acknowledged the existence of Australian offensive cyber capabilities. In November 2016, Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull announced that the country had been conducting offensive cyber operations against ISIS targets. Australia therefore has a pedigree in the offensive cyber capability space and it also has a formulated policy on how these capabilities should be used: despite misplaced notions of deterrence expressed in the Cyber Security Strategy, later policy documents have stated that offensive cyber capabilities would be used to target cyber criminals.

Australia’s geopolitical situation means this approach of deprioritising state-based threats to instead focus on non-state actors (even if some these may have state-backing) is likely the best use of its offensive cyber capabilities. Geographically, politically, and economically, Australia’s most pressing concern is China: it’s attempted dominance of south east Asian sea routes, it’s influence in Australian politics, and its large investments in Australian industry, particularly the mining sector. However, deployment of offensive cyber capabilities against Chinese targets would not address any of these issues and they must instead be tackled with diplomatic, legal, and economic means.

A better use of offensive cyber capabilities is therefore to target non-state actors and criminal groups. For these targets, capabilities which cause disruption or enable better information gathering by law enforcement are more appropriate than capabilities which cause physical destruction. As an example, an extension of the Australian patrol boat scheme can be envisaged where Australia provides support to anti-piracy and anti-people smuggling operations in the south Pacific and Indian oceans. Capabilities that stain dark web traffic, allowing it to be tracked, can help identify the criminal actors which perpetrate these activities. Such capabilities may not be at the behest of the island nations which inhabit the south Pacific and Australia is well-placed to meaningfully contribute with its own capabilities.

 

Sweden

Sweden published a national cyber security strategy in 2016 which contains provisions for ‘a robust capability to conduct active operations in the cyber environment.’ However, as early as 2013 a report on long-term strategic planning had advocated for Sweden to develop offensive cyber capabilities. This view was backed by several people in the Government, who assessed that Sweden had to keep pace with technological developments – if everyone else were acquiring offensive cyber capabilities, so should Sweden.

Similar to Australia, Sweden has an obvious adversary in its immediate geographical locale: Russia. In this case, contemporary concerns about Russian behaviour (military manoeuvres, disinformation campaigns) are backed by a history of conflict between the countries – Russia is very much the old enemy. But since the 20th century Sweden has also positioned itself as a paragon of neutrality and all operational military activity has been strictly limited to UN peacekeeping missions. The utility of offensive cyber capabilities is less obvious in these missions because the critical component is a physical presence on the ground which serves a securing and deterring effect. This presence cannot be achieved with cyber capabilities.

Instead, Sweden may find a peacetime outlet for its offensive cyber capabilities if used as signalling devices. Russia regularly runs military flights provocatively close to, sometimes within, Swedish airspace. It could be envisaged that targeting one of these flights in a non-lethal capacity (for example by displaying a message on the pilot’s heads-up display) would send a message about the maturity of Swedish offensive cyber capabilities and their intent to use them. A key caveat here, however, is that the benefits of the operation must be carefully weighed against the cost, particularly if zero-day vulnerabilities need to be burned to achieve the desired effect.

 

Conclusion

Offensive cyber capabilities are not just the remit of great powers and rogue actors. Some states, such as Australia and Sweden discussed above, are technologically sophisticated yet perhaps do not have the remit to deploy cyber capabilities in the sort of arenas that make headlines. However, as suggested in the postulated deployment scenarios, these capabilities should not be discounted as means for achieving tactical and strategic effects in a limited context. The geopolitical situation of each country shapes these deployments and it is important to establish the desired effects before cyber capabilities are considered – they are not necessarily the most appropriate solution for every problem. Therefore, with careful deliberation, offensive cyber capabilities can be made to fit the imperatives of medium powers.

 

Andreas Haggman is a PhD researcher in the Centre for Doctoral Training in Cyber Security at Royal Holloway University of London. His thesis is a practical exploration of wargaming for cyber security education and awareness training. Andreas’ additional research interests span a wide spectrum of non-technical cyber security topics. He can be followed on Twitter @Andreas_Haggman.

Image Source: https://www.123rf.com/photo_49099172_puzzle-with-the-national-flag-of-sweden-and-australia-concept.html

 

Strife Series on Cyberwarfare and State Perspectives: Strategic effectiveness in Cyberspace – Introduction

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By Shivali Bhatt

 

Soldiers on the digital battlefield

 

Over the past couple of decades, the world has witnessed an unstoppable and almost inevitable rise in cyber-attacks and acts of digital warfare. Just over ten years ago, the Israeli government successfully disarmed the Syrian air defence system near a nuclear facility, allowing it to destroy the base without having to deal with the Syrians putting up a fight. This event marked a critical turning point for state warfare, as it exemplified the way in which cyberspace and digital technology can become an accessory to broader military strategy. A few years later, a joint built American/Israeli cyberweapon, also known as Stuxnet, unleashed havoc in Iran and a few other countries. This highly sophisticated attack not only managed to infiltrate a significant portion of cyberspace and thousands of computers but is believed to be an explanatory factor behind the rate at which states have been investing in, and advancing, their cyber capabilities.

Today, over two hundred thousand samples of malware get launched daily, and states are participating in a ‘cyber arms race’ or ‘technology arms race’. States, especially like the United States and China, are competing to acquire military edge by investing and developing skills in innovative technology, like artificial intelligence [1]. One of the main reasons behind the significant interest in technological superiority is because the rules to the global politics and warfare are changing. The instrument of cyberwarfare has and continues to become one of the most highly regarded domains for political strategy, yet each state has a different perspective and reality in this evolving context.

Therefore, the purpose of this series is to shed light on the perspectives of states, all of which possess varying cultural, geopolitical and economic contexts. A significant narrative today is how cyberwarfare and generally cyberspace are changing the balance of power in the international system. However, these arguments present themselves in the absence of critical analysis, which helps contextualise the reality and trajectory of modern cyberwarfare. The states examined in this series engage with cyberspace in different ways; at times, can be conceptualised by a set of underlying factors. They offer the reader a compelling contrast, and hopefully shall help them understand the scope for further discussion and research on the extent to which cyberwarfare is strategically effective.

In the first article, PhD researcher Andreas Haggman analyses the cyber capabilities of two ‘medium’ powers, Australia and Sweden. He identifies how they enhance their existing traditional military strategies, placing greater emphasis on the relevance of geopolitical context.

In the second article, PhD researcher Amy Ertan examines the strategic value of ‘false flags’ in a context of state-led cyberwarfare, using Russia as a critical case study. She analyses how geopolitics can act as a catalyst for those states faced with the problem of attribution.

In the final piece, Shivali Bhatt approaches the domain of cyberwarfare through the lens worn by American policymakers and critiques current narratives circulating in popular media and also specific academic communities today. Her lines of argument emphasise the underlying factors that in the case of the United States, increase strategic leverage.

We hope this series offers readers a greater insight into state perspectives on cyberwarfare and critical understanding of the domain’s strategic effectiveness.

Thanks for reading!

 

Shivali is currently pursuing her MA Intelligence and International Security at Department of War Studies, King’s College London. She is also a Series Editor at Strife, as well as a Creative Writer at cybersecurity startup PixelPin, where she contributes articles on ‘Thought Leadership’, encouraging readers to approach security issues through innovative means. Prior to that, she spent some time in Hong Kong under the InvestHK and EntrepreneurHK organisations, engaging with the cybersecurity and tech scene on the East Coast. Her core research interests include modern warfare and contemporary challenges, cybersecurity, and strategic policy analysis. You can follow her  on @shivalixb

 

Strife Series on United Nations Peacekeeping, Part V – The Future of UN Peacekeeping Operations

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By Felix Manig

UN Unmanned/Unarmed Aerial Vehicle (UAV) is prepared for take-off (Credit Image: UN Dispatch)

The nature of conflict is changing and so must UN peace operations if they are to remain an indispensable and effective tool in promoting international peace and security. What then UN Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon stated in 2014 echoes even louder today, given the ever more politically complex and high-risk environments UN peacekeepers operate in. While there is no one-size-fits-all peace operation, adopting a number of priorities can help all UN missions to move toward necessary reform. The future peacekeeping architecture should build on strategic and regional partnerships, strengthen conflict prevention capacities and harness emerging technologies to effectively sustain peace in the twenty-first century.

 

Strategic and Regional Partnerships

 A key challenge for UN Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKOs) is to compel states with more advanced military capabilities and technical expertise to contribute more meaningfully to missions in the future. Perhaps the most promising path for this lies in building on the strategic partnership with the European Union (EU), which vowed to cooperate more closely with the UN on peacekeeping and crisis management. The EU is uniquely qualified to aid the UN in capacity building for the maintenance of international peace and security, especially in complex operations for which regular troop contributing countries are ill-equipped. In fact, EU member states collectively represent the largest financial contributor to UNPKOs and UN peace operations also address key EU foreign and security policy priorities in counterterrorism, the rule of law and promoting the role of women in peace and security. The initial results of increased policy coherence, joint training exercises and EU engagement in support of UN peacekeeping over the last years appear promising. In Mali, EU military and civilian support helped MINUSMA to strengthen local internal security forces. In the Central African Republic, the EU’s EUFOR RCA operation set the foundation for the later UN-led MINUSCA mission.

In Africa, where the UN currently conducts the majority of its peacekeeping missions, building on partnerships means strengthening collaboration with the African Union (AU) and other regional and sub-regional organisations such as ECOWAS or IGAD. While the UN already cooperates with the AU in conflict prevention, mediation and peacekeeping, simultaneous or complementary deployments by the UN and AU will likely feature more prominently in the future. These hybrid mandates can add important political capital to operations and prove valuable during peace negotiations, such as in the Central African Republic, where local and regional knowledge may be indispensable.

 

Strengthen Conflict Prevention

In his vision statement, Secretary-General António Guterres stressed his commitment to a “culture of prevention” to bring about peace, political solutions and sustainable development to crisis hotspots. One major strategy to promote stability and prevent conflict is to include more women in UN peacekeeping, both as security sector officials within operations and in critical decision-making bodies for conflict resolution. Passing UN Security Council resolution 1325 on women, peace and security was a historic and important step. However, the UN must act more decisively to build up women’s participation and turn the resolution’s pledges into a reality. Given that it is the responsibility of UN member states to commit peacekeeping personnel, the organisation should feature its gender mainstreaming strategy more prominently and boost the reach and responsibility of its Gender Advisers to encourage troop contributing countries to increase the share of female staff. Strong evidence shows that women’s participation in peace and security processes improves the safety of peacekeepers, leads to more successful radicalisation prevention programmes, and improves the economic recovery in conflict-affected regions. Perhaps most importantly, peace agreements in which women participated meaningfully are 35% more likely to last at least 15 years than agreements which were concluded by male-only signatories.

 

Harnessing Emerging Technologies 

The reform agenda introduced by the Secretary-General equally calls for scaling up the technological capabilities of UNPKOs to make peacekeepers more flexible and mobile. In 2015, an independent Expert Panel on Technology and Innovation found that many UN field operations were lacking the technological tools considered necessary by militaries and law enforcement agencies to operate effectively. The report also drew a direct connection between these deficiencies and the reluctance of developed countries to meaningfully contribute troops to existing operations.

An improved understanding of operating environments as well as the presence or intent of adversaries are key components for risk reduction in conflict. Harnessing emerging technologies such as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) is one way to move into this direction. Unarmed UAVs were first used by the UN MONUSCO operation in December 2013, helping peacekeepers to improve their situational awareness, monitor migration movements and track armed groups in the mountainous terrain of the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo. Since then, camera and sensor-equipped UAVs have become increasingly common in other UNPKOs, including in Mali and the Central African Republic, and their use should be expanded to other operations as needed.

The UN should also push for more intelligence gathering and monitoring tools within UNPKOs of the future. From satellite reconnaissance to ground surveillance radars and acoustic or seismic sensors, the cost of such once exclusive technologies has now fallen so dramatically that even the small peacekeeping budget allows investment in them. The collection and analysis of data about movements, crime and conflict can then produce intelligence which in turn can be used to shorten warning and response times for peacekeepers on the ground. Systematic and data-driven monitoring and mapping of crises can also promote patterns and models to make the prevention of human rights abuses or cease-fire violations more efficient and cost-effective.

 

Looking Forward

 A meaningful implementation of the above recommendations depends, as always, on the necessary funding and political will of UN member states. Threats by the US administration to cut its share of the already meagre $6.8 billion peacekeeping budget, which is less than half of one per cent of world military expenditures, sends a troubling sign to multilateral efforts at maintaining peace and security. For UNPKOs, gaining the necessary political will largely depends on the strategic interests of P5 members in conflict regions. In this sense, geopolitical competition and the current stalemate at the UN Security Council around humanitarian crises such as in Syria or Yemen represent major challenges to the UN peacekeeping architecture.

However, the UN is not in an existential crisis. Since taking office, the Secretary-General has made reform a priority for the UN and the organisation is responding to the justifiable criticisms. The UN realised the changing nature of conflict and is in the process of adapting its prevention and peacekeeping missions to this new threat landscape. Although the UN may sometimes seem like a relic of the 20th century, it has the ability and necessary vision under its current leadership to evolve and remain irreplaceable for promoting international peace and security.

 

Felix Manig is a postgraduate in International Relations at King’s College London. He focuses on global governance, conflict resolution strategies, and cybersecurity. Outside of academia, he is Series Editor at Strife and writes for the Peacekeeping Project at the United Nations Association of Germany. You can follow him on Twitter @felix_manig

Image Source:  https://www.undispatch.com/un-learning-love-drones/

Strife Series on United Nations Peacekeeping, Part IV – Lessons Through a Gender Lens: The Efforts and Failures of UNMISS

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By Caitlyn OFlaherty

UN peacekeepers control South Sudanese women and children before the distribution of emergency food supplies in a PoC site in Juba (Credit Image: Adriane Ohanesian/Reuters)

Shockingly gruesome violence has defined South Sudan since civil war broke out in 2013, only two years after it gained independence. Over 50,000 people have been killed since, including tens of thousands of civilians. Over 4 million have been displaced.

The United Nations peacekeeping mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) was established in 2011 to foster development but has faced broader responsibilities. The evolution of UNMISS’ role presents an opportunity to understand the changing demands and challenges facing peacekeepers today. UNMISS grapples constantly with the difficulty of operationalizing its mandate to protect civilians—especially women. Its presence has been controversial but has brought the needs of and the need for women to the forefront of peacekeeping efforts.

Women and girls are disproportionately affected by violent conflict, and this civil war is no exception. One in four women in South Sudan experience some form of gender-based violence on a daily basis. Thousands of women have been raped by government and opposition forces.

Though women only represent three percent of soldiers and ten percent of police deployed to UN missions worldwide, the numbers are slightly higher in South Sudan. As of August 2017, four percent of UNMISS’ military forces—14 percent of police personnel and 26 percent of civilian personnel—were women. From inception to 2014, the mission was led by a woman, Hilde Johnson. Two women have been contingent commanders: Adzo Sowlitse, the first woman to command a Formed Police Unit, and Lt Col Katie Hislop, Commander of the UK Engineering Task Force.

UNMISS has grown to include 16,987 troops but still cannot  seem to control the chaotic growth of PoC camps. Over 200,000 internally displaced civilians are sheltering in UN bases turned into “Protection of Civilian” (PoC) sites. The mission’s quick growth has perhaps outstripped its capabilities, exacerbating anti-UN sentiment among civilians, and the strained relationship with government.

Although arguably innovative, the PoC sites cannot guarantee residents’ safety. Four PoC sites have been overrun or shelled, over 180 internally displaced persons have been killed during attacks on the sites, and hundreds of women have been raped on or near UN-protected territory. Doctors Without Borders found that three-quarters of those surveyed living in PoC sites had lost trust in UNMISS. Safety in PoC sites has been unreliable, and site management has demanded a majority of mission resources. This has prolonged the time women spend surviving—and raising families—in tents, in such persistent states of vulnerability.

Notably though, UNMISS was the first UN mission to deploy Women’s Protection Advisors across the country. UNMISS former gender adviser Major Bettina Stelzer emphasised women peacekeepers are able to access communities in ways men cannot. To capitalise on this, UN police train women leaders in community watch groups to gather sensitive information about sexual abuse in the camps. Along with serving as mentors and role models, it is critical to understand how women peacekeepers can provide necessary support and open up channels of communication that could inform UNMISS activities.

There remains a deficient connection between UNMISS and the community. This was placed in stark relief during an attack in July 2016.  Over 300 people were killed in the capital city, Juba, with foreigners and locals assaulted alike. The UN compound, less than a mile away, refused to respond. Peacekeepers abandoned posts, according to the UN’s fact-finding mission. Retired Major General Patrick Cammaert, who led the investigation, concluded that troops were risk-averse and inward-looking—regularly staying in camp rather than going out on foot patrols.

Another incident exemplifying deficiencies of response and diffusion of accountability came in February 2018, when 46 UNMISS peacekeepers were recalled following allegations of sexual exploitation of sheltering women. Without prosecutory mechanisms, the UN cannot effectively prevent or punish misconduct. Complaints of sexual assault by government soldiers in or near camps are also common. Growing resentment among residents towards the UN mission is evidence of slow and inefficient action by authorities. A small, wooden “jail” has been established in a PoC in Malakal to hold alleged rapists awaiting investigations that may never occur.

Even without systematic reforms to the Department of Peacekeeping, creative efforts to make environments safer could mitigate threats. These should include the reduction of masculine military tactics and the expansion of desecuritised peacekeeping—strategies like digging nearby wells to prevent unguarded walks to distant water or developing 911 numbers for civilians and providing cell phones. These must also include purposeful recruitment of women into peacemaking, -keeping, and -building efforts.

In terms of policy, UN Security Council Resolution 1325 calls for more women involved in peace agreements and peacekeeping operations. However, according to a 2015 review, fewer than three percent of signatories to peace agreements are women, and women are frequently kept out of high-level negotiations. Judging from the consistently low levels of participating women, the UN has not taken seriously recommendations to incentivise the appointment of more female troops.

Embedded in these simple suggestions is a danger of further burdening women by essentialising them as inherently peaceful. Such justification for women’s participation is laden with specific expectations rather than based in their fundamental right to participate.

Evidence shows that security efforts are more successful when women are included in peace processes. Involvement of women’s organisations makes peace agreements 64 percent less likely to fail. Peace agreements on the African continent which failed to maintain peace for even a single year—in Uganda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Sudan—all had in common a complete lack of women at the negotiating table.

The UN should focus on protection strategies for women made vulnerable in PoC sites. PoC sites are, as evidenced by the number of IDPs who continue to voluntarily reside within them, an important, if imperfect, tool. Along with strengthening practical protections for civilians, UNMISS should continuously increase involvement of female troops, whose nuanced perspectives are a necessary part of peacekeeping. Their unique access will allow for the equally necessary elevation of the experiences of local women, whose participation, safety, and empowerment are critical to the sustainability of peace.

 

Caitlyn OFlaherty is an M.A. candidate in Ethics Peace and Global Affairs at American University. Her particular research interests center on issues of migration, displacement, and human security. She is a freelance journalist and a member of the administrative support team for the Out of Eden Walk Project. You can follow her on Twitter @COFlaherty44

Image Source: https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2016/09/failed-peacekeepers-sudan-160908091206526.html

Strife Series on United Nations Peacekeeping, Part III – Bystanders for 7 years – is the UN ready for a peacekeeping mission in Syria?

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By Diego Salama and Ortrun Merkle

Military personnel of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) on security detail of the observation post at the Golan Heights. (Credit Photo: UN Photo/Gernot Maier)

Seven years into the war , Syria has seen over 400,000 casualties and more than five million refugees. Those still in the country suffer from chemical attacks and brutalities from all belligerent actors, with  no end in sight. The question after so many years of bloodshed: isn’t it time for the UN to step in? The political answer –coming from Moscow–, is a resounding ‘No’, which would likely be echoed by the other permanent members of the Security Council (P5), albeit for different reasons. The practical answer  might well have to be ‘there is no alternative’. Therefore, we must discuss how this arguably most difficult endeavour in the history of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) could be a success.

 

Peacekeeping has never been harder

On December 7, the UN Peacekeeping Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), experienced the worst attack on UN forces in 24 years, killing 15 Peacekeepers and wounding 53. This act of violence was not an isolated incident but just the latest example of the increased hostility ‘Blue Helmets’ face.

Over the past few months, many of the UN’s 15 Peacekeeping missions have taken a turn for the worse. Peacekeepers are deployed in hostile terrains where they face asymmetrical threats from rebel groups and terrorist organisations. 2017 was a very tough year for peacekeeping, not only in terms of casualties but also due to political challenges, such as the politicization of troop contributions, the reluctance of host countries to cooperate with the missions and the national interests of the Security Council members.

This is a dangerous trend. First, major Troup Contributing Countries (TCCs) are likely to become even more risk-averse and impose greater limits, or ‘caveats’, to what their troops may do during deployment. These caveats hinder the ability of field commanders to make tactical decisions and thus jeopardise the success of mandates. Second, this trend can also be politicised by the UN’s critics who may call for even bigger budget cuts to DPKO by virtue of its ‘ineffectiveness’. Third, the increase in violence Peacekeepers are involved in –either because they were mandated to or because they were attacked– evaporates the notion that peacekeepers are neutral, putting troops and civilian staff in danger.

Despite these conditions, it is important to see what DPKO could learn from its existing operations for a mandate in Syria. Such a peacekeeping mission would require three main components: A hybrid setup, a mandate to fight against terrorism and a strong political strategy.

 

Hybrid is the future

First, any such peacekeeping operation would necessarily have to be co-administered with a regional organisation, i.e. have a hybrid mandate. This wouldn’t be the first of its kind, together with the African Union (AU), DPKO currently runs a mission in Darfur (UNAMID). The results, so far, have been mixed, but having the AU as an equal partner gave the mission considerable political capital within the region, streamlined contributions from African countries and helped smooth the political dialogue as it was not seen as a ‘Western’ intervention.

The mission needs to not only have the blessing of the region but long-term commitment to provide troops, equipment and political support. In addition, Western countries ought to support the mission in different ways, including logistical coordination, equipment and intelligence capabilities. As this support will not translate into many troops, more pressure will be on the Arab League to step up their commitment. 

 

Stabilize first, keep the peace second

Even with a brokered cease fire, the mission would deploy in a hostile region and therefore the mandate must allow troops to actively engage terrorist organisations. Deploying stabilisation missions into active conflict and hostile territories with broader and more robust mandates represented a drastic shift in peacekeeping. One of the strongest examples of this new area of peacekeeping is the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission Mali (MINUSMA), which had been deployed in an active conflict, in the midst of multiple terrorist organisations, with a mandate that could be considered a counter-insurgency operation.

MINUSMA has been one of the deadliest missions in UN history and observers expressed doubt that 2018 will be a more peaceful year. Much of the complex security environment in Mali, and the failures to address it can be lessons learned for a potential mandate in Syria.

The Syrian context is incredibly complex, involving a plethora of actors. Already there is a fundamental disagreement among the P5 on which actors should be considered terrorist organisations, which as could be seen in Mali can jeopardise peacebuilding in the long-term. The hostile environment and variety of actors also requires better training and equipment for the TCC countries from member states. Lastly, resilience is of the outmost importance. Attacks on MINUSMA have shown that especially Western TCCs are not willing or able to provide long-term commitment when troops are at risk. Without increasing resilience of TCCs, however, a mission in Syria cannot be successful.

 

Political dialogue

At the end of the day, sustainable peace requires political concertation and a complete rebuilding of civil society, likely taking generations. The UN has to support a conversation, provide technical expertise and political credibility to the process and foster coherence between both foreign and domestic actors.

The UN can draw on experience from other political missions where it has been successful, e.g. the UN Mission in Somalia. There UN involvement has helped the national government develop a long-term agenda, bring other sub-national actors to the table and plea to the IMF to continue to engage in debt relief

 

Conclusion

A potential peacekeeping mission in Syria would have to be hybrid and have a strong mandate which enables it to not only go after terrorist organisations but also ensure stabilisation of the country. In addition, there needs to be considerable political capital which fosters dialogue within Syrian society and, at the same time, limits the intrusion of external actors looking to further their own national interests.

In a climate of budget cuts, paralysis at the Security Council and lack of commitment from the region, this seems like a very tall order. However, it is essential for the UN to prepare itself and, to the best of its ability, work towards the peaceful resolution of the Syrian conflict should it be asked to do so.

 

Diego Salama is a communications officer at the United Nations University (UNU-MERIT) and a PhD candidate in history of international relations at Leiden University. His PhD focuses on history of the United Nations and Peacekeeping in the Middle East. He worked as a research assistant to the academic director at UNU-MERIT and at the United Nations Information Centre in Lima. Diego holds a BA in international relations from University College Maastricht and a MA in international relations (cum laude) with an emphasis on history from Leiden University.

Ortrun Merkle is a PhD Fellow at the United Nations University (UNU-MERIT). Her PhD thesis focuses on the relationship of gender and corruption. Challenging the one-dimensional approach most corruption research takes on gender, she argues that one must understand underlying gender norms to truly comprehend how corruption is rooted in society. She holds a MA in Economics, a MA in International Relations and a Certificate of Advanced Stud in Security Studies from the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs at Syracuse University, NY and a B.Sc. in Business Administration and Economics from the University of Passau, Germany.

Image Source: https://news.un.org/en/story/2014/08/476322-un-peacekeepers-golan-come-under-renewed-attack