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You are here: Home / Archives for ISIS

ISIS

An elusive stalemate: Israel and Hezbollah along the tri-border

May 22, 2015 by Strife Staff

By Sebastian Maier:

07hezbollah.xlarge1
Hezbollah soldiers. Photo copyright: Associated Press (published under fair use policy for intellectual non-commercial purposes)

When the Israeli Air Force on 12 January 2015 allegedly carried out a sortie against a Hezbollah military convoy in the south western Syrian district of Quneitra, news spread quickly that among the victims was a prominent figure of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards Corps Quds Force special unit, General Allah Dadi. The purported Israeli air strike on the al-Amal Farms also killed Jihad Mughniyeh, son of the late Hezbollah intelligence commander Imad Mughniyeh, who in February 2008 died in a car bomb in the Syrian capital of Damascus. Merely two weeks after, Hezbollah lived up to expectations and retaliated by ambushing Israeli military vehicles, killing two and wounding seven soldiers close to the Israeli-occupied Sheba’a Farms on the Golan Heights.

In the grand scheme of things, the reported airstrike and Hezbollah’s act of reprisal are hardly surprising. Quite the contrary, in order to understand these events, one has to look to the inception and evolvement of what has become a well-entrenched animosity taking place across one of the Middle East’s most precarious theatres: the Syria-Lebanon-Israel tri-border area.

The prelude: Hezbollah’s early years

When Israel in 1978 first staged a military incursion into southern Lebanon, few considered it a harbinger of what was to come. With the outbreak of the 1982 Lebanon War, the Israeli occupation, and Hafez al-Assad’s efforts to establish a Ba’athist Pax Syriana on its neighbouring country’s soil, Lebanon’s sectarian fractures became deeply entrenched.

While the Israelis pushed northbound into the outskirts of Beirut with the support of the South Lebanon Army (its Christian proxy), the emerging Islamic Republic of Iran came to the fore and seized an opportunity to spread Iran’s influence in the region. Iran deployed 1,500 Revolutionary Guards to Lebanon, with the strategically crucial Beqa’a Valley as their final destination. In doing so, Tehran turned this fertile land into a Shia militant hotbed, ultimately paving the way for the birth of its Lebanese surrogate, ‘the Party of God’, or Hezbollah.

With this consolidated supply route over Shia territory, ranging from Tehran through Damascus into Southern Lebanon, the foundation had been laid for Hezbollah. In the coming years it relied on this route to violently resist the Israeli occupation while pursuing its integration into Lebanese politics.[1] As a consequence, after a 15 year-long low-level war of attrition, in 2000 Israel’s prime minister Ehud Barak called for the unilateral withdrawal of troops from what had become a protracted battlefield in Southern Lebanon. It was no longer the cordon sanitaire the Israelis had originally set out to create. Playing into Hezbollah’s hands, this manoeuvre subsequently fuelled the perception that the politicians in Israel were trying to sell an obvious surrender as a strategy.

Lessons of the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah War

The years after the withdrawal do not represent a period of peaceful coexistence along the Lebanese border. Occasional skirmishes prevailed on the meadows of the Sheba’a Farms. Then on 12 July 2006, Hezbollah mounted a cross-border raid leading to the killing of 8 Israeli soldiers and the abduction of two reservists. This was supposed to represent a stepping stone towards securing the release of Druze Samir al-Quntar, the Lebanese former Palestine Liberation Front (PLF) member, who was imprisoned by Israel for his involvement in the 1979 Nahariya kidnapping attack. The raid by Hezbollah sparked the outbreak of the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah War.

Other factors that led to the War were Israel’s determination to change the rules of the strategic deadlock along the border, and Hezbollah’s increasing influence on Hamas, who in June 2006 had abducted Israeli soldier Gilad Schalit. What’s more, there were rumours that Hezbollah were on the brink of achieving first-strike capabilities.[2]

With the Israeli military campaign one week old, Ehud Barak admitted that the Israeli occupation in Lebanon may have led to the creation of Hezbollah:

‘When we entered Lebanon, there was no Hezbollah. We were accepted with perfumed rice and flowers by the Shia in the south. It was our presence there that created Hezbollah.’[3]

Soon it became clear that Israel’s military had lost its deterrent edge against an enemy who could blend irregular warfare with the weaponry and capabilities that were generally the preserve of regular armies.

As a result, in the later stages of the hostilities, Israel tried to alter the perception of Hezbollah at the receiving end by applying an iron fist policy of massive retaliation. On 22 July 2006 the Israeli Air flattened the Shia Dahiya suburb, a Hezbollah stronghold, in Beirut’s southern outskirts. Ever since, the term ‘Dahiya’ has been used to describe a strategic watershed experience for the Israeli military. The draconic air campaign was intended to be a disproportional punishment in order to restore credibility and to induce ‘a calm built on fear, not on political settlement.’[4]

Israel map

Hezbollah, however, endured the pounding by absorbing the damage, and continued their operational resistance. Indeed, it even managed to drag Israel back into waging a ground incursion into Southern Lebanon, a battlefield with negative connotations hard-wired into Israel’s military history.[5] To that end, Israel’s firepower, and Hezbollah’s ability to exploit Israel’s ‘Lebanese mud-syndrome’[6] cleared the way for a realignment of their animosity.

Both sides managed to seriously damage each other, which explains the relative quietude and restraint along the Israeli-Lebanese border ever since. Israel’s calculus stems from a pragmatic realization that only an escalatory response can achieve the temporary absence of violence along its borders. Hezbollah, for its part, internalized the art of blending into civilian areas and concealing its operating squads in order to hide and disperse. It decreased its own vulnerability but raised the probability of Lebanese civilians coming into the firing line.

Another front opens up: Hezbollah’s engagement in Syria

In April 2013, the Arab Spring now a distant memory, Hezbollah’s Secretary General Nasrallah made a public vow of fidelity to Assad. This came only a few days after visiting Tehran.[7] He made no secret of the fact that his fighters had gone to support the Shia-sect Alawite regime. Nasrallah, in an attempt to rally domestic support across sectarian lines, justified the deployment of his troops over the border by declaring that Hezbollah would only fight Sunni extremists, who would otherwise threaten Lebanese Shia and Christians.

The true reason for helping Assad is different: besides Tehran, Damascus still counts Hezbollah’s amongst its most important allies. If Assad were to fall, Hezbollah’s resilience in its struggle against Israel would be at stake, as would its strategic foothold in the Levant. For Assad, the involvement of Hezbollah’s troops in Syria is vital in containing a variety of anti-regime forces and the surge of the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS).

The consequence of Hezbollah’s involvement in Syria is that the group is very busy. Another escalation with Israel and it may be forced to engage on two fronts simultaneously. This would divert and overstretch its military capabilities, and could even push Lebanon to the brink of collapse. This is exacerbated by the massive influx of Syrian refugees, who have become a huge social burden for the country.

Nasrallah, the former hero of the Arab masses, has thus embarked on a dangerous path. Celebrated for his achievement in forcing Israel’s pullout in 2000 and resisting a military incursion 6 years later, he has now risked further deepening the region’s broader Sunni-Shia divide. In addition, despite possessing an impressive rocket arsenal, it appears unlikely that Hezbollah could survive another round of Israeli escalation as long as it is caught up in the Syrian quagmire.[8]

Israel is attempting to navigate through an increasingly troublesome landscape on its northern front, and so for now it seems to be determined to adhere to a containment policy against Hezbollah. In 2013, when the risk of violence increased in the Shia Crescent, Israel sent a clear message by carrying out air strikes targeting military transport in the outskirts of Damascus, which Israel claimed to be supplying Hezbollah.

Finally, the events in January 2015 can be considered the latest reminder of a strategic stalemate along the border. The law of talion, ‘an eye for a tooth’[9], which represented the Israeli strategy during the hostilities in 2006, set the pattern for the conflict. Israel and Hezbollah now tacitly adhere to an even-tempered rationale. In the foreseeable future it will be tit-for-tat, rather than all-out war, that will characterise the ever volatile tri-border area.


Sebastian Maier graduated in January 2015 from the Department of War Studies, King’s College London, with an MA in Intelligence & International Security. He lives in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.

NOTES

[1] Saad Ghorayeb, A., Hizbu’llah: Politics and Religion (Pluto Press London UK, 2001), pp.112,113.

[2] Norton, A.R., Hezbollah- A Shorty History (Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 2007), pp.133,134.

[3] Ibid. p.33.

[4] Rapoport, M., Flaws in Israel’s ‘punish and deter’ strategy, Middle East Eye, 10 July, 2014.

[5] Even before Hezbollah’s inception hostile actions against Israel had been carried out from Southern Lebanese soil, e.g. by armed terrorists, including 1000 Libyan and 500 Syrian volunteers. In: Gilbert, M., The Arab-Israeli Conflict- Its history in Maps ( London, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1984), p.77.

[6] Lieberman, E., Reconceptualizing Deterrence: Nudging Toward Rationality in Middle Eastern rivalries (Abingdon, Routledge, 2013), p.197.

[7] The Daily Star, Lebanon, Nasrallah met Khamenei in Iran, to make speech May 9, April 22, 2013.

[8] Levitt, M., Hezbollah’s Syrian Quagmire, PRISM, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, September 2014.

[9] Byman, D. L., An Eye for a Tooth: The Trouble with Israeli Deterrence,  ForeignPolicy.com, 23 July, 2014.

Filed Under: Blog Article Tagged With: assad, Hezbollah, Iran, ISIS, Israel, Lebanon, Syria

What does the fall of Ramadi mean for Iraq?

May 20, 2015 by Strife Staff

By Victoria Fontan:Ramadi Dr. Victoria Fontan writes this article from Duhok, Kurdistan.

EDITORS NOTE: On May 20, following the publication of this article, the Iraqi government granted conditional entry to Baghdad for IDPs fleeing the violence in Ramadi. However, as of May 22, Sharqia News, Iraqi TV was reporting the bridge had only been opened for 1,000 IDP’s, leaving 5,000 remaining IDPs stranded.

The town of Ramadi has completely fallen to the Islamic State in Iraq and Sham (ISIS). Many commentators have already stated that this is a major defeat for the government of Prime Minister Abadi. Indeed, it represents both a long and short-term disaster for the current Baghdad administration.

Only a month after triumphantly proclaiming that he would rid Anbar of ISIS, against US wishes to focus on re-taking Mosul, Prime Minister Abadi has failed. His strategy is not only placing Baghdad at risk, but also the Haditah Dam, the second largest source of hydropower in Iraq.

Shi’a militias are now gathering in Habaniya airbase in preparation for a major counter-offensive. Yet, a year on, Mosul is still waiting to be “saved”. This flexing of governmental and Shi’a militia muscles seems to be no more than a Baathist-style propaganda stunt, that former Saddam Information Sahhaf-style. So what does this mean for Iraq?

It is now very clear that the modern state, as Gertrude Bell designed it, belongs to the history books. Sectarian relations between Iraqi Sunnis and Shi’as have reached a point of no return. Conflict resolution scholars compare relationships to an elastic band: it can be stretched, but at one point, it breaks.

Baghdad’s refusal of Anbar Internally Displaced Persons (IPDs) illustrates this. While the Kurdistan Regional Government welcomed almost two million Arab IDPs after the fall of Mosul last June, Baghdad has closed its doors to its own, clearly indicating to the its Sunni population that Iraq is no longer their country.

With this clear sign of sectarian disintegration of the country, Kurdish independence looks like a fait accomplit. It is not a matter of if, but when Kurdistan will finally exist as a sovereign State. Seen under this light, Kurdistan is indirectly benefiting from Prime Minister Abadi’s strategic and sectarian mistakes. That is a clear long-term benefit to Kurdistan, but at what price?

In the short term, it might be that once again, Baghdad’s errors have to be paid for by the Kurds, and specifically the Peshmerga forces, who remain, under-armed, in the northern frontline of the war against ISIS. In the same way that ISIS significantly benefited from the fall of Mosul in terms of weaponry; scores of armaments were left when General Berwary and his Golden Brigades left the Anbar Military Command on Sunday.

Like the Baghdad-backed Shi’a militias, ISIS is armed with the latest technology; while Peshmerga only receive a fraction of the weapons sent by the US via the Baghdad government. This makes the holding of frontlines, such as in the town of Sinjar, which I visited a couple of weeks ago, more difficult.

This also undoubtedly reinforces an unnecessary metric imbalance between ISIS and the Peshmerga. Each time that the Baghdad Government makes another gross mistake, its ripple effects can be felt at the largest frontline against ISIS, defended by the Kurds for over 1000 kilometers. Each Baghdad military defeat creates even stronger anti-bodies in the ranks of ISIS, whose fighters, thanks to the government’s strategic mistakes, have access to the latest weapon technology. With the strategic help of former Iraqi Army top commanders, the combination is proving deadly on the battlefield. If it weren’t for the Coalition airstrikes, ISIS would have made more advances.

The results are instructive. In Tikrit, Abadi’s troops were incapable of retaking the city on their own. While more than 30,000 troops surrounded Tikrit for over a month, it was only after Coalition airstrikes and the Jibouri tribe’s assistance in re-taking the neighboring town of al-Alam, that the city could be accessed. How many ISIS bodies were found inside? Between 60 and 80. In Ramadi, it was reported that 6,000 Iraqi forces fell to 150 ISIS fighters. At this rate, the Iraqi army and Shi’a militias are only making matters worse.

Militarily, the Baghdad government has reached such a low that a sustained presence on the battlefield will only weaken its army even more, and further alienate the Sunni tribes who are still part of the coalition against ISIS. Politically, the Baghdad government should swallow its pride and start working on a serious end to sectarian politics in Iraq.


Dr. Victoria Fontan is the Interim Chair, Department of Politics and Public Policy, at the American University of Duhok, in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. She is also the author of “Decolonizing Peace” (2012) and “Voices from Post-Saddam Iraq” (2008). She is now undertaking an additional PhD in the Department of War Studies, King’s College London. Her thesis title is: “The Resilience of Insurgencies in Fallujah.” You can find more information on Victoria Fontan’s research on her website: http://www.victoriacfontan.com or follow her on Twitter @DecolonizingPAX.

Filed Under: Blog Article Tagged With: Abadi, Baghdad, Iraq, ISIL, ISIS, Islamic State, Israel, Kurdistan, Peshmerga, Ramadi

Can POTA counter the ISIL threat in Malaysia?

May 9, 2015 by Strife Staff

By Munira Mustaffa:

Malaysia
A snapshot of ISIL’s recruitment video featuring Malay-speaking children training with weapons. Photo: uploaded by ISIL’s Malay-speaking media division, Azzam Media.

Prime Minister Dato’ Seri Najib Razak is painting Malaysia as “a model of moderate Islam” to the rest of the world, but the emergence of a recent recruitment video and photos from the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) threatens to shatter that harmonious image.[i] The video and photos feature Malay-speaking youths training with weapons in an undisclosed ISIL-controlled location.

It was recently revealed that the Royal Malaysian Police had identified 39 more Malaysians who have joined ISIL, and eight Malaysian families are now in Syria.[ii] There are reportedly over 100 Malaysian fighters in Syria and Iraq.

The strength of ISIL’s reach is not to be underestimated; authorities are increasing their monitoring of sympathisers and making arrests to disrupt possible threats by ISIL in the country. In fact, a new terror group with a Nusantara[iii] element operating under ISIL’s command has emerged under the name Majmu’ah al-Arkhabiliy (lit: “the Archipelago Group”).[iv]

To counter these new threats of Islamic extremism, Malaysian policymakers introduced the Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA) just over a month ago, on 7 April, 2015. This new anti-terrorism law has drawn fire from all quarters for its draconian measures. Critics have described it as ‘a reincarnation of the Internal Security Act’. There are legitimate concerns about the potential inconsistencies in state practice in its attempts to eradicate terrorism at the local level. This is largely because there is no universally agreed definition for terrorism that could facilitate the available legal frameworks for prosecuting the actors[v] of terrorism in a court of law. This is an issue faced not only by Malaysia, but internationally as well.

Taking this into perspective, it is necessary to examine how policymakers at Putrajaya define terrorism within Malaysia’s experience. Malaysia had a history of countering insurgencies even before the nation gained independence from the British Empire on 31 August, 1957, by employing preventive detention law as national security measures. After independence, the Internal Security Act (ISA) was enacted in 1960 to deter communist threats that no longer exist today. Under the ISA, the accused can be detained without trial or criminal charges under limited and legally defined circumstances for up to two years.[vi]

In the last few decades, there have been instances when ISA was used to detain members of the opposition for ‘instigation’. Therefore, it should come as no surprise why so many are fearful that POTA will be wielded to curb free speech and silence the opposition in the same manner.[vii] At present, Malaysian policymakers have yet to define exactly what qualifies as terrorism. Just like the ISA, POTA enables law enforcement officers to detain suspects of terrorism without a judicial review or a trial for up to two years, with an initial remand for 60 days with no guarantee of legal representation.[viii] This drew ire from Human Rights Watch, who called the law ‘repressive’.[ix] However, the Deputy Home Minister, Datuk Seri Dr. Wan Junaidi Tuanku Wan Jaafar, argued that POTA is nothing like the ISA, in that the executive power rests on a five-member advisory board and not on the minister.[x]

It is all very well that Malaysian policymakers are stepping up to combat terrorism threats at the national level. However, a problematic law with the purpose of preventing terrorism is not sustainable in the long run, especially when a nebulous term like ‘terrorist’ is so ill-defined. POTA carries unrealistic expectations in reducing terrorism and extremism in this region.

In terms of concrete action, it is a lot more practical to try to understand why so many Malaysian Muslims are drawn into ISIL. The Malaysian authorities believe that they are influenced by the desire to be martyred and wish to express solidarity with the Muslims suffering in Syria.[xi] Regardless, the fact of the matter cannot be denied – radicalisation in Malaysia is a serious concern, particularly amongst the Malay-Muslims.

Joseph Chinyong Liow was correct when he argued that Malaysia’s current brand of Islam could be the main cause of concern for the ISIL dilemma. This brand alienates non-Muslims by establishing exclusivity and ownership on the religion and language with ‘no intentions to encourage pluralism or compromise’.[xii] This feeds into a form of state-sponsored extremism, where Islam is consistently utilised to legitimise and justify state power to interfere with not only the private and political lives of Muslims in Malaysia, but also to encroach on the right of non-Muslims to simply exist.

There are community leaders and politicians who encourage this divisive behaviour with their own polarising views and loose statements on religious policing, that can be seen as “othering” the non-Muslims and non-Malays, and even excluding gender and sexual minorities. Some recent notable examples include the cow-head protest incident, prohibiting non-Muslims from using the word “Allah”, and refusing to acknowledge Muslim women’s agency. To illustrate his point, Liow highlighted the worrying results of 2013 Pew Global Attitudes Survey, which showed that 39% of Malaysian Muslims believe that “violence against enemies of Islam is justifiable”.

In order to counter extremism more effectively, policymakers in Malaysia should consider aiming for a more realistic disruption and prevention goals rather than enacting an iron-fisted anti-terrorism law that may not be constructive in the long term, as well as opening the door to abuse. It is more feasible to put a concerted effort into increasing community resilience and wellbeing, particularly amongst the Malay-Muslims, to make them less susceptible to extremist ideologies.

This could potentially be done through a two-pronged approach. On the one hand, a a sense of nationhood between Malaysians could be fomented through governmental policies that emphasise inter-community cooperation. On the other, the government could censure those who stoke hatred. It is important that the Malaysian government should make a point of refusing to give legitimacy to divisive views.

In Malaysia’s context, community resilience could mean the ability to withstand threats of extremism through an active engagement with local communities and education. Promoting interfaith acceptance and encouraging an embrace of diversity can achieve this. People should be encouraged to challenge and question religious sermons and teachings that contain insidious and dangerous messages that could incite hatred and exclusions.

Considering the country’s diverse cultural and religious identity, interfaith discussions should not be seen as a threat or viewed with suspicions by certain quarters, but instead should be welcomed as a crucial part of nation-building efforts. Through a strong and supportive community, empathy can be promoted and a safe space for an open dialogue can be created. In the long run, counter-radicalisation efforts could potentially encourage vulnerable Malaysian Muslim youths to reject extremist ideologies and reduce the threats that emanate from extreme and false interpretations of Islam.


Munira Mustaffa is pursuing her MSc in Countering Organised Crime and Terrorism at the Jill Dando Institute of Security and Crime Science, University College of London. She is also an intelligence analysis consultant for several corporate intelligence and security firms in London and New York. She tweets at @FleetStGir1.

NOTES

[i] Zakir Hussain, ‘ISIS Posts Footage of Boy-Trainees From South-East Asia’, The Straits Times, March 17, 2015, http://www.straitstimes.com/news/asia/south-east-asia/story/isis-posts-footage-boy-trainees-south-east-asia-20150317

[ii] The Malaysian Insider, ‘Jumlah Keluarga Rakyat Malaysia Sertai ISIS Meningkat’, March 4, 2015, http://www.themalaysianinsider.com/bahasa/article/jumlah-keluarga-rakyat-malaysia-sertai-isis-meningkat-kata-polis

[iii] It varies depending on national and historical context, but in this essay, nusantara refers to both Malay- and Indonesian-speaking archipelago.

[iv] The Malay Mail, ‘New IS Militant Wing for Malaysians, Indonesians Uncovered’, March 4, 2015, http://www.themalaymailonline.com/malaysia/article/new-is-militant-wing-for-malaysians-indonesians-uncovered

[v] ‘Actors’ in this write-up is defined as any non-state individuals or organisations engaged in acts of terror.

[vi] 8. Internal Security Act, 1960, Laws of Malaysia Act No. 82 (January 1, 2006), The Commissioner of Law Revision, http://www.agc.gov.my/Akta/Vol.%202/Act%2082.pdf

[vii] Bilveer Singh, ‘Prevention of Terrorism: Relevance of POTA In Malaysia’, RSIS Publications, March 31, 2015, https://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/cens/co15075-prevention-of-terrorism-relevance-of-pota-in-malaysia/

[viii] FMT Reporters, ‘Legal Fraternity United in Denouncing POTA’, Free Malaysia Today, April 13, 2015, http://www.freemalaysiatoday.com/category/nation/2015/04/13/legal-fraternity-united-in-denouncing-pota/

[ix] Human Rights Watch, ‘HRW Slams Malaysia’s New ‘Repressive’ Anti-Terrorism Law’, April 7, 2015, http://www.hrw.org/news/2015/04/07/hrw-slams-malaysias-new-repressive-anti-terrorism-law

[x] Elizabeth Zachariah, ‘POTA Not Like ISA, Deputy Minister Tells Critics’, The Malaysian Insider, April 6, 2015, http://www.themalaysianinsider.com/malaysia/article/pota-not-like-isa-deputy-minister-tells-critics

[xi] The Royal Malaysian Navy, Ke Arah Menangani Ancaman Kumpulan Islamic State, Dewan Rakyat, November 26, 2014, p.vi, http://navy.mil.my/index.php/media-massa/galeri/penerbitan/category/45-kertas-putih-ke-arah-menangani-ancaman-kumpulan-islamic-state#

[xii] Joseph Chinyong Liow, ‘Malaysia’s ISIS Conundrum’, Brookings, April 21, 2015, http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2015/04/21-malaysia-isis-conundrum-liow

Filed Under: Blog Article Tagged With: ISIL, ISIS, Islamic State, Malaysia, POTA, radicalisation, terrorism

Netanyahu's victory: what it means for Israel's security

March 19, 2015 by Strife Staff

By Eddo Bibro Bar:

Benjamin Netanyahu visits the IDF Hermon Brigade base, February 2015. Photo: Amos Ben Gershom, GPO (CC)
Benjamin Netanyahu visits the IDF Hermon Brigade base, February 2015. Photo: Amos Ben Gershom, GPO (CC)

This is the first of a three piece series analyzing outcomes and impacts of the recent Israeli election. Next, Jill R. Russell will analyse the “new” US position on Israel.  

The Israeli elections on Tuesday have ended with the overwhelming (and some might say surprising) victory of incumbent Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Now that the dust is starting to settle on what has been a very emotional election campaign, it is time to examine the effect that Netanyahu’s re-election might have on domestic and regional security.

Perhaps the biggest change following the elections is that the coalition Netanyahu will most likely form will comprise of strictly right-wing parties. In recent decades, most coalitions in Israel were comprised of members from different parts of the political spectrum. However, the new coalition is expected to consist of Netanyahu’s Likud Party, Bennett’s radical right Jewish Home Party (comprised mostly of members who live in the settlements) and the economically oriented right-wing party of Moshe Kahlon, who is himself a former senior Likud member.

During the election campaign Netanyahu repeatedly claimed that the Islamic State poses a direct threat to Israel’s security. This does not appear to be the case. The IS-affiliated groups in the Sinai desert are currently contained by the Egyptian Army, which is aggressively trying to eradicate them, and they are not likely to open a second front against Israel. On Israel’s northern border, Hezbollah, aided by Iran’s Revolutionary Guard, are focusing most of their resources and efforts on defeating IS while simultaneously fighting Jabat al Nusra forces, which have obtained a number of strongholds in South Lebanon and are undermining Hezbollah’s military supremacy in the region. It is therefore safe to assume that IS will not be posing a threat on the Israeli northern border in the foreseeable future.

Indeed, the threat to Israel’s northern border is not posed by IS but by Hezbollah. Hezbollah’s ongoing war with IS and Jabat al Nusra has led its units to gain control in the Golan Heights, an area previously controlled by the Syrian Army. Israel will not allow Hezbollah (and vicariously Iran) to take over the Syrian part of the Golan Heights, as it is perceived by Israel as an area of great strategic importance. Hezbollah, which has exhausted its resources in the four-year war in Syria, has no interest in opening a new front against Israel. Yet changing circumstances might lead it to try and conquer parts of the Golan Heights. It is a scenario that Israel can’t allow and it might lead it to engage in conflict with Hezbollah.

Gaza will continue to be a major problem for Netanyahu. Operation Protective Edge has left the Gaza Strip in pieces and it is struggling to rebuild itself. Egypt’s persistent stand against Hamas, which includes closing the border between Egypt and Gaza and fighting Hamas’s smuggling industry – which has flourished since 2005 – has taken a big toll on Hamas and the Gazan population alike.

The declining economic state of the Gazan population, along with the loss of hope for political reconciliation with the PLO, are causing public unrest in Gaza. While Hamas is not interested in another war at this moment, as it has drained its resources, if the unrest continues or intensifies, Hamas might be pushed to attack Israel in order to reassert its dominance and regain its legitimacy in the Gazan streets. Netanyahu’s right-wing coalition will not allow him to alleviate the blockade on Gaza, as this will be perceived as a concession to a terrorist organisation, but leaving the situation as it is at the moment will likely result in a war that neither of the sides wants.

In the West Bank, it seems like Netanyahu has dug himself a hole from which he will have a hard time finding his way out. Over the last few days of the election campaign, Netanyahu announced that the two-State solution is no longer viable, thereby retracting his 2009 ‘Bar Ilan Speech’, in which he declared that he would be striving to reach a peace agreement based on the two-State solution. In addition, his predicted right-wing coalition will not allow Netanyahu to stop building in the settlements, since the parties are heavily dependent on the settlers’ support. The US government and the EU have both demanded that Israel stops building in the settlements, and if there is no let up in the building then the tensions in the West Bank may be brought to a boiling point.

The PLO is likely to try and unilaterally achieve recognition of its independence through the UN. Whereas in the past such an option seemed extremely unlikely to succeed as the US was expected to automatically veto such requests, the deteriorating relations between Israel and the US, fuelled by the mutual loathing and complete distrust between the American and Israeli heads of state, might lead the US to back such a Palestinian request. In the unlikely event that Netanyahu does in fact pursue a two-state solution, it would probably lead to the collapse of his coalition. Any attempt to pacify his coalition allies by militarily preventing the establishment of an internationally recognised Palestinian State is likely to lead to Israel’s isolation in the international community.

Netanyahu’s six years in power have severely damaged Israel’s international relations and have alienated Israel’s greatest allies. Obama dislikes Netanyahu, who, according to sources in the White House, is referred to as ‘chicken shit’. Hollande has a similarly dim view of the Israeli leader, particularly after the speech Netanyahu delivered following the attack on Charlie Hebdo in which he urged the French Jewish community to flee France. Moreover, relations with Germany are at a historic low.

Israel has always relied on international support, in one way or another, in times of war. Despite the fact that some of the threats Israel is facing may erupt due to circumstances that are not due to Netanyahu’s actions, the international isolation caused by his actions and policies, the radicalisation of his rhetoric, and the predicted formation of a radical right-wing coalition are the main reasons that it will be difficult for Israel to respond to potential future threats.


Eddo Bar holds a BA in Philosophy and Political Science from Tel Aviv University. He is currently studying towards an MA in International Conflict Studies. and Previously worked as a TA, RA and a research intern in the INSS. His work work focused on Peacemaking in Israel since 1967 and history, strategy and warfare in the Middle East.

Filed Under: Blog Article Tagged With: ISIS, Israel, likud, netanyahu

Financing Terror: A Strife 4-part series

January 7, 2015 by Strife Staff

By: Maya Ehrmann:

Photo: Wikipedia
Photo: Wikipedia

Al Qaeda, ISIS, and the Taliban are household names these days. Yet, in the climate of the ‘War on Terror’, how do organisations like these survive and even thrive? It takes more than just strong leadership and organizational skills to uphold the proper functioning of terrorist groups – it takes money. Terrorism is the culmination of costly planning. It includes the dissemination of ideology, maintenance of logistics, recruitment and training of operatives, and perpetration of the terrorist act itself. Financial activity related to terrorism accounts for an estimated 5% of the annual global output, or about $1.5 trillion USD. 1

The events of September 11th 2001 thrust the issue of terrorist funding into the limelight of the global arena. Globalisation of communication, the internet, and banking systems have enabled terrorist organizations to expand their activities and financial mechanisms needed to finance these activities. While state-sponsoring was previously a primary source of funding for terrorist activity, international cooperation through UN resolutions and economic sanctions has dissuaded state actors from sponsoring terrorist activities, thereby leading to the substantial decrease of this method of funding. Terrorist organizations have, as a result, increasingly turned to diverse and alternative sources of revenue, such as criminal activities – including drug trafficking, credit card fraud, and kidnapping for ransom – as well as private sources of funding through charities and individuals.

The methods and resources used to fund terrorism vary from region to region, and from group to group. Limiting the financial resources available to terrorist organisations is a crucial step in the fight against terrorism, and both national governments and international bodies have taken steps to address this.

The attacks of September 11th had highlighted the shortcomings of UNSC Resolution 1267, which called upon UN member states to identify, seize, and freeze financial resources of the Taliban, Al Qaeda and their affiliates, but which lacked any means of enforcing its provisions. In response to these shortcomings, the UN adopted UNSC Resolution 1373 in 2001, which required all UN member states to criminalize direct or indirect support for terrorism, including terrorism funding.

As one of the leaders in the ‘War on Terror’, the US government issued the USA Patriot Act which created strict legal measures to counter terrorist financing. Also, the Financial Task Force (FATF), an inter-governmental body created in 1989 by the G-7 in order to combat money laundering and terrorist financing, issued a revised series of recommendations on how to combat money laundering and terrorist financing. The World Bank and the IMF have since developed assistance programs for countries to ensure compliance with the FATF’s recommendations.

Current international efforts to combat this phenomenon have been largely focused on commitments by UN member states. This is problematic, as it does not provide a framework or incentive for non-UN member states or entities to effectively combat terrorist financing. Furthermore, current international legislation on terrorist financing is very general and does not take into consideration the unique situation of each state. Whereas the United States may easily implement some of the legislation on a national level, it is very difficult for a state such as Syria, which is currently in the midst of a civil war and is a hotbed of terrorist activity and chaos, to properly implement international legislation on terrorist financing. Ironically, it is precisely states such as Syria, Afghanistan, and Iraq which may benefit the most from a crackdown on terrorist financing.

On a strategic level, despite a growing international focus on combating terrorist funding, increasingly sophisticated methods of financing terrorism have meant terrorists are often able to stay one step ahead of authorities. The illegal activities used by terrorist groups to finance their activities often do not leave a cash trail, making them difficult to track. Thus, terrorist financing continues to remain a major stumbling block to curtailing terrorist activity.

Over the next few weeks Strife will feature a four-part series on terrorist financing. Each author will examine a different method of terrorist financing, using modern and varied case studies, offering a new look at who and what is funding today’s terror activities. Arne Holverscheid will discuss the role of private Kuwaiti donors in financing rebel groups in Syria affiliated with terror organisations and blurring the lines between good and bad, friend and foe. Claire Mennessier will examine the involvement of Pakistan in financing terror groups, and the motivations and challenges presented by this involvement. Samuel Smith will address the frightening trend of kidnapping for ransom as a source of finance for terror groups through a case study of the Abu Sayyaf Group in the Philippines and Southeast Asia. Finally, Drew Alyeshmerni will shed light upon the use of charities as a cover for terrorist financing and the implication that defining certain organisations as terror groups may have upon the eradication of this source of financing.

The financing of terrorism continues to be a global challenge and an increasingly important aspect of counterterrorism efforts. We hope this series will pique your interest in the subject and lead to a more detailed understanding of the sophisticated and varied ways of financing terror.


Maya Ehrmann is a Guest Editor for Strife. She is currently reading for an MA in Intelligence and International Security at King’s College London and holds a BA in Government and Diplomacy from the Interdisciplinary Centre, Israel. Her primary areas of research interest include counterterrorism, international security, and Middle Eastern affairs. References: 1 Jennifer L. Hesterman, The Terrorist-Criminal Nexus: An Alliance of International Drug Cartels, Organized Crime, and Terror Groups, (Boca Raton: CRC Press, 2013), p. 167.

Filed Under: Blog Article Tagged With: al-Qaeda, ISIS, terrorism, terrorist funding, United Nations

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