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Extremism, environment, and new security dynamics: Strife in conversation with RUSI Director, Dr. Karin von Hippel

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Interviewed by: Harris Kuemmerle

Yazidi_refugees
Yazidi refugees in Northern Syria. Source: Wikimedia

Harris Kuemmerle – Where do you see climate change fitting within the wider European security dynamic moving forward? Do you feel that European policy makers adequately appreciate the security risks of climate change? Or is it still seen as somewhat of a secondary security issue?

Karin von Hippel – I think we all need to focus much more on the longer term security impacts of climate change. For example, many scientists have argued that the drought in Syria, which began in 2006, contributed to the civil war as it forced many people (notably farmers) to move to urban areas. We need to prepare for similar challenges in the future, especially in parts of the Middle East and Africa, where scarce resources will cause more people to compete, which in turn, will lead to more conflict.

I cannot say for certain if the Europeans appreciate this more or less than others. While it is common to discuss the threat posed by climate change, I’m not sure we are all doing as much as we can today to prepare for different scenarios tomorrow. That really is the crux of the issue. At RUSI, we are establishing a Futures Programme, looking at issues such as migration, robotics, space, climate change, conflict, etc and where and how they may intersect over the next 15 to 20 years, and what this will mean for our common security. Governments, multilateral institutions, academia and the private sector need new tools to anticipate and plan for such uncertainty.

HK – Is it fair to say then that environmental issues haven’t quite internalised themselves within the primary security paradigms and agendas?

KvH – That’s an interesting question. In the United States the military and intelligence communities are very forward leaning in this space. By contrast, the rest of the U.S. government may be lagging, primarily because so many officials end up being consumed by the crises of the moment and have very little spare time to focus on future threats

HK – The integration of coal markets was one of the founding elements of the European project. With that being said, do you feel that increased energy interdependence among member states has the potential to again be a key driver of European integration moving forward? Or could energy instead serve as a driver of disintegration?

KvH – I think that energy issues in Europe have indeed led to some challenges. For example, some countries have a closer relationship with Moscow, and need to rely on Russian oil; and that has made it very difficult within Europe to have unity over issues such as the Ukraine crisis. Honestly, I don’t see energy interdependence operating as an integrating factor within Europe in the near future. Indeed, energy may be more likely to lead to fracturing because of the reliance of some countries on Russian oil supplies.

HK – How would you define the term radicalisation with regards to people joining terrorist or other extremist groups?

KvH – That’s a good question, and it’s similar with the term “fundamentalist”. The way we [at RUSI], and researchers like myself look at it is by asking whether or not such extreme views lead to violence. You could be radical and fundamental in your beliefs, but if you are not going to channel your radical beliefs into violence (especially violence against civilians) then it’s not a security issue. If you are going to use violence as a tool to try to impose your belief system, then radicalism or fundamentalism is a problem.

Ultimately (provided such groups are not violent) people have a right to their beliefs. We may not agree but freedom of expression is a fundamental tenet of any democracy. This doesn’t mean we should be ignoring extremist, non-violent groups – and in fact – we should be thinking of ways of keeping communication channels open with such groups as they may have individuals who decide to leave precisely because such groups are not violent. Hence communication could help security and other officials identify potential terrorists-in-the-making. The challenge is that these relationships are hard to establish because many extremist groups (on the left or right) often do not trust the authorities or outsiders.

HK – What would you suggest have been the greatest strengths and weakness of current US policy with regards to counter terrorism and counter extremism? Why?

KvH – I think everyone is struggling with understanding what radicalises people, especially with ISIL, which is very different from previous terrorist groups. The numbers of people joining ISIL are much higher than those joining groups like al-Qaeda or al-Shabaab. In the past few years, between 1,500 and 2,000 people a month have travelled to join ISIL. In recent months, these numbers have been reduced significantly, to around 200 a month; though that is still way higher than those joining al-Qaeda or al-Shabaab. There is definitely something else going on with ISIL, be it the so-called Caliphate or the extreme violence they employ – we don’t really understand the appeal of ISIL as well as we should. As a result we are making too many untested assumptions, and throwing a whole lot of money on those assumptions. I’m afraid we still need to do more research to understand this issue better.

Ultimately radicalisation is very location-specific, each recruit will have a very specific set of reasons to join, based on local grievances. Recruits from Iraq, Minneapolis, or Birmingham will all have distinct motivations. So you really need to understand what is happening in these particular areas, in addition to understanding the global appeal of these organisations.

HK – Are there other cases of past or present radicalisation that we can draw upon to help tackle groups like ISIS? For example, the case of gang membership in urban areas?

KvH – Yes, these issues are definitely comparable. I was recently at a conference speaking with Gary Slutkin, the founder of Cure Violence, an organisation that has done some great work in reducing gang violence all over the world (it was launched in Chicago, but has since spread globally because their methodology works). They employ interruptors and former gang members to play a role in preventing violence. They borrow a methodology used by health workers to stop the spread of pandemics. So there are definitely successes out there, and techniques which one can borrow from adjacent fields, provided you are able to tweak it to make it work for your purposes.

HK – Given the importance of an enabling environment in facilitating radicalisation, in your opinion, what would be the best way to prevent such an enabling environment in Syria or other such parts of the world?

KvH –ISIL emerged from the civil war in Syria, I think a more robust U.S. approach to Syria would have helped prevent the country deteriorating as much as it has. I understand why President Obama did not want to do more than he was doing, as he was worried about the unintended consequences, as we saw in Libya. On the other hand, I think the U.S. government by 2014 knew many more Syrians than it did Libyans, and it had lots of relationships with people on the ground, through training programmes and other non-lethal support to opposition activists. Had the US bombed around the time the red lines were crossed, I think it would have made a big difference and ISIL would not have been able to capitalise on the space as they did. Though this is of course all conjecture and impossible to prove, it’s just my personal belief.

ISIL has been able to thrive in Syria primarily because they are experts at filling power vacuums and taking advantage of chaotic situations. ISIL’s territorial holdings have changed frequently since 2014 and they have been in sporadic conflict with a range of militias, including opposition fighters, the Kurds, aL-Qaeda, Hezbollah, the Syrian regime, and recently the Russians. Unfortunately, the longer Western powers essentially watch from the sidelines, with minimal assistance, the worse it’s going to get.

HK – In your experience, do you think gender is a concept that is understood and engaged enough in counterterrorism policy and practice? Can you offer an example to highlight this?

KvH – Women play a role in preventing family members from being radicalised. They also can play a negative role and contribute to radicalisation of friends and family members. The interesting thing about ISIL is that more women are joining ISIL than have joined other groups in the past, and we are doing research to try to understand this issue and ultimately understand the way women perceive the phenomenon.

HK – Finally, in your calculations, would a British exit from the EU have a net positive or negative impact on British and European Security?

KvH – We have been looking at the security implications of Brexit at RUSI, and from this perspective, it makes more sense for Britain to remain (e.g., to enhance/build on the common arrest warrant, sharing of intelligence, etc), but at RUSI we do not take a corporate position on Brexit.

 

 

Dr Karin von Hippel became Director-General of the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) on 30 November 2015. Karin von Hippel joined RUSI after recently serving as Chief of Staff to General John Allen, Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition to Counter-ISIL. Karin has also worked as a Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations and as a Senior Adviser in the Bureau of Counterterrorism at the US Department of State. Prior to that, she worked at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC and at the Centre for Defence Studies at King’s College London. She has also worked for the United Nations and the European Union in Somalia and Kosovo.

Harris Kuemmerle is a doctoral researcher in the Department of War Studies and the Department of Geography at King’s College London. His research focuses on the intra and inter-state hydropolitics of the Indus River. Twitter: @HarrisKuemmerle

Libya’s civil war & the importance of strategic sequencing

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By: Robert Andrea

Secretary_Kerry_Sits_With_Italian_Foreign_Minister_Gentiloni_and_UN_Special_Representative_for_Libya_Kobler_at_the_Italian_Foreign_Ministry_in_Rome_(23090680244)
US Secretary of State John Kerry at a 2015 meeting for the future of Libya in Rome. Source: Wikimedia

One of the most overlooked aspects in strategic deliberations is that of sequencing. It is much more common for the ‘what’ and the ‘how’ of a policy to receive the lion’s share of analysis. Despite this, the order in which the segments of a strategy are implemented can often be just as important. And while this may not always be the case, the cost of not giving due consideration to sequence can be painfully high. The ongoing Libyan Civil War provides a contemporary case study into how important sequencing can end up being in the pursuit of strategic interests.

Concerning Libya

In the immediate term, Western states appear to see (based on the different types of policy approaches on the table) two broadly defined interests in Libya. One is resolving the civil war that has been ongoing since 2014. The second is counterterrorism, primarily with regard to the increasing presence in Libya of the so-called Islamic State, but also of groups like the AQ-linked Ansar al-Sharia.

In terms of the civil war, the international community (particularly the United States and European Union) is committed to a diplomatic resolution of the conflict via the UN-led peace process. Dealing with the counterterrorism issue, on the other hand, will almost definitely involve a more kinetic approach.

Without the proper sequencing of these respective policies, however, neither issue will be solved effectively. Worse still, the situation on the ground would likely deteriorate significantly if the major actors fail to appreciate this.

Civil war

Following the overthrow of Colonel Muammar al-Qaddafi by NATO-backed rebels in 2011, Libya has struggled to rebuild effective state institutions, culminating in another civil war in 2014. This current conflict has essentially been fought between two rival entities – both claiming to be the legitimate government of Libya – each with their respective loyalists.

On one hand, there is the General National Congress. Often referred to as the Tripoli government or the Libya Dawn Coalition, the General National Congress (GNC) is comprised largely of Islamist militias and political blocs including the Justice and Construction party – considered by some to be the Libyan branch of the Muslim Brotherhood. The GNC and its allied militias are backed by Qatar, Turkey, and Sudan.

The rival of the GNC is the Tobruk-based House of Representatives, alternatively known as the Council of Deputies or the Tobruk government. Comprised of supposedly secular-leaning opponents of the Islamist-dominated GNC, the House of Representatives (HoR) is internationally recognized as the legitimate elected government of Libya. The HoR also maintains the loyalty of General Khalifa Haftar and his loyalists in the Libyan National Army.

In an effort to end hostilities, a U.N.-led diplomatic effort has produced a roadmap towards reconciliation.

In January of this year, a Government of National Accord (GNA) was announced, which, it is hoped, will unite the warring factions. For security reasons, the GNA (led by chairman and prime minister Fayez al-Sarraj) was not able to enter Libya until 30 March of this year, when he landed in Tripoli. In a somewhat surprising move, the Tripoli-based GNC announced shortly thereafter that it would remove itself from power in favor of the U.N.-backed unity government.

As of yet, the HoR has not ratified the agreement, as certain clauses would call for Haftar to step down as their army chief.

New place. Same threat. Same policy.

Taking advantage of the chaos during the civil war, the Islamic State has managed to establish a major foothold in Libya. This presence includes, but is not limited to, control of the coastal city Sirte. Increasingly concerned about these developments, Western states have been mulling more direct military options to combat the growing jihadist threat in Libya.

Earlier this year, a U.S. airstrike against an Islamic State camp in Sabratha, western Libya, killed around 50 people, including Noureddine Chouchane. Chouchane is thought to have been a key player in the two attacks last year targeting a museum and a beach resort in Tunisia. The attacks have been claimed by the Islamic State. However, this was a fairly isolated operation and there has yet to be a sustained Western airstrike programme conducted in Libya.

In terms of ground forces, part of the agreement that led to the GNA includes plans for an Italian-led multinational force of 6,000 troops to be deployed to Libya. It is still unclear what part of that force will be specifically devoted to counterterrorist operations and, for now, it is still a theoretical force. There doesn’t appear to be any reports of conventional Western troops actually in Libya currently, though multiple reports do place U.S., U.K., and French special operations forces in the country.

The foregoing reveals nothing to suggest that the counterterrorism programme in Libya will consist of anything tactically different than the ones implemented (mostly by the United States) in places like Yemen, Syria, or Somalia: Drone/airstrikes as well as occasional direct action raids by special operations forces (SOF). As we have learned time and time again though, airstrikes and SOF operations alone are usually insufficient in countering jihadist insurgencies. In the absence of a sizeable deployment of conventional Western troops, partnership with local ground forces would additionally be required to make these airstrike/SOF programmes effective.

If examined purely at a tactical level, the disparate nature of the two policies (conflict resolution and counterterrorism) would theoretically allow them to be pursued concurrently. That would be a very serious mistake – doing so would essentially ignore sequencing considerations and would likely end in catastrophe.

Enter the role of sequencing

It is critical to the long term effectiveness of both the political solution to the civil war and the West’s counterterrorism programme in Libya that the diplomatic portion of the strategy be conducted first. Only after the civil war has ended and the Libyan factions reach a modicum of unity, should counterterrorist operations against the Islamic State and other groups begin.

Without reaching a settlement to the civil war first, there will not be a single unified Libyan state to serve as a local military partner to foreign-led counterterrorism efforts. Rather, the prevailing status of a martially factionalized Libya would be the environment in which these counterterrorism operations would have to take place. In such a situation, the West would probably be forced to pick a side in the domestic conflict to act as its partner. This would undoubtedly result in an even more protracted civil war. Only now, it would be a civil war in which Western forces might find themselves as a target.

In the event of such a scenario, it’s more than likely that the Western powers would choose to side with the HoR and, specifically, Haftar over the GNC. For one, the HoR and Haftar are favoured by close partners of the West in the Middle East, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates. Furthermore, the Libyan National Army, under the command of Haftar, has proven to be the most capable fighting force in the country and has already shown a willingness to fight the Islamic State.

However, Haftar is also predisposed to fighting Islamists in general. This includes the Islamist-dominated GNC, which he labels (in its entirety) as terrorists. A foreign intervention siding with their chief rival would almost assuredly incense and seriously threaten the GNC.

Not only would this be a death blow to the diplomatic efforts towards national reconciliation, it would also seriously hamper counterterrorism operations. If they were to feel threatened by an HoR backed with Western military support, it is more than conceivable that some of the more hardline elements in the GNC might make common cause with the very jihadist organisations being targeted. This should not be viewed as a hypothetical. Certain GNC-aligned elements already cooperate from time to time with these jihadist groups.

Take the Benghazi Revolutionary Shura Council as an example. The Benghazi Revolutionary Shura Council (BRSC) is one of the primary elements fighting Haftar’s forces in the east and has often allied with the GNC. Comprised of multiple Islamist militias, the BRSC is led by Ansar al-Sharia in Libya (ASL). Both ASL, the group behind the 2012 attack on the US consulate in Benghazi, and the BRSC at large have periodically cooperated with the Islamic State against Haftar’s forces.

This places the GNC only one degree of separation away from the Islamic State. This is not to say that in the event of a foreign counterterrorism intervention that the GNC would swear the bay’ah to the caliphate en masse. It is entirely plausible however, that at least some of these forces decide to enhance their level of cooperation with the Islamic State if they were to perceive the West’s backing of their arch rival, Haftar, as a threat.

Such a strategic blunder would leave foreign counterterrorism forces facing an already capable enemy, but now potentially reinforced with thousands of new fighters.

If the aforementioned scenario were to occur, the chances for a political settlement to the Libyan Civil War would evaporate almost instantly and the jihadist threat that Libya already poses to the West (particularly to Europe) would increase drastically. Or, to put it succinctly: It would be an unmitigated strategic failure for the West.

To their credit, both the Western states and the U.N.-supported unity government are trying their best to properly sequence their strategies in Libya. Italy, who will be leading the eventual international troop deployment, has said it will refuse to lead the operation until the GNA is ratified by all parties and the Libyan military command structure is clarified. Even more recently, the GNA itself called on all military factions to hold off on any military operation against Sirte until a unified military structure is established.

So it would seem that, for now, the policymakers handling the Libya file in the West are aware of the importance of taking sequence into account.

Conclusion

All of this is not to say that utilising proper sequencing will guarantee success in Libya. The road ahead contains a veritable minefield of challenges to reaching some semblance of stability. In such a complicated political and security landscape, there is nothing to say that the peace process and/or counterterrorism operations in Libya might not face serious challenges in the future. That said, while sequencing might not be the most stimulating aspect of policy analysis, as we see in the case of the Libyan Civil War, failure to fully appreciate its necessity could lead to disastrous consequences.

 

 

Robert Andrea is an incoming MA student in War Studies at King’s College London. His research interests include U.S. and Iranian foreign policy, diplomatic strategy, and proxy warfare. He can be found on Twitter at @Bob__Andrea

Does Malaysia have concrete counterterrorism strategies to mitigate potential terrorist attacks?

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By: Munira Mustaffa

Unit_Tindak_Khas_of_PGK_on_CT's_drill
The Royal Malaysia Police (PDRM) Special Operations Command unit undergoing a tactical counterterrorism training. Source: Wikimedia

While Indonesia successfully demonstrated remarkable resilience with her defiant cry of “Kami tidak takut” (“We are not intimidated”) on social media after the January 2016 attack,[1] there are some uncertainties that the same level of fortitude can be witnessed in Malaysia should a Daesh-inspired attack happen.[2] This raises some pressing debates about Malaysia’s existing counterterrorism policies and resilience strategies.

It is already known that Daesh has issued warnings that they had planned attacks on Westerners in Kuala Lumpur.[3] To date, there has been one attempt by local Daesh’s sympathisers which was successfully disrupted by members of the Royal Malaysia Police (RMP) in January.[4] Last month, in the latest government crackdown on local terror cells, over 100 individuals were detained for suspected involvement with the core Daesh militancy.[5] In previous arrests since 2013, many of them were reportedly first-time offenders who were radicalised online.[6]

However, capturing ringleaders or copycats do not guarantee our safety or guarantees against terrorist attacks. If anything, as demonstrated by open source media, the fact that Daesh as an organisation is weakening does not mean that it will not influence groups abroad.[7] Daesh supporters may be even more determined to intensify their overseas strategies.[8]

The probability that Kuala Lumpur could be the next target is rather sobering.[9] Filled with complex and multi-ethnic communities, along with abundant international visitors, countless international corporates and multi-national companies centred around an urban hub, one could argue that these factors make Kuala Lumpur a high-value target. Moreover, Putrajaya is currently being encumbered by grand corruption controversies involving the country’s sovereign wealth that could erode its “moderate Islam” image and status as the custodian of Malaysia Muslims’ religious interests.[10] The fact that Kuala Lumpur is highly populated by a large percentage of Muslims who Daesh sympathisers might consider as takfiri could be a potential concern.[11]

The Malaysia experience

Malaysia is no stranger to asymmetric warfare. Much of Malaysia’s experience and formation of current antiterrorism laws and legislation are legacies of the days of Malayan insurgencies. Post-insurgency, homegrown radical militant groups began to surface in the late 1960s, slowly evolving into today’s mujahideen extremists who are enjoying a revival and enthusiastically responding to the rallying call for global Muslim solidarity.[12] Although not all of them agree with Daesh’s brand of violence, one thing is clear: Daesh does make a convenient vehicle for them to realise their Daulah Islamiyah (Islamic State) ambitions in this region that imposes stricter Islamic interpretation of the law and way of life.[13]

Malaysia’s current counterterrorism (CT) measures

On the morning of November 26, 2014, Prime Minister Najib Razak tabled a white paper in Parliament entitled, “Towards countering threats posed by Islamic State Militant Group”.[14] Delivered entirely in Malay, Najib condemned the violence propagated by Daesh, encouraged support from the public to reject extremist ideas, and promised to increase efforts in reducing the threat of terrorism.[15]

It has been a little over a year since the submission of the white paper, which is available only in scanned copy online (and difficult to find).[16] Upon review, what was striking about the concluding remarks in the document was that the only solution proposed was to further stiffen existing anti-terror laws. These included the Security Offences (Special Measures Act) (SOSMA), Prevention of Crime Act (POCA) and the Penal Code. No other policy recommendations were provided to substantially elevate the current threat. This is worrying, considering the questionable way Malaysia’s anti-terror laws and legislation could be enforced and regulated.

For instance, in the past, opposition activists of the incumbent government have been arrested under the Internal Security Act (ISA) that was originally intended as a preventive measure against communist threats that no longer exist.[17] When the Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA) 2015 was introduced as a response to the emerging Daesh threats, there were serious and justifiable concerns that it was just “a reincarnation of the ISA”.[18] Furthermore, the Communications and Multimedia Ministry recently submitted a proposal to the Attorney General for legal amendments to be made on the Communications and Multimedia Act 1998. If passed, this new law will require the registration of political blogs and online news portals with the government as an effort to counter “defamatory news” and “inflammatory opinions”.[19] Antithetical to the current administration’s previous pledge in 2012 to repeal the Sedition Act for more freedom of expression,[20] this proposal is a grim reminder how freedom of speech and Internet freedom in the country are being tightly scrutinised and regulated.[21]

Absence of robust policy framework and lack of public engagement

If we are to believe that the Najib administration is serious about mitigating terror threats at domestic level, then some further research, serious reassessments and critical revisions should be carried out to improve current policies. Information should be available in an efficiently accessible form that can be promptly found and used to maintain public interest, and keep them in the loop. As it stands, apart from the crackdowns, arrests and promises to tighten the law, it is difficult for the rakyat to gauge if other preventive measures have been implemented.[22] This lack of transparency and accountability in leadership creates unnecessary political vulnerabilities and heightens anxiety.

Dissidents would argue that the current administration benefits from the rakyat’s ignorance because the dynamics of the power play here allows more room for manipulation of the general public. In reality, the inadequate effort in engaging the public signifies how much the Malaysian government undervalues public contribution. Key security strategies should always include engaging the public as part of a concerted state effort to mitigate terrorism. Support from the public is crucial in assisting local law enforcement agencies, be it for crime prevention or counterterrorism. Everyone should be encouraged to feel like they are part of the nation-building narrative and meaningful governing process. The desired outcome could motivate people to step up to be part of the solution. Increasing community capabilities in acknowledging legitimate social problems, dispelling disruptive views and identifying suspicious behaviour would be productive, as opposed to citizens relying on false assumptions on what terrorism is or looks like.[23]

At present, there is no document or policy paper that is readily available online (or otherwise) that could comprehensively explain to the Malaysian public the nature of threat we are currently facing and how the government plans to react to terrorist threats or emergencies. Officially-released notices bear no semblance of even a formal presentation that could help distinguish them easily from rumours, which further exacerbate fear-mongering. One such instance is the Federal Territories Minister Tengku Adnan Tengku Mansor (aka Ku Nan) who decided to “notify” the public of the “list of targets” in possession of the captured Daesh members. It was not even within his jurisdiction to release such statement, of which even the PDRM themselves were mystified as to where and how did he receive his intelligence.[24] Regardless of the motive behind the public disclosure of the list of targets, Ku Nan’s action was not viewed favourably by the public at all – in fact he was slammed for being an alarmist.[25]

This is why many Malaysians feel excluded, mishandled and abandoned by top-level officials. Unless they are full of praise (such as the recent PR disaster of the #RespectMyPM Twitter campaign) or they carry certain myopic viewpoints that are supported from within the government, critical debates and discussions are actively discouraged.[26] For example, a popular Malaysian news portal, The Malaysian Insider, which has been blocked several times for allegedly publishing “inflammatory content” finally shuttered to a close after persistently reporting on the PM’s alleged misuse of sovereign funds.[27] More significantly, foreign journalists were recently deported for asking uncomfortable questions about the corruption allegations directed at the PM.[28] So when it was revealed last month that there was a terror plot to kidnap PM Najib Razak, of course it was greeted with a great collective disbelief.[29]

Counterproductive Outcomes

These latest episodes serve as a stark reminder that the Malaysian public’s value, trust and well-being are not a priority for the incumbent government. If anything, their reluctance to acknowledge their hand in the growing problem at the domestic level, and their stubbornness to adopt a more sensible policy-building approach is greatly impacting the situation. Considering that the ruling party has shown a lack of accountability and failed at fulfilling their political pledges on more than just one occasion, it is no wonder that the public is becoming exceedingly distrustful of it.

Meanwhile, despite assertions in news reports of the “success” of Malaysia’s de-radicalisation programmes which have been boasted as “the best in the world”, there is no official indication how these government programmes were planned or assessed for implementation.[30] Additionally, there is no clear definition for what “success” means in the programme’s introduction either.[31] Even more worrying, one of the agencies involved in the process is the controversial Islamic Development Department (JAKIM), well-known for their invasive and boundary-violating “moral-policing” activities which aimed to “preserve the chastity of Muslims” everywhere in the country.[32] In short, the question whether or not Malaysia is capable of coping with the growing terrorist threat remains unanswered.

Conclusion: rethinking security policies

It is true that Daesh’s brand of extremism has limited appeal in the Southeast Asia.[33] The Jakarta attack itself was poorly executed and, at best, amateurish. The probability of a Daesh attack to occur in Kuala Lumpur is still considerably low and and its threats should not be overestimated. However, the growing indoctrination, radicalisation and rising extremist views amongst Malay-Muslims continue to be worrying security conundrums and should be seen as a major counterterrorism challenge.[34]

There is also a disconcerting number of high-level people who are only too quick to shift the blame to external factors such as liberal values and pluralism, Jewish conspiracies, and Wahhabism/Salafism, of which local religious authorities are only too eager to distance themselves from.[35] Compound these all together, they build a grave picture that shows how far removed and complacent the Malaysian government can be from the reality of the current global threat.

While there is no doubt that the PDRM have been successful in their anti-terror sting operations, nevertheless tactical operations alone are not sufficient without robust counterterrorism policies and resilience strategies in place. More conscious efforts should also be made to improve cohesiveness amongst the diverse communities in Malaysia as part of a nation-wide strategy of building resilience against terrorism. The government would significantly benefit from public confidence in their capabilities. In turn, a mutually rewarding collaborative relationship could be forged.

Nonetheless, with the Prime Minister’s loss of legitimacy in the storm of his corruption scandal, fractured inter-community relations, and growing demands from the conservatives for a more Islamic and divisive Malaysia, one thing is certain, however: the country’s security landscape will become increasingly turbulent should things stay the way they are.

 

 

Munira Mustaffa is a strategic intelligence analyst and due diligence consultant for a private London-based firm. She earned her Master’s degree in Countering Organised Crime and Terrorism from the University College of London. She tweets at @FleetStGir1.

 

 

 

Notes:

[1][1] Rishi Iyengar, ‘Indonesians display defiance toward Jakarta attackers through rallies and social media’, Time, January 15, 2016, http://time.com/4182106/jakarta-rally-attacks-kami-tidak-takut/

[2] Zachary Abuza, ‘Terror attack could rip apart Malaysian society’, Southeast Asia Globe, March 7, 2016, http://sea-globe.com/terrorism-in-malaysia-zachary-abuza/

[3] Tom Batchelor, ‘ISIS targets Malaysia: terror group ‘very real’ threat after jihadis warn of reprisals’, Express, January 26, 2016, http://www.express.co.uk/news/world/638163/Islamic-State-Malaysia-terror-attacks-Jakarta-bombing

[4] Eileen Ng, ‘Malaysian police foil suicide blast hours before planned attack in Kuala Lumpur’, Stuff, January 17, 2016, http://www.stuff.co.nz/world/asia/75970763/Malaysian-police-foil-suicide-blast-hours-before-planned-attack-in-Kuala-Lumpur

[5] Victoria Ho, ‘Malaysia detains 13 suspected ISIS militants’, Mashable, March 24, 2016, http://mashable.com/2016/03/24/13-arrests-isis-malaysia/

[6] Elina Noor, ‘Identifying the root causes of terrorism’, New Straits Times, March 22, 2016, http://www.nst.com.my/news/2016/03/134311/identifying-root-causes-terrorism

[7] Henry Johnson, ‘Mapped: the Islamic State is losing its territory – and fast’, Foreign Policy, 16 March, 2016, http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/03/16/mapped-the-islamic-state-is-losing-its-territory-and-fast/

[8] Joshua Holland, ‘Here’s what a man who studied every suicide attack in the world says about ISIS’ motives’, The Nation, December 2, 2015, http://www.thenation.com/article/heres-what-a-man-who-studied-every-suicide-attack-in-the-world-says-about-isiss-motives/

[9] James Chin, ‘Malaysia: clear and present danger from the Islamic State’, Brookings, 16 December, 2015, http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2015/12/16-malaysia-danger-from-islamic-state-chin

[10] Daniel Woker, ‘In Malaysia and Turkey, are we witnessing the end of moderate Islam?’, The Interpreter, 5 August, 2015, http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/08/05/In-Malaysia-and-Turkey-the-end-of-moderate-Islam.aspx

[11] Hayat Alvi, 2014, ‘The diffusion of intra-Islamic violence and terrorism’, Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 18, No. 2, p. 38-50.

[12] Mohd. Mizan Aslam, 2009, ‘The thirteen radical groups: Preliminary research in understanding the evolution of militancy in Malaysia’, Jati, 14, p.145-161

[13] Joseph Chinyong Liow, ‘Counterterrorism conundrum: rethinking security policy in Australia and Southeast Asia’, Foreign Affairs, 17 December, 2014, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/southeast-asia/2014-12-17/counterterrorism-conundrum

[14] NajibRazak.com, ‘Ucapan pembentangan kertas putih ke arah menangani ancaman kumpulan Islamic State’, 26 November, 2014, https://najibrazak.com/bm/blog/ucapanpembentangan-kertas-putih-ke-arah-menangani-ancaman-kumpulan-islamic-state/

[15] Razak is the patronymic and refers to the Prime Minister’s father’s administration. In this essay, we will use Najib to denote this current administration.

[16] Malaysia, ‘Ke Arah Menanangani Ancaman Kumpulan Islamic State’, Dewan Rakyat/Dewan Negara, 2014, http://www.airforce.gov.my/images/PENERBITAN/kertasputihislamicstate.compressed.pdf

[17] Human Rights Watch, https://www.hrw.org/legacy/backgrounder/asia/malaysia-bck-0513.htm

[18] Munira Mustaffa, 2015, ‘Can POTA counter the ISIL threat in Malaysia?’, Strife, 9 May, 2015, https://strifeblog.org/2015/05/09/can-pota-counter-the-isil-threat-in-malaysia/

[19] Shazwan Mustafa Kamal, ‘Putrajaya weighing new leash for news portals, blogs’, The Malay Mail Online 16 March, 2016, http://www.themalaymailonline.com/malaysia/article/putrajaya-weighing-new-leash-for-news-portals-blogs

[20] Centre for Independent Journalism – CIJ Malaysia, ‘[Malaysia] Disappointments and promises in freedom of expression’, Southeast Asian Press Alliance, 6 May, 2015, https://www.seapa.org/disappointments-and-promises-in-freedom-of-expression/

[21] Mong Palatino, ‘Malaysia will likely force “political blogs” and news websites to register with the government,’ Global Voices, 23 April, 2016, https://globalvoices.org/2016/04/23/malaysia-will-likely-force-political-blogs-and-news-websites-to-register-with-the-government/

[22] Malay word for “ordinary citizens”.

[23] Munira Mustaffa, ‘Dismantling terrorism myths’, The Malay Mail Online, 22 February, 2016, http://www.themalaymailonline.com/what-you-think/article/dismantling-terrorism-myths-munira-mustaffa

[24] Eunice Au, ‘Top KL tourist areas cited as possible terror targets’, The Straits Times, 17 January, 2016, http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/top-kl-tourist-areas-cited-as-possible-terror-targets

[25] Sebastian Loh, ‘Malaysian minister under fire for naming IS targets in Kuala Lumpur’, Asian Correspondent, 18 January, 2016, https://asiancorrespondent.com/2016/01/malaysian-minister-under-fire-after-naming-is-targets-in-kuala-lumpur/

[26] BBC, ‘#RespectMyPM: Online war breaks out in Malaysia’, March 7, 2016, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-35742118

[27] Jahabar Sadiq, ‘Eight proud years of being “The Malaysian Insider”’, The Bangkok Post, 22 March, 2016, http://www.bangkokpost.com/opinion/opinion/906004/eight-proud-years-of-being-the-malaysian-insider

[28] BBC, ‘Australian journalists leave Malaysia after avoiding charges’, March 15, 2016, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-australia-35800172

[29] Amy Chew, ‘ISIS, Malaysia, and the risks of lost moral authority’, The Diplomat, March 22, 2016, http://thediplomat.com/2016/03/isis-malaysia-and-the-risks-of-lost-moral-authority/

[30] The Star, ‘Zahid Hamidi: Malaysia’s deradicalisation programme “best in the world”’, 20 February, 2016, http://www.thestar.com.my/news/nation/2016/02/20/zahid-hamidi-malaysia-deradicalisation-programme-best-in-the-world/

[31] New Straits Times Online, ‘Malaysia’s deradicalisation process a success’, 22 January, 2016, http://www.nst.com.my/news/2016/01/123407/malaysias-deradicalisation-process-success

[32] Kamles Kumar, ‘Moral policing driving youths away from Islam, Ku Li tells Jakim’, Malay Mail Online, 5 December, 2015, http://www.themalaymailonline.com/malaysia/article/moral-policing-driving-youths-away-from-islam-ku-li-tells-jakim

[33] Joseph Chinyong Liow, ‘ISIS reaches Indonesia’, Foreign Affairs, 8 February, 2016, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/southeast-asia/2014-12-17/counterterrorism-conundrum

[34] Joseph Chinyong Liow, ‘Malaysia’s ISIS Conundrum’, Brookings, 21 April, 2015, http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2015/04/21-malaysia-isis-conundrum-liow

[35] The Malay Mail Online, ‘Putrajaya in espionage, psychological warfare against “liberal” Islamic groups, minister says’, 18 March, 2016, http://www.themalaymailonline.com/malaysia/article/putrajaya-in-espionage-psychological-warfare-against-liberal-islamic-groups;

Robert Fulford, ‘Malaysia: a hotbed of anti-Semitism’, National Post, 2 January, 2016, http://news.nationalpost.com/full-comment/robert-fulford-malaysia-a-hotbed-of-anti-semitism;

The Malay Mail Online, ‘No place for Wahhabism in Malaysia, fatwa council says’, 1 March, 2016, http://www.themalaymailonline.com/malaysia/article/no-place-for-wahhabism-in-malaysia-fatwa-council-says

 

Tackling Iraq’s Shia Militia Crisis

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By: Peter Kirechu

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Iraqi Shia Militia Fighters Near Tikrit. Source: Al-Jazeera

Iraqi security forces are engaged in a contentious fight against a determined and effective foe in the self-styled Islamic State (also referred to as IS, ISIS, ISIL, or Daesh). Iraq’s security sector, while resilient in the face of tens of thousands of jihadist militants has nonetheless required substantial external assistance from the Islamic Republic of Iran and a US-led international coalition. Heeding calls for drastic military assistance against the IS juggernaut, both external powers have expended substantial financial and technical resources in an effort to shift the battleground calculus to the government’s favor.

These external efforts, distinguished mainly by the gradual blunting of the IS’s prior momentum have nonetheless exacerbated a growing rift between the central government and various ascendant Shia militias. The fracturing of the security sector along lines of external sponsorship has since left Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi, with the herculean task of navigating a politically volatile environment dominated by opposing US-Iranian interests, and a fledgling balance between Iraq’s internal security forces.

Iraq’s Sectarian Challenge

The problems with Iraq’s security sector are as numerous as they are complicated. Yet, between rampant corruption, extra-judicial application of lethal force, and problematic management of scarce resources, the growing use of sectarian militias remains the most urgent threat to the security sector.

Following Saddam Hussein’s removal from power, Iraq’s official security apparatus fell under the command of former Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki, whose tenure in office characterized him as a polarizing Shia political figure. Under Maliki’s rule the country’s sectarian crises deteriorated further as he increasingly used the state’s coercive instruments to settle political scores and secure his own political survival. This trend escalated with the official withdrawal of US forces in 2011.

However, the marginalization of the Sunni population facilitated al-Qaida in Iraq’s (AQI) return to Iraq under the banner of the Islamic State (then only known as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria). The group launched a ferocious insurgency against the Maliki’s government, capturing Fallujah and most of Anbar province in the Summer of 2013, and in 2014, triggered Maliki’s eventual removal from power. Maliki’s partisan rule  ended when thousands of IS fighters routed the better armed, trained and numerically superior Iraqi military and police forces. These blistering defeats also surged Islamic State ranks with millions worth of US-provisioned military hardware. IS fighters looted banks and swelled their war chests with roughly $2 billion after Mosul’s fall. Once the city was occupied the group expanded its extortion, human trafficking and oil smuggling and theft rackets earning $3 million a day.

Efforts at sectarian reconciliation by Iraq’s new Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi have done little to temper sectarian tensions within Iraq’s political society. The government’s dependency on the wide constellation of dominant Shia militia groups (under the general banner of the Popular Mobilization Units, PMU) is an indication of the central government’s overall weakness. Further, these groups serve as a constant reminder to the Sunni population of its subjugation under Shia governance—a grievance commonly employed by the Islamic State in its recruitment efforts. The militias’ material and financial support from the Iranian government similarly undermines the central government’s authority and highlights Iran’s influence on Iraqi domestic affairs.

Within this volatile sectarian environment, Iraq’s new premier must foster reconciliation, not only defeat the Islamic State, but also restore sectarian harmony to ensure the overall stability of the state. This arduous task begins with the security services and its success will likely determine the prime minister’s political fortunes and those of the state writ large.

Taming the Militia Problem

Crafting effective solutions to Iraq’s security sector predicament requires an honest acceptance of Iran’s long-term influence on Iraqi security politics. However, the roles played by Iran and the US coalition need not be mutually exclusive. While Al-Abadi’s government receives aid from both the United States and Iran, the prime minister still maintains executive authority over the allocation and disbursement of military assistance. As each element of the security sector relies on the central government for resources, if the prime minister can reassert his authority over the ministries of defense and interior, the Iraqi government would gain immense leverage over the forces fighting against the Islamic State.

Financial control, if effectively leveraged, will likely serve as both the carrot and stick in the prime minister’s limited toolset when facing an unwieldy relationship between the renegade militias and the slowly improving Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). Exercising such power will allow Al-Abadi to selectively reward Shia militias whose conduct is in-line with the central government’s agenda, while sidelining other rogue elements.

The Prime Minister certainly recognizes the precarious position that he currently occupies; overreliance on either the US-led coalition or Iran risks aggravating existing tensions between rival leaders within his governing party. Nonetheless, achieving the terminal goal of expelling IS militants from Iraqi territory will require that the ISF and Shia militias cooperate on the field of battle, while benefiting from continued support from the US coalition. But since Shia militias–specifically those allied with Iran–hold different equities from those of the central government, the Prime Minister requires financial leverage which may be parlayed as political capital to undermine the militias influence.

Given Iraq’s fragile economy which is currently burdened by an austerity budget, an uncertain oil revenue deal with the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) and globally depressed oil prices, Abadi’s government is in severe need of economic relief. The World Bank completed a  $350 million loan agreement with the Iraqi government in early July, 2014 and this agreement was swiftly followed by 1.24 billion in rapid financial assistance approved by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The United States has already commitment $623.8 million in recovery and stabilization assistance in areas liberated from IS. The collective desire of all these programs is to not only facilitate reconstruction, but also lend visibility to the central government as a stabilizing agent. These levels of financial assistance, if well executed, can produce the local effect of undermining militias in areas where they serve as surrogates of the state. Yet these measures which require long-term investment should be complemented by equal commitments to the security sector.

The first of these security-focused measures should target select elements of the Iraqi security sector that are competently functioning, despite numerous limitations. The Iraqi Counterterrorism Service (CTS) as discussed here has served as an apolitical, yet tactically and operationally competent force in the anti-IS campaign. CTS combines with the newly built 16th Army Division and the 76th Brigade to form Counterattack Brigades that have effectively routed IS fighters from Ramadi and are now pushing northwards toward Mosul and its environs.

The expansion of President Obama’s Counterterrorism Partnership Fund provides the necessary equipment and training support to sustain the maturation of these forces, and others like them. A recommitment to presidential engagement between President Obama and Prime Minister Abadi (which may take the form of increasing communication between the two leaders then publicizing these interactions as detailed here) is urgently needed. Raising the level of these interactions provides a strong public image of the United States’ unwavering commitment and support of Iraq’s long-term stability.

Ultimately, the prime minister’s ability to leverage control over financial and technical support from external sponsors confers great internal power that can be used to entice cooperation amongst internal rivals. The task is not simple and requires great diplomatic skill, but if effectively applied it will likely yield favorable results.

Stronger Shia militias will certainly rebuff these efforts, but if a substantial number can be convinced to follow the central government’s lead, those operating outside the government’s mandate will likely ostracize themselves from the general population over time. For Al-Abadi’s aggressive efforts on purse control to succeed, government forces must perform exceedingly well to allay domestic concerns among Shia leaders who seek to exploit the Islamic State’s campaign to advance their independent political agendas. Creating a counterbalance to their influence ensures that all Iraqi security forces operate in a manner that preserves the unity of the state in the post-Islamic State era.

This strategy does not guarantee concessions by Iran, but it does limit Tehran’s delicate grip on the Iraqi security sector. Opposition to the prime minister’s bolder actions on financial and resource distribution vis-a-vis the security sector will continue; Iran is unlikely to relinquish its levers of influence in Iraq absent a strong deterrent from the United States. Since the US-led coalition holds influence on combat operations (as a factor of its air capabilities), the United States must firmly message its support of Al-Abadi’s efforts to limit Iranian meddling in Iraq’s internal affairs.

Risks certainly abound and the proposals provided here require long-term US-Iraq engagement. This is perhaps the greatest handicap of the current US strategy in Iraq. The level of US commitment need not return to pre-2011 levels, but the amount of financial and technical resources currently deployed have the ability to achieve substantial progress in the long-term. Any expectations that Iranian influence in Iraqi politics will completely erode is unrealistic and unrepresentative of Iraq’s current political sphere. The technical approach presented here provides an alternative that builds Iraqi security forces, provides them with the capabilities required to confront unwieldy militias, and provides the economic benefits required for the government to slowly restore its trust within the local population.

Thousands of US-led sorties across Iraqi airspace have, with pronounced effect, limited the self-proclaimed Caliphate’s advances in Iraq. US air superiority, if strategically combined with a united ground component, featuring both mainline forces and responsible PMU militias, will likely accelerate the Islamic State’s defeat. Yet, more importantly, slowly degrading the influence of the militias on the campaign will likely aid  demobilization efforts as the ISthreat recedes and is eventually defeated. The prime minister’s ability to control the influence of Shia militia’s within the security services will ultimately determine the future stability of Iraq.

 

 

Peter Kirechu is a graduate student at the Mercyhurst Institute for Intelligence Studies where he focuses on civil strife, insurgencies and counterterrorism. @PeterKirechu

 

Turning technology from an asset into a liability: using big data to fight ISIS

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By: Sabina Ciofu

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Source: www.datafloq.com

Unlike any other terrorist organisation, the so-called Islamic State has consistently and efficiently made use of social media tools for self-promotion and recruitment. With an estimated 200,000 tweets a day for at least the last couple of years, it is by far the most aggressive social media offensive we have ever seen from a radical group. Western powers, often focused on traditional military and political responses to conflict and aggression, have initially reacted in a weak and fragmented manner to the wave of social media activity. It is only recently that concerted action has been taken by national and regional counter-terrorism authorities to respond to the threat of online radicalisation and recruitment. This has led to some decrease in the number and activity of English-speaking ISIS accounts, but it is still far from achieving the dismantling of their online networks.

That there is no coordinated military and political solution to the crisis in Syria and Iraq is getting more and more obvious by the day. The Western powers cooperate with the Arab countries and Sunni groups on one side, while Russia is closely working with Iran and the Shia militias on the other. With such a complex landscape of strategic interests, it is no surprise that coming up with a coherent approach to ending the war in Syria is proving a big mountain to climb. However, the latency to counteract ISIS’ charm offensive on social media – even when it targets Western citizens who have in significant numbers fallen for the Islamist rhetoric – is far more problematic.

Public-private cooperation

Following a slow initial response, in recent times several meetings have taken place between Western governments and the largest American internet platforms in an attempt to cooperate in fighting ISIS propaganda online. The US government has, upon a number of occasions, asked the private sector for assistance, most recently enlisting Facebook, Instagram and Twitter to assist in the fight against terrorism. The French government has also contacted the US companies for support in removing online propaganda material, following the Charlie Hebdo attacks, while the UK Parliament had previously put blame on internet platforms, claiming that they are instrumental in spreading terrorist ideology. Far from a synchronized effort to find a common strategy to combat terrorism online, it oftentimes looks like a desperate cry for help from some governments, when they realise that what goes on online is strongly linked to national security threats. And this picture is further twisted by the complexity of the international law system, where tech companies are left with the decision of balancing out questions of freedom of expression, censorship and the difference between dissemination and promotion of online propaganda.

Using Big Data to draw patterns

What if one could turn one of the mightiest ISIS weapons into a liability? What if, by using big data analytics, one can look into the huge amount of content provided by ISIS-related websites, traditional media and social media accounts, to be able to draw relevant patterns? This may already be underway in highly classified intelligence programmes, where advanced algorithms may be used to track and determine potential terrorist activity. For example, in domestic law-enforcement domains, this is a model already being explored in some parts of the United States. By making use of mathematical and analytical techniques, police authorities are able to determine patterns that could lead to predicting criminal activity.

Apply that same technique for counter-terrorism and the value of big data analytics increases substantially. Having the technical ability to follow the data patterns, the footprints and the online records, looking into location, travel, profiles and messages of potential terrorists is a gold mine for national security authorities. It is easy to estimate that advanced big data analytics will outpace the computational ability of ISIS users to fake their identity and hide their location, as there are already a significant number of failings, even when instructed to hide their GPS location. There are situations where ISIS buildings and hotspots have been targeted by Western military forces, after users had accidentally pinpointed their location on social media. Ultimately, there is very little ISIS propagandists can do to completely hide online, if the organisation’s aim is to use the internet to spread the ideology, promote the mission and recruit new fighters.

As a general rule, recent research shows that social media analytics can be used for creating detailed profiles of potential terrorists and then looking for places where a high percentage of the local population matches the profile. Although this would seem a pretty straightforward approach, it has been shown that looking into the motivations and backgrounds of confirmed terrorists doesn’t necessarily lead to one single profile. However, sketching using big data analytics can define some widely-valid characteristics. For instance, ISIS recruits tend to be predominantly young and male and the ones originating in the EU and the US tend to come from a middle class background, with a high level of education. Drawing patterns out of huge amounts of available data has, however, obvious downsides, as it would only be a perfect profiling system if both the data and the algorithm were perfect. Therefore, privacy concerns are ultimately justified and any such governmental initiatives should duly take them into account.

Existing Big Data analytics projects

A massive data mining project by Qatar Computing Research Institute in Doha looked at social media data to figure out the origins of support for the Islamic State. Over a three month period, scientists looked into more than three million tweets, highlighting common patterns and attributes between pro and anti-ISIS messages. The algorithm was successful in “guessing” the sentiment in 87% of the cases, which is amazingly high for any big data project.

The Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Agency (IARPA) – the high-tech research arm of the U.S. intelligence community – is also focusing several programmes on using big data analytics to tackle some of the challenges ISIS has created online. For instance, they are currently focusing efforts on a facial recognition programme, based on imagery collected from available sources, be they high resolution cameras, or mobile phones, and even devices with less reliable resolution or lighting. Of course, the process is proving to be a difficult one, especially when algorithms are in charge of creating one face and recognising it from imagery in various angles, with varying lighting and quality.

Aside from its facial recognition programme, IARPA is also focusing on analytics results based on online video searching, through its code-named Aladdin programme. This implies designing new big data search methods for video content, that does not simply target tag words or user-generated content, but scans the video itself for elements that can describe what the movie is about. While terrorists may be clever enough not to tag videos where, for instance, they explain how to make explosives in view of a potential terrorist attack, their videos would be easily inspected and tracked down if a search method non-reliant on tags would be developed. Thus, while YouTube has been doing a great job in taking down such content almost in real time and while ISIS has moved these activities to the dark web to be less visible and thus less searchable, these movie samples may provide very valuable insight to national security experts, using advanced big data analytics to extract information from video material.

Moreover, the bigger the data, the better the big data analytics will be. Shared information for national security purposes has been something friendly governments have been focused on doing ever since 9/11. The precision and quality of information coming out of a big data project will always rely on the amount of data analysed, thus making it obviously necessary that countries cooperate in exchanging the information they have. The Dfuze system, for instance, is a database that allows such information exchange across multiple countries. National security experts can use the platform to access large amount of data shared by various actors and thus draw possible trends and patterns that can assist with prevention and preparation in view of potential terrorist attacks. There are already 40 countries using this product, which is an indication that such big data application can be very powerful tool in terrorism prevention and control.

Conclusion

This is not to say that big data, alone, can prevent terrorist attacks. Lone wolves will always be a difficult category to track, hunt and make sense of. This is to say, however, that big data can have a very significant input in creating and tracking the kind of patterns needed for effective intelligence gathering. It can also have a very important part to play in prediction, especially when it comes to planned, organised and coordinated terror attacks. Significant human reasoning and expertise will have to be attached to this, to distinguishing between real attacks and online bluff, between facts and intentionally deceptive mass-upload of messages. But that is the case for any intelligence method – human reasoning will continue to be at the centre of decision-making. And while it will always be the case that intelligence failures will be blamed for terrorist attacks – and hence also the failure of the people involved and the tools used – we simply don’t know how many terror plots have already been foiled and how many anti-ISIS military operations have already been successful with input from big data analytics.

 

 

Sabina Maria Ciofu is a first year MPhil/PhD candidate in Defence Studies, at King’s College London, where she explores the relationship between big data and US foreign policy. She is also a policy advisor in the European Parliament, working on digital economy, foreign affairs and trade issues. Sabina holds a BA in Classics from Cambridge and a MA in War Studies from King’s College London. @SabinaCiofu