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Widows and Children of the Caliphate’s Last Stand

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By Miles Vining

9 April 2019

“They came in mostly as Burkha-clad widows with their screaming, crying, and confused children.” (Miles Vining)

“She soaked a big rag with bright red blood. We put a new one on and it soaked up a whole rag again within two minutes, bleeding a lot. Does that anti… Elliah, what do we do?….”. Our Chief Medic Elliah responds over the radio sets with, “Okay, is it a complete miscarry or not?”. “Stand by, it’s hard to tell but it looks like arterial bleeding to me,” Jason replied back. The two field medics were describing a pregnant woman who had just suffered a miscarriage. She was with what was left of her family at a temporary IDP (Internally Displaced Person) site behind Syrian Democratic Force (SDF) forward positions that faced the last remnants of the failed caliphate in the small Syrian town of Baghouz. Joining her before this day and afterwards would be over 29,000 IDPs who had fled from the fighting.

Some days they trickled in on foot across wide open spaces of No Man’s Land between the lines; other days they came in caravans of small trucks, pickups, sedans, even motorcycles. They came in mostly as Burkha-clad widows with their screaming, crying, and confused children. Many of their husbands had been killed while fighting for the so-called Islamic State; others vehemently claimed their husbands had no involvement with the group. One such wife even stated that, “I left my husband to die in that damned town!”. Another said, “Mine went into the desert,” while making a crawling motion with her hands. ISIS infiltrators were being killed within sight of SDF positions on many occasions. Sometimes you could hear the ordnance dropping all night from coalition aircraft, along with the illumination flares, mixed in with the Dushka and PKM machine gun fire.

(Miles Vining)

To some of them this would be the first time they had slept outside in the freezing plains of southeastern Syria. As one young Canadian widowed put it, “We didn’t know how to make a fire so we just ordered takeout for every meal”. Indeed, these  were not your covered-wagon, pioneering types but instead the urban middle-class that had been wooed by many a recruiter or suitor to find a way into Syria through Turkey or Iraq. So many widows that our team members interviewed had stories about being drawn to the caliphate during its early years, but still more of these stories had themes of trickery running through them. “He said that before we get married, we’d need to go meet his family in Raqqa”, or “I went to meet him in Turkey and he said we could get medicine for my children in Syria”. Again and again we would hear variations of the same tale, very badly wanting to ask if they had read a single news report about Syria before the trip. Even so, the Canadian lamented, “I mean, it was alright when the Caliphate was doing well,” and in the words of one Tunisian, “This is the land of Allah”.

They came from all corners of the world. Russians, Turks, Malaysians, Canadians, French, Germans, Azeris, Tajiks, Sudanese, Moldovans. The list would go on and on if we were able to conduct a complete census of them all. The flowing robes of the black abayas might have concealed the complexions of the mothers, but the children told a different tale. Different skin tones and hair styles spanned the breadth of humanity. Unfortunately, the youngest of these children had known nothing but the caliphate’s vicious education system, one that used IEDs (Improvised Explosive Device) as symbolic counters to teach basic arithmetic. Yet we saw them, daily, in such horrible conditions that many of our team members would have to step aside for a second to squeeze out tears before going back to tending to a bloody gash from shrapnel or a fractured limb.

(Miles Vining)

Casualties came from all over the spectrum as well. Some were from Inherent Resolve airstrikes or the artillery batteries that were pounding the caliphate lines on the outskirts of Baghouz. Some were from the caliphate’s gunfire as fleeing IDPs were trying to get away from the fighting, while others were even from SDF fire as militiamen in forward positions mistook vehicles packed with refugees for potential car bombs racing towards them in one final suicide attack. Indeed, at the beginning of February 2019, several SDF fighters were killed when fake “babies” that women were bringing in as IDPs exploded. On top of the wartime wounds were skin diseases, live births, miscarriages, kidney stones, and even old age conditions that all had to be attended to medically among the squalor of the temporary IDP site.

Men, however, were a different story. None of them were willing to admit it, but you could almost feel their hatred simmer in the chilly air. Much of it was directed towards us, the foreigner aid workers, but it was also towards the SDF fighters as well. Some of their responses to our greetings were short, showing minimal eye contact if it could not be avoided. Men would refuse outright medical care for injured women in their families, not wanting for a blood relative to be touched by our “Kaffir” medical staff.

Despite the horror and miserable conditions that the IDPs faced, the frightening realization for many on our team was that these people still had a formidable conviction in their failed caliphate. Indeed, towards the end, during the SDF-ISIS negotiations for terms of surrender, the families that were coming out of Baghouz were not  “fleeing” or were “Internally Displaced” in the real sense of the word. These were widows and husbands that had clung on until the bitter end, only now being forced to leave through political negotiation. In the words of one such widow, “Al-Baghdadi and Dyala went off the track. I’m still on the track and ready to die. This is a test from God to see if I just came to Syria for adventure”.

Many want that black flag to fly again.

Miles Vining is a volunteer relief worker behind SDF lines in Baghouz.

Just Who Are the YPG?

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By Ed Nash

22 October 2018

 

A Manbij Military Council tank, part of the SDF, engages ISIS positions (Credit Image: Ed Nash)

 

Donald Trump recently praised what he described as the sacrifice of Kurds in the fight against ISIS across Iraq and Syria to the international press. His declaration was made shortly after the State Department removed the previous rather limited reference to the Syrian Kurdish militias known as the Yekîneyên Parastina Gel (Peoples Protection Units – YPG) from its ‘Country Reports on Terrorism 2017’. As a consequence, President Erdogan of Turkey accused the US of breaking its word in agreements reached between the two countries whereby the YPG were to withdraw from the town of Manbij in northern Syria.

A dangerously volatile nexus — composed of a range of disparate groups including the YPG — now exists in Manbij. These disparate groups operate in the same space as Turkish troops, who seek to advance their own, opposing agenda in the region.

If we read into America’s intention[1] to take a more steadfast position on backing the Syrian Kurds, then the US is very much antagonising a long time NATO ally and critical regional partner with whom relations are already at an unparalleled low.

The reasons for these tensions are multiple, and thus can hardly be summarised in a few sentences. The focus of this piece is elsewhere. Indeed, it is perhaps wise to understand a bit more about the YPG, what they stand for and why the Turks are so concerned about them, as they form such a thorny part of the disagreement.

The YPG and Yekîneyên Parastina Jin (Women’s Protection Units – YPJ) are predominantly Kurdish militias which represent the armed wing of the PYD (Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat or Democratic Union Party). The latter organisation subscribes to the ideological, philosophical and historical writings of Abdullah Öcalan, a Kurdish political theorist and guerrilla leader who originally founded the infamous PKK, who have fought a bitter war against the Turkish military on and off for almost forty years.

This connection arguably explains the Turks’ antipathy. For them, the PYD/YPG are simply the same as the PKK and thus represent an intolerable threat to their security (for an interesting refutation of this, see Hurriyet Daily News and Foreign Policy). As the SDF – which the YPG forms the major component of – controls the whole of the north-east of Syria as the Democratic Federation of Northern Syria (generally known as Rojava), the Turk’s concerns are understandable.

Öcalan originally founded the PKK as a Soviet/Stalinist style communist party seeking a socialist Kurdish state but, inspired by the writings of American social theorist Murray Bookchin, has since become focused upon promoting  Democratic Confederalism, a political theory that mixes Marxism-Leninism, Stalinism, anarchism, and libertarian ideals. Broadly, it espouses the idea that the authority of a central government should be kept to a minimum, that power should be highly decentralised, and local issues should be addressed at a local level; that regional, racial, and religious customs should be respected; and greater attention is need to espouse gender equality and ecological issues. The theory also advocates for a fairer redistribution of wealth along similar lines to European social democracy.

Such a mix of political theories would seem to create a rather schizophrenic ideology that, depending on your personal stance, could be interpreted in any way one deems fit. And there are definite, radical contrasts in how the PYD/YPG conducts itself that demonstrate this. On the one hand, areas under their control have brought women’s rights into fact. On the other hand, however, they have been accused of recruiting child soldiers and criticised for their human rights record, as well as persecution of other political parties in the region.

It is in their reaction to these external criticisms that we see the key to the world’s relationship with the PYD/YPG. Complaints against them by external actors are generally addressed and openly rectified, which stands in stark contrast to just about every other faction involved in the Syrian Civil War, the Assad government included.

What motivates this willingness is the wish to be seen to be a better, more democratic society that can engage with the international community, something the council currently running northern Syria understands it needs desperately. Without a powerful backer, the fledgling experiment in local democracy will be mercilessly crushed by either Assad or the Turks, as what took place with the Kurdish canton of Afrin.

And it seems that the sudden interest in America for sponsoring the YPG beyond the defeat of ISIS could be inspired by the realisation that, if it won’t commit to backing the Kurds and their assorted allies in Syria, then others will. Recently the YPG has made overtures to Assad and the Iranians, seeking their support. With , the sudden renewed interest in the Kurds as a local ally makes sense.

There is no denying that continued support for the YPG/PYD is beset with political complexities, including a number of concerns with the movement’s ideology, that will need to be addressed if it is to continue to receive said support. At this time, however, it is probably the best chance for more reasoned, democratic, and ultimately law-abiding governance in the region.

 

Ed Nash has spent years travelling around the world and, on occasion, interfering as he sees fit. Between June 2015 and July 2016 he volunteered with the Kurdish YPG in its battle against ISIS in Syria. His book Desert Sniper: How One Ordinary Brit Went to War Against ISIS was published in September 2018. 

 

Notes:

[1] Which, when concerning Syria, may be best accomplished with a crystal ball.

Image Source: the picture was provided by the author

Islamist Extremism in the Philippines

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By Jamie Matthews

 

ISIS media had released this image of one of their militants waving the group’s flag in Marawi in May 2017

On October 17 2017, Philippine President Duterte declared that the city of Marawi had been ‘liberated from terrorist influence‘. The city, located on the southern Philippine island of Mindanao, had been under siege by militant groups fighting under the flag of the so-called Islamic State (IS). While the Government’s victory is a welcome success, the five-month siege exposed the vulnerability of the Philippines to the continued threat of jihadist extremism.

 

Islamic State’s Pivot to Asia

The battle for Marawi represents the escalation of Islamist militancy in the Philippines and, more broadly, in South East Asia (SEA). The island of Mindanao has a history of Islamic separatism, with both peaceful and violent attempts to gain autonomy. However, the more violent elements of the movement have been given a boost by recent global changes. The most obvious change has been the rise of IS, which has attracted a growing number of Muslims to the creation of an Islamic caliphate. While IS has lost ground in Syria and Iraq, the group has sought to extend its influence elsewhere. This change has involved encouraging terrorism in the West, and the establishment of wilyats (IS provinces) in regions such as SEA and North Africa. With a sizeable Muslim minority often living in harsh poverty, the Philippines provides a particularly attractive target for the formation of a wilyat. The attack on Marawi therefore represented the beginning of IS’s ‘pivot to Asia’, meaning the actions of extremists in Marawi was part of a long-term strategic goal of IS. The threat of further attacks across the Philippines and SEA is high.

 

Impact of the Marawi Siege

Despite the militants’ eventual defeat in Marawi, the conflict has heightened the risk from extremist groups inspired by IS. Over five months, a small number of militants resisted government forces and controlled large parts of the city. At one point, it is thought that as few as 70 militants were keeping some 7000 troops at bay. The effectiveness of such a small number of dedicated fighters emboldened IS over the strategic potential of occupation in Mindanao. Some security analysts even believe that IS won the battle strategically because they showed their ability to resist powerful military forces. Success during the battle for Marawi has provided Islamists with a martyrdom to inspire others.

The siege also assisted the radicalisation of young Muslims in the region and attracted extremists from around the world to the cause in Mindanao. The attack was well-documented in the media and IS publications. Images of militants raising black IS flags across Marawi were broadcast across the world and are thought to have had a similar impact as the images of IS’s 2014 victory in Mosul. The heavy-handed and ineffective approach of the Philippine military further aided the recruitment of young Muslims into IS ranks. IS recruiters utilised the Philippine military’s reliance on airstrikes to claim that it was the Government that destroyed the city and its residents’ homes. These publications by IS were made in conjunction with information on the historic plight of Muslims in Mindanao, highlighting previous governments’ attempts to oust Muslims from the region. These messages have encouraged radicalised Muslims to sympathise with the cause in Mindanao. The Island has even been described as “the new land of jihad”.

In the aftermath of the siege, the risk of Islamist extremism remains high. Civilians in Mindanao are growing increasingly wary that the militants will regroup and overrun surrounding rural areas and towns. The likelihood of lone-wolf terrorist attacks has led some Christian groups in Mindanao to arm themselves. The arming of Christians against Islamists is particularly worrying because previous rounds of sectarian violence in the Philippines began in a similar manner. President Duterte is aware of the severity of the danger,  shown by the recent extension of martial law in Mindanao until the end of 2018. This extreme course of action taken by Duterte, and ratified by the Congress in Manila, demonstrates the difficulty of providing security and rule of law in a region which is extremely vulnerable to civil unrest.

 

Future Policy

The threat of Islamist extremism is clearly ongoing and serious in the Philippines. There are numerous ways in which the Philippine Government can mitigate these risks. Firstly, investment is required to rebuild the city of Marawi. Failing to do so would heighten poverty and resentment towards the government. Such conditions would prove fertile for the radicalisation of young Muslims by IS propaganda. Secondly, sufficient intelligence and policing resources are required to track down and capture extremists. This is particularly important given recent accusations that Duterte has not dedicated enough time, energy and money into countering Islamist extremism. Instead, he has been accused of diverting precious military and policing resources to his infamous war on drugs. Finally, the Philippines should take a more collective approach to countering extremism alongside their South East Asian neighbours. Tighter security checks on movement between borders and improved intelligence sharing would prove particularly helpful. The threat from IS in SEA is becoming increasingly apparent which should encourage cooperation between states. The Philippines, Indonesia and Malaysia have already demonstrated over the past year their willingness to tackle the threat collectively with joint military and security operations. Further collective action is required if they wish to stem the surging tide of Islamist extremism across the region.

 

Jamie is a postgraduate reading Intelligence and International Security at King’s College London. He has a degree in Politics and International Studies as Warwick University. He is interested in a wide range of international and domestic security issues including the rise of Islamist extremism, the use of drones for targeted killing and intelligence related issues.

 

Image Source: 

http://i.dailymail.co.uk/i/pix/2017/05/25/09/40C5C47900000578-0-image-a-25_1495700147350.jpg

Strife Feature | The Islamic State’s Social Contract: A ‘state’ founded on fear or freedom?

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By Kierat Ranautta-Sambhi

 

A man cries as he carries his daughter while walking from an Islamic State-controlled part of Mosul towards Iraqi special forces soldiers during a battle in Mosul, Iraq, on March 4, 2017. Image Credit: REUTERS/Goran Tomasevic

 

With the Islamic State’s caliphate crumbling, many in the towns and villages on the brink of liberation fear their post-Islamic State future.  To understand why the group succeeded to such an extent and to establish a lasting end to the conflict, we must look back at how the Islamic State managed to win the hearts and minds of the people, thus allowing the rise of its caliphate.  Whilst the group has attempted to portray itself as a concerned and capable ruler, the reality is that its social contract is built on a foundation of fear.

Annie Barnard and Hwaida Saad of The New York Times write: ‘The Islamic State alternates between terrorizing residents and courting them.’  The group succeeded precisely because it realised that there is no single method by which to persuade its target audiences to its cause – in this case, the revival of the Islamic caliphate.  Rather, it carefully constructs its strategic communications so that it resonates with numerous audiences, appealing both to their desires and fears.

The question of whether the basis for the state – the Islamic State or otherwise – is freedom or fear is an old one.  In this regard, the influences of both Thomas Hobbes and Jean-Jacques Rousseau are evident in the Islamic State’s approach to establishing its caliphate.  For instance, Hobbes suggests that the desire for security lies at the heart of the formation of the social contract.  Ultimately, fear lays the foundations of the state.  On the contrary, Rousseau’s approach to the social contract is based on freedom which, in essence, is the right of an individual to pursue his/her will.  And so, the question arises: Does the philosophy of fear or the philosophy of freedom found the basis for the state?  Is fear more powerful than freedom?

Mara Revkin argues that the existence of a social contract goes beyond the theoretical realm in the context of the Islamic State, as evidenced by the Wathīqat al-Madīnah [Document of the City].  The document is distributed by the group throughout territories under its control, defining the rights and duties binding together the residents of the caliphate and the Islamic State.

 

Excerpts of the Wathīqat al-Madīnah[i]

 

So, the question remains: what is – or, more accurately, was – it about the Islamic State that resonated with certain individuals?

Hobbes believes that humans are fundamentally governed by our ‘appetites and aversions’ – in other words, our desires and our fears.  The Islamic State has recognised this.  It capitalises on the desires and fears of its target audiences in order to construct the Islamic State, and gain and maintain support for its rule.  Beyond those who are ‘ideologically committed to the goal of establishing a caliphate that is governed according to sharia’, [ii] many of those who support – or, at least accept – Islamic State control are attracted to its claims to be able to provide security and services to its residents.

Consider just one example of a target audience: Sunni Muslims in Iraq and Syria.

Certain individuals view the Islamic State as the only actor actively addressing its (immediate) desires for a sense of belonging, and fears of continued alienation.  The group claims that ‘There is only one sect here, Sunni Islam […] Here in the Caliphate, there is no room for pluralism’.[iii]  Such claims resonate with many Sunnis who feel marginalised by the relevant non-Sunni ruling sect.  By nature, humans seek power so that they are able to preserve themselves.  It appeals to Iraqi Sunnis’ desires to restore the power lost in the wake of the 2003 Iraq War; and, it appeals to many Sunni Syrians living under an Alawite regime (a minority sect), as evidenced in the accounts given by former Islamic State members.  Peter Neumann observes that defectors’ critiques are ‘framed in jihadist and/or sectarian terms’, with some members deserting as a result of brutality against Sunnis, whom they believed the Islamic State ought to protect.[iv]

Others fear the Islamic State itself, viewing the group as a threat to their self-preservation.  Whilst the role of the government should be to dispel fear, the Islamic State utilises it to consolidate its control in areas it has seized.  William McCants argues that brutality can be a very efficient means with which to ‘subdue a population’ and ‘establish your own state’ – at least, in the short-term.  The Islamic State made clear that violations of its strict understanding of sharī‘a codes of conduct would result in harsh punishments – from lashes to execution.

It could be argued that, as consideration for a Hobbesian social contract, subscribing citizens voluntarily give up their natural rights and pool their liberties, agreeing to live by the rule of the state in return for which the state provides them security.  Yet, at least in the case of the Islamic State, the choice is often taken away from many residents living in areas under its control.  They are often left with little choice but to accept the group’s rule.  In a somewhat twisted version of the Hobbesian state, it could be argued that individuals accept this social contract as a means to avoid a state of war with the state itself.

Those who break the social contract – or, those who the Islamic State deem to have done so – revert to the state of war, and, thus, the state is no longer required to protect them.  Rather, the state is at liberty to protect itself against such a threat to its preservation – an approach followed by the Islamic State.  This is evident when considering its brutal reaction to deserters.  By 2016, the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights had recorded more than 400 executions carried out by the group on its own fighters and followers, including many whom were trying to return to their home countries.

Whilst many of the arguments Hobbes makes are still pertinent to the construction of a state based on fear, there is an obvious flaw in applying the Hobbesian explanation of the social contract to the Islamic State.  The group is actively seeking the coming of ‘the Major Malhamah’,[v] ‘eagerly awaiting’ the arrival of its opponents’ armies. [vi]  Rather than avoiding war at all costs, the Islamic State invites war, and, thus, the inevitable insecurity that accompanies it.  Moreover, whilst Hobbes argues that the social contract is formed so that man can live together in society without fearing one another, this is not the case with the Islamic State.  Rather, many residents of the caliphate live in fear of their rulers.

Furthermore, contrary to Hobbes, Rousseau argues that the social contract is essentially founded on freedom.  Individuals surrender their natural liberties in the hope that the state can protect the civil liberties that they receive in return.  However, the Islamic State provides very limited rights within its social contract.  It claims to abide by the religious teachings of the ḥadīth which states: ‘The people are as equal as the teeth of a comb’.[vii]

(In theory), most non-Muslims within Islamic State-controlled areas would be protected so long as they paid the jizyah tax.  However, in reality, protection is only afforded to the ‘true believers’, determined by the Islamic State as only Sunni Muslims.  Christians and other religious minorities are the victims of genocide at the hand of the group.  This contradicts the idea that the social contract establishes mutual protection amongst citizens within society, in return for the enjoyment of the same rights as every other citizen.  Thus, it appears as though this protection only extends to certain contracting parties.

The promise of rights, liberties, and security serves as a means with which to entice individuals to accepting Islamic State rule, playing to the fears of those feeling marginalised by national governments.  The Islamic State attempts to construct the perception of being a compassionate, embracing, and capable governing group so that it can demand allegiance in return for the provision of security, public services, and justice – responsibilities typically associated with a traditional understanding of a state.  This is explicitly demonstrated in its social contract: in the Wathīqat al-Madīnah, the Islamic State promises to provide safety and security, rights (albeit limited), and justice in return to those who ‘join the society [the Islamic State] and renounce factions and strife’. [viii]

Yet, as coalition efforts continue, the Islamic State continues to suffer considerable financial and territorial losses, affecting its ability to provide security and services in the caliphate.  With its caliphate crumbling around it, the group seems to rely on fear as a sort of fail-safe.  In reality, the Islamic State seems, first and foremost, based on fear – fear of the alternative and/or fear of the Islamic State itself.

Whilst the group has made attempts to demonstrate its commitment to protecting the rights of the residents of the caliphate, it is its reputation as a strict, authoritative ruler that dominates.  It relies on coercive credibility, leaving residents fearful of acting out of line with Islamic State rule.  Following a somewhat Hobbesian mindset, the group seems to believe that less freedom will lead to less anarchy.

As it fails to uphold the mirage of protector, even those supporting the group begin losing faith in its abilities to govern.  Yet, it remains evident that the Islamic State will follow through on what it says regarding punishment of those who it deems an enemy of the group.  Moreover, Hobbes argues that man is able to connect together his sensory experiences to garner what may occur in the future; consequently, mankind fears not only its present but, also, its future.  Given its high coercive credibility, many residents of Islamic State-controlled areas continue to live in fear for their lives, and those of their family.

Although this has been a somewhat simplistic discussion of the Islamic State’s social contract, it is worth considering in more depth what it is that attracts individuals to the Islamic State: What do they desire? What do they fear?  What made them believe the Islamic State was more able to fulfil the responsibilities and duties of the State?  The Islamic State evidently possessed an answer to these questions.  From its inception, the group has purported to address the disaffection of Muslims worldwide.  It claims that the ‘revival of the Khilāfah [caliphate]’ has allowed each Muslim to ‘satisfy his natural desire for belonging to something greater.’ [ix]  Yet, the rise of the caliphate was largely due to the Islamic State’s ability to play on the fears of its target audience(s).  Rather than Hobbes or Rousseau, the success (at least, initially) of the Islamic State in establishing its State is perhaps more accurately summarised by Niccolò Machiavelli:

‘it is desirable to be both loved and feared, but it is difficult to achieve both, and if one of them has to be lacking, it is much safer to be feared than loved.’

 

Kierat Ranautta-Sambhi has just completed her MA International Peace and Security at King’s College London.  She holds a LLB Law with French Law from the University of Birmingham, with a year spent studying at Université Panthéon-Assas (Paris II).  Her research interests include strategic communications, counter-extremism and the MENA region.  You can follow her @kieratsambhi

Notes:

[i] Revkin, Mara. 2016. “The legal foundations of the Islamic State.” Analysis Paper No.23, July, 2016. The Brookings Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World. https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-legal-foundations-of-the-islamic-state/, 15.

[ii] Revkin, Mara, and Mhidi, Ahmad. 2016. “Quitting ISIS.” Foreign Affairs, May 1, 2016.  https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/syria/2016-05-01/quitting-isis.

[iii] Dabiq #12. 2015. “Just Terror.” Al-Ḥayāt Media Center. November 18, 2015. https://clarionproject.org/islamic-state-isis-isil-propaganda-magazine-dabiq-50/, 47.

[iv] Neumann, Peter R. 2015. “Victims, Perpetrators, Assets: The Narratives of Islamic State Defectors.” ICSR. http://icsr.info/2015/09/icsr-report-narratives-islamic-state-defectors/, 10.

[v] ‘Malhamah is the singular of malahim, which are the bloody battles that occur before the Hour.’ – Rumiyah #3. 2016. Al-Ḥayāt Media Center. November 11, 2016.  https://clarionproject.org/islamic-state-isis-isil-propaganda-magazine-dabiq-50/, 25.

[vi] Al-Furqan Media. 2014. “Although the disbelievers dislike it.” November 16, 2014. https://clarionproject.org/gruesome-islamic-state-video-announces-death-peter-kassig-50/, 15:12.

[vii] Revkin, Mara, and Mhidi, Ahmad. 2016. “Quitting ISIS.” Foreign Affairs, May 1, 2016.  https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/syria/2016-05-01/quitting-isis.

[viii] Revkin, Mara. 2016a. “The legal foundations of the Islamic State.” Analysis Paper No.23, July, 2016. The Brookings Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World. https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-legal-foundations-of-the-islamic-state/, 15, Table 1, Articles 3 & 9.

[ix] Dabiq #7. 2015. “From Hypocrisy to Apostasy: The Extinction of the Grayzone.” Al-Ḥayāt Media Center. February 12, 2015.  https://clarionproject.org/islamic-state-isis-isil-propaganda-magazine-dabiq-50/, 57.

 

Image source: 

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-iraq-father/terror-on-the-mosul-front-line-idUSKBN16D2F2

Strife Interview – Counterterrorism Expert on Daesh Communication Strategies

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Since Daesh first declared the so-called ‘Islamist State Caliphate’ in mid-2014, their global communications strategy and online recruitment operations have caught most observers by surprise. The scope and seeming sophistication of their propaganda campaign soon came to represent the cornerstone of Daesh’s initial military triumphs and generated a certain a degree of alarm within western political and academic circles.

However, as the civil war in Syria now enters its sixth year and ISIS’ territorial presence across the region continues to recede, many are beginning to question the impact this has had on their messaging strategy. Strife’s Iona Allan talks to one of the leading Counterterrorism Expert (CE) in ISIS propaganda to discuss the current state of their communications strategy and the challenges facing global efforts to counter Daesh. The expert is referred to hereafter as CE. All names, titles, employers, and personal details have been withheld for security and safety reasons. All enquiries as to this article’s content should be sent to Strife Journal & Blog.

IA – How have Daesh communication strategies changed in recent months, particularly since the Mosul offensive? Has there been a notable shift in either the tone of their messaging strategy, the core theme of their message or their intended audience? Or do you see some continuity?

CE – I think what they have done is try and not focus on Mosul because it doesn’t fit into their original strategy and narrative. Either they don’t focus on it or they try to divert attention away from it. For example, in some of their magazines like Rumiyah, the current focus is a lot more on inspiring lone actor attacks and providing advice. The message is shifting attention away from what is transpiring in their so-called Caliphate, i.e. by trying to create this perception that regardless of whatever is happening on the ground in Iraq, Syria and Libya, they are still in charge and they are still strong. You can understand from a recruitment point of view why you would want to create that perception.

The other discernible trend in their propaganda is trying to blame outside powers for causing civilian deaths and casualties. Again, it is a diversionary tactic because there is quite a lot of evidence surrounding what they are doing in terms of execution or hiding amongst local civilians in eastern Mosul. In brief, one strand is the lone actor and the other is basically blaming others for what is happening.

IA – The prevailing preconception is that Daesh propaganda and recruitment are a sophisticated and well-disciplined operation. Do you feel that this is an accurate assessment? Or do you feel that the role of online recruitment in the growth and success of Daesh has been exaggerated?

CE – I think we tend to build up this sophistication. I’m not saying that they haven’t done well with their communications, but I’m always struck by why we are always so surprised that terrorist organisations operating in the 21st century digital age are using all the communications tools at their disposal. Especially if you think about the age group that they are recruiting from, and where their base support comes from, I’ve always been surprised about why we make such a big deal about their communications – it is to be expected. You can go back hundreds of years; people do use the communications tools at their disposal to advance their cause.

What I think has been very clever is where they have differentiated themselves from previous groups is that they have created a ‘call to action’ which requires someone to leave their bedroom whether they are tweeting or on Facebook.  That, I think has been very clever. That is what I think is their USP. It is not enough just to support by ‘liking’ but there is an action that you need to take. The other thing – again my own observation – I think we have under-reported as an international community – is how they effectively use one-to-one contact. It is obvious that they use social media as the first point of contact; but if you speak to a lot of those who were contacted and who have now defected, or have become disillusioned by Daesh, they [say] quite a lot about the phone calls [and] about one-to-one contact. If you think about the way that states communicate to counter Daesh, that personalised approach is absent. I think this aspect hasn’t been reported enough. We therefore, attribute much of their work to the fact that they are on Twitter and produce lots of different communication.

IA – So perhaps it is a more targeted communications strategy than we tend to assume?

CE – Yes, they try to appeal to a very broad base, but then they narrow it down to a more personalised contact. And I think some people will say that what they have noticed has changed is the barrier to entry has become much lower, i.e. as Daesh’s position of strength has reduced, lost territory, fighters and finance etc., that in their communications they are really saying to anyone – ‘can you just need to commit something in our name no matter who you are’.

A member of the Syrian pro-government forces carries an Islamic State (IS) group flag as he stands on a street in the ancient city of Palmyra on March 27, 2016, after troops recaptured the city from IS jihadists._President Bashar al-Assad hailed the victory as an “important achievement” as his Russian counterpart and key backer Vladimir Putin congratulated Damascus for retaking the UNESCO world heritage site. / AFP PHOTO / STRSTR/AFP/Getty Images

 

IA – Can you explain a little about what counter- Daesh communications actually involves? What does counter-communications really mean? Many people may assume that counter- Daesh communications strategy simply means creating a ‘counter-narrative’, is there anything problematic about this idea?

CE – Yes, I don’t really like the word counter-narrative because I think it puts you always on the back foot and I think one of the things which Daesh has done very well is they have had a very clear call to action. In terms of counter-narrative, this is focused on the three different areas of their messaging – military success, Sunni supremacy and statehood.

The global narrative has changed from ‘look they are terrible and evil’, which is what terrorist organisations like- they thrive off that publicity to a focus on their failures. When attacks happened in Paris or in Nice, the fact that you have blanket coverage for days after days that is exactly what organisations like Daesh live for. Those countering Daesh focus less on what they thrive on and try to focus on exposing the reality behind their words.

There is quite a lot of research out there to say that counter-narratives in themselves don’t work, there needs to be an alternative. Speaking to a lot of people who work in the creative industry, advertising, marketing and PR, in their experiences of whatever campaigns they have worked on and whoever in the world it may be, having a positive call to action is very important. You need to be able to harness people around something. So just countering it won’t ever be enough by itself.

IA – It seems like one of the major dilemmas for counter-Daesh communications is determining what the most appropriate channels of communication are. Would you agree with this assessment? If so, what are the risks of using the government as an official channel of communication and what alternatives are available?

CE – I think there is a tension between your domestic public expecting you to do something and wanting to know what you are doing and recognising that governments aren’t best placed, because of the credibility factor to do that type of communicating. While it is important to show that there is a very broad alliance working against Daesh, it is also imperative to work at the grass roots level. That is, working with local voices on the ground (who are better placed than governments that are far removed) to communicate and to understand what resonates with those local audiences. There are a lot of voices who do not believe that Daesh is the solution in their community in Iraq or their community in Syria and those voices are being heard more and more at the moment. But only those communities are best placed to do that.

IA – So do you think you can observe more of such voices the further the conflict has gone on?

CE – Definitely. What we see in Iraq, where Facebook is much more popular than Twitter, there are a lot of campaigns which have started quite small, but you can see that they have just gone viral because those messages from Iraqis are resonating with other Iraqi fellow citizens. If you look at good communications practice, that makes absolute sense.

IA – So counter- communications also serves a domestic purpose?

CE – We should recognise the need for the domestic public to know what their government is doing to protect them and keep them safe. The problem with the military action is that it has so many negative connotations in the region – both recently and historically. So if you spend too much time talking about the military action, you actually also provide a channel for Daesh to say ‘haven’t we always told you..? it’s them and look at them killing innocent civilians.’ So in a way, it plays into their narrative.

Image 1 source: https://www.newss.co/2017/01/06/devastated-by-daesh-3000-year-old-city-nimrud-left-to-looters-in-northern-iraq/