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Resource-Induced Conflicts, Part I: Petro-violence in the Niger Delta

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By: Obi, Cyril and Siri Aas Rustad

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Since the turn of the century, petro-violence has brought the oil-producing Niger Delta to the forefront of international energy and security concerns for strategic, socio-economic, historical and political reasons. However, the root causes of this conflict lie in decades of marginalisation of the region’s inhabitants, pollution and the highly centralised state control of oil revenues.[1] Over five decades of oil production has largely contributed to the enrichment of international oil companies and national and local elites, while at the same time leading to the disempowerment and impoverishment of the local population through direct dispossession, repression, and pollution of the air, lands and waters.[2]

The turn to violent resistance in the early 2000s took place in the context of prolonged military rule, marginalisation, and repression of community protests. Militias, riding on the back of widespread frustration about the ineffectiveness of prior non-violent protests, resorted to violence. The attacks on oil installations and the kidnapping of expatriate oil workers were initially intended to gain attention and support for their cause. Subsequently, however, the activities of some militias began to acquire other characteristics and goals that went beyond demands for resource control.[3]

While some scholars point to greed and personal enrichment as the motivation for violent conflict[4], there is a growing quantitative literature pointing to resource-related grievances as the main explanation of the statistical correlation between oil in particular and violent conflict. Østby, Nordås, and Rød (2009) find that regions with high level of group inequalities, combined with resource endowment, have a higher risk of conflict, while Rustad (2016), in a study of the Niger Delta, concludes that those who believe their region to be worse off than others are more likely to support violence. Similarly, Must and Rustad (2016) observe that a perception of unfair treatment also increases the likelihood of supporting the use of violence. The case of the Niger Delta brings some of these issues to the fore.

The petro-violence in the Niger Delta is closely linked to revenue sharing between the Nigerian state and oil-producing areas, control over the resources, as well as feelings of exclusion, marginalisation and exploitation endured by ethnic minority groups compared to larger groups on national level, such as the Ogoni and Ijaw communities. Perhaps most relevant are the ways in which the high stakes involved have fed into a vicious cycle of exploitation, protest, repression, resistance, militarisation and the descent into a volatile mix of insurgent violence and criminality[5]. Both these processes place great strain on the relationship between the local and the national levels.

The Niger Delta is a vast coastal plain in the southernmost part of Nigeria, with an estimated population of 31 million people. Traditionally, the local people earned their livelihood as farmers, fishers, and traders of items linked to the principal subsistence economies. At the same time, the region is also home to over 75% of Nigeria’s petroleum production and exports, including oil multinationals, state and local oil companies, oil service companies, ‘thousands of kilometers of oil pipelines, ten export terminals, four refineries and a massive liquefied natural gas (LNG) sector’.[6] The great challenge to forging a balanced relationship between the local and national level is the coexistence of a vast petro industry alongside the local grievances related to the subsistence livelihoods of the population.

At the national level, oil accounts for over 70% of government revenues[7] and 90% of merchandise export earnings[8], making it the fiscal basis of both state and federal power, as well as economic development. Thus, at the local level there is the strong feeling among ethnic oil minorities that the non-oil producing ethnic majority groups (Igbo, Yoruba and Hausa-Fulani), which dominate the federal government, also control the oil wealth, while those who produce the oil suffer from neglect, exploitation, and pollution.

Marginalisation

The feelings of marginalisation among the ethnic minorities in the Niger Delta compared to the larger national ethnic majorities gained momentum in the wake of Nigeria’s independence from British rule in 1960. In 1966, there was an attempt at secession by a group of ethnic Ijaw youth, the Niger Delta Volunteer Force (NDVF) led by Isaac Adaka Boro, who wanted to create a Niger Delta republic that would ensure Ijaw self-determination, and ownership and control of the oil in its territory.[9] The attempted secession failed. Instead, Colonel Odumegwu Ojukwu led the Biafran secession, ostensibly to fight for Igbo self-determination against perceived northern domination, but also to assert control over the Niger Delta oil fields. Boro joined the federal war against Biafra, to repel Biafran claims to oilfields in Ijaw territory. This struggle over oil riches in the 1960s, both amongst various ethnic groups within the Niger Delta, and between the ethnic minorities and the federal government, underline the grievances and claims that feature in many of the struggles witnessed today.

Several developments during and after the Biafran civil war had implications on the agitation for minority rights in the Niger Delta. The first was that the oil from the region became the main source of national revenues and export earnings. Secondly, the federal military government had seized control of oil through Decree No. 51/Petroleum Act of 1969. Specifically, it provided that “the entire ownership and control of all petroleum in, under or upon any lands…shall be vested in the state [Federal Government]”[10]. In section 2, the Act granted the federal oil minister “the sole right to grant oil mining leases to oil companies”. This legislation expropriated oil from the Niger Delta much to the chagrin of the ethnic minorities of the region, who had hoped that the individual states would own the oil within their respective territories. This meant a loss of power over the oil resources by local people and the loss of compensation for the full value of appropriated land. It also meant that multinational corporations (MNCs) could directly get oil and land leases from the government without recourse to local communities.

These feelings of exclusion, dispossession and disappointment were further reinforced by the progressive downward revision of the derivation principle for revenue allocation (i.e. the share of the revenues being returned to the producing state) from 50% in 1966 to 1.5% in the mid-1990s. While this level was raised to 13% following the return of democracy in 1999, the relationship between the Niger Delta and the federal government worsened when demands from the oil-producing states for an increase to 25% were blocked by the northern elites.[11]

Protests and militants

However, what followed was a systematic repression of Ogoni protests, including military raids on Ogoni villages, and arrests of suspected MOSOP cadres and sympathizers. This culminated in a trial, widely held as flawed, where Saro-Wiwa and eight MOSOP members were found guilty of the murder of four pro-government Ogoni leaders. In spite of worldwide pleas for clemency, they were executed in 1995.[12]

The return to democracy in 1999 also had negative ramifications for the human rights and pro-democracy movement. Politicians of the Niger Delta tapped into the groundswell of popular anger among the large number of unemployed or alienated youth in the region, frustrated over the lack of local jobs within the oil industry.[13] Some of these youths became ready tools of politicians, feeding into a spiral of local violence in the 1999 and 2003 elections. By 2006 these violent outbursts, combined with communal conflicts, politics of local resistance, and the struggle for resource control, evolved into a full-fledged insurgency. Although initially rooted in the militarization and coming together of youth groups and their protests at several levels, the insurgency quickly took on other agendas and dimensions. The complex conflict that raged in the Niger Delta involved broad militant alliances like the militant group Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), linked to the ethnic minority group Ijaw. This insurgent faction combined lethal attacks and sabotage of oil installations with the effective use of global media to publicize its campaign of fighting for the control of oil revenues by indigenes of the Niger Delta.[14]

Amnesty

Rising domestic and international concerns surrounding the conflict, alongside the inability of the government’s military Joint Task Force in reining in MEND – which had successfully managed to shut down a third of Nigeria’s oil production – formed the basis of a Presidential Amnesty granted to the Niger Delta militants in 2009. The aim was to restore security by ending the disruption of oil production and exports, which had contributed to the loss of oil revenues and profits, and offer the battle-weary militias an opportunity to partake in state patronage and assistance programs. The offer to ‘drop their guns in exchange for peace’ was accepted by the main militia leaders, while a faction of MEND remained opposed to the Amnesty. Consequently, there was a remarkable reduction in the level of violence between 2010-2011.

Over time, however, the region has been once again engulfed by violence; a trend mainly caused by ex-combatants who have either turned to criminality, or have engaged in protests over their perceived exclusion from the benefits of the Amnesty. Their behaviour can be traced back to several factors. The first was the election of President Muhammadu Buhari from north-central Nigeria in 2015. After taking office, Buhari reorganized the Amnesty program and fired the leadership appointed by former President Goodluck Jonathan, while reviewing and reducing the funding of the program. Secondly, speculations emerged on the alleged expiry of the Amnesty program at the end of 2017. These rumours arose, in part, due to on-going investigations of corruption in the program, as well as the allegations (raised by some ex-militia leaders) that the new President is hostile to the interest of the region and seeks to perpetuate northern domination of regional oil resources. Thirdly, Nigeria felt the negative impact caused by the crash of global oil prices on its oil-dependent economy and fiscal federalism. The stakes of gaining access to shrinking oil revenues in the midst of an economic recession led to intensified struggles.

The foregoing broadly defines the context within which a new group, the Niger Delta Avengers (NDA), emerged after over five years of relative peace in the Niger Delta, attacking MNCs’ oil installations in early 2016. While the Amnesty succeeded in buying some respite for a few years, it failed to address the underlying causes of the violent conflict. The local population still feels marginalised and the federal government retains control over the region’s natural resources. While the establishment of the Amnesty was a window of opportunity for the federal government to deal with the Niger Delta crisis, it seems that this window is about to close.[15] If the root causes continue to be left unsolved, and the old and new protagonists of the conflict see the struggle for power over oil in zero-sum ways, the oil-rich region could be engulfed by another wave of violence in the near future.

 

 

 

Siri Aas Rustad is a senior researcher at the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO). She has extensive experience with research on natural resource management, conflict, peace and the extractive industry both in Africa and Latin America.

 

Dr. Cyril Obi is a program director at the Social Science Research Council (SSRC) and leads the African Peacebuilding Network (APN) program. Dr. Obi is well published, and is a member of the editorial boards of many international journals. He is also a research associate of the Department of Political Sciences, University of Pretoria, South Africa, and a visiting scholar to the Institute of African Studies (IAS), Columbia University, New York.

 

This article was based on:

Obi, Cyril and Siri Aas Rustad (2011a), “The Complex Politics of an Insurgency?” in Oil and Insurgency in the Niger Delta: Managing the Complex Politics of Petroviolence edited by Cyril Obi and Siri Aas Rustad. Zed Books. London

 

 

Notes:

[1] Obi, Cyril (2014). “Oil and Conflict in Nigeria’s Niger Delta Region: Between the Barrrel and the Trigger”, The Extractive Industries and Society, 1: 147-153; Obi, Cyril Obi (2016), “Understanding the Resource Curse Effect: Instability and Violent Conflict in Africa”, in Pamela Aall (ed.), Minding the Gap: African Conflict Management in a Time of Change, Ontario: CIGI.; Watts, Michael J. and Ibaba Samuel Ibaba (2011), “Turbulent Oil: Conflict and Insecurity in the Niger Delta”, African Security, Vol. 4, Issue 1.

[2] Obi, Cyril (2010), “Oil Extraction, Dispossession, Resistance and Conflict in Nigeria’s Oil-Rich Niger Delta,”, Canadian Journal of Development Studies, Vol. 30, Issue 1-2.; Nwajiaku-Dahou, Kathryn (2012), “Then political economy of oil and Insurgency ‘rebellion’, Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 39, Vol. 39, Issue 132.; Agbiboa, Daniel (2013), “Have we heard the Movement for the Emancipation Last? Oil, environmental insecurity, and the impact of the amnesty programme on the Niger Delta and the empowerment of violence” Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 40, Issue 137.

[3] Boås, Morten (2011), “Mend Me’ the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta and the empowerment of violence” in Oil and Insurgency in the Niger Delta: Managing the Complex Politics of Petroviolence edited by Cyril Obi and Siri Aas Rustad. Zed Books. London; Ikelegbe, Augustine (2011), “Popular and Criminal Violence as instruments of struggle in the Niger Delta Region” in Oil and Insurgency in the Niger Delta: Managing the Complex Politics of Petroviolence edited by Cyril Obi and Siri Aas Rustad. Zed Books. London

[4] Collier, Paul and Anke Hoeffler (2004), ‘Greed and grievance in civil wars’, Oxford Economic Papers 56:663–595.

[5] Obi, Cyril and Siri Aas Rustad (2011b), “Is the window of opportunity closing for the Niger Delta?” in Oil and Insurgency in the Niger Delta: Managing the Complex Politics of Petroviolence edited by Cyril Obi and Siri Aas Rustad. Zed Books. London

[6] Watts, Michael (2007), “Petro-Insurgency or Criminal Syndicate? Conflict and Violence in the Niger Delta,” Review of African Political Economy, vol. 34, no. 114, p. 639.

[7] http://www.resourcegovernance.org/our-work/country/nigeria

[8] http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/TX.VAL.FUEL.ZS.UN?locations=NG&view=chart

[9] Obi (2010), ‘Oil Extraction, Dispossession, Resistance and Conflict in Nigeria’s Oil-Rich Niger Delta’, p. 225

[10] http://www.lexadin.nl/wlg/legis/nofr/oeur/arch/nig/petroleumact.pdf

[11] Ukiwo, Ukoha (2011), “The Nigerian State, Oil and the Niger Delta Crisis” in Oil and Insurgency in the Niger Delta: Managing the Complex Politics of Petroviolence edited by Cyril Obi and Siri Aas Rustad. Zed Books. London

[12] Obi, Cyril (1997) “Globalization and Local Resistance: The Case of Ogoni versus Shell”, New Political Economy, Vol. 2, Issue 1.;  Obi (2010), ‘Oil Extraction, Dispossession, Resistance and Conflict in Nigeria’s Oil-Rich Niger Delta’

[13] Ukoha (2011), “The Nigerian State, Oil and the Niger Delta Crisis”

[14] Rustad, Siri Aas (2016), “Socioeconomic Inequalities and Attitudes Towards Violence: A Test with New Survey Data in the Niger Delta”. International Interactions 42(1): 106-139

[15] Obi and Rustad (2011b), “Is the window of opportunity closing for the Niger Delta?”

Image Credit: Socialist Youth League of Norway (Sosialistisk Ungdom (SU)),  Flikr, https://c2.staticflickr.com/4/3607/4560583670_991d50ea04_b.jpg, (April 6 2010)

 

Resource-Induced Conflicts, Part I: Resource Wars

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By: Jasper Humphreys

f-14a_vf-114_over_burning_kuwaiti_oil_well_1991
1991 picture of a United States Navy Grumman F-14A Tomcat from Fighter Squadron 114 (VF-114) Aardvarks. Courtesy of Lt. Steve Gozzo, USN – U.S. DefenseImagery photo VIRIN: DN-SC-93-03891

Fighting over resources has been going on since Mankind started trading with one another, even though the phrase ‘resource wars’ is a modern invention.

With the period known as the Bronze Age emerging roughly six thousand years ago, the outlines of what today we regard as ‘resource wars’ became apparent: globalisation, the ‘pull’ factor of technology, improving communications, commercial sophistication, empire-building, and of course, the ability to fight.

Bronze is an alloy made principally from copper and tin. Its strength and durability characteristics made it perfect for forging swords, axes and shields. Thus revolutionising warfare from club-wielding skirmishes to mass kinetic encounters that sometimes led to death and occasionally, annihilation. However, not every country is blessed with copper and tin. In such instances, the only option available is to rob these resources by force from other political, and potentially unfriendly powers. This added an additional layer of complexity to the logistics and strategy of the plundering army, as exiting the land with the booty would prove as difficult as entering the forbidden territory in the first place. The discovery of bronze allowed armies to grow and become more heavily armed (including the use of cavalry), made possible through involving complex logistics alongside good leadership.

Nothing has changed since those ancient times about the two simple identities of ‘resource wars’: they are either i) about plundering and grabbing, or ii) about holding on with force to what you already have. It is here that the problems associated with ‘resource wars’ emerge, stemming from both identifying the motivation of the parties involved and how to devise an appropriate response to end hostilities.

Until the modern era, economists generally saw a large amount of natural resources as being an advantage; that view changed in the 1980’s as new scholarship sparked by Jeffrey Sachs and Andrew Warner focused on what was labelled the ‘natural resource curse’: this suggested that actually having an abundance of natural resources created a negative impact, as it could lead to slower growth, undemocratic regimes and violent civil conflict; all part of ‘resource wars’.[1]

It was this thinking that prompted moves to ban the trade of resources originating from conflict zones, highlighted in ‘blood diamonds’, ‘blood ivory’ and so on. This new research also highlighted the concept of ‘resource dependency’. This is when a country relies on one or two resources for its income, with obvious contemporary examples being Saudi Arabia and its oil and Botswana and its diamonds.[2]

When looking at resources as a cause of civil wars, several important debates can be identified. Firstly, ‘greed or grievance’, heavily associated with Paul Collier who saw ‘greed’ as one form of motivation for the fighters who pursued economic gain, while working on the assumption that the rewards of joining a fight were much greater than if they did not join the fight. ‘Grievance’, however, was a stronger motivation for Collier, who reckoned that people were much more motivated to fight over issues of identity like ethnicity or religion than being driven solely by ‘greed’.[3] However, others view the ‘resource curse’ totally differently, seeing greater resource wealth as lowering the probability of conflict and not leading to civil war.[4]

The alternative debate centres on the theory that poor environmental conditions forces people to fight to satisfy their basic survival needs, such as cutting down timber, poaching or plundering as an economic resource. This link between ‘environmental scarcity’ theory and conflict is most heavily associated with Thomas Homer-Dixon and the Toronto School. Sometimes referred to as ‘environmental conflicts’, where these conflicts typologies originate from human-made disturbances so great that the environment is unable naturally regenerate. Examples include fighting over water that is diminishing due to the construction of a dam upstream, or having land overgrazed to such an extent that competition (over its use?) leads to fighting.[5]

Conflicts that involve natural resources and are caused by physical, geopolitical or socio-economic problems are not environmental conflicts. They are actually traditional conflicts over resource distribution. In the same way, conflicts over agricultural land can only be called an ‘environmental conflict’ if the land is under contest because of soil erosion, climate-change, or other environmental degradation. Otherwise they are simply ‘contests of territory’ like any war or conflict that we commonly think of. So far, so confusing. To provide some analytical rigour, the phrase ‘resource wars’ is restricted to only inter-state conflicts; while distinguishing between the types of resources. A ‘resource’ is defined as being those elements that are key to human survival. Water, soil, air and eco-systems are defined as Resources-Life, while oil and gas are Resources-Strategic; the latter being the realm of traditional geo-strategic ‘high politics’. Here the price is controlled not only by supply/demand, but also by the additional costs relating to the environmental and securitisation impact of changes in the supply, such as the costs tied to the distribution of water in the Jordan Valley.

By contrast, those conflicts linked to resources that are not considered as part of ‘high politics’ might be given another description – ‘commodity conflicts’. Here the identity of a ‘commodity’ lies in that it is controlled by market-forces that are accompanied by a sliding-scale of ‘conflict-risk’ that ranges from high (cocaine, coltan, diamonds) to mid-low (copper, gold, rhino horn) to very low (coffee, tea). Additionally, it is important to make a distinction between the illegal and legal forms of ‘commodity conflicts’: in the former category they would be defined as ‘lootable’ and the latter as ‘extractible’. The basic profile of ‘commodity conflicts’ is that they have been:

 

> Localised

> Based on extractive/ ‘lootable’ commodities.

> Violent in short bursts, sometimes over long periods.

> Difficult for outside forces to quell.

> Often linked to power struggles within the ruling elite.

 

To provide even greater clarity, another category in the resource-conflict spectrum could be referred to as ‘environmental confrontations’. This gathers in the wider spectrum of conflict that has some element of the environment at its core, which range from over-fishing, riparian access, to animal rights, wildlife poaching, illegal timber-felling and environmental campaigns of all types.

Finally, there is a fourth category. This is the most problematic as it contains elements of both resources and commodities, and so makes devising a response especially difficult. It covers five broad issues:

 

> Food security: food is both a commodity and a resource. For example, the cocoa commodity market was targeted in 2010 by British financier Anthony Ward by developing a hoarding strategy; meanwhile the British investment fund, African Century, are looking to develop fish and chicken farms to provide a major source of food in southern Africa.

> New sources of energy. 

> Land sales/rights: land is a resource that is both publicly and privately owned and is often sold as commodity.

> Drugs trade: drugs are a commodity controlled by market-forces for which the suppliers use drug-users as a resource to be exploited, with ramifications of national and global importance.

> Flora and fauna: both are a commodity and a resource (for firewood and eating).

 

Throughout post-Biblical history wars within the category of Resources-Life have never occurred, and follow the logic that these resources are so crucial that even though war theoretically could rapidly escalate, in practice it is in the interest of all parties to negotiate rather than to fight. This is borne out in the story of the so-called ‘water wars’, both past and present, where disagreements and confrontations have not erupted into fighting, and from which emerges a school of thought that sees negotiations over water access creating a ‘neutral’ zone from which wider antagonisms can be discussed, such as in the Middle East.[6]

Regarding conflicts within the category of Resources-Strategic, the two Gulf Wars illustrated the sharp limits to American geo-strategic endurance when its oil supplies in the Middle East were threatened; it was a similar perception from the earlier Soviet invasion of Afghanistan that gave rise to the 1980 Carter Doctrine of ‘red-lines’ in the sands of the Middle East.[7]  Furthermore, there was a surge in ‘commodity conflicts’ after the post- Cold War euphoria had ebbed and ushered in a new wave of ethnic conflicts with unprecedented dimension and geographical spread. These conflicts, predominately in the global South, often witnessed an overlap between criminal ‘lootability’ and long-standing ethnic or religious grievances; ‘blood diamonds’, ‘conflict minerals’, gold and illegal timber extraction all helped to fuel conflict. In the post-colonial dawn, groups have battled each other for power within the realm of modern globalisation; combining new technological developments in communications and transportation, with market forces and the ‘shadow economy’ of undeclared and illegal trading.

And the future. The iron rule of the commercial market-place means that some resources and commodities fade due to lack of demand and the rise of others. Who today would think of fighting to control the spice and fur trades as in the past? Instead, today’s insatiable need for tantalum capacitors inside mobile-phones and other electronic devices has put a premium on coltan (short for columbite-tantalite). The fact that coltan is found in both developed countries such as Canada, and under-developed countries such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), has led to the emergence of parallel extractible/regulated and lootable/unregulated markets – buyers make their choice, it’s a free market.

The wide range of ‘lootable’ resources has caused an entwining with the ever-growing ‘shadow’ economy of transnational criminal networks, especially in countries and areas that have been ‘wasted’. These ‘wastelands’ can either occur through conflict, such as in the DRC, or severe deprivation, as in parts of Mexico and much of Central America. The absence of an effective and centralized authority in these ‘wastelands’ makes them, in the view of political geographer, Derek Gregory, ‘pre-constituted as fallen, violated and damaged, always and everywhere potential targets for a colonising capitalist modernity.’ Furthermore, the state’s monopoly of violence may have collapsed, meaning for Gregory that ‘non state actors (warlords, local and ethnic militia) are able to establish alternative, territorially restricted forms of centralised violence.’[8]

 

 

Jasper Humphreys is Director of External Affairs of the Marjan Centre for the Study of War and the Non-Human Sphere in the Department of War Studies, King’s College: this centre is unique in studying the overlap of conflict and biodiversity. Formerly, he was a journalist with over thirty years of experience, writing for various national newspapers.

 

 

 

Notes:

[1] Jeffrey D. Sachs/Andrew M. Warner, ‘Natural resource abundance and economic growth’, working paper Center for International Development and Harvard Institute for International Development, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1997, accessed 15 December 2011.

[2] Kenneth Good; ‘Diamonds, Dispossession and Democracy in Botswana’, Boydell and Brewer, Rochester, New York, 2008

[3] Paul Collier/Anke Hoeffler, ‘On economic causes of civil war’, Oxford Economic Papers 50(4),1998.

[4] Christa N. Brunnschweiler/Erwin H. Bulte, ‘Natural resources and violent conflict: resource abundance, dependence, and the onset of civil wars’, Oxford Economic Papers 61, 2009, pp.651-674.

[5] Thomas Homer-Dixon, Environment, scarcity, and violence (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1999).

[6] Tony Allan; ‘The Middle East Water Question: Hydropolitics and the Global Economy’, I.B Tauris, London, 2012

[7] Andrew J. Bacevich, ‘The Carter doctrine at 30’, World Affairs, 1 April 2010.

[8] Derek Gregory, ‘War and Peace’, Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, 35, 2010, p. 166.

Image Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kuwaiti_oil_fires#/media/File:F-14A_VF-114_over_burning_Kuwaiti_oil_well_1991.JPEG

Resource-Induced Conflicts: Introduction to the Series

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By: Annabelle Vuille

istock_000020867570large

 

In 2001, Michael T. Klare published his ground breaking work Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict. In it, he argued that humanity’s growing dependence on a finite supply of critical resources – from oil and minerals, to water and land – at a time when demand for such resources was expected to soar, meant that our future would increasingly be characterised by what he termed ‘resource conflicts’; that is, armed conflicts or civil strife revolving ‘to a significant degree, over the pursuit or possession of critical materials.’[1] Today, this analysis seems prescient.

According to the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP), at least 40% of all internal conflicts recorded over the past 60 years, including at least 18 violent conflicts since the 1990s have been fuelled by issues relating to the exploitation and control of either scarce or ‘high value’ commodities. With the world population expected to exceed 9 billion by 2050, and the effects of climate change and environmental degradation placing increased pressure on commodity supplies, it is highly likely that the new fault line underlying world politics will be natural resources: who has them, who needs them, and which actors have the necessary means to secure them. While natural resources can foment war both between states – such as the ongoing petroleum clash between the Angolan and Congolese government in the Cabinda region, or the Spratly Islands dispute in the South China Sea – and within states – as is the case in both Iraq and Yemen, where disagreements over resource-wealth sharing have caused ethnic fragmentation and civil strife – it is the latter that will be the focus of this Strife series.

Since the turn of the century, there has been a growing body of literature dealing with the link between intrastate conflict and natural resources. The contentious issue on the matter is whether armed conflicts within a state are linked to an abundance or scarcity of resources, commonly referred to as the ‘resource curse’. Proponents argue that an abundance of natural resources leads to economic underperformance, fuels corruption, and creates socio-political ills that may lead to civil strife. Contrastingly, critics point to other countries such as Norway, Botswana and Chile, as examples of peaceful states possessing significant resource endowments. [2]–[3]  However, although scholars remain divided on the salience of the resource-curse theory, there is common consensus that while resources may not be the sole cause of conflict, stresses related to their exploitation can have a significant impact on civil strife. From inciting initial acts of violence, financing or sustaining conflict by providing the revenues necessary to purchase arms and secure loyalties, to undermining peace building efforts due to concerns over disenfranchisement and loss of income – natural resources can be implicated in all phases of the conflict cycle.[4]

Over the coming weeks, Strife will be featuring a five-part series on the role of natural resources in triggering, escalating, or sustaining violent conflict within states. Jasper Humphreys will start by surveying the theoretical underpinnings and debates surrounding ‘resource wars’, and subsequently offer insights into where and over which resources future violent conflict might ensue. The three subsequent pieces will provide an insight into current cases of ‘resource conflicts’. Sourojeet Chakraborty will discuss the drawbacks of fracking for shale exploration, how these effects have led to public uprisings from the U.S. and the UK to Algeria, and offer an assessment of what energy companies might do to alleviate such tensions. Siri Camilla Rustad and Cyril Obi will take a closer look at petro-violence in the Niger Delta, the evolution and causes of the conflict, and offer insights into why the Amnesty granted to the Niger Delta militants in 2009 ultimately failed. Dr. Charles Schmitz will use the case of Yemen to argue that though linking natural resource scarcity or abundance to conflict has an attractive conceptual simplicity, the roots of conflict are far more complex.  Social relations—economy, politics, social institutions—mediate the relationships between the natural environment and people and bear far more responsibility for scarcity, abundance, and conflict than simple Malthusian equations. Finally, Päivi Lujala will place ‘resource conflicts’ into the context of peacebuilding and discuss the ways in which increased transparency in contract formulation, ownership schemes, and revenue flows may prevent resource-rich states from sliding back into violence.

With soaring global population growth, and the subsequent rise in the demand for resources – from oil and gas, to water and livestock – there is significant potential that the coming decades will experience an intensification of civil strife and conflict over resources. In this five-part series Strife hopes to provide a deeper understanding of the dynamics shaping such conflicts and the means available to states and non-state actors to address their root cause and (hopefully) create a sustainable road to peace.

 

 

Annabelle Vuille is currently based in Switzerland and in her final year of the MA programme in International Relations and Contemporary War at the Department of War Studies at King’s College London. Having studied International Business in Rome, she is specifically interested in applying her economic background to the sphere of conflict and security. Her main research interest is the interplay between geopolitics and energy security, particularly in the maritime domain.

 

 

 

Notes:

[1] Klare, Michael (2001), Resource Wars: The Changing Landscape of Global Conflict (New York, United States: Henry Holt), p. 23.

[2] Wright, Gavin and Czelusta, Jesse (2004), ‘Why Economies Slow: The Myth of the Resource Curse’, Challenge, Vol. 47, No. 2, pp. 6-38.; Varisco, Andrea (2010), ‘A Study on the Inter-Relation between Armed Conflict and Natural Resources and its implications for Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding’, Journal of Peace, Conflict and Development, Vol. 15, pp. 38-58.

[3] Michael L. Ross, “The political economy of the Resource Curse”, World Politics 51, no.2 (1999): pp. 297-322 explains the so-called Dutch Disease effect, Indra De Soysa, “The Resource Curse: Are Civil Wars Driven by Rapacity or Paucity?”, in Greed and Grievances: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars, ed. Mats R. Berdal and David M. Malone (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Press, 2000) pp. 113-136 introduces the concept of ‘honey pots’. See also Philippe Le Billon, “The political ecology of war: Natural Resources and Armed Conflicts”, Political Geography, 20 (2001): p. 564.

[4] United Nations Environment Programme (2009), From Conflict to Peacebuilding: The Role of Natural Resources and the Environment (Nairobi, Kenya: United Nations Environment Programme).

Image Source: http://tantec.no/TantecNorgeAS/produkter/iptv/content/photogallery_8925791b-a11d-4323-8228-c5e02616d6f4/images/1353664924198/istock_000020867570large.jpg

After Ukraine, Part I – Sleepwalking into crisis: Britain, Russia and the Ukraine

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By Michael Jones:

David Cameron meets Vladimir Putin in Moscow, September 2011. PA copyright (CC 2.0)
David Cameron meets Vladimir Putin in Moscow, September 2011. Photo: Number 10, PA copyright (CC 2.0)

Britain’s Defence secretary Michael Fallon said in February that the Russian Leader Vladimir Putin presented as much of a threat to Europe as ISIS[i]. It seems strange that to assert the seriousness of the threat from Russia – a major nuclear-armed power in Europe – Fallon had to compare it to a rebellion on another continent. Fallon was suggesting that people were seriously underestimating Russia’s power and misunderstanding its nature.

This is suggestive of both how the crisis in Ukraine arose and why our reaction to it has been so muted. The House of Lords said as much in a new report, stating that Britain, NATO and the EU had “sleepwalked” into the crisis with Russia in the Ukraine. Britain (as well as NATO and the EU) has consistently misread Russia’s perceptions and actions, and even now they seem confused over how to react to the Russian intervention in eastern Ukraine and the subsequent confrontation.

Fallon’s comparison of Russia to ISIS reflects the relatively minor attention this war in Europe has received in Britain. With the exception of the downing of MH17, the Ukraine conflict has generally garnered less media or public attention than ISIS or the threat of terrorism at home. Parliament has debated the subject several times but action has been limited to sanctions in line with the US and EU, sending one company of non-combat troops and a large amount of high-flying but ultimately hollow rhetoric.

Why the lack of interest? 

The reason for this seems to be that Britain has had more immediate problems. It is easy to forget that seven months ago Britain came close to splitting up, which would have thrown the government, economy and military of Britain into uncertainty and crisis. Thus, for most of 2014, while the Ukraine crisis blew up into civil war, Britain was not sure if it would make it to Christmas in one piece (it did, unlike Ukraine). Britain could hardly commit to radical sanctions or military pressure when it was not sure if its treasury and armed forces would be split with an independent Scotland.

The haunting figure of the Londoner “Jihadi John” personifying the “Islamic State” (IS) on our TV screens hooked our attention and dominated debate. Horror reminiscent of the dark ages in a country we recently invaded, with large numbers of our (erstwhile) countrymen running enthusiastically to join in was hard to ignore. IS has not only stolen the headlines with its sweeping conquests and brutal TV executions, but it has provoked a serious debate about the role of extremism within the West. Radical Islam seems to be a brutal and terrifying enemy that is hard to understand and is at work amongst us, an impression fuelled by the Charlie Hebdo and Copenhagen attacks.

Finally, in the face of economic crisis, potential dissolution and domestic terrorism, Britain’s public has become reluctant to sanction actions abroad and the government has been duly circumscribed. The 2013 defeat in Parliament of David Cameron’s proposed intervention in Syria has made government reluctant to commit forces abroad; indeed, we have fewer aircraft fighting IS than Denmark. This all suggests that Britain’s government is preoccupied and its people unwilling to act.

Britain is involved, whether we like it or not. 

With all of these distractions and weaknesses, perhaps conflict in Ukraine is a troublesome irrelevance. But Britain is involved, whether we like it or not. Britain is an EU and NATO member state, both of which are being challenged by Russia. Even without NATO and the EU, we are one of the three guarantors of the Budapest Agreement of 1994, which promised Ukrainian sovereignty would be inviolate in return for abandoning the nuclear arsenal it inherited from the USSR.

The UK supported NATO expansion into Eastern Europe, with seemingly little consideration of what the implications would be. NATO expansion brought with it Article V of the NATO treaty, meaning that an attack on one state is an attack on all. Britain is therefore bound by treaty to defend the states of Eastern Europe as much as it is bound to defend the Falklands. Russia’s consistent and vocal opposition to this expansion should not have left us under any illusions about what might happen. The states of Eastern Europe that joined NATO expected the protection of NATO’s Article V, because they did not want to be treated like Ukraine. Despite seeking and accepting these numerous responsibilities, we seem surprised that they should cost us anything. Sleepwalking is an apt description.

In terms of concrete action, Britain has joined EU sanctions against Russian banks, energy and defence companies, although the government policy states it has merely left its economic relations with Russia “under review”[ii]. British troops help form the NATO Rapid Reaction Corps, which has drilled in Poland and the Baltic states, while the RAF and the Royal Navy intercept Russian ships and jets near the UK.

Britain did unilaterally send 75 troops to Ukraine to help train the government forces, a move that no other EU states matched. But this was a gesture, nothing more, as it was too late to affect the training standards of troops already engaged in combat and the ceasefire of February has effectively created a frozen conflict already.

These lacklustre actions mean that at home and abroad we are perceived to lack the will to act. A growing chorus of generals, politicians and journalists are drawing attention to our underwhelming reaction. Generals are using the menace of Russia as an argument to stop or reverse defence cuts. So far in this election campaign, none of the UK’s main parties have pledged to maintain the commitment to spend 2% of GDP on defence required of NATO states. This has drawn warnings from our American allies and will not have been missed in Moscow.

The Prime Minister was notably absent from the Minsk talks and has generally allowed Angela Merkel and Obama to lead the Western diplomatic efforts. Politicians have talked tough on Russia but musings about cutting Russia off from the SWIFT banking mechanism were quickly silenced by Medvedev’s claim that this would be an act of war. Russia has achieved escalation dominance and they are prepared to do more in Ukraine than we or our allies are prepared to do to prevent them.

The implications of sleepwalking.

The implications of this are considerable. Our actions here will affect our interests globally. First, Russia has redrawn European borders at gunpoint, a move that we have not prevented (although NATO also did this in Kosovo in 2008). The fact that the UK was unable to prevent the violation of the Budapest Agreement means that our ability to uphold our obligations will be called into doubt. This will mean our enemies show less respect for our interests or those of our allies. Our allies will view the UK as a less credible ally and think twice before admitting us to the negotiating table. If Russia feels emboldened by our weakness and NATO is indeed undermined by Russian actions, the security of the UK will be undermined because the reliability of NATO as a pillar of UK security will vanish.

The second issue is nuclear weapons. As Ukraine gave up its nuclear weapons based on the promise of the protection of its sovereignty in 1994, what message does that send to Iran, North Korea and other would-be nuclear powers? Arguably it shows them that a nuclear weapon is more necessary than ever, that their sovereignty can be violated without it. This impression was exacerbated by the US-led invasion of Iraq. Powers like Israel and Pakistan are nuclear states that, despite many threats, remain intact; while non-nuclear Ukraine and Iraq have both suffered invasion. The logic behind nuclear non-proliferation will be irrevocably damaged.

What can the UK do?

It is easy to highlight problems and not proffer solutions, and clearly the UK has made some efforts in Ukraine which other states have not. It is extremely unlikely the UK would ever fight a war over Ukraine, whatever its treaty obligations. But what can the UK do?

First, the crisis in the Ukraine has taught us that we need to think carefully about taking on burdens we cannot support, specifically in terms of the implications of signing up to treaties and expanding alliances. Renewing our commitment to spending 2% of GDP on Defence would improve the means to act and signal to the rest of the world that we are not shirking our responsibilities.

Second, we should play Russia at its own game. Since Russia has violated the Budapest accords by invading Ukraine, we could, in turn, stop adhering to the NATO-Russia Founding Act of 1997. This Act stated that there would be no permanent NATO bases in Eastern Europe, only temporary deployments. Estonia’s president has called for NATO troops to remain in Eastern Europe on more long term deployments in violation of the act. By stationing troops in Eastern Europe for as long as Russia is in Ukraine, the UK and NATO would show that they are prepared to support and honour their obligations to their allies and that Russia would not be able to hide behind treaties if it was itself reluctant to honour them.

Whatever the wisdom or morality of NATO and EU expansion, and whether or not we have provoked Russia, the damage to UK-Russia relations is done and Russia cannot be appeased. We are now bound to support our allies. We cannot salvage our failure to keep to the terms of the Budapest Agreement by withdrawing from Eastern Europe, acknowledging a Russian sphere of influence and thereby forsaking our NATO responsibilities.

The world is shaped by powers that act. If we don’t, it will be shaped by someone else, quite probably to our detriment.

Michael Jones has a BA in History from the University of Oxford. He is currently reading for an MA in War Studies at King’s College London. His particular areas of interest include modern Russia and great power rivalry.

This article is part of a Strife series entitled ‘Russia and the World following Ukraine’. Over the next couple of weeks Strife will feature three more articles about the global reaction to the crisis in the Ukraine. Next, Conradin Weindl will look into the relationship between the European Union and Russia in the wake of the war in Ukraine. Then Andrzej Kozłowski will analyse Poland’s approach to the crisis and the implications for Polish security. Finally, Sebastian Åsberg, will examine the debate regarding NATO membership in neutral Sweden and Finland, which has intensified significantly as a result of the war in Ukraine.

NOTES

[i] I Magazine pp.4 20/02/2015

[ii] https://www.gov.uk/government/news/doing-business-in-russia-and-ukraine-sanctions-latest