nuclear

North Korea, Nuclear Weapons, and the Spectre of Enhanced Terrorism

September 14, 2016 by Kyle R. Brady

By: Kyle R. Brady

With yet another[1] illegal underground nuclear weapons test[2], North Korea has again flaunted the international community’s attempt to control what is quite arguably a rogue and/or failed state. A key difference in this test[3], however, is not its apparent yield[4] but, instead, the claim that this is part of a miniaturization process intended to produce nuclear warheads for internationally deployable missiles[5]. Despite well-regarded international treaties on the development of nuclear weapons programs and the testing of nuclear weapons, extraordinarily heavy international sanctions on this already-struggling state, and increasingly irritable neighbor states – namely, South Korea[6], Japan[7], Russia[8], and China[9] – North Korea seems intent on this nuclear path. The question remaining is why? The answer may be found in the minds of terrorists.

In developing nuclear weapons designed to thwart early detection and protection measures by other states[10], North Korea seems to be essentially demonstrating the seriousness of their program while simultaneously broadcasting their flexible nuclear weapons delivery mechanisms. If their claims regarding physical size, delivery vehicle, and detection-/destruction-avoidance abilities are true – as much of the analysis is suggesting – then one way to frame such a test is as “a sales pitch to other rogue states.”[11] The rogue states who may have been targeted for future sales deeply desire nuclear weapons and the cachet that comes with being a nuclear state, but lack the political will, financial means, or technological ability to develop them internally and in secret – an outside source is, therefore, required. This remains a highly plausible motivation, since it would inject desperately needed cash into the North Korean economy, continue to project the North Korean state as strong and militant, and avoid any entanglements or negotiations with their long list of stated enemies.

However, if such a test was designed to attract the purchasing power of rogue states, then it seems even more likely that terror actors were targeted, as well.

Rogue states, as their name suggests, have an inherent flaw in their operations that non-state terror actors do not: physical territory and state-run bureaucratic infrastructure. These two components of statehood make rogue states highly vulnerable to international sanctions and more conventional warfare, producing a sensitivity to the sentiment of the international community, even as the desires of this community may be eschewed. In contrast, terror actors lack these two components of statehood, among many others, which is part of what has made the suppression of large terrorist organizations so difficult. Without a territory to invade, formal trade to prevent, or official finances to freeze, terror actors are simply much more mobile and non-corporeal than states, even rogue ones; factors that correspondingly increase their interest in strategies and tactics otherwise impossible for a state to employ.

The nuclear ambitions of terrorists in the modern era are well documented, most recently including[12] the Islamic State[13]; the problem in all known acquisition attempts, however, was essentially a lack of viable products to purchase. Although some quantity of former Soviet nuclear material has disappeared over the years[14], logic dictates that such material would have explosively and catastrophically reappeared if it had fallen into the hands of terror actors. Furthermore, any nuclear states – both recognized and unrecognized – have inherent motivations to continue their nuclear weapons development programs and maintain their stockpiles, in part by ensuring these weapons are not placed into the hands of terrorists. Even unstable countries with questionable security practices, such as Pakistan[15], have no desire for nuclear weapons to be delivered to terror actors.

Enter North Korea.

With a long list of enemies that includes the most powerful states in the world, a failed economy, a people bound together by the sheer force of propaganda and fear, and a long-standing interest in cultivating international fears regarding its unpredictability, North Korea has nothing to lose from selling weapons on the black market[16] even if the ultimate buyers are terror actors. Whether these weapons are light arms, small arms, munitions, or nuclear does not matter to the North Korean regime – the all-important selling price is the only factor in this cash-starved state. If this motivational confluence is combined with a growing list of terror organizations and independent terror actors who have a defiant and remorseless dedication to their deadly cause, the sale of North Korean nuclear weapons to terror actors seems not only logical, but probable. This probability only increases when consideration is given to the apparent struggles of the Islamic State to maintain both its territory and its fighting force[17].

The conclusion that North Korean weapons programs may be seeking to connect with terror actors fundamentally changes the way in which the international community should view this rogue, failed state. The long-standing international policy of disapproving tolerance permissive of nuclear development and testing has now produced viable, and apparently adaptable nuclear weapons. Thus raising – once more – the spectre of enhanced terrorism. This is not to suggest that the infamous suitcase nukes[18] are of any real concern, but, rather, that the detonation of a nuclear warhead – of any size – in Baghdad, Damascus, Ankara, Cairo, or Tripoli would substantially change the worldwide understanding and fear of terrorism.

With the help of North Korea, this may now be a very real possibility.

Note: Any opinions expressed are directly and expressly the author’s own; they do not represent – unless stated – his employers (past, present, or future) or associated/affiliated institutions.

Kyle R. Brady is an imminent postgraduate student at King’s College London in the Department of War Studies, holds a Masters in Homeland Security from Pennsylvania State University, and has primary interests in terrorism, law enforcement, and contextualizing security concerns. Previously, he graduated with Departmental Honors from San Jose State University’s undergraduate Political Science program, where he focused on both international relations and political theory. All of Kyle’s work can be found online through http://docs.kyle-brady.com; he can be reached by email at brady.k@gmail.com or, nominally, on Twitter as @KyleBradyOnline; and he occasionally blogs at http://blog.kyle-brady.com.

Online profiles:

http://docs.kyle-brady.com

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Notes:

[1] “Timeline on North Korea’s Nuclear Program.” New York Times, November 20, 2014. http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/11/20/world/asia/northkorea-timeline.html.

[2] Fifield, Anna. “Q&A: Everything You Need to Know about the North Korean Nuclear Test.” Washington Post, September 9, 2016. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2016/09/09/qa-everything-you-need-to-know-about-the-north-korean-nuclear-test/.

[3] Fifield, Anna. “North Korea Conducts Fifth Nuclear Test, Claims It Has Made Warheads with ‘higher Strike Power.’” Washington Post, September 9, 2016. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/north-korea-conducts-fifth-nuclear-test-as-regime-celebrates-national-holiday/2016/09/08/9332c01d-6921-4fe3-8f68-c611dc59f5a9_story.html.

[4] Lewis, Jeffrey. “Nuclear Test No. 5: How North Korea’s Compares to Other Countries’.” Defense One, September 11, 2016. http://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2016/09/look-how-different-north-koreas-fifth-nuclear-test-other-countries/131427/.

[5] Fifield, Anna. “With Each Test, N. Korea Inches Closer to Being Able to Send a Nuclear-Tipped Missile to the U.S.” Washington Post, September 9, 2016. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/with-each-test-n-korea-inches-closer-to-intercontinental-nuclear-capability/2016/09/09/b6823c0c-768e-11e6-9781-49e591781754_story.html.

[6] “North Korea Nuclear Test: South Would Reduce Pyongyang ‘to Ashes.’” BBC News, September 11, 2016. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-37331852.

[7] Takenaka, Kiyoshi. “Japan’s Abe Says North Korea Nuclear Tests ‘Absolutely Unacceptable.’” Reuters, September 11, 2016. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-nuclear-japan-idUSKCN11I059.

[8] Solovyov, Dmitry. “Russia Says North Korea’s Nuclear Test a Threat to Regional Security.” Reuters, September 9, 2016. http://in.reuters.com/article/northkorea-nuclear-russia-reaction-idINKCN11F17J.

[9] Merchant, Nomaan. “China Says It Can’t End North Korea Nuke Program on Its Own.” Washington Post, September 12, 2016. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/china-says-it-cant-end-north-korea-nuke-program-on-its-own/2016/09/12/5603bc16-78cd-11e6-8064-c1ddc8a724bb_story.html.

[10] Fifield, Anna. “These North Korean Missile Launches Are Adding up to Something Very Troubling.” Washington Post, September 9, 2016. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/these-north-korean-missile-launches-are-adding-up-to-something-very-troubling/2016/09/08/eae2c50a-743d-11e6-9781-49e591781754_story.html.

[11] Rathi, Akshat. “North Korea’s Nuclear Test Was a Sales Pitch to Other Rogue States.” Quartz, September 12, 2016. http://qz.com/778839/north-koreas-nuclear-test-was-a-sales-pitch-to-rogue-states-like-iran-syria-and-pakistan/.

[12] Cowell, Alan. “‘Low-Grade’ Nuclear Material Is Seized by Rebels in Iraq, U.N. Says.” New York Times, July 10, 2014. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/11/world/middleeast/iraq.html?_r=0.

[13] “Nuclear Smuggling Deals ‘Thwarted’ in Moldova.” BBC News, October 7, 2015. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34461732.

[14] Tirone, Jonathan. “Missing Nukes Fuel Terror Concern as Obama Drawn to Seoul.”Bloomberg, March 26, 2012. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-03-22/missing-nukes-fuel-terror-concern-as-seoul-meeting-draws-obama.

[15] Kerr, Paul K., and Mary Beth Nikitin. “Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons.” Congressional Research Service, August 1, 2016. https://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL34248.pdf.

[16] “North Korea’s Shadowy Arms Trade.” The Guardian, July 17, 2013. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/18/history-north-korea-arms-dealing.

[17] Witte, Griff, Sudarsan Raghavan, and James McAuley. “Flow of Foreign Fighters Plummets as Islamic State Loses Its Edge.” Washington Post, September 9, 2016. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/flow-of-foreign-fighters-plummets-as-isis-loses-its-edge/2016/09/09/ed3e0dda-751b-11e6-9781-49e591781754_story.html.

[18] “Suitcase Nukes? Probably a Myth.” NBC News, November 10, 2007. http://www.nbcnews.com/id/21723693/ns/us_news-security/t/suitcase-nuclear-weapons-probably-myth/.

The trivialisation of the UK’s nuclear deterrent

April 11, 2015 by Strife Staff

By Christy Quinn:

Nuclear Submarine HMS Vanguard Returns to HMNB Clyde, Scotland. Photo: MoD, Tam McDonald (CC 2.0)

There is no more serious and pressing question in UK defence policy than the role of the nuclear deterrent. One thermonuclear warhead found in the D5 trident missile has an effective explosive yield up to 100 kilotons of TNT; over 5 times the power of the atomic bombs dropped on Nagasaki and Hiroshima in 1945. Each D5 missile can carry up to 5 warheads. Each of the four British Vanguard-class submarines carries an estimated 8 missiles at any one time. The destructive power that the UK wields globally on a daily basis is hard to comprehend. What circumstances would allow for the use of such terrible and indiscriminate destruction are equally hard to imagine.

The cost of upkeep is vast and growing. The cost of replacing the four ageing submarines when their service life expires was estimated by the UK Government in 2011 at £25 billion. For comparison, the total UK defence budget in 2016 is £43.1 billion. A report by the Royal United Services Institute have estimated that renewing the UK deterrent will consume up to 35% of the Defence procurement budget by the early 2020s. At the same time, UK defence spending as a share of national income is falling, with the UK likely to miss its 2% of GNI spending commitment as part of NATO by the beginning of the next parliament.

Clearly then, the decision over the future of the nuclear deterrent is one that policymakers across the armed forces, civil service and all political parties have had to grapple with in a serious and thoughtful manner. This makes the recent intervention by the current Secretary of State for Defence and Conservative Party candidate for Sevenoaks, Michael Fallon, difficult to understand.

In an op-ed for Wednesday’s edition of The Times, Fallon suggested that if the Leader of the Labour Party, Ed Miliband, were to be made Prime Minister following the election on 7 May, he would “barter away our nuclear deterrent” in return for the support of the Scottish National Party (SNP) in government, who oppose the renewal of Trident. As Ed Miliband ran against his brother, former Foreign Secretary David Miliband, for the Labour Leadership in 2010, electing Labour as the largest party in the House of Commons would mean that Ed Miliband would be willing to “betray” the UK’s national defence just as he had “stabbed his own brother in the back”.

Ed Miliband has already stated in several recent interviews that he would not negotiate with the SNP over the renewal of the deterrent. But to dismiss these comments as mere electioneering would be to dismiss the serious damage being done to the discussion over defence policy. If suggestion of being able to merely consider whether to maintain the nuclear deterrent in its current form is “betraying” the defence of the realm, then there are many more traitors than Miliband.

Many senior and retired staff in the armed forces have advocated, both publicly and privately, that the running costs and renewal program for Trident is degrading the defence capacity of the UK by draining funds for conventional military spending. There are also serious questions over whether a nuclear deterrent is currently serving the strategic basis on which its existence is justified; deterring aggression from a hostile state. Rory Stewart, Chair of the Commons Select Committee on Defence and a supporter of Trident renewal, has made the point that if the UK is unwilling to meet its commitments of 2% defence spending to NATO, then the deterring ability of Trident will be fatally undermined by demonstrating that Britain is not committed to the collective defence of other treaty members.

Taking the position that agreeing to any discussion of the purpose and utility of the nuclear deterrent is a “stab in the back” will make it harder, not easier, to form a coherent and effective policy of national defence. There is a valuable debate to be had about what place the nuclear deterrent has in a chaotic and unpredictable global security environment. The Secretary of Defence should know better than to trivialise it.

Christy Quinn studied International History at the London School of Economics & Political Science and is currently reading for an MA in Intelligence & International Security at Kings College London. His research interests are cyber security, national security strategy and the Asia-Pacific region. He is a Guest Editor at Strife. Follow him @ChristyQuinn.

Defending the Falklands: A role for nuclear weapons?

July 29, 2014 by Strife Staff

By Alex Calvo and Olivia Olsen:

Deep conventional cuts have put a question mark over the British defence posture in the South Atlantic. Although the steep deterioration in Argentine military capabilities means that the balance of power has not necessarily moved against London, the deterioration in expeditionary and amphibious capability has led to what some voices consider to be an excessive reliance on static defence. In other words: in Royal Air Force Mount Pleasant’s ability to resist while airborne reinforcements arrive. Since the UK retains her nuclear deterrent, it is only logical to ask ourselves whether it may also contribute to the successful defence of the Falklands. The purpose of this paper is to examine whether current nuclear doctrine allows for this.

The strategic and the tactical levels

There are two basic ways in which nuclear weapons may be employed in defence of the Falklands. First of all, at the strategic level, deterring Argentina by threatening her population centres in the event of an invasion. Second of all, at the tactical level, by attacking air and naval bases with low-yield warheads in such a case or right before it, pre-emptively.

The 2006 White Paper: a door open?

We shall begin our examination of British nuclear doctrine with the 2006 white paper titled ‘The Future of the United Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrent’[i]. This document makes it clear that ‘we deliberately maintain ambiguity about precisely when, how and at what scale we would contemplate use of our nuclear deterrent. We will not simplify the calculations of a potential aggressor by defining more precisely the circumstances in which we might consider the use of our nuclear capabilities. Hence, we will not rule in or out the first use of nuclear weapons’. It is thus clear that there is no need to be attacked with atomic weapons first, in order to respond in kind. Needless to say, Argentina is not a nuclear-weapons state, although it has a certain ‘latent’ nuclear and missile capacity, and therefore a ‘no first use’ declaration by London would make any further discussion unnecessary.

Once this is understood, it is now necessary to examine under what conditions a conventional attack from a non-nuclear weapons state, either alone or in association with a nuclear weapons state, may be met with an atomic strike. The document is not that clear about this, since it contains no explicit statement saying whether the UK may employ nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear weapons state. However, its tone and some of its assertions seem to at least imply that the country’s nuclear-deterrent is basically, if not solely, aimed at other nuclear-weapons states, whether acting directly or by means of sponsored terrorist groups. We can see this in its section ‘The UK Approach to Nuclear Deterrence,’ listing ‘Five enduring principles’ underpinning ‘the UK’s approach to nuclear deterrence.’ These five principles clearly refer to other nuclear-weapons states, whether recognized or not by the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (NPT).

For example, the first is titled, ‘our focus is on preventing nuclear attack’ and states that, ‘The UK’s nuclear weapons are not designed for military use during conflict but instead to deter and prevent nuclear blackmail and acts of aggression against our vital interests that cannot be countered by other means.’ Although this clearly points out in the direction of other nuclear-weapons states, we should note the following:

a) Not being ‘designed’ does not mean not being able to be employed. The word ‘designed’ is ambiguous, probably intentionally so. It is likely that this is no accident, but rather a deliberate attempt at not ruling out any option. Actually, such ambiguity is built in British nuclear doctrine, as clearly stated in the third principle, discussed below.

b) The provision ‘that cannot be countered by other means’ stresses the strong link between conventional military capabilities and nuclear doctrine, a connection often missing in the debate on defence cuts. Politicians and the public should understand that the lower British conventional capabilities are, the lower the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons must be, if we are to retain the same level of commitment to our national security. The comparative approach may come in handy here; Moscow is unable and unwilling to cut down her tactical nuclear arsenal because her conventional military capabilities are insufficient to deter potential enemies, above all China. Only a successful conclusion of the current Russian military reforms, resulting in a modern, agile, conventional force, able to defeat the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in the field, may pave the way to negotiations in this arena. Similarly, for the UK to rule out using tactical nuclear weapons against countries not possessing them (which, again, the 2006 paper does not do), would require a major upgrade in conventional military capabilities. The alternative, which we may call the ‘Russification of the Falklands’, that is just like Russia versus China resorting to non-conventional arms to cover one’s conventional weakness, would be to explicitly rely on tactical nuclear weapons in the defence of the Islands. This would entail a significant departure from the current British nuclear posture, going from ‘minimum’[ii] to ‘maximum deterrence’.

The third principle[iii] should also be read carefully and in its entirety: ‘we deliberately maintain ambiguity about precisely when, how and at what scale we would contemplate use of our nuclear deterrent. We will not simplify the calculations of a potential aggressor by defining more precisely the circumstances in which we might consider the use of our nuclear capabilities. Hence, we will not rule in or out the first use of nuclear weapons.’ This is quite self-explanatory, but we can perhaps look in some more detail at the last sentence. Not ruling out a first strike is an option which basically makes sense against non-nuclear-weapons states (or with a rudimentary, or solely tactical, nuclear capability).

Why? Because when faced with a country possessing a similar strategic nuclear capability, it does not really matter who is the first to employ it, since the end result is the same, the destruction of both powers, ‘Mutual Assured Destruction’ or MAD. When does it then matter whether or not to be ready to use them? When at war with powers not having them, or where the possibility of striking them with nuclear weapons may serve as a deterrent, either preventing an outbreak of hostilities or, at least in theory, the escalation of the conflict (also called ‘intra-conflict deterrence’).

Thus, while the British nuclear deterrent was not originally designed to deal with conventional aggression, and the UK doctrine mainly refers to dealing with nuclear threats or attacks, its documents do not rule out a first strike and more to the point do not provide any explicit assurance to non-nuclear weapons states.

The 2003 Defence Ministry White Paper and the UK policy aims

This is made even clearer in another key document, the 2003 Defence Ministry White Paper on ‘Delivering Security in a Changing World’,[iv] which, while noting that ‘The Government’s policy on nuclear weapons remains as set out in the SDR’, assigns a broad deterrent role to British nuclear forces and lists a number of ‘UK policy aims’ which include responsibility for overseas territories and economic and trade matters, ranging from the ‘free flow of natural resources’ to ‘overseas and foreign investment’. While not stating a direct link between each and every such aim and the nuclear forces, it provides a measure of ambiguity in not clearly defining which may merit the employment of the atomic deterrent. Some observers have noted that these very broad interests go beyond existential threats.[v]

The 2010 NSS and SDSR: confirming nuclear ambiguity

Two additional important documents appeared in 2010, partly dealing with nuclear weapons: the National Security Strategy (NSS)[vi] and the Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR).[vii]

The NSS does not specifically refer to the criteria for their employment, but the SDSR discusses this in a number of passages. It explains that ‘to respond to the low probability but very high impact risk of a large-scale military attack by another state, we will maintain our capacity to deter, including through the nuclear deterrent.’ It must be noted that this is not qualified by the assertion that such an attack must be nuclear, or even that the state carrying out should have that capability. This is later compensated, however, with a reference to the ‘need for a minimum effective nuclear deterrent as the ultimate means to deter the most extreme threats’, although a list of such threats is not provided, and therefore a conventional attack on the Falklands is not explicitly ruled out.

Thus, the SDSR confirms, rather than dispels, the traditional ambiguity on the scope of the British nuclear deterrent, its possible targets, and the kind of attacks it could respond to. The text says that ‘The UK has long been clear that we would only consider using our nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances of self-defence, including the defence of our NATO Allies, and we remain deliberately ambiguous about precisely when, how and at what scale we would contemplate their use’.

The negative use assurance and countries acting in concert with nuclear powers

The SDSR also contains, however, a so-called negative use assurance, stating that ‘We are now able to give an assurance that the UK will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states parties to the NPT. In giving this assurance, we emphasise the need for universal adherence to and compliance with the NPT, and note that this assurance would not apply to any state in material breach of those non-proliferation obligations.’ The question thus emerges of whether this assurance covers Argentina, a non-nuclear weapons state party to the NPT. At first sight it seems it would, but similar guarantees are usually interpreted as not covering countries acting in concert with nuclear-weapons states.[viii]

Which confirmed that the use or threat of use, of nuclear weapons is subject to the laws of armed conflict, and rejected the argument that such use would necessarily be unlawful’. Although ‘the threshold for the legitimate use of nuclear weapons is clearly a high one’ and the UK ‘would only consider using nuclear weapons in self-defence (including the defence of our NATO allies), and even then only in extreme circumstances’, British doctrine is based on the principle that ‘The legality of any such use would depend upon the circumstances and the application of the general rules of international law, including those regulating the use of force and the conduct of hostilities’.

That is, British doctrine considers that international law does not in itself make illegal employing nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states. Rejecting an invasion of British territory would clearly fall within the confines of ‘self-defence.’ Even more so thanks to the reference to ‘our NATO allies’, since it would not seem logical to employ atomic weapons to defend foreign lands and not a British Overseas Territory.

Possible changes to nuclear targeting policy and arsenal to enhance deterrence

British nuclear weapons are currently strategic and not targeted at any country in particular.[ix] While changing these two factors is not strictly speaking necessary to guarantee an effective deterrent against Argentine aggression, two amendments may be advisable. First, publicly announcing that the country had become the pre-planned target for some of the missiles on board the submarine on patrol at any given time could send a powerful message to Buenos Aires, reducing the scope for miscalculations. Second, given the high threshold use for strategic weapons, it may be advisable to recover an explicitly tactical capability. Although strategic devices may be employed in a tactical role, the risk for miscalculations by would-be aggressors may be higher if the UK’s arsenal contains no specific tactical devices.

Conclusions: a role for nuclear weapons in the South Atlantic

Deep defence cuts and the loss of a significant portion of the British expeditionary capability have made the defence of the Falklands heavily reliant on Mount Pleasant and aerial reinforcement. While the military balance in the South Atlantic remains favourable, a purely conventional posture may no longer be sustainable. By analogy with Russia, it could be termed the ‘Russification’ of the Falklands. An examination of British nuclear doctrine has shown that, while originally designed to mainly counter non-conventional threats, it does not rule out reacting to conventional attacks not threatening the very existence of the United Kingdom. However, in order to make the nuclear deterrent more credible in the South Atlantic, and reduce the scope for another miscalculation, it may be advisable to amend targeting policy and recover a specific tactical capability.

___________________

Alex Calvo is a guest professor at the Law Department of Nagoya University (Japan). Olivia Olsen is a War Studies graduate from Wolverhampton University. You can follow Alex Calvo on Twitter @Alex_Calvo.

NOTES

1 The Future of the United Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrent, London, United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, December 2006, available at http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/AC00DD79-76D6-4FE3-91A1-6A56B03C092F/0/DefenceWhitePaper2006_Cm6994.pdf
[ii] A concept confirmed in the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review, which refers to ‘a minimum effective nuclear deterrent’ Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review, London, United Kingdom Government, October 2010, p. 12, available at http://www.direct.gov.uk/prod_consum_dg/groups/dg_digitalassets/@dg/@en/documents/digitalasset/dg_191634.pdf?CID=PDF&PLA=furl&CRE=sdsr
[iii] The Future of the United Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrent, p. 18.
[iv] Delivering Security in a Changing World. Defence White Paper, London, United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, December 2003, available at http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/051AF365-0A97-4550-99C0-4D87D7C95DED/0/cm6041I_whitepaper2003.pdf
[v] Nick Ritchie, UK nuclear weapons policy: deconstructing ‘minimum deterrence’, British International Studies Association, 2011, p. 6, available at http://www.bisa.ac.uk/index.php?option=com_bisa&task=view_public_papers_author_char_search&char_search=R
^{^[vi]} A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy, London, United Kingdom Government, October 2010, available at http://www.direct.gov.uk/prod_consum_dg/groups/dg_digitalassets/@dg/@en/documents/digitalasset/dg_191639.pdf?CID=PDF&PLA=furl&CRE=nationalsecuritystrategy
^{^[vii]}Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review, London, United Kingdom Government, October 2010, available at http://www.direct.gov.uk/prod_consum_dg/groups/dg_digitalassets/@dg/@en/documents/digitalasset/dg_191634.pdf?CID=PDF&PLA=furl&CRE=sdsr
^[VIII] Martin Butcher, Otfried Nassauer and Stephen Young, Nuclear Futures. Western European options for nuclear risk reduction, BASIC-BITS Research Report 98.5, British-American Security Information Council and Berlin Information Center for Transatlantic Security, December 1998, p. 13, available at http://www.bits.de/public/pdf/rr98-5.pdf
[ix] ‘In a posture known as Continuous At Sea Deterrence (CASD), one submarine, armed with up to 16 Trident missiles and up to 48 warheads, is always on deterrent patrol 24 hours a day, 365 days a year. The notice to fire has been increased to several days since the Cold War ended and the missiles are not targeted at any country.’ ‘Fact Sheet 4: The Current System’ The Future of the United Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrent, London, United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, December 2006, p. 1, available at http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/AE97B570-0E9A-48BC-9405-857F5E962507/0/Cm6994_Factsheet4.pdf

Is Trident relevant?

July 16, 2014 by Strife Staff

By Christy Quinn:

The Trident Commission, comprised of representatives of the three major parties and members of the UK defence establishment and organised by the British American Security Information Council (BASIC), represents the latest attempt to evaluate the necessity of the UK nuclear deterrent and its renewal.^{^[i]} Unfortunately, it has simply ended up restating many of the existing contradictions of UK nuclear strategy.

Historically the UK government has justified maintaining its own nuclear arsenal as the necessary price of remaining a world power in an era dominated by the United States. Thankfully the Commission has recognised the declining role of nuclear power in international diplomacy and looked primarily at how Trident contributes to the UK’s national security. It has ended up focusing its requirement for retaining a UK nuclear deterrent around the hypothetical “nuclear blackmail”scenario, where an aggressive nuclear-armed state threatens nuclear attack unless its needs or objectives are met. However, the Commision provides very little evidence about the likelihood of such a scenario and when policymakers in unfriendly countries would consider it in their interests. Indeed, it is highly likely that such behavior would be counterproductive in turning such states into ‘pariahs’, resulting in diplomatic and economic isolation.^{^[ii]} The primary example of brinkmanship resembling nuclear blackmail in recent years has been North Korea, which has periodically raised tensions with the US and South Korea in order to extract economic concessions. However, the report rightly notes the isolation of the UK from the South Asian strategic theatre and its small role in the conflict, to the extent that the UK’s nuclear deterrent is not relevant.

Special attention in the report was given to Russia, where Russian involvement in the Ukrainian conflict and the perceived threat to the Baltic states have forced a reassessment of the likelihood of Russian aggression against NATO member states. If Russia were to blackmail the UK to comply with its political objectives under threat of nuclear attack, it would have to assume that it faces no risk of nuclear retaliation. Russia would also have to assume that the US has also disarmed. There is frankly no possibility of the US completely disarming and withdrawing the nuclear umbrella over its NATO allies while there are any potentially unfriendly nuclear states still in existence. France conceivably may also have a problem with its EU partner, NATO ally and close neighbour being threatened with nuclear annihilation. In this reading, the United States’s nuclear deterrent and its willingness to protect its allies is the only one necessary to prevent nuclear blackmail. If Russia threatened to attack UK territory or bases with nuclear weapon, the US would be expected to honour Article 5 and defend Britain with any means necessary.^{^[iii]} Would the US stand idly by if London, a global trading centre and a key base of Western geopolitical power, suddenly disappeared under a rain of thermonuclear missiles? It’s a very hard scenario to imagine outside of a Hollywood thriller.

Furthermore, the report also confirms that the UK nuclear deterrent is entirely dependent upon US support and cooperation. Whilst the operational decisions for Trident are made by the Prime Minister, the UK only possesses Trident with the explicit support and technical cooperation of the US. If the US did withdraw its support for maintaining the UK nuclear deterrent, it would take “months rather than years” for their operational ability to expire due to shared maintenance agreements for the missiles and warheads.^{^[iv]} Many key components for the missiles are manufactured exclusively in the US. Even in the event of a renewed deterrent that featured an entirely new warhead and vehicle design, the prohibitive cost of starting from scratch would force the MoD to depend at least partially on US designs compatible with UK submarine designs.

Another major problem facing Trident is its lack of deterrent against the most likely form of nuclear attack; where a terrorist group, either with or without the help of an unfriendly state, detonates a mobile, low-yield nuclear weapon in a populated area. One of the most discussed scenarios in security circles is political instability in Pakistan leading to the country’s stockpile of nuclear weapons falling into the wrong hands.^{^[v]} If the terrorist group were evidenced to have obtained its warhead from Pakistan’s military or intelligence units, what would constitute proportionate response? Does Mutually Assured Destruction apply to state-sponsored terrorism? Do the residents of Islamabad warrant nuclear retaliation due to the actions of their government, or rogue actors within it? If there was no evidence of state sponsorship and the attack was entirely conducted by non-state actors, who or where warrants retaliation? Trident answers none of these questions. It is a strategic relic from another age that the UK’s defence establishment cannot face up to losing, despite its diminishing value in the 21st century.

___________________________
Christy Quinn is an incoming student for the MA in Intelligence & International Security at the War Studies Department of Kings College London and is a graduate of International History at the London School of Economics. His primary research interests include cyber security, diplomacy & strategy, economic history and the SE Asia and MENA regions. You can follow Christy on Twitter @christyquinn

Bibliography

UK Cabinet Office. “Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR)”, HM Government, 2010.
T.C. “Accounting and the Bomb”, The Economist, 30 July 2010.
http://www.economist.com/blogs/blighty/2010/07/britains_nuclear_weapons

NOTES

^{^[i]} BASIC, “The Trident Commission: Concluding Report”, British American Security Information Council (BASIC), 2014.
^{^[ii]} Sechser, Todd S. and Fuhrmann, Matthew, Crisis Bargaining and Nuclear Blackmail (2012). International Organization, http://ssrn.com/abstract=2135028
^{^[iii]} North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), “What is Article 5?”NATO. http://www.nato.int/terrorism/five.htm
^{^[iv]} Taylor, Richard N. “UK’s nuclear deterrent entirely dependent on the US –cross party report”, The Guardian, 1 July 2010, http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/defence and-security-blog/2014/jul/01/trident-nuclear-weapons-uk
^{^[v]}“What US could do if Pakistan loses control over nukes”, Global Security Newswire, http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/what-us-could-do-if-pakistan-loses-control-over-nukes/

No guts, no glory

April 24, 2014 by Strife Staff

By Matthew Bell:

Would an independent Scotland be missing some essential body parts?

How do you create a new country? Not a question many of us have had to ask, but one surely on the minds of thousands of Brits worrying what independence would mean for the security we have all come to take for granted.

The Scots now join an exclusive club of peoples who have found themselves charged with picking a course separate from that of its closest neighbour – in Scotland’s case, one it has been bound to for over 300 years.

Devolution has given Scotland a taste of independence, and much debate has understandably focused on whether Scotland could afford to lose the pound and many of the businesses that may prefer to be based across the border.

But the White Paper[1] published by the Scottish government last November also shows the scale of the task it faces in setting up new structures for defence and security.[2]

Or rather, it doesn’t. Because virtually every statement made on defence raised new questions without answering the multitude already posed.

Scotland’s future membership of the EU is far from certain, while the Scottish National Party has gently retreated from an absolute ban on nuclear weapons in its territory, reflecting just how much it values membership of NATO – an alliance underpinned by nuclear deterrence.

Vital organs

But even without descending into those uncertain waters, an independent Scotland would plainly have a plethora of problems to address, with few solutions clear.

Chief among these is how to create the public bodies that will look ahead, gather information, make plans and execute them to ensure Scotland stays safe and secure. All the boring stuff that in reality comprises the vital organs of a country, helps animate its spirit and keeps everything working properly.

The UK government estimates Scotland would need to create over 200 public bodies after independence,[3] including about a dozen that would be essential to secure its borders and protect the new nation.

The Scottish government countered that the list proved how “cluttered” the UK’s public sector had become, and said it would absorb many of the required roles into pre-existing departments and agencies.[4] Even so, the list of essential defence bodies is formidable.

This should not be too surprising for a country vying to break away and go it alone. But astonishingly, the SNP seems to have given little or no thought on how to pay for it.

Settling on an annual defence budget of £2.5 billion is all very well, even if many of the SNP’s stated expectations – including a fleet of at least 12 Typhoon fighters – seem more than a little unrealistic.

But factor in the costs of setting up a sprawling network of highly skilled military and civilian staff to carry out a bewildering array of highly specialised jobs, and you wonder how much money would be left.

At the risk of burdening illumination with detail, this is how the list stands. Bear in mind this is not an exact science, and much of what is currently done in UK hands could indeed be shuffled around quite a bit, as the SNP suggests – but the sheer scale of the challenge is eye-watering:

MI5 – spying for protection of the homeland
MI6 – foreign spying for protection of the homeland and overseas interests
GCHQ – data and signals monitoring
Ministry of Defence – strategic planning, co-ordination and command, troop recruitment and training, essential liaison with other armed forces
Defence Science and Technology Laboratory – scientific and technical research on technologies too sensitive or specialised for the private sector
Defence Nuclear Safety Committee – expertise on nuclear programmes, sites and operations
Defence Scientific Advisory Council – expertise on other areas of engineering and technology
Defence Support Group – essential maintenance of land and aerial vehicles
Advisory Group on Military Medicine – advice on the use of medical treatments on operations
Armed Forces Pay Review Body – independent advice on military salaries

The list does not include the following bodies, whose roles are carried out within the MoD but are significant enough to warrant separate mention:

Defence Intelligence – strategic defence intelligence for the military
Defence Equipment & Support – buys all the MoD’s equipment, annual budget £14 billion

The Scottish government has at least tackled part of the conundrum, settling on the creation of a Security and Intelligence Agency to replace the work currently done by GCHQ, MI5 and MI6.[5]

But even here the strategic planning and costing is woefully inadequate, according to the Royal United Services Institute.[6]

An effective agency would take years to build from scratch, and would probably have paltry access to data and signals intelligence to properly identify and track security threats, says RUSI.

To add to its woes, an independent Scotland would not have automatic access to the ‘Five Eyes’ intelligence pool – shared by the UK, US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand – and could also be left out from the Club of Berne, which enables intelligence sharing between European agency heads.

A familiar new friend

These challenges may push an independent Scotland towards close intelligence co-operation with the remainder of the UK, but the UK would not be in a position to share sensitive information garnered by others without their permission.

All things considered, the rest of the UK would have to decide how secure it would be with the country on its border shorn of useful intelligence and the means to understand it. In defence too, the UK and Scotland may prefer intimate collaboration to ensure the joint security of the island.

This is perhaps the nub of the issue: the extent to which UK co-operation would be desirable or even essential for Scotland in any number of areas, from defence and intelligence to finance and business.

The problem will hit both countries hard, at which point the politicians will really have to earn their pennies by striking acceptable compromises across the board.

Of course, both sides already know what could be coming and are busy installing leverage for what would be hugely important separation negotiations.

But in a worst case scenario, could Scotland really get by on its own if the political battle was lost, and it received minimal aid in defence and intelligence from the remainder UK?

Those working in defence and security already face a sea of uncertainties in their daily toil. Independence without proper planning could bring a whole lot more.

______________________

Matthew Bell is author of ‘Making the Break’ (November 2013) and ‘Separation Anxiety’ (June 2012), articles on Scottish independence and defence published by IHS Jane’s.
www.Matthew-Bell.com
@MatthewAlBell

NOTES

[1]Scottish government White Paper: http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2013/11/9348/0
[2]Scottish government White Paper – international relations and defence: http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2013/11/9348/10
[3]List of 200 public bodies Scotland would need to establish after independence: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-public-bodies-that-operate-in-scotland
[4] BBC coverage of public bodies serving Scotland: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-22993752
[5] Scottish government White Paper – security and intelligence: http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2013/11/9348/11
[6]RUSI on the proposed Scottish security and intelligence agency: https://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/201403_BP_Scotlands_Blueprint.pdf

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