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You are here: Home / Archives for NATO

NATO

Putting ‘brains on the ground’: why is Britain sending military advisors to Ukraine?

February 25, 2015 by Strife Staff

By Thomas Colley:

David Cameron with President Poroshenko of Ukraine at the NATO Summit in Wales, September 2014. Photo: Paul Shaw / Crown copyright (CC)
David Cameron with President Poroshenko of Ukraine at the NATO Summit in Wales, September 2014. Photo: Paul Shaw / Crown copyright (CC 2.0)

One month after the US announced its decision to send a military training mission to the Ukraine, the British government has announced that 75 military advisors will also be sent to support the Ukrainian military. Backing the US is unsurprising for those familiar with British foreign policy in recent decades. Yet this decision, taken without parliament or the explicit backing of Europe, has surprised some.

But how significant is the decision to send military advisors to Ukraine, and what is its primary purpose? Is it a genuine attempt to alter the strategic situation in Ukraine or more a move for domestic political gain? Are the military advisors a serious attempt to deter further Russian aggression and if so, what can 75 military advisors be expected to achieve?

A domestic political move?

Despite the artificiality of separating the domestic and international effects of foreign policy decisions, it is tempting to view Cameron’s decision to send military advisors as domestically driven, rather than a genuine attempt to alter the strategic situation. Domestically, limiting military intervention to sending advisors polls well. Yougov recently found that almost two-thirds of people supported sending military advisors to Iraq to support forces fighting the Islamic State; less than a third supported sending regular troops.

There are several reasons for this relative popularity of sending military advisors. A primary military concern of many British citizens remains the risk of combat casualties for causes not deemed sufficiently justified. Direct combat with Russia would clearly be extremely costly, it was avoided throughout the Cold War for good reason.

Sending military advisors resonates with those on the right who believe Britain should take an active military role in world affairs, but baulk at the idea of combat casualties. Far from shying away from its consistently interventionist role, Britain can make a military contribution, supposedly enhancing Ukrainian military performance at minimal human cost. This reinforces the notion that Britain can still ‘punch above its weight’, the overused metaphor that is the explicit cornerstone of British foreign policy.

Even better, it demonstrates that Britain is willing to go a step further than Europe, for whom economic sanctions have been the limit thus far. This reinforces the narrative that Britain is the power willing to do what needs to be done, to act decisively while Europe dithers – from Europe in 1940 to Libya in 2011, Britain will act. This narrative is particularly significant after Britain was conspicuously excluded from the recent peace negotiations between Russia, France and Germany, after which many predictably bemoaned Britain’s waning international influence.

It is hard then not to read Cameron’s military response as an attempt to reassert Britain’s power and influence domestically and internationally, rather than a genuine attempt to alter the strategic calculus in Ukraine. In this sense, the 75 advisors hold a symbolic power far beyond their material capability. With the ceasefire faltering they symbolise, however erroneously, Britain’s wisdom and Europe’s naivety in thinking Putin could be negotiated with; they reinforce Britain’s international relevance domestically, and theoretically they signal to Putin (some of) NATO’s willingness to escalate matters if necessary.

Will the military advisors change anything?

Despite the domestic benefits of the decision, it is unlikely that the decision will have a significant impact on the military situation or on Putin’s strategic thinking. What can a meagre 75 advisors be expected to deter? After all, deliberately placing advisors ‘well away from the conflict zone’ could be read as signalling fear that they might come under attack as much as a demonstration of resolve.

The hope, of course, is that the move signals to the pro-Russian side that Western nations are prepared to escalate their actions to protect their allies. Yet it is doubtful how such a meagre move successfully does this. During the Vietnam War, the US’s steady escalation of targeted airstrikes was thought to be signalling to North Vietnam that the costs of continuing to fight would become unbearable if they refused to negotiate. Instead, they signalled that America was not willing to fully commit the resources required to overwhelmingly defeat the North Vietnamese.

The presence of British ‘brains on the ground’ also does little to alter Putin’s strategy of plausible deniability. The presence of distant military advisors cannot affect the involvement of Russian forces if, as Putin claims, they are not involved anyway. Even in the unlikely event that the advisors were harmed, Putin’s plausible deniability strategy remains intact.

Furthermore, arguably the main issue facing the Ukrainian military is not their lack of training but that they are simply being outgunned. This brings the issue of sending arms to the fore, but it also raises the important question of exactly how this latest British move is expected to actually change anything.

Again, domestic perceptions in Britain may matter more than reality on the ground. The assumption common in British public discourse of the superior capability of the British military implies that the advisors should significantly bolster the Ukrainian military effort. They will no doubt help, but the effect of such a small number is overstated, based as it is on the assumption of an incapable Ukrainian military that was losing until ‘our boys’ (and girls) turned up. This reinforces narratives of British military exceptionalism, but will not have a significant effect on the conflict.

Despite these concerns, Britain’s move is significantly bolder than the economic sanctions so derided by Putin, which have done little to alter his actions despite damaging the Russian economy. It should also not be seen in isolation, but part of a number of moves designed to steadily deter further aggression. With fears of Russia’s eye turning towards the Baltic States, a firm military signal of NATO’s intent to defend its member states decisively is important. In that sense Britain’s decision to send military advisors to Ukraine is a cautious, if insufficient, step in the right direction.


Thomas Colley is a doctoral researcher in the Department of War Studies, King’s College London, and Senior Editor of Strife Blog. Twitter: @ThomasColley

Filed Under: Blog Article Tagged With: david cameron, NATO, poroshenko, Russia, UK, Ukraine

Which Canada are we talking about?

October 31, 2014 by Strife Staff

By Zachary Wolfraim:

un-canada

In light of this week’s horrible attacks in Ottawa and St-Jean-sur-Richelieu there has been some commentary in the Canadian media declaring that this would not change Canada. The international media have suggested that Canada has lost its innocence but that reflects a lack of insight into evolving Canadian politics. While the importance of homegrown, lone-wolf style terrorism should not be underestimated, in the grand sweep of attacks plotted against Canadians this is by no means an outlier. Nonetheless, the fact that an armed person intent on killing managed to rush into the Canadian parliament and lock down the centre of Ottawa has triggered some introspection among Canadians. The question is, which Canada are observers talking about when they are discussing Canada? The internal narratives from Canadians seem uncritical while the international observations about Canada are outdated. The Canada of 2014 is not the same idealized Canada that many people seem to remember.

Since taking power in 2006 the Conservative Harper government has sought to gradually change Canada’s internal politics and redefine Canada’s international image. This has been arguably most dramatic at the international level ranging from minor things such as ensuring that portraits of the Queen hang in every embassy and re-instating the “Royal” back in the Canadian Navy and the Air Force. Of course, there are much bigger issues such as the Harper government’s unwavering and vocal support of Israel. Canada’s transactional view of multilateral forums such as the UN and NATO has not gone unnoticed in foreign capitals. Moreover, while bullhorn diplomacy such as Foreign Minister John Baird’s loud pronouncements on Russia, Iran or Gaza gets headlines in Canada, it has marginal impact on world affairs.

Canada’s military has also been active over the past few years. The Canadian Forces contribution to Afghanistan was significant between 2001 and 2011, as were its casualties. Canada also contributed fighter aircraft to NATO’s Libya campaign in 2011 and is now offering a similar contribution to the multinational coalition against ISIS/L in Iraq. Indeed, while many hark back to the ‘Canada-as-peacekeeper’ myth, it is well established that Canada has not really cultivated this significantly since the early 1990s.[i] The problem with this is that Canada’s current foreign policy is not coupled with any coherent diplomatic strategy and ultimately, this has diminished Canada’s influence in the world.

The current mission that Canada has undertaken in Iraq is an excellent example of this problem. While the international community should take action against IS, and Canada should be involved, realistically its contribution is token: six F-18s and support aircraft will not turn the tide of the conflict. Canada’s relationship with the UN and NATO remain strained and its international diplomatic efforts, to say nothing of its international development efforts, are a shadow of what they once were. Whichever party wins the federal election in 2015 needs to offer some clear leadership and vision for Canadian foreign policy and rebuild the country’s diplomatic depth. Similarly, Canadians need to decide on the domestic vision of Canada that they want to support.

This is not to say that Canada is not still a desirable or attractive place to live; however, the shift in Canada’s politics is gradually changing the country, a trend that has been noticed and come under increasing scrutiny. So the question remains – when it’s said that ‘terrorism will not change Canada’, which Canada is being referred to? If anything, during this time of reflection and prior to an election year, each of the main political party leaders would do well to craft and articulate a distinct vision of the Canada they want to build. Critically, they also need to avoid parochialism and articulate a clear vision of where they regard Canada’s place in the world.

The spectre of terrorism has loomed over Canada and the Western world for some time and will continue to do so for the foreseeable future. That being said, the recent attacks are not necessarily an indictment of Canadian foreign policy or the current government but rather seem to be tragic, largely unpredictable events. The current state of world affairs is uncertain and it is naive for Canadians or international observers to think that Canada is a “fireproof house far from inflammable materials.”[ii] Ultimately, Canada – like the world – has changed, and Canadians must see these two things are interrelated. This is neither a call for a ‘return’ to the Canada of the past nor for knee-jerk patriotism with affirmations of resilience and strength. Instead, it is to urge Canadians to channel their introspective impulses in the wake of tragedy to work to constructive ends and use this opportunity to redefine the key tenets that Canada represents and for which it stands.

 

__________________

Zachary Wolfraim is a PhD researcher in the Department of War Studies, King’s College London, where he focuses on the role of narratives in shaping foreign policy in relation to NATO operations. He previously worked as a consultant in NATO Headquarters on operations in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya. You can follow him on Twitter @ZachWol.

 

NOTES
[i] Canada currently has a total of 21 peacekeeping troops participating in UN missions, fewer than the United States.
[ii] From Canadian Senator Raoul Dandurand’s 1927 speech to the League of Nations, quoted in C.P. Stacey, Canada and the Age of Conflict. 2: The Mackenzie King Era, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981.

Filed Under: Blog Article Tagged With: Canada, IS, ISIS, lone-wolf, NATO, Ottawa, UN

Canada’s NATO response: A missed opportunity

September 9, 2014 by Strife Staff

By Zachary Wolfraim:

Meetings of the Defence Ministers at NATO Headquarters in Brussels - Meeting of the NATO-Ukraine Commission (NUC)
Meetings of the Defence Ministers at NATO Headquarters in Brussels – Meeting of the NATO-Ukraine Commission (NUC) (Source: Reuters)

Earlier this May I analysed Canada’s tentative re-engagement with NATO given its full-throated defence of Ukrainian sovereignty and its commitment of military assets to NATO’s reassurance mission in Eastern Europe. The deployment of F-18s, the participation of a Canadian frigate in NATO’s Standing Naval Maritime Group, as well as additional headquarters staff, raised the profile of Canada in the NATO alliance and is a welcome step given that Canada was seen to be somewhat disengaged after the end of the Libya campaign and its withdrawal from Afghanistan. Indeed, it is noteworthy that Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper was one of the longest-serving leaders of one of the founding NATO member states at the Wales Summit, however there was no distinct Canadian ‘stamp’ on any initiatives adopted. Now, in the wake of the NATO Summit in Wales this past week, can this still be characterised as a significant re-engagement with the Alliance? More broadly, does this signal any kind of change in direction for Canadian foreign policy?

Over the weekend Prime Minister Harper made a number of foreign policy announcements related to Canada’s commitment to international security. He grudgingly committed Canada to spending more on defence, however, he had previously noted that increasing spending to the NATO target of 2% of GDP would be unpalatable to Canadian taxpayers. By the Harper government’s reckoning, the Canadian public is not overly keen on spending on foreign policy or defence and moreover, spending on defence has not been a guarantee of international influence. Given that Canada’s defence spending currently lies around 1% of GDP it represents a disconnect for the government with regards to its previous public commitment to supporting and investing in the Canadian military. The current government had been withering in its criticism of the previous Liberal governments who slashed defence spending during the 1990s (to a comparable 1%). This disconnect between investment and rhetoric undermines Canadian credibility as ultimately, Canada has little ability to back up its threats with actions and raises questions about the actual priorities of Canadian foreign policy.

NATO and the Afghanistan mission were paramount up until they were no longer politically tenable and Canada unceremoniously withdrew from combat operations in 2011, pushing aside the ‘in-together, out-together’ mantra. The Conservative government had been keen to stress its links with the military and a willingness to utilise ‘hard power’ in response to crises unlike preceding governments which had favoured multilateral, diplomatic solutions. Nonetheless, the current Conservative government has been willing to follow the lead of other nations when it comes to determining a response to Russian aggression in Ukraine. This however, remains a fundamentally reactive response and reflects a wider shortcoming in the current government’s approach to diplomacy. Though this government has eschewed the idea of ‘going along to get along’ it appears to be willing to do so provided some conditions and coalitions are right and as long as it allows for strong rhetoric. This has been the case with Canada’s recent deployment of the Canadian Special Operations Regiment to northern Iraq to assist multinational efforts against ISIS. That said, while a positive contribution this once again reflects a reactive response to international affairs and ultimately a solely military response.

Years of disengagement from the UN along with other multilateral partnerships mean that Canada while certainly still respected for its contributions to various initiatives, is left out in the cold when it comes to actually influencing international affairs. While content to offer ‘bullhorn diplomacy’, and making bellicose statements, it has done little of the behind-the-scenes diplomatic work to actually try and remedy these issues. This naturally absolves the government of any failures when it comes to major foreign policy initiatives. However, it also means that Canada’s influence in the world is also diminished. The government needs to acknowledge that influence in the world does not come only through military contributions and trade, but that diplomacy and development also matter.

NATO requires the diplomatic and military capabilities of all its members in the face of growing threats from Russia as well as the Middle East, on top of its current NATO commitments in Afghanistan, the Balkans and off the Horn of Africa. While the NATO Summit in Wales reaffirmed and reinvigorated the Alliance, the real work has yet to be done – namely staffing, basing and supplying the Rapid Reaction Force along with continuing to put pressure on Russia for its invasion of Eastern Ukraine and Crimea. Indeed, the Alliance needs countries like Canada to not only remain staunch supporters, but also to undertake vital public diplomacy and communicate the value of the Alliance in order to maintain its momentum and relevance. Given that the Harper administration has focused largely on headline diplomacy it seems unlikely that there will be a concerted effort to rebuild the NATO relationship to levels it once reached, nor to regenerate Canadian diplomacy more broadly.

Canada’s attitude towards NATO is indicative of a fickle approach to world affairs which has focused more on immediate public diplomacy rather than any kind of overarching strategic aim or narrative. The government has stressed trade but thus far its crowning achievement, a Canada-EU free trade agreement, has languished since it was signed in principle last October and has yet to be fully concluded. While the importance of trade shouldn’t be underestimated, using this as a central platform for diplomacy does not offer many avenues for future crisis management or leveraging Canadian influence in other forums. Ultimately, the current government has not articulated a clear vision of Canada’s place in the world and by failing to seize on the initiative leading up to the Wales Summit, has lost an opportunity to reinvigorate Canadian diplomacy and reinforce Canada’s international influence.

__________________

Zachary Wolfraim is a PhD researcher in the Department of War Studies, King’s College London, where he focuses on the role of narratives in shaping foreign policy in relation to NATO operations. He previously worked as a consultant in NATO Headquarters on operations in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya. You can follow him on Twitter @ZachWol.

Filed Under: Blog Article Tagged With: Afghanistan, alliance, Canada, Crimea, Diplomacy, Harper, NATO, Russia, Ukraine

Obama offers some humility; this can be a good thing

May 29, 2014 by Strife Staff

By Zachary Wolfraim:

Barack Obama

President Obama sought to outline a vision for US foreign policy in his commencement speech to West Point graduates on 28 May and once more highlighted the role of American leadership in global affairs.  While he noted that the US was the ‘indispensible nation’, the new dangers to the international system were neither to be underestimated, nor should the US be complacent about its place in this system. Indeed, President Obama noted the rising challenges coming from a rapidly developing world and outlined the continued need for American leadership in tackling future crises. Moreover, despite the blows struck against al-Qaeda, he also highlighted the still dangerous and diffuse threat of international terrorism.

What exactly does this mean for the role of the US as primus inter pares? Perhaps most notably, Obama’s speech sought to balance optimism with a dose of humility. The heavy toll of Iraq and Afghanistan has certainly given pause for reflection over the use of force as an immediate solution for major foreign policy crises. Indeed as he noted, “just because we have the best hammer doesn’t mean that every problem is a nail.” Similarly, Obama sought to highlight the importance of restoring America’s moral leadership – again vowing to close Guantanamo, revise protocols on intelligence gathering and support the broader cause of international justice. Of course, this was balanced by his continued support for drone strikes as a vital counter-terrorism tool.

Critics of the President may see this speech as broadly kowtowing to international public opinion and damaging US ability to project its power and protect its interests internationally. However, in many ways the speech betrays a realism that has been a long time coming. America’s ‘unipolar moment’ is long past and the dynamics of international power continue to change; however, to suggest that the US has less of a role in world than it did in the past is also wrong. Indeed, as noted already, the US remains first among equals and will for some time yet, despite previous missteps or errors like the drawing of ‘red-lines’ with regards to Syrian chemical weapons.

As outlined in the speech, redoubling efforts to reinforce legitimacy-building institutions enhances American power far beyond military adventures or one-off diplomatic initiatives. The recognition that military power does not exist in a vacuum recognizes the important lessons learned from Afghanistan. As demonstrated by the shaky progress in Afghanistan, development and diplomacy need to be critical components of any future intervention or counter-terrorism initiative from the very beginning. Utilising appropriate international organizations will help achieve this by building the capabilities of allies reinforcing partnerships.

Nonetheless, the foreign policy as outlined carries dangers if followed through half-heartedly. If the US is to truly try and reform and reinforce the components of the current international order it needs to be done so with zeal, commitment and genuine follow-through to prevent its efforts from being bogged down in a bureaucratic quagmire. Taking on deeply entrenched bureaucracies such as the UN will require serious diplomatic commitment on the part of the US and its allies.  This echoes many of the same issues that the US has faced in NATO in the past with regards to free-riding and burden sharing. Any optimism about the US trying to embed itself deeper in the system of international institutions should be tempered by the recognition that its partners and allies must match or at least share in this commitment. Indeed, US leadership is all well and good, but not all nations will see this renewed engagement as a positive step. Rather, this move can open the door to restrict, contain or otherwise hamper the exercise of American power internationally. Additionally, the increased engagement of the US in these organizations can also open them to criticism that they are only instruments of Western power. Perhaps most vitally, the international community should not expect the Obama administration or future administrations to sacrifice the ability to act on some issues on the altar of international legitimacy.

While Obama has outlined this ‘new’ approach to foreign policy, the international community should not expect any dramatic, immediate changes. He has already shown a hesitancy to use military force; largely reflecting the tentativeness of the American public to avoid another prolonged entanglement abroad. Rather this likely signals a greater effort to support existing areas of US influence within international organizations. NATO, ever starved for summit deliverables, will likely have a raft of possibilities for counter-terrorism cooperation, alongside cyber-defence and other joint activities to bolster European defence. With regards to the UN, IMF and World Bank, it will be interesting to see new American initiatives in these organizations and what these entail.

The announcement of new priorities in US foreign policy certainly deserves attention. It is naïve, however, to think that this will dramatically change any of the numerous challenges facing the international community. That said, if executed properly this sets the stage for US foreign policy over the next decade. It serves Obama and any future administrations well to recognize that the international system is changing, as is the position of the US within it. Terrorism, Syria, and challenges posed by Russia all present continuing threats to the international order. In order to stay relevant, US foreign policy must adapt and learn the lessons of the past decade’s military adventurism. We should all hope that Obama’s speech, if followed through and implemented, represents a step in the right direction.

 

________________
Zachary Wolfraim is a third year PhD student in the War Studies Department, King’s College London, where he focuses on the role of narratives in shaping foreign policy in relation to NATO operations. He previously worked as a consultant in NATO Headquarters on operations in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya. You can follow him on Twitter @ZachWol.

Filed Under: Blog Article Tagged With: al-Qaeda, NATO, Obama, Syria, UN, us, West Point

Back in the fold? Canada's tentative re-engagement with NATO

May 16, 2014 by Strife Staff

By Zachary Wolfraim:

nato-flag-w-istock

Amid the increasing tensions with Russia, Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper’s meeting on 5 May with the head of NATO’s military operations, General Philip Breedlove along with the recent deployment of 6 F-18s to Romania have garnered some Canadian press attention. This represents some of the highest-level contact between the Canadian government and NATO leadership in some time. The question is, does this signal a Canadian re-engagement with NATO?

Since Canada’s withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2011, there has been a marked disengagement with the alliance, the hints of which came while Canada was still engaged in Kandahar. The decision to deploy Canadian forces there, motivated by undoubtedly honest intentions, nonetheless placed a heavy strain on a force not really designed for a long-term overseas combat deployment. The challenge of stabilizing southern Afghanistan was underestimated by allies and the casualties among the deployed nations attest to the grim and thankless challenge. With years of blood and treasure spent in southern Afghanistan and trying to muster greater commitment to the operation from NATO Allies, Canadian policymakers had seemed fed up.

After continually hammering allies over burden sharing and finding no relief for their forces in Kandahar, the Canadians faded into NATO’s background, still present, but not nearly as forward-leaning, constructive or vocal as in years past. Beyond Afghanistan and Libya, there was no more Canadian engagement in any other NATO operations, be it Kosovo, counter-piracy off the coast of Somalia or elsewhere. The commitment to the Libya campaign, while not irrelevant, was done without fanfare which can be attributed to Harper’s tight control over diplomatic messaging. While quiet diplomacy can be positive, the lack of recognition in headquarters of Canada’s contribution adds to the perception of its diminishing NATO presence.

When coupled with Canada’s meagre presence in the International Military Staff, it further highlights how it has lost its informal presence around the Brussels headquarters and across the alliance. Moreover, Canada publicly withdrew from NATO’s aerial surveillance platform (Airborne Warning And Control System, AWACS) which it had previously supported. The withdrawal left the programme in limbo and upset its allies. On top of that, the withdrawal from the allied ground surveillance programme was also noticed as both of these happened as the Secretary General was pushing for more shared capabilities in the Alliance.

Undoubtedly, Harper’s move to support NATO against Russia is the right one, but as of yet it doesn’t represent a wholesale re-engagement with the alliance. NATO needed to send a clear message that the annexation of Crimea would evoke a notable transatlantic response and the deployment of US and Canadian assets to Europe helps underscore the alliance’s solidarity, To not respond to NATO requests for assets would have been damaging for the alliance and certainly upset a number of allies, perhaps most importantly the US and the UK. The current government has often accused previous Liberal administrations of offering hollow rhetoric and relying on its peacekeeping and ‘middle power’ traditions without offering concrete contributions. In this circumstance, the Canadian contribution, important as it is, needs to also support a robust diplomatic effort on the part of Canada focused on keeping the Alliance relevant and purposeful.

The deployment of F-18s to Romania and a frigate to support NATO’s Standing Maritime Naval Group in the Mediterranean is significant, but they need to be coupled with a diplomatic effort in NATO headquarters. Though it is unlikely to happen, the Harper government needs to offer some additional leeway to its diplomatic corps in order to let them not only ‘talk up’ Canada’s contribution, but also offer some significant experience and depth of knowledge.

This is an opportunity for Canada to once again exercise a level of leadership and agency in NATO and help shape its character for the year to come. It may not represent a new ‘overarching’ theme to Canadian foreign policy, but it will show allies that not only is it an active contributor to the defence of Europe, it is also proactive in ensuring the future transatlantic relevance of the alliance. As the past decade of foreign policy has demonstrated, it is not enough to wield the stick; speaking softly is also a requirement. The upcoming NATO summit in Wales and a lack of identifiable deliverables places a burden on the shoulders of the member nations to start articulating a vision for a post-Afghanistan phase. While this was previously conceived of as the transition from ‘NATO operational’ to ‘NATO prepared’ these plans, however nebulous they may be, will have required some alteration. Russia will certainly dominate the agenda, but for NATO to lose the capabilities it has developed in Afghanistan would also be tragic. The alliance has worked relatively successfully with militaries from around the world in Afghanistan and built relationships with many more. To see these partnership opportunities wither or disappear after 2014 would diminish the influence of NATO for years to come.

This should also give policymakers in Ottawa some pause and hopefully encourage a more serious contemplation of Canada’s foreign policy, which has been adrift for some time now. With elections next year there will be an opportunity to redefine Canada’s place in the world and encourage a deeper contemplation as to what that means for Canadian influence. Are they content to continue with ad hoc diplomacy or can they define priorities which not only defend and advance Canadian interests but also buttress an increasingly beleaguered Western international order?

 

_____________________

Zachary Wolfraim is a third year PhD student in the War Studies Department, King’s College London, where he focuses on the role of narratives in shaping foreign policy in relation to NATO operations. He previously worked as a consultant in NATO Headquarters on operations in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya.

Filed Under: Blog Article Tagged With: Afghanistan, AWACS, Canada, Libya, NATO, Stephen Harper, Ukraine

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