ISIS

Malaysia's Daesh problem: extremism in the shadow of moderation

October 1, 2015 by Strife Staff

By Munira Mustaffa:

Malaysians participating in a rally to express their desire for change. (Photo: Obtained via a Flickr account. Licensed under Creative Commons.) — Malaysians participating in a rally to express their desire for change. (Photo: Hitoribocchi, CC 2.0)

Regional analysts and Western pundits may be inclined to wonder why Daesh’s[1] influence still persists in Malaysia, despite concerted efforts to combat the group.[2] The answer lies in the fact that with a population of approximately 240 million Muslims in the region, Southeast Asia is an ideal ground for Daesh’s radicalisation ventures. Its geostrategic position in energy and commercial trade routes and maritime affairs could prove to be of value, and may even allow Daesh more latitude to expand their influence.

This much is evident from Daesh’s newly formed Bahasa-speaking unit known as Majmu’ah al-Arkhabiliy (aka Katibah Nusantara).[3] Recent developments have shown that Malaysia could potentially shift from its current status as a terrorist transit point to becoming a target state. Reports are rife that Daesh is encouraging their supporters through the organisation’s online magazine, Dabiq, to carry out attacks in Malaysia, as well as Singapore and Indonesia.[4] If such attacks materialise, the consequences could potentially destabilise the country’s politics and socioeconomy.

With the intention of narrowing “the divide between the moderates and the extremists”, Malaysia’s Prime Minister, Najib Razak, boasts of being the pioneer of the Global Movement of Moderates Foundation (GMOMF).[5] But he is also embroiled in a grand corruption scandal [6] that even managed to grab the attention of the international media, and warranted an FBI investigation.[7] His rapidly deteriorating reputation as a state leader triggered nationwide outrage that prompted calls for his resignation.[8] The serious loss of confidence in Najib, both personally and as leader of the UMNO party, has intensified the bellowing from restless conservatives who fervently believe that it is time for the country to be governed by “a pure Islamic leader” who is willing to introduce hudud (lit: “limit” or “prohibition”) law[9] as the ultimate answer to crime and corruption.

The clamour for a more orthodox Islamic Malaysia is not a new phenomenon. Nor is it one that has occurred in a vacuum. One might argue that as much as moderation is a counter-reaction to fundamentalism, religious extremism can be seen as a reaction to modernity. While religious conservatives do not resist harnessing technology for their own purposes, the goals they espouse and the rejection of other modern values such as pluralism is a clear separation of religion, state and democracy that points back to a “simpler time”. This is even more apparent from their use of modern processes (like guerrilla warfare), technology (like encryption and social media), and ideologies, like modified forms of Marxism.

Communism and socialism have anti-clerical and anti-religious undertones, possibly resulting from their criticism of religion from a Western background. Both the anti-clerical and anti-religious elements of modern Western ideologies came from the desire to reduce something to its purest and truest form, eliminating superstition. The same is true of fundamentalist ideology, which is hostile to innovations and ‘corruption’ of tradition and culture. A lot of the doctrine of Daesh came from earlier writings and the influence of the first modern Muslim revival in the late 19th and 20th century.[10] It has been argued that the Daesh movement is rooted in the Wahhabism^[11] doctrine, which demanded that all Muslims pledge their allegiance to a single Islamic authority. Those who refused would be denounced as takfiri (infidel), and would thereby deserve the punishment of death.[12]

This is why it is essential to recall Malaysia’s past association with Communism prior to Independence. As a former colony of Britain and a strategic partner of the US, multi-ethnic Malaysia is frequently described as a moderate and progressive nation. Grassroots militant jihadism in the country emerged in the late 1960’s after the insurgency era, and gained momentum during the Islamic revivalism period of the 1980’s. Anxious to detach themselves from the country’s left-wing anti-religious communist past, a number of eager young Malay Muslims took off for Afghanistan to join the mujahideen (guerrilla fighters)[13] during the Soviet-Afghan War in 1979 as an expression of solidarity and Muslim camaraderie, much like those who ventured into Syria to participate in Daesh today. There, these recruits received their training in the art of militant war, and this educational package included extreme interpretations of Islam.

Upon their return, not only did they bring back knowledge of military combat to share with fellow sympathisers, but also their radical ideology. More homegrown militant groups have surfaced since then, such as Kumpulan Militan Malaysia (KMM) and al-Mau’nah. By the late 1990’s, a number of these sympathisers enlisted with Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), after being moved by the plight of oppressed Muslims around the world.[14] Two of them gained infamy in their own right, the now-deceased Noordin Md. Top and Azahari Husin. One study identified 13 homegrown radical militant groups, and they all share one common goal: to create a Daulah Islamiyah (Islamic State) out of Malaysia.[15]

Since its Independence on 31^st August 1957, much of Malaysia’s national security and nation building has centred on race relations, given the country’s diverse population. Those who believe that the iron-fisted Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA) – recently enforced in September 2015 – will be an effective countermeasure to terrorism will be disappointed if policymakers continue to reject and dismiss reality. Enabling racist and polarising views, fanning paranoia of the Jewish/Chinese conspiracy purportedly seeking to dismantle Muslim faith[16], and legitimising and empowering Malay supremacist sentiments are all reasons why extremism exists in the first place. There is no doubt that the incumbent Malaysian government is very keen on promoting fundamentalist and austere elements of religion only when it suits their purposes and benefits the state.

Moreover, the model of Malaysia’s religious authority is similar to models of how religious authorities in the Muslim world are treated as extensions of the state, which finds its origins in the relationship between the Egyptian state, the al-Azhar University, and Egypt’s religious leaders. Malaysia’s religious authorities are appointed by the state, therefore it is in their best interests to collude with state authority and legitimise the state’s policies. Despite government reassurances that POTA is employed only to tackle radicalisation and mitigate terror activities, it could possibly be misused and abused to subdue critics of the incumbent leadership. In fact, a dissident critic of Najib Razak was recently detained under SOSMA (Security Offences (Special Measures) Act) for having the audacity to demand government accountability over the corruption allegations.[17]

In the face of extremism, a more active state effort in addressing bigotry and dissociating itself from racial chauvinism and religious supremacy is pivotal for reformation. This is a necessary step in strengthening nation building and community resilience. Much of this must come from a demonstrably positive leadership, one that requires accountability and transparency.

There is no denying that the root of Malaysia’s growing extremism lies not just related to the global spread of fundamentalist religious ideologies, but is also ingrained in the attitude of the country’s irresponsible policymakers, community leaders and politicians – all of whom refuse to be held accountable for their actions. This much is evident from UMNO Supreme Council member Tan Sri Annuar Musa, who proudly and wrongfully proclaimed that racism is acceptable in Islam, knowing full well that his peers in power would never castigate him.[18] Nevertheless, such statements feed and validate Islamophobic rhetoric that marginalises Muslim minorities across the globe, which in turn is a reactive co-radicalisation factor in the formation of reactionary extremism.[19]

Two wrongs will never make a right. When one recognises Malaysia’s history of religious policing, and the way that its authoritative ruling power breaches even the most personal boundaries [20] of its people and infringes the space of both Muslims and non-Muslims [21] alike, is it any wonder that Malaysia is suffering from a problem of extremism?

Munira Mustaffa completed her MSc in Countering Organised Crime and Terrorism at the Jill Dando Institute of Security and Crime Science, University College of London, and her dissertation was on mapping and analysing terrorism in Malaysia. She is also an intelligence analysis consultant for several corporate intelligence and security firms based in London and New York. She tweets at @FleetStGir1.

NOTES

[1] Throughout this entire essay, ISIS/ISIL will be referred to as Daesh.

[2] John Hudson, ‘Why does Malaysia have an Islamic State problem?’, Foreign Policy. September 9, 2015, https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/09/09/why-does-malaysia-have-an-islamic-state-problem/

[3] TRAC. ‘Kuala Lumpur Cell / Katibah Nusantara Lid Daulah Islamiyyah / Malay archipelago unit for the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria / Majmu’ah al Arkhabiliy / Katibah Nusantara’, Terrorism Research and Analysis Consortium, http://www.trackingterrorism.org/group/kuala-lumpur-cell-katibah-nusantara-lid-daulah-islamiyyah-malay-archipelago-unit-islamic-state

[4] The Malay Mail Online. ‘Police counter-terrorism unit says beefing up security after IS threatens attack on Malaysia’, September 11, 2015, http://www.themalaymailonline.com/malaysia/article/police-counter-terrorism-unit-says-beefing-up-security-after-is-threatens-a

[5] The Global Movement of Moderates, http://www.gmomf.org/

[6] Jennifer Pak, ‘1MDB: the case that’s riveting Malaysia’, BBC News, August 28, 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-33447456

[7] Oliver Holmes, ‘US investigators launched probe into scandal-hit Malaysian PM Najib Razak,’ The Guardian, September 22, 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/22/us-investigators-launch-probes-into-scandal-hit-malaysian-pm-najib-razak

[8] Ansuya Harjani, ‘Malaysia’s anti-government protests: what’s next?’, CNBC, August 31, 2015, http://www.cnbc.com/2015/08/31/malaysias-anti-government-protests-whats-next.html

[9] Islamic penal law for severe crimes considered being against the rights of God as outlined in the Holy Quran and hadith. See Oxford Islamic Studies, http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t125/e757

[10] Karen Armstrong, ‘Wahhabism to ISIS: how Saudi Arabia exported the main source of global terrorism’, Newstatesman, November 27, 2014, http://www.newstatesman.com/world-affairs/2014/11/wahhabism-isis-how-saudi-arabia-exported-main-source-global-terrorism

[11] A Sunni movement founded by Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, described to be radical and extremely orthodox. See Crooke (2014) and Armstrong (2014).

[12] Alastaire Crooke, ‘You can’t understand ISIS if you don’t know the history of Wahhabism in Saudi Arabia’, The Huffington Post, October 27, 2014, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/alastair-crooke/isis-wahhabism-saudi-arabia_b_5717157.html

[13] “Mujahideen” is translated as “one who engages in jihad (struggle)”, but in contemporary conflicts the term has become synonymous with Muslim guerilla fighters.

[14] Sidney Jones, 2005, ‘The changing nature of Jemaah Islamiyah’, Australian Journal of International Affairs, 59:2, p.169-178.

[15] Mohd. Mizan Aslam, 2009, ‘The thirteen radical groups: Preliminary research in understanding the evolution of militancy in Malaysia’, Jati, 14, p.145-161.

[16] Ian Buruma, ‘The ‘Jewish conspiracy’ in Asia’, The Guardian, February 9, 2009, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2009/feb/06/judaism-race

[17] The Malay Mail Online, ‘Khairuddin rearrested under Sosma moments after court orders his release’, 23 September, 2015, http://www.themalaymailonline.com/malaysia/article/khairuddin-rearrested-under-sosma-moments-after-court-orders-his-release

[18] Sheridan Mahavera, ‘I am racist and my racism based on Islam, says Umno’s Annuar Musa’, The Malaysian Insider, September 16, 2015, http://www.themalaysianinsider.com/malaysia/article/i-am-racist-and-my-racism-based-on-islam-says-umnos-annuar-musa

[19] Douglas Pratt, ‘Islamophobia as reactive co-radicalization’, Islam and Christian–Muslim Relations, 26:2, p.205-218, January 28, 2015, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09596410.2014.1000025

[20] Kamles Kumar, ‘Cover up to “respect” Muslims, mufti tells non-Muslims in dress code rows’, The Malay Mail Online, June 28, 2015, http://www.themalaymailonline.com/malaysia/article/cover-up-to-respect-muslims-mufti-tells-non-muslims-in-dress-code-rows

[21] The Malaysian Insider, ‘What more do you want from me, Borders manager asks JAWI’, 25 March, 2015, http://www.themalaymailonline.com/malaysia/article/cover-up-to-respect-muslims-mufti-tells-non-muslims-in-dress-code-rows

Photo essay from the frontline against IS: playing the waiting game with the Kurdish Peshmerga

September 28, 2015 by Strife Staff

By Christiaan Triebert:

A fighter from Koya in his base – a house recaptured from Islamic State – at one of the most southern positions of the Peshmerga. Photo: Christiaan Triebert.

Christiaan Triebert recently returned from the frontline between the Kurdish Peshmerga and Islamic State militants in northern Iraq. This is his account of his time with the Peshmerga.

***

“Get the brothers ready for tonight’s position.”

“Yes I will, inshallah.”

“Inshallah.”

A group of Peshmerga soldiers stand around a walkie-talkie. They listen to the Arabic of Islamic State (IS) fighters who are just a stone’s throw away. Another Peshmerga fighter scans the horizon with his binoculars. “There,” he points. Two cars drive off, leaving a cloud of dust behind them.

The question is whether the information is useful to the Kurds. The village where the IS fighters take their positions overnight is about 1.5km away. Close enough to clearly see it from the six-meter-high vantage point, but too far away to hit accurately. It would be a waste of ammunition. A cloth is draped around the barrels of a ZU-23-2 anti-aircraft gun for that reason. “We’ll take it off as soon as they move toward us.”

I stand here at the frontline in northern Iraq, between the Kurdish Peshmerga forces and Islamic State, east of the oil-rich city of Kirkuk. Oil is money, and there’s always someone who is willing to buy it, which makes this bit of land a target for IS.

In the nearby villages of Tel al-Ward and Mullah Abdullah IS flags flew six months ago. Now they have been replaced by the Alaya Rengin, the ‘Colourful Flag’ of Iraqi Kurdistan. The coalition’s air strikes have given the Peshmerga fighters the chance to recapture this territory from IS. Now they have created a new, more resilient defence line. A metre-high wall of sand separates the Peshmerga controlled area from that of IS. Every few metres a lookout has been built upon the defence line. On some of them sit sizeable guns.

An outpost overlooking 'no man’s land'. The boy holding the flagpost is fighting together with his father at this part of the frontline. — An outpost overlooking ‘no man’s land’. The boy holding the flagpost is fighting together with his father at this part of the frontline. Photo: Christiaan Triebert.

Peshmerga fighters listen to their commander. The house where they sit was captured from Islamic State and is now used as a Peshmerga base. Photo: Christiaan Triebert.

The area between the old and the new defence lines is marked by previous battles. Major General (liwa) Wurya grabs the base plate and bipod of an improvised mortar system. According to him, chloride-loaded mortars were fired from the installation. He then points to a huge hole. Twisted steel lies in and around it. “An Islamic State suicide vehicle exploded there, luckily enough we managed to hit it just in time before it exploded at our lookout.”

These suicide trucks, so-called VBIEDS (Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Device), are nightmares for the Kurds: heavily armoured vehicles loaded with explosives that drive straight into the Kurdish positions and are detonated by the driver in exchange for a one-way ticket to paradise.

“Have you ever seen the movie Mad Max,” asks retired liwa Abozid Salih. I nod. “Such vehicles are also made by IS. But worse. One foggy morning, we saw an armoured harvester armed with heavy artillery looming towards us. Bullets and rocket launchers were fired — nothing helped. That day, we lost a lot of men.”

It is not surprising that many fighters emphasise how happy they are with the German supply of MILAN anti-tank-missiles, which have proved to be effective against these moving monsters.

Yet many Peshmerga soldiers complain about the poor condition of their weapons and their lack of ammunition. Most of their weapons were seized from Saddam’s forces during the wars in 1991 and 2003. There are also several tanks and other hardware, but none of it can compare to the modern American-made weapons IS militants have looted from Iraqi bases.

In addition to the anti-tank-missiles, Germany has provided around 6,000 assault rifles: 3,000 G3s (“old junk”) and another 3,000 G36s (the standard weapon of the Bundeswehr), as well as thousands of machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs).

But still there are not enough weapons on the front. One soldier asks where the other weapons are. To which another responds, “In the hands of the KDP”. Others nod in agreement. Kurdish police officers had earlier said that Massoud Barzani, the current president of the Kurdish Autonomous Region (KAR), had a monopoly on arms distribution.

Former liwa Saleh holds 44-mm rocket for the RB M57, a Yugoslavian rocket-propelled grenade launcher (RPG). — Former liwa Saleh holds a 44-mm rocket for the RB M57, a Yugoslavian rocket-propelled grenade launcher (RPG). Photo: Christiaan Triebert.

A fighter in position with his Russian made PK machine gun at the frontline south of Kirkuk. Photo: Christiaan Triebert.

Despite the fact that the Iraqi Kurds are united in their fight against IS, the Peshmerga has always been plagued by internal division. The forces are still divided along political lines. Although they led the Kurdish resistance against Saddam together, armed conflict has broken out sporadically between the different Kurdish political groups, most notable in the bloody Kurdish civil war from 1994 to 1997.

On one side is the group that swears allegiance to the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) of the incumbent President Massoud Barzani and his family. On the other side are the groups that are loyal to the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), led by Jalal Talabani and his family. The two political parties together form the ruling coalition of the KAR.

The divide is noticeable on the frontlines. ISIS graffiti is often repainted with ‘PUK’ rather than ‘Peshmerga’. The KDP Peshmerga is mainly in the north while the PUK Peshmerga is stationed in the south. When Islamic State militants pushed an offensive on Kirkuk in June 2014, both factions sent too many troops to the region, leaving other strategic positions unmanned. At the moment, the Kirkuk front is predominantly staffed by PUK Peshmerga.

An older generation of PUK Peshmerga fighters. Photo: Christiaan Triebert.

Writing on a building just behind the frontline. Photo: Christiaan Triebert.

The main danger for the men at the Kirkuk front comes from IS mortars. Snipers are less of a threat: the walls of sand are tall enough and the distance is just too far.

Apart from the occasional mortar attacks, the front is quiet. Perhaps too quiet. In early August, Kurdish commanders said that many jihadists seemed to have been transferred from here to the IS stronghold at Mosul. But every so often there is a larger attack; recently 600 IS fighters attacked Peshmerga positions.

“I do not understand,” Wurya says. ‘Of those six hundred we killed, at least a hundred were foreigners. Why do Westerners, sometimes even with a university background, blow themselves up here? What is their right to fight here?”

This is the reason why Wurya and Saleh believe that Western countries should continue to support the Peshmerga and their fight against Islamic State. “After all, many of your compatriots are fighting here.”

There is debate as to what role radicalisation plays among the Kurdish youth. Certainly the motivation to fight is greater in the older generation than among the young. While defending their homeland is a source of pride – as demonstrated by the many British and American Kurds have come back to fight here – many youngsters talk openly about their desire to go to Europe.

They are tired of the front, or even find it boring. The boys keep themselves busy by playing FarmVille, cards, or watching ‘funny videos’. That gets boring after a while. They also denounce corrupt politicians and the little wages they receive for their efforts at the front. This explains the remarkably large number of taxis just behind the front. A lot of guys try to earn extra dinars as taxi drivers when they’re not at the front.

A Peshmerga fighter is using his phone for relaxation. Several fighters said there was not much to do: — A Peshmerga fighter using his phone for relaxation. Several fighters said there was not much to do: “Waiting, waiting, waiting.” Photo: Christiaan Triebert.

Peshmerga fighter Chewan, 22, bought his ‘US Army’ outfit in the local bazar in Koya. Most fighters have to pay for their own outfits. Photo: Christiaan Triebert.

Liwa Wury says he does not understand why so many Westerners are fighting for Islamic State. For that reason, Wurya believes, the West should continue its support for the Peshmerga. “After all, many of your compatriots are fighting here.” Photo: Christiaan Triebert.

“The problem of the youth is that they have learned to fight out of a book,” Wurya says. “We, by contrast, have gained experience by fighting in the mountains.” Holding a cup of tea, he laughs with his old comrades about the things they did during previous wars, reminiscing about the time one of them was the first on top of a bunker of Saddam’s troops.

Together they fought many armed conflicts, especially against the Iraqi authorities in the sixties, seventies and eighties. After the Gulf War, they fought against the KDP between 1995 and 1998 in the Kurdish civil war. In 2003, they stood side by side with the American elite units.

Yet there has been little training since Saddam was ousted from power, especially for a fight like the current one. “The Islamic State is by far the hardest enemy we’ve ever had,” Salih says. “And that battle is far from over.”

As night falls, the Kirkuk front becomes even quieter. But the silence is deceptive. There is unrest within the political landscape of the KRG, and frustrated youths would rather go to Europe than be stationed there. Whatever the case, Salih will continue his fight. He is certain that “something big will happen soon”.

A few days later, the Peshmerga launched a massive offensive involving over a thousand men. The attack was successful: IS was pushed back over 10km and several villages were recaptured. Air support from the coalition was vital to the success of the attack.

Salih knows how important that support is. He refers to the greater powers of the region and the world, all of whom have a stake in his fight. But it does not bother him. He is proud. “Despite the external support, this struggle is, to me, a Kurdish struggle. And with or without support — I will defend my country till my last breath.”

Retired liwa Saleh laughs with his old comrades about the things they did in previous wars, including fighting the forces of Saddam Hussein. — Retired liwa Saleh laughs with his old comrades about the things they did in previous wars, which included fighting the forces of Saddam Hussein. Photo: Christiaan Triebert.

For six months, it has been relatively quiet at this front. Some soldiers go fishing, just behind the frontline, to kill time. Photo: Christiaan Triebert.

Christiaan Triebert (1991) is a postgraduate student in Conflict, Security and Development at the Department of War Studies, King’s College London. He completed his undergraduate studies in International Relations and International Organisation as well as Political Philosophy at the University of Groningen in the Netherlands. He has visited several conflict-torn regions, most recently Northern Iraq. You can find more of his work on his website www.christiaantriebert.com or follow him on Twitter @trbrtc

NOTES

Thanks to Thomas van Linge for recognizing the ZU-23-2 anti-aircraft guns mounted on MT-LB’s.

UK Defence Analysis: Reduced capabilities amid growing threats

August 7, 2015 by Strife Staff

By Dan Zamansky & Hugh Pickering-Carter:

An RAF Typhoon FGR4 refuels from a Voyager tanker aircraft. Photo: MoD, Cpl Neil Bryden RAF.

This article summarises the changes in British military capabilities compared with their state in 1985, whilst also discussing their relevance to the current security context; focusing upon the threat of terrorism, Iran’s nuclear weapons programme and Russia’s military involvement in the Ukraine. The article makes two main arguments: first, British military capabilities have declined, in some cases very seriously; second, the world is in practice more dangerous now than it was in 1985, with the threat now confronting Britain much greater than it was thirty years ago. It is suggested that an urgent improvement in military capabilities is therefore required.

The 2015 Military Balance identified various capabilities as being in high demand: “strategic transport aircraft and fast-jet fleets, as well as intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) platforms”[1]. Given that these components of air power have been the first resort of the Government in numerous military operations, they are likely to remain a vital element of British force projection in the future. The relevant figures for these categories are summarised in the table below:

	1985	2015
Transports	20 (converted airliners)	19 (10 converted airliners and 9 dedicated heavy-lift)[2]
Fast Jets	485	203 [3]
ISR Aircraft	30 (6 dedicated and 24 pod-equipped)	30 (12 dedicated ISR aircraft, 8 pod-equipped and 10 Reaper UAVs) [4]

Clearly, the RAF’s strategic transport fleet has increased compared with 1985, largely due to the adoption of heavy transport aircraft, especially the C-17. Nevertheless, airframe numbers remain constant, even as the need to transport forces long-distance has increased dramatically, both for ongoing operations in the Middle East and the deployment of British troops to Eastern Europe with NATO’s High Readiness Joint Task Force.

Furthermore, fast jets have fallen by more than half. This comes at a time when RAF aircraft are continually involved in operations abroad, unlike 1985. In ISR assets, which have been the focus of procurement since the beginning of the war on terrorism in 2001, the RAF is somewhat better served. Nevertheless, there remains a significant capability gap, since the three electronic intelligence Nimrods are being replaced only gradually, with just one Rivet Joint aircraft available at present. The pressure on this particular capability is demonstrated by the fact that the second airframe will be deployed operationally immediately following delivery. The overall picture for air capability is that of a limited improvement in the fields of transport and ISR, which has not kept pace with increased commitments, and a very sharp decline in strike capability.

2015: An uncertain strategic environment

The deficiencies in capabilities are particularly significant in the context of a highly uncertain strategic environment, much changed from 1985. In that year, the Armed Forces had some 9,000 men deployed in Northern Ireland, supported by 6,500 men of the Ulster Defence Regiment.[5] This was the only deployment which involved an ongoing risk of casualties from hostile action, taking place at a time when the bulk of Britain’s forward-deployed military force was concentrated in Germany as part of NATO’s Cold War organisation.

The fall of the Berlin Wall witnessed the force number deployed in Germany reduce from 70,000 to just 12,300.[6] The 38-year Operation ‘Banner’ in Northern Ireland finally came to an end in July 2007, another way in which the old certainties are dissipating. The current operational deployments are much smaller, but take place in much more uncertain circumstances; 300 personnel remain in Afghanistan, where British forces have suffered 453 fatalities since 2001[7]. The casualty rates of the Afghan security services and civilian population rose to record levels in the year of 2014, signalling increased danger to British advisory forces.

The other active combat deployment, the Operation ‘Shader’ air campaign over Iraq, brings a different element of risk. The murder of Jordanian pilot Lt Moaz al-Kasasbeh by Islamic State (IS) shows that any loss of aircraft over terrorist-controlled territory could have serious political consequences, through its effect upon public perceptions and consequent demands for military retaliation.

Recently, the intensity of numerous conflicts has increased, which makes for a substantially more dangerous world. Since 2008, the number of conflict fatalities has increased from 56,000 to 180,000 annually[8]. War has also come geographically closer to Britain, with some 5,000 fatalities in the Eastern Ukraine conflict by the end of 2014[9]. The Ukrainian war poses a particular danger of a rapid increase in its scale and intensity, since the casualties in that conflict were increasing until the recent cease-fire, which is being repeatedly violated by Russian forces.[10] Increasing levels of Russian military posturing, as demonstrated by recent long-range air patrol activity, similarly indicates hostilities may spread to new areas such as the Baltic States, further increasing the danger posed to Britain.

The terrorist threat

Moreover, terrorism as an enduring phenomenon has also risen on the security agenda since the 9/11 attacks and has become a major threat to the West. The UK has since experienced similar attacks in the form of the 7/7 London bombings (2005) and the recent shooting in Sousse, Tunisia. The growing threat of IS has brought with it numerous challenges for security officials, including the coordination of a timely and effective response to an attack; the identification of an appropriate level of proportionality in any given response; and the issue of fighting an enemy that does not respect borders. The International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS) states ‘The actual and potential threat to international security posed by ISIS triggered a degree of military engagement and political alignment by regional and international states that had not been seen for some time’.[11] Nevertheless, this has not yet led to decisive success in tackling terrorism.

Decision-makers remain divided on the subject of how best to respond to IS. There have been extended debates regarding the use of air power as a means of disrupting terrorist activity in Iraq, with numerous MPs calling for further RAF air strike capabilities in Syria, in the hope of further reducing the IS threat. Support for the greater use of British air power has noticeably increased, while ‘the defence secretary [Michael Fallon] has long believed it is not logical to limit air strikes to Iraq when the terrorists do not respect, or even recognise, borders’. These additional air strike capabilities could be committed by September 2015 and would incorporate the use of both conventional aircraft, as well as Reaper and Predator drones.

The effectiveness of these potential strikes, however, is open to question, unless their employment is fully supported by intelligence on the ground and a firm commitment of resources by policy-makers. But the UK’s full engagement in Syria with conventional ground forces is the subject of an ongoing debate. RUSI’s Professor Michael Clarke has stated that ‘sooner or later someone has got to take IS on [in Syria] at the centre of their power’. Others may soon come round to his view, since IS continues to control a substantial area of territory in spite of an extended air strike campaign.

Iran’s nuclear programme

Another current issue in the Middle East is Iran’s nuclear programme. The Iranian government was caught violating the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 2002. The consequent 13 years of diplomatic stalemate was followed by the signing of an agreement this July. This deal has been called a ‘historic mistake’ by Benjamin Netanyahu, since, according to the Israeli president, it will allow Iran to produce nuclear weapons in 10-15 years, even if it abides by the terms of the accord.

It is noteworthy that Iran has made major policy changes in the past only under extreme pressure. At the end of the Iran-Iraq War in 1988, Ayatollah Khomeini declared the cease-fire “worse than drinking poison”. In 2003, the suspension of Iran’s nuclear programme was connected to regime fears of the US invasion of neighbouring Iraq. The latest statements made by Iran are very different, with Hassan Rouhani saying that the American commitment to keeping ‘all options are on the table’ has “broken legs”. Iran’s actions throughout the region suggest that it is unlikely to restrain its activities, since it is currently supporting both the Sunni terrorists of Hamas and the Shia terrorists of Hezbollah. Iran has also supplied weapons to the Houthi rebels in Yemen since at least 2009; contributing to the civil war there. It is likely that the confrontation between Iran and other Middle Eastern countries will intensify, as Iran’s budget grows following the lifting of sanctions.

Force readiness and willingness to use force

The UK’s force readiness remains in doubt, in terms of both conventional capabilities and newly emerging cyber technology. Admiral Sir Nigel Essenhigh stated that if UK spending does not increase, ‘the Government will be neglecting its prime and overriding duty … by failing to halt the progressive decline of British military capability into penny packet numbers.’ Concern has also arisen relating to the UK’s willingness to use force against both state and non-state actors. Britain has taken a leading role in the deployment of the High Readiness Joint Task Force to Eastern Europe, in response to Russia’s aggression in the Ukraine. Nonetheless, concerns have been fuelled by the fact that, on a Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) basis, Russia’s defence spending is now 5.4% of the world total, while the UK’s is just 2.4%.[12] Since 2011, Russian defence spending has grown from 2.7 to 3.4% of national GDP[13]. Russia may also be an example of the broadening threat of offensive cyber and psychological operations, which has been highlighted by the recent defection of Edward Snowden.[14]

Conversely, the British willingness to use air strikes in Syria has repeatedly come up against political opposition, which cited a deficit of hard intelligence and possible retaliatory domestic terrorist attacks. The SNP foreign affairs spokesperson, Alex Salmond, claimed that extending strikes to Syria would be ‘very hard to justify’, with a number of other MPs expressing similar sentiments. On the other hand, it is clear that the threat of IS will endure for a prolonged period given that ‘UK officials think some 600 Britons have fought in Syria, with 300 having returned.’

In summary, an image emerges of uncertain British capability in a time of increasing threat. Lord Dannatt has provided an important reminder that political commitment is vital for the success of military operations. Since such commitment, both in terms of capability and the desire to deploy available forces, has been weak or absent in several recent cases, the UK’s security position has deteriorated. In consequence, an urgent rethink of defence policy is required to meet a growing level of threat. The hour is late and the absence of policy change is likely to have extremely serious consequences as threats continue to appear.

Dan Zamansky & Hugh Pickering-Carter are KCL undergraduates in the Department of War Studies with an interest in current and foreign affairs.

NOTES

[1] IISS Military Balance 2015, p.68

[2] IISS Military Balance, 1985 and 2015.

[3] IISS Military Balance, 1985 and 2015.

[4] IISS Military Balance, 1985 and 2015.

[5] IISS Military Balance 1985, p. 41

[6] Ibid, p.43; IISS Military Balance 2015, p.152

[7] IISS Military Balance 2015, p.152

[8] IISS Armed Conflict Survey 2015, p. 78

[9] Ibid, p. 76

[10] Ibid, p. 326;

[11] IISS Military Balance 2015, p. 7

[12] IISS Military Balance 2015, p.22

[13] Ibid, p.164

[14] Ibid, p. 17

Interview – A window into the life and mind of Mary Kaldor

July 7, 2015 by Strife Staff

By Melanie Daugherty:

Mary Kaldor is Professor of Global Governance at the London School of Economics and Political Science. She is best known for her seminal work ‘New and Old Wars: Organised Violence in a Global Era’, now in its third edition. Professor Kaldor was interviewed for Strife by Melanie Daugherty.

***

What shaped your perspective of the world?

Mary Kaldor: There were two important things in my background that shaped my intellectual trajectory. One, my mother was very active in the peace movement; she took us on anti-nuclear missile demonstrations from an early age. Second, my father is Hungarian and my uncle was a dissident in Hungary in prison while my aunt and cousin were in a Stalinist labour camp. I’ve experienced the Cold War in an immediate sense, which really influenced what I did afterwards.

Some people encounter new environments and certain experiences that radically change or perhaps challenge their conceptions. Have you ever had a period or experience in your life that challenged your preconceived ideas?

The thing about my trajectory is that while I was always an academic and scholar, I was also active in the peace movement. I was with a group called European Nuclear Disarmament fighting against the deployment of nuclear missiles in Europe. We were putting emphasis on not only ending the deployment of missiles in Europe but also ending the Cold War. We were working with dissidents in Europe. Many of the dissidents disagreed with us. Yet, of course, there was disagreement on both sides. Many people in Western Europe were sympathetic to the Soviet Union and saw it as the alternative to the US. Then there were some in Eastern Europe who believed Thatcher and Reagan were on their side in favour of human rights. We kept trying to argue that their chance of human rights would be best preserved in Europe without the Cold War. Particularly, that the hawkishness of the West provided a justification for the oppression in the East. We were challenged the whole time. My views were absolutely formed by these experiences. My family was also much divided. My uncle always told me that you ‘can’t trust Russia’ and that ‘you shouldn’t be a peace activist.’ I had to deal with all these complicated arguments.

And very important for New Wars was what came after. Because I was an activist after the end of the Cold War, I helped found a new NGO that was helping civil society in difficult places. And almost immediately groups sprang up all over the Balkans in the South Caucasus. We were actually involved on the ground with peace and human rights groups during the Bosnian Wars and the wars in the South Caucasus. Of course, that enormously impacted me – I was very pro-peace, but seeing ethnic cleansing at first hand, I thought ‘you know, I really hope there is a military intervention to save these people from ethnic cleansing.’ So you have to start thinking all over again.

You were a great part in the shift of thinking on the political economy of war. In the late 1990’s, new writing emerged in academia questioning whether war was really about winning – that perhaps, war was instead a mutually beneficial economic enterprise. It radically changed how the world thought about war. It seems that realisation for you was in Bosnia, which was years prior. Is that right?

I think it was actually implicitly even earlier. I wrote a book called the Imaginary War about the Cold War as it was ending. It described the Cold War as a mutual enterprise. I was arguing that we tend to think it’s a conflict between capitalism and socialism or between democracy and totalitarianism, but actually it is two systems that mutually uphold each other. The idea that war was a mutual enterprise was definitely in my mind then.

But it was a long journey before I came to New Wars and the mutual enterprise idea. As I said in the beginning of New Wars, if there was a key moment, it was when I went to Nagorno-Karabakh [South Caucasus] in about 1992. I suddenly looked at these people – before the Bosnian War and the beginning of Serb enclaves – young men in their Ray-Ban glasses and Adidas running shoes and home-made uniforms. And at the refugees, most memorably Greek refugees asking for help because they were being forced to leave after living there for hundreds of years. I remember talking to a politician, who’d only been a politician for two minutes and I just remember thinking, ‘he’s not what you’d expect of a politician.’ This was not what I expected war to be like, not like what I’d seen in WWII movies. I realised it was very similar to Bosnia. I thought at that time that what was going on was something specifically post-communist, but then we had a project for the United Nations University and I realised that this has been going on in Africa for quite a while.

You started your career at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute directly after completing your BA. Did you know right after completing your BA that you wanted to commit your career to the pursuit of finding ‘peaceful solutions to international conflicts?’

I don’t know that I was very explicit about it. My father was a well-known economist and my sister was also an economist and I’d studied Politics and Economics at university. I was very keen on peace, but at that time, I thought I didn’t want to be a ‘straight economist’ because the field was too crowded. Then this job came up that involved the arms trade and I thought it was ideal because it involved a cross-over between economics and politics. Then, of course, I went to Stockholm and there were these two amazing people, Gunnar and Alva Myrdal, key figures in Swedish Social Democracy. It was Alva who talked extensively about the Cold War as a mutual enterprise. And by the time I’d left Stockholm, I was an expert on the arms trade.

Some say that your firm belief in the power of cosmopolitanism in solving conflict is idealistic. [Cosmopolitanism is a political-moral philosophy that views individuals as citizens of the world instead of one particular nation-state and sees humanity evolving toward harmony and away from conflict.] What is it that allows you to cling to your idealism or, put differently, what gives you encouragement that it is a viable alternative?

There are two things. One – not being a cosmopolitan is not an option anymore. The Second World War was the worst event that anyone can possibly imagine. The idea that you can go on having war between states is not a realistic option anymore if we want the planet to survive. For me, cosmopolitanism is the only viable way of thinking about things if we’re going to live together on the planet. And by the way, I’m not that hopeful.

But second, on a positive note, there is the caveat that there are incredibly brave cosmopolitans in conflict zones – thought they don’t call themselves cosmopolitans – that reject the sectarianism of each side. In Syria it’s amazing what these civil society groups do, but you don’t read about them very often. In Africa, you meet all kinds of people trying to support themselves, solve their own problems, and to treat each other as equals. As long as there are a few people doing that, we have moral responsibility to support them in doing it.

You’ve said before that change must happen from the inside out and from your thoughts now, it seems that you think we might do that from empowering individuals with a cosmopolitan mentality. Yet, if cosmopolitanism is founded on the belief that each human being has equal dignity and worth, do you think you can change groups like ISIS (who are fighting for an exclusionary state) from within?

First, let me distinguish between humanism and cosmopolitanism – cosmopolitanism is not just about equality. It’s about people who celebrate the different ways of being human. It’s not just about human equality – it’s about human difference.

Secondly, let me put the answer from the other way around again. I don’t think you can deal with ISIS through classic defeat unless you kill them all. This doesn’t mean that I don’t think you can make friends with them either. I think what you have to do is treat them as criminals. I think you have to protect people as well – like the Christians who don’t want to be a part of ISIS. I think you ought to marginalize them and, where possible, arrest them rather than kill them. You want to stop this vicious cycle – where the more people you kill, the more people become frustrated.

I had a friend visit from Egypt who says all her students want to join ISIS because Egyptian society is so brutal and they don’t see any other alternative. You must then deal with the brutality of everyday life that these young men are experiencing. That may not be a problem here, but I also take a boring economistic view that a key issue is also unemployment – dealing with unemployment is absolutely crucial.

You’ve stated before that this is the most difficult thing – to change people’s mindset. Some say that it is nearly impossible. Culture, with values and beliefs as its subsidiaries, is one of the most difficult things to change in the world. How do you believe that we go about this process of change?

I think you find cosmopolitans in the tiniest remote places. I don’t think you start by saying that we should go to Bosnia and tell everyone to stop being sectarian. You go talk to cosmopolitans and say ‘What do you propose?’ or ‘What can we do to expand the space?’ And by the way it’s not about money – funding cosmopolitanism may have disastrous consequences. It’s about creating space where people start talking to each other.

You know I think sectarianism is constructed, it’s not deep in people. Yet I also think war creates sectarianism. If someone tries to kill you because you’re a Serb, a Jew, or a Muslim – then obviously you hate them and you turn to people who are going to protect you. It’s about creating safe spaces and communicating.

Perhaps the most common critique of your New Wars Thesis is the fact that you chose to use the word ‘new.’ Have you ever had regrets in choosing to use the word ‘new’ to describe the apparent change in military warfare/wars that you’ve outlined in ‘New Wars?’

I’ve thought about that a lot, because I meant ‘different’ wars. Of course, it would be very peculiar if they were entirely new, but it would be equally peculiar if they were not a little bit new. Some things about them have been new – like the use of information and communications technology. The point is not that they’re ‘new’ but that they’re ‘different’ from old wars.

On the other hand, the debate that it provoked was very good. I sometimes think about ‘hybrid’ – because the people who talk about hybrid wars have taken a lot from the new wars argument about the blurring of internal and external and public and private. Yet, hybrid would not be better, because it is a ‘mixture’ whereas I’m trying to define a different logic of war and hybrid could be just anything. Maybe post-modern would have been the most accurate. These are wars that come after modernity but they might not be new. At the same time, I don’t think it would have provoked the same debate, namely whether new wars are empirically new. Although I do get hugely irritated by people who go on and on about a point that is really unimportant; I don’t think it would have provoked the same debate. Maybe, then, I was right to call it ‘New Wars.’

Melanie Daugherty earned a BS in International History with a European concentration at the United States Air Force Academy and is currently reading for an MA in Conflict, Security and Development at King’s College London. Her main interest is security sector reform, defense policy and state-building.

Hezbollah in Syria: a game of high stakes

June 19, 2015 by Strife Staff

By Kitty Veress:

000_Nic6455785-e1432745822842-635x357 — Hezbollah members mourn during the funeral of a comrade who was killed in combat alongside Syrian government forces in the Qalamoun region. Photo: Times of Israel (published under fair use policy for intellectual non-commercial purposes)

The Western world has been quick to label Hezbollah’s involvement in Syria and Iraq as nefarious and threatening while failing to consider the wider strategic implications. A more comprehensive perspective is needed to evaluate the risks and opportunities the extremist Shi’ite group faces in its support of the Syrian regime. The potential benefit of establishing itself as a regional power and battle-hardening its troops needs to be weighed against Hezbollah’s risk of physical and ideological overexpansion that might expose the group’s vulnerabilities and ultimately endanger Lebanon’s defence capabilities.

Hezbollah

Created in 1982, Hezbollah was originally a resistance group against the Israeli occupation in Lebanon. Since then it has become a prolific global terrorist organisation that has proven its ability to attack anywhere in the world through a wide network of cells. Hezbollah has adapted to domestic and regional dynamics, asserted its position by strengthening its grip on Lebanese politics, and expanded its military influence in the region. The extremist group remains a strong political player with an ability to paralyze Lebanese political institutions and obstruct the appointment of key positions.

Thanks to its state-sponsor Iran, Hezbollah has grown into the strongest military force in Lebanon, with its own division of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and a breadth and variety of both short and long-range military-grade weapons, such as Syrian Scud-D missiles, that can reach deep into Israeli territory. The group’s involvement in regional crises in Syria, Iraq and Yemen marks an ideological and tactical shift towards regional power that renews the threat to American interests and to their allies in the Middle East.

The regional footprint

Hezbollah’s engagement in Syria is not based on rash decision-making but is rather a sign of the trademark methodical approach that has ensured the group’s survival over more than three decades. Openly operating in Syria since 2013, Hezbollah assists the Assad regime and wages what is essentially a counterinsurgency campaign against inferior enemy rebel factions. In response to ISIS’ territorial expansion, Hezbollah also sent troops to Iraq in early 2015 to back local Shi’ite militias leading the fight against the Sunni extremist group. Although the West publicly minimizes the role that foreign Shi’ite fighters play in the coalition’s battle against ISIS, Hezbollah’s formidable military posture and its ability to foster support against a common enemy beyond its Shi’ite constituency render it an essential part of the fight against Sunni extremism.

Recent open source footage chronicles Hezbollah’s pro-Assad battlefield actions and illustrates the commitment and fierceness of the group’s operations: Youtube videos show military battles against both al-Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra, as well as against ISIS, after Hezbollah began an offensive within the Syrian Qalamoun Mountains along the Lebanese-Syrian border.

In addition to its advanced weapons cache, Hezbollah continues to tactically innovate, the prime example being its employment of commercial short-range UAVs. The drones assist in the planning of assaults, conduct reconnaissance and support real-time combat operations via live feeds.

A recently revealed UAV airstrip in the Lebanese Beka’a valley, close to the Syrian border, underlines the role of technological innovation in Hezbollah’s operations as well as the group’s longer-term commitment to defending the Assad regime. While Hezbollah has employed Iranian-made drones against Israel since 2004, its construction of an airstrip as well as its switch to commercial drones against other non-state actors proves how seriously the group takes its involvement in Syria.

The stakes

Hezbollah’s engagement in Syria was undoubtedly requested by Iran, its main sponsor, who directed Hezbollah to support its prime regional Shi’ite ally by fighting the Syrian opposition and Sunni extremists alike. Yet Hezbollah’s involvement also reflects deep personal stakes because it could be immeasurably damaged were the Syrian regime to fall. By bolstering Assad’s forces, the Shi’ite group preserves its relationship to the state and ensures that important logistical and weapons supply routes are kept accessible. At the same time, it fends off an expansion of Sunni extremism that threatens to spillover into neighbouring countries.

Risks and opportunities

Hezbollah’s active regional presence comes with a plethora of consequences that will be decisive for the group’s future. Success on the battlefield will bolster Hezbollah’s reshaped identity as living proof that the group has evolved from merely a defender of Lebanese Shi’ites against Israel to a defender of the Shi’ite faith within the entire region. In an echo of the Arab World’s overwhelmingly supportive reaction to Hezbollah after the second Lebanon War in 2006, an effective Syria campaign would exponentially boost the group’s regional influence and elevate it into a key stakeholder in the Middle East. A successful extension of Assad’s grip on Syria would keep the Iranian-led Shi’ite Axis intact and continue to allow Hezbollah a logistical safe-haven to sustain smooth operations.

Military successes would further maintain Hezbollah’s position within Lebanon and promote continued, self-sustained domestic recruitment into the organisation. A worry, especially promulgated by Israel, is that Hezbollah’s engagement in Syria could battle-harden its troops who will gain valuable skills and combat experience that will give them an edge in potential future conflicts with its primary enemy Israel. This concern is not unwarranted, as the group is already bolstering its military capabilities by cleaning out Syria’s weapons depots and stockpiling them in southern Lebanon. However, due to its deep commitments in Syria and other regional crises, it would seem suicidal for Hezbollah to embark upon an offensive against Israel at this time.

At the same time, continued involvement in Syria without visible successes may lead to a rift between Hezbollah’s leadership and its followers. Since its involvement in domestic politics in 1992, the group has become more accountable to its constituency who – with unprecedented magnitude – have voiced concerns about the legitimacy of the Syrian intervention. The leadership is being forced to justify the sacrifice of Shi’ite lives in a conflict that at present does not pose any immediate threats to Lebanon, thereby straining the coherency of Hezbollah’s narrative. While imposing speeches by Hezbollah’s Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah continue to maintain widespread and fervent support among its members, rebellion within its own ranks may become a more pressing issue as the conflict moves on without resolution and battle-weariness sets in.

In addition to the risk of internal division, Hezbollah also faces potential over-exertion by waging a multi-front campaign that could overstretch its forces and limit its operational capacities. While this may at first seem beneficial to Western national security interests, a weakening of the Shi’ite group would expose Lebanon’s defence capabilities, which depend on Hezbollah as the first line of defence. A weakened Hezbollah might also tempt ISIS to direct some elements towards Lebanon, especially in the face of Hezbollah’s propagation of anti-Sunni sentiment. Extreme battlefield attrition could thus render the group unable to defend Lebanon and make its home base an attractive target for the high-flaming sectarian tensions fostered by ISIS.

Conclusion

Hezbollah has repeatedly proven its adaptability to changing domestic and regional dynamics, which demonstrates the group’s strength and unpredictability. Yet the intervention in Syria pushes the group into a somewhat reactive position, as Hezbollah’s fate now hinges on Assad’s perseverance and on ISIS’ success or failure. Should Hezbollah manage to push back the Sunni extremist factions, the prospective rewards are likely to elevate the group’s domestic and regional standing beyond anything it has ever experienced. However, the risks of failure are great, as an unsuccessful mission in Syria threatens to unravel the group’s reputation for strong ideological and organisational coherence. In a worst-case scenario, Hezbollah’s risky enterprise could daisy-chain Lebanon into the events in Syria and push the country into the black hole of sectarian violence.

Kitty Veress is a recent graduate from the M.A. Security Studies Program at the School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University. Her research focuses on non-state violent actors and the nexus between psychology and terrorism. She currently lives in Washington, DC, and is about to take up her PhD studies at King’s College London’s War Studies Department on the topic of European foreign fighters and their decision-making processes. Follow her @Kitonia

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