ISIS

Which Canada are we talking about?

October 31, 2014 by Strife Staff

By Zachary Wolfraim:

In light of this week’s horrible attacks in Ottawa and St-Jean-sur-Richelieu there has been some commentary in the Canadian media declaring that this would not change Canada. The international media have suggested that Canada has lost its innocence but that reflects a lack of insight into evolving Canadian politics. While the importance of homegrown, lone-wolf style terrorism should not be underestimated, in the grand sweep of attacks plotted against Canadians this is by no means an outlier. Nonetheless, the fact that an armed person intent on killing managed to rush into the Canadian parliament and lock down the centre of Ottawa has triggered some introspection among Canadians. The question is, which Canada are observers talking about when they are discussing Canada? The internal narratives from Canadians seem uncritical while the international observations about Canada are outdated. The Canada of 2014 is not the same idealized Canada that many people seem to remember.

Since taking power in 2006 the Conservative Harper government has sought to gradually change Canada’s internal politics and redefine Canada’s international image. This has been arguably most dramatic at the international level ranging from minor things such as ensuring that portraits of the Queen hang in every embassy and re-instating the “Royal” back in the Canadian Navy and the Air Force. Of course, there are much bigger issues such as the Harper government’s unwavering and vocal support of Israel. Canada’s transactional view of multilateral forums such as the UN and NATO has not gone unnoticed in foreign capitals. Moreover, while bullhorn diplomacy such as Foreign Minister John Baird’s loud pronouncements on Russia, Iran or Gaza gets headlines in Canada, it has marginal impact on world affairs.

Canada’s military has also been active over the past few years. The Canadian Forces contribution to Afghanistan was significant between 2001 and 2011, as were its casualties. Canada also contributed fighter aircraft to NATO’s Libya campaign in 2011 and is now offering a similar contribution to the multinational coalition against ISIS/L in Iraq. Indeed, while many hark back to the ‘Canada-as-peacekeeper’ myth, it is well established that Canada has not really cultivated this significantly since the early 1990s.[i] The problem with this is that Canada’s current foreign policy is not coupled with any coherent diplomatic strategy and ultimately, this has diminished Canada’s influence in the world.

The current mission that Canada has undertaken in Iraq is an excellent example of this problem. While the international community should take action against IS, and Canada should be involved, realistically its contribution is token: six F-18s and support aircraft will not turn the tide of the conflict. Canada’s relationship with the UN and NATO remain strained and its international diplomatic efforts, to say nothing of its international development efforts, are a shadow of what they once were. Whichever party wins the federal election in 2015 needs to offer some clear leadership and vision for Canadian foreign policy and rebuild the country’s diplomatic depth. Similarly, Canadians need to decide on the domestic vision of Canada that they want to support.

This is not to say that Canada is not still a desirable or attractive place to live; however, the shift in Canada’s politics is gradually changing the country, a trend that has been noticed and come under increasing scrutiny. So the question remains – when it’s said that ‘terrorism will not change Canada’, which Canada is being referred to? If anything, during this time of reflection and prior to an election year, each of the main political party leaders would do well to craft and articulate a distinct vision of the Canada they want to build. Critically, they also need to avoid parochialism and articulate a clear vision of where they regard Canada’s place in the world.

The spectre of terrorism has loomed over Canada and the Western world for some time and will continue to do so for the foreseeable future. That being said, the recent attacks are not necessarily an indictment of Canadian foreign policy or the current government but rather seem to be tragic, largely unpredictable events. The current state of world affairs is uncertain and it is naive for Canadians or international observers to think that Canada is a “fireproof house far from inflammable materials.”[ii] Ultimately, Canada – like the world – has changed, and Canadians must see these two things are interrelated. This is neither a call for a ‘return’ to the Canada of the past nor for knee-jerk patriotism with affirmations of resilience and strength. Instead, it is to urge Canadians to channel their introspective impulses in the wake of tragedy to work to constructive ends and use this opportunity to redefine the key tenets that Canada represents and for which it stands.

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Zachary Wolfraim is a PhD researcher in the Department of War Studies, King’s College London, where he focuses on the role of narratives in shaping foreign policy in relation to NATO operations. He previously worked as a consultant in NATO Headquarters on operations in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya. You can follow him on Twitter @ZachWol.

NOTES
[i] Canada currently has a total of 21 peacekeeping troops participating in UN missions, fewer than the United States.
[ii] From Canadian Senator Raoul Dandurand’s 1927 speech to the League of Nations, quoted in C.P. Stacey, Canada and the Age of Conflict. 2: The Mackenzie King Era, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981.

The arrival of IS in Pakistan and the politics of the caliphate

September 26, 2014 by Strife Staff

By Zoha Waseem:

* * *

While Pakistan remained fixated on the political stalemate between Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif (PML-N), Imran Khan (PTI) and Tahir ul Qadri (PAT), that is now well into its second month, a foiled attack on a naval dockyard in its financial capital Karachi went unreported for two days by an otherwise animated media. A naval officer and two militants were killed in the incident that was swiftly contained by the Pakistani Navy. Spokesman for the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Shahidullah Shahid told news agencies that the group claimed responsibility for the attack which was carried out with ‘support from inside the naval force’.[i] The event came three years after an assassinated journalist, Saleem Shahzad, published a controversial article on the infiltration of al Qaeda in the Pakistani military, primarily the navy, which has been at the receiving end of militant attacks on a number of occasions.[ii] On their part, the Navy remains hushed about the events of the night of 6 September 2014.

This foiled attack is important for a number of reasons. First, it occurred at a time when there was a relative decline in the number of terrorist attacks across the country. Second, it was ‘missed’ by the media as all eyes remained on the Capital. Third, it cast a shadow over the security operation in Karachi that started last September. Fourth, it calls into question the status and success of the military-led Operation Zarb-e-Azb against militants in North Waziristan which started earlier this year. Lastly, it corresponds with the alleged rise of the so-called Islamic State (IS) in Pakistan. It is this last (and most recent) development in Pakistan: the arrival, place and presence of IS, which demands further examination and analysis as to what this could mean for the already-present militant groups in the country.

Over the past two months, stories have been trickling into Pakistani newspapers about pamphlets and brochures circulating across Afghanistan and the northern areas of Pakistan in Urdu and Dari, complemented by wall-chalking sighted in various areas, urging the Muslims of South Asia to join the global jihad for the establishment of an Islamic caliphate, though not explicit on the idea of the caliphate itself. Al Qaeda has taken this opportunity to remind the region of its existence and outreach, with Ayman ul Zawahiri announcing the formation of al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent.

In his recent speech, President Obama vowed to dismantle IS’ ‘network of death’ and stressed that “those who have joined the ISIL should leave the battlefield while they can”. Razeshta Sethna, a prominent journalist and editor, spoke with Strife about these developments. ‘If the US hits the backbone of ISIS on the Syrian border with Iraq, then you may see ISIS gradually dismantled. But they have a lot of money and access to foreign fighters. They can travel easily. Where will they go if ISIS gets dismantled? They will head towards Afghanistan and Pakistan. That is what we need to be wary about. Pakistani and Afghan governments need to think about whether they will allow ISIS to recuperate in their territories’.[iii]

Sethna further explains that for local militant groups in Pakistan, the funds that IS brings will be a major attraction. ‘The money that ISIS leadership will have to offer al Qaeda or Pakistani Taliban, in order to gain their trust and hospitality, could feed back into logistical support for them, including training camps, recruitment of fighters, weapons, etc. If they come with money, there’s nothing stopping them’. The arrival and acceptance of wealthy Arab fighters in the region during the Afghan jihad has already set precedence for this.

Meanwhile, Jamaat-ul-Ahrar (JuA), a hard-line group, has splintered from the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (presently headed by Maulauna Fazlullah). JuA is currently commanded by Omar Khalid Khorasani, from the Mohmand agency, with Ehsanullah Ehsan as his personal spokesman. They claim to be the ‘original’ Pakistani Taliban and have expressed frustration and discontentment at the in-fighting within various factions of the TTP taking place since the former leader, Hakimullah Mehsud was killed in a drone strike last year. Khorasani is a nom de guerre, referring to one from the region of Khorasan, which is considered by certain jihadi groups as the base of international jihad (Image 1). According to one article, while the JuA faction appears to be inspired by Islamic State, Ehsanullah Ehsan has been careful not to pledge allegiance to it, although they have referred to IS as their ‘muhajideen brothers’. Regardless, social media activity by Khorasani and Ehsan depicts indirect support for IS. (Images 2 and 3).

Image 1: This map, which has been widely circulated on the internet over the past few
months, depicts Islamic State’s plan for the expansion of the caliphate.

Image 2: Social media activity by Ahrar’s spokesman Ehsanullah Ehsan
welcomes the development of Al Qaeda in South Asia as well as IS.

Image 3: Social media activity by Ahrar’s spokesman Ehsanullah Ehsan
welcomes the development of Al Qaeda in South Asia as well as IS.

Consider why the JuA has expressed support to IS. One of the points where both IS and JuA appear to be united pertains to the imprisonment of Aafia Siddiqui in the US, whose release was demanded by IS in exchange for James Foley (Image 4). Siddiqui, an MIT graduate and neuroscientist was arrested in Afghanistan in 2008 for allegedly attempting to shoot American soldiers. In 2010, she was sentenced by an American court to 86 years imprisonment. Jihadi groups like IS and JuA have referred to her as the ‘daughter of the ummah’. It is uncommon for non-Pakistani militant groups to rally for Siddiqui’s cause, suggesting warming interests between IS and Pakistan.

Image 4: JuA has appraised IS’ demands for Siddiqui’s release. Previously, al Qaeda,
the Pakistan Taliban, and the Afghan Taliban have demanded her release as well.

Other similarities between IS and JuA are seen by comparing leaders Khorasani and al-Baghdadi. Both head breakaway factions from groups they deemed not to be ruthless enough. Both are educated; Khorasani is a former journalist, whereas Baghdadi has a doctorate in Islamic Studies from Baghdad. Both routinely utilise media outlets and social media to convey their messages to the world that often feature the brutal terror tactic of beheadings. While IS sparked global outrage following the release of the recorded beheading of Foley, last year the TTP had released an even gorier video of militants playing football with decapitated heads of Pakistani police officers.

Nevertheless, both groups have thus far been careful not to commit to any marriage of convenience just yet and it is too premature to suggest whether they will merge in Pakistan. In fact, according to an article in Pakistan’s The Friday Times, a spokesman for IS in Pakistan, Asad al Khorasani, has explicitly denied this alliance. ‘A lot of people who had been active with the Taliban are attracted towards us because they do not approve of how the Taliban conduct themselves… The best part about our recruitment in Pakistan is that 60% of the people joining us are educated. We have differences with the TTP and they keep a distance from us and we do the same’. To what extent these figures are correct is a matter of contention.

Another contrasting feature on the agendas of the aforementioned groups and Islamic State is that most TTP factions pledge allegiance to Mullah Omar, the spiritual leader and commander of the Taliban, not Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the self-proclaimed caliph of IS. Journalist and writer Zahid Hussain on his part has suggested that it is premature to liken IS with the Pakistani or Afghan Taliban given the ambitious global reach of the former and the geographically limited aspirations of the latter. Hussain has argued that the ideological agendas differ too, with IS being distinctly more anti-Shia than the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban. With regards to al Qaeda in the subcontinent and IS, Director of Pakistan Institute of Peace Studies, Muhammad Amir Rana has cautioned that in South Asia, the rise of IS need not symbolize the decline of al Qaeda. ‘[Militant groups] may have differences over strategies, as ISIS and al Qaeda had, but ultimately they overcome their differences. Al Qaeda might feel stunned over the ‘victories of ISIS but now, instead of arguing with ISIS over strategies, will prefer to develop a consensus over a model of caliphate’.

The idea of the caliphate as advocated by IS has been subjected to criticism by Muslim civilians and scholars around the world. As in 1924, when the caliphate was considered a rally cry to gather Muslim followers and subsequently abolished by Ataturk, so too today many consider the idea to be a political propaganda hailed by Mullah Omar, and now al-Baghdadi. There appears to be no unity over which (and whose) model of the caliphate should be established, who should be its Emir (leader), and which territories should be encompassed within it. The idea of the caliphate is less religious and more political. It can also be argued to be outdated.

In an article published by S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) Commentary, Assistant Professor Mohamed Osman has argued, ‘Islam as a religion prescribed values of governance such as accountability and justice. In fact, even in the realm of jurisprudence, only five principles must be met. These principles include the protection of religious life, lineage, property and intellect. It is clear that there is nothing Islamic about the Caliphate or the regulations implemented by the ISIS when all these principles have clearly been transgressed’. Osman is similarly critical of Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia in their categorisations as ‘Islamic states’ that are ‘examples of how supposed Islamic states are in fact either unjust or underdeveloped and not ‘Islamic’ by any stretch of the imagination’.

Sethna similarly emphasises the need to rethink the appeal of IS, that has less to do with religion and more with the ‘enjoyment of conflict’ by a neglected and jaded youth. ‘The general perception is that Islam is attracting European jihadi fighters to IS. It is incorrect to use this reasoning. It is not about Islam. The youth bulge and the general disquiet and discontentment surrounding the youth in the West needs to be targeted through education and economic opportunities. Communities (including immigrant communities) need to be targeted.’ Talking primarily about the specific age group of recent IS recruits from the UK, Sethna analyses that younger generations need a sense of deeper understanding. ‘They don’t know any better. At the end of the day, the long-term solution is to give them what a younger generation deserves and needs.’[iv]

At a recent talk at King’s College London, Joshua White, the Deputy Director for South Asia at the Stimson Centre in Washington D.C., delivered an insightful lecture on how groups within Pakistan view with the Islamic caliphate. There are two foundations for their perceptions. The first stems from the caliphate movement (1919-1924), while the second is rooted in the historical army of Khorasan. The latter is both a physical as well as an imagined territory. The imagined territory of Khorasan is much larger (although its reach is disputed) than the physical, and religious significance allegedly lies in a saying by Prophet Muhammad.

White has also noted that there is a lack of unity between groups in Pakistan and their idea of the caliphate. The Deobandi groups do not seem particularly enthusiastic (yet) about the idea of the caliphate and are careful in their usage of the concept. According to Deobandi texts studied by White, it is revealed that Muhammad was the last Caliph and all those who followed are ‘deputies to the deputy’. He further suggested that these texts are ‘half-hearted’ and suggest that ‘Caliphs are nice if you can get one, but regional leaders can be good too’.[v] On the other hand, Wahabi groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) are more open in their desire for a caliphate. ‘The LeT has a vision that [they] should keep advocating for a caliphate. The objective is in the struggle, not about getting there’. Nevertheless, White maintains that the LeT has been unclear about their idea of the caliphate too, possibly because of their ‘close relations’ with the Pakistani state. He concurs with other analysts that on its part the TTP has pledged allegiance to Mullah Omar as their Emir-ul-mumineen (Commander of the Faithful).

While Zahid Hussain has written of ideological dissimilarities between the Pakistani Taliban and IS, White raises valid concerns about the commonalities between sectarian groups in Pakistan and IS, accompanied by the increasing linkages between the TTP and sectarian organisations. Although anti-Shia groups such as Lashkar-e-Jhangvi may not easily buy into the idea of the caliphate, their sectarian agendas have tied them with IS. The problem now is that should the Pakistani state actively externalise these sectarian militant organisations and withdraw support, they may strengthen strategic ties with IS.

Whatever the intentions of the Pakistani Taliban, Jamaat-ul-Ahrar, and Islamic State may be for Pakistan and future alliances with other jihadi groups in the region – acknowledging that these are too murky at the moment to see clearly – they pose multiple causes for concern. It suffices to say, for the moment, that their arrival in Afghanistan and Pakistan was but a matter of time. Given shifting dynamics such as Afghanistan’s uncertain future, a right-wing government in New Delhi with its hard-line approach, and Pakistan’s own internal turmoil, groups such as the IS were bound to find a vacuum in this region. The Pakistani establishment would be well-advised to shift gears from petty ‘container’ politics and competitive protests in Islamabad to operations that are losing momentum; security before democracy needs to be the motto of the day.

_________________

Zoha Waseem is a doctoral researcher at the Department of War Studies, King’s College London. You can follow her on Twitter @zohawaseem.

NOTES

[i] Later reports by Karachi police revealed that the officer killed in the exchange of gunfire with the Navy was a former navy official. The TTP states that this attack was in response to Operation Zarb-e-Azb, but an investigation by a leading English daily suggested that the militants involved intended to hijack a frigate purchased from China.
[ii] Most notable, the attack on the PNS Mehran naval headquarters in Karachi on 22 May 2011 that lasted over 15 hours and killed 20 people, including 11 navy personnel. It was carried out by the TTP and is considered one of the biggest attacks on the Pakistani navy in recent history. Saleem Shahzad was found dead a week later.
[iii] Sethna, R. (2014) Interviewed by author, 24 September.
[iv] Ibid.
[v] White, Joshua. ‘State and Caliphate: The Future of Islamist Advocacy in Pakistan.’ Lecture. War Studies Meeting Room. King’s College London. 11 September 2014. Lecture.

A creative mind? An early assessment of Modi’s foreign policy

July 12, 2014 by Strife Staff

By Zoha Waseem:

As Narendra Modi prepares to depart for the 6^th summit of BRICS during what will be the Indian Prime Minister’s first international appearance since being voted into office in May this year, many will observe closely to dissect his meetings with his Brazilian, Russian, Chinese and South African counterparts. Modi’s foreign policy, a matter that has been the subject of much speculation, was also the subject of the Chairman of the Indian National Security Advisory Board (NSAB) and former Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran’s talk at King’s College London, ‘Indian Foreign Policy under Prime Minister Modi: An early assessment’, on Friday, July 11. On the domestic front, Mr. Modi has been blatantly vocal and articulate about his goals for India, but his intentions towards the Asian neighbourhood have been less transparent. Mr. Saran, who holds a commendable record as a respected Indian diplomat for four decades now, attempted to break these down.

After acknowledging the positive developments between India’s relations with Bhutan and Bangladesh, Mr. Saran turned his focus to her dynamics with Washington. The negative legacy of this relationship, and a certain amount of bitterness that lingers on between the two countries, was worsened by the decade-long visa restriction irritant (which was quickly reversed following Modi’s victory). Despite this, Mr. Saran observed, the United States is bound to remain a preferred partner for India, although Modi’s visit to the US later this year will reveal more on this account.

This brings us to another key question: how will India deal with China? In Modi’s views, previous Indian governments have taken a weak posture towards China, which needs to be changed. Under Modi, India is likely to have a more robust stance that will safeguard Indian interests first but, according to Saran, will be balanced with a stronger economic relationship as the Prime Minister has long been fascinated by the Chinese economic model, which could be an area he would likely want to expand upon

Mr. Saran argued that to strengthen the defence policy vis-à-vis China, India is likely to build closer relations with the US and Japan. There is thus a possibility of stronger security ties with Tokyo, coupled with a furtherance of shared defence interests, while maintaining the slowly developing industrial relations ahead.

The possibility of regional cooperation with China is also going to be influenced by the Pakistan factor. By Mr. Saran’s analysis, although the Chinese have been previously unwilling to speak about Pakistan with India, this attitude is gradually changing. While Mr. Saran did not specify to what extent this is going to be discussed between the two neighbours, it can be assumed that Chinese grievances with Pakistan for not taking stronger action against the Uyghur militants affiliated with the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), on the territory bordering China, is likely to be a common ground for discussions between New Delhi and Beijing.

Despite Mr. Saran’s optimism, Modi should not be quick in expecting a frank cooperation from China as the latter’s relationship with Islamabad – fair-weathered as it may be on security matters – is unlikely to be strained on economic and energy fronts.

While Modi’s policies vis-à-vis East Asia will be moulded long-term, Afghanistan is likely to be a critical and immediate issue in the foreseeable future, which will naturally influence the Indo-Pak relationship ahead.

On the non-military foundations of this relationship, Islamabad has requested for the supply of power and petroleum from India. This request, as per Saran, made by the civilian government may not be something the Pakistani army is particularly happy about. Regardless, ties between the two governments are going to remain a subject of apprehension ahead of the uncertainty surrounding what might happen in Afghanistan.

Concerning military assistance to Kabul, Mr. Saran maintained that while India is going to continue providing aid and training to the Afghan military and police forces, boots on ground is not an option New Delhi is likely to pursue.

Coming to the pressing question of the terrorist threat from Pakistan, Mr. Saran referred to previous statements from Delhi that have recognised that Pakistan’s internal threat of terrorism is far greater than otherwise understood abroad. But while there are efforts on the part of the Pakistani army to fight non-state actors in North Waziristan, India – like many within Pakistan – is concerned about the lack of efforts being made to target groups that have particular agendas against her.

Coincidentally, Saran’s concerns on this regard were voiced at King’s soon after a seminar was held at the Lahore High Court by Hafiz Saeed in which the Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD) chief, while praising Operation Zarb-e-Azb (the on-going Pakistani military’s operation against terrorists in North Waziristan, FATA), said that the United States and NATO are ‘bound to be defeated in this region’. This was Saeed’s second address to the Lahore High Court this year. In May, he was invited as a chief guest at the Lahore High Court Bar Association. One month later, the US blacklisted JuD as a foreign terrorist organisation and a charity front for the Lashkar-e-Taiba.

Mr. Saran warned that despite a willingness in India to push ahead with the peace dialogue with Pakistan, should there be another Mumbai-style attack on its soil, orchestrated by any group in Pakistan, the ability to take the Indo-Pak friendship forward would be stalled once again and the forbearance shown by the Indian Congress – the previous administration – may not be likely anymore. The Bharatiya Janata Party(BJP) government has already made clear its intentions towards taking a robust response to any terrorist attack. Whether this is pure political rhetoric or a strategy that will be practised, are theories that can only be tested should New Delhi be confronted with the repeat of such an event. Only then will Modi’s threshold be truly gauged.

Moving on to the Gulf, Mr. Saran analysed that the region is important to India for two reasons. First, the obvious remittance factor, and second, most importantly, the threat of sectarian conflicts spilling over to India. The risk of the latter is being realised by a couple of recent developments in Iraq: the abduction of 46 Indian nurses by ISIS in Tikrit (released last week) and the kidnapping of 39 Indian construction workers near Mosul in June.

The growing sectarian divide in the Gulf region (coupled with that in Pakistan), according to Mr. Saran, poses risks for an otherwise peacefully co-existing Sunni-Shia population of India (its peaceful coexistence has by no means been an absolute condition and should be read here in relation to and in comparison with that in Pakistan, Afghanistan and the broader Middle East). While there have been no major recent sectarian struggles in India, there have been a few sporadic clashes erupting. This is likely to be further aggravated by the fact that recent news now reveals that at least 18 Indian citizens have travelled to Iraq and Syria to fight as ‘jihadis’.

Asked if Modi’s lack of experience on the international stage could hamper India’s foreign relations, Mr. Saran assured that even during his tenure as Chief Minister of Gujarat, Modi had made several visits to China, Japan and other countries. Besides Nehru, not many Indian prime ministers have had foreign exposure prior to being voted into office, but they have been assisted by selected advisors. Moreover, as was demonstrated by his invitation to Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif for his swearing-in ceremony, Mr. Saran insisted that Narendra Modi has ‘a creative mind’, implying that Modi’s lack of past presence in Delhi and abroad should not be taken for granted.

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Mr. Shyam Saran was hosted at King’s College London by the Department of War Studies and King’s India Institute.

Zoha Waseem is a PhD researcher in the Department of War Studies at King’s College London and Associate Editor at Strife. You can follower her on Twitter @ZohaWaseem.

Could protracted conflict in Syria be in the national interest of the United States?

April 1, 2014 by Strife Staff

By Eugenio Lilli:

In a recent talk I chaired at King’s College London, a prominent American expert on US foreign policy described the crisis in Syria as a ‘no good option crisis’ for the United States.

Similarly, in a February piece on the web magazine War On The Rocks, the authors argued that,

‘With chemical weapons off the table, Assad’s external opposition in disarray, Islamists dominating the insurgency, and an American public unhappy with foreign wars, the Obama administration feels it has few options other than taking steps to prevent the civil war from destabilizing Syria’s neighbours and harming U.S. security.’

There seems to be general agreement in western foreign policy circles about the fact that the complex nature of the Syrian crisis has left the United States with limited leverage to bring the violence to an end. In other words, the United States does want to stop the fighting but international and domestic factors have prevented it from doing so.

What if, instead, Washington was actually benefiting from the protracted confrontation in Syria?

The mainstream debate has not seriously contemplated the possibility that, in fact, the Obama administration has come to the conclusion that the US best option in Syria is to let the confrontation continue. This is not to say that Washington’s concern about the deteriorating humanitarian situation in the country is not sincere. The United States has indeed repeatedly tried, especially through diplomatic means, to stop the ongoing violence. However, both the failure of successive diplomatic initiatives and developments on the ground might have changed the perception of the Syrian crisis in the minds of US officials. Over time, humanitarian concerns might have been superseded by security ones. While blunt, it is a fact that the history of international relations is filled with examples where states’ concerns about the protection of lofty principles were sacrificed on the altar of the pursuit of strategic interests. In this regard, the post-WWII foreign policy of the United States toward the Middle East is a case in point: i.e. the 1953 US/British coup to oust the democratically-elected Iranian Premier Mohammad Mossadeq and replace him with the dictatorial regime of the shah, or the US/Western blind eye to Saddam Hussein’s use of chemical weapons against Iraqi Kurds while Saddam was fighting the Islamic Republic of Iran in the 1980s).

Could the Syrian crisis be yet another example of this trend? And if it is, what US strategic interest would be best served by the continued conflict in the country?

The answer to these questions lies in understanding the contentious relationship between the United States and the actors involved in Syria. Russia, Iran, the Assad regime, Hezbollah, and a variety of Sunni extremist groups (some of them admittedly linked to al Qaeda) represent active parties to the conflict. Prior to the 2011 uprising, these actors were competing in different ways with the United States for influence in the region of the Greater Middle East. President Putin wanted to reassert Russia’s regional power status and have a say in Middle Eastern affairs. Leaders in Tehran clashed with the United States and its local allies to increase Iran’s sway across the region. President Assad and the Shiite party-cum-militia Hezbollah were a continued threat to the security of Israel, ostensibly Washington’s principal Middle Eastern ally. Finally, the profound anti-Americanism of some Sunni extremist groups, especially of those local franchises of al Qaeda such as Jabhat al-Nusra, was not a secret.

The outbreak of the Syrian uprising markedly changed these regional dynamics. While none of the aforementioned actors has ceased to represent a challenge to US influence in the Greater Middle East, the relations among such actors have been significantly affected. Before 2011, Russia, Iran, the Assad regime, Hezbollah, and Sunni extremist groups were by no means allies and were not part of a united anti-US front, however, they were not at war with one another. Today, after three years of bloody confrontations in Syria, a clear divide exists among those fighting on the side of the Assad government and those fighting against it.

On the one side, Russian and Iranian open support for the Syrian regime against a mostly Sunni uprising has tarnished the two countries’ image in the eyes of Sunni Arab communities. The Assad government and Hezbollah’s violent repression of the Syrian uprising has come at the expense of their reputation as regional defenders of all Arabs against US and Israeli oppression. On the other side, Sunni extremist groups are now avowed enemies of the pro-Assad camp that they now perceive as being an anti-Sunni camp. Sunni Hamas, for example, broke its ties with the regime in Damascus in February 2012, while the Sunni, al Qaeda-linked Abdullah Azzam Brigades has claimed responsibility for a number of recent attacks against Iranian targets in Lebanon. Significantly, for the purpose of this article, it is important to notice that the Syrian civil war has also resulted in profound fissures among different Sunni groups within the anti-Assad opposition, especially between the more extremist Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and the relatively more moderate Islamic Front (IF).

In other words, developments in Syria have significantly diverted these actors’ attention from challenging the United States to fighting among themselves. The Obama administration might have reasoned that the old Roman strategy of the divide et impera could well apply to the current Syrian crisis and eventually benefit the United States. In fact, whatever the future outcome of the crisis, the sharp polarization of the actors involved in the Syrian conflict has weakened their regional influence. This is not only due to the high human, economic, and political costs of sustaining the war but perhaps primarily to the effects that the protracted crisis has on their image and legitimacy across the Arab world.

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Eugenio Lilli is a PhD Candidate at the Defence Studies Department, King’s College London. His research focuses on US foreign policy toward the Greater Middle East, in particular on the Obama administration’s response to the Arab Awakening. Eugenio is also the founding chairperson of the King’s College London US Foreign Policy Research Group.

COIN, resilience, and a new approach to conflict: Interview with Victoria Fontan

February 18, 2014 by Strife Staff

By Joana Cook, Managing Editor, Strife:

Victoria Fontan is a Professor of Peace and Conflict Studies at the UN University for Peace in Costa Rica and author of “Decolonizing Peace” (2012) and “Voices from Post-Saddam Iraq” (2008). She is now undertaking her third PhD in the Department of War Studies, King’s College London.

Joana Cook: Thank you for speaking with us today. You have had an expansive and extensive career and I wanted to talk about your focus on Iraq. Can you elaborate more on the reason that Iraq has become the focus for you and about your roles and experiences in Iraq?

Victoria Fontan: Iraq came to me by accident because I was finishing my research on Lebanon and I had just defended by PhD thesis and the Iraq War happened. I thought I would find in Iraq the same type of Shiite, as my first doctorate was on Hezbollah and I thought that in Iraq there would be exactly, or similarly organised political/spiritual networks, and that these would revive Shiite-based socialism in the area, and I arrived and I found everything but that. I stumbled onto Fallujah, because at the time I was there as a researcher for a journalist at The Independent, and while there, saw a U.S. raid on the city. That’s when I realised that was going to be my focus, and I’ve never stopped going to Fallujah.

What was interesting that day, is that there was an American soldier who had died the night before, and his colleagues were actually raiding the streets to find the culprits. Going house to house in Fallujah, they arrested a woman who was a schoolteacher because she had a Kalashnikov and she didn’t want them to come into her house, and I could see the theatre of war right in front of me. As the raids finished at the end of that street, an old man, a shop keeper, gave a bottle of water to the soldiers and said ‘you must be so thirsty after all of this’, as if we had just snapped out of this scene and now everybody was friends again. I thought ‘wow,this is a fascinating topic’ and I focused on the perception of humiliation in the escalation of violence, between soldiers and Iraqi’s, because everybody is a loser in war and I think that soldiers need to understand why they are facing these situations.

Can you elaborate more on this theme of humiliation, which was quite prominent in your earlier work as well and link it with your current research focusing more on counterinsurgency (COIN) and civilians?

The perception of humiliation on both sides actually leads to a complete falling out in communication. It is a tactic used against the opponent. COIN comes in because, in 2003-2004, I thought that the only way to prevent humiliation, or the perception of humiliation, would be to win hearts and minds. At the time I had found the Mateus and Petraeus earlier reports from US Army Field Manual, 3-24 and I was fascinated. I thought this is it; this is the answer, and I really thought it was going to save lives. I carried on and was in Baghdad during the ethnic cleansing during 2005-2006, those two summers. I saw that it was a lot more complex than [humiliation, violence and tactics], but I couldn’t put my finger on [what] it [was]. At the same time I went into the UN and realised that, because I was evaluating the electoral cycle (for the first three elections), I realised that we actually created the situation of sectarianism, through our democratisation process, and so COIN and liberal peace together created this mess. ….From a COIN perspective, [I was] really disappointed, because I believed in it. When the Americans established the human terrain system in Afghanistan, and had anthropologists on the ground to actually [communicate better with] the population, I thought that was brilliant.

Tell us more about this new kind of connection between COIN and resilience you are currently researching. What do you see as the new material or angle that can be brought to the field from this perspective?

I think the innovative angle is how organic thinking gives us a fuller picture. It’s almost as if regular COIN looks at the tip of the iceberg, and the rest really tries to look at things more holistically. Holistically doesn’t mean looking at everything, every interconnection like some of the works that have been done at the moment in COIN, but trying to look at us and our initiatives and societies and situations as systems, systems of resilience, and resilient cycles. If we look at it that way it gives us not only a fuller picture, but an understanding of when to intervene and when not to intervene…. If you intervene, let’s say when you are in a conservation phase, there’s no space for innovation, no space for new connections. So obviously you’re going to fail miserably, and in retrospect this is one of the main mistakes that occurred in Iraq as well.

We haven’t seen levels of violence in Iraq like we currently are since 2008, and perhaps using this approach that you’re now exploring, can you comment more specifically on some of the dynamics we currently see in Iraq and more broadly how we see that affecting Sunni-Shiite tensions?

It’s unprecedented this Sunni-Shiite conflict, in French we call it guerre fratricide, it’s basically brothers killing each other. I think that the situation never really changed, it’s just our outlook, because really since 2008 it looks worse to us because maybe the numbers of bodies are piling up. But if you’re looking at the repression in the prisons, if you’re looking at the state’s structural violence, it’s actually always been there and I think that the government has been feeding this escalation to such a level that we only see the tip of the iceberg, but really the entire society has been divided, since probably the establishment of those personal ID cards which reflected a person’s religion, by stating the person’s family lineage and neighbourhood.

This has had tremendous consequences for the establishment of The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS) because they started in 2007, al-Qaeda is actually absorbed by the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI )and then [as] the years [have gone] by, whatever we tried to do in COIN has failed. It’s as if we’ve given the wrong antibiotic and now we’ve created a resistant bug. I think that the strength of ISIS is it goes across states, it is transnational; it is also going back to a paradigm that exists outside the state. Before al Qaeda would say ‘We just want to take over the government and become a Caliphate and that’s it’, but it’s not an aphorism, it’s completely unprecedented.

You did mention the transnational nature of it, and specifically we’ve seen ISIS coming up a lot more in Syria. Can you briefly comment on your perceptions of the situation in Syria right now and perhaps how these dynamics will continue to evolve?

I remember last summer Syria was more a recreation ground for ISIS in Iraq, and the people from ISIS I met were saying that they were going to spend two weeks in Syria and it was going to be bonding time between them as a group, to go and actually fight for real somewhere else. So I think that to a large extent this is how it started. The operations in Iraq are different; you plant bombs, you’re not really in it, actually not really giving your person to the fight, to the struggle. Of course this created tensions on the ground because they were so motivated, that they actually succeeded and advanced rapidly, they took over so many towns, and then Jabhat al-nusra was like, ‘Wait a second, al Qaeda, this is our fight, you have to [leave]’. That’s when they said ‘no, no, we are here for the greater Syria and the entire region.’

I think that the funders such as Qatar and Saudi Arabia, are very clever…. I think it’s going to depend on the [regional] funders more than anything else and who they’re ready to back up; this will be at the core of it. Especially groups like Islamic Front who were former Jabhat al-nusra who became more and more structured…. every funder is trying to create its own brand of al-Qaeda, but ISIS somehow comes out right now as the most ideologically sound, and religiously sound as well. They make mistakes, for instance they beheaded the wrong [target], about a month and a half ago, and then they apologised on the internet …. That’s very smart. By doing that the population sees that they might have a future with them. Right now though it’s also a propaganda war, we don’t know how they are going to fare until we actually understand how the local population reacts to them.

Thank you very much for all of your insights. As a final point on resilience, would you like to leave our readers with a final thought to ponder on?

The most important aspect [of resilience] is to understand that whenever an obstacle comes our way, we have to make it become part of our landscape and not consistently try to destroy it. We have to find a use for it within our landscape, which comes from this competitive symbiosis that author Rafe Sagarin talks about. Once we think outside the box and look at the larger picture what we will see…. if the different actors that seek to exist outside the state understand they are much better off together than against each other it creates the potential for a completely different kind of future. I think that this is the key for understanding resilience, how we can work together, and we have to work together from an organic perspective.

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You can find more information on Victoria Fontan’s research on her website: http://www.victoriacfontan.com.

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