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Different colours, same hats? UN vs. non-UN peace operations

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The AU/UN Joint benchmarking team led by the Head of the African Union Peace Support Operations Division head Mr. Sivuyile Bam Bam, poses for a poto with senior AMISOM officers in Baidoa on April 18, 2015. AMISOM Photo / Abdikarim Mohamed

From the period of June 1948 to December 2000, non-United Nations (UN) actors implemented 53 peacekeeping operations, a figure identical to that of the number of operations deployed by the UN during the same period. Since the turn of the century, moreover, the number of peace operations deployed by regional organisations and coalitions of states has surpassed that of those initiated by the UN. This historic, and burgeoning, proliferation of non-UN peace operations has solicited an enduring and seemingly strategically important research agenda seeking to determine whether UN or regional peace operations are better-equipped to intervene in civil wars. This article contends that the prevailing conceptual dichotomy between UN and non-UN peace operations is in large part an illusory one. Through an analysis focussed primarily on regional/UN operations on the African continent, the article posits first that an increasing level of UN support for regional operations blurs distinct analytical lines between the two. Second, regional and UN peace operations often operate according to a de facto division of labour, meaning some comparative statements pit UN/regional operations against one another according to false standards. Third, the increasing regionalisation of UN peace operations renders the UN/non-UN dichotomy a weak one.

The UN/non-UN Playoff

While large-n quantitative studies charting the track record of UN vs. regional peace operations can identify valuable broad-scale patterns, these studies reap often inconsistent results. This is in part due to the fact that such investigations are ultimately contingent upon how authors define and code peacekeeping operational success, amongst other variables. For instance, one quantitative analysis argues that, controlling for ‘mission difficulty’, UN and non-UN operations have a similar ‘success’ rate, yet a similar study finds UN operations to be more successful than non-UN operations whilst controlling for the same variable. Furthermore, a 2020 study concluding that only UN operations curb violence against civilians committed by non-state actors is contrasted by recent research finding that non-UN peace operations limit rebel-caused violence.

Speculative theoretical stances attributing innate premiums to either regional or UN peace operations are similarly contradictory. Primordialist accounts recite the UN’s alleged intrinsic global moral authority over peacekeeping, premised upon its unique mandate for the maintenance of international peace and security, claims to the UN’s transcendent impartiality, and the belief that, ultimately, ‘peacekeeping is UN business’. In contrast, proponents of regional solutions to regional problems tout the inherent pre-eminence of non-UN intervention based on the idea that the people and governments of one region have a natural affinity with others in that region and an intrinsic distrust of external intervention. Ultimately, advantages in political will, legitimacy, and rationalist-material factors are ascribed equally to either regional actors or the UN, depending on who is doing the ascribing. One common theme throughout these conflicting inferences, however, is that they subscribe to a binary UN vs. non-UN taxonomy of peace operations. In practice, this taxonomy is much more convoluted.

Past the Regional/UN Dichotomy

Whilst the UN has sought its own resource-based support from some regional organisations – the European Union, for example – it provides an increasing degree of quasi-institutionalised support to regional peace operations on the African continent. For instance, the United Nations Support Office for the African Union Mission in Somalia (UNSOA) uses assessed contributions for peacekeeping to directly support a non-UN peace operation: the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). Mounting debates over the creation of a similar support office to finance the G5 Sahel Joint Force coalition using assessed peacekeeping contributions point to a more widespread, growing interconnection between UN and non-UN operations. Indeed, some forewarn of a new type of UN peace operation, led by the Department of Operational Support, as a result of this trend. Thus, while the case of the hybrid African Union (AU)-UN operation in Darfur epitomises explicit UN-regional organisation cooperation, relationships between the two operate on a much broader scale. Unprecedented support structures emerging from the UN dictate that more regional peacekeeping also effectively means more UN peacekeeping; the two are by no means divorced from one another.

Furthermore, there often exists to some extent a temporal division of labour between UN and regional peace operations. The AU, for example, has often demonstrated a clear preference to deploy interim operations that act deliberate precursors to UN intervention. AU operations in Mali (2013) and the Central African Republic (2014) were recast as UN missions within one year of their deployment, and the AU explicitly demanded the deployment of a UN follow-up mission to the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) within six months of AMISOM’s implementation in 2007. That this did not come to fruition does not alter the reality that the AU at least conceives of its peace operations as short-term measures. As such, assessing regional operations directly against UN operations fails to account for key differences in mandated objectives and the comparative advantages held by each in line with this temporal division of labour.

What is more, UN operations themselves have frequently emerged as a preferred form of regional peacekeeping, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa. In 2009, former UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon proclaimed that African troops in UN operations were ‘helping to find African solutions to African challenges’, appealing to the popular mantra coined to underscore the benefits of regional intervention. This sentiment echoes an enduring tendency for neighbouring states to supply the bulk of troops for UN peace operations. For instance, in August of 1999, Nigeria insisted upon a phased withdrawal of troops from the regional Economic Community of West African States’ (ECOWAS) peace operation in Sierra Leone, offering instead to subsume these troops into a new UN operation (UNAMSIL). The same regional troops were effectively rehatted under the auspices of the UN. In a similar vein, ECOWAS countries plus Chad provide nearly two thirds of the UN operation in Mali’s military personnel, reflecting a tendency for regional states to compose a large bulk of UN troops.

This regionalisation is also reflected in the data. Throughout the 2000s, sub-Saharan African contributions to UN peacekeeping increased significantly. Notably, though, the majority of this increase in contributions was disproportionately channelled towards UN operations within the continent; from 2001-2009, sub-Saharan Africa’s commitment remained relatively stable to an ever-increasing number of military personnel deployed outside the region, with the figure remaining between 680 and 1,120 troops. In contrast, sub-Saharan African contributions to UN peacekeeping within the African continent rose from 8,441 troops in 2001 to 20,677 in 2009, a 145% increase. As such, while sub-Saharan African participation in UN (global) peacekeeping ascended rapidly in the early 21st century, it in fact became more localised and regional.

Conclusion

While failing to acknowledge distinctions between UN and non-UN peace operations is clearly unproductive, increasingly blurred lines between the two divulge a fundamental tension inherent in the conceptual UN/regional peacekeeping binary. There is a spurious homogenisation inherent in arranging a vast and diverse scope of peace operations into a taxonomy of UN vs. non-UN-sanctioned interventions, meaning ‘non-UN’ and, to a lesser extent, ‘UN’ as categories of peace operations require considerable further disaggregation in order to be able to draw meaningful comparisons. Paul Diehl’s 1993 observation that the success of regional peacekeeping is contingent upon many of the same factors as UN peacekeeping has withstood the test of time; regional peacekeeping is not the antithesis of UN peacekeeping and vice versa.

Strife Series on United Nations Peacekeeping, Part II – Security Challenges in UN Peacekeeping Operations: How Best to “Fight Back”?

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By Lenoy Barkai

A view of two of United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) Pakistani peacekeepers who arrived in Che, Ituri province, DRC, with reinforcements of troops and ammunition to secure the area following the recent brutal militia fighting and massacres of the local population. 30/Jan/2005. (Credit Image: UN Photo/Christophe Boulierac)

 

On 7 December 2018, fifteen Peacekeepers from the United Nations Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO) were killed when armed rebels attacked one of their forward operating bases in North Kivu.[1] The attack raised the estimated death toll of UN Peacekeepers killed in malicious attacks in 2017 to 53, with the vast majority of deaths emanating from the UN’s missions to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Somalia and Central African Republic.[2] In response to the escalating security situation, the UN’s Departments of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and Field Support (DFS) commissioned an independent study into the security protocols for UN Peacekeeping operations.[3] While the study’s key recommendations centred on enabling a more emphatic use of force amongst UN Peacekeeping personnel, the implications thereof are fraught with ethical landmines.

 

A worrying trend

Although a key tenant of UN Peacekeeping Missions is the “non-use of force except in self-defence and defence of the mandate,”[4] certain missions operating in more hostile regions, such as MONUSCO in the DRC, have received the extended mandate of using “all necessary means”, which includes the use of force to fulfil their missions. Nevertheless, security continues to be one of the UN Peacekeeping Mission’s greatest challenges. Since its first mission in 1948, the UN has lost over 900 Peacekeepers due to malicious attacks.[5] While isolated conflicts in the past have marked temporary spikes in Peacekeeper fatalities, a worrying gradual uptick has emerged since 2007:[6]

The blue helmet no longer offers “natural protection”

The independent study into UN Peacekeeping security protocol was published in December 2017, and its authors found much room for improvement. Criticisms included: a proclivity for inaction in the face of bureaucracy and operational inertia, lack of training, poor understanding of the threat environment, resistance to culture-change and a lack of accountability. Perhaps the most stand-out criticism pertained to the outdated “mind-set” of UN Peacekeepers and their leaders. “Overall,” conclude the authors, “the United Nations and Troop- and Police-Contributing Countries need to adapt to a new reality: the blue helmet and the United Nations flag no longer offer ‘natural’ protection’”. Nowadays, UN Peacekeepers face security threats from groups and individuals who do not distinguish between soldiers, civilians and Peacekeepers in selecting their targets. In fact, the report suggests, the UN Peacekeeping Mission’s essential non-combative and ostensibly apolitical nature, makes it a more attractive target for indiscriminate militant groups.

 

Meeting force with force, and the ethical tug-of-war

The remedy to this, conclude the authors, is a drastic change in the mind-sets of UN Peacekeeping Mission personnel and leadership. This mind-set shift comprises a move away from the organisation’s current defensive and restrained posture. Rather, when faced with security threats, UN Peacekeepers should adopt an active willingness and readiness to use “overwhelming force” so as to bring an end the “impunity” of their attackers. Unless they do so, claim the authors, UN Peacekeepers will continue to be regarded as soft targets by terrorists, militias and other hostile groups. They therefore recommend that UN bases be demarcated by “clearly-defined security zones”, sending a strong message to local communities and other regional actors that there will be “zero tolerance” for security threats in these areas.

In identifying this security “failure” on the part of UN Peacekeeping Missions, the authors place the UN at the heart of the dilemma faced by governments the world over when it comes to asymmetric warfare. How does one deal with a threat actor whose “rules of engagement” directly challenge the norms of war that one takes to be the fundamental principles thereof? Ronald Kuerbitz[7] asserts that traditional warfare is determined by two such principles: “military necessity and humanitarianism.” While conventional war is subject to such “prescriptive norms,” terrorist groups and armed militia frequently shift this normative paradigm by attacking soft targets such as civilians and Peacekeepers. In this way, they are able to strategically relocate the “terms of war” into a normatively problematic arena for their opponents, be they states or multinational organisations such as the UN. This is particularly problematic for the members of Peacekeeping Missions, where the absence of war constitutes their very mandate.  In the tug-of-war for moral high-grounds, it is at the very point when the militant group is able to draw its adversary into committing acts on par with its own that it gains the upper hand in terms of delegitimising its opponent. By following the authors’ recommendations, UN Peacekeeping Missions risk falling into this very trap. While great care may be taken to ensure the use of force by Peacekeepers is situationally justified, the grey areas, and room for error, are likely to be significant. Before changing course in this way, the UN should consider the long-term implications for UN Peacekeeping legitimacy should a cultural mind-set shift take place which sees Peacekeepers become trigger-happy versus trigger-shy.

 

An intelligence-first approach

However, this is not to say that Peacekeepers should continue operating in high-risk environments under the status quo. Before resorting to “overwhelming force”, the security implications of improving the UN’s understanding and application of their threat environment should be fully explored. One of the primary criticisms of the report was that UN Peacekeeping Mission intelligence is “unable to provide timely information that could help prevent, avoid and respond to attack.” The authors describe UN Peacekeeping Mission intelligence as frequently “incomplete”, with knowledge gaps pertaining to the presence, intent, and capability of regional threat actors. Furthermore, where threat assessments do exist these are rarely translated into “operational/tactical activities”.

A thorough overhaul of extant intelligence gathering and risk analysis protocols, replaced with robust, ongoing reporting and intelligence briefings combining both Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) and Human Intelligence (HUMINT) sources, is likely to significantly improve both the safety of on-the-ground personnel and the ability for leadership to take swift, informed and considered action in the face of security threats. Such an approach has the added advantage of enabling Peacekeeping operations. While increasing the use of force risks alienating local communities and delegitimising the Peacekeeping mandate, an enhanced understanding of the threat environment can only work to improve and optimise the efficacy of Peacekeeping operations. With this in mind, the UN may be far better served by developing a robust, relevant and timely intelligence and risk analysis apparatus before encouraging their Peacekeepers to shoot-to-kill.

 

UN Peacekeeping: most fatal missions from malicious attacks[8]

 

Mission Name Region Total Fatalities by Malicious attack (as at Feb 2018) Date of Operation
ONUC, MONUC, MONUSCO (Democratic) Republic of Congo 203 1960 – 1964; 1999 – present
UNOSOM Somalia 114 1993-1995
MINUSMA Mali 99 2013 – present
UNIFIL Lebanon 93 1978 – present
UNPROFOR Croatia and in Bosnia and Herzegovina 74 1992-1995
UNAMID Darfur 73 2007 – present
UNEF Egypt/Gaza/Israel 35 1956 – 1967; 1973 – 1979
MINUSCA Central African Republic 28 2014 – present
UNTSO Middle East 26 1948 – present
UNTAC Cambodia 25 1992 – 1993
UNAMSIL Sierra Leone 17 1999 – 2006
MINUSTAH Haiti 15 2004 – 2017
UNFICYP Cyprus 15 1964 – present
UNAMIR Rwanda 14 1993 – 1996
UNMISS South Sudan 13 2011 – present
UNMIK Kosovo 12 1999 – present
UNOCI Côte d’Ivoire 11 2004 – 2017

 

 

Lenoy Barkai is an Associate at S-RM, a risk consulting firm specialising in the management of security, operational, regulatory and reputational risks. Prior to joining S-RM, Lenoy completed her MA in International Relations at the Department of War Studies at King’s College London, where her research focused on political violence, counterterrorism and human rights.

Notes

[1] ‘At least 15 U.N. peacekeepers killed in attack in Congo’, The Washington Post, 08 December 2017.

[2] Source: https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/principles-of-peacekeeping

[3] ‘New Improving Security Peacekeeping Project’, UN, 01 August 2017.

[4] ‘New Improving Security Peacekeeping Project’, UN, 01 August 2017.

[5] Source: https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/statsbyyearincidenttype_5_7.pdf

[6] Source: Improving Security of United Nations Peacekeepers: We need to change the way we are doing business’ UN Commissioned Independent Report, 19 December 2017.

[7] Kuerbitz, R. (1988) The bombing of Harrods: Norms against civilian targeting. In Reisman, W. M. & Willard, A. R. (eds.) International incidents: The law that counts in world politics. Princeton, Princeton University Press, pp. 238-262.

[8] Source: Peacekeeping.un.org/en/fatalities

 

Image Source: here

Strife Series on United Nations Peacekeeping: Peacekeeping has never been harder – Introduction

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By Felix Manig

The United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) peacekeepers on the field (Credit Image: UN News)

The year 2018 marks the 70th anniversary of United Nations Peacekeeping, one of the organisation’s primary tools for maintaining international peace and security. Over 110,000 peacekeepers currently serve in 15 missions around the world. Based on the three basic principles of consent, impartiality, and non-use of force except in self-defence and defence of the mandate, peacekeeping helps countries navigate the difficult path from conflict to peace.

Long gone are the Cold War days when peacekeepers were deployed to act as neutral observers of peace processes between warring state actors. Today, the Blue Helmets operate in more complex and high-risk environments than ever before, facing armed militant groups, terrorists, and organised criminal gangs. The contemporary multidimensional operations are tasked not only to keep the peace but also to protect civilians and human rights, to promote political dialogue, or to assist in the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of former combatants. Given the increasing risks linked to deployments, a December 2017 UN study commissioned by the Departments of Peacekeeping Operations and Field Support concluded with the sobering statement “The blue helmet and the United Nations flag no longer offer ‘natural‘ protection”.

Questions of effectiveness have always accompanied UN Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKOs), from successes like in 1992, when a UN-brokered settlement ended a decade-long civil war in El Salvador, to tragic failures such as in Rwanda, where the UN failed spectacularly to prevent the 1994 genocide. Today, as major conflict and humanitarian crises persist in Yemen and Syria, threats of funding cuts, and the deadlock affecting the UN Security Council over geopolitical interests, the UN peacekeeping architecture faces one of its most serious challenges to date.

Over the coming weeks, the five-part Strife Series on United Nations Peacekeeping will highlight the changing and increasingly asymmetric threat landscape peacekeepers find themselves in and what the future of UNPKOs may look like as hard power geopolitical competition appears to grip the UN General Assembly and Security Council. The upcoming articles by researchers from King’s College London, the United Nations University, as well as the private sector will offer a detailed analysis of both the efforts and missteps of the UN to maintain international peace and security in the twenty-first century.

First, Dr Samir Puri highlights how geopolitical competition and national interests play out in the UN Security Council and decide the fate of UNPKOs. The War Studies Department lecturer cautions that the UN must prepare itself for stronger geopolitical winds.

The second piece, written by Lenoy Barkai, addresses the security challenges facing UNPKOs in high-risk environments today. By examining some of the key criticisms of the December 2017 study, she explores how peacekeepers can maintain the moral high ground over their opponents but still fight back effectively.

Third, Ortrun Merkle and Diego Salama of the United Nations University take us on a thought experiment. With seven years into the Syrian civil war, the authors examine what a future peacekeeping mission in the war-torn country may look like and how it could be mandated.

In the fourth article, Caitlyn O’Flaherty evaluates the role of women in conflict prevention and mediation. Using UNMISS in South Sudan as a case study, Caitlyn highlights key challenges and opportunities when it comes to gender in UNPKOs.

In the final piece, Felix Manig looks at the future of UNPKOs. With a focus on strategic partnerships, emerging technologies, and increased participation of women in operations, Felix examines what the UN can and must do to effectively sustain peace in the twenty-first century.

Happy reading!

 

Felix Manig is a postgraduate in International Relations at King’s College London. He focuses on global governance, conflict resolution strategies, and cybersecurity. Outside of academia, he is Series Editor at Strife and writes for the Peacekeeping Project at the United Nations Association of Germany. You can follow him on Twitter @felix_manig

Image Source: https://news.un.org/en/story/2015/12/517102-south-sudan-critical-juncture-un-peacekeeping-chief-warns-calls-more-blue

Impact of New Technologies on United Nations Peacekeeping Operations

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By Felix Manig

The UAVs used by the UN are unarmed and used by the UN peacekeeping force MONUSCO in the Democratic Republic of Congo to track movements of hostile actors and bolster humanitarian responses. Image credit: Felix Manig, 2014, Goma, DRC

Rapid technological advancements are changing the nature of warfare and military operations, with serious implications for peace and security. At present, states are investing immense sums into the research and development of emerging technologies for their national security. This phenomenon is led by the U.S. government which approves nearly $3 billion annually for its defense research agency DARPA. As technology becomes ever more essential in an evolving and complex world, how can less affluent security projects like multilateral United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKOs) benefit from new technologies and integrate the positive effects into their mission? Introducing advanced technology into peacekeeping missions yields significant opportunities but must go hand in hand with strengthening the existing capabilities of UN diplomats and agencies that address the socio-economic, development and political issues related to the conflict.

UNPKOs have a poor technology track record

UNPKOs have been slow to adapt to technological change. In part, this is because the private sector is most often better situated than governments or bureaucratic organisations to harness and promote innovation. Secondly, the UN peacekeeping infrastructure is chronically underfunded and currently faces threats of further financial cuts. In February 2015, an independent Expert Panel on Technology and Innovation appointed by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Field Support found that many UN field operations were lacking the technological capabilities considered necessary by militaries and law enforcement to operate effectively. It also cited these deficits as a direct reason for tech-enabled militaries of developed member states to refuse to participate in the field. With missions in the Democratic Republic of Congo, South Sudan or Syria representing some of the world’s most complex conflict environments, can new technologies soften the critical voices that attest these PKOs a failure to execute their Security Council mandate?

How can UNPKOs benefit from new technologies?

As the United Nations system is set to undergo significant reforms introduced by the new Secretary-General António Guterres, some changes and amendments include scaling up the technological capabilities of peacekeeping operations. The positive effects of new technologies are most likely to be useful for the prevention and response to conflicts, intelligence gathering, and communications system of missions.

In his vision statement, the Secretary-General stressed his commitment to a “culture of prevention” to bring about peace, political solutions and sustainable development to crisis hotspots. Technology can play a central role in supporting the UN’s endeavor to prevent conflict. Most importantly, the collection and analysis of data about crime and conflict could result in indicators which in turn can be used to shorten warning and response times for peacekeepers on the ground. Systematic monitoring and mapping of crises can promote patterns and models to make the prevention of human rights abuses or cease-fire violations more efficient and cost-effective. For example, when the UN tested the use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) in the DR Congo and Central African Republic (CAR), significant advancements were made in the protection of civilians from ambushes by armed groups. UAVs also allowed peacekeepers to maintain improved situational awareness by tracking migration movements or performing aerial reconnaissance of hostile actors, thereby helping them to operate in difficult asymmetric threat environments.

Another important step in ramping up the prevention of conflict and violence would be a concerted effort among UN member states to develop an intelligence agency within the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. While UNPKOs have established intelligence-gathering units, they are largely based on an ad-hoc approach and member states have expressed confusion around this concept. The UN doesn’t like to see itself as an intelligence-gathering unit; however, intelligence capabilities are required if peacekeeping operations want to effectively address threats to international peace and security in the twenty-first century. Several issues currently impede the development of an intelligence oversight body, including the reluctance of member states to share information and equipment, questions of accountability, and the lumbering communications infrastructure of many peacekeeping operations, making it difficult to bring together the civilian, police and military components of a mission.

The communication network of UNPKOs is the third pillar that could benefit enormously from improved technology by incorporating local populations into missions – dubbed along the lines of “participatory peacekeeping”. Some recent ideas include letting locals send their information, observations or alerts directly to the peacekeeping force as a confidence-building measure and as a means to engage local communities in the process of conflict resolution. Modern communications equipment and better coordination between peace operations would also help improve the safety and security of UN personnel and assets.

A holistic approach to peacekeeping

At the same time, it is essential to understand that while new technologies can offer great assistance to UNPKOs, they are not a panacea to prevent all forms of conflict and violence. The heads of UNPKOs should be careful not to overstate the opportunities of big data analytics and simply replace their understanding of local politics and context-sensitive approaches with statistical models. It would be extremely foolish to discard the value of personal relationships that diplomats and conflict mediators have formed with actors on the ground over time or the important work of other UN agencies in the field.

Danger also lies in the adverse effects modern communication and technology can have within conflict settings. Concerns over internet privacy, censorship, and surveillance, or the opportunities technologies offer to extremist groups for recruitment and propaganda tools should all be considered. Furthermore, as armed drones or offensive cyber attacks become more frequent in today’s conflicts, international laws and norms are yet to materialise to contain their irresponsible use.

Missing the opportunities new technologies provide means missing chances for peace. The fact that the UN has adopted a strategy for technology and innovation for its PKOs is a promising step. At the same time, current operations must also address the technological capabilities of adversaries and civilians in conflict zones. In the end, PKOs need a holistic approach by effectively combining the opportunities of modern equipment and innovation, political solutions, and paths to economic development to secure peace.

Felix (@felix_manig) is a postgraduate in International Relations at King’s College London. He focuses on conflict resolution strategies, political violence, and human rights. Outside of academia, he is Series Editor at Strife and writes for the Peacekeeping Project at the United Nations Association of Germany.

 

Canada Needs to Rethink Foreign Policy: Peacekeeping isn’t the Answer

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By: Zachary Wolfraim

https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/3/35/Canadian_Army_Brig._Gen._Dave_Corbould,_center_left,_the_deputy_commanding_general_of_Coalition_Effects_and_Transitions,_Combined_Joint_Task_Force_101,_Regional_Command_East,_talks_with_an_Afghan_National_Army_130523-A-XM609-063.jpg
Brigadier General Dave Corbould meets with Afghan National Army personnel.

The election of Justin Trudeau and the Liberal Party on 19 October marks the end of a decade of Prime Minister Harper’s dominance in Ottawa. After a grueling 78-day campaign, voters convincingly rejected the Harper government and put a majority Liberal government in place for the first time in 15 years. This campaign has largely been a referendum on Harper’s leadership and one of the areas that has evinced the most visceral reaction from his opponents has been in foreign policy.

Both the left-wing Liberal and NDP parties, when discussing foreign policy, were more than willing to (rightly) point to Canada’s diminishing role in the world. Prime Minister Harper and his supporters have been quick to state that their foreign policy has been more forceful in defending Canadian interests internationally and has intentionally steered away from previous government’s ‘fence-sitting’ and moral equivocation. Nonetheless, it is hard to dispute that on the foreign policy file, while Canada has remained an active member of the international community, its diplomatic initiatives have been wanting.

In discussing foreign policy, both Liberal Party leader Justin Trudeau and NDP leader Thomas Mulcair stated that Canada needs to reprioritize peacekeeping as a vital component. This is a mistake. The mythological Pearsonian peacekeeping tradition to which they are referring, died with the Cold War. Trying to apply its tenets to the current international environment would invariably fail. That said, this presents an interesting opportunity for whoever forms the next government to start thinking seriously about foreign policy.

The current international environment is, to put it lightly, a mess. With a retrenched United States, rising China, revanchist Russia, and a refugee crisis in Europe spurred by instability through the Middle East it is hard to see where exactly a peacekeeping force would offer added value. A military commitment to NATO’s presence in Eastern Europe and participation in coalition operations in Iraq and Syria give Canada international visibility, however, this doesn’t necessarily translate into influence. Utilising hard power as the key means to promote Canada’s interests and values internationally is neither sustainable nor feasible.

While Canada’s military has had over a decade as the go-to tool by which to implement Canadian foreign policy aims, it requires significant investment and strengthening. A long decade of action in Afghanistan combined with a high tempo of operations means that the military needs revitalisation. Similarly, a reinvigoration of the diplomatic service and a re-examination of Canada’s foreign aid programs would offer a more robust and holistic approach to foreign policy priorities. This is an opportunity by which Canada can not only rebuild its diplomatic reflexes but also seriously re-engage with the international forums such as the UN and NATO which act as force multipliers. Indeed, there is a risk for Canada that as a comparatively small country (population-wise), it can have difficulty making its voice heard amidst the international chaos. Offering a constructive presence in these forums is a way by which Canada builds international influence and enables it to punch above its weight.

In doing so, this makes Canada’s opinion consequential again. One of the key criticisms of Harper’s foreign policy was that it represented bullhorn diplomacy – this is our position, take it or leave it. Supporters of this style of foreign policy suggest that this means Canada gets taken seriously, but in reality, it generally means that Canada is left shouting from the margins. Treating diplomacy like any other type of negotiation is a misjudgment at best, particularly given that the consequences of failing to negotiate effectively can be catastrophic. Moreover, by throwing the military at every major international security issue, it automatically escalates both Canada’s commitment by risking Canadian lives and military assets in a way that diplomatic initiatives tend not to, but also raises the likelihood of deeper military involvement.

Invoking a role as international peacekeeper has become the solution of choice for countries that want to remain internationally engaged while limiting their investment in the military. The UK is already going down this route as Minister of Defence Michael Fallon indicated recently, he intends to commit the UK’s stretched defense capabilities to future peacekeeping missions. However, this should not be seen as a sustainable avenue to pursue a foreign policy agenda in the current international environment, particularly given that there is currently very little peace to keep. Unless a commitment to peacekeeping is coupled with a commitment to streamline the UN’s capabilities and also has the support of other Security Council members, it is unlikely to offer a serious method by which to assert security policy.

Ultimately, it needs to be remembered that in many ways, the international system is pay-to-play and underinvestment usually reaps diminished influence. Canada’s incoming Liberal government will need to do more than re-hash ‘traditional’ foreign policy roles but instead decide what Canada’s international priorities are going to be and how it will achieve them over the next four years. It will be a serious undertaking to recalibrate Canadian foreign policy after years of neglecting both military and diplomatic capabilities, particularly while also tackling the ambitious domestic agenda that the Liberal party articulated during the campaign. Given that it has been a decade since Canada’s last foreign policy review it may be time to revisit what its key foreign policy priorities should be heading forward.

Zachary Wolfraim is a PhD researcher in the Department of War Studies, King’s College London, where he focuses on the role of narratives in shaping foreign policy in relation to NATO operations. He previously worked as a consultant in NATO Headquarters on operations in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya. You can follow him at @Zachwol.