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You are here: Home / Archives for kidnapping

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Strife Interview – Antonio Moscatello on “Megumi”

May 17, 2018 by Strife Staff

 

 

Antonio Moscatello is an Italian journalist who graduated in Japanese language and translated many texts from Japanese. He became a professional journalist in 2001 and worked as foreign correspondent in Tokyo, Iraq, and Budapest. In 2012 he investigated North-Korean kidnappings, which is also the theme of “Megumi”, his latest book. Strife’s Editor Andrea Fischetti met with Mr Moscatello to discuss the issues raised in “Megumi”.

All Enquiries as to this article’s content should be sent to Strife Blog.

 

AF: Let’s start with “Megumi”, who inspired the title of your book. Who is Megumi? What does her case tell us about North-Korean kidnappings?

AM: Megumi Yokota was kidnapped when she was 13 years old, in November 1977, on her way home after school. Everything happened within around 500 meters. For about 20 years her disappearance remained a mystery, until, almost by chance, the truth came up: she was kidnapped and taken to North Korea by agents working for Pyongyang.

Her story became the most emblematic case among the many North Korean kidnappings in Japan, South Korea, and further afield. Moreover, the story of Megumi has yet to come to an end, after more than 40 years.

I believe a remarking characteristic of Megumi’s case is the reason behind her disappearance. This wasn’t a planned operation, like many others conducted by Pyongyang in those years. In fact, Megumi was kidnapped due to her physical appearance, since she looked older than her actual age. This is also an emblematic case of Kim Jong Il’s strategy. At that time, for the North Korean regime there was no difference between normal people and those who held official roles in government and parties: everyone was believed to be an “agent” of a government, be it ally or enemy. For example, when 30 years later five Japanese citizens were returned to Japan after being kidnapped, they were presented as part of an official delegation.

The lack of a difference between normal citizens and government officials in the eyes of North Korea explains a lot about the North-Korean view of power; it also highlights the cohesiveness of the regime and, possibly, of the whole North-Korean society.

 

AF: Megumi is not the only case you analyse in your book. Is there another one you want to tell us about?

AM: There are many stories, and each one could make for a great espionage movie. However, there is one specific case that I wish to mention; one that took place in the United Kingdom, and more precisely in London. In 1983, a young exchange student from Japan, Keiko Arimoto, disappeared. Similarly to Megumi’s case, Keiko’s whereabouts remained unknown for many years, until another Japanese citizen, who was also detained in North Korea following his kidnapping, managed to send a letter saying that Keiko was in that country. This was the starting point of a series of investigations.

The last time she had been seen, Arimoto was at Copenhagen airport. She appeared in pictures together with a man believed to be a North Korean diplomat or spy. Keiko Arimoto has been approached by another young Japanese woman, who appeared to be the wife of a member of the Yodo-go group. This group was made of far left political activists who hijacked a Japanese plane in 1970, taking it to Pyongyang. The group, which was initially headed towards Cuba, remained in North Korea and played a role in at least three kidnappings of young Japanese in Europe (although they deny these accusations). Among these three kidnappings, there was Keiko, brought to North Korea with false promises regarding a job in the import-export field.

 

AF: You have been investigating North Korean kidnappings for years. What have you learned about their modus operandi? What is their purpose, and how do the victims live afterwards, once they are in North Korea?

AM: Each kidnapping was unique and there are many differences among them. I could divide them, focusing on those I have the best knowledge of, in sub-categories with opposing themes: casual targets / specific targets, violence / lies and tricks, couples / singles. The kidnappings that took place in Japan provide good examples of all categories. Spies would intercept people in isolated seaside places, ideally beaches. They would capture the targets, putting them inside of sacks, then running away with rubber boats. From there, they would reach the motherships, which were used to go back to North Korea.

The purposes of these kidnappings are various. Some of them are random, such as Megumi’s, while others had specific targets in mind. This is the case, for example, of a famous film director and an actress, both from South Korea, which were both kidnapped to develop the North-Korean cinema scene. Another instance of kidnappings of specific targets is the case of four young Lebanese women and a Romanian girl. They were kidnapped to become wives of American deserters who were used in national cinematic propaganda.

When it comes to Japanese victims, they were used in a number of different ways. Megumi, for example, was employed as teacher of Japanese language and culture to prepare North-Korean agents, and subsequently was married to a South-Korean who was also possibly a victim of kidnapping. Other Japanese were forced to marry among them, but no clear explanation emerged about this.

Generally, those who were kidnapped enjoyed higher living standards than the average North-Korean when it comes to food and nutrition. Even in the 1990s, when the country experienced a severe shortage of food, the victims of kidnappings that were living in North Korea were given proper food rations, at least compared to those of the North-Korean population. They did not have any external contacts with North-Korean citizens, and only met with those who took care of them, their guards, and government spies.

 

AF: You met with family members of the victims. How do they make sense of these events and what do they think about the Japanese government’s take on the kidnappings?

AM: Their families have been wishing for decades to meet again their dearest ones, and for them it is very hard to make sense of these events. Some of the families developed a radicalised political stance on this theme, which is often part of the rhetoric of right-wing politicians in Japan. Understandably, they have an extremely negative vision of Pyongyang, as they believe it has been hiding the truth for decades.

It is Pyongyang’s silence and lies that make North-Korean kidnappings even more worrying. In fact, there is no clear figure about the number of kidnapped Japanese citizens, which could amount to several hundreds. However, only 17 have been proved by the Japanese government.

Many families who experienced a kidnapping have been criticising the Japanese government. Until 2001, despite the public had been aware of this phenomenon for several years, Japanese governments appeared to negate the existence or understate the gravity of this issue and even preferred realpolitik to a tough line in their talks with Pyongyang. During the second half of the 1990s, Tokyo was supporting the Clinton administration with their efforts to resolve the North-Korean nuclear crisis through dialogue and a normalisation of diplomatic relations. This stance was also due to the economic interests in reaching a dialogue between Pyongyang and Washington and, through that, between Pyongyang and Tokyo.

It was under Junichiro Koizumi’s administration that the Japanese approach to the problem of North-Korean kidnappings began to change. Nowadays, especially thanks to Shinzo Abe, the issue became a priority for Japan. The current Prime Minister has been very concerned with the issue of North-Korean kidnappings, and even wears the blue-ribbon [which is a symbol of support for those who were kidnapped and their families – AF] in many occasions.

However, families, and especially the elderly, remain skeptic about the government: they fear that the destiny of their sons could be subject to realpolitik, and that ultimately they could be exchanged for a solution to the North-Korean crisis.

 

AF: America, Europe, Asia: to different extents and in different contexts, kidnappings have been a reality to deal with in many countries. However, in these cases a sovereign state such as North Korea recognised its involvement in kidnappings operations: should we treat these cases differently from other kidnappings?

AM: These kidnappings are definitely different from those carried by organisations such as Al Qaeda or the Islamic State. In this case, we are looking at a series of kidnappings that are part of a detailed program planned by a sovereign state. Although we should take into account that, as Kim Jong Il stated when he was still the leader of the country, there had been an excess of zeal among North-Korean officials, there is no doubt that official branches of the North-Korean government planned, and carried out, the kidnappings, organised the imprisonment of those who were kidnapped, and produced false documents regarding the victims.

Terroristic groups usually tend to make their kidnappings public in order to have an economic or ideological return. North-Korean kidnappings have been kept secret and the victims were ultimately used for the regime’s benefit. These kidnappings are more similar to the forced labour that Korea experienced during the colonial period. Pyongyang itself used this example in an attempt to legitimise their kidnappings.

 

AF: Despite the recent North Korean tensions resulted in ballistic missiles flying over Japan, also triggering missile alerts in the country, I argued that Japan’s involvement in the North Korean tensions will remain marginal due to legal, military, and political reasons. So far this has been the case, but many kidnappings are currently unresolved, and cannot be officially attributed to North Korea. What are their implications for Japan-DPRK relations and East Asian Security?

AM: It is hard to say. Japan tried to keep the North-Korean kidnappings issue on the agenda using Abe’s relation with U.S. President Donald Trump as leverage. There were positive results, and Trump cited Megumi in his first speech at the UN, and even met with families of the kidnapped Japanese during his first visit to Japan.

However, Trump’s behaviour is hard to predict and this is especially annoying for Japanese politicians. Trump’s will to meet Kim Jong Un, for example, seemed to worry Abe, who is still determined to keep a tough line on North Korea.

The issue of North-Korean kidnappings may once again be overshadowed by the international need to overcome the North-Korean crisis and denuclearise the Korean peninsula. Nonetheless, this is far from certain: in the past, Pyongyang often simulated an openness to dialogue just to earn precious time and soften international pressure. Trump’s will is also still to be clearly verified, even in the context of South-Korean openness to cooperation.

Furthermore, despite Abe appeared to be determined to achieve a resolution to this issue, it is possible that the kidnappings will eventually end up being bargaining chips in international talks. This would not necessarily be a negative change for the victims’ families, but it could make the situation even more complex or deprioritise its resolution. What happened in the past, unfortunately, doesn’t suggest that the victims of kidnappings will have priority.

 

AF: “Megumi” is currently available in Italian, and I would definitely recommend it to anyone who has an interest in this specific topic, but also International Relations and East Asia in general. At this point I am sure many of our readers would ask the same question: will an English version be available in the future?

AM: The book has been published by Rogiosi in Italy, a small publishing house based in Naples. They recently notified me of their willingness to discuss an English edition, and I am awaiting to see whether this could actually happen. I really wish it could, because the literature on this topic is currently very scarce in the West, and surprisingly in Japan too, where despite the many books published by victims, families, and North-Korean defectors, nothing has been written by an external observer.

 


Image Credit: Antonio Moscatello

Filed Under: Blog Article Tagged With: feature, Japan, kidnapping, North Korea, Strife Interview

Financing Terror, Part III: Kidnapping for ransom in the Philippines

January 26, 2015 by Strife Staff

By Samuel A. Smith:

Abu Sayyaf gunmen displaying their weapons in the jungles of the Philippines in 2000. Photo: AFP
Abu Sayyaf gunmen displaying their weapons in the jungles of the Philippines in 2000. Photo: AFP

Abstract: The international community has been relatively successful in restricting terrorist financing, so terrorist organisations have turned to alternative means to fund their organisations. The Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) is currently one of the most prominent terrorist organisations in the Philippines and Southeast Asia and is but one example of a terrorist organisation that engages in kidnapping-for-ransom (KFR) activity. The ASG’s KFR activity is believed to stem from past organisational devolution and finance restrictions. The ASG’s penchant for KFR suggest that the group is more interested in personal wealth and material gain than political ends.

***

Terrorist groups, like any other type of organisation, require funding to maintain their operations. There are numerous methods that allow terrorist groups to generate cash flow. One such method is kidnapping-for-ransom (KFR), which has become increasingly popular amongst terrorist groups around the world.[1] In a speech made at Chatham House in London, David Cohen, Secretary of the U.S. Treasury Department, described KFR as a ‘serious threat’ and estimated that terrorist organisations have earned approximately $120 million in ransom payments between 2004 and 2012.[2] KFR is becoming more transnational in character, with one study estimating that there has been a 275% increase in kidnappings of foreign nationals in the decade preceding 2008.[3]

Kidnapping activity, whether used as a political tool or for economic extortion, is useful in understanding a terrorist organisation’s ideology and modus operandi. The KFR activity by the ASG suggests that economic goals are the preference of its members. This inclination leaves the group bereft of any real drive towards the goal of liberating the Moro Muslim people.

It is necessary to first discuss the nature of KFR and the issues aligned with the statistics documenting its activities. The criminological concept of the ‘dark figure of crime’ refers to criminal offences that are unobserved and/or unreported, consequently leaving the true figure of crime unknown.[4] KFR does not escape the ‘dark figure of crime’. One study estimates 12,500 to 25,000 incidents occur globally each year, and only 10% of these kidnappings are actually reported.[5]

Explanations for this vary. Sometimes victims and their families are coerced into silence. Sometimes the payment of the ransom is usually seen as a better option. Some reports approximate that only 11% of kidnapping victims are released without payment. However, when payments are made, around 40% are released unscathed.[6] KFR is double pronged: terror is instilled during the kidnapping and subsequent negotiations, and any monetary gain made from the hostage taking may be put to further terror-related activities. KFR is also understood to be cyclical, as successful ransom payments create a stronger incentive to conduct further operations.[7]

There have been a substantial number of reported kidnappings conducted by the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) in the Philippines which indicate the behavioural trends of the group, such as the tendency to drift between terrorist and criminal activity.[8] When the group formed in the early 1990s, it was ideologically driven and sought to liberate the Moro Muslim population in the southern Philippines and ultimately in Southeast Asia.[9] The ASG initially degenerated into bandit factions after suffering leadership decapitation through the killing of its spiritual leader Abdurajak Abubakar Janjalani in 1998.[10] Janjalani’s younger brother unsuccessfully attempted to reunite the fragmented organisation from 2002 until his death in 2006.[11] The ASG lost its ideological drive, and any radical Islamic elements are arguably only at a superficial level and are a legacy of ASG’s previous Islamic nationalist and separatist views.[12] It is debated whether the ASG still actively seeks to achieve its former ideological goals today – experts claim that there are only a few individuals who are pushing for Islamist goals, and these individuals lack any sort of power or leadership within the organisation.[13]

After the Philippine government cut off external funding to the group through counterterrorism measures beginning in 2006, the group reoriented themselves toward the pursuit of criminal activity for financing.[14] The ASG has grown particularly fond of using KFR as their primary source of income, alongside other illegal activities such as the selling of counterfeit goods, narcotics, and serving as bodyguards for local politicians.[15] The ASG is believed to have earned $35 million in a 16-year period between 1992 and 2008 from kidnapping activity.[16] In 2010, the ASG received around $704,000 in ransom payments from a mere 11 kidnappings.[17] During these kidnappings, the ASG did not apply any serious pressure on the Philippine government.[18] Zac Fellman, a researcher for the Center for Strategic and International Studies, suggests that the execution of hostages appears to only occur when the ASG fails to receive payment in exchange for hostages.[19]

The ASG has conducted kidnappings since its formation in the early 1990s; however, the frequency of kidnappings grew dramatically after Janjalani’s death in 1998, when a power vacuum saw bandit leaders rise to power.[20] While there was only one recorded incident of kidnapping for ransom in 1997, [21] this number later jumped to 140 people being ransomed in 2000 and 2001.[22] This dramatic spike can be attributed to the lack of a strong ideological leader to steer efforts towards political and religious objectives.

Kidnapping activity quietened down after 2002, when the younger Janjalani attempted to control the fragmented group.[23] Since another loss of leadership in 2006, there have been two dramatic increases in KFR activities by the ASG: one increase took place in 2008 and another 2013.[24] During KFR hostage situations, the ASG failed to apply pressure on the government to change policies or release fellow terrorists from prison, focusing instead on the demand for funds.[25]

The ASG’s main recruiting pool is from disadvantaged and marginalised youth from impoverished areas of the southern Philippines.[26] There are some instances of Muslim parents volunteering their sons to fight with the ASG for a monthly payment of rice worth around $200.[27] This reinforces the theory that ASG membership is determined by economic needs rather than political radicalisation. If material and financial incentives are the main motivator for the ASG to continue functioning, increasing legitimate economic opportunities for the population in the Philippines and Southeast Asia would greatly shrink ASG’s recruitment pool.

The organisational fragmentation and lack of a strong religious leader to provide direction for ASG’s Islamist agenda have led to ASG’s descent into a financially motivated criminal organisation without political goals. This, in combination with further restrictions on other traditional terrorist financing institutions and the informal money transfer system known as hawala coming under inquiry, has led to the surge of KFR activity, which is likely to continue as long as drivers for ASG recruitment continue.


Samuel graduated with a Masters of Government and a specialisation in Counterterrorism and Homeland Security from the Lauder School of Government, Diplomacy and Strategy at the Interdisciplinary Center in Herzliya, Israel. He holds a Bachelor of Social Science with a double major in Criminology and Peace and Development Studies from the University of Western Sydney in Australia.

This article is the penultimate part of a four-part Strife series on terrorist financing. Next Monday Drew Alyeshmerni will end the series by shedding light on the use of charities as a cover for terrorist financing and the implication that defining certain organisations as ‘terror groups’ may have upon the eradication of this source of financing.

NOTES: 

[1] M. O’Brien, ‘Fluctuations between crime and terror: the case of Abu Sayyaf’s kidnapping activities’, in Terrorism and Political Violence. Vol 24, issue 2, 2010, p. 320.

[2] D. Cohen, ‘Remarks by Treasury Under Secretary Cohen: “Kidnapping for ransom: the growing terrorist financing challenge”’, in Primary Sources, Council of Foreign Relations, Oct. 2012.

[3] M.K.N. Mohamed, ‘Kidnap for ransom in South East Asia: the case for a regional recording standard’, in Asian Criminology, vol. 3. 2008, p. 62.

[4] P. White & S. Perrone, Crime, criminality and criminal justice, Oxford University Press, 2010, p. 27.

[5] F. Zuccarello, ‘Kidnapping for ransom: a fateful international growth industry’, in Insurance Journal West. June, 2011.

[6] Ibid.

[7] Cohen.

[8] O’Brien, p. 327-329.

[9] O’Brien, p. 322.

[10]Ibid, p. 328.

[11] Ibid, p. 329.

[12] R.C. Banlaoi, ‘The sources of the Abu Sayyaf’s resilience in the Southern Philippines’, in CTC Sentinel, vol. 3, issue 5, 2010, p. 17-19.

[13] Ibid, p. 19

[14] Z. Fellman, ‘Abu Sayyaf Group’, in Homeland Security & counterterrorism program transnational threats project, case study number 5, Center for Strategic & International Studies, 2011, p. 2.

[15] Banlaoi, p. 19.

[16] O’Brien, p. 321.

[17i] Fellman, p. 6.

[18] Ibid, p. 6.

[19] Fellman, p. 6.

[20] O’Brien, p. 321, p. 328.

[21] Ibid, p.321.

[22] Fellman, p. 3.

[23] Obrien, p. 328.

[24] National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, START, Global Terrorism Database, 2014, accessed 13/12/14 <http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd>

[25] O’Brien, p. 321.

[26i] O’Brien, p.330.

[27] Ibid, p. 330.

[28] START

Filed Under: Blog Article Tagged With: Abu Sayyaf Group, extortion, kidnapping, Philippines, ransom, terrorist funding

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