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You are here: Home / Archives for Mao

Mao

The Maoist Way of Guerilla Warfare and the Broader Challenge Presented by China

April 9, 2020 by Tom Harper

by Tom Harper

Long Live Chairman Mao! Long, Long Live! (Image credit: Chineseposter.net)

In the eyes of the modern world, Maoism is a relic of a more ideologically divided world and of a China that no longer exists.  Nevertheless, the ideas and strategies of Mao continue to have a direct and indirect influence upon a diverse array of actors, ranging from the insurgent movements of the post-colonial world to post-Cold War Chinese foreign policy strategies. Here, followers of the strategies devised by Mao and his German-educated strategist, Zhu De, are inspired by their combination of Marxist ideology and the maxims from Sun Tzu’s The Art of War.  They applied these strategies to a China described by Mao as ‘half colonial, half feudal’[1], far removed from Marx’s original prognosis.

Prior to Mao’s leadership, China’s communist movement followed a strategy more in keeping with those of the Russian Bolsheviks, with cadres going to the Soviet Union for study.  The most prominent of these were known as the ‘Twenty-Eight Bolsheviks’, who were guided by advisors from the Soviet Comintern.  As a result of several strategic blunders in their rebellion against the nationalist KMT under Chiang Kai shek, which concluded in the Long March to Yan’an, Mao and Zhu were in a position to apply these strategies.

Mao and Zhu’s strategies were characterised by three main phases.  The first phase involved sending party cadres to the rural, isolated areas of China, which were often ignored by the KMT, which drew its support from the smaller urban class.  Unlike the Bolsheviks’ focus on the industrial proletariat, Mao saw the Chinese peasantry, which made up around eighty per cent of China’s population, as the driving force of communism in China.  To do so, these cadres sought to mobilise popular support through measures such as land reforms. These proved to be succesfull with a Chinese peasantry that had long been exploited by the feudal land-owning classes[2]. Over time, the communists were increasingly viewed as more capable administrators than the KMT, with the Chinese peasantry seeing the latter as corrupt and inefficient[3].

Through these measures, the Chinese communists had effectively created a parallel government in China’s agrarian provinces, in a manner similar to the earlier Taiping Heavenly Kingdom of Hong Xiuquan[4].  This made the KMT increasingly irrelevant to the lives of the Chinese peasantry which undermined Chiang Kai-shek’s rule.

The military aspects of Mao and Zhu’s strategies came in the second and third phases of these strategies.  The former involved utilising guerrilla tactics against stronger opponents, such as the KMT and the Japanese, to build support, and to acquire resources while the latter came in defeating the KMT through conventional warfare.  In doing so, the CPC was able to preserve their forces while the KMT bore the brunt of the Japanese invasion.  As a result, the CPC was better placed for the continuation of the Chinese Civil War after Japan’s surrender. In returning to Sun Tzu, Mao and Zhu used the maxim that ‘supreme excellence consists of breaking the enemy’s resistance without fighting’ to defeat a conventionally stronger opponent.  It was this maxim that had wider consequences as the new communist government sought to export its vision to the post-colonial world.

To China’s communist rulers, the largely agrarian post-colonial nations resembled pre-revolutionary China, which made it ripe for their efforts to replicate their earlier successes[5].  This came through assistance to the numerous anti-colonial movements battling the European colonial powers that had been damaged by the Second World War.  China’s bid to become the vanguard of communism in the developing world clashed with those of the Soviet Union, which also sought to promote its own vision of communism.  This became more pronounced with the Sino-Soviet Split of 1963 and there were often clashes between rival communist movements supported by Beijing and Moscow, such as the Angolan Civil War, where the Maoist UNITA battled the Soviet-backed MPLA.

It was the conflicts of the post-colonial world that drew attention to Maoist strategies from those who sought to combat it.  The earliest example of this was the French officer, David Galula, who witnessed the first phase of these strategies as a prisoner of the Chinese communists. After his release, Galula attempted to deploy these strategies against the anti-colonial movements throughout France’s overseas territories in a bid to deprive these movements of their local support.

While France failed to retain its colonies, Galula’s Maoist-inspired strategies caught the attention of American counter-insurgency planners who found themselves in the midst of the Vietnam War.  Like the Chinese communists before them, the National Liberation Front built support by mobilising the Vietnamese peasantry dissatisfied with the corrupt rule of the American-backed South Vietnamese government.  This influence was particularly notable in the Strategic Hamlets programme which replicated Galula’s earlier efforts in Algeria.

The Vietnam War was a case of where Maoist strategies influenced both insurgent movements and those who sought to combat them.  Ultimately, the Vietnamese communists were able to prevail over their stronger American foe by destroying its will to fight, as demonstrated by the fallout from the Tet Offensive in 1968.  Nevertheless, it was this pattern that would continue even after the Cold War.

With the end of the Cold War, Maoist strategies continued to maintain a degree of influence, the most visible of this being the groups within the developing world that still identified themselves with Mao’s ideas.  The most successful implementation of this was the overthrow of Nepal’s feudal monarchy by the Nepalese Communist Party in a manner eerily reminiscent of China’s own revolution, which once again came through the mobilisation of the Nepalese peasantry.

Maoist strategies also found a new audience in the midst of the War on Terror.  Just as these strategies had influenced Galula’s theories on counter-insurgency, American strategists, such as David Petraeus, invoked Mao and Zhu’s theories to justify the study of the non-military dimensions of warfare with the irregular conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq.  This continued the influence of these strategies on both insurgent movements and their opponents.

The most unexpected manifestation of Maoist strategies has been in Chinese foreign policy itself.  During the Cold War observers, such as John Cooley, warned that China’s strategies in Africa were aimed at expelling the United States from the continent.  In so doing, these attempts would turn Africa into a ‘major revolutionary outpost’ in a Sino-centric world where the US was largely irrelevant[6].  Cooley’s warnings are eerily reminiscent of later fears of Chinese influence in Africa and echoed the first phase of Mao’s strategies applied on a greater scale.

Ironically, this would come to pass, not through Chinese moves, but rather through the disinterest in Africa in the post-Cold War era[7].  As a result, China exploited this development to capture hearts and minds in the developing world, which had often been ignored by the major powers.  As a result, China has become an integral feature of the economic landscape of these nations, which has made it more relevant to the governance of these nations.  It is this template which China has deployed to the wider world.

In addition, China has also built a parallel international order, through institutions such as the BRI, SCO and AIIB.  These institutions shadow more established American led bodies, such as the IMF and NATO, which has seen the emergence of two competing forms of global governance just as China had been fought over by two rival governments.  From this, one can infer that Chinese strategies do not seek to overthrow American hegemony, as it has often been accused of doing, but rather seeks to render it irrelevant to global governance[8].

Whether it be the low-intensity guerrilla conflicts throughout the developing world or the globe-spanning machinations of Great Powers, Mao and Zhu’s strategies retain a significant influence.  This has become especially notable with China’s wider challenge, since it follows a strategic culture that is very different to those of the Great Powers that came before it.  Therefore, an understanding of this is an imperative in crafting a more effective response to Chinese strategies.


[1] Mao Zedong, On Guerrilla Warfare (New York: Dover Publications Inc, 2005), p. 68

[2] Erik Durschmied, Beware the Dragon: China: 1,000 Years of Bloodshed ( London: Andre Deutsch, 2008) p. 223

[3] Rana Mitter, The War Years, 1937-1949 in The Oxford Illustrated History of Modern China (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016) p. 175

[4] Jonathan D. Spence God’s Chinese Son: The Taiping Heavenly Kingdom of Hong Xiuquan (London: WW Norton and Company, 1996) p. 173

[5] Julia Lovell Maoism: A Global History (London, Bodley Head, 2019) p. 138

[6] Lovell, 2019, p. 186

[7] Joshua Eisenmann, Eisenman, Joshua (2012) China-Africa Trade Patterns: Causes and Consequences, Journal of Contemporary China, 21:77, p.45

[8] Tom Harper, China’s Eurasia: The Belt and the Road Initiative and the Creation of a New Eurasian Power, Chinese Journal of Global Governance, 5.2, October 2019, p. 103


Tom Harper is a doctoral researcher in politics and international relations from the University of Surrey. His research interest is Chinese foreign policy in the developing world and has been published in the Cambridge Journal of Eurasian Studies as well as in the Conversation, the Asia Times and the Independent and has been interviewed by the China Daily and the Gazeta Do Povo. His articles have been translated into Arabic, French, Japanese, and Spanish. He can also speak Mandarin Chinese and Japanese

Filed Under: Blog Article, Feature, Uncategorized Tagged With: China, Counter Insurgency, CT, insurgency, Mao, Mao Zedong, strategy, Tom Harper, Zhu De

The Strategy of Star Wars: The Rebel Alliance as a Maoist Insurgency

December 11, 2015 by Timothy Collins

2000px-Star_Wars_Logo.svg.png

Star Wars has been a cultural behemoth for over forty years. As fans of the series well know, in its origins, George Lucas’s original trilogy of films drew heavily from preceding works. Its plot, themes, and even individual characters were significantly influenced by the Flash Gordon serials, as well as the films of Kurosawa. Indeed, its cinematic ‘inspirations’ extend even to the way individual scenes are framed and shot. Entire set pieces in A New Hope, such as the attack on the Death Star, serve essentially as science fiction remakes of World War II epics, most notably The Dambusters, 663 Squadron, and The Bridges at Toko-Ri. So striking are these similarities that shot for shot comparisons demonstrate how Lucas took raids by Mosquito and Lancaster bombers, in essence replacing the World War II aircraft with X-Wings and the Millennium Falcon – to undeniably thrilling effect.

While these cinematic comparisons are well known, perhaps more interesting are the ways in which the films also parallel real life historical events. Sadly, there are no recorded examples of Jedi knights in the annals of history. What is striking, however, is the extent to which the rebellion depicted in the original trilogy of films resembles, in both its form and its underlying strategy, the Maoist model of insurgency, as developed and popularised by Mao Zedong. Specifically, the manner by which the Rebel Alliance challenges the dominance of the Galactic Empire follows an essentially Maoist model of insurgency, beginning with political infiltration at the local level before proceeding through to guerrilla warfare and, ultimately, direct mobile engagement.

That Star Wars contains such similarities is not entirely surprising. Authors of science fiction typically reflect the concerns of the society in which they live and, writing in 1973, George Lucas was no exception. Much has already been written about the ways in which the films were shaped by the politics of the Nixon era White House – particularly their depiction of a centralised authority abusing state power. Equally, after spending years preparing to direct Apocalypse Now, Lucas was by all accounts personally affected by the Vietnam War, then still raging in the Far East. Not least, the war appeared to demonstrate how a relatively small band of insurgents could hold at bay the much larger and better-provisioned forces of a superpower, despite the latter’s best efforts to eradicate them. Whether consciously or not, the films thus reflected their origins in revolutionary war as much as the Flash Gordon serials that set their tone.

Soon a new trilogy of films will arrive, ready for fans to over-analyse. Before this occurs, however, it is worth revisiting the trilogy that inspired the phenomenon, and the popular insurgency it depicts. What are the strategic underpinnings of the Star Wars universe, and how do the films sit alongside other cinematic depictions of revolutionary war?

A People’s Revolution

As its opening text famously declares, Star Wars is set both a long time ago and in a galaxy far, far away. Through the course of the original trilogy we are introduced to aliens, epic space battles, and characters empowered with effectively magical capabilities. That one may seek to draw parallels between the world inhabited by Luke Skywalker and our own history may appear far-fetched, therefore; not least with the insurgency fought by Mao in mainland China between 1927 and 1950.

Scratch beneath the series’ science fiction trappings, however, and what soon emerges is a story with far greater worldly significance. Indeed, parallel to Luke Skywalker’s personal journey is that of the Rebel Alliance – an aspiring insurgent movement, formed with the goal of toppling an authoritarian central government. Its character is clearly that of an armed insurgency. By the time Luke Skywalker joins the rebellion it has already grown to assume the trappings of a traditional military force, complete with regular ranks, insignia, and significant military capabilities of its own. Most importantly, it is also unmistakably a popular insurgency. By this it is meant a movement that draws its members from across society, utilising the population as a key strategic resource in its goal of overthrowing the government. While the weapons with which the rebellion is fought may be alien to us, its essential character is one that would thus be familiar to observers of many of the insurgencies of the 20th Century – be they in China, Malaya, or beyond.

Key to a popular insurgency is the possession of a cause capable of inspiring support, and it is in this that we find the first key similarity between the Rebel Alliance depicted in Star Wars and the concept of insurgency described by Mao. More than any other factor, Mao stressed the critical importance of a popular cause in staging a successful insurgency. It is only by possessing such a factor that the insurgent may begin to prise the population away from the government, effectively turning them into a resource to be exploited by the insurgency itself. Through such successful manipulation the population may increasingly be induced to provide material aid to the insurgency – for example in funding, in armaments, or in manpower. Equally, by becoming the people’s champion, the people may in turn provide crucial shelter to the insurgent, allowing them, in Mao’s famous dictum, to ‘move amongst the people as a fish swims in the sea.’ This is crucial at all stages in the insurgency, but particularly so in its earliest phases when the government maintains a vast advantage in material strength, and the insurgent is only beginning to build up its power base.

What form a popular cause may take is open to interpretation. Mao defined it merely as ‘an unresolved contradiction’ in society, and across its 20+ years his own campaign championed many issues. The fact that the Rebel Alliance possesses such a cause, and that this cause is instrumental in providing both cohesion and support to the movement is, however, beyond doubt.

Our first introduction to the Rebellion’s popular appeal comes almost at the very beginning of the Star Wars universe. In the opening act of A New Hope Luke’s adopted family are murdered in a clear example of extra-judicial killing. This is but one of numerous demonstrations we are privy to of the brutality of the Empire’s system of government, and the manner in which its rule creates fertile ground for the Rebellion to grow. While it may have originated within a democracy, by the time Episode IV begins the Empire has grown to take on its full authoritarian form. Power is centralised in the hands of an all-powerful Emperor and exercised through a system of local governors. Order is brutally maintained, including through the routine use of torture. And while there is a pretence to the rule of law, it is a system that is ultimately safeguarded by the instrumental use of terror. Note how the Death Star – very much the ‘MacGuffin’ of the original trilogy – is described by its commander not as a weapon of war, but primarily as an instrument to maintain political control through fear. It is for this reason that Alderaan is destroyed, and it is in direct response to the Empire’s system of brutal rule that Luke, Leia, and even criminal elements such as Han Solo are inspired to pick up arms in rebellion. Faced with such ruthless oppression, even scoundrels may become freedom fighters.

Revolution In Stages

To possess a popular cause is one thing. To successfully overthrow a government is another matter entirely, however. Fortunately for the would-be insurgent, Mao also outlined a strategy for achieving precisely this aim. Based on his own experiences in mainland China, Mao’s approach envisages taking an insurgency from its humble beginnings through to supplanting the government as the main political authority. It is a strategy that influenced not only many insurgencies of the 20th Century but, judging by their actions, evidently the leaders of the Rebel Alliance as well.

At the centre of Mao’s strategy is the concept of a revolutionary war fought in stages. Mao recognised that during the early stages of a rebellion the odds are stacked heavily against the insurgent. The government holds the advantage not only of superior forces but, whether through loyalty or coercion, also effective control of most of the territory. It would thus be foolish for a fledgling insurgency to assault the government head on. One failed battle and the movement could be snuffed out entirely. Rather, the insurgent must start small, building support at the local level while simultaneously avoiding the government’s counter-insurgent forces.

This is precisely the approach taken by the Rebel Alliance. Though the films offer only tantalising clues as to the movement’s origins, recently, a new animated series, Star Wars: Rebels, has begun to fill in the missing details. Set 20 years before the events of A New Hope, the series follows a small group of rebels as they attempt to subvert the Empire’s hold over a backwater planet. Tellingly, the tactics employed by the rebels are precisely those advocated by Mao. The rebels are organised into a small resistance cell, with contacts to other insurgent groups deliberately limited lest the wider organisation be infiltrated by counter-intelligence forces. Outmatched by the government’s military might, the rebels limit their actions to staging hit and run attacks, targeted acts of sabotage, and political subversion. While their resistance is often armed, importantly, at no stage is the goal of such acts to overthrow the government directly. Rather, the intention is to spread the Rebellion’s message of resistance, growing the insurgent movement over time and, with it, its political and military strength.

Revolutionary Endgame: The Battle of Endor

Clearly the Rebellion’s strategy is one that bears fruit. By avoiding engaging the government’s forces directly and subverting the regime politically, the Rebellion builds up its strength to the point that by A New Hope, small bands of fighters have grown into a semi-regular military force. It is at this stage that, according to Maoist theory, the revolution enters a perilous but potentially decisive stage. Having built up its military capabilities into that approaching a regular army, Mao argues that the insurgency should abandon guerrilla warfare in favour of launching a conventional military campaign. In essence, after years of operating in the shadows Mao advocates that the insurgency step into the open and engage the government head on.

As a strategy this is not without risk, and many of the insurgencies that attempted to follow Mao’s model floundered at precisely this stage. The problem is easy enough to anticipate even if its solution is not so readily apparent. By stepping into the open too soon the insurgency risks a military defeat that may set it back years, or even decades. Mao himself suffered numerous reversals in his campaign against Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist government, at one point losing so badly that he was forced to retreat to a rural hinterland – an episode better known as the ‘Long March.’ Yet by remaining in its safe areas for too long the insurgency risks losing the support of the people, or suffering at the hands of the government’s counter-insurgent efforts. In insurgency, as in comedy, timing is clearly everything.

For its part the Rebellion appears aware of this dilemma. Throughout the original trilogy we see the Rebellion opt to retreat rather than engage the Empire’s forces in the field. This occurs after its base is discovered at the end of A New Hope and, more spectacularly, at the beginning of The Empire Strikes Back. From a tactical point of view this makes sense. For all the jokes about Stormtroopers’ inability to shoot straight, the Empire’s forces are clearly superior, both on the ground and in the air. Yet in order to win the war the insurgency must clearly do something to break the Empire’s political control. Like Mao, the Rebel Alliance’s solution is to seek a military victory, confronting the Empire in a dangerous but ultimately decisive battle at the end of Return of the Jedi.

It should be noted that, as far as engagements go, the Rebellion is exceptionally lucky in the outcome of The Battle of Endor. Recognising that military defeat would be a catastrophe for the Rebellion, the Emperor deliberately tempts the insurgents into amassing their forces in one location, so that they can be destroyed. The fact that the subsequent battle turns ultimately in the rebels’ favour owes as much to the insurgents’ luck as it does tactical skill.

Yet it is in the strategic consequences of the battle that the Rebellion is most fortunate of all. By the close of Return of the Jedi the Emperor and Darth Vader are dead, the Empire’s (second) Death Star is destroyed, and with it we can presume a sizable portion of its fleet. To employ the language of strategic studies, this is a hammer blow against the Empire’s ‘centre of gravity’. In one battle the Rebellion has destroyed the very thing that the autocratic Empire cannot survive without. In this case its political leadership, as well as a significant portion of the fighting power that underpins its authority.

It is worth noting that as decisive as the battle may be, the Empire is not completely destroyed in this encounter. The trailers for The Force Awakens indicate that some sort of rump imperial state survives the rebellion, much like the Chinese Nationalists themselves survived after retreating to Taiwan. Nevertheless, for an autocratic, essentially dynastic state to lose its political leadership is a defeat that cannot readily be compensated for. The Rebellion may have stumbled into a trap, but they mange to emerge with a more decisive victory than could possibly have been hoped for. Mao, ever the advocate of a final ‘annihilation campaign’ against one’s opponents, would approve wholeheartedly.

Lessons from Cinematic History

Any comparison between the cinematic universe of Star Wars and our own requires taking a degree of creative licence. The fact remains however that, as a representation of both the challenges and strategy of insurgency, Star Wars deserves consideration alongside such other cinematic classics as The Battle of Algiers and The Wind that Shakes the Barley. As well as echoing many Maoist principles, the films provide an exemplary demonstration of how not to conduct a counter-insurgency campaign. While considerations of length prevent this article from considering the issue in depth, the Empire’s strategy throughout is to seek military solutions to a problem that is essentially political in nature. Of Mao’s many legacies, it was his recognition that an insurgency is first and foremost a political endeavour that was arguably his most influential. A government may attempt to employ force to eradicate its opponents, but unless it addresses the underlying political grievance that gives it force, the movement will continue to grow. In this as in other areas, the films provide a lesson as relevant today as when A New Hope first entered theatres over forty years ago.

 

Timothy Collins is a PhD candidate in the War Studies Department at King’s College London.

Filed Under: Blog Article Tagged With: China, insurgency, Mao, Rebellion, rebels, Star Wars

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