• Skip to primary navigation
  • Skip to main content
  • Skip to footer
  • Home
  • About
    • Editorial Staff
      • Bryan Strawser, Editor in Chief, Strife
      • Dr Anna B. Plunkett, Founder, Women in Writing
      • Strife Journal Editors
      • Strife Blog Editors
      • Strife Communications Team
      • Senior Editors
      • Series Editors
      • Copy Editors
      • Strife Writing Fellows
      • Commissioning Editors
      • War Studies @ 60 Project Team
      • Web Team
    • Publication Ethics
    • Open Access Statement
  • Archive
  • Series
  • Strife Journal
  • Strife Policy Papers
    • Strife Policy Papers: Submission Guidelines
    • Vol 1, Issue 1 (June 2022): Perils in Plain Sight
  • Contact us
  • Submit to Strife!

Strife

The Academic Blog of the Department of War Studies, King's College London

  • Announcements
  • Articles
  • Book Reviews
  • Call for Papers
  • Features
  • Interviews
  • Strife Policy Papers
    • Strife Policy Papers: Submission Guidelines
    • Vol 1, Issue 1 (June 2022): Perils in Plain Sight
You are here: Home / Archives for strategy

strategy

The Maoist Way of Guerilla Warfare and the Broader Challenge Presented by China

April 9, 2020 by Tom Harper

by Tom Harper

Long Live Chairman Mao! Long, Long Live! (Image credit: Chineseposter.net)

In the eyes of the modern world, Maoism is a relic of a more ideologically divided world and of a China that no longer exists.  Nevertheless, the ideas and strategies of Mao continue to have a direct and indirect influence upon a diverse array of actors, ranging from the insurgent movements of the post-colonial world to post-Cold War Chinese foreign policy strategies. Here, followers of the strategies devised by Mao and his German-educated strategist, Zhu De, are inspired by their combination of Marxist ideology and the maxims from Sun Tzu’s The Art of War.  They applied these strategies to a China described by Mao as ‘half colonial, half feudal’[1], far removed from Marx’s original prognosis.

Prior to Mao’s leadership, China’s communist movement followed a strategy more in keeping with those of the Russian Bolsheviks, with cadres going to the Soviet Union for study.  The most prominent of these were known as the ‘Twenty-Eight Bolsheviks’, who were guided by advisors from the Soviet Comintern.  As a result of several strategic blunders in their rebellion against the nationalist KMT under Chiang Kai shek, which concluded in the Long March to Yan’an, Mao and Zhu were in a position to apply these strategies.

Mao and Zhu’s strategies were characterised by three main phases.  The first phase involved sending party cadres to the rural, isolated areas of China, which were often ignored by the KMT, which drew its support from the smaller urban class.  Unlike the Bolsheviks’ focus on the industrial proletariat, Mao saw the Chinese peasantry, which made up around eighty per cent of China’s population, as the driving force of communism in China.  To do so, these cadres sought to mobilise popular support through measures such as land reforms. These proved to be succesfull with a Chinese peasantry that had long been exploited by the feudal land-owning classes[2]. Over time, the communists were increasingly viewed as more capable administrators than the KMT, with the Chinese peasantry seeing the latter as corrupt and inefficient[3].

Through these measures, the Chinese communists had effectively created a parallel government in China’s agrarian provinces, in a manner similar to the earlier Taiping Heavenly Kingdom of Hong Xiuquan[4].  This made the KMT increasingly irrelevant to the lives of the Chinese peasantry which undermined Chiang Kai-shek’s rule.

The military aspects of Mao and Zhu’s strategies came in the second and third phases of these strategies.  The former involved utilising guerrilla tactics against stronger opponents, such as the KMT and the Japanese, to build support, and to acquire resources while the latter came in defeating the KMT through conventional warfare.  In doing so, the CPC was able to preserve their forces while the KMT bore the brunt of the Japanese invasion.  As a result, the CPC was better placed for the continuation of the Chinese Civil War after Japan’s surrender. In returning to Sun Tzu, Mao and Zhu used the maxim that ‘supreme excellence consists of breaking the enemy’s resistance without fighting’ to defeat a conventionally stronger opponent.  It was this maxim that had wider consequences as the new communist government sought to export its vision to the post-colonial world.

To China’s communist rulers, the largely agrarian post-colonial nations resembled pre-revolutionary China, which made it ripe for their efforts to replicate their earlier successes[5].  This came through assistance to the numerous anti-colonial movements battling the European colonial powers that had been damaged by the Second World War.  China’s bid to become the vanguard of communism in the developing world clashed with those of the Soviet Union, which also sought to promote its own vision of communism.  This became more pronounced with the Sino-Soviet Split of 1963 and there were often clashes between rival communist movements supported by Beijing and Moscow, such as the Angolan Civil War, where the Maoist UNITA battled the Soviet-backed MPLA.

It was the conflicts of the post-colonial world that drew attention to Maoist strategies from those who sought to combat it.  The earliest example of this was the French officer, David Galula, who witnessed the first phase of these strategies as a prisoner of the Chinese communists. After his release, Galula attempted to deploy these strategies against the anti-colonial movements throughout France’s overseas territories in a bid to deprive these movements of their local support.

While France failed to retain its colonies, Galula’s Maoist-inspired strategies caught the attention of American counter-insurgency planners who found themselves in the midst of the Vietnam War.  Like the Chinese communists before them, the National Liberation Front built support by mobilising the Vietnamese peasantry dissatisfied with the corrupt rule of the American-backed South Vietnamese government.  This influence was particularly notable in the Strategic Hamlets programme which replicated Galula’s earlier efforts in Algeria.

The Vietnam War was a case of where Maoist strategies influenced both insurgent movements and those who sought to combat them.  Ultimately, the Vietnamese communists were able to prevail over their stronger American foe by destroying its will to fight, as demonstrated by the fallout from the Tet Offensive in 1968.  Nevertheless, it was this pattern that would continue even after the Cold War.

With the end of the Cold War, Maoist strategies continued to maintain a degree of influence, the most visible of this being the groups within the developing world that still identified themselves with Mao’s ideas.  The most successful implementation of this was the overthrow of Nepal’s feudal monarchy by the Nepalese Communist Party in a manner eerily reminiscent of China’s own revolution, which once again came through the mobilisation of the Nepalese peasantry.

Maoist strategies also found a new audience in the midst of the War on Terror.  Just as these strategies had influenced Galula’s theories on counter-insurgency, American strategists, such as David Petraeus, invoked Mao and Zhu’s theories to justify the study of the non-military dimensions of warfare with the irregular conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq.  This continued the influence of these strategies on both insurgent movements and their opponents.

The most unexpected manifestation of Maoist strategies has been in Chinese foreign policy itself.  During the Cold War observers, such as John Cooley, warned that China’s strategies in Africa were aimed at expelling the United States from the continent.  In so doing, these attempts would turn Africa into a ‘major revolutionary outpost’ in a Sino-centric world where the US was largely irrelevant[6].  Cooley’s warnings are eerily reminiscent of later fears of Chinese influence in Africa and echoed the first phase of Mao’s strategies applied on a greater scale.

Ironically, this would come to pass, not through Chinese moves, but rather through the disinterest in Africa in the post-Cold War era[7].  As a result, China exploited this development to capture hearts and minds in the developing world, which had often been ignored by the major powers.  As a result, China has become an integral feature of the economic landscape of these nations, which has made it more relevant to the governance of these nations.  It is this template which China has deployed to the wider world.

In addition, China has also built a parallel international order, through institutions such as the BRI, SCO and AIIB.  These institutions shadow more established American led bodies, such as the IMF and NATO, which has seen the emergence of two competing forms of global governance just as China had been fought over by two rival governments.  From this, one can infer that Chinese strategies do not seek to overthrow American hegemony, as it has often been accused of doing, but rather seeks to render it irrelevant to global governance[8].

Whether it be the low-intensity guerrilla conflicts throughout the developing world or the globe-spanning machinations of Great Powers, Mao and Zhu’s strategies retain a significant influence.  This has become especially notable with China’s wider challenge, since it follows a strategic culture that is very different to those of the Great Powers that came before it.  Therefore, an understanding of this is an imperative in crafting a more effective response to Chinese strategies.


[1] Mao Zedong, On Guerrilla Warfare (New York: Dover Publications Inc, 2005), p. 68

[2] Erik Durschmied, Beware the Dragon: China: 1,000 Years of Bloodshed ( London: Andre Deutsch, 2008) p. 223

[3] Rana Mitter, The War Years, 1937-1949 in The Oxford Illustrated History of Modern China (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016) p. 175

[4] Jonathan D. Spence God’s Chinese Son: The Taiping Heavenly Kingdom of Hong Xiuquan (London: WW Norton and Company, 1996) p. 173

[5] Julia Lovell Maoism: A Global History (London, Bodley Head, 2019) p. 138

[6] Lovell, 2019, p. 186

[7] Joshua Eisenmann, Eisenman, Joshua (2012) China-Africa Trade Patterns: Causes and Consequences, Journal of Contemporary China, 21:77, p.45

[8] Tom Harper, China’s Eurasia: The Belt and the Road Initiative and the Creation of a New Eurasian Power, Chinese Journal of Global Governance, 5.2, October 2019, p. 103


Tom Harper is a doctoral researcher in politics and international relations from the University of Surrey. His research interest is Chinese foreign policy in the developing world and has been published in the Cambridge Journal of Eurasian Studies as well as in the Conversation, the Asia Times and the Independent and has been interviewed by the China Daily and the Gazeta Do Povo. His articles have been translated into Arabic, French, Japanese, and Spanish. He can also speak Mandarin Chinese and Japanese

Filed Under: Blog Article, Feature, Uncategorized Tagged With: China, Counter Insurgency, CT, insurgency, Mao, Mao Zedong, strategy, Tom Harper, Zhu De

Tactical Instability on the South China Sea and Sino-American Decoupling

October 30, 2018 by Axel Dessein

By Axel Dessein
30 October 2018

The USS Decatur finds itself seconds from disaster during an unsafe encounter with a Chinese destroyer in September 2018. (Image Credit: US Navy)

In late September 2018, a Chinese Luyang-class destroyer nearly collided with the American destroyer U.S.S. Decatur during a Freedom of Navigation Operation (FONOP) in the South China Sea. These operations are essentially aimed at signalling a commitment to keeping the sea lanes open, the near-collision demonstrates that such commitments are to be upheld. Following the unsafe encounter at sea, several commentators pointed out that this atypical event may be a reflection of the broader deterioration in relations between the two countries. Indeed, we may now be witnessing the effects of the trade war spilling over into the military and security domain. This shift in behaviour is a crucial development, as the Trump Administration seems to have declared a new Cold War on China.

Winning Control

At the strategic level, China’s acquisitions in the South China Sea are its answer to the First and Second Island Chains, which caused the country’s claustrophobic vision of its surrounding seascape. Indeed, while the American interpretation of these island chains was aimed at keeping the country in, China itself views this enduring element of the region’s geostrategic outlook as benchmarks for its naval ambitions, as Andrew S. Erickson and Joel Wuthnow demonstrate.

In the 1970s, China took control of the Paracel Islands and their surrounding waters after a military standoff with the Vietnamese Navy. It is on those islands that China eventually established Sansha City, the administrative basis for control over the “Three Sands:” the Paracels (or Xisha, West Sand), the Spratlys (or Nansha, South Sand), and the Macclesfield Bank and Scarborough Shoal (commonly grouped under the name Zhongsha, Central Sand).

Undoubtedly, heaps of sand abound. Satellite imagery reveals that since 2014, China has engaged in massive land reclamation and construction activities on many of the islands and submerged features. This island-building enterprise is a clear expression of the intent to establish a military foothold in the region, thereby securing relative control of the sea. If for instance, one draws a line between the different island groups, a triangle becomes visible within the Nine-Dash Line, a series of dashes that trace China’s maritime demarcation line.

The Science of Military Strategy (Zhanlüe xue), an informative study released by the Chinese Academy of Military Science is especially enlightening as to what these advancements mean for China. According to the study, China’s strategic thinking is increasingly looking towards the South China Sea to attain a form of effective control (youxiao kongzhi) over the area to establish a forward-deployed position (qianyan fangwei) away from the mainland. However, it remains unclear what exactly China is claiming: the sea itself or the many features within the Nine-Dash Line.

This ambiguity fits perfectly within the nature of the country’s approach towards asserting its claims. In fact, China seems to be moving within the so-called grey zone, a form of strategy “at the low end of the conflict spectrum in which […] military coercion is occurring to alter the status quo,” according to James J. Wirtz. Whether conflict in the grey zone is an entirely new domain is of course an interesting debate, as Toshi Yoshihara demonstrated an earlier variation of such behaviour in his appraisal of the Paracel Sea Battle between China and Vietnam. Whatever the answer may be, such short-of-war behaviour has clearly demonstrated its effectiveness time and again.

Manning the Great Wall at Sea

Ambiguity and non-military coercion appear to be essential elements in China’s toolbox for the South China Sea. Conor M. Kennedy and Andrew S. Erickson have written extensively on this topic. Most importantly, one has to recognise that there are essentially three Chinese sea forces: the grey-hulled navy, the white-hulled coast guard and its fishermen. Aptly called a maritime militia, these fishing boats are the vanguard involved in promoting and defending China’s sovereignty at sea. That is not to say, however, that China has come up with a recipe for success.

The 2012 Scarborough Shoal standoff demonstrates the fallibility of Chinese strategy. Special attention can be drawn to the Philippines which in 2013 filed a case against China’s territorial claims at the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague. After a ruling in favour of the Philippines that thereby denied the Chinese claims, China rejected the validity of the PCA and insisted on resolving the disputes bilaterally. In this instance, China failed to win control, and the shoal remains a major source of tension between the two countries.

The South China Sea is sometimes referred to as “Asia’s powder keg” because of its precarious position between China and several ASEAN states. (Image Credit: Global Security, CSIS, DW)

Other attempts have been made to quell China’s expansionist activities in the South China Sea. After sixteen years of negotiations China and the Association of the Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) recently made some progress on drafting the framework of a proposed Code of Conduct in the South China Sea, which is a slow albeit necessary process. However, the conflict is not limited to Asia. Because of the growing economic and political relationship between China and countries like Greece, the European Union has come short of wording a clear statement on the issue. Here, we see attempts at preserving international law in a key trading region like the South China Sea increasingly being trumped by other economic interests.

One commentator suggests that the Scarborough Shoal standoff reveals much about China’s intent. The country demonstrated non-military assertiveness with the aim of becoming a great power at sea (haiyang qiangguo). Another commentator sees an analogy between China’s sea power endeavours and those of the German navy under Admiral Tirpitz. Broader historical parallels are also drawn with the Anglo-German conflict of the nineteenth century. However, while the clash between the world’s most powerful states is primarily about their desire for great-power status, diverging ideologies are shaping how this conflict plays out. Here, Alfred W. McCoy writes: “Treat the South China Sea as central, not peripheral, and the Cold War not as bounded by a specific ideological conflict but as the midpoint in a century-long clash of empires.” Today, the empires in question are of course, China and the U.S.

A Relationship Adrift

Amid growing trade tensions, the countries put a halt to their Diplomatic and Security Dialogue (D&SD). The U.S. Secretary of Defence James Mattis also skipped China during his October 2018 trip to Asia, but did meet with his Chinese counterpart in Singapore. In light of such events, it is but a small surprise that Chinese academics and political groups are discussing a “decoupling” (tuogou), a process which describes a potential rupture in the economic and security relationships between China and the U.S. The risks associated with such an unravelling of the ties between China and the U.S. are manifold, with increased tactical instability demonstrated by the recent near-collision as an example.

Strategic competition with China is back on the American agenda. As a result, the two giants are increasingly stepping on each other’s toes. In this scenario, the destroyer’s sortie could indeed be a display of greater confidence and boldness on the Chinese part, showcasing a broader shift in the relationship. Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that an article by a think tank affiliated with China’s State Council still urges restraint in face of “long-term strategic competition” with the United States. While it is unclear how long such moderation will last, our understanding of the Chinese decision-making process clearly suffers from large information gaps. Simply talking about a new Cold War will not be the answer, learning from Chinese words and actions will be.


Axel Dessein is a doctoral candidate at King’s College London and a Senior Editor at Strife. His research focuses on the implications of China’s rise on the current world order. Axel completed his BA and MA in Oriental Languages and Cultures at Ghent University. You can follow him on Twitter @AxelDessein.


Banner image source: https://www.stripes.com/news/photos-show-how-close-chinese-warship-came-to-colliding-with-us-navy-destroyer-1.550153

Filed Under: Blog Article Tagged With: America, Axel Dessein, China, China Maritime Strategy, feature, New Cold War, South China sea, strategy, Tactics

Strife Series on Cyberwarfare and State Perspectives, Part I – Offensive Cyber Capabilities and Medium Powers: Two Case Studies

July 17, 2018 by Andreas Haggman

By Andreas Haggman

Credit Image: luzitanija (123RF)

 

Introduction

In recent years, traditional military capabilities have been supplemented by the development of offensive cyber capabilities. Examples of cyber capabilities have proved that effects can be achieved in both the kinetic (e.g. Stuxnet, Black Energy) and information spheres (e.g. Crimea, TV5 Monde). However, discussions in this area are often predictable in the actors that are considered. When commentators, both in the media and academia, talk about offensive cyber capabilities it is usually in reference to a list of usual suspects: the US, Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran are the primary state antagonists, with the UK, Israel, and sometimes France being cast in supporting roles. Anonymous and amorphous organised crime groups are often referenced as non-state actors, though the role of Anonymous seems to have subsided in the past couple of years.

This article seeks to highlight how offensive cyber capabilities augment the traditional capabilities of two lesser-mentioned state actors: Australia and Sweden. Although geographically distinct, both these countries can be classified as ‘medium powers’ who, in the words of Richard Hill, are ‘likely to have few resources to spare for the exercise of power beyond what is necessary to safeguard and, where possible, further its vital interest of territorial integrity, political independence and betterment.’ Importantly, in the context of cyber capabilities, both countries have declared either operational deployment of such capabilities or intent to develop them. This article discusses how cyber capabilities form part of both countries’ official policies and how these might be deployed for operational effect in their geopolitical contexts.

 

Australia

Australia published its first Cyber Security Strategy in 2016, which formally acknowledged the existence of Australian offensive cyber capabilities. In November 2016, Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull announced that the country had been conducting offensive cyber operations against ISIS targets. Australia therefore has a pedigree in the offensive cyber capability space and it also has a formulated policy on how these capabilities should be used: despite misplaced notions of deterrence expressed in the Cyber Security Strategy, later policy documents have stated that offensive cyber capabilities would be used to target cyber criminals.

Australia’s geopolitical situation means this approach of deprioritising state-based threats to instead focus on non-state actors (even if some these may have state-backing) is likely the best use of its offensive cyber capabilities. Geographically, politically, and economically, Australia’s most pressing concern is China: it’s attempted dominance of south east Asian sea routes, it’s influence in Australian politics, and its large investments in Australian industry, particularly the mining sector. However, deployment of offensive cyber capabilities against Chinese targets would not address any of these issues and they must instead be tackled with diplomatic, legal, and economic means.

A better use of offensive cyber capabilities is therefore to target non-state actors and criminal groups. For these targets, capabilities which cause disruption or enable better information gathering by law enforcement are more appropriate than capabilities which cause physical destruction. As an example, an extension of the Australian patrol boat scheme can be envisaged where Australia provides support to anti-piracy and anti-people smuggling operations in the south Pacific and Indian oceans. Capabilities that stain dark web traffic, allowing it to be tracked, can help identify the criminal actors which perpetrate these activities. Such capabilities may not be at the behest of the island nations which inhabit the south Pacific and Australia is well-placed to meaningfully contribute with its own capabilities.

 

Sweden

Sweden published a national cyber security strategy in 2016 which contains provisions for ‘a robust capability to conduct active operations in the cyber environment.’ However, as early as 2013 a report on long-term strategic planning had advocated for Sweden to develop offensive cyber capabilities. This view was backed by several people in the Government, who assessed that Sweden had to keep pace with technological developments – if everyone else were acquiring offensive cyber capabilities, so should Sweden.

Similar to Australia, Sweden has an obvious adversary in its immediate geographical locale: Russia. In this case, contemporary concerns about Russian behaviour (military manoeuvres, disinformation campaigns) are backed by a history of conflict between the countries – Russia is very much the old enemy. But since the 20th century Sweden has also positioned itself as a paragon of neutrality and all operational military activity has been strictly limited to UN peacekeeping missions. The utility of offensive cyber capabilities is less obvious in these missions because the critical component is a physical presence on the ground which serves a securing and deterring effect. This presence cannot be achieved with cyber capabilities.

Instead, Sweden may find a peacetime outlet for its offensive cyber capabilities if used as signalling devices. Russia regularly runs military flights provocatively close to, sometimes within, Swedish airspace. It could be envisaged that targeting one of these flights in a non-lethal capacity (for example by displaying a message on the pilot’s heads-up display) would send a message about the maturity of Swedish offensive cyber capabilities and their intent to use them. A key caveat here, however, is that the benefits of the operation must be carefully weighed against the cost, particularly if zero-day vulnerabilities need to be burned to achieve the desired effect.

 

Conclusion

Offensive cyber capabilities are not just the remit of great powers and rogue actors. Some states, such as Australia and Sweden discussed above, are technologically sophisticated yet perhaps do not have the remit to deploy cyber capabilities in the sort of arenas that make headlines. However, as suggested in the postulated deployment scenarios, these capabilities should not be discounted as means for achieving tactical and strategic effects in a limited context. The geopolitical situation of each country shapes these deployments and it is important to establish the desired effects before cyber capabilities are considered – they are not necessarily the most appropriate solution for every problem. Therefore, with careful deliberation, offensive cyber capabilities can be made to fit the imperatives of medium powers.

 


Andreas Haggman is a PhD researcher in the Centre for Doctoral Training in Cyber Security at Royal Holloway University of London. His thesis is a practical exploration of wargaming for cyber security education and awareness training. Andreas’ additional research interests span a wide spectrum of non-technical cyber security topics. He can be followed on Twitter @Andreas_Haggman.


Image Source: https://www.123rf.com/photo_49099172_puzzle-with-the-national-flag-of-sweden-and-australia-concept.html

 

Filed Under: Blog Article Tagged With: Cyber Security, strategy, Strife series

NATO is wounded, this Summit could break it

July 12, 2018 by Dr Zachary Wolfraim

By Dr Zachary Wolfraim

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg ahead of the Summit (Credit Image: NATO HQ)

In light of the recent chaos consuming British politics and the looming NATO summit, I revisited an article I wrote on the eve of the US election in 2016 hoping it would outline a worst-case scenario, rather than reality. At that time, NATO was heading into uncertainty with the reality of Brexit and the Conservative Party’s significantly reduced majority in Parliament just starting to sink in. Turkey was moving steadily towards autocracy and Donald Trump was a long-shot, but nonetheless threatening Presidential candidate. This scenario has since come to pass and with the critical ongoing summit  (on the 11th and 12th July 2018), NATO has again been pushed into a corner and forced to defend its existence. This is a frequent occurrence for the alliance, particularly since the end of the Cold War.  With the collapse of the Soviet Union, rather than disbanding, the alliance found new purpose both as a vehicle for promoting US interests in Europe but also as a security organisation capable of undertaking coordinated multilateral interventions. In occupying this role, NATO has reinvented itself from collective defence organisation established to prevent Soviet expansionism into one able to execute complex, coordinated multilateral military interventions. In doing so it has responded to crises in the Balkans, Afghanistan, Libya and has now reoriented back towards countering Russian aggression in Eastern Europe. The threat it faces now is not from an external crisis, however, but internal within the alliance and the effect of radical realignments in policy both in the US and the UK.

As a backdrop to current events, suspected Russian interference into both countries have undermined mechanisms of political campaigning and cast doubt on democratic outcomes while delivering policies that dramatically upend decades of Western international security policy. President Donald Trump and specifically his transactional view of international alliances and a complete lack of consistency in policymaking present an existential threat to the organisation and consequently, creates another way of undermining US influence in Europe. Concurrently, Britain has been rendered politically unstable, consumed with Brexit which adds to years of austerity that have diminished much of its defence capability. Both countries play a central role in providing military support and a diplomatic vision to NATO and are struggling to define their respective relationships within the broader international order.

In the UK specifically, both major parties, the Conservatives and Labour, are completely riven by Brexit with the Conservative party engaging in open conflict over the UK’s future relationship with the EU, most recently losing its Foreign Secretary and its Brexit minister. This has not yet spilled into the UK-NATO sphere but nonetheless has planted seeds of doubt in the minds of allies over the type of reliable member the UK will continue to be. Despite the country’s position as a framework nation contributing to vital capabilities and forces alongside meeting its 2% budgetary commitment, it has continued to under invest in maintaining its military capabilities and by extension limiting its ability to act as a capable partner in NATO operations. This is now reaching  a point where its future effectiveness could be called into question. Stagnant economic realities mean that future defence investment decisions are likely to be pushed down the road until there is a clearer UK-EU relationship. As a result, one of Europe’s critical NATO members is effectively in a holding pattern for the next few years.

The US, on the other hand, presents an even more fundamental question. President Trump has made it relatively clear that he does not believe the values that underpin NATO are sufficient to justify its existence. Trump’s sole emphasis has been on the disparity between US defence spending and the continuing 2% spending target, disregarding the agenda setting influence this spending has bought. While this has often been a point of contention in NATO, the President’s willful misunderstanding of how this spending target works has only compounded his sense of grievance with NATO allies. Fundamentally, the President seems willing to dismantle the security architecture that has underpinned the safety and security of Europe, the North Atlantic and the West more broadly since the end of the Second World War over the issue of spending and budgets. Despite reassurances from the US Permanent Representative to NATO and US Defence Secretary, James Mattis, about the alliance’s central role to US defence priorities, no one actually knows what President Trump will say as he has no defined priorities or identifiable value structure when it comes to international relations.

Regardless of what happens in this summit, NATO remains in serious trouble during the tenure of the Trump presidency and until Britain has decided its future relationship with the EU. For the time being NATO member states must remain defensive about their continued increases in spending, proactive in their policymaking and vocal about what NATO’s value added is to international security. The 2% spending goal, while admirable, should be adapted to place emphasis on effectiveness and thus increase coordination between Allies to enhance the capability of NATO as a whole. Though the UK has made its commitments to NATO clear, its ability to follow through on them is variable and thus the ability to coordinate with similarly effective NATO forces creates a way of preserving influence and capability. Ultimately, despite the UK’s diminished international presence, NATO can potentially continue to limp along with US disengagement until the next presidential election. However, there is no doubt that this is one of the lowest points for the transatlantic relationship since the beginning of the Iraq War. At that time, major NATO members both publicly rebuked the US invasion of Iraq and refused to support US efforts in mobilising NATO to defend Turkey. This previous rift in the alliance seems minor in hindsight, however, it nonetheless demonstrated that the organisation can endure difficult diplomatic relations and carve out a relevant international role.

During this summit and beyond, Canada and European NATO Allies will need to prioritise the relevance of NATO, invest in maintaining the organisation and prepare to speak up in its defence. There remains considerable support for NATO in the US and Allies should make every effort to maintain links with aligned US Senators and Representatives to continue making the case for NATO. In terms of operations, NATO must continue its presence in Eastern Europe and continue to be a proactive force in international affairs, driven by the initiative of Canada and European members, otherwise it runs the risk of becoming a discussion forum rather than an active force for stability and progress. More generally, NATO member states will need proactive strategies to deal with Russian disinformation and spend time on reaffirming and rebuilding trust with voters. With time and perhaps a different administration, the alliance will recover somewhat, however, the damage that has already occurred will take time and dedication, particularly on the part of the US, to recover.

 


If you have come to the end of this piece, we are interested in what you think about our Blog. We have launched our first readers survey just so that you can tell us how we are doing and what we can do better. You will find the survey here. It takes just a few minutes, but your help will be much appreciated. Thanks in advance!


Dr. Zachary Wolfraim graduated from the War Studies department where he examined how narratives shape foreign policy behaviours. He has previously worked in NATO headquarters on operations in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya as well as political risk and intelligence sectors in London.


Image source: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_156597.htm

Filed Under: Blog Article Tagged With: Diplomacy, Donald Trump, EU, Future of NATO, NATO, strategy, USA

Strife Series on Cyberwarfare and State Perspectives: Strategic effectiveness in Cyberspace – Introduction

July 10, 2018 by Shivali Bhatt

By Shivali Bhatt

 

Soldiers on the digital battlefield

 

Over the past couple of decades, the world has witnessed an unstoppable and almost inevitable rise in cyber-attacks and acts of digital warfare. Just over ten years ago, the Israeli government successfully disarmed the Syrian air defence system near a nuclear facility, allowing it to destroy the base without having to deal with the Syrians putting up a fight. This event marked a critical turning point for state warfare, as it exemplified the way in which cyberspace and digital technology can become an accessory to broader military strategy. A few years later, a joint built American/Israeli cyberweapon, also known as Stuxnet, unleashed havoc in Iran and a few other countries. This highly sophisticated attack not only managed to infiltrate a significant portion of cyberspace and thousands of computers but is believed to be an explanatory factor behind the rate at which states have been investing in, and advancing, their cyber capabilities.

Today, over two hundred thousand samples of malware get launched daily, and states are participating in a ‘cyber arms race’ or ‘technology arms race’. States, especially like the United States and China, are competing to acquire military edge by investing and developing skills in innovative technology, like artificial intelligence [1]. One of the main reasons behind the significant interest in technological superiority is because the rules to the global politics and warfare are changing. The instrument of cyberwarfare has and continues to become one of the most highly regarded domains for political strategy, yet each state has a different perspective and reality in this evolving context.

Therefore, the purpose of this series is to shed light on the perspectives of states, all of which possess varying cultural, geopolitical and economic contexts. A significant narrative today is how cyberwarfare and generally cyberspace are changing the balance of power in the international system. However, these arguments present themselves in the absence of critical analysis, which helps contextualise the reality and trajectory of modern cyberwarfare. The states examined in this series engage with cyberspace in different ways; at times, can be conceptualised by a set of underlying factors. They offer the reader a compelling contrast, and hopefully shall help them understand the scope for further discussion and research on the extent to which cyberwarfare is strategically effective.

In the first article, PhD researcher Andreas Haggman analyses the cyber capabilities of two ‘medium’ powers, Australia and Sweden. He identifies how they enhance their existing traditional military strategies, placing greater emphasis on the relevance of geopolitical context.

In the second article, PhD researcher Amy Ertan examines the strategic value of ‘false flags’ in a context of state-led cyberwarfare, using Russia as a critical case study. She analyses how geopolitics can act as a catalyst for those states faced with the problem of attribution.

In the final piece, Shivali Bhatt approaches the domain of cyberwarfare through the lens worn by American policymakers and critiques current narratives circulating in popular media and also specific academic communities today. Her lines of argument emphasise the underlying factors that in the case of the United States, increase strategic leverage.

We hope this series offers readers a greater insight into state perspectives on cyberwarfare and critical understanding of the domain’s strategic effectiveness.

Thanks for reading!


 

Shivali is currently pursuing her MA Intelligence and International Security at Department of War Studies, King’s College London. She is also a Series Editor at Strife, as well as a Creative Writer at cybersecurity startup PixelPin, where she contributes articles on ‘Thought Leadership’, encouraging readers to approach security issues through innovative means. Prior to that, she spent some time in Hong Kong under the InvestHK and EntrepreneurHK organisations, engaging with the cybersecurity and tech scene on the East Coast. Her core research interests include modern warfare and contemporary challenges, cybersecurity, and strategic policy analysis. You can follow her  on @shivalixb


 

Filed Under: Blog Article, Uncategorized Tagged With: Cyberwar, strategy, Strife series, Stuxnet

  • « Go to Previous Page
  • Go to page 1
  • Go to page 2
  • Go to page 3
  • Go to page 4
  • Go to Next Page »

Footer

Contact

The Strife Blog & Journal

King’s College London
Department of War Studies
Strand Campus
London
WC2R 2LS
United Kingdom

blog@strifeblog.org

 

Recent Posts

  • Climate-Change and Conflict Prevention: Integrating Climate and Conflict Early Warning Systems
  • Preventing Coup d’Étas: Lessons on Coup-Proofing from Gabon
  • The Struggle for National Memory in Contemporary Nigeria
  • How UN Support for Insider Mediation Could Be a Breakthrough in the Kivu Conflict
  • Strife Series: Modern Conflict & Atrocity Prevention in Africa – Introduction

Tags

Afghanistan Africa Brexit China Climate Change conflict counterterrorism COVID-19 Cybersecurity Cyber Security Diplomacy Donald Trump drones Elections EU feature France India intelligence Iran Iraq ISIL ISIS Israel ma Myanmar NATO North Korea nuclear Pakistan Politics Russia security strategy Strife series Syria terrorism Turkey UK Ukraine United States us USA women Yemen

Licensed under Creative Commons (Attribution, Non-Commercial, No Derivatives) | Proudly powered by Wordpress & the Genesis Framework