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Can the Trump Peace Plan Survive Political Upheaval in Israel’s Upcoming Elections?

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By Lauren Mellinger

4 March 2019

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and US President Donald Trump shake hands during a press conference in February 2017. Netanyahu is up for reelection in April, after which Trump plans to release a Middle East peace plan. (Benjamin Applebaum)

 

As Israelis prepare to vote on April 9, the Trump administration has announced that at long last, the U.S. peace plan, which President Trump has referred to as ‘the deal of the century’, will be unveiled in April. The fate of the plan however, and of the prospect of an American role in getting the parties to return to the negotiating table, remains an open question.

From an “election about nothing” to a referendum on Netanyahu

In September 1992, the popular TV-sitcom Seinfeld aired an episode titled ‘The Pitch’, in which Jerry Seinfeld and his friend, George Constanza, pitch a pilot to NBC, predicated on a half hour of, well, nothing. Fast forward 27 years, and one could similarly describe the current Israeli elections as a race about nothing. Israel faces formidable challenges at home and abroad — including the threats from Iran’s increasing presence in Syria and their assistance in Hizballah’s growing arsenal; the withdrawal of the US from Syria and the challenge of Russia’s expanding presence in the region; and ongoing tensions in Gaza. In addition, a host of unresolved religion and state issues, in particular matters pertaining to burden-sharing, continue to vex slimmer, right-wing-led coalitions, while challenges to Israel’s relationship with Diaspora Jewish communities and the ongoing stalemate in negotiations with the Palestinians merit more debate time. In lieu of a substantive debate regarding the geopolitical and domestic challenges facing Israel however, the election thus far has largely focused on whether Benjamin Netanyahu, the incumbent prime minister, should win another term. 

The prospect of Israel’s incoming government led by someone other than Netanyahu increased this past week, following Attorney General Avishai Mandelblit’s announcement of the intent to indict Netanyahu on charges including bribery, fraud, and breach of trust. Following the announcement, Israel’s newest party, the Blue White list, eclipsed Netanyahu’s Likud Party in the polls for the first time, suggesting that Netanyahu might not be able to form a coalition.

Though damaging to Netanyahu, per Israeli law, Mandleblit’s announcement does not preclude him from running, or serving in office —pending a verdict. Thus far Netanyahu responded by doubling down on populist rhetoric, a move that will most likely preclude the formation of anything other than a right-wing coalition, in the event Netanyahu can win another term. This would then put the incoming Israeli government squarely at odds with the Trump administration’s plan, should the Americans proceed with the plan’s release.

The ‘deal of the century’ is finally set to be unveiled in April . . . maybe

The lack of substantive issue-oriented discussions in the election thus far is by no means evidence of the lack of a campaign strategy — by either side of the political spectrum. By not formally taking a position on the issue of future peace with the Palestinians outright, the centre-left bloc may be hoping to pry votes away from the right. If their efforts ultimately pay off, it would likely be due to two key reasons: a party list which has prioritized leaders with bona fide security credentials, namely three former military chiefs of staff (including one who also served as defence minister); and the fact that Netanyahu, who until recently faced the prospect of an indictment on corruption charges, has moved so far to the right to maintain his grip on the premiership that he coordinated a deal that could bring the extremist group Otzma Yehudit — a group anathema to even right-leaning Israeli voters — into the Knesset.

And here is where the Trump administration lost a critical opportunity. Most veteran Mideast observers would undoubtedly caution an American administration against announcing a potentially game-changing peace effort amid an Israeli election — both to avoid an outward appearance of intervening in Israel’s domestic politics and to insulate the administration from having the initiative fail. Yet, in the current political environment, waiting until April to release the plan is a missed opportunity. As Beilin argued, for the moment, neither Netanyahu nor former IDF Chief of Staff Benny Gantz, head of the Blue White Party, appeared bothered by the administration’s decision to delay the unveiling of the plan until after the elections. Gantz’s new alliance has yet to reveal their platform, but the presence of one of his bloc partners, former defence minister Moshe Ya’alon, currently #3 on the Blue White List, having ruled out support for a two-state solution, together with the party’s reported opposition to dividing Jerusalem and evacuating settlement blocs in the West Bank, suggest that a two-state solution is a non-starter. Recent statements from Naftali Bennett’s new party, and those of parties to the right of Bennett that are now aligned with Netanyahu, as well as recent statements by Netanyahu himself, seem to suggest that this may be one area of agreement for the right and centre. Laying out the terms of the Trump peace plan now, rather than after April 9, would have required the parties to address the issue in a more substantive way.

Should Netanyahu manage to emerge the victor in April’s elections, he will come to a crossroad in his relationship with Trump, which until now has arguably been the closest relationship Netanyahu has ever had with a U.S. president. The farther right the prime minister has to move in order to secure his reelection and manage to assemble a coalition, the more difficult it will be to make any concessions regarding a peace agreement. Nor does the prime minister appear willing to do so. As Netanyahu himself recently stated, if he wins, he will form a religious, right-wing governing coalition, and will not offer a partnership to his centrist challengers. The possibility that Otzma Yehudit crosses the 3.25% threshold and forms a part of a future government poses yet another challenge for the Trump peace plan, and for U.S.-Israel relations more broadly, in light of U.S. anti-terrorism laws. (Under U.S. law, Otzma Yehudit is led by followers of the late Rabbi Meir Kahane, and Kahane Chai/Kach is still designated as a foreign terrorist organisation).

An added complication likely to hamper the success of Trump’s peace plan is the current U.S. relationship with the Palestinians, which has deteriorated significantly while President Trump has been in office, due to a host of missteps by the administration, including aid cuts, the President’s decision to relocate the US embassy to Jerusalem, and his more recent decision to downgrade the U.S. consulate in Jerusalem by merging the two, a move largely considered a further affront to the Palestinians, and suggests that the pending announcement of the Trump peace plan will not endorse a two-state solution.

Now with five weeks to go before the election, with the race essentially boiling down to a referendum on the incumbent prime minister, it remains to be seen whether a substantive, issue-oriented debate about the future of a two-state solution can occur before Israelis head to the polls. With what appears to be a close race between Netanyahu and Gantz for the premiership, both parties would be well advised to develop their positions on the pending Trump plan. The U.S. president is well-known for maintaining a transactional relationship with politicians and world leaders. As President Trump has demonstrated a penchant for responding to praise while doubling down on petty, yet damaging, attacks on opponents when he feels criticized, precisely how much attention the U.S. will give to efforts to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the next two (or six) years will likely depend on how both sides — Israelis and Palestinians — respond to his administration’s proposed peace plan.

Lauren Mellinger is a doctoral candidate in War Studies at King’s College London and a 2018-19 Israel Institute Doctoral Fellow. She is also a former senior editor of Strife’s blog and journal. Her research specializes in Israeli counterterrorism, foreign policy, and national security decision-making, as well as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. You can follow her on Twitter @Lauren_M04.

Image source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?search=Netanyahu+Trump&title=Special%3ASearch&profile=advanced&fulltext=1&advancedSearch-current=%7B%22namespaces%22%3A%5B6%2C12%2C14%2C100%2C106%2C0%5D%7D&ns6=1&ns12=1&ns14=1&ns100=1&ns106=1&ns0=1#/media/File:President_Donald_Trump_and_Prime_Minister_Benjamin_Netanyahu_Joint_Press_Conference,_February_15,_2017_(01).jpg

 

Netanyahu, just the man we need

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By Gianmarco Morassutti Vitale:

Photo: Wikipedia
Photo: Wikipedia

This is the last of a three-piece series analysing outcomes and impacts of the recent Israeli election. Last week Eddo Bar considered what impact Netanyahu’s re-election would have on Israeli security, and Jill Russell examined the potential consequences for US-Israeli relations.

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Last Wednesday, Isaac Herzog, leader of the centre–left Zionist Union, conceded defeat to Benjamin Netanyahu after his party was allotted 24 seats in the Knesset – the Israeli parliament – to the Likud’s 30. In a similar fashion to the 1996 elections against Shimon Peres and the Labor party, Netanyahu’s Likud trailed behind the opposition in opinion polls but managed to secure the elections with a victory that he described as “against all odds”.

That same day, the Likud party announced that it was looking to form a coalition government with the Jewish Home party, Yisrael Beitenu, the United Torah Party, the ultra-orthodox Shas, and the centrist Kulanu.

Beyond the Likud’s victory, what really caused media uproar was Netanyahu’s declaration on Tuesday that he rejected the possibility of a Palestinian state, ultimately destroying the possibility of a two-state solution and deepening schisms in the US-Israeli relationship.

However, in order to galvanise the peace process and change decision-making in Israel, it is necessary to raise the cost of the occupation. In order to create constructive change, it is necessary to place Israel on a collision course with everyone else. Since long-standing support from the US and international partners have been critical to maintaining the status quo, a re-evaluation of the peace process might lead to a new direction and initiative. For this, Netanyahu is just the man we need; he is a polarising figure on the international stage, and his re-election will compel allies and partners to re-assess their policy towards Israel.

It is no secret that the relationship between the United States and Israel, or more specifically, with the Bibisitter himself, has been colder than it had been in the past. Netanyahu’s most recent visit to Washington DC, where he appeared before Congress to speak against an emerging nuclear deal with Iran, galvanised certain elements of the Republican party but placed him in the doghouse for the Obama administration. Netanyahu was accused of trying to bolster his election support and provide the Republican-dominated Congress with the backing to oppose the executive’s negotiations with Iran. Perhaps the decision to invite Netanyahu was motivated more by anti-Obama sentiment than an anti-Iran / pro-Israel sentiment.

Netanyahu’s outright opposition to a Palestinian state marks a decisive break from US interests in the region. Republican and Democrat administration in the past decades have implicitly desired the establishment of a Palestinian state, despite the US’s continuous support of Israel in the UN. The Prime Minister’s declaration has therefore raised some serious concerns in the current administration. According to Josh Earnest, the press secretary to the Obama administration, the US is ‘deeply concerned about rhetoric that seeks to marginalize Arab-Israeli citizens’. He also added that the administration would ‘have to reassess our options going forward’. There have in fact been warnings that the US might withdraw its political support for Israel within the UN. However, military support and the security relationship will continue to be sacrosanct.

Many have dismissed Netanyahu’s abandonment of prior commitments as mere election rhetoric aimed at consolidating right-wing votes during the elections, and they aren’t wrong. According to a report from Haaretz by Or Kashti, while the Zionist Union fared better in the larger and wealthier cities, Likud won the majority of middle- and lower-class towns (64 of 77) and the support of West Bank settlements. On Thursday, two days after his electoral victory, Netanyahu had already begun to backtrack on his statements. He explained that he wasn’t divorcing the peace process but that ‘what has changed is the reality’. He said that the reality on the ground marked what was achievable and what wasn’t. ‘To make it achievable, then you have to have real negotiations with people who are committed to peace’.

For Dimi Reider, an Israeli journalist and researcher at the European Council on Foreign Affairs, Benjamin Netanyahu needs to maintain the mirage perception of a two-state solution as it allows Israel to pursue and implement a de facto, rather than de jure, one-state reality. According to certain officials, Netanyahu has previously talked about the two-state solution as lip service to coalition partners but tended to focus policy arguments on the dangerous presence of Hamas in the West Bank and Gaza. He has also categorically refused to address a binational state solution, preferring an ‘Israel-only’ supervision of future demilitarisation in the West Bank[1].

Regardless of Benjamin Netanyahu’s backtracking and attempts to clarify his statements, the White House has reaffirm its commitments to the two-state solution. Mr Earnest clarified that Netanyhu’s statement did have consequences, one of which was demonstrating that he wasn’t truly committed to the peace process and that consequently the administration would have to reassess its options and ‘re-evaluate our thinking’.

And this is why Netanyahu is – inadvertently – perfect for the long-term prospects of the peace process.

When the election results came out and it became clear that Netanyahu had won, social media platforms rang out with all sorts of disappointment and many echoed the fear that a two-state solution was finally buried. But the victory of Likud and Benjamin Netanyahu is actually a positive outcome because it is likely to harden the desire within the US and other international actors for a new process and mobilise the effort needed for it to be constructive.

Netenyahu’s divisive rhetoric during the elections and the abandonment of prior commitments for the sake of votes has demonstrated that Netanyahu is the worst kind of opportunist. This, alongside his continuous flip-flop between the possibility of negotiating a two-state solution and the categorical refusal to withdraw from the West Bank, demonstrates that Netanyahu is not a trustworthy partner and the US should refrain from being his enabler. Senators Dianne Feinstein and Richard Durbin stated that Netanyahu has sacrificed a ‘deep and well-established cooperation’ for partisan points that would have lasting repercussions.

Netanyahu’s persona carries an important phenomenon: polarization, and it is this ability that, as Gideon Levy – a writer for Haaretz – stated, will ‘lead the United States to adopt harsh measures against Israel, for the man whom the world long ago grew sick of’[2].

In irregular warfare insurgent or guerrilla movements often aim at polarizing the populace, who are regarded as the critical battleground, rather than the conventional battlefield. Polarising the populace typically results in the heightened mobilisation of people and a more clear distinction of who is on whose side. In other words, polarisation shifts perceptions so that the world stops being viewed as many different shades of gray and becomes a world of black and white or “us versus them”. Netanyahu embodies this polarisation factor.

Netanyahu has come to embody the very concept of Israeli intransigence, the expansion of settlements, and the violation of Palestinian rights.

As interactions between Israelis and Palestinians has diminished and the costs of maintaining the occupied territories hasn’t risen, Israel has become comfortable with the status quo. For any kind of effective change it is necessary to alter the trajectory. If Isaac Herzog had been elected, the illusory perception of change might have lessened international pressure on Israel. A new government would have sought to reopen previously failed channels and peace negotiations would have begun without any real progress. Stagnation would be the inevitable product of a united right-wing opposition in the Knesset.

Despite being snubbed by the Obama administration, Israel continues to have deep contacts within Congress. Netanyahu’s government will probably try to ride out the division with the Obama administration until the next US presidential is elected in 2016, but if the current administration begins to act on its re-evaluations, as Earnest stated, it could spell real trouble for Netanyahu. Even if he does try to ride it out, pressure on Israel is bound to increase.

In fact, under Netanyahu’s leadership, the ‘BDS’ or ‘boycott, divestment and sanctions’ campaign against Israel by the international community has thrived. Millions of dollars have been divested from Israeli Banks and companies like SodaStream that operated in the West Bank.

Netanyahu continues to heighten tensions between allies and polarise the international community. The opposition of his government to any constructive change will mobilise international pressure and possibly the future of an entirely new peace process.

And that’s why I, for one, am glad that the Bibisitter is back.

Gianmarco Morassutti Vitale is an MA student in War Studies at King’s College London.  His holds a BA in Arabic and Politics from the University of Leeds. He spent a year in Egypt during the revolution 2011 and has a particular interest in the Middle East, especially Lebanon, Hezbollah and Israel.

Where there's a stick, there's also a carrot: the 'new' US position on Israel

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By Jill R Russell:800px-U.S._and_Israeli_flags_are_flown_in_preparation_for_a_media_event_during_Austere_Challenge_2012_in_Israel_121024-F-SM325-002

This is the second of a three-piece series analyzing outcomes and impacts of the recent Israeli election. Next, Gianmarco Morassutti Vitale will consider how polarization around Netanyahu may actually result in mobilization.

***

“We’re currently evaluating our approach.” State Department spokeswoman Jen Psaki.

Reading responses to the Obama Administration’s latest moves on Israel paints a starkly negative picture. An age of 24-hour news and social media trends means that it can be difficult to see diplomacy in public discourse between countries as one of give and take, statement and response. Coupled with this and despite every criticism of his process, President Obama continues to rely upon a slow unfolding to pursue his policies. The first step is never the policy but rather the signal of the preferred direction it should take. If this is the case, how should the recent statements on Israel, the United Nations and future relations be understood? Leaving behind the partisan interpretations dominating headlines and drawing these moves in stark binary terms to poison the relationship, removing that lens brings to the fore a more nuanced message of preferences and options.

Where there is a stick…

“The United States and this administration are deeply concerned by divisive rhetoric that seeks to marginalize Arab-Israeli citizens.” White House Press Secretary Josh Earnest.

The ongoing Palestinian crisis is the thorn in the side of Arab-Israeli relations and stability within the region as a whole. Attenuating its emotion will serve the interests and desires of all reasonable parties, Israel first among them. To stanch the animosity towards the west the narrative has to shift to put them more on the side of the Palestinians. This can be done not only with Israeli consent, but in fact with their lead. The reference to their Arab citizens is a powerful reminder of the significant strategic edge Israel holds, but does not utilize, with respect to Hamas, because these citizens especially know that in any quality of life comparison Israel wins. This can be a wedge with the Palestinian people as well.

Despite the political difficulties it faces within a conservative Israeli demographic, the United Nations resolution regarding the two state solution and the 1967 borders is a sensible starting point for negotiations. There is no indication from the US that this would represent the end to a negotiation policy and it is puerile to suggest so. But to come to the table under those terms is, I suspect, a preference within the framework of greater regional diplomacy and relations.

Acquiescence to negotiation puts Israel in the better strategic and political position. Their agreement to the process puts pressure on Hamas amidst a growing narrative of discontent with the group in response to its cold calculations regarding the likely use of the civilian population as a human shield for the fine propaganda fodder of those casualties. Shifting the political burden to Hamas to negotiate allows the West and Israel to begin retaking the terrain of the strategic narrative.

…there is also a carrot.

“The premise of our position internationally has been to support direct negotiations between Israelis and the Palestinians. We are now in a reality where the Israeli government no longer supports direct negotiations. Therefore we clearly have to factor that into our decisions going forward.” US Administration spokesperson.

Netanyahu’s recent unwillingness to engage presents a challenge. One expects that the domestic political demands of the election drove this position. With that behind him softening is possible, probably not hurt by a small measure of American pressure to blame for it. There is only so far Netanyahu and Israel can go in terms of eschewing diplomacy. No matter the hardliners, in his party and beyond, the only path forward is negotiations. While military skirmishing might provide slight alterations in the political calculus, the answers will only be found in political settlement.

Thus, while this statement can read as a blunt dismissal of Israeli interests and needs, it also marks a clear and positive path forward. If the failure to engage is understood to justify negative consequence, it is equally the case that the opposite offers benefits. We are not at the end, but the beginning, offering as much hope as despair.

Pressure has been placed on Israel, to be sure, but it has been done so in a way that makes clear there are options. And while the partisans howl already it seems that Netanyahu has read the cues and is moderating his terms.

Jill S. Russell is a military historian and doctoral candidate who writes frequently on contemporary foreign policy and security issues. She is a regular contributor to Strife, Kings of War and Small Wars. You can follow her on Twitter @jsargentr.

 

 

Netanyahu's victory: what it means for Israel's security

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By Eddo Bibro Bar:

Benjamin Netanyahu visits the IDF Hermon Brigade base, February 2015. Photo: Amos Ben Gershom, GPO (CC)
Benjamin Netanyahu visits the IDF Hermon Brigade base, February 2015. Photo: Amos Ben Gershom, GPO (CC)

This is the first of a three piece series analyzing outcomes and impacts of the recent Israeli election. Next, Jill R. Russell will analyse the “new” US position on Israel.  

The Israeli elections on Tuesday have ended with the overwhelming (and some might say surprising) victory of incumbent Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Now that the dust is starting to settle on what has been a very emotional election campaign, it is time to examine the effect that Netanyahu’s re-election might have on domestic and regional security.

Perhaps the biggest change following the elections is that the coalition Netanyahu will most likely form will comprise of strictly right-wing parties. In recent decades, most coalitions in Israel were comprised of members from different parts of the political spectrum. However, the new coalition is expected to consist of Netanyahu’s Likud Party, Bennett’s radical right Jewish Home Party (comprised mostly of members who live in the settlements) and the economically oriented right-wing party of Moshe Kahlon, who is himself a former senior Likud member.

During the election campaign Netanyahu repeatedly claimed that the Islamic State poses a direct threat to Israel’s security. This does not appear to be the case. The IS-affiliated groups in the Sinai desert are currently contained by the Egyptian Army, which is aggressively trying to eradicate them, and they are not likely to open a second front against Israel. On Israel’s northern border, Hezbollah, aided by Iran’s Revolutionary Guard, are focusing most of their resources and efforts on defeating IS while simultaneously fighting Jabat al Nusra forces, which have obtained a number of strongholds in South Lebanon and are undermining Hezbollah’s military supremacy in the region. It is therefore safe to assume that IS will not be posing a threat on the Israeli northern border in the foreseeable future.

Indeed, the threat to Israel’s northern border is not posed by IS but by Hezbollah. Hezbollah’s ongoing war with IS and Jabat al Nusra has led its units to gain control in the Golan Heights, an area previously controlled by the Syrian Army. Israel will not allow Hezbollah (and vicariously Iran) to take over the Syrian part of the Golan Heights, as it is perceived by Israel as an area of great strategic importance. Hezbollah, which has exhausted its resources in the four-year war in Syria, has no interest in opening a new front against Israel. Yet changing circumstances might lead it to try and conquer parts of the Golan Heights. It is a scenario that Israel can’t allow and it might lead it to engage in conflict with Hezbollah.

Gaza will continue to be a major problem for Netanyahu. Operation Protective Edge has left the Gaza Strip in pieces and it is struggling to rebuild itself. Egypt’s persistent stand against Hamas, which includes closing the border between Egypt and Gaza and fighting Hamas’s smuggling industry – which has flourished since 2005 – has taken a big toll on Hamas and the Gazan population alike.

The declining economic state of the Gazan population, along with the loss of hope for political reconciliation with the PLO, are causing public unrest in Gaza. While Hamas is not interested in another war at this moment, as it has drained its resources, if the unrest continues or intensifies, Hamas might be pushed to attack Israel in order to reassert its dominance and regain its legitimacy in the Gazan streets. Netanyahu’s right-wing coalition will not allow him to alleviate the blockade on Gaza, as this will be perceived as a concession to a terrorist organisation, but leaving the situation as it is at the moment will likely result in a war that neither of the sides wants.

In the West Bank, it seems like Netanyahu has dug himself a hole from which he will have a hard time finding his way out. Over the last few days of the election campaign, Netanyahu announced that the two-State solution is no longer viable, thereby retracting his 2009 ‘Bar Ilan Speech’, in which he declared that he would be striving to reach a peace agreement based on the two-State solution. In addition, his predicted right-wing coalition will not allow Netanyahu to stop building in the settlements, since the parties are heavily dependent on the settlers’ support. The US government and the EU have both demanded that Israel stops building in the settlements, and if there is no let up in the building then the tensions in the West Bank may be brought to a boiling point.

The PLO is likely to try and unilaterally achieve recognition of its independence through the UN. Whereas in the past such an option seemed extremely unlikely to succeed as the US was expected to automatically veto such requests, the deteriorating relations between Israel and the US, fuelled by the mutual loathing and complete distrust between the American and Israeli heads of state, might lead the US to back such a Palestinian request. In the unlikely event that Netanyahu does in fact pursue a two-state solution, it would probably lead to the collapse of his coalition. Any attempt to pacify his coalition allies by militarily preventing the establishment of an internationally recognised Palestinian State is likely to lead to Israel’s isolation in the international community.

Netanyahu’s six years in power have severely damaged Israel’s international relations and have alienated Israel’s greatest allies. Obama dislikes Netanyahu, who, according to sources in the White House, is referred to as ‘chicken shit’. Hollande has a similarly dim view of the Israeli leader, particularly after the speech Netanyahu delivered following the attack on Charlie Hebdo in which he urged the French Jewish community to flee France. Moreover, relations with Germany are at a historic low.

Israel has always relied on international support, in one way or another, in times of war. Despite the fact that some of the threats Israel is facing may erupt due to circumstances that are not due to Netanyahu’s actions, the international isolation caused by his actions and policies, the radicalisation of his rhetoric, and the predicted formation of a radical right-wing coalition are the main reasons that it will be difficult for Israel to respond to potential future threats.

Eddo Bar holds a BA in Philosophy and Political Science from Tel Aviv University. He is currently studying towards an MA in International Conflict Studies. and Previously worked as a TA, RA and a research intern in the INSS. His work work focused on Peacemaking in Israel since 1967 and history, strategy and warfare in the Middle East.

Interview – Dr Ahron Bregman on Israel/Palestine: 'The third Intifada is underway'

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By Isobel Petersen:

pal_wall

On June 30th the bodies of three Israeli teenagers were found buried in a shallow grave near Hebron, in the southern part of the West Bank. On July 2nd a suspected revenge killing of a Palestinian teenager took place in Jerusalem. Since these murders, there has been a renewed escalation of fighting, resulting in hundreds of deaths, injuries and displacement, predominantly suffered by Palestinians. We are now witnessing what could arguably be called the ‘Third Intifada’.

Intifada is an Arabic word loosely meaning ‘to shake off’ and has been adopted by Palestineans to describe the two major historical uprisings against Israeli military occupation of the West Bank and Gaza, from 1987-1993 and 2000-2005. In recent weeks the crisis has been transposed from the rubble of Gaza to the holy Old City of Jerusalem. Ten days ago five Israelis were killed in a vicious attack on worshippers in a synagogue in West Jerusalem. Yesterday Israel’s internal security service Shin Bet said that it had arrested 30 Hamas militants in the West Bank allegedly planning attacks on Jerusalem. Israeli’s Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, has vowed to win a ‘battle for Jerusalem’.

Dr Ahron Bregman, an expert in the Israel-Palestine conflict, is better placed than most to talk about the current situation and its historical roots. His most recent publication, Cursed Victory: A History of Israel and the Occupied Territories, charts the Israeli occupation since the 1967 war. The first of its kind, this book uses top-secret and never-before-published documents and recorded conversations to shed light on critical moments in the ongoing peace process. Dr Bregman has lived in the UK for 25 years since leaving Israel beause of his moral objection to the occupation. He teaches at the Department of War Studies at King’s College London. I interviewed him in the wake of the attacks on the synagogue in Jerusalem:

***

Your book ‘Cursed Victory’ was released this year. What first set you onto the path and determination to publish the many previously unpublished documents and recorded conversations deatiled in your book?

There are so many books on Israel and the Arabs and I’ve looked for ways to attract potential readers to my book. So I’ve spent quite a lot of time researching new material. What I found – and then published in Cursed Victory – shocked me to the core. For instance, transcripts of telephone conversations between the president of the US and world leaders, secretly recorded by Israeli agents. But don’t be mistaken: for me, publishing top secret documents was only a tool to attract the readers to what I really wanted them to read, namely about the Israeli occupation, one of the cruelest occupations in modern history.

There has been criticism in the press that perhaps the book does not adequately address the past ten to fifteen years of the conflict, in which there has been increased violence, set-backs and diplomatic breakdown. Is this a fair criticism?

The perspective of time is important. Therefore, you need to stop early enough in the story so that you’ll have this perspective. The gap between the past and present provides a better view of past events. But for the American and German editions of the book, which will be published soon, I’ve added a new Foreword, bringing the story up to date.

Much of the book discusses former Israeli Defence Minister Moshe Dayan’s fierce policy of Israel as an ‘invisible’ presence. Today Israel argues that Gaza has the opportunity to develop independently because the state officially departed in 2005. But as we have seen this summer, Gaza is anything but free from Israeli interference. Can there be mutual trust between Israel and the Palestinians if Israel never truly leaves Gaza?

Israel withdrew in 2005, but the occupation of the Gaza Strip continues from the outside, as Israel exercises what the international law of occupation would call “effective control” over the territory. Israel controls the Gaza Strip from the air, sea and land. By now the people of Gaza are accustomed to the constant buzzing background noise of Israeli drones and helicopters overhead. Gaza’s fishermen are prevented by the Israeli navy from going deep into the sea to fish. And of course Israel can dictate – and it does – what the Gazans will have on their plates for breakfast through the army’s monitoring of the flow of food and other products into the Strip. As for real reconciliation between Gazans and Israelis – well, it will take many generations before the Gazans can forgive the Israelis for turning their lives into hell.

You have spoken openly about your time in the Israel military and your role as an artillery forward observer during the 1982 Lebanon war. This summer you have condemned unreservedly the so-called ‘Hannibal Protocol’. Could you please explain in a little more depth precisely what this military command means for both the Israeli military and Palestinians?

The ‘Hannibal Protocol’ is the Israel Defence Force (IDF) procedure aimed at preventing its soldiers from falling into enemy hands. It’s a product of Israel’s Lebanon wars – it was invented there in the 1980s – a procedure to be used in the first minutes and hours after a possible abduction of an Israeli soldier. It calls on the military to dramatically escalate attacks in the vicinity of any kidnapping – to destroy bridges, roads, houses, cars, everything in fact – to shoot in all possible directions in order to prevent the captors form disappearing with the abducted soldier.

During the conflict in Gaza this summer, when the IDF thought – wrongly, as it turned out – that one of its officers had been abducted by Hamas in the southern Gaza Strip, the “Hannibal Protocol” was activated with a devastating effects; don’t forget that the Gaza area is one of the most densely populated areas on Earth. The army used everything at its disposal – tanks, artillery, aeroplanes, drones – and pounded vast areas in Rafah [the largest town in the south of the Gaza Strip, very close to the border with Egypt], causing enormous damage, killing and wounding scores of innocent Palestinians. The brutal “Hannibal Procedure” seems to me to break all rules of war. It should be thrown out of the window and never used again in Gaza or anywhere else. The Israelis who activated it should be sent to The Hague to face trial.

It is widely known that you left Israel in 1988 for moral reasons and your deep-set disagreement with the Israeli occupation. Earlier this year there were three tragic suicides of Israeli soldiers, all of whom had been part of the Givati Brigade. This Brigade has become infamous for its heavy bombardments and zealous religious justification. There is also a drop in numbers of those continuing in the armed forces after their national service. Reflecting on your six years in the forces and your decision to leave Israel for the UK, do you think there is an underestimated negative effect that being in the Israeli military is having on public cohesion about the occupation?

Serving in the Israeli army is not the problem. In fact, for Israel the IDF is the perfect melting pot to turn people who came to the state from four corners of the earth into one nation. Young people, many of whom can’t speak Hebrew because they came from Russia or Ethiopia, or wherever, join the army and after three years of military service they can swear in Hebrew! The problem, however, is the use of the soldiers to run the occupation. These young people, often aged no more than 18, do things that poison their souls and ruin the society of which they are a part. They break into Palestinian houses in the middle of the night and humiliate Palestinians, many of whom are probably the same age as their parents or grandparents.

This summer was the beginning of a series of public and shocking acts of violence enacted by Palestinians, Israelis and the Israeli military, which arguably has begun the ‘Third Intifada’. What are your predictions for the rest of the year and into 2015?

The third Palestinian Intifada is well underway. For now it is mainly in Jerusalem. But it could easily spread into other parts of the West Bank, Gaza Strip and even into Israel proper where a large non-Jewish community live. I believe this uprising will continue well into 2015.

Religious competition over Jerusalem is at the heart of the Arab – Israeli conflict, as we saw a few days ago. Should there have been more of a focus on reconciling Jewish and Islamic tensions in recent years rather than Hamas and security? Or are they separate and yet equally as divisive?

I’m afraid that the Arab-Israeli conflict is now turning into a Jewish-Muslim conflict. This is dangerous! Holy wars are bad news.

The Arab-Israeli conflict seems to be perpetually related to Western support or disapproval. In Cursed Victory you point the finger very strongly at consistent United States backing of Israel. Many conflict theorists point to international pressure in bringing about a transformation for states embroiled in conflict and those with a weak human rights record. Israel seems to have bucked this trend, surely the US cannot be the only reason for this?

The US is part of the problem. They are just too close to Israel. In Cursed Victory I publish a secret letter from American secretary of state Madeleine Albright to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu promising him that the US will never show a peace proposal to the Arabs before first showing it to the Israelis. This is incredible. It effectively gives the Israelis a veto power over their peace proposals. And yes: only international pressure, particularly on Israel, as the strongest party, holding almost all the tangibles, could move the peace process forward. Pressure on Israel should also include boycotts on products and services coming from the occupied territories.

When you conclude in Cursed Victory that Israel has ‘hardened those under its power, making them more determined to put an end to the occupation, by violent means if necessary, and live a life of dignity and freedom’ does this imply that the only way to end the occupation is through violent means on the part of the Palestinians? Or can the diplomatic route work?

The Palestinians have no other option but to embark on a massive non-violent Intifada against the occupation. Otherwise, the Israelis will not move. The Israelis, believe me, only move when under pressure. The Palestinians can’t get their state on a silver platter; they’ll have to fight for it. But it must be a non-violent uprising. An uprising of flowers and of candles; not of suicide bombings.

Two central tenets of the Palestinean indepedence cause are the ‘right of return’ and the claim to sovereignty over parts of Jerusalem, yet Israel will not entertain these ideas. As such, how can there ever be a peaceful two-state solution?

You’ve put your finger on the heart of the matter, on the two most complicated issues which the Israelis and Palestinians will have to tackle head on. I believe that technical solutions could be found to divide Jerusalem between Israelis and Palestinians. But what the Palestinians call “our right of return” to old Palestine; the Israelis refer to it as “your claims of return”, immediately illustrating the depth of the matter. It is much more complicated to sort out than the Jerusalem problem.

 

Note from the editors: This article was originally titled “Interview – Dr Ahron Bregman on Israel/Palestine: ‘One of the cruelest occupations in modern history'” After consideration, we have chosen to rename the article.

Dr Ahron Bregman’s book, Cursed Victory: A History of Israel and the Occupied Territories, is published by Allen Lane (June, 2014). Pages: 416. Hardback: £25. To be published in America by Pegasus in May 2015. ISBN: 9780713997750 

Isobel studied International Relations at the University of Exeter and is currently reading for an MA in Conflict, Security and Development at King’s College London. Her particular interest is post-conflict resolution with a specific focus on the Arab-Israeli crisis. Other distractions from her course are current affairs, aspirations of travel and writing.