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President Trump’s gift to Al Shabaab

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by Marie Blessing Gilbert

US Troops in Somalia. Source: Commondreams

On the 4th of December last, the withdrawal of approximately 700 US troops and assets from Somalia was announced by the Pentagon. Some of these numbers will be deployed outside of East Africa whilst the rest will be repositioned in countries neighbouring Somalia. For decades Somalia has been devasted as a result of wars and famines. The burden carried by its people has been huge. Assistance from the US forces in Somalia in attempting to stabilise the country is vital if any hope of a better tomorrow is ever to be achieved.

Al Shabaab is an Al Qaeda linked militant group in Somalia whose aim is to establish a caliphate in Somalia that would in turn spread to neighbouring countries in the ‘Horn of Africa’ and beyond. They are not the only extremist group in Somalia, ISIS too has a footing there, however they are the primary source of terrorist offences in the Horn of Africa.

US troops have been present in Somalia since the early 1990s when at its height, there were approximately 25,000 troops assisting UN aid workers in humanitarian and peacekeeping missions. This number was critically cut soon after by President Bill Clinton, and has dwindled since, to the 700 that were removed from Somalia in the last days of the Trump Administration.

The timing of the decision couldn’t be worse. Somalia has already missed the deadline of its general election which was due this month. Presidential elections are due to take place in February 2021. Tensions always run high in East Africa on the run up to and in the aftermath of elections. Anxiety in Somalia, which has been decimated for years at the hands of warlords and terrorist groups like Al Shabaab will hit a pinnacle soon. Pre- and post-election violence is expected no matter what the result of either election is due to the power struggle between elected officials, opponents, jihadist groups and clan elders. It is widely believed that the Somali security forces and African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) are not prepared to deal with a further escalation of violence within the country. Al Shabaab, as the most powerful jihadi extremist group in Somalia, is set to capitalise in the strife that will ensue.

Further to this, Somalia’s current fragile governmental system has long been aided by troops from neighbouring Ethiopia as part of AMISOM. Ethiopia has approximately 4000 troops currently in Somalia. However published reports have shown hundreds of Tigrayans troops forming part of this number have had their weapons seized by Ethiopian troops loyal to the government in Addis Ababa as a result of the current conflict between Tigrayan and Ethiopian forces in Ethiopia. Should AMISOM forces get distracted in any way from their peacekeeping mission in Somalia a vacuum will be created where militants can thrive even further than they do already. Somalia and Ethiopia have a long, porous border and traditionally strong ties. If the conflict in Ethiopia continues or escalates Somalia will undoubtedly suffer as a consequence.

To add to the problems of this highly vulnerable state the announcement that the US will remove their troops from within Somalia’s borders in weeks will further weaken the security forces in Somalia. The brunt of the American withdrawal is expected to be felt by the Somali commando force, Danab that was set up in 2014 as an elite force of combatants. Danab was established largely with US financial help, training and equipment. Its primary aim was that of a counter terrorist force in the country. Accompanied on many missions by US forces, Danab will surely be left to fend for itself when its US counterparts leave Somalia. Given they have worked together closely for 6 years it will, without doubt be a devastating blow to the Somali counter-terrorism efforts.

Al Shabaab members in Somalia. Source: Independent.ie

Leading politicians in Somalia and neighbouring countries have been left alarmed by the Pentagon’s announcement with Somalia’s President, Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed expressing deep concern that the efforts to counter terrorism in the region were aided hugely by the existing US-Somali partnership. In Neighbouring Kenya, Foreign Affairs Principal Secretary, Kamau Macharia, has opined that the situation will worsen in Somalia after the US withdrawal. It had already been announced that AMISOM troops were to work towards a full withdrawal of their troops from Somalia by the end of 2021, with graduated withdrawal already underway. Should this take place on top of US withdrawal the future looks very bleak for this extremely fragile and volatile state.

It seems that everything is happening at once to hinder any hopes that Somalia has to rise from the ashes of decades-long conflict. Somalia’s loss will be Al Shabaab’s gain and undoubtedly Trump’s final actions as he leaves the White House to withdraw his forces from Somalia will have devastating effects. The final withdrawal of troops was completed just two days before the inauguration of Joe Biden as President. The hope would be that President Biden will reverse this decision. However, with the troops already out of Somalia and even the uncertainly surrounding Trump’s decision will unquestioningly strengthen Al Shabaab’s resolve and can be seen as Trump’s parting gift to these jihadi extremists.

Marie Blessing Gilbert is currently studying full time for a Masters degree in Terrorism, Security and Society in King’s College London with an interest in the terrorism threat in Ireland and East Africa.

Marie is a part of the Strife Women in Writing Programme.

Strife Series on Climate Change and Conflict (Part I) – Climate Change and the Rise of Islamist Terror: al-Shabaab in Somalia

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by Annabelle Green

Illicit charcoal trading, and deforestation that lies in its wake, is threatening an already fragile climate in Somalia (Image credit: Getty Images/AFR/T. Karumba)

In June 1989, a gathering of British, American, and Canadian bureaucrats in Wilton Park, England left little impression on history. At the conference, despite being titled ‘Sub-Saharan Africa: The Challenge of Population Growth, Desertification and Famine,’ only a handful of African representatives were present. Somalia did not feature significantly within the discussion, save for its involvement as one-sixth of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and Development.

At a time when agriculture was the primary occupation of the Somali labour force  – seventy-one per cent in 1975 – the country was vulnerable to the key issues discussed. Adversities they faced, such as droughts and subsequent famines, were only exacerbated by a growing population and a decrease in fertile land appropriate for cultivation, caused by processes such as desertification. Despite these issues being highlighted, few attempts were made to improve the situation. Those at the meeting could not know that these environmental factors, if left unchecked, would hold great international significance in the future. By neglecting efforts to tackle the issue of climate change in Somalia, experts unknowingly aided the rise of violent extremist group al-Shabaab, which would come to present new and dangerous problems of its own.

Today, the severity of climate change as a key transnational issue is increasingly recognised by countries around the world. The international effort to combat Australian bushfires, Greta Thunburg’s global school strikes campaign, and emerging climate-centric summits, demonstrate the ever-growing awareness of climate change as a pressing issue. Yet, the negative effects of climate change, such as those in Somalia, are by no means a novel development. According to research conducted by the Federal Republic of Somalia published in 2013, Somalia has experienced one or more extreme climate events per decade since 1960. Along with excessive heat and subsequent famines, such as those of 1991 and 2011, Somalia has yoyo-ed between nationwide floods and droughts. These erratic patterns of rainfall are a strong indicator of climate change.

A startling lack of consensus surrounding the method to tackle climate change in Somalia can be largely attributed to the limited data collected on the country’s climate. This lack has been inhibited primarily by domestic political tensions which resulted in the ongoing civil war. Subsequently, the country’s climate monitoring network collapsed, resulting in little data availability from 1990 onwards. Such a situation has made it difficult for accurate scientific analysis of weather patterns to be conducted.  As a result, extreme weather and potential natural disasters are difficult to predict, based on the lack of records from previous years. This uncertainty adds to the lack of security in Somalia, as leaders do not have sufficient resources to deal with the aftermath of environmental crises, let alone prepare for them.

The impacts of climate change discussed so far, combined with other factors including desertification and above-average birth rates (compared to the Sub-Saharan average), exacerbate an already weak economy. The climate and economy are intrinsically linked. A key example of this is that land scarcity, caused by increased population levels and decreased fertility, is having an adverse effect on employment levels and food shortages. High youth unemployment contributes to further human insecurity; causing a small number, and only those that can afford it,  to migrate to Southern African countries. A large number of countries also do not accept Somali identification documents, meaning many cannot legally leave the country. Consequently, this had left the demographic more vulnerable to recruitment campaigns of al-Shabaab.

While the relationship between human insecurity and the likelihood of joining an extremist group is not linear, there is a strong correlation between both. Research suggests that those who face uncertainty are more likely to be attracted to extremist groups because they offer a clear vision for the future. al-Shabaab provides members and their families the security most of the country is lacking. In return, it commands an intense commitment from its followers to comply with its ideology. Moreover, militants have been known to divert river water to commercial farmers who have supported them financially, whilst others experience shortages. The importance of human security to this issue has been acknowledged: before 1994, policies surrounding the improvement of conditions in countries such as Somalia were focused on national security. However, following a UN report produced in 1994, there was a shift to emphasis on human security. While not conclusive, this shift to a human security focus in Somalia demonstrates the impact that poor socio-economic conditions, exacerbated by climate extremities, have on wider political and security issues.

Critically, it seems that al-Shabaab is not only impacted by, but contributing to, the negative effects of climate change. A key example of this is al-Shabaab’s deforestation endeavours, which supported its charcoal trade until late 2019. For this reason, the United Nations Security Council imposed an embargo on Somali charcoal trade in 2012. However, before this legislation was implemented, nearly two-thirds of forests in southern Somalia were destroyed to ship charcoal to the Persian Gulf. These shipments went through the port of Kismayo, which was only recaptured from the militant group in 2012. Revenues from Kismayo and two other ports run by al-Shabaab were estimated to have earned the group between $35-50 million a year, according to a UN report.  The removal of these trees from the Somali ecosystem has led to a deficit in nutrients and a subsequent decrease in fertile ground. This has subsequently worsened the impacts of extreme climate change that are ongoing in the East-African country, escalating the scale of floods and famines.

A key concern is that al-Shabaab has recognised that a level of environmental insecurity is in its best interests to strengthen its power. This is supported by evidence suggesting the terrorist organisation exploited the Somali famine of 2011. It forcibly limited movement when residents tried to flee areas of the country most severely impacted by the food shortages. The group consistently blocked support from NGOs, suggesting it would prefer a starving population than a dilution of power. Its own feeble attempts to manage the situation, such as a Drought Committee founded in 2010, have made little progress. The country has continued to experience droughts almost annually in the last five years. Therefore there is a strong argument to suggest that despite some attempts to act as a social regulator, there is little motivation for Al Shabaab to facilitate improvement.

In conclusion, al-Shabaab clearly benefited from the impacts of climate change in Somalia. The loss of fertile land has led to an economically vulnerable population; which the terrorist organisation has fuelled through deforestation efforts and promoting competition for scarce resources (by limiting in-migration). With few opportunities, a consequently disillusioned youth have turned to extremism for some form of security, however tenuous. There is little motivation for al-Shabaab to improve conditions, demonstrated by its refusal to grant access to NGOs and prevention of out-migration in famine stricken areas. The meagre attempts it has made to improve conditions, such as its Drought Committee, appear superficial and have achieved limited results. Through such exploitation of the impacts of climate change, al-Shabaab in Somalia sustains already rife human insecurity, thus strengthening its own power.

 Annabelle Green is currently completing an MA in Terrorism, Security and Society at King’s College London. She hopes to pursue a career in policy surrounding extremist offenders and in her spare time volunteers as a researcher for the charity Action on Armed Violence. She can be found on LinkedIn.

al-Shabaab’s Anatomy: A Study in Context

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by Leonardo Palma

15 May 2019

al-Shabaab militants during a training session near Chisimaio, Somalia (Al Jazeera)

Chronic instability in the Horn of Africa, with clear repercussions for Uganda, Sudan, Kenya, and Mozambique, has reinforced a process of aggregation within Islamists groups that include nationalist fringes, maritime pirates and organised crime groups. While this region is under the influence of al-Qa’ida in Eastern Africa (AQEA), the group that is the strongest cause of concern – both numerically and militarily – is al-Shabaab.

From the Islamic Courts to the Battle of Mogadishu

After the Somali state’s collapse in 1991 and the failure of UN Operation “Restore Hope”, the country fell prey to local warlords spurring overall disintegration. The result was the birth, especially in Mogadishu, of the so-called “Islamic Courts Union (ICU)”, which assumed certain administrative and social duties including the settling of civil lawsuits through a rigid application of Sha’ria. Through their private militias, the Courts were also able to handle public order and counter numerous warlords. In 2006, to make the system more efficient and coordinated, several Courts decided to meet in a Union called Midowga Maxkamadaha Isaamiga (ICU). Thanks to strong popular support, the Union was able to recapture Mogadishu after years of anarchy in an institutional vacuum. The Courts established some order, opened up both the harbour and the airport, enlarged the market of Bakara and extended their influence far beyond the city towards Baidoa. The latter was the seat of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), a body born in 2004 after the dissolution of the National Transitional Government (NTG). At that time, the Union’s project of renewal included the introduction of Sha’ria as source of law, but Somalia’s highly stratified tribal system made that almost impossible. Furthermore, the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IAD), created in 1986 by neighbouring countries, kept supporting the Baidoa transitional government, suggesting that the neighbours were – at least – suspicious if not worried about the birth of an Islamic State in Somalia.

al-Shabaab fighters under the black banner (The Independent)

In December 2006, the TFG, militarily supported by Ethiopia, promoted a campaign against Islamic Courts rule. Within a few weeks, the TFG managed to regain control of the city, marginalising the ICU until its complete and utter defeat. It was during those chaotic days that, inside the crumbling ICU, the al-Shabaab movement was born[1]. Previously a minority Islamist group that involved youth inside the Courts, al-Shabaab emerged as an autonomous organisation with wider aim and appeal. The leaders, most of whom were veterans of the Mogadishu battle against the old warlords, decided to carry on the war against the TFG while promoting a three-phase plan: overthrow the federal government, establish an Islamic State and drive the multinational African force (ANISOM) out of Somalia. The latter has led to a progressive tightening of attacks against Kenya, Ethiopia, and Mozambique, all of them responsible for the supply of military equipment to the TFG and for operations against the al-Shabaab training camps.

Evolution, adaptation and ideological clashes

Al-Shabaab evolved quickly, eventually pledging allegiance to and integrating with al-Qa’ida. On 26 January 2009, al-Shabaab insurgents besieged and conquered Baidoa, to the detriment of the weak, and former allied, President Sharif Ahmed[2]. In the following months, several suicide attacks in the cities of Belet Uen and Mogadishu caused the death of hundreds of students, civilians, officials and TFG cabinet members such as Interior Minister Omar Aden[3]. The group extended its control over the country between 2009 and 2011, including much of southern Somalia. In those areas, al-Shabaab reduced the import of low-price food to increase the local wheat production and shift wealth from urban centres to rural areas, where the application of the Sha’ria was less problematic. Over time, al-Shabaab also changed its mind about maritime piracy in the Gulf of Aden. Indeed, the group realised that tolerating pirate activity would have had a huge impact over public opinion against the weak federal government. Nevertheless, following the loss of the Bakara market, and needing to secure financing, al-Shabaab started to engage in economic activities with the pirates, receiving money in return for the use of its territories as “sanctuary” for logistical needs and as routes for weapons and supplies.

In addition to engaging with pirates, its attempts to expand into Somaliland and Puntland shifted al-Shabaab’s ideology closer to that of AQAP (al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula) in Yemen. These new ties led to a divide within the group, since several local leaders and fighters were more rooted in a nationalistic view rather than in an international jihadist ideology[4]. This strife was worsened by the TFG and Kenya’s harsh repression, which weakened the widespread control that al-Shabaab had enjoyed over the coastal region and in the south.[5] Between 2011 and 2012, TFG forces, supported by Kenya reconquered Afgoi, Laanta Bur, Afmadù (a core asset for road connections) and Chisimaio. Indeed, it is during 2012 that the war between the TFG and al-Shabaab for the control of Somalia advanced: in February, through an online message, the Shabaab leader, Ali Zubeyr “Godane”, swore allegiance to Ayman al-Zawahiri, head of al-Qa’ida, thereby officially rendering al-Shabaab a branch of al-Qa’ida. Shortly thereafter, the TFG was disbanded and the Somali Federal Government (SFG) was sworn in, without settling the division between those who want a federal unitarian nation, and those who prefer a tribal federalism with wide administrative autonomies[6].

The group has been also accused of recruiting primary school pupils (Intelligence Briefs)

With the loss of Chisimao and Jubaland, al-Shabaab started to direct its activities towards the consolidation of its territorial control, widening its influence over Somaliland and Puntland and strengthening its asymmetrical terror strategy against Somalia’s neighbours. The carnage of Westgate Mall in 2013 and Garissa College in 2015 were painful manifestations of that strategy[7]. However, al-Shabaab’s menace has increased not only through its adherence to al-Qa’ida (which led, as a direct consequence, to the birth of an international cell named al-Muhajirun) but also through the worsening divide between the fringe controlled by the late Godame (killed in a US drone airstrike in 2014) and the nationalistic faction, tied to the spiritual guru Hassan Dahir Aweys and led by Mukhtar Robow. [8]Indeed, al-Qa’ida decided to replace Godame with Ibrahim al-Afghani in 2010. The strife led to a harsh confrontation until Aweys accepted to move with a private militia in Adado, under SFG control.

The decentralisation strategy beyond 2014 

The death of Godame in 2014 left a dangerous power vacuum which the group tried to fill with a strategy of operational decentralisation, following the path marked by al-Qa’ida[9]. That phase of uncertain transition was overcome by a new wave of terrorist attacks in the region. This, on the one hand, confirms the prediction that when a terrorist group is weakened, it tends to strike back to show its vitality. On the other hand, these attacks forced the US military to intensify its counterterrorism operations with airstrikes and special forces. In June 2016, a drone airstrike killed both Mohamud Dulyadeyn, mastermind of the Garissa attack, and Maalim Daoud, al-Shabaab’s intelligence chief. The organisation retaliated over he Summer with car bombings, armed assault, kidnapping and suicide bombers, causing several deaths and re-seizing territory.[10] After the death of an American soldier in a clandestine operation, the US resumed its bombing campaign and struck, from June to August 2017, in several provinces and regions, killing, among others, the regional commander Ali Jabal. According to US intelligence, he was the man behind the suicide attacks in Mogadishu

From late 2017, al-Shabaab has shown great resilience and capacity to adapt to SFG, US, and AMISOM counterterrorism efforts. Decentralising both its operational branches and leadership, has allowed the group to relieve the military and police pressure they have experienced in the last years. The continuation of terrorist attacks is proof that the movement is trying to show that it is still active although weakened. Furthermore, al-Shabaab is attempting to remain on a relentless offensive, thereby exacerbating regional tensions and stability. Regional cooperation, humanitarian assistance, advanced training for the Somali soldiers, selected counterterrorism operations to cut ties between AQAP, al-Shabaab and its sponsors are the only means to drain the territorial control that the group at present still enjoys.

Leonardo Palma attended the Italian Military Academy of Modena and graduated in Political Science and International Relations at Roma Tre University. He is a postgraduate visiting research student at the Department of War Studies, King’s College London.

[1] For a comprehensive historical account, see: Stig Jarle Hansen, Al-Shabaab in Somalia: The History and Ideology of a Militant Islamist Group, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013; but also James Fergusson, The World’s most dangerous place: Inside the Outlaw State of Somalia, De Capo Press, 2013.

[2] J. L. Anderson, Letter from Mogadishu, The Most Failed State, The New Yorker, December 14, 2009, p. 64, https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2009/12/14/the-most-failed-state.

[3] Three ministers killed in Somalia attack, Newvision.co.ug, December 3, 2009, https://web.archive.org/web/20100106162350/http://www.newvision.co.ug/D/8/12/703172

[4] Where in the World is Sheikh Aweys? Somalia Report, February 1, 2012, http://www.somaliareport.com/index.php/post/2675/Where_in_the_World_is_Sheikh_Aweys; and Somali observers: internal divisions widening within al-Shabaab, Sabahionline.com, 4 August 2012, http://sabahionline.com/en_GB/articles/hoa/articles/features/2012/04/05/feature-01; see also: Hansen (2013), Ibidem, p.103.

[5] Joint Communique – Operation Linda Nchi, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kenya, January 14, 2012; and Alex Ndegwa, Al Shabaab’s propaganda war, The Standard, 17 November 2011, https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/category/2000046627/n-a;

[6] Somalia: UN Envoy Says Inauguration of New Parliament in Somalia “Historic Moment”, Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, 21 August 2012, https://allafrica.com/stories/201208220474.html;

[7] Kenya al-Shabab attack: Security questions as Garissa dead mourned, BBC News, 3 April 2015, and Okari, Dennis, Westgate’s unanswered questions, BBC News, 22 September 2014.

[8] Nation’s army in new battles as advance resumes, Allafrica.com. November 17, 2011, https://allafrica.com/stories/201111180120.html; and Al-Shabaab Leader Admits Split, Somalia Report, 7 November 2012;

[9] On Al-Shabaab and Al-Qa’ida: Tricia Bacon, Daisy Muibu, Al–Qaeda and al-Shabaab: A Resilient Alliance, in Michael Keating, Matt Waldman, War and Peace in Somalia: National Grievances, Local Conflict and Al-Shabaab, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2019, p. 391;

[10] Somalie: le retrait des troupes éthiopiennes lié à des «contraintes financières», RFI, 27 October 2016, http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20161027-somalie-le-retrait-troupes-ethiopiennes-lie-contraintes-financieres .

[11]  US confirmed the death of al-Shabaab’s Ali Jabal, Fox News, 4 August 2017, https://www.foxnews.com/world/us-confirms-death-of-al-shabaab-terrorist-ali-jabal; and US troops call in airstrike after they come under fire in Somalia, CNN, 17 August 2017, https://edition.cnn.com/2017/08/17/politics/us-troops-somalia-airstrike/index.html.

Image source: https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/al-shabaab-somalia-ban-single-use-plastic-bags-terror-environment-livestock-a8428641.html 

The Somaliland Campaign and the Origins of British Counterinsurgency Airstrikes

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By: James A. Fargher

HMS Ark Royal
HMS Ark Royal, the world’s first seaplane carrier. Source: Wikimedia

In response to an effective Islamist insurgency which threatened British interests in the Greater Middle East, the Cabinet sent a carrier-based strike force to commence an air campaign to disrupt and degrade the insurrection.[1] A radical Somali cleric, Mohammed Abdullah Hassan, had inspired the uprising, which threatened to spread and to radicalise British subjects elsewhere. With a newly-formed special forces unit[2] and an RAF squadron, codenamed ‘Z-Force,’ the Admiralty dispatched an aircraft carrier to the Gulf of Aden to conduct surgical strikes against the militants. Displaying many parallels with the present day, the ensuing campaign fought in northern Somalia in 1920 marked the first time that carrier-based airpower was used to fight in an asymmetric war.

The ship was HMS Ark Royal, the world’s first purpose-built aircraft carrier,[3] and the bombers on board were Airco DH.9A single-engine biplanes which had recently served on the Western Front. The special forces unit was the Somaliland Camel Corps, which had been created in 1914, and now formed the ground component of the British government’s strategy to destroy the self-proclaimed Dervish State with simultaneous attacks from the land and from the air. Its plan pioneered the use of airpower in asymmetric warfare, and the RAF bombers were used successfully to locate enemy forces and to bombard them from the air. This innovation contributed to bringing a twenty-year insurgency to an end in three weeks, and persuaded the British government to use airpower in future imperial counterinsurgency campaigns, such as Iraq in 1921.

The Dervish Revolt

The uprising began in 1899, only twelve years after Britain had declared a protectorate over Somaliland, and would continue with varying degrees of intensity until 1920. Inspired by the Mahdist uprising in Sudan which had briefly established an Islamic empire in the 19th century before being crushed by Lord Kitchener at the Battle of Omdurman, Mohammed Abdullah Hassan gathered a band of followers and declared a jihad against the British government.[4] Nick-named the ‘Mad Mullah’ by the British, Hassan was a skilled leader, and his Dervish forces conducted raids largely unchecked throughout British Somaliland.[5] British infantry punitive expeditions struggled to find and to engage Dervish militants, who could withdraw to their fortified bases deep in the arid and rugged Somali interior. By 1914, the British administration had withdrawn to the protectorate’s capital in Berbera on the coast, leaving much of Somaliland in the hands of the insurgents.[6]

In the ensuing crisis of the Great War, the Dervish uprising in Somaliland was all but forgotten, and by the time the armistice was signed in 1918, the British public was in no mood for a protracted military campaign on the Empire’s fringes.[7] Nevertheless, the protectorate’s governor, Geoffrey Archer, was keen to use the armistice in Europe as an opportunity to finish the insurgency once and for all. In fact, his petition to the Colonial Office came at a propitious time for the infant Royal Air Force, which was then fighting for its existence as an independent service during a time of severe budget cuts and hostility from the Army and the Navy.[8] The Air Ministry presented a plan to the government to crush the insurgency from the air, and assured the Treasury that it could do so at a fraction of the cost of an Army-led operation.

The Campaign

After some wrangling with the War Office, in October 1919 the government agreed to the plan, and following initial preparations, HMS Ark Royal set sail from Malta to Berbera in December.[9] Royal Engineers had prepared an aerodrome in Berbera from which the bombers would operate, but Ark Royal stayed on in the harbour to act as a depot and repair ship for the aircraft. Archer, appointed to be Commander-in-Chief of the operation, devised a combined arms offensive, using the aircraft to locate and strafe Dervish formations whilst pre-positioned regular troops and friendly auxiliaries would interdict retreating forces and mop up any remaining resistance. Z-Force would also bomb the Dervish capital and forts to break enemy morale and to soften up positions before they were stormed by the Camel Corps’ mounted infantry.[10]  In this campaign, the aircraft would play a key role in locating enemy positions over a huge area of operations and in providing the 1920s equivalent of ‘shock and awe.’ The infantry, by contrast, were the means to establish control over the territory out of which Hassan and his forces operated.

On 19 January 1920, the bombers took off for their first attack mission. Although only one plane actually found the target, one of Hassan’s fortified compounds, it dropped eight 20 lbs bombs into the fort, wounding Hassan himself and killing one of his sisters and ten fighters.[11] Increasingly effective bombing missions continued regularly after this raid, hitting the fortified camps which Hassan had established across Somaliland and machine-gunning flocks of sheep and camels – the main source of food, transportation, and revenue for the group. In a concerted attack on the 27th, four planes bombarded one of the Dervishes’ main forts before it was stormed by waiting infantry.

These attacks forced Hassan to retreat south towards his fortress-capital of Taleh, deep in the Somali hinterland and close to the frontier with Italian Somaliland. Z-Force was able to identify the Dervish line of retreat, and on 4 February Taleh was bombed. Heavy bombs landed on the main gate and an incendiary bomb set the huts clustered around the outer walls ablaze.[12] Once the Camel Corps had advanced through the desert, the British launched a combined aerial-ground attack on Taleh on 9 February, capturing the city and large herds of camels, killing large numbers of Dervish militants.

The victory at Taleh drove Hassan into the Ogaden desert in Ethiopia, where he died several months later. The bombers returned to Ark Royal, and the Dervish insurgency collapsed. The use of aircraft was critical for the success of this campaign, as it allowed the British to locate and destroy Hassan’s forces and to cut off their access to revenue in what had proven to be a difficult environment.[13]

The significance of this campaign is that it represents the first time that carrier-based airpower was used in fighting a counterinsurgency operation. Moreover, it was launched from the world’s first aircraft carrier and it was the RAF’s first mission as an independent branch of the Armed Forces after the First World War. During a time of constrained military budgets, Sir Hugh Trenchard, Chief of the Air Staff, effectively demonstrated that the RAF could be used as an imperial police force to patrol the huge, unguarded hinterlands of the Empire such as north-west India and territories in the Middle East.[14] This victory in Somaliland would preserve the RAF’s independence, and airpower go on to become a fixture in Britain’s counterinsurgency campaigns.

 

 

James A. Fargher is a doctoral candidate in the Laughton Naval History Unit in the Department of War Studies, specialising in British naval and Imperial history.

 

 

 

Notes:

[1] David E. Omissi, Air Power and Colonial Control: The Royal Air Force 1919-1939 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1990), 39.

[2] ‘News in Brief,’ Times, 12 Aug. 1913: 8, The Times Digital Archive. Web.

[3] Norman Polmar, Aircraft Carriers: A History of Carrier Aviation and Its Influence on World Events, vol. I: 1909-1945 (Herndon: Potomac Books, 2006), 15.

[4] Randal Gray, ‘Bombing the “Mad Mullah” – 1920,’ Journal of the Royal United Services Institute 125.4 (1980): 41.

[5] ‘Another Little War,’ Times, 17 Feb. 1920: 17, The Times Digital Archive. Web.

[6] Chaz Bowyer, RAF Operations 1918-38 (London: William Kimber, 1988), 56.

[7] Ibid.

[8] David Killingray, ‘A Swift Agent of Government: Air Power in British Colonial Africa,’ Journal of African History, 25.4 (1984): 432.

[9] ‘Mullah’s Overthrow,’ Times, 19 Feb. 1920: 13. The Times Digital Archive. Web.

[10] Gray, ‘Bombing the “Mad Mullah” – 1920,’ 43.

[11] Ibid.

[12] Ibid., 45.

[13] ‘Somaliland Operations,’ Times, 20 Feb. 1920: 13. The Times Digital Archive. Web.

[14] Michael Paris, ‘Air Power and Imperial Defence 1880-1919’, Journal of Contemporary History 24.2 (1989): 209.

Schengen and free circulation at the crossroads: lessons for the East African Community?

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By Moses Onyango and Jean-Marc Trouille:

Refugees from Somalia wait to register at Ifo refugee camp in Dadaab, Kenya. Kenya is a member of the EAC, which is on a path to closer integration reminiscent of the one taken by the EU in the lead up to the Schengen agreement. Photo: Internews Europe (CC 2.0)
Refugees from Somalia wait to register at Ifo refugee camp in Dadaab, Kenya. Kenya is a member of the EAC, which is on a path to closer integration reminiscent of the one taken by the EU in the lead up to the Schengen agreement. Photo: Internews Europe (CC 2.0)

In many parts of the world, geopolitics is confronted with two contending trends. On the one hand, numerous countries are engaged in a process of regional economic integration, epitomised by the more advanced model of the European Union (EU), which requires ‘internal’ borders between participating states to become more fluid to facilitate the free circulation of goods, services, capital and labour. On the other, borders are regaining momentum. Inherited from colonisation, the post-war or post-cold war status quo, the validity of these borders is now a moot point. From Ukraine to Iraq, Syria, Mali, South Sudan or Nigeria, old borders are questioned, new demarcation lines appear. In Europe, the large influx of refugees has led to very different approaches across EU member states, with some overtly questioning the Schengen agreement on border-free travel.

Events currently taking place in Europe are of great significance to the East African Community (EAC) and Africa as a whole. Indeed, the EU is not only an important trade and development partner that can potentially provide an alternative to China, it is also a prosperous example of regional economic integration that can serve as an advanced model to African countries involved in a similar regional process. The five EAC member states, in particular, are currently on a path towards regional integration that bears striking resemblance with the process undergone by the EU.

In 1999 Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Uganda and Tanzania signed the EAC Treaty to enhance trade cooperation and political relations. In 2005 a Customs Union was launched, followed in 2010 by a common market with zero internal tariffs. Talks about setting up an East African Currency Union with an EAC-wide Shilling started in 2011. Furthermore, the EAC has its own Legislative Assembly and Court of Justice. Plans to create an East African Tourist Passport are on the way. Establishing a sustainable economic and political bloc in the form of an East African Federation is also high on the EAC agenda. What’s more, in October 2014, the EAC and the EU signed a comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) that supports the EAC’s ambitious integration project and gives EAC member states extensive access to the EU Single Market.

Among these many parallels between the European and East African contexts, it is also important to note that the EAC is considering measures to establish free circulation between its five members, at a time when it is facing the challenge of a growing influx of refugees, mainly from Somalia. Before thinking of the feasibility of setting up an East African ‘Schengen’, it is therefore worth looking into the European model of free circulation: its strengths, weaknesses and limitations.

Abolishing borders has been one of the utmost achievements of the European project, and free movement is one of the dynamics of European prosperity. The dismantling of internal borders among Schengen participating countries was backed up by a strengthening of external borders. Article 25 of the agreement allows national authorities to re-establish border controls temporarily in exceptional circumstances, for a period of time limited to ten days, which can be prolonged to two months. The current reintroduction of controls on several internal borders of the EU is therefore not the beginning of the end of the Schengen agreement, but rather a procedure faithful to the letter of the agreement.

It follows that Germany’s reintroduction of border controls in the aftermath of chaotic scenes at train stations and reports of bed shortages at refugee camps is more an attempt to process refugees in a more orderly fashion and better identify those deserving of help than an attack on European principles. This came after Germany reasserted important European values and Europe’s international commitments to host refugees, particularly those coming from war zones.

Despite this, tensions between member states, overwhelmed by the scale of refugees in search of a safe haven, have put Schengen‘s principle of free movement under strain. This has revealed a lack of solidarity towards member states more exposed geographically to the refugee crisis, as well as showing the generosity on the part of Germany, Sweden and a few others. Crucially, the tensions have also revealed very different attitudes from the East and the West towards traditional European values.

The reason why Schengen is questioned today is not Schengen per se, but rather the weakness – or lack – of policies that should have been adopted or consolidated to accompany Schengen and make it work better. Does Europe have a coherent EU asylum policy? No. Does Europe have a European police? No. Is the EU agency Frontex sufficient to guarantee European border management? Clearly not, in view of the human tragedies in the Mediterranean and of the Hungarian reaction to the influx of refugees, to cite only two examples.

By the end of the year the EU Commission will at last propose measures to set up a European corps of border guards to consolidate Frontex, which coordinates cooperation between national border guards on external borders to prevent illegal immigration, terrorist infiltration and human trafficking. But does Europe have a real foreign security and defence policy capable of stabilizing its close neighbourhood? No. Its Eastern and Southern Neighbourhood Policy is a shambles.

Europeans assumed that they would be able to enjoy a common area of freedom, in which people, goods, and labour would circulate freely, whilst keeping most features of their national systems. Today, Schengen is the victim of member states’ lack of a coherent vision. The so-called four freedoms (free circulation of goods, services, capital and labour) can only work efficiently with a set of rules and policies at the supranational level. Inward-looking attitudes will not solve the challenges Europe faces in view of the extent of Africa’s migration potential. In areas where European integration is more advanced, where Europeans share the currency, the market, the freedom to trade, work and travel across this market, full sovereignty belongs in the past. Without sharing more sovereignty, all these envied attributes are threatened by crises such as the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis and the migrant crisis, none of which, surprisingly, Europeans anticipated.

As is often the case in Europe when populists spot imperfections in the way that a new European framework has been designed, Schengen has been presented as a threat to internal security. And yet, to make up for the abolition of internal controls, member states are expected to cooperate in order to maintain a high level of security. First, by exchanging information to fight borderless organised crime and terrorism. Second, by intensifying policy cooperation. Finally, by using the Schengen Information System (SI).

Schengen is by no means a ‘wide open door’ to illegal migrants. Indeed, the Dublin agreements require the country of arrival to register migrants, take fingerprints, and consider their asylum application. But in the wake of vast flows of refugees, this rule has reached its limits. Nonetheless, it is not in the Europeans’ interest to dismantle the Schengen area and the freedom that it provides to EU citizens. Rather, this joint public area has to be managed by joint public action.

What lessons can be drawn by the EAC in the light of European developments? First, that free circulation leads to more wealth and not the opposite. All economists agree on these great advantages, which is in itself exceptional. Second, that an agreement on free circulation implies not only benefits, albeit significant ones, but also constraints in terms of sharing sovereignty in areas hitherto regarded as national prerogatives. Third, that any weakness in the design of the free circulation agreement will, one day, be subject to a random shock that tests its resilience. This happened with the Eurozone. This is now the case with Schengen.

Schengen is currently being challenged, though primarily by populist misrepresentations. It continues to work. But it faces some reluctance among certain member states and is not sufficiently backed up by effective policies. Its long-term survival will depend on EU member states’ ability to consolidate its design and back it up with more integrated policies in the fields of asylum, police and border management, foreign security and defence, particularly with regard to stabilizing the EU’s neighbourhood.

More generally, any step towards integration, whichever area is concerned, requires sharing sovereignty. This will be a substantial challenge. EAC member states would clearly benefit from a system like Schengen, it would potentially bring the shared reward of increased prosperity for each member state and for the region as a whole. But such a system must be accompanied by effective policies, joint public action, and greater integration in terms of shared sovereignty. Otherwise it may end up finding itself in a similar crisis to that faced by the EU today.

Moses Onyango is a Fellow of the African Leadership Centre, King’s College London, and Director of the Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs at the United States International University-Africa in Nairobi, Kenya. Jean-Marc Trouille is Jean Monnet Professor of European Economic Integration and European Business Management at the University of Bradford School of Management, UK.