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The Burmese Civil War: Seventy Years and Counting

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By Ed Nash

20 May 2019

Kachin militiaman watching Burma Army outposts for activity. Kachin State, 2018. (Ed Nash)

The world’s current longest running war, the internal conflict in Burma (also known as Myanmar) receives but limited attention in the outside world. Considering the complexities of the conflict, as well as the growing importance of neighbouring countries and an increasingly assertive China, it may be useful for any watcher of international affairs to develop an understanding of the current events in Burma. This article aims to provide a basic grounding of the situation to those who may be interested in a conflict that has killed an estimated 130,000 people.

Since 1948 the Burmese Civil War has carried on largely unabated and today finds itself on the verge of escalating violently, as groups negotiating as part of the National Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) become further disillusioned. Despite seventy years of bloodshed under an oppressive military dictatorship, the year 2015 signalled a break-through for democracy, as the famous prisoner Aung San Suu Kyi’s NLD party rose to power. The NCA negotiations began promisingly, however the last few years have seen growing discontent from several Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs) stemming both from the lack of progress in talks with the central government and the actions undertaken against them by the powerful Burmese military, the Tatmadaw

Since January 2019, the Arakan Army (AA) has been battling against the Burmese Army in Rakhine State, situated on the western coast of Burma. The AA, formed in 2009, have been employing both conventional and guerrilla tactics against the army and police units and experienced a surge in support with around 7000 volunteering to fight. Although months of fighting have led to an estimated 33,000 civilians displaced, the AA appear committed to resistance. On 17 April 2019, their leader Tun Myat Naing, speaking at a military parade in Wa State, said: “We are not the ones to give up. We have to fight the war. We will not get peace by praying.”

Meanwhile, in Kachin and Shan States, the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) continues to fight a guerrilla war in the mountains and dominate large sections across the Burma-China borderline. The Burmese Army have deployed their Light Infantry Division 99 (LID99) into the region, a unit notorious for brutality and its role in the Rohingya genocide of 2017 that saw over 10,000 civilians murdered and another 700,000 displaced into neighbouring Bangladesh.

Additionally, two of the AA’s allies in the east, the MNDAA and the TNLA have both issued threats that they “have to take necessary action” in support of their alliance. The last time there was extensive combat between the Tatmadaw and the MNDAA, an errant Burma Air Force bomb killed four Chinese citizens, provoking an angry response from Chinese officials. Therefore, there is no doubt that a flare-up in that sector will draw the watchful attention of China’s People’s Liberation Army, which is speculated to be informally assisting the MDNAA.[1]

Further south-east of Burma, in Kayin State, the Karen are also experiencing a series of attacks. Despite guarantees given during NCA negotiations between the Burmese government and the Karen National Union (KNU), the KNU have accused the Burmese Army of breaking faith by building roads in areas under Karen control. Also, there are reports of Kayin civilians being murdered by Burma Army personnel. To add to the growing internal conflict, the United Wa State Army (UWSA) – considered to be the strongest of ethnic minorities within Burma – have just celebrated their thirtieth anniversary with a deliberate display of their military might and statements that mark a more belligerent tone than usual.

An estimated 25,000 soldiers at their disposal, the Wa have generally been circumspect of antagonising the central government since they signed a truce in 1989. But on 17 April, a spokesman stated that he was doubtful the agreements would remain in effect after the general elections of 2020. Such a development would represent a substantial change in the Wa’s situation as “flexibility and compromise have long been crucial to the UWSA”[2] but a collapse  of their current accord with the Tatmadaw could well mean the Wa becoming aggressive to protect the considerable business empire they have created, especially if other ethnic forces are also fully engaged.

With the NLD government appearing increasingly autocratic or powerless to rein in the military, it’s likely the next few years may see a return to the widespread warfare of the kind that blighted Burma in the past, as the EAOs abandon any hopes for peace through talks. If the Tatmadaw continues to push its presence into ethnic areas in defiance to the residents wishes, they will see no other recourse but to fight. Such an event would likely spell a complete disaster for any hopes of a lasting peace for another generation.

Ed Nash has spent years travelling around the world and, on occasion, interfering as he sees fit. Between June 2015 and July 2016 he volunteered with the Kurdish YPG in its battle against ISIS in Syria. His book Desert Sniper: How One Ordinary Brit Went to War Against ISIS was published in September 2018. 

[1] Beehner, Lionel; “State-building, Military Modernization and Cross-border Ethnic Violence in Myanmar”, Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs, Volume: 5 issue: 1 (January 30, 2018); p.24

[2] Ong, Andrew, “Producing Intransigence: (Mis) Understanding the United Wa State Army in Myanmar.” Contemporary Southeast Asia vol. 40, no. 3 (2018); p. 462

A Glimmer of Hope for Burma’s Peace Process?

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By Anna Plunkett

As two new parties sign Burma’s National Ceasefire Agreement, are we witnessing a new stage in Burma’s peace process? (Credit Image: Xinhua/U Aung)

 

On February 13, 2018, the number of signatories on Burma’s National Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) grew from eight to ten with the New Mon State Party (NMSP) and the Lahu Democratic Union (LDU) officially joining at a ceremony held in the state capital Naypyidaw. Peace and reconciliation have been the primary focuses of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD) since its landslide victory in the 2015 election. The cornerstone policy has been the NCA, which was established under President Thein Sein’s government and aims to negotiate between the government and the numerous Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs) throughout Burma. Despite multiple peace conferences since 2015, the addition of two new signatories to the NCA in February has been the first tangible development in Burma’s peace process under the new NLD-led government. So, is this development the breath of life the beleaguered peace agreement has needed – or has it simply masked the larger problems within Burma’s peace process?

Either way, it has brought a glimmer of hope to Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s peace and reconciliation aspirations that have not only been her primary objective since 2015 but a lifelong cause. Best known for her years under house arrest, Daw Suu is internationally recognised as a symbol of non-violent struggle against oppression. However, since taking office in early 2016 she and the NLD have struggled to make any progress on this central objective despite inclusive peace conferences with a variety of armed actors. Thus, the signing of two new armed groups to the NCA is the first substantial and official development within a highly-coveted peace process.

The NCA itself was developed under the leadership of President Thein Sein, Burma’s first civilian leader, elected in 2011. A former general, President Thein Sein brought mass political and economic reforms to Burma – among them the NCA. The National Ceasefire Agreement aimed to bring peace to Burma and unify multitude bilateral ceasefires that have been previously established around the country. Although it failed to meet its national aspirations, eight of the fifteen invited groups signed the agreement in October 2015.  This progress was marred with criticism after the main active armed opposition groups remained among the groups unwilling to sign the NCA.

This challenge to peace remains – Burma’s strongest opposition groups continue to oppose rather than negotiate with the government. Since 2011, the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) is actively engaged in combat with the Tatmadaw (Burmese Army). This war continues, mostly forgotten in the wake of the Rohingya crisis in the south of the country, which has seen the mass forced migration of almost 700,000 civilians into Bangladesh among claims of horrendous and systematic crimes against humanity. These crises within Burma’s borderlands highlight not only obstacles to the NCA but to Burma’s transition from war to peace.

The signing of two more groups to the NCA, the first substantial development since the original signing in late 2015, should be a cause for celebration. It represents long awaited progress in a war of almost seventy years. At the signing ceremony, Daw Suu confirmed the government’s commitment to fostering peace with the ten or so EAOs yet to sign the NCA.  Nevertheless, the central concern remains the same – the largest EAOs still refuse to sign and conflict continues to plague many communities within the borderlands. There is no doubt that steps towards a more comprehensive NCA represent not only success for the peace process but for the NLD government, struggling to live up to citizen’s expectations as it is.

As things stand, these successes are more superficial than lasting. Less than one month on, cracks are beginning to show in this newly reconfigured ceasefire. At the end of February, a skirmish was reported between the NMSP and the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) in Ye Township of Mon State. Although fighting between the two groups is known to occur over land disputes, their newly forged alliance through the NCA provides a disconcerting backdrop to the escalation. This point is perhaps underlined by the Mon leadership’s refusal to give up their arms despite signing the NCA last month. A commitment to the peace process has been made, but the trust in it to work has yet to be forged.

Mistrust continues to undermine further agreements with non-members of the NCA. The Karenni National People’s Party (KNPP) has stated that it will delay its decision on whether to sign the ceasefire agreement until it can be established if the Tatmadaw were responsible for the deaths of three party members and a civilian. Although the Tatmadaw launched an investigation, the KNPP leadership remains unsure of its validity given the nature of the incident.

These proceedings demonstrate the fragility and complex environment in which the government attempts to forge nationwide peace and reconciliation. The signing of the NMSP and LDU has been a major step forward and may provide some momentum to what has been a beleaguered peace process. However, major obstacles to the NLD’s central objective persist. Fighting within the country continues between ethnic armed groups and the Tatmadaw, the Rohingya Crisis has taken on new proportions with villages now flattened within Rakhine State, and general mistrust of the army throughout the country remains high. Until the government can resolve some of these long-term underlying mistrust issues between the actors involved, it is unlikely that the peace process can be anything but tenuous.

 

Anna is a doctoral researcher in the Department of War Studies, King’s College London. She received her BA in Politics and Economics from the University of York, before receiving a scholarship to continue her studies at York with an MA in Post-War Recovery. She was the recipient of the Guido Galli Award for her MA dissertation. Her primary interests include conflict and democracy at the sub-national level, understanding how transitions are implemented at the local level.  You can follow her on Twitter @AnnaBPlunkett

Image Source 

Banner: http://home.bt.com/news/world-news/two-rebel-groups-join-burmese-government-peace-process-11364250153132 

Image 1: http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1089677.shtml

The Rohingya Need More International Protection

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By William McPherson

Displaced Rohingya people in Rakhine State, Myanmar (Source: Foreign and Commonwealth Office, via Wikimedia Commons)

 

In August/September 2017, around 500,000 Rohingya Muslims fled to Bangladesh, trying to escape a violent crackdown by the Myanmar military. The latest round of violence towards the Rohingya people began at the end of August — after the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) militant group attacked and killed 12 Myanmar security personnel. There have been reports from fleeing refugees of elite Myanmar soldiers killing or violently forcing Rohingya Muslims from their homes, stealing and burning properties as they move from village to village.

The Myanmar civilian government, led by State Counsellor (Prime Minister) Aung San Suu Kyi, and the military leadership have rejected the accusation of targeting civilians, saying the army is just conducting anti-terrorism raids against militant groups. As human rights groups, the media, and international observers are unable to gain access into Rakhine state, where most of the violence has taken place, verifying the claims and reports been made either by the fleeing Rohingya Muslims or the military has been impossible. The only evidence are photos and videos from refugees in camps in Bangladesh and satellite images of burning villages.

The Military operation in August/September 2017 has shown how weak Ms Suu Kyi is when dealing with internal security issues, as the civilian government does not have control over the military and police. The real power is still in the hands of the generals, not the civilian government. As such, the military are the perpetrating actors in committing these human right abuses — and more emphasis on their actions is required, rather than criticism toward Ms Suu Kyi. Even if personally Ms Suu Kyi, a former human rights and democracy campaigner, might want to advocate for the protection of the Rohingya Muslims, she seems to lack political, military and public support.

Although Ms Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD) won the 2015 elections, the constitution bestows real power to the military, who are allocated 25 percent of seats in parliament, and also are not under the authority of the civilian government. The NLD have to be causes when dealing with such a delicate issue as minority groups, as apart from the military dislike, there is also hatred for Muslims by a majority Buddhist population. In recent decades there has been an increase in Buddhist nationalist groups, such as the Ma Ba Tha, who have fuelled tensions between the two communities since its founding in 2013. With no authority over the military and a hatred by some of the Buddhist population, Ms Suu Kyi has been balancing between trying to enact reforms on the one hand and appease the military and nationalist groups on the other.

To make the crisis even more direr for the Rohingya Muslims, the latter do not hold citizenship rights neither in Myanmar (where they are called Bengali Muslims) nor in Bangladesh. In essence, the one million Rohingya Muslims are stateless. In Myanmar, Buddhist nationalists — who view them as Bengali migrants — have persecuted this group for decades. Without recognition or rights, they have become a forgotten ethnic group, with limited recourse to basic healthcare, education, and employment.

Since the latest military crackdown, human rights groups and the United Nations (UN) have condemned the violence and called for the halting of security operations against the Rohingya Muslims. The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Zeid Raad Al Hussein, has said that the security operation against the Rohingya Muslims ‘seems a textbook example of ethnic cleansing’. The UN Secretary-General, Antonio Guterres, has also spoken of a need to halt the violent military operations.

At a recent United Nations Security Council (UNSC) meeting, member states further condemned the military for the violent crackdown, with French President Emmanuel Macron calling the actions of the military as ‘genocide’. U.S Vice President Mike Pence also condemned the military violence and called for the UN and UNSC ‘to take strong and swift action to bring this crisis to an end — and give hope and help to the Rohingya people in their hour of need.’ There has been condemnation by some world leaders towards the Myanmar government and military, but no joint agreement on how the international community could place further pressure on these institutions.

If Ms Suu Kyi is correct in her claim that the military have stopped ‘clearance operations,’ the current situation in the region will hopefully stabilise, allowing refugees to return. The issue now is how the international community and the Myanmar government can work together to prevent future violence and improve the lives of Rohingya Muslims.

In the near-term, the international community needs to place pressure, through the threat of economic sanctions or other embargos on both the civilian government and military, aimed at the immediate halt to the violent crackdown. There also needs to be an increased role for UN and other humanitarian agencies to assist the Myanmar government in its responsibility to protect. This could be undertaken by acting as a mediator between the government and the Rohingya Muslims. An ideal situation would be an agreement between the Myanmar government/military and the international community to send a UN observer mission to Rakhine state to oversee the repatriation of returning refugees and the delivery of aid. The UN mission should also have the mandate to observe the military operations and report back to the UNSC on any human rights abuses.

The second way forward in dealing with the crisis is for the international community to work with the Myanmar government to carry out the recommendations of the Advisory Commission on Rakhine State. The Myanmar government-established commission, led by former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, outlines a list of recommendations to improve living conditions for Rohingya Muslims, including ending restrictions on citizenship, marriage, and freedom of movement; and improving health care and education. To undertake these recommendations by the commission, the Myanmar government has established a Committee for Implementation of the Recommendations on Rakhine State. In a statement released by the Myanmar President’s office, the committee has been given a list of duties: including, improving living condition, equal access to education and healthcare, and efforts to bring peace and security to the region. Many of the duties outlined by the government, do not specifically adhere to protecting or improving the lives of the persecuted Rohingya Muslims, just to the population in Rakhine state in general. As the Kofi Annan led commission’s recommendations were only released in August 2017, there has been no major reforms, except for the establishment of an implementation committee. So far the Myanmar government have indicated that the reforms will be conducted in-house, with a planned formation of an advisory commission, with international experts. These are all good steps, but the international community should be more involved in the implementing the recommended reforms.

These recommendations are the ideal process for preventing future violence and improving the lives of the Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar, although the military and its major international supporter, China, would likely block a UN observer mission. For instance, due to China’s national interest, they might block any UN-led mission in the case of objection by Myanmar military. Even the civilian government would be powerless to agree to an UN-led mission without the support of the military leadership.

In the short term, the only option available to the international community to protect Rohingya Muslims displaced in Myanmar and returning refugees is to monitor the situation from afar and continue to place pressure on the Myanmar government and military.  We will need to see if the civilian government has enough power and political will to effectively carry out the recommendations of the advisory commission.

As for the long term, if the situation for the Rohingya Muslims does not improve and they still face human right abuses and discrimination, the international community may require more forceful measures to put pressure on the Myanmar military. Even though sanctions on the military would lack China’s support, placing more unilateral embargoes by the U.S, European countries, and other states could be a measure to be considered.

William McPherson is a MA: International Relations and Security graduate from University of Westminster, London. He is interested in many topics within the field of international relations and security, but his main focus is on humanitarian intervention, and the Responsibility to Protect. He has previously worked in the defence and security sector, including an internship at Risk Intelligence Solutions (RIS), based in Perth, Australia.

Image sources: 

Image 1:   https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Displaced_Rohingya_people_in_Rakhine_State_(8280610831)_(cropped).jpg

Feature image:   https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/0/07/Displaced_Rohingya_people_in_Rakhine_State_%288280610831%29.jpg

The Rohingya: Remembering a Forgotten People

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By: Sarah Choong Ee Mei

Rohingya fleeing from burned villages in the Maungdaw District of Myanmar.
Rohingya fleeing from burned villages in the Maungdaw District of Myanmar.

On 9th October 2016, nine border policemen were killed by what Burmese government officials have admitted was an unidentifiable militant group near the Maungdaw District in Myanmar. Despite the lack of verification, the Rakhine State government officials have since pinned the blame on the Muslim minority group known as ‘the Rohingya‘ and have launched a counter-insurgency campaign in retaliation. The Human Rights Watch reported that at least 1,500 buildings, mainly belonging to Rohingya villages, within the Maungdaw District were destroyed in the wake of the crackdown.

The use of high-definition satellite imagery reveals two things. Firstly, the razing of the Rohingya villages was caused by widespread fire-related destruction; secondly, the pattern of incineration points to the involvement of the state as villages were systematically destroyed following attacks on government forces. For example, the Wa Peik village was burned just hours after Border Guard Post Number 1 was attacked and has since suffered two other waves of arson attacks, suggesting an element of state reprisal.

In sum, more than 100 people have been killed throughout the counter-insurgency and roughly 21,000 Rohingya have fled to Bangladesh over the past two months looking for refuge. At the moment, cries of ethnic cleansing have all but fallen on deaf ears as the military continues to rape Rohingya women and conduct extrajudicial killings while an apathetic and callous government refuses to respond.

An Identity Crisis

According to the United Nations, the Rohingya are one of the most persecuted minorities in the world. Over one million Rohingya remain stateless under the 1982 Burma Citizenship Law; they do not fall under any of the government’s recognized ethnic groups despite claiming to have settled in the Rakhine State as early as the 18th century.

As a result, the Rohingya are denied access to education, employment in the civil service as well as experience limited freedom of movement. The recent military crackdown in the Maungdaw District is but a continuation of a series of systemic persecutions against the minority group who also suffered a similar fate during the 2012 Rakhine State Riots[1].

Myanmar’s Response

Since securing a landslide victory in the 2015 general elections, the National League for Democracy (NLD)’s Aung San Suu Kyi has been accused by the international community of failing to condemn violence against the Rohingya. Aung San Suu Kyi, once the recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize in 1991 and regarded as Myanmar’s beacon for democratic values and hope is now under scrutiny for her indifference in safeguarding human rights in Myanmar. For instance, in a meeting earlier this year with a UN human rights investigator, Aung San Suu Kyi said that the very term ‘‘Rohingya’’ is controversial and should be avoided.

The Burmese government recently created the Advisory Commission on Rakhine State to ‘‘propose concrete measures for improving the welfare of all people in Rakhine state’’. Although chaired by former United Nations secretary general Kofi Annan, the advisory commission will not feature any Rohingya members and will only be able to offer recommendations to the government at most.

However, some argue that it may not be politically wise for Aung San Suu Kyi to defend the Rohingya outright, even if she wanted to. To begin, the National League for Democracy (NLD) is a nascent government that has just taken over the reins from 54 years of military junta rule. To court with the idea of protecting the Rohingya whom the general populace believes to be ‘Bengalis’ – namely illegal immigrants from neighboring Bangladesh – could adversely affect the popularity and legitimacy of the NLD. Secondly, the hatred that the Buddhist-majority country holds against the Rohingya is both culturally and religiously entrenched, making this difficult for the NLD, who has only held one year in office to eradicate.

Hoping for a Better Future

Regardless of the political stakes at hand, it is nevertheless still very much desired that due action is taken to quell the violence that has escalated once again in the Rakhine State. Burmese citizens who voted the NLD in clearly wanted a change of government from decades of military rule, and with that, a desire for new state policies in dealing with both domestic and foreign affairs.

The same courage and resilience that saw Aung San Suu Kyi defy the military junta government despite 15 years of house arrest, needs to arise once more if she has any desire to help the Rohingya, or at least to end the long-standing ethnic conflict in Myanmar. Although limited in its power, perhaps the creation of the advisory committee leaves hope that the Burmese government is willing to adopt alternative measures to resolve the conflict other than its age-old use of violence.

In delivering her Nobel Lecture in the Oslo City Hall in 2012, Aung San Suu Kyi said that receiving the Nobel Prize award gave her renewed hope because ‘to be forgotten is to die a little’. Perhaps the conflict may not end in the near future, but it is hoped that the Rohingya will not remain forgotten.

Sarah Choong is pursuing her MA International Relations in the War Studies Department at King’s College London. She is the recipient of the Top 5 Best Delegate Award at the ASEAN Youth Summit 2012 in Jakarta, Indonesia. She was also selected by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Malaysia to represent her country at the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) Debate in Singapore, 2015. You can reach her at: sarah.choong@kcl.ac.uk.

Notes:

[1] Rahman, KM Atikur. “Ethno-Political Conflict: The Rohingya Vulnerability in Myanmar.” 2015.

Image credit: http://www.aljazeera.com/mritems/imagecache/mbdxxlarge/mritems/Images/2016/10/10/a9d87c1509a14a5ca81d446baf5909a6_18.jpg