Protest

The Road to Oligarchic Peace: Comparing the Nashville Conventions of 1850 and the Severodonetsk Congress of 2004

November 5, 2019 by Daria Platonova

by Daria Platonova

During the Orange Revolution, the people of Ukraine spontaneously took to the streets in what would become known as the country’s “first” Maidan (Image credit: WikiMedia/Sirhey).

In March 1850, following a compromise motion on slavery tabled by Henry Clay in the US Congress and the debates that ensued John Calhoun, a statesman from the slave-holding state of South Carolina, threatened the “aggressive” North with southern secession if it continued to encroach upon the rights of the South in relation to slavery. He said: “If you, who represent the stronger portion, cannot agree to settle [the questions] on the broad principle of justice and duty, say so; and let the States we both represent agree to separate and part in peace.” This statement was followed by two Nashville Conventions in Tennessee at which the southern states debated the Compromise and the potential for secession. In the end, moderation prevailed.

Fast forward a century and a half and in a different country, in 2004, regional deputies took a more radical action than their American counterparts in a series of congresses held in eastern Ukraine and proposed the secession of the east, after mass protests erupted in Kyiv in a phenomenon known as the Orange Revolution. Like Calhoun in America, during the Severodonetsk Congress (Luhansk region) on the 28 November 2004, the chairman of the Donetsk regional council, Borys Kolesnikov similarly couched his message to the deputies in the language of rights: the people of the East exercised their constitutional right to elect Yanukovych, and neither the Ukrainian Parliament nor Viktor Yushchenko could violate it.

After a decade, both countries were plunged into war.^[1] In this article, I argue that a comparison between the secessionist endeavours in the United States and Ukraine indicates that, to put it very broadly, internal wars are not caused by some primordial animosities and differences between ethnicities (the so-called “ancient hatreds”). Rather it is the breakdown of an “oligarchic” peace that accounts for internal wars. Here, the different sectional, political and economic interests are held more or less in equilibrium. In this regard, it are especially the compromises that are made between elites that accounts for internal wars. Indeed, elite compromise is an essential part of a peace process.

On the surface, Ukraine in the post-Soviet period and the United States in the mid-19^th century evolved as quintessential “divided societies”. The South in the US was largely agricultural. Slavery, as an economic system, naturally encompassed nearly every aspect of life, and therefore had an undeniable impact on culture and politics of the South. The North, by contrast, was industrialised, with no toleration for slavery. The historian Kenneth Stampp describes the differences between the two sections of the US in the following terms: these were “Southern farmers and planters… and Northern merchants, manufacturers, bondholders, and speculators.” The historian Lee Benson describes the United States at that time as “bicultural,” although there are debates whether the South was a truly distinctive “civilisation”.

The post-Soviet Ukraine developed along the lines of a divided society as a result of its turbulent history: as in America, similar regional divisions existed between the agriculture and services-dominated West and the industrialised East. In Ukraine, the divisions were reflected not only in the political economy of the different regions but also in voting behaviour, the use of Ukrainian and Russian languages, and opinions on the political situation.

In the US, the vital interests of the South were periodically threatened by the North. The two parts of country therefore existed in an uneasy union. In Ukraine, similarly, there were tensions between the West and the East, with the East often resisting the Ukrainisation campaigns (the introduction of the Ukrainian language), showcasing a higher inclination towards Russia, while the West of the country sought closer ties with the European Union and NATO.

In the United States, the pressure to abolish slavery in the South had been building up for a long time. The North criticised the institution of slavery and issued legislation limiting economic growth there. After the Mexican-American war (1848), the major issue facing the Union was whether slavery should be permitted on the new territories. A Compromise was devised by Clay which allowed certain territories to decide the slavery issue for themselves, while entrenching the existing rights of the South to their property in slaves. Continuous debates were held in the Congress for the next several months, with the aim of averting a simmering crisis. Calhoun and the “fire-eaters” (as the radical group of Southerners were called) however argued that the continuing “Northern aggressions” were threatening the state of the Union. The Nashville Conventions inspired by Calhoun were therefore expected to be radical undertakings to demonstrate the unity of the southern states to the North and put pressure on it to ceased its aggressions.

The two Nashville Conventions held in June 1850 and November 1850, however, were by all means moderate. There were some radical Southerners present but, in the end the delegates adopted a “wait-and-see attitude”. They condemned Clay’s Compromise and also the Compromise that was enacted by the Congress in September 1850, issued calls for an extension of the Missouri Compromise Line to the Pacific Ocean, and agreed to meet again. In essence, the Conventions were held in order to demonstrate to the North that the South could act as a single front. In doing so, conflict was avoided.

It can be argued that the reason why the moderates prevailed in America was because the Compromise did not threaten the prevailing “oligarchic peace.” In other words, the Compromise did not endanger the representation of the South in American politics. As McPherson writes: “California… did not tip the balance in the Senate against the South”. The South still wielded a lot of power in the country. Henry Wilson goes on to write on the power of the South: “They had dictated principles, shaped policies, made Presidents and cabinets, judges of the Supreme Court, Senators, and Representatives”.

In Ukraine, galvanised by the dissatisfaction with the incumbent President Leonid Kuchma’s rule and the outrage at the fraudulent election of his chosen successor Viktor Yanukovych to the Presidency, people in Kyiv and Ukrainian regions took to the streets on that 22 November 2004. These gatherings came to be known as the Orange Revolution. In response to the pickets of the Ukrainian Parliament by the competing candidate from the West Viktor Yushchenko, and the recognition of Yushchenko as president in western Ukraine, the disgruntled deputies in the eastern regions organised a series of congresses attended by delegates from almost all across those regions. They proposed radical actions to tilt the balance back in favour of the East and to force the Parliament and Yushchenko to recognise the unalienable right of eastern Ukrainians to choose their own president. Accordingly, on the 26 November, the deputies of the Kharkiv regional council supported the creation of the South-Eastern Autonomous Republic. The Kharkiv governor Evhen Kushnaryov ruled that no budgetary transfers were to be made to the centre. The regional council deputies proposed to concentrate all power in the regional council and on the 27th of November, the council refused to recognise the central government.

Similar developments took place in other regions. On 28 November 2004, the Donetsk regional council decided to hold a regional referendum in December on granting the Donetsk region a status of an autonomous region within the “Ukrainian federation”. On the same day, the famous “separatist” congress was held in Severodonetsk in the Luhansk region. Following the Congress, a union of all regions was created and the chairman of the Donetsk regional council Borys Kolesnikov was chosen as its head. Kolesnikov proposed to create a “new federal state in the form of a South-Eastern Republic with the capital in Kharkiv,” if Yushchenko won the presidential election.

However, as in America, the conflict was avoided and, in the end, moderation prevailed. Again, the talks between the opposing camps of Yushchenko and Yanukovych carried on through the crisis period. The election results were cancelled, a new election day was agreed, and, most importantly, the two competing sides agreed to a major amendment in the Ukrainian constitution. Like Clay’s compromise, Kuchma’s amendments to the Ukrainian Constitution appeared to save the day. The Constitution was to divide the executive (Hale) and grant more power to the Prime Minister and Parliament. This ensured that Viktor Yanukovych and his Party of Regions, despite now going into opposition, could still wield enormous power in Ukrainian politics. Hence, in the elections of 2006 the Party of Regions won plurality in Parliament and Yanukovych came back as Prime Minister. Yanukovych’s Donetsk clan continued to play an important role in politics.

The historical experience of the US before the Civil War demonstrates that when compromises between elites are made and some deeply entrenched elites are still able to stay in power, a conflict can be avoided. With the election of Abraham Lincoln on the 6 November 1860, it can be argued that the elite compromise ceased to work for the South. In the case of Yanukovych, he fled in February 2014 and left the dominant network of the Party of Regions and its members in disarray. It follows therefore that wars are not caused by primordial ethnic hatreds but by the break down of elite compromises.

[1] This is not a place to discuss whether the war in Ukraine is a civil or any other kind of war. This discussion would merit another article altogether.

Daria is a PhD student at King’s College London. Her research focuses on violence and the unfolding of conflict across several regions in eastern Ukraine, 2013 – 2014. She also leads one of the Causes of War seminars in the War Studies Department. Prior to joining King’s, she worked as a teacher. She graduated with a degree in History from the University of Cambridge in 2011. Her broader interests include European history, war studies, and interdisciplinary methods.

Feature — Putsch-ed Out of Power: After Sudan’s Coup d’Etat Set the Board, Where will the Pieces Move?

May 6, 2019 by Stephen Jones

By Stephen Jones

7 May 2019

Part 1, with Analysis as of 13 April 2019

Omar al-Bashir during a 2011 visit to Juba (Al Jazeera English)

Following months of protests demanding the resignation of long-time Sudanese dictator Omar al-Bashir, he was removed from power by a military coup on Thursday, 11 April 2019. The coup, led by former allies of the President, is far from a complete regime change and Sudan is by no means on a certain and steady road to democratic governance. Complicated further by territorial disputes with Egypt, an unstable peace agreement with South Sudan which may yet collapse into fresh civil war, and the legacy of ethnic cleansing and genocide in Darfur, the country has a difficult course to chart if the democratic vision of tens of thousands of protestors is to be realised. Amidst the ever-changing aftermath of the coup, this article will attempt the fool’s errand of predicting how the situation may develop in the medium- to long-term with regards to Sudan’s main players: former-President al-Bashir, the coup leaders, and the civilian protestors.

Who Mourns For al-Bashir?

So far, it seems, no-one. al-Bashir’s closest allies took part in the coup against him, led by the multi-tasking Defence Minister and Vice-President Ibn Auf, previously al-Bashir’s presumed successor. Even the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), the paramilitary force formerly loyal to the President has issued statements apologising for its role in the regime and pledging itself to “the protection of the Sudanese people”. As it is highly unlikely that any military or paramilitary faction will begin a civil war to return al-Bashir to power, his time as President is without a doubt over.

If no-one will champion al-Bashir against the coup, what lies in store for the former dictator? Indicted for war crimes and crimes against humanity by the International Criminal Court (ICC) since 2009 for the ethnic cleansing and genocide that he oversaw in the western region of Darfur during 2003 and 2004, many civil rights activists around the world had hoped he would be extradited to face justice in the Netherlands. However, the coup leaders have made it clear that they do not wish to extradite him. This is likely because the coup leaders themselves are implicated in the same crimes through their roles in senior military leadership at the time, such as Ibn Auf’s position as head of Military Intelligence during the oppressive campaign. To set a precedent of holding those responsible to account would leave the coup leaders vulnerable to prosecution themselves. This reluctance to see justice administered through internationally recognised institutions and processes does not paint an encouraging picture for those hoping to see Sudan transition to a law and norm-abiding democratic nation.

Instead, al-Bashir faces two possible futures. For the same reasons as above, it is likely Sudan’s new leaders will refuse to prosecute him domestically, and instead exile him to a regional ally or neighbour such as Saudi Arabia or Egypt. It is a realistic possibility that al-Bashir struck a deal with military leaders, not calling on his paramilitary supporters to resist the coup in return for avoiding prosecution and retaining a comfortable life in exile. This would again avoid setting a precedent of accountability for the crimes against humanity committed fifteen years ago. Alternatively, it is also likely that coup leaders will use al-Bashir as a scapegoat, prosecuting him in an unfair trial with a forgone conclusion, likely ending with his execution in an attempt to gain favour with the anti-Bashir protestors. Either way, it is highly unlikely that the former President will receive a free and fair trial; not a good start for those hoping that strong, independent judicial institutions would flourish to form the backbone of a new democracy.

You Say You Want A Revolution? Keep Waiting, says the Army.

Ever since soldiers stepped in to protect protestors from Government-aligned militias on 8 April, a military coup seemed inevitable. Announcing the coup on state TV on 11 April, Defence Minister and putsch leader Ibn Auf declared a three-month state of emergency and a two-year transitional period before any democratic formation of civilian government could be held. A concern for many Sudanese protestors, who continue to sit-in at army headquarters, is that the coup will end up as a mere rebranding rather than a revolution, with one dictator simply replaced by another.

The initial indications, however, are reasonably promising for the protestors demanding democratic, civilian government. Ibn Auf, the coup leader and former close ally of al-Bashir, stepped down on Friday, 12 April after less than twenty-four hours in charge of the country, declaring veteran soldier General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan his successor. Similarly, another close ally of al-Bashir and leader of the coup, head of Sudan’s intelligence service the National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS), Salih Ghosh resigned on Saturday, 13 April. Having orchestrated violent crackdowns on protestors since December, Ghosh was deeply unpopular with protestors despite his recent role in removing al-Bashir. In most military coups, the coup leaders declare themselves the new heads of government, usually after a brief power struggle between themselves. However, in Sudan we have seen former allies of the President first oust him, then — apparently voluntarily, although under large pressure from protestors — step down. It is unclear whether the resignations were driven by personal values, internal power politics, or fear of what angry protestors would do were they not placated. So far, no actor appears desperate to cling to power. While this is encouraging, protest movements should not drop their vigilance until their demands for democracy are enshrined in stable state institutions.

With a smaller public profile, little involvement in the Darfur genocide, and few direct links with al-Bashir, Sudan’s subsequently appointed leader al-Burhan was a less controversial figure than Ibn Auf; the military likely hoped his appointment would calm protestors’ demands for civilian governance, but the gambit did not worked and the sit-ins continued. A relatively unknown character, he had the support of the paramilitary RSF after fighting alongside them in Yemen against Houthi rebels, and it is likely that this support was a primary reason for his appointment over other candidates. Should the RSF yield significant influence over al-Burhan, many in Darfur will rightly become nervous, as the RSF is a direct descendant of the Janjaweed militias that committed the bulk of atrocities in 2003 and 2004.

Overall, following the coup, Sudan’s new leaders have attempted to placate protestors with resignations and promises of democracy after a two-year transition, rather than resorting to oppressive measures. While encouraging, there is a realistic possibility that military leaders are simply playing for time, waiting for international interest and attention to fade before reneging on promises of democracy and returning to violent oppression of protestors. The international community, particularly democratic nations and liberal bodies such as the United Nations (UN), must continue advocating for democratic reform. Coup leaders must be prevented from using this two-year transitional period as a chance to consolidate their personal power.

At Present, The Revolution Must Remain Televised

Protestors continue to sit-in at army headquarters in Khartoum demanding democratic civilian government. To get even this far since December, ordinary civilians, mobilised and organised by the Sudanese Professionals Association (SPA), have endured brutal oppressive measures from NISS forces and government-aligned militia groups. As discussed above, that oppression has largely been put on hold for now, although isolated incidents of protestors killed by stray bullets or attacked by NISS forces continue to be reported. It is highly unlikely that the protestors will end their calls for democracy until a civilian government has been formed; therefore, if Sudan’s new leader al-Burhan decides to hold onto power, he will need another way of dispersing these protestors. al-Burhan reportedly already enjoys the support of the RSF, Sudan’s largest paramilitary group, and he will likely have the loyalty of the military due to his rank of Lieutenant General and his reputation as a professional soldier. With the resignation of NISS head Ghosh, al-Burhan is now likely able to appoint a loyalist to lead the intelligence service. With all branches of Sudan’s security apparatus loyal to him, al-Burhan will easily be able to oppress and disperse the unarmed protestors should he so wish.

The most effective protection the protestors currently have from such oppression is the eyes of the world. With global media fixated on the developing situation, international bodies racing to help support a transition to democracy, and writers tripping over their editors to publish op-eds on each new event, the SPA-led protests have a rapt global audience. With the world watching, it is unlikely that al-Burhan will resort to oppressive measures for fear of international isolation, and even UN intervention as in Darfur. However, should news cycles move on, and international advocates for democracy be placated by vague promises of a transitional period, the protestors will lose their watchful shield. International actors must therefore not turn away from Sudan until a peaceful transition to democratic governance has been realised.

Protestors One, Dictators Nil; But It Is Only Half-Time

Overall, al-Bashir is gone for good, although he is unlikely to face justice for his oppressive policies in government and crimes against humanity in Darfur. The generals who replaced him have, so far, appeared to resist the temptations of seizing personal power and continuing al-Bashir’s brutal measures. The restraint, however, is likely due more to the intense pressure generated by the SPA-led protest movements that tirelessly continue to demand civilian governance. Should international attention waver or the protests falter, there is a realistic possibility this revolution will stumble in the second-half of this dramatic Sudanese tale, succumbing to yet another medalled dictator in uniform.

Stephen Jones is a Master’s student at Kings’ War Studies Department, following an MA in Psychology from the University of Edinburgh. His main research interests involve the psychological causes of inter-group conflict and violence, as well as the cognitive processes that allow disinformation campaigns and terror recruitment strategies to succeed. Before joining King’s, he worked for the UN in New York, observing the positive effects of diplomacy and international collaboration in conflicts large and small around the world.

What next for protest?

May 14, 2015 by Strife Staff

The ‘Fuck the Tories’ demonstration earlier this month was the embodiment of everything wrong with the way the Left use protest. Protest is a form of conflict; it is unique. Ideally a peaceful protest raises the issues at the heart of society between the people, the police, and those in power. Protest is not only a human right but a human responsibility. If you genuinely disagree with something in society it is your duty to make your voice heard. If you won’t, who will? It does not matter what the issue is. If you feel aggrieved, make your voice heard.

I speak as a member of the Left, and while there is no shortage of those on the Left who are vocal, the problem is the dearth of rational, constructive thinking. There is a culture among ‘radical’ demonstrators to view anyone interested in placing a limit of action or directing it in a different way as a ‘scab’ or a ‘splitter’. If you don’t agree with everything they say, you are their enemy. And, well, then you may as well be a Tory.

A shambolic demonstration

The demonstration on the 9^th was an entirely confused event. The sudden, flash demo organised days before was, while well attended, a shambles. No constructive message, no unity of method or tactics and no positive media representation. These three problems are entirely connected. A failure to properly appreciate what was wanted meant that there was no real understanding of how to behave to bring about the desired ends.

The political aim for most, I genuinely believe, was to raise the many issues with First Past the Post and our democratic system. This, as far as I am concerned, should have been the real focus of our protest that day. While I, like everyone else, am hugely angry with and afraid of the Conservatives’ policy plans, that day was not the time to have that as our primary message.

The Conservatives got into power with 37% of the vote and with badly constructed constituencies. This, coupled with the factionalism of left-wing parties, is the primary reason why the Conservatives were able to grow their majority in Parliament. Therefore, the problems with First Past the Post should have been the main message we carried; our banners, our chants and our interviews with media should have put this across.Instead we had Class War and other radical groups calling for the ‘devastation’ of the wealthy; others called for the Conservatives to get out of government; some even brought the issue of climate change with them.

All of these are, to varying degrees, entirely legitimate concerns, but, on a pragmatic and sensible level, it is hugely difficult to give each of these a hearing in the media. No one is going to read an article that details all of the various issues raised at a protest. Instead the headlines are caught by graffiti, violence and disorder. These acts, usually committed by the minority of those on the ‘radical’ end of the Left, are hugely divisive.

Peaceful direct action

Peaceful direct action is a fantastic way of achieving change, history has proven that. The 1960s sit-ins are a prime example of this. There is a subtle difference between the sit-ins by African-Americans in the 1960s and the cone-throwing, smoke-bombing behaviour of our radical wing.

The sit-ins broke a law that was the direct subject of the protest. Racist laws prevented certain sections of society from going in certain places. Breaking these laws not only highlighted them to the media, but they also set a precedent for change. The demonstration against the Tories on the 9^th, however, saw direct, violent action that was entirely directed at the wrong targets. The graffiti of ‘Fuck Tory Scum’ on the Women of World War Two memorial is a prime example of this. Looking at the graffiti, one might think that the protester was attacking the women of World War Two for being Tories!

Similarly, attacking police officers (who are also going to suffer at the hands of the Conservatives) for simply doing their jobs is not in any way legitimate in the light of our aims. The aim – for sake of argument, to challenge First Past the Post – is only subverted and trivialised by chants of ‘Fuck the Police’. Protests against the police, such as those seen after the shooting of Mark Duggan, are a different matter.

The fact that these acts are entirely divergent from our aims are not only divisive within the movement, but they allow the media and our political opponents to paint us with the same brush: we’re rioters, anarchists, and thugs. At least that is what the media will tell you. This should not be shrugged off, as some of those on the Left do.

Political change requires support from those outside of one’s immediate circle and the narrative in the media does not help us. To illustrate the point, Class War, a political party calling anyone in government a ‘wanker’, received 526 votes in 2015, a figure so negligible that it represented 0% of the vote nationwide. This is down 0.3% from 2010. The growth in violent direct action from these groups has clearly been ineffective.

How to create change?

This brings us to the issue of how best to create change. If we want to change the voting system, how is throwing a cone at a police officer’s head going to help? Unless by the butterfly effect it creates a change of unforeseeable events leading to Utopia, I fail to see it. The police may be the immediate physical barrier between demonstrators and those democratically elected to be in power (and so they should be) but that does not make them part of the problem. Moreover, the violence, as far as I saw, was instigated by a small Black Bloc outside Downing Street as they tried to breach the outer fence. As a result of this, the police used snatch tactics to arrest the perpetrators. Since then, the actions of the police have been labelled ‘disgusting’ and ‘sinister’. Yet, surely, a crime is a crime. Just because you do it in a political context does not mean you can behave with impunity.

I, and I hope I am not alone, do not want to see David Cameron dragged out of Downing Street by a group of protesters dressed head-to-toe in black. I want to see him and his party fall into irrelevance in the face of their failed, damaging policies, triggering the rise of a true, united and reinvigorated left wing in Britain.

How do we do this? We demonstrate effectively in the streets. We build a unified narrative across all elements of our end of the spectrum. We decide which party is best to represent us. We vote as a bloc, and if they fail to deliver, we refuse to vote for them again. The instance of the Liberal Democrats is the perfect illustration. The wave of protest against them has, I am sure, driven our message of discontent home. Our withdrawal of votes from them has seen them lose 49 seats and led to the resignation of the man who perjured himself to us. Try convincing me there is no point in voting now.

Before all this, we must push for true electoral reform. The results of 2015’s elections have shown that this system prevents certain parties, regardless of their level of popular support, from properly creating change. The Green Party, for instance, remained at one seat. They had 1,157,613 votes. This is more than the SNP and how many seats did they get? More than fifty times more. Our voting system handicaps parties that cannot stand in as many constituencies as others. Similarly, the U.K. Independence Party (UKIP), are not a group that I am sad to see remain largely irrelevant in Parliament. However, if people voted for them, they deserve a proportional voice. To argue otherwise is to suggest that people should not have a say in politics and, if you think that, I have nothing to say to you.

Protests often devolve into a mass of people completely lacking in a sophisticated political narrative. The movement soon becomes the democracy of the loudest voice; the individual with the megaphone dictates the message, the direction of the march. The most dramatic action decides the public perception of the event. The interplay between our political aims and our strategy must be properly understood by everyone. The political aim dictates the strategy.

If you disagree with Rupert Murdoch’s press ownership, how best to change it? Campaign for a boycott of his papers, start petitions, lobby Parliament, protest outside his headquarters (as some from Occupy did) and establish an effective counter-narrative. If one disagrees with First Past the Post, how best to create change? Lobby Parliament and protest peacefully. If you want a revolution, perhaps violent action is the only way – I’ve never heard of a revolution where not one drop of blood was spilt – but I think you’d be in the great minority if you were to call for a British version of 1789.

With regard to what we should do over the next five years, we must protest even more, but these protests must be in the image constructed above. They must have a clear political message with a strategy and set of tactics that work alongside it. Our protests must grab sympathetic media coverage: defacing war memorials or attacking police officers does not help that. We must campaign for changes to First Past the Post alongside campaigning for our chosen party(s) on the streets. We must work in our communities to fight the effects of Conservative policy, organise our communities to support each other and raise awareness of the true effects of Tory policy. They will quote economic figures; we will show the human side. We must make sure it is seen and countered.

Finally, above all, we must vote. Telling someone not to vote is hugely damaging to our democracy and, therefore, our cause. Not only does it reduce our political weight and capacity to create change, but it allows those in power to identify their support and focus all of their policies on them. There is no party of non-voters. No party of spoilt ballots. Get out and campaign, get out and vote.

Due to personal circumstances, the author of this article wishes to remain anonymous.

Democracy on the brink: turmoil in Taiwan

May 19, 2014 by Strife Staff

By Carla Hung:

POST Taiwan Article - Carla Hung 2nd edit - sm. — Protesters occupying parliament (photo by J. Michael Cole)

An unprecedented protest, now dubbed the ‘Sunflower Student Movement’ or ‘Occupy Taiwan Legislature’, broke out in Taiwan on March 18, followed by a violent suppression in the midnight hours of March 23, during which the riot police forcibly evicted the protesting students who had broken in and stayed around the Executive Yuan (Cabinet), the highest administrative body of the Republic of China. The brutal assault by the riot police targeting unarmed citizens shocked Taiwanese society, which has long enjoyed peace and prosperity, exposing the internal division and deepening conflict within the island against a controversial trade agreement with China.

Waking up to the Crisis

The crisis was initiated by the improper review of the Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement Framework Agreement (ECFA) signed in June, 2010. Angered by the unilateral move of the Ma Ying-jeou administration and his party regarding negotiations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC), tens of thousands of students in the capital carried out 23 days of sit-in protests and occupied the Legislative Yuan (Parliament), in which the March 23 clash erupted. The conflict and criticism heightened when the president and premier failed to respond to the appeals of the demonstrators, spurring more than 500,000 people to take to the streets on March 30. The Movement not only shook up the political structure, but also brought about more civil unrest that followed.

Selling Taiwan or helping Taiwan?

The Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement (CSSTA) itself may appear to be legitimate given the increasing business interaction between Taiwan and Mainland China, but the underlying political ambition is worrying. Conflicts and crises between the Republic of China (ROC) and PRC have existed for more than six decades. As a political entity claimed by China to be an indispensable part of its territory, Taiwan has an ambiguous status in the international community. When Ma took office in 2009, Taipei’s tense relations with Beijing largely relaxed with his declaration of a ‘diplomatic truce’ and ‘no unification, no independence and no use of force’.[1] In other words, his policies focus on maintaining peaceful cross-strait relations on the basis of the 1992 Consensus: ‘one China, respective interpretations’.[2] As a result of the friendly and cooperative political relations, peoples on both sides now have even closer exchange in business, education, culture and various areas. However, there is always a concern among people in Taiwan about the opening of the market to the Chinese Mainland, and more deeply, a fear of losing freedom, democracy and sovereignty when they become too dependent on their strong neighbour.

Trust crisis facing the pro-China ruling party

The Sunflower Student Movement has opened Pandora’s box. Citizen journalism thrives and grassroots media outlets stand up against biased media conglomerates that ‘have substantial business relations with China or seek to develop them’[3]. These citizen journalists take an active role in informing the public of the pressing issues juggled by the government and in helping shape public opinion to urge the government to listen to the voice of the people. As a result, frequent protests erupt regarding issues such as the trade agreements, construction of nuclear power plants, labour rights, social injustice and environmental protection, all demonstrating the increasing awareness among the general public and their dwindling trust in political leaders.

Nevertheless, under such tremendous social and political pressure, when the Sunflower Student Movement was drawing to an end, the leader of the ruling party, Ma Ying-jeou, who is also the President of the Republic of China (Taiwan), made a remark during a CSIS video conference on April 9 that his administration ‘do not exclude political topics if the people of Taiwan support it.[4]’ This statement directly contradicted the appeal of the protesters who demanded a slowdown in the negotiations with Beijing. It also demonstrated the intention of Ma to defend his power and stance by taking a stronger position in cross-strait relations, sending a clear message to Beijing that the situation is still in his control and he is willing to take cross-strait cooperation to the next level.[5] Being well-known for his pro-China policies, the two-term president, whose approval rating has hit a historic low of 9.2%, continues to turn a blind eye to people’s demands [6]. Since he will not be able to run for a third term and it is likely that the opposition party, Democratic Progressive Party, will win the 2016 election, Ma is seeking a closer relationship and an eventual peace agreement with the Chinese administration before his term ends.

The recent turmoil certainly gives the PRC leadership a new perspective and pushes them to rethink their strategy towards Taiwan. The Sunflower Student Movement marked the rise of a more independence-inclined third power, the citizens and the younger generation who have been enraged by the obstinate, autocratic KMT and the incompetent, marginalised DPP. With growing support for independence and resentment towards the KMT as well as China, it will be more difficult and complicated than ever for the PRC to dissolve Taiwan’s independence threat through political influence, business means and media manipulation.

Conclusion

Being de facto independent, Taiwan has always been a beacon of freedom and democracy for many in the Chinese mainland, including those in Hong Kong, Tibet and regions of ethnic minorities. The Sunflower Student Movement is yet another great example. This is also a significant reason why Communist China has to contain pro-independence force in Taiwan, especially when there are more and more riots happening within the mainland. However, in a world where almost every nation finds it difficult, if not impossible, to ignore a powerful China and its influence, it is ever more challenging for Taiwan to strike a balance between political and economic goals as it struggles to safeguard its sovereignty. Faced with a seemingly friendly business partner who can take over Taiwan at any moment, the next step of the Taiwanese people will be crucial to the existence of the Republic of China and the political map of the People’s Republic of China.

___________________

Carla Hung holds an MA in International Relations from the Department of War Studies, King’s College London and is currently a translator and interpreter in Taiwan.

NOTES

[1] ‘President Ma’s Inaugural Address’, http://english.president.gov.tw/Default.aspx?tabid=491&itemid=16304&rmid=2355&word1=President+Ma%27s+Inaugural+Address, 20 May 2008.
[2] ‘President Ma meets delegation from US Center for Strategic and International Studies’, http://www.mac.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=97299&ctNode=5909&mp=3, 24 August 2011.
[3] ‘Blanking Out’, https://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/03/31/taiwan_media_mainland_influence, 31 March 2014.
[4] ‘President Ma’s Remarks at the Videoconference with the Center for Strategic and International Studies’, http://www.mofa.gov.tw/EnOfficial/ArticleDetail/DetailDefault/80d8d4f6-5e63-405d-83f6-d8093dde8e48?arfid=7b3b4d7a-8ee7-43a9-97f8-7f3d313ad781&opno=84ba3639-be42-4966-b873-78a267de8cf1, 9 April 2014.
[5] ‘A political war will decide Taiwan’s future’, http://www.thinkingtaiwan.com/articles/view/2030, 8 May 2014.
[6] ‘Ma’s approval rating is only 9.2%’, http://www.taiwannews.com.tw/etn/news_content.php?id=2301606, 15 September 2013.

Unrest in Turkey: from ‘3 or 5 trees’ to ‘democracy’

June 5, 2013 by Strife Staff

By Gonenc Uysal

Recently, the Municipal Government of Istanbul decided to rebuild the Taksim Military Barracks (Topcu Kislasi) in Taksim as either a shopping mall or a hotel. This project involves building over much of Gezi Parki, in Taksim. However, Mayor of Istanbul Topbas and AKP (Justice and Development Party) officials including PM Erdogan denied any damage to trees, stating they would ‘dislocate and plant’ trees elsewhere. Protesters including young people, civil rights activists and environmentalists started to flock to the park after the beginning of demolition and construction on 29th May. When asked about the protest, Mayor Topbas declared PM Erdogan would make the final decision, but the latter refused to review the project.

This is not the first time this year that Taksim square has been at the centre of protests. On 1st May 2013 workers’ unions were denied the right to march into the square -arguing that potholes prevented a safe demonstration. Taksim holds vast symbolic importance in Turkey’s recent Republican history. On that occasion, police reacted with heavy-handed crowd control methods including gas rounds and water cannon, resulting in several wounded.

The present protests have seen unprecedented and disproportionate use of force by police –including burning down tents of civilian protesters, tear gas bombs, and water cannon. Undeterred and rallied through social media such as Twitter the number of protesters swelled to tens of thousands turning up on Saturday 31 May. Protests quickly spread to other big cities including Ankara, Izmir, Eskisehir, Adana, Antalya, Trabzon, Gaziantep and Balikesir, Hatay and Tunceli. Simultaneous protests were also organised in cities abroad such as London, Brussels, Berlin, Amsterdam, the USA such as New York, Chicago.

This protest, unlike many in Turkey’s politically fractious past, includes protesters from different sectors of society. There are elderly and young, men and women, secular and veiled, Turkish, Kurdish, or other ethnic, Muslim, non-Muslim, Sunnis, Alevis, leftists, rightists, Revolutionary Muslims, anarchists, Turkish and Kurdish nationalists, environmentalists, conservatives, non-party partisans, LBGT rights activists. Some, who would not descend to what are becoming street battles with 7ft high barricades of cobble stones, make noise with cooking pots in their balconies. Additionally, on Monday the KESK union federation (with 240,000 members) has begun a two-day strike in support of the protests, accusing the government of ‘state terror’, as has the Istanbul branch of EGITIM-SEN. The level of individuality, and claims of citizen’s rights in these protests is highlighted by criticism of the main opposition parties, CHP (Republican People’s Party) and MHP (Nationalist Movement Party) for their inability and unwillingness to provide a concerted opposition or take action in parliament. On the other side of the spectrum, protesters have been unable to appeal to wider working class concerns, which makes participation of working groups unlikely, unless the growing protest movement is able to speak to dire economic, social and political concerns of workers.

Although demands and concerns are far from coordinated and comprehensively supported, a brief summary of the main ones seems necessary. For further reference, see at the end of the article for a list of sources and websites to follow the demands and developments.

-the reversal of plans for Gezi Park;

-the reversal of the decision to demolish the historic Emek Sinemasi (cinema) in Istiklal, Beyoglu, and Ataturk Kultur Merkezi (Ataturk Cultural Centre) in Taksim, Beyoglu.

-revision of the Constitution by the AKP government –the AKP government launched an amendment to change the first three articles of the constitution (which define the fundamental principles of the Republic), and to introduce a presidential system;

-opposition to the government’s Syrian policy, which they contend is bringing instability to the South of the country -with instances such as Reyhanli;

-reversal of policies restricting alcohol consumption

-concern about state control of the media

-widespread arrest, imprisonment and trial of opposition military leaders, journalists and intellectuals, activists since 2007 –symbolised by detention in Silivri prison.

-concern about rapid privatisation programmes and the role of private firm in rural areas

-accusations of corruption at executive government and judicial level;

-recent changes in the education system promoted without consultation and despite educators’ concerns;

-concerns about mistreatment of minority entities like Kurds, Alevis and others (see for instance the Uludere incident). The naming of the proposed third bridge over the Bosphorus as ‘Yavuz Sultan Selim’ –Selim the First (responsible for a massacre of Alevi in the 16th century) has become a symbol of this issue

-concerns about domestic and public, physical and verbal violence against women and LBGT

-call for PM Erdogan to resign

-wider environmental concerns

Evidently, it is no longer the issue of the park that is drawing such disparate groups together; the protests have now escalated with a rising number of diverse and, so far, uncoordinated demands. The park, however, is still the only issue that commands broad consensus, with requests to cancel the demolition of the park and the construction of the Ottoman-style barracks, accountability over recent police excesses in Istanbul and the right to protest. As of the time of writing protests continue, with hundreds camping out in city centres. Disproportionate use of force police has continued, with one casualty confirmed as of Tuesday afternoon.

PM Erdogan has notoriously criticised Syrian President Assad for his use of force against opponents and ignoring democratic demands. On the other hand, Turkish protesters are not spoken of in the same light, instead being labelled by government sources and the PM as ‘marginal’, ‘plunderers’, ‘drunks’ and agents of the Republican Party out to destabilise the country. Furthermore, he highlights that his leadership is supported by the 50% of the country that voted for him in the last election. On 3rd June Erdogan left for a scheduled visit to Morocco and today 4th, the Deputy Prime Minister Arinc has declared that the original protests against the redevelopment of the park were ‘just and legitimate’ and offered talks with the protesters on the subject of the park. He offered a very qualified apology to protesters victims of police excesses adding ‘I do not think we need to apologise to those who create destruction of public property in the streets and who try to prevent the freedom of the people in the streets.’

Another major issue has been the role of the mainstream national and independent media including NTV and even CNNTurk (the Turkish franchisee of CNN) have not been covering the protests except for the reverberations events have had on stock market valuations. This silence, notoriously including cooking shows and documentaries about penguins being aired during the protests, has revealed the extent to which the government is able to control major state and independent media outlets, provoking protests against the media. Smaller outlets such as Halk TV, Ulusal Kanal and T24 have been reporting on the protests, as well as foreign media including the BBC, CNN, Reuters, Al Jazeera, AP, AFP and others.

Considering the partial abstention of mainstream media from the events, not unlike events in North Africa and the Middle East in the last two years, observers following events are left with snippets of information from social media and online depositories of photographs and video. The evidence so far points to widespread abuse by police forces including thousands of arbitrary arrests, beatings of protesters, excessive use of tear and other crowd dispersing gas agents, and serious injuries caused by the widespread use of rubber bullets, water cannon.

Amnesty in Turkey have published a report (3rd June) detailing round numbers for injured protestors on the basis of hospital data. In Istanbul, at least 1500 people received treatment during demonstrations. In Ankara, at least 424 people received treatment in hospitals; in Izmir, 420 people received treatment in last two days. Amnesty in Turkey calls for an immediate end to abusive use of force against demonstrators. It states that the use of tear gas and water cannons is not acceptable during peaceful demonstrations. It also calls for authorities to launch impartial and independent investigations into the policing of demonstrators. It also indicated that lessons should be for the future policing of demonstrations.

This is the biggest public protest since Cumhuriyet Mitingleri (Republic Protests) in 2007 against the candidacy of politicians from Milli Gorus –a predecessor of AKP. During these protests, many marched to ‘protect Republican values’ especially secularism. Although today’s protests include all Republicans, it goes beyond to include above-mentioned various groups.

It would not be accurate to describe these protests as a ‘Turkish Spring’. For a start, Turkey is already a democracy. On the contrary, I read the protests as a claiming its right to practice democracy beyond the ballot box and in protest form. A variety of dissatisfaction with the AKP government is certainly the key to these protests, and it is clear that the PM is unwilling to address or be seen to address this dissatisfactions, as many have read his persistence in continuing his scheduled trip to Morocco and the much-belated offer by Deputy PM Arinc to have a dialogue about the park.

Finally, I wish to highlight a crucial point that I feel is at the core of the non-park aspects of the protests: democracy is a right and principle that extends beyond the ballot box and includes freedom of expression and protest as well as demanding accountability from government. Peaceful protests, freedom of speech and government accountability are constitutional principles in Turkey; these protesters are actualising their claim to these rights.

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