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Strife Series on Counter-Terrorism in Modern Warfare (Part I) – The Importance of Labels: A Social Psychology Approach to Counterterrorism Policies

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by Lucía Ruiz Vila

Fighters of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) during their retreat from Turkey into Northern Iraq (Image credit: Firat News Agency/AP)

 

Terrorism is constituted through discourse. Understanding that process of construction can provide important insights for policy and practice. This piece will first address how a group’s identity determines the way in which the narrative on terrorism is constructed and how that identity impacts the possible policies in response. The second part is a case study of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê, PKK), in which two actors, in this case: Turkey and the EU, both label this group as ‘terrorist’ but differ in their counterterrorism policies towards it. This divergence is to do with their respective construction and understanding of terrorism, which are radically opposed. Ultimately, this group identity can be considered as the premise for constructing terrorism through language. By analysing the process behind labelling a group as terrorists, the type of counterterrorism policies available to each actor can be better understood.

Social Psychology, Discourse, and Terrorism  

This essay will particularly explore how social behaviour is determined by discourse. Social psychology is concerned with how individual behaviour is affected by social behaviour. Within the field, social psychologists link language with terrorism by arguing that the latter is a ‘naming-making practice,’ which implies that instead of focusing on the terrorists’ motivations, they look at people’s perceptions of those. Therefore, terrorism is a ‘socially constructed’ term, as what the terrorists think of themselves becomes less relevant than what ‘we make of the terrorists.’

It is important to remark that not everyone has equal power to construct this discourse. Bathia refers to the ‘politics of naming’ to explain how influential actors are the ones who impose their perception of reality on others. This imposition on the way in which we refer to reality will develop into the construction of ‘common knowledge,’ that is shared understandings of the reality which ultimately fence in the possibilities for policymakers to step out of that narrative.

Group Identity  

Discourse on terrorism is constituted by referencing, developing, or reassuring the identity of the group that is affected by terrorism. This essay suggests three guiding questions that reveal how this process is made:

  • Who is the ‘Other’?
  • Can we engage in a conversation with the Other’s claims?
  • Does an attack by the ‘Other’ threaten our identity?

Answering the first question allows an understanding of how a group builds its own identity by attributing undesirable characteristics to the opposite ‘Other.’ In the case of a terrorist attack against a specific group, their identity might be reinforced through negation, arguing that no one from the in-group could engage in such violent action. This notion of members of the inner group denying the possibility of ever being like the ‘Other’ resonates with Foucault’s explanation of group belonging and language. The French philosopher argued that groups distance themselves from others who they deem inferior by labelling them as ‘mad.’ Once this perception is built, and sanity is on the side of the group, the use of language will reinforce that perception.

If the ‘Other’ has been constructed as immoral, it is harder for individuals to engage with them in a conversation to try to understand their reasons, as they fear falling into a trap of ‘humanising‘ what is by nature ‘evil.’ In this case, this is even more difficult if the reasons behind a terrorist attack are blurred by media and politicians. For instance, in the United States after 11 September 2001, media and politicians referred to terrorism by reinforcing its irrationality and extremism, which portrayed them as an illogical actor with whom there could be no dialogue. If there is a sense of fear among the population, the practice of othering will become more acute, and the conditions for belonging to the in-group will be more restrained. This is how, to answer the third question, a group will determine if the terrorist attack impacts the core of their identity. This was also the case with the previous example of the post-9/11 USA, as American media spread a sense of fear through a victimising discourse accusing “the other” of threatening their values as a nation.

Limitations on Policies 

The limits on the possible policies in reaction to terrorism will mainly answer two questions:

  • Is this threat inevitably recurring? Or is it an extraordinary event?
  • Are we willing to do whatever it takes to respond to the threat?

If by answering the first question, the group identifies the threat as extraordinary, this will give rise to the ‘politics of exception’ which will allow for the government to have unchecked power in order to answer to the terrorist threat. Media can add to this narrative by fuelling a sense of urgency and fear that encourages governments to take measures that may be considered non-democratic to tackle the issue. Another reason why constructing the nature of the threat is important is because it will determine which departments of government will respond. For instance, because the US portrayed al-Qaeda as a military target, its response inevitably involved the Army and the Department of State; if it had been constructed as a criminal act, it would have been confronted by the police.

Furthermore, this differentiation will determine what type of limitations, if any, that group will set for its policies on terrorism. If the threat is seen as extraordinary, there will be a risk of forsaking civil liberties in exchange for the state to guarantee security. This state of exceptionality can also lead to an erosion of public morality, which will make terrorists seem undeserving of human rights. Nevertheless, perceiving the treat as exceptional does not mean that the group will be willing to set no restrictions on their possible policies in response. This was the case of Spain who decided not to extradite to the US an al-Qaeda cell found after 9/11, as they feared that the terrorists would be sentenced to the death penalty, which under the EU legislation would have been illegal.

Adaptability is also a very important part of the policy limitations on terrorism, as what is framed as extraordinary in a first instance, might become normalised over time. This was the case when the UK labelled migration as a security issue. This label became part of its counterterrorism narrative after 9/11. At present, the government understands migration as a matter of security because it may give rise to social tensions, but not because it is related to terrorism. This shift of perception promoted new democratic channels to tackle the issue instead of justifying political decisions on an overly extended threat or state of exceptionally. In conclusion, by understanding how group identity impacts the construction of terrorism through discourse, important insight can be gained on the types and limitations of counterterrorism policies available to different actors.

Case Study: The Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) as a terrorist group

The case of the PKK in Turkey is a prime example that shows how terrorism is constructed through language and discourse. It demonstrates how two actors, Turkey and the EU, who labelled the PKK as a terrorist group have radically opposed policies, due to their in-group identity, and how they construct the nature of the terrorist group. The Kurds have historically been suppressed by the Turkish state, unable to exercise their right to autonomous government or cultural expression of any kind. In the 1970s, the PKK was founded to defend the Kurds within Turkey, and in 1984 they began engaging in violent action against the government to reclaim their rights as an ethnic group.

The Turkish authorities referred to those Turks who were part of the PKK as ‘children’ who needed to come to their senses and leave their terrorist lifestyle behind. Öcalan, the leader of the PKK, was often referred to by the media as a ‘baby-killer’ whose followers were ‘uncivilized.’ The Turkish government for many years tried to capture the Kurdish leader, who thanks to the Greek authorities’ support, managed to escape Turkey. It was finally in 1999 when the Turkish state captured him. Offended by Greece’s attitude towards Öcalan, the Turkish president demanded that the EU added Greece to the list of countries that supported terrorism.

Leaving aside already existing tensions between Turkey and Greece, the reason why the latter was not seen as being complicit in terrorism was that the West did not perceive the PKK as a terrorist organization per se. At that time, Western media referred to the PKK as an ‘outlawed group’, a ‘rebel group’, or one conducting ‘guerrilla war’. Even the EU itself referred to the Kurds’ cause as a minority struggle and questioned the terrorist narrative around them. Unconcerned about Western opinion, the Turkish judiciary sentenced Öcalan to the death penalty, which caused demonstrations throughout Europe in support of the Kurdish cause. The European Union was clear in its response: if Turkey were to execute Öcalan, the country will never be considered to join the European Union.

Conclusion

Building on the case study, there are two clear processes of othering. On the one hand, the Turkish state identifies the Other as the Kurds, who are subsequently labelled as terrorists. According to Turkish anti-terror legislation, terrorism is an act that threatens the territorial unity of the state, and even non-violent propaganda against said unity is considered terrorism. As it has been mentioned, the Kurds were referred to as infantile and uncivilised, which made them an illogical actor with whom there could be no dialogue, and which ultimately threatened Turkish identity.

On the other hand, at the time Öcalan was captured, the EU did not have a terrorist list until after the 9/11 attacks and did not consider the PKK as terrorists. The decision not to give the terrorist label to the PKK was very significant for the EU’s identity, as they chose to ‘other’ the Turkish government instead of the Kurds. Turkey had long been a point of debate in determining the limits of Europe as a political unit, as the EU characterised itself as a ‘rational’ actor unlike those beyond its borders, as Isin argues. Ultimately, it was the death sentence of Öcalan which set the limits of Europe’s identity.

Interestingly, in 2002, there was a turning point for the PKK terrorist debate. Turkey overturned Öcalan’s death penalty sentence and changed it to life imprisonment, while the EU added the PKK to its terrorism list. The EU’s decision was highly controversial since the PKK had not engaged in violent action since 1999 and also because the procedure for adding the PKK to the list had not been transparent. It was later condemned by the European Court of First Instance. To this day, Turkey is unlikely to join the European Union, and the PKK remains in the EU list of terrorist organisations.

Although both the EU and Turkey now recognise the PKK as the Other and labels them as terrorists, their approaches to the issue and their policies vary. The EU is concerned with preventing terrorism in the first place, which makes them interested in learning about the root causes of terrorism. Following this rationale, they invited in February of 2020 representatives of the PKK to join a European Parliament Session. Yet, because for Turkey there is no possible dialogue with terrorism, Turkish media was outraged by the meeting.

Lucía Ruiz Vila graduated with honours in International Relations from the University of Deusto in Spain and afterwards studied a year abroad in the University of Richmond in the United States. Following this, Lucía completed a MA in Conflict, Security and Development at King’s College London where she researched transitional justice, counterinsurgency campaigns, DDR and SSR, peacekeeping missions, and women’s role in security. You can connect with her via LinkedIn. 

Many Problems with Neighbours: The Ankara Attack and the Fragility of the Erdoğan Era

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By: Jackson Webster

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On October 10th 2015, two suicide bombings shook Ankara, the Turkish capital, killing almost 100 Turks and wounding hundreds more. As if the death toll was not tragic enough, the victims of the explosions were peace demonstrators. The march in Ankara last Saturday was protesting the current government’s refusal to accept the offer of a three-week ceasefire by the Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê (Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or PKK), proposed by the Kurdish leadership in light of the impending snap elections scheduled to be held on the 1st of November. The snap elections were announced by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in August after his Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party or AKP)—which saw its majority become a plurality in last June’s general elections— failed to form a coalition with opposition parties. Since the bombing, the Erdoğan government has imposed a “media blackout”, denying the Turkish press the ability to investigate the bombing further. Ignoring this government directive, the Turkish paper Cumhuriyet (Republic) has since published claims that the perpetrators crossed into Turkey from Syria at the border town of Kilis, just north of the Syrian city of Aleppo, which is currently embroiled in a bloody three-way struggle between rebel militias, government forces, and ISIS. To add to the controversy, as of October 17th, Cumhuriyet —a popular and frequently anti-government Turkish-language newspaper— published an article claiming to have found evidence that Turkish security services had been wire-tapping the suspected bombers, yet were surprisingly unable to stop the attack. The validity of these claims could not be confirmed by additional sources at the time of the article’s publication.

The first Cumhuriyet report neither supports nor attacks the unofficial government stance, articulated by Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu, which claims that the PKK and ISIS were “likely in cooperation” and were jointly responsible for the October 10th bombings. Despite the ludicrous nature of this accusation, one can see the reasoning for the government looking to curate this highly improbable narrative. Turkey is currently waging an air campaign against the PKK in Anatolia, the Kurdish Peshmerga in Syria and Iraq, and the Islamic State. Thus, it follows that the Erdoğan government would want to use the bombing to rally support behind further military action against both the PKK and ISIS.

The bombing in Ankara comes during a delicate period in Turkish politics, due to both the AKP’s uneasiness with its lost majority status and the extremely volatile nature of opposition groups, both inside and outside parliament. The most notable opposition parties, Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (Republican People’s Party or CHP) and Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (Nationalist Movement Party or MHP), were not able to reach an agreement with the AKP over the creation of a cabinet following the June general elections. This failure of government-formation was attributed by Foreign Policy’s John Hannah to the AKP, which allegedly was dogmatic and unwavering in negotiations with opposition parties to the point where the Nationalist Party leader Devlet Bahçeli refused to meet with Prime Minister Davutoğlu immediately following the bombings. In addition, the Halkların Demokratik Partisi (People’s Democratic Party or HDP) has accused the government of negligence, criticising the Turkish intelligence services for not being able to prevent the attack, with some members even going so far as to hint at intentional government ignorance of a terrorist attack which conveniently targeted activists protesting government policy.

What both the political antagonism and the bombings themselves articulate and exacerbate is the truly tenuous nature of Turkish security, the questionable state of its democracy, and the lack of logical continuity in recent foreign policy. The bombing itself calls into question whether the vast and expensive Turkish internal security apparatus is truly able to protect its citizenry and state. The Turkish people elected the AKP on promises of safety, yet the recent frequency of attacks within Turkey has shown how Ankara’s long and sometimes porous border with Syria presents serious security challenges. Additionally, the government’s media blackout following the bombing, going so far as to keep mourning family members away from the blast sight, is indicative of the state of the free press in Turkey today. Indeed, as the investigation continues, how the government will respond to further reports from Cumhuriyet and other papers that may be critical of its handling of the recent crisis will be an excellent indicator of how an AKP majority would conduct itself should the Turkish people choose Erdoğan’s party in the coming snap elections.

The ruling AKP’s failure to see the interconnectedness of the crises it has faced in its neighbourhood has lost touch with the sound policy which saved the Turkish nation-state from dissolution following the First World War, and future administrations in Ankara would do well to learn from the secular, populist, and calculated examples of their twentieth-century predecessors. Turkey’s foreign policy over the last decade —the brain-child of current Prime Minister and then-Foreign Minister Davutoğlu—has been coined “zero problems with neighbours”. The original idea of the policy was essentially to pursue close ties with all countries in Turkey’s region. This task has proved difficult considering that, since the policy’s inception, Syria has erupted into civil-war-turned-proxy-war, Iran and Saudi Arabia have grown more belligerent, Israeli-Turkish relations have suffered under a conservative government in Jerusalem, and Russia has annexed Ukrainian territory. Simultaneously forming energy ties with the Russian government against the will of a distinctly pro-European and anti-Russian population has cost the Erdoğan government support both domestically and in Brussels. The policy of non-intervention in the Peshmerga’s struggle for Kobanê and subsequent delays in allowing for coalition access to Turkish airfields soured NATO opinions towards Turkey, just as Ankara was filing an Article IV declaration (formal request for a meeting of the North Atlantic Council). NATO’s discontent with Turkish policy regarding Syria can arguably be seen in the withdrawal of Patriot missiles from Turkey first by Germany and the Netherlands, and last week by the United States. Though the  relevance to last week’s bombings in Ankara is debatable, Turkish policies of attempting to play too many sides in harshly divisive conflicts such as Syria and Ukraine could find Ankara frighteningly alone should violence between the government, PKK, and the potential spillover of the fight against IS and other groups in Syria escalate beyond the control of Turkish security forces.

Modern Turkey, a NATO member-state and traditionally stable regional power, currently faces existential threats to the state’s ability to govern both from within and without. The dire nature of these threats originates not from opposition groups, but from the ruling party figure head and strongman Erdoğan’s policy and rhetoric. Turkey’s advantageous geopolitical position as a bridge between the European and Muslim worlds has been squandered by a series of policy miscalculations. Equally, NATO members, preoccupied for most of 2014 by Russian actions in the Baltic and Ukraine, are beginning to direct their attention southward to Asia Minor and the Levant. Ankara’s geographical privilege has been wasted on a policy seeking to solidify support within its homogeneous core voter-base while forgetting that it presides over a multicultural, and multi-ethnic society. A heterogeneous population can add vibrancy to open democracies, but such diverse electorates are the bane of repressive states. Future Turkish governments, regardless of the party from which they originate, will have to face the above myriad of diverse threats. The security of the Turkish nation-state as we know it cannot be taken for granted in light of current instability. Ultimately, the Ankara bombing is one more variable to enter into the calculations of Turkish grand strategy, yet another sign of the instability both in and around Anatolia. Perhaps Turkey, much like the Ottoman Empire of old, cannot be ruled: it must be administered.

Update: Since the initial writing of this article, a Turkish court has lifted the “media blackout” on coverage of the attacks and investigations into those responsible, despite the ban being ignored by more critical newspapers like Cumhuriyet. Additionally, the first suspect has been named: Yunus Emre Alagöz, a young man from the southeast of Turkey who’s brother Şeyh carried out a similar suicide attack in Suruç this July. Both brothers had allegedly discussed sympathies with the Islamic State in Syria in online exchanges.

Jackson Webster, a Los Angeles native, is in the final year of an International Relations degree at the King’s College London Department of War Studies. He is the President of the KCL United Nations Association and is a content editor for Dialogue Magazine.