Pakistan

Drones series, Part I: Pakistan's decade of drones (2004-2014)

April 8, 2014 by Strife Staff

By Zoha Waseem:

‘Things fall out of the sky’

In June 2004, the first drone strike in Pakistan targeted a man who had rejected peace agreements with the government, sworn allegiance to the Taliban, and vowed to continue his ‘jihad’ against the United States in Afghanistan. The Pakistani military initially claimed responsibility for Nek Mohammad’s death, until more could be revealed about the drone programme. It was speculated that Pakistan granted CIA access into its airspace in order to take Mohammad out. This was to be the first of several hundred such attacks that neither the American nor Pakistani administrations were willing to officially acknowledge. Musharraf would later go on record to justify these attacks: ‘In Pakistan, things fall out of the sky all the time.’

Indeed, they would. Following the strike on Nek Mohammad, there would be 44 attacks under the Bush administration. The drone campaign initially made use of the notorious Shamsi Airfield near Quetta, leased to the CIA in 2001. In 2011, NATO forces opened fire on two Pakistani border check-posts in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), killing 24 Pakistani soldiers, unleashing a country-wide outrage, and resulting in Islamabad ordering the US to evacuate (Salala attack).

The total numbers of strikes in Pakistan have ranged from 330 to over 380, escalating dramatically under the Obama administration. Those targeted are suspected of belonging primarily to al Qaeda, the Pakistani Taliban (TTP), the Afghan Taliban, the Haqqani Network, and various Pakistani and foreign jihadi organisations, including the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. The campaign in Pakistan has been largely restricted to FATA, a region where the concentration of militants has been overwhelming. Located northwest of Pakistan, FATA borders Afghanistan on the eastern side of the Durand Line. The tribal areas fall outside the writ of Pakistani law and governance – a weakness that the US and terrorists alike draw to their own advantages for respective onslaughts and campaigns.

Casualty Controversies

The calculation of civilian casualties has always been an area of contention. To an extent, this is understandable given the challenges of reporting from within the tribal areas. Additionally, the environment in FATA, their complex terrains and geographies makes it difficult to differentiate civilians from militants who blend in by living amongst locals.

Regardless, American and Pakistani authorities have not been forthcoming in acknowledging drone attacks or their casualties and the recognition of civilian deaths has been misleading. In March 2013, Pakistani officials claimed that between 400 and 600 civilians had been killed; in October, the Pakistani Ministry of Defence claimed the figure stood at 67 since 2008. A month later, Islamabad retracted the statement, claiming it was ‘wrong and fabricated’.

The table below summarises the data collected by the Bureau of Investigative Journalism, New America Foundation and the Government of Pakistan on drone strikes in the country.

* Of which 332 strikes were carried out under President Obama’s administration.
///////** According to a Special Rapporteur, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights.

The CIA maintains these strikes are ‘surgically precise’. It has yet to officially acknowledge any civilian casualty.

‘The only game in town’

The question of Islamabad’s consent has been the centre of debates on drones in Pakistan. In one article, Peter Bergen and Katherine Tiedemann wrote, ‘Behind the scenes, many Pakistani officials – including [former] president Asif Ali Zardari and [then] Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani – have supported the drone strikes, despite their occasional public protests.’ Local perceptions from within Pakistan suggest a majority of people believe they are carried out by Islamabad’s consent. Amnesty International’s Pakistan Researcher, Mustafa Qadri told Strife that Pakistan may have given tacit approval but there is no paper trail.

Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s visit to President Obama last year, along with his plea to stop drone strikes, was little but a political move to show his countrymen that the Sharif government does not condone breaches of Pakistan’s sovereignty. Islamabad relies immensely on aid from the US. Telling the Americans what to do would mean disrupting an incoming flow of dollars; acknowledging approval for drones would result in a severe backlash from Pakistani militants and civil society alike; keeping the debate running under the shadow of dubious press releases, timely condemnations, and a lack of transparency, allows Islamabad to control resistance from within the Pakistani populace, appease local militants, and avoid upsetting allies in D.C.

Within the US, the debate has steadily been questioning American foreign policy in the war on terror. Mazzetti pointed out in his book, The Way of the Knife, that this ‘knife fighting’ is not as surgical as agencies claim. It ‘creates enemies just as it has obliterated them’ and has ‘lowered the bar for waging war’. Despite protests from the likes of David Kilcullen and Cameron Munter, Leon Panetta has notoriously described the drone programme as “the only game in town”.

An aspect that is often under-considered is how drones have contributed to militant propaganda. The TTP has repeatedly used the destruction caused by drones to further their ‘jihad’. Till 2009, estimates suggested the TTP and allied groups carried out suicide attacks in retaliation for drone strikes. Either way, civilians have been at the receiving end which has made it easier to instil anti-American sentiments within the aggrieved populace. As a result, the campaign has resulted in heated debates within Pakistan, leaving its citizens divided.

Local Debates, Perspectives and Impacts

The case against drone attacks within Pakistan has been most aggressively taken up by Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf’s chairman, Imran Khan. The social and psychological impacts of drones are the main arguments put forth by Khan, who believes drones (and American presence in the region in general) have created terrorism in the country. Amnesty’s Qadri disagrees. ‘Drones are not the drivers of radicalization; local, social factors are’.

Qadri’s own investigations into the campaign (published in Amnesty’s report, Will I Be Next?) took him across Pakistan, making him critically aware of local perceptions. ‘The closer you get to FATA, the more sympathy you will find for drone strikes. People don’t like the Taliban. They are annoyed with terrorists. When you’re in such a violent region, people think, at least there are terrorists being killed [by drones]. It is not morally justified, but they are saying it out of frustration. [Drones] appear to be the least worst option out of some very bad options.’

A more extreme case for drone attacks was made by a columnist, Irfan Hussain. 2009 was known as ‘the year of the drone’ in Pakistan. Shortly after, Hussain asked, ‘If we condemn the Americans so vociferously over the drone campaign, should we not be more critical of the thugs who are killing far more Pakistani civilians?’ Hussain’s opinions are amongst the minority; the majority still protests against drones.

The anti-drone advocacy in Pakistan goes beyond the element of fear. Little is written about the rural-to-urban displacement of people since the start of the campaign. The displacement of people from northern areas to cities further strains the limited resources allocated for urban areas like Karachi. Conflicted cities, aggravated by an influx of IDPs, increase instability and deepen anti-American sentiments amongst the urban and liberal populace.

Moreover, the campaign has made Pakistanis doubtful about local and international humanitarian efforts. “It is difficult for aid agencies [including polio workers], local and foreign, to operate in these areas. Locals tend to think [these workers] are being used for spying”, points out Mustafa Qadri, resonating a view that has been prevalent since the Abbottabad raid of May 2001.

Another concerning matter is the lack of rehabilitation and reconstruction accompanying the campaign. Since there are no official agencies appointed for these efforts, groups such as Jamaat-ud-Dawa, the charity wing of Lashkar-e-Taiba, are able to sweep in to assist the locals, further propagating anti-Pakistani and anti-American rhetoric. Coupled with this is the fact that often two strikes occur consecutively at a given location; when locals reach the location following the first strike to provide assistance, a second hits. This makes local rescue operations much more difficult.

Internal impacts, popular dissent against drones and relations between the US and Pakistan may be contributing to a gradual decrease in strikes. In an unprecedented move, these factors led the Peshawar High Court to direct the government to move a resolution against the attacks in the United Nations. The historic verdict declared drones as ‘illegal, inhumane, and a violation of the UN charter on human rights’.

Last December, after pressure from Pakistan, the UN adopted a resolution on drone strikes, calling on the US to comply with international law. In March this year, the UNHCR held a third round of discussions on the draft resolution. Washington boycotted, refusing to supply UN any details about its programme

It is unclear whether the campaign will remain paused for the duration of negotiations between the Pakistan government and the TTP. It can be assumed that Pakistan may witness a decrease in the number of strikes as NATO withdrawal is undertaken from Afghanistan and as western interests shift from South Asia. Till then, it suffices to say that Pakistan’s decade of drones has caused yet another rift in the country’s socio-political fabric.

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Zoha Waseem is a PhD researcher in the Department of War Studies at King’s College London. Her research focuses on urban violence, organised crime and conflicts in cities. You can follow her on Twitter @ZohaWaseem.

The good, the bad, the drones: A Strife 5-part series

April 7, 2014 by Strife Staff

By Joana Cook,
Managing Editor, Strife

BAE-Taranis-UAV-(Model-on-d — BAE Taranis UAV, Model on display at Farnborough Airshow 2008 (Photo by Mike Young)

By 2025 it is estimated to be an industry worth $82 billion USD and responsible for the creation of more than 100,00 new jobs in the US alone. It will target commercial and civil markets, and be used in applications ranging from precision agriculture and public safety, to niche areas, such as battling poachers in wildlife reserves. It is, however, their use in security operations which will be the focus of this Strife series.

The controversial use of Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS), more widely known as drones, has been recently highlighted by a UN Special Rapporteur examining their use in counterterrorism, news stories of victims of drone attacks testifying before US Congress, as well as recent documentaries such as Jeremy Scahill’s Dirty Wars. There are even iPhone apps, such as Metadata, which have tracked and mapped drone attacks since the first known incident on November 3, 2002 in Yemen. Since then, The Bureau of Investigative Journalism estimates that upwards of 4,172 people have been killed in strikes across Yemen, Somalia and Pakistan, 1,032 of which were civilians. Afghanistan has seen at least 59 civilian deaths under ISAF, while the number in Iraq and Libya remain less clear. Organizations such as UK-based Reprieve call for international accountability for what they refer to as ‘the new face of state-lawlessness in the name of counterterrorism.’

The use of drones, however, has been supported by some as an option which has left the forces using them safe, reduced the amount of potential civilian casualties, and eliminated key targets in areas often referred to otherwise as ‘terrorist safe havens’. The use of drones has also been viewed by analysts like Clint Watts, a senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, as the latest piece of the US counter-terrorism package which has traversed from ‘hearts and minds’ campaigns, detentions and renditions, to the ‘clear, hold, build’ policies seen in Afghanistan, and most recently focusing on drones as the most effective and publicly accepted counterterrorism policy.

Over the coming weeks, Strife will be featuring a five-part series on drones, expanding on the ways by which drones are commonly framed. We will reexamine the roles drones play in shaping how we think about, and engage in, security from a number of diverse approaches. Zoha Waseem will survey how the current drone program in Pakistan is affecting everything from militant propaganda by the TTP, to rural-to-urban population displacement. David Hofmann will discuss why, as traditional battlefields give way to insurgent campaigns, drones are necessary and effective. Dr. Jack McDonald will be analyzing the legal implications of drones in a field not yet internationally defined. “May you die in a drone strike” is becoming a favourite curse in Yemen, and Dr. Victoria Fontan will discuss both the social implications of drones in Yemen, and how this may not be weakening AQAP as intended. Daniel Møller Ølgaard will be taking a unique look at drones through the lens of biopolitics, and at how the use of drones may be transforming the very nature of war and governance.

Drones will not be exiting the security scene anytime soon. Instead, we hope this series will provoke more thought and debate in a field that will play a significant part in all our lives in the coming years. We leave you to be the judge in “The good, the bad, the drones.”

‘The era of saving failed states is over’: The Afghan withdrawal and its regional implications, with special focus on Pakistan

January 24, 2014 by Strife Staff

by Zoha Waseem

Speaking at the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) on Friday 17 January 2014, Ahmed Rashid, journalist and author of Taliban, Descent into Chaos, and most recently, Pakistan on the Brink, confidently asserted that the West will no longer be a major stakeholder in the Afghan region as ‘the era of saving failed states is over’. According to Rashid, all regional players must accept this and take responsibility instead of ‘weeping tears’ of betrayal or abandonment.

Another era of transitions

Rashid, addressing a gathering on the withdrawal from Afghanistan and its regional implications, argued that although the military transition in Afghanistan has been the primary focus of the West, it is the political and economic transitions that are more relevant in the short-term. He noted that the coming elections must give credibility to the next president (sans rigging); without a legitimate government, there may never be a peaceful settlement in Afghanistan between the government and the Taliban. This settlement, Rashid believes, will be the major deterrent to a multi-faceted civil war.

‘The Taliban are ripe for a peace settlement. There is a lobby for it within the Afghan Taliban. They are fed up of fighting, or living in Pakistan. They are fed up with al Qaeda. The older generation of Taliban understand that they cannot govern Afghanistan. [They] know that they are a basket case. Therefore, [they] need a peaceful power-sharing agreement.’

Just how supposed free-and-fair elections should take place during a ‘dodgy transition’ in a corrupt and battle-ridden country where everything is up for grabs is not a subject matter the speaker delved into.

Economically, Rashid reminds us, there has not been the creation of an indigenous economy, a reason that could deter the Taliban from taking over cities. ‘The Taliban are not in a position to take over cities. They need the cities for economic reasons. They will let the cities flourish and act sensibly.’ Rashid rejected the ‘Helmand paranoia in the UK’ (that the Taliban will re-enter their former provinces), arguing that it is only inevitable for them to return to their natural habitat.

‘Of course, they will come in. They come from Helmand; the population in Helmand is pro-Taliban; poppy production is allowed by the Taliban; and [their] families reside in Helmand too.’

‘A Pandora’s Box is about to be opened’

At the moment, Rashid believes, there is power equilibrium in the region as all stakeholders are taking a hands-off approach. Nevertheless, he warns us that should even one country interfere, it could disturb the delicate balance within the region. India and Pakistan are the most likely to play out their rivalries in Afghanistan; Iran does not want the Taliban coming into power, which could upset the Iran-Pakistan-Afghanistan dynamics in the country; Russia and Central Asian countries are equally nervous, having been left out of post-war negotiations. China appears to be uninterested in mediation, but is likely to step in for economic reasons once the conflict comes to an end.

In Rashid’s opinion, all regional players want stability in Kabul, especially Pakistan. ‘Backing Taliban for the second time will have a blowback in Pakistan’, he argued, as an insurgency across the border is likely to keep trickling into Islamabad’s territories. Because of this, current Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s government has been working on bettering civil-military relations, as both organs of the state finally have a consensus for a peaceful resolution in Afghanistan.

For this, Pakistan (as well as the US) needs to speed up the facilitation of dialogue but efforts towards dialogue as part of the reconciliation have not been good, argued Ahmed Rashid. There appears to be a lack of clarity for Americans, Pakistanis, as well as Karzai.

‘More authoritarian regimes in [Islamic] states will emerge the West takes a hands off approach towards failed or failing states [and] if they don’t be careful with nation-building. Right now, the US do not have a clear agenda for the troops that are intended to remain in Afghanistan’.

A Pakistani official, who wishes to remain anonymous, addressed the Afghan question vis-a-vis Pakistan:

‘Pakistan has limited influence in Afghanistan. Pakistani army and the civilian government are on the same page. Pakistan does not have favourites in Afghanistan anymore [but] it does not want to abandon the Taliban [again]. But also, we don’t have Mullah Omar in our pocket.’

Much of Rashid’s analysis echoed that of other Pakistani analysts. Journalist Zahid Hussain, speaking at the London School of Economics in November 2013, rejected the theory that Islamabad has strategic depth in Afghanistan. Rather, Hussain claimed, it is the Afghan Taliban has that has strategic depth in Pakistan. Similarly, the Pakistani official quoted above and Ahmed Rashid both maintained that there is no longer a doctrine of strategic depth for the Pakistani army or state.

‘Fixing’ Afghanistan

Nevertheless, some of the arguments put forth by the speaker require further analysis. Rashid pointed that Afghanis have done nothing to fix themselves (‘What have Afghanis done to fix themselves? There is still intrinsic corruption – shameful!’), without clarifying how they should be expected to ‘fix themselves’. On elections, it seems that the speaker emphasised that the centre (Kabul) cannot hold unless the next government is legitimate. But can western-style, free-and-fair elections take place in Afghanistan, minus corruption and minus political agreements signed covertly?

Anatol Lieven, a professor at the Department of War Studies (King’s College London) writing for the New York Review of Books, has already pointed out that this view may be too idealistic.

‘The choice Afghanistan faces is not between some idealized version of Western democracy and a corrupt state; it is between a corrupt but more or less consensual Afghan state and the horrors of no state at all.’

Furthermore, Rashid highlighted the supposed desires of the Taliban to stop fighting and work towards improving their economic conditions. While it could be accepted that the insurgency may have reached exhaustion, to expect a group that is acknowledged historically as trained fighters, known to have battle in their blood and revenge in their code, to simply go home with weapons and work in the fields is unconvincing.

Lieven has also pointed out, like Ahmed Rashid, that there is no risk of the Taliban taking over Kabul, but, is less optimistic about how things may progress if the West disrupts its flow of cash.

‘US and international aid now account for around nine-tenths of the Afghan national budget… Today, we too have created an Afghan state and army that cannot survive without our help, and that will also disintegrate again into warlord anarchy if our help is withdrawn. The West has a deep moral and historical responsibility to make sure that this does not happen.’

Rashid also placed little emphasis on the Durand Line (the 2,640 kilometre border between Afghanistan and Pakistan): ‘It’s an issue, but I don’t think this is occupying people’s minds’. It is unclear why the question of the Durand Line has been sidelined, when it is still not recognised by the Afghan Taliban – and the Pakistani Taliban for that matter – who move freely between the porous territorial divisions. It also remains to be seen that, should there be a peace settlement with the Taliban, could it amount to the recognition of the Durand Line? If not, what is to stop the Pakistani Taliban from travelling across the Line, making Pakistani military efforts against its own militant groups in its tribal areas that much more futile? And without a clear understanding of how the Afghan Taliban seeks to deal with the Pakistan Taliban (and vice versa), can you reasonably expect all regional players to just sit tight?

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Zoha Waseem is a PhD researcher in the Department of War Studies at King’s College London. You can follower her on Twitter @ZohaWaseem.

'Still violent, vulnerable and vital'. Pakistan's prospects for 2014

January 10, 2014 by Strife Staff

by Zoha Waseem

In Pakistan’s 67^th year of existence, living with violence in contested spaces appears to have become a norm. Since 2003, over 50,000 Pakistanis have been killed in terrorism-related violence. An estimated 5,366 people were killed last year alone; over half of them reportedly in urban violence in Karachi. In the beginning of 2013 the Pakistani army finally altered its stance on militancy and recognised that internal terrorism was the biggest threat to its national security. But the civilian government has yet to devise a strategy to tackle this monster. As the world enters 2014 it carries with it ghosts of conflicts past and Pakistan’s baggage is perhaps one of the heaviest. This is a brief analysis of developments that shaped the country in 2013 and what is in store for the year ahead.

Pakistan Goes to the Polls

Perhaps the greatest milestone last year was a smooth transition of power; the landmark elections of May 2013 celebrated the first completion of a democratic government’s tenure. While clouded by riots and rigging, it was a watershed moment for Pakistanis who came out in scores to campaign and vote, demonstrating the country’s resilient street power. Unfortunately, almost customarily, Pakistan voted in a previously tried and tested government, that of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif.

Sharif’s third term in the position under Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz (PML-N) has succeeded in undermining the role of President Mamnoon Hussain, contrary to the authority previous president Asif Ali Zardari held. Sharif’s agenda focuses on three core elements: economy, energy and extremism. Sharif will have his hands full this term with Afghanistan, India, Iran, domestic militancy and rising sectarianism, economic instability, and volatile political eruptions in the province of Sindh.

The May elections also saw the rise of Imran Khan, Chairman of political party Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), which has over the months witnessed diminishing popularity following Khan’s statements criticising drone strikes; blocking NATO supply routes; calling for negotiations with the terrorist group Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP); creeping further to the right by allying with Jamaat-e-Islami, and attempting to vindicate Bangladeshi war criminal Abdul Quader Mullah. Eight months on, PTI has yet to deliver as Khan appears to be stuck in campaign gear. In 2014 Pakistanis will watch closely how his government performs in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa (the northern province of Pakistan that borders the Federally Administrative Tribal Areas and Afghanistan, and has been home to both Afghan and Pakistani Taliban).

The months leading up to the election period coincided with the return of former president and army chief, Pervez Musharraf, from London. Now on trial for treason for imposing emergency rule in 2007, and trying to avoid the court on medical grounds, Musharraf faces death penalty or life imprisonment if convicted. While Musharraf maintains that the army is on his side, his prosecution could be demoralising for the entire institution – perhaps the strongest in Pakistan – and risk complicating the slowly mending civil-military relations.

Negotiating with the TTP

One of the most debated subjects in Pakistani media was the dialogue with the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). When TTP chief Hakimullah Mehsud was killed in a drone strike in November, the government criticised the United States for hampering negotiations. Little importance was given to the fact that members of the TTP denied that these talks had begun. The killing of Hakimullah in a drone strike put the TTP under the leadership of Mullah Fazlullah, a militant notorious for lashing out over the radio against the Pakistani government, education, and anti-polio drives. Staunchly against negotiations, Fazlullah is said to be close to the Afghan Taliban, having taken shelter in the country following a military operation in Swat (2009), and his appointment may indicate warming relations between the Afghan and Pakistani Talibans.

The year ended with the government appointing chief of Jamiat Ulema-i-Islami, Sami-ul Haq, to initiate dialogue with the TTP. The group has three core demands: (i) withdraw the armed forces; (ii) implement TTP’s brand of Sharia; (iii) eradicate democracy. Sharif insists the TTP must disarm and accept the Pakistani constitution, but Sami-ul Haq is known to be supportive of TTP’s demands. Pakistan’s current strategy of negotiation – with the appointment of said middleman – already appears feeble.

Besides uncertainty over how or with whom to negotiate, Pakistan must remember previous violations of ceasefire agreements by the TTP. While these are beyond the ambit of this article, it suffices to say that continued targeting of civilians calls into question TTP’s sincerity for peace. The July jail break that led to the escape of 250 prisoners from Dera Ismail Khan (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa); the church attack in Peshawar that killed over 80 people followed by one in Qissa Khwani bazaar claiming 40 lives; the attacks on anti-polio drive workers across the country; the attacks on female students in Quetta; and the massacre of 10 foreign mountaineers in Nanga Parbat are but some reminders of the audacity of the group which, at this rate, is likely to continue operating with scant regard for the writ of the state.

Operation: Karachi

Karachi suffered from one of its deadliest years in history. 2013 started with waves of target killings, now almost the city’s trademark, including Parveen Rehman, a devoted social worker, and Zahra Shahid, vice-president of PTI. In August 2011, the Supreme Court took a suo motu notice of the increasing crime and violence in the city. It took two years before law enforcement agencies were finally instructed to crack down and begin an operation against criminals and terrorists. Over 14,000 suspects have been arrested since September, but violence continues unabated.

Alongside 3,000 civilians killed in violence in Karachi (compared to 143 in Islamabad), more than 172 police officers were targeted last year (1 every 2 days), making it the worst year for city police fatalities. Assassinations of police officials have continued into 2014, with the recent suicide attack on SSP (Crime Investigation Department) Chaudhry Aslam, a distinguished officer recognised for his counter-terrorism efforts in Karachi, especially against the TTP. The group retaliated in broad daylight, theatrically demonstrating their increasing presence in the city.

The previous summer saw Altaf Hussain (chief of Karachi’s leading ethnic political party, Muttahida Quami Movement (MQM)) under fire from the British media after Scotland Yard took notice of his money laundering activities, his alleged involvement in the murder of Imran Farooq (a senior member of the MQM in London), and for inciting violence in Karachi. Presently, media reports are again hinting that Hussain’s recent statements may cause Scotland Yard to investigate the case this year. Should this happen, and if Karachi is disturbed by developments in London that demoralise MQM activists, Islamabad may pressure the British to temporarily take a softer approach to Hussain in order to gain time to stabilise Karachi and allow the on-going operation to continue. This will be a particularly sensitive subject in the first half of 2014, ahead of the local body elections due to take place.

Escalating Sectarian Strife

Pakistan further suffered the loss of 500 civilians to sectarian violence, 96 percent of whom were Shia Muslims. Systematic killings of the Shia Hazara minority continued (over 125 were killed in 2012, whereas the first two months of 2013 saw more than 200 Harazas targeted). Responsibilities for these attacks have been claimed by both the TTP and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (both pro-Sunni, anti-Shia groups). Sectarian minorities (including Ahmedis) in Balochistan and elsewhere, blame the federal government for its lack of dedication to the plight of minorities.

Of Foes and Friends

Drone attacks remained a crucial aspect of Pakistan’s rocky courtship with the US. In response to the droning out of Maulvi Nazir and then Mehsud (senior TTP commanders), PTI rashly responded by blocking NATO supply routes to Afghanistan via Pakistan, hurting not only civilians for whom the supplies were intended, but also other NATO countries not responsible for drones. Sharif received no justification on this subject during his sit-down with Obama in Washington DC in October, 2013. Sources on the ground suggest the attacks will continue this year, though perhaps with reduced frequency post-NATO withdrawal, and that supply routes will remain open through backdoor diplomacy. Despite feelings of betrayal and subordination, Islamabad will continue relying on the US for financial support.

Backdoor diplomacy also appears to be the preferred tactic on the question of Afghanistan. Pakistani media is relatively quiet on how the state intends to deal with Afghanistan ahead of coming elections. Analysis suggests that the Pakistani establishment remains divided: some within the establishment will back the Afghan Taliban, whereas other will seek to resist it. Regardless, the complete disregard by the Taliban for the Durand Line suggests Pakistan’s porous border will remain tense and open to militant activities.

Pakistan’s policy vis-à-vis Afghanistan will be considered with India in mind. Pakistanis still feel uncertain about Narendra Modi, the leading prime ministerial candidate in India’s upcoming elections, and his agenda for Islamabad. Sharif’s campaign emphasised bettering relations with India, opening dialogue, and ending visa restrictions. But Modi has thus far hinted towards a hard-line approach in dealing with its nuclear neighbour. With Kashmir and Afghanistan still circling the room like two giant elephants, the tense relationship and dialogue will remain vulnerable to breaches and violations. There were 400 cease-fire violations on the line of control in the disputed territory of Kashmir and the much-awaited Director General Military Operations (DGMO) meetings took off in December 2013 to discuss these violations. The fact that the DGMOs met for the first time since the 1999 Kargil War is a positive development. Nevertheless, it is likely that while talks and meetings continue, behind-the-door arms build-ups, border skirmishes, and indirect support for low-scale conflicts on opposing sides, will continue with all guards geared for defence.

Pakistan is also faced with a strict deadline of completing the Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline by the end of 2014, which is crucial for Sharif’s desire to address the energy crisis. Though dedicated to the project, Islamabad feels the heat of US pressure and threats of sanctions should it continue. Iran has already suspended the loan for Pakistan’s side of the pipeline, and if unable to follow through with the deal, Pakistan will face severe financial repercussions as well as risk jeopardising ties with Tehran.

The Year of Appointments

2013 was also a year of new appointments in Pakistan. The retirement of former Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry was met with mixed feelings. Once renowned for judicial activism and recognised as the face of the Lawyer’s Movement, Chaudhry soon became notorious for judicial dictatorship and addressing personal vendettas. The decline of judicial activism welcomed the appointment of Tasadduq Hussain Jilani who, in a remarkable contrast to Chaudhry, is mild-tempered, nicknamed ‘the gentleman judge’, and indifferent to the media.

Former chief of army staff Ashfaq Kayani also stepped down in 2013. The antithesis to Musharraf, he was respected for keeping the military outside of the civilian government’s domain, tolerating extreme criticisms in the media, and recognising the threat posed by domestic terrorism. His successor, Raheel Sharif, has been hand-picked by Nawaz Sharif (no relation), with indifference towards merit-based selection (Raheel Sharif was third in line). Raheel is close to the PM, but Pakistani history indicates that a selection that does not respect seniority or merit does not bode well for Pakistani politicians. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto appointed Zia-ul-Haq who hanged him; Nawaz Sharif previously appointed Musharraf who overthrow his government in a coup. Both were low in seniority.

Pakistan will have a full plate in 2014 with too many hungry appetites. Power struggles in the centre between government and opposition will continue trickling down to provincial and local levels, gathering arms and soldiers as they ripple on. Like in Afghanistan, where the future is up for grabs, in Pakistan, power and space will be contested through violence and chaos. This is unlikely to present a picture much different from the previous year.

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Zoha Waseem is a PhD researcher in the Department of War Studies at King’s College London. You can follower her on Twitter @ZohaWaseem.

“Pakistanis: Divided we stand”

November 27, 2013 by Strife Staff

by Zoha Waseem

On the evening of 25 November 2013 gathered about four hundred people at the London School of Economics facing Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s granddaughter and Benazir Bhutto’s niece, Fatima Bhutto. In the hour-long Q&A session that followed, she presented less her upcoming book, and answered questions pertaining more to the politics and current affairs of Pakistan. Bhutto also honoured the International Day for the Elimination of Violence against Women by briefly, but vigilantly, mentioning how unfairly Malala Yousufzai has been treated inside Pakistan and must be supported unconditionally, regardless of how certain politicians in the West may be marketing her cause for their own self-interests.

In Miss Bhutto’s words, ‘when you live in Pakistan, politics defines the way you live’. Yet for someone who herself is a product of decades of family politics of one of the leading political parties, the People’s Party of Pakistan (PPP), she treads carefully in wording her political alignment, advocating the right to support people over parties. She was also, like many Pakistanis, weary of defining what the role of the West should be in Pakistan, expressing the need for less foreign intervention, an argument in line with Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf’s chairman, Imran Khan, who has succeeded in temporarily blocking NATO supply routes to Afghanistan to protest recent drone strikes in the country. That one of these strikes took out one of the most despicable terrorists, Pakistani Taliban leader Hakimullah Mehsud, and that the closure of these routes economically impedes both Pakistan and Afghanistan, are apparently other matters. They were also, surprisingly, not discussed by Bhutto even though drone attacks affect most specifically the tribal areas of Waziristan that happen to be the setting of her latest literary work.

In an interview given to a local newspaper, London Evening Standard, earlier this month, Miss Bhutto presented her image of the country’s largest city with remarkable amnesia. Gravely exaggerating that one could not walk in Karachi without the likelihood of being mugged, molested or murdered, she refrained from mentioning that the creation of such an environment in the city is the by-product of the country’s turbulent political culture, a good chunk of which was designed at the hands of her own family members, where once her father, the late Mir Murtaza Bhutto (mysteriously gunned down in Karachi during Benazir’s prime ministerial term) was notorious for traversing the streets of Karachi with armed gunmen spilling out of his vehicles and creating terror.

‘Pakistan’s struggle has to be fought by Pakistanis’, argued Fatima Bhutto, ‘and be led by Pakistanis as well’. Herein lay the inherent memory loss and selective denial that have been increasingly gripping the youth of the country. The argument begs the question: which Pakistanis? As a people, tragically, Pakistanis are not unified. Not only are internal and external borders sources of major contentions defining identities, a majority of the people identify themselves on religious, or ethnic, or linguistic, or tribal lines. Post-colonial Pakistan has never really had a strong grip on nationalism. Political narratives and discourses range from religious nationalism to ethnic nationalism, further dividing themselves into sub-categories of Pashtun nationalism or Muhajir nationalism. The list goes on.

November this year falls on the month of Muharram, the first month of the Islamic calendar which also commemorates the Battle of Karbala fought in 680 AD between Imam Hussian (the Prophet Ali’s son) and the army of Yazid in present-day Iraq. The battle was to forever divide Shias and Sunnis for centuries on. Shias consider Muharram to be the month of mourning and it reflects most strongly the divides within Pakistani Muslims, some of whom resort to extreme violence against Shias. The latest Sunni-Shia clashes sparked as a result of pre-meditated rioting and bloodshed in Rawalpindi, just minutes away from the capital, Islamabad, demonstrate how quickly and vehemently some people within the country can be incited into turning on each other following religious and sectarian sermons.

So, while one can sympathise with Miss Bhutto’s bitterness towards the chaos engrained in Pakistani politics today, one finds it difficult to overlook the divisions created within societies for the sake of Pakistan’s coming into being. As a people, Pakistanis cannot even agree upon the vision Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the founder and first leader of Pakistan, had for the country he created. One can only assume it was not this.

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Zoha Waseem is a PhD researcher in the Department of War Studies at King’s College London. You can follower her on Twitter @ZohaWaseem.

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