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Feature — Putsch-ed Out of Power: After Sudan’s Coup d’Etat Set the Board, Where will the Pieces Move?

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By Stephen Jones

7 May 2019

Part 1, with Analysis as of 13 April 2019

Omar al-Bashir during a 2011 visit to Juba (Al Jazeera English)

Following months of protests demanding the resignation of long-time Sudanese dictator Omar al-Bashir, he was removed from power by a military coup on Thursday, 11 April 2019. The coup, led by former allies of the President, is far from a complete regime change and Sudan is by no means on a certain and steady road to democratic governance. Complicated further by territorial disputes with Egypt, an unstable peace agreement with South Sudan which may yet collapse into fresh civil war, and the legacy of ethnic cleansing and genocide in Darfur, the country has a difficult course to chart if the democratic vision of tens of thousands of protestors is to be realised. Amidst the ever-changing aftermath of the coup, this article will attempt the fool’s errand of predicting how the situation may develop in the medium- to long-term with regards to Sudan’s main players: former-President al-Bashir, the coup leaders, and the civilian protestors.

Who Mourns For al-Bashir?

So far, it seems, no-one. al-Bashir’s closest allies took part in the coup against him, led by the multi-tasking Defence Minister and Vice-President Ibn Auf, previously al-Bashir’s presumed successor. Even the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), the paramilitary force formerly loyal to the President has issued statements apologising for its role in the regime and pledging itself to “the protection of the Sudanese people”. As it is highly unlikely that any military or paramilitary faction will begin a civil war to return al-Bashir to power, his time as President is without a doubt over.

If no-one will champion al-Bashir against the coup, what lies in store for the former dictator? Indicted for war crimes and crimes against humanity by the International Criminal Court (ICC) since 2009 for the ethnic cleansing and genocide that he oversaw in the western region of Darfur during 2003 and 2004, many civil rights activists around the world had hoped he would be extradited to face justice in the Netherlands. However, the coup leaders have made it clear that they do not wish to extradite him. This is likely because the coup leaders themselves are implicated in the same crimes through their roles in senior military leadership at the time, such as Ibn Auf’s position as head of Military Intelligence during the oppressive campaign. To set a precedent of holding those responsible to account would leave the coup leaders vulnerable to prosecution themselves. This reluctance to see justice administered through internationally recognised institutions and processes does not paint an encouraging picture for those hoping to see Sudan transition to a law and norm-abiding democratic nation.

Instead, al-Bashir faces two possible futures. For the same reasons as above, it is likely Sudan’s new leaders will refuse to prosecute him domestically, and instead exile him to a regional ally or neighbour such as Saudi Arabia or Egypt. It is a realistic possibility that al-Bashir struck a deal with military leaders, not calling on his paramilitary supporters to resist the coup in return for avoiding prosecution and retaining a comfortable life in exile. This would again avoid setting a precedent of accountability for the crimes against humanity committed fifteen years ago. Alternatively, it is also likely that coup leaders will use al-Bashir as a scapegoat, prosecuting him in an unfair trial with a forgone conclusion, likely ending with his execution in an attempt to gain favour with the anti-Bashir protestors. Either way, it is highly unlikely that the former President will receive a free and fair trial; not a good start for those hoping that strong, independent judicial institutions would flourish to form the backbone of a new democracy.

You Say You Want A Revolution? Keep Waiting, says the Army.

Ever since soldiers stepped in to protect protestors from Government-aligned militias on 8 April, a military coup seemed inevitable. Announcing the coup on state TV on 11 April, Defence Minister and putsch leader Ibn Auf declared a three-month state of emergency and a two-year transitional period before any democratic formation of civilian government could be held. A concern for many Sudanese protestors, who continue to sit-in at army headquarters, is that the coup will end up as a mere rebranding rather than a revolution, with one dictator simply replaced by another.

The initial indications, however, are reasonably promising for the protestors demanding democratic, civilian government. Ibn Auf, the coup leader and former close ally of al-Bashir, stepped down on Friday, 12 April after less than twenty-four hours in charge of the country, declaring veteran soldier General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan his successor. Similarly, another close ally of al-Bashir and leader of the coup, head of Sudan’s intelligence service the National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS), Salih Ghosh resigned on Saturday, 13 April. Having orchestrated violent crackdowns on protestors since December, Ghosh was deeply unpopular with protestors despite his recent role in removing al-Bashir. In most military coups, the coup leaders declare themselves the new heads of government, usually after a brief power struggle between themselves. However, in Sudan we have seen former allies of the President first oust him, then — apparently voluntarily, although under large pressure from protestors — step down. It is unclear whether the resignations were driven by personal values, internal power politics, or fear of what angry protestors would do were they not placated. So far, no actor appears desperate to cling to power. While this is encouraging, protest movements should not drop their vigilance until their demands for democracy are enshrined in stable state institutions.

With a smaller public profile, little involvement in the Darfur genocide, and few direct links with al-Bashir, Sudan’s subsequently appointed leader al-Burhan was a less controversial figure than Ibn Auf; the military likely hoped his appointment would calm protestors’ demands for civilian governance, but the gambit did not worked and the sit-ins continued. A relatively unknown character, he had the support of the paramilitary RSF after fighting alongside them in Yemen against Houthi rebels, and it is likely that this support was a primary reason for his appointment over other candidates. Should the RSF yield significant influence over al-Burhan, many in Darfur will rightly become nervous, as the RSF is a direct descendant of the Janjaweed militias that committed the bulk of atrocities in 2003 and 2004.

Overall, following the coup, Sudan’s new leaders have attempted to placate protestors with resignations and promises of democracy after a two-year transition, rather than resorting to oppressive measures. While encouraging, there is a realistic possibility that military leaders are simply playing for time, waiting for international interest and attention to fade before reneging on promises of democracy and returning to violent oppression of protestors. The international community, particularly democratic nations and liberal bodies such as the United Nations (UN), must continue advocating for democratic reform. Coup leaders must be prevented from using this two-year transitional period as a chance to consolidate their personal power.

At Present, The Revolution Must Remain Televised

Protestors continue to sit-in at army headquarters in Khartoum demanding democratic civilian government. To get even this far since December, ordinary civilians, mobilised and organised by the Sudanese Professionals Association (SPA), have endured brutal oppressive measures from NISS forces and government-aligned militia groups. As discussed above, that oppression has largely been put on hold for now, although isolated incidents of protestors killed by stray bullets or attacked by NISS forces continue to be reported. It is highly unlikely that the protestors will end their calls for democracy until a civilian government has been formed; therefore, if Sudan’s new leader al-Burhan decides to hold onto power, he will need another way of dispersing these protestors. al-Burhan reportedly already enjoys the support of the RSF, Sudan’s largest paramilitary group, and he will likely have the loyalty of the military due to his rank of Lieutenant General and his reputation as a professional soldier. With the resignation of NISS head Ghosh, al-Burhan is now likely able to appoint a loyalist to lead the intelligence service. With all branches of Sudan’s security apparatus loyal to him, al-Burhan will easily be able to oppress and disperse the unarmed protestors should he so wish.

The most effective protection the protestors currently have from such oppression is the eyes of the world. With global media fixated on the developing situation, international bodies racing to help support a transition to democracy, and writers tripping over their editors to publish op-eds on each new event, the SPA-led protests have a rapt global audience. With the world watching, it is unlikely that al-Burhan will resort to oppressive measures for fear of international isolation, and even UN intervention as in Darfur. However, should news cycles move on, and international advocates for democracy be placated by vague promises of a transitional period, the protestors will lose their watchful shield. International actors must therefore not turn away from Sudan until a peaceful transition to democratic governance has been realised.

Protestors One, Dictators Nil; But It Is Only Half-Time

Overall, al-Bashir is gone for good, although he is unlikely to face justice for his oppressive policies in government and crimes against humanity in Darfur. The generals who replaced him have, so far, appeared to resist the temptations of seizing personal power and continuing al-Bashir’s brutal measures. The restraint, however, is likely due more to the intense pressure generated by the SPA-led protest movements that tirelessly continue to demand civilian governance. Should international attention waver or the protests falter, there is a realistic possibility this revolution will stumble in the second-half of this dramatic Sudanese tale, succumbing to yet another medalled dictator in uniform.

Stephen Jones is a Master’s student at Kings’ War Studies Department, following an MA in Psychology from the University of Edinburgh. His main research interests involve the psychological causes of inter-group conflict and violence, as well as the cognitive processes that allow disinformation campaigns and terror recruitment strategies to succeed. Before joining King’s, he worked for the UN in New York, observing the positive effects of diplomacy and international collaboration in conflicts large and small around the world.

Burkina Faso: The downfall of another tyrant in Africa

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By Albert Mbiatem:

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Photo: The Speaker (creative commons)

The recent popular revolution in Burkina Faso and the resignation of President Blaise Compaoré has emerged as a ‘warning alarm’ to African tyrants who are bent on eternalising themselves in power. The political crisis in Burkina Faso could be seen as a ‘call for attention’ to the presidents of Democratic Republic of Congo, Republic of Congo and Rwanda who intend to amend their respective constitutions in order to become eligible for a third mandate.[1]

Presented by some Western states (France and the United States) as an effective mediator in resolving regional crises, Compaoré has just failed to prevent and resolve the political crisis in his own country. The Burkinabe people chose to oust Compaoré during the month of October, just as he ousted President Thomas Sankara in October, 27 years earlier. With the complicity of France, Compaoré took power in 1987 by eliminating a Sankara, a transformational leader. Sankara and thirteen collaborators were killed during the coup.[2] The result was that a committed head of state was replaced by a ruler responsive only to the interests of the former colonial power.

During his rule, Compaoré set up a political system largely unresponsive to people’s needs, wants and aspirations. For almost three decades, the Burkinabe people witnessed a high level of corruption, poverty, injustice, a high unemployment rate and a repressive political system. Civil rights and the freedom of the press were undermined. One of the most gruesome examples of this came on December 13th 1998, when the charred bodies of journalists Norbert Zongo and three of his friends were found in their vehicle 100km south of Ouagadougou.[3] The President’s brother, Francois Compaoré, was a prime suspect. Unequal resource distribution has also been one of the main causes of persistent popular disenchantment. According to World Bank statistics from 2012, 46% of the population still lives below the poverty line.[4]

President Compaoré, like many African Heads of State, was more interested in clinging to power than in the needs of his people. Modifying the constitution to stay in power became the ultimate goal for Compaoré.  Article 37 of the constitution of Burkina Faso stipulates that ‘the president of Faso is elected for five years by direct universal suffrage in a secret ballot. He can only be re-elected once’. Elected in 2005 and again in 2010, Blaise Compaoré could not stand for re-election without amending this article. On October 21st 2014, Compaoré announced his intention to hold a referendum which, if it went his way, would give him the power to amend the constitution and stand for a fifth presidential term.[5] A wave of popular disapproval spread throughout the country, incorporating both the opposition party and large sections of civil society.

On 30th October, when the amendment of the constitution was due to be debated in parliament, the Burkinabe people stormed into the parliament building and destroyed it.

The weakening of the regime in Ouagadougou not only came from the discontent of civil society but also from perennial mutinies in the army. In 1999 soldiers protested about the payment of their bonuses. In 2011 there was another mutiny, coinciding with civil unrest. Despite the fact that Compaoré at that time added the role of Minister of Defense to his presidential portfolio, the regime continued to show signs of weakness.[6] The relatively low degree of retaliation by the armed forces with regard to the uprisings of 28-30th October show the persistent discontent within the ranks.

Another problem for Compaoré was his firm belief in protecting his ‘Western friends’ above all else – France and the USA. He thus gave little attention to the famous phrase vox populis, vox Dei (the voice of the people is the voice of God). The victories of popular revolutions over tyrannical regimes across the world provide enough evidence to argue that ultimate power lies in the hands of the people.

As we look towards the future, there are several questions to consider: What kind of political future will Burkina Faso have? Will the country undergo the kind of political controversies witnessed in Tunisia and Egypt after the respective downfalls of Ben Ali and Hosni Mubarak? As the former second in command of Compaoré’s presidential guard, will Lieutenant Colonel Zida ensure a transparent transition? Does the military’s ascendance to the helm of the state undermine the intention of the revolution to free the people from tyranny? Is it not high time for the African Union to actively intervene in favour of a peaceful and consensual transition in Burkina Faso?

It is not easy to find specific answers to these questions since the situation on the ground is evolving all the time. But it is high time for the leaders in Burkina Faso to recognise leadership as a process of interaction between leaders and followers. Leaders must be aware and responsive to societal needs. The structure of the transition should be consensually determined by the Burkinabe people in such a way that all the strata of society are taken into account. In this context, a consensual civilian government would be the appropriate structure for an effective democratic transition. As the main political organisation on the continent, the African Union must effectively encourage a peaceful transition in ‘the land of incorruptible people’, as Sankara once called Burkina Faso, before he was deposed by the eminently corruptible Compaoré.

 

 

Albert Mbiatem is a fellow of the African Leadership Centre, King’s College London. He is currently on attachment at the Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS) in Addis Ababa. He is also a research assistant at the University of Buea in Cameroon. 

 

References

  1. Radio France Internationale, Revue de Presse. 31 October, 2014.
  2. Bonkoungou, M. (2007) “Burkina Faso Salutes “Africa’s Che” Thomas Sankara”. Reuters, 17 October 2007. And Radio France Internationale, October 27, 2008.
  3. International Crisis Group “Burkina Faso: With or Without Compaoré, Times of Uncertainty” Africa Report N°205, 22 July 2013.
  4. World Factbook and the World Bank. 2012.
  5. Le Figaro, “Au Burkina Faso, Blaise Compaoré Rêve Encore de Pouvoir”. 22 October 2014.
  6. Crisis Group Interview, International Military Official, Ouagadougou, September 2011.

The Lost Revolution

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By Lamya Hussein Marafi

It almost seems that the Egyptian revolution never happened, or is still waiting to happen. A struggling economy, an ambiguous foreign policy, extremely brutal police system, continuous fatal train accidents, increasing unemployment rate, sexual harassment of both women and men, a controversial constitution, the abandoned, ‘dangerous’ land of Sinai, a return to the emergency law, and a threat of a state collapse —President Morsi is torn and lost between satisfying the Muslim Brotherhood or the revolution.

The battle between the President’s Muslim Brotherhood (MB) and the revolutionaries will continue until one side wins or the military intervenes. If the MB continues to hold firmly to power, Egypt’s relationship with the West could deteriorate due to fractionalized, poor governance and the rise of Islamic extremism. On the other hand, if the revolutionaries succeed, then they will also face challenges in creating a unified opposition that will continue to seek dialogue and political integration. This is because they are widely thought of as seculars, liberals, moderates, socialists, and even Muslims and Christians who simply oppose the MB. It is unlikely that the military will intervene due to political alienation, criticisms, and exhaustion from governing Egypt’s post-revolution transitional period. If so, for now the battle is between the MB and the revolutionaries.

The MB, including President Morsi, claims that they are not abandoning the revolution, while the opposition claims that Morsi and the MB ‘hijacked’ the revolution. The MB desperately wants to control Tahrir Square, even though this was where all political groups rallied against Mubarak. Tahrir Square and other major public spaces across Egypt will continue to be the microcosm of the struggle over who should represent Egypt’s revolution. The beauty and irony of it all is that no single leader or political group was credited for triggering the revolution: literally anyone who opposed Mubarak’s regime went out to the streets calling for the regime’s downfall.

Given this alarming situation, Egypt’s revolution seems lost. A solution will be difficult to implement because it seems unfortunately too late for President Morsi to regain the trust of the opposition in order to achieve a sense of consensus. Likewise, it is very unlikely that he can rebuild faith to engage in national political dialogue.

The country is caught in a vicious cycle. Security-sector reform needs to be initiated from within the government to avoid a descent into anarchy and chaos. A stable, solid economy and democracy will not thrive without the proper development of state security and institutions. But it is risky to rely on foreign aid to achieve security sector reform or even some form of economic stability. An influx of foreign aid will increase Egypt’s dependency on the West or perhaps the Gulf region, stirring political controversy among those who expect a lack of transparency on loan conditions and future repayment of debts.  At some point, a leader must emerge out of this revolution who will be capable of establishing political consensus and a sustainable vision to get Egypt’s out of its ‘collapsed’ state paradox.

The revolution was genuinely peaceful and people-led. However, with all the chaos developing as a result of the dramatic change and lack of political security and reform, the revolution is at a crossroads. It could either lead to complete state collapse or a nostalgic return to Mubarak’s past. It is not useful to reflect whether it was ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ to overthrow Mubarak in this particular period, as Mubarak’s regime would have eventually collapsed, for better or for worse. More urgent and important is to think about how this lost revolution can be found again.

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Lamya Marafi is currently pursuing her master’s degree in Conflict, Security, and Development at King’s College London. Lamya’s interest is the Middle East region, especially youth and women’s empowerment, as well as civil society. She also loves traveling to explore diverse cultures.

Joining the ‘Million Man March’

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By Nesma El Shazly

I was not allowed to leave the house throughout the first week of the revolution. Although my parents wholeheartedly endorsed the revolution, they feared for my life and would not let me join the protests. For this reason I spent that week documenting the events as they unfolded from my own home. The Egyptian people were revolting against sixty years of military rule, calling for three demands: bread, freedom and social justice. For eighteen consecutive days, protesters were engaged in face-to-face confrontations with President Mubarak’s brutal central security forces. Revolutionaries peacefully faced live ammunition, rubber bullets, tear gas, kidnappings and detainment with complete fearlessness.

After watching the horrifying brutality with which protesters were met on The Friday of Anger (28 January), I decided that enough was enough. I could not sit at home helplessly watching my people die. I frantically called up all my friends to see who was willing to march to Tahrir Square with me. Needless to say most of my male friends tried to discourage me out of concern for my safety. I was one of many women facing difficulty in taking to the streets and so, my friends and I, all women, decided to join the ‘Million Man March’ on 1 February.

As I walked down the stairs carrying the banner that I had spent the whole night making, my mother followed me, tightly gripping my hoodie, trying to pull me back. My brother drove me to my friend’s house, where we had all planned to meet. That morning came to be a turning point in my life. As we were about to leave to Tahrir, my best friend called me from the airport to tell me that she and her husband were leaving for the U.S for the safety of their 2 year-old child.  I experienced a mixture of conflicting emotions. I felt content that I was doing the right thing, excited that I was going to be a part of making history, apprehension of the risks I was about to take and sorrow that I could not even bid my best friend farewell.

There were three phases to our day: comedy, terror and euphoria. The first phase took place on the underground train. As we purchased our tickets the vendor looked at us with pride and said “May God be with you,” while a man standing behind us in line looked at us in disgust and told his wife that we were probably drug addicts. As we boarded the train, an old man selling copies of the Quran followed us on and tried to convince us that we should buy a copy and read it before we go to Tahrir and die. The adverse reactions we received throughout our journey put us in hysterics.

We experienced the second phase – terror – as we got off the train in downtown Cairo. We marched through the streets towards the Square alongside several other small groups. Mubarak supporters were surrounding the Square yelling out foul words at all the revolutionaries. An older woman followed me and grabbed my arm asking me where I was going. I looked her straight in the eye and said, “I’m going to Tahrir.” She tightened her grip on my arm and started hitting me and shouting out, “You are going to ruin this country! You are going to turn Egypt into Iraq!” My friends eventually realized that I had been held back and ran to my aid.  It was only at this point that we realized the extent of danger we were subjecting ourselves to. We resumed our journey quietly.

As we got closer to the Square we started hearing the enthusiastic chants of the protesters, “Al sha’ab yoreed isqaat al nizam!” (The people demand the fall of the regime!) Surges of revolutionary spirit and energy shot into us, abolishing our fear and wiping away thoughts of our encounter with Mubarak supporters. I have never felt as safe as I did that day in the Square. We were all brothers and sisters uniting for one common goal. People welcomed us as we marched in, handing us water and fruit. Nobody looked at us. No man tried to harass us. Everyone there truly believed in the cause. They knew that this was a matter of life or death.

While the world classifies the events of 25 January as a revolution, most revolutionaries have a contrary view. We ousted one brutal figurehead, and that in itself is a tremendous accomplishment.  But we have yet to dissolve the ruthless military regime that has ruled our country for 60 years. The Egyptian public was manipulated into believing that the military supported our revolution. But their assumption of power following the ousting of Mubarak suggests otherwise. It seems more likely, in my eyes, that the military sought to reinstate their power, which had seen a downturn during Mubarak’s later years. Throughout that period, Mubarak shifted his focus towards the business elite, bringing prominent businessmen into the political sphere.

During November 2011, the public was voting in the parliamentary elections that the military was administering. Concurrently, protesters were being attacked and killed by central security forces in the Mohamed Mahmoud clashes. Not only were we seeing the military gradually replace central security forces, we were also seeing protesters being unlawfully detained and tried in military prisons and courts. Furthermore, we had yet to see the last of Omar Suleiman and Ahmed Shafiq, who later sought to run for presidency. Omar Suleiman, a leading figure of Egypt’s inhumane intelligence system, renowned for his direct implication in the CIA’s callous rendition programme, took on the role of Vice President on 29 January. Suleiman later sought to run for the 2012 presidential elections. However, he failed to garner enough support in the initial stages of the race. Ahmed Shafiq, a military-backed figurehead that turned his back on the revolution through his assumption of the position of Prime Minister on 31 January, also sought to enter the race. However, unlike Suleiman, Shafiq somehow managed to garner widespread support. His support base mainly derived from ardent anti-revolutionary supporters of the Mubarak regime and the military, as well as liberals who feared the growing dominance of the Muslim Brotherhood in the political sphere. The fact that Shafiq was even able to run for president, let alone make it to the final round of the elections, shows that the revolution is far from over

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Nesma El Shazly was born and raised in the UK. She moved to Egypt in 2007 to study at the American University in Cairo. On 1 Feb 2011, she took to the streets in protest and she has been a participant of the Egyptian Revolution ever since.

COMING SOON ON STRIFE: ‘The Lost Revolution’, by Lamya Hussein Marafi, assessing the remaining challenges for Egypt’s revolution.