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You are here: Home / Archives for Iraq

Iraq

Barrel bombs in Fallujah – a crime against humanity?

May 13, 2014 by Strife Staff

By Dr. Victoria Fontan, with additional editing by Joana Cook and Thomas Colley:

photo-6

Dr. Victoria Fontan has been spending time in Fallujah since July 2013, one of the only Westerners to do so. She wrote this piece from the ground at the date of publication.

On 21 April, two barrel bombs were dropped from an Iraqi air force MI8 helicopter in the mechanic shops area of Fallujah, close to the government protester demonstration sites.[1] An additional barrel bomb was dropped onto the al-Rashad village near Garma. This is the first such instance of their use in Iraq under the current government, though they have denied their use.[2] Barrel bombs have made themselves known recently with the Syrian government’s assault of Aleppo.[3] These bombs are artisanal; their weight and the amount of their devastation differ according to the circumference of the barrel used. They are filled with incendiary agents, explosives and bolts, and have a devastating effect on the populations on which they are launched. The impact this may have in terms of international law, as well as the ability of the citizens of Fallujah to exercise their newly won political freedoms with barrel bombs landing around the city are critical and diverse. Not only are these bombs destructive, their use against a targeted group may constitute a crime against humanity. Moreover, the international community’s complacence towards the Iraqi government in relation to the population of Fallujah and greater Anbar province may make it an accessory to this crime.

International Humanitarian Law (IHL) has made critical advancements for humankind. It regulates the use of weapons in situations of conflict. It presses for rules of engagement to be respected, and for some weapons to be used over others to reduce civilian casualties and suffering. Since it has legalized some forms of killing but not others, International Humanitarian Law has, in its own way, made killing legitimate. Mankind has managed to sanitize the inadmissible, so that states can both assert their sovereignty and exert their monopoly of power over their population.

There are certain places in this world where IHL appears not to apply. In the forsaken city of Fallujah, in the Anbar province of Iraq, the Baghdad government has been systematically repressing its own population since January 2013 under the pretext of terrorism, used by Prime Minister Maliki. Not only has the Iraqi government been killing civilians under the narrative of counter-terrorism, but the United Nations Assistance Mission to Iraq (UNAMI), as well as Secretary General Ban Ki Moon, have also seemingly bought into it. The International Crisis Group condemns how both parties ‘endorsed and backed the [Iraqi] government’s struggle against terrorism [while] shunning criticism of its heavy-handed approach’.[4]

In the past few years, Fallujah has been emphasized as a stronghold of resistance against the US occupation in Iraq. More than 60% of Fallujah was destroyed in the two sieges of the city in 2004, and, ten years on, it seems to be running the same course.[5] This time, it started with the same Occupy-style demonstrations seen in the US, with Iraqi’s protesting against the central government, perceived to be favoring the Shi’ite population over its Sunni counterpart.[6] As demonstrations progressed, the government tried to block popular dissent on several occasions, culminating in an Iraqi army crackdown of the mainly Sunni populated Anbar province in late December 2013. Since then, scores of civilians have been killed, wounded or displaced and more anti-government sentiment has spread beyond the Anbar province as a result.[7]

Contrary to other cities in Anbar, Fallujah was organized against the government from the start. When the Iraqi army began to move into the Anbar province, a Shura, or council was established, comprised of tribes and social groups from the demonstrations in Fallujah.[8] Its mission was to repel, at all costs, government forces. A city known for its unwillingness to surrender, it was not going to fall this time. Prime Minister Maliki had always been very quick to dismiss the Occupy Fallujah demands as mere support for al-Qaeda, even though a closer look at the demonstration showed their clear political undertone. Protesters were demanding an end to talks of federalism in Iraq, no discrimination of one part of the Iraqi population over another, and the resignation of Prime Minister Maliki.[9]

As the Maliki government’s troops attempted to enter Fallujah on several occasions in January 2014, the terrorist organization Islamic State in Iraq and Sham (ISIS) also saw an opportunity to assert its power within the region.[10] This came at a time when it was momentarily weak in Syria, and Iraq offered an opportunity to strengthen its influence where it had originated. While the Fallujah Shura originally tolerated ISIS, fearing a similar situation to that of 2004, where foreign agents of al-Qaeda escalated violence there, all outside observers of Maliki’s Anbar campaign exaggerated its influence over the city.[11] These same observers also did not understand ISIS’s clear departure from al-Qaeda strategy, rendering most media reports on Fallujah grossly inaccurate.[12] Al-Qaeda had never taken over Fallujah, and calls in Washington DC ranged between blindly supporting Maliki and a US-intervention in Iraq, could not have been less opportune. As Maliki strengthened his armed repression on Fallujah, claiming not to enter the city to spare the population, he began a relentless shelling of Fallujah in January 2014, from various strategic points surrounding it.[13] It was not long before the Shura made a deal with ISIS to defend its city against a perceived Shi’ite invader.

UNAMI never set foot on the demonstration sites and is now failing in its moral mission to monitor the Baghdad government’s actions against its own people. This, even after countless invitations were made on behalf of its leader Sheikh Hamoudi, who was executed by members of the government-friendly group Hamas al-Iraq two weeks before the December 2013 crack down.[14] Since January 2014, countless missiles, mortar rounds and Katiusha rockets have been launched against the civilian population of Fallujah, yet what is happening at present is far more disturbing than anything seen before.[15]

An Iraqi air force helicopter pilot, who in the 1980’s also launched chemical agents on the city of Halabja in Iraqi Kurdistan, explained in a conversation with the author: ‘The bombs are still in their developing phase, these two rounds on 23 April were experimental. We are trying to copy what Bashar did in Aleppo, and Fallujah is the perfect place for it.’[16] None of the bombs launched onto Fallujah detonated; in Garma, the bomb exploded and made a hole five meters wide and three meters deep. It took two more weeks to try to perfect the mechanism, and on 10 May, twenty more barrel bombs were launched onto Fallujah.[17] While many did not detonate, the Iraqi army will no doubt perfect its technology to be even more deadly next time.

Barrel bombs are not distinctly mentioned in any international arms convention, they are simply invisible.[18] UNAMI will not likely object to their use, as it is the complacence of its representative Nicolas Mladenov in relation to the Anbar campaign, that has seemingly emboldened Maliki enough to resort to using barrel bombs, among other weapons, with impunity against its own population. Overall, mainstream media has also been silent in relation to the issue, while at the same time condemning Bashar al Assad for the same deeds against his population in Syria.[19] For the moment, barrel bombs can only be seen in blogs around the internet, and on Fallujah-related social media, restricting international attention from this critical development.[20]

On 10 May, Fallujah’s infrastructure, alongside its power and water stations, was targeted in the government’s most ferocious reprisal yet. Civilian casualties which have resulted from these attacks between January 2014 and today amount to 40 dead and 60 wounded.[21] Adding insult to injury, 10 mosques have also been destroyed, all Sunni.[22]

The perceived Shi’ite war against the Sunni population of Fallujah may well have become a reality due to these extreme acts of violence. Under the circumstances, it could be questioned whether the use of barrel bombs and the indiscriminate use of force against the population of Fallujah constitutes a crime against humanity. According to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, a crime against humanity can be defined as the “[P]ersecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender as defined in paragraph 3, or other grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under international law.”[23] If, in fact, Sunnis in Fallujah are being specifically targeted by the government, then this could be interpreted as a crime against humanity.

If anyone, entity or government, assists in the political persecution of a group of people, would this not make them accessory to this crime? The UN’s support of Nuri al-Maliki, the US government’s impending renting of F16 airplanes to the Iraqi government, the international media’s hate speech against the people of Fallujah: in a perfect world, this could all be prosecuted.[xxiv] Yet while International Law and International Humanitarian Law are meant to be universal, they appear to neglect the people of Fallujah.

_________________

Dr. Victoria Fontan is a Professor of Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of Duhok, in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, and author of “Decolonizing Peace” (2012) and “Voices from Post-Saddam Iraq” (2008). She is now undertaking a PhD in the Department of War Studies, King’s College London. Her thesis title is: “The Resilience of Insurgencies in Fallujah.” You can find more information on Victoria Fontan’s research on her website: http://www.victoriacfontan.com

 

NOTES
[1] Telephone conversation with an Iraqi air force officer 27 April and 10 May 2014. The name is being withheld as they are not authorized to speak on the matter.
[2]World Bulletin, ‘Iraq Denies Using Barrel Bombs’. 13 May 2014 http://www.worldbulletin.net/news/136196/iraq-denies-using-barrel-bombs-in-fallujah
[3] See BBC News, ‘Syria conflict: Barrel-bombed Aleppo ‘living in fear” 28 April 2014 athttp://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-27180006 and http://brown-moses.blogspot.de/2013/12/syrias-barrel-bomb-technology-relative.html, accessed on 12 May 2014.
[4] See Group, I. C. (2014). Iraq: Fallujah’s Faustian Bargain. Middle East Report. Headquarters. Brussels, International Crisis Group. 150.
[5]Fontan, V. (2006). ‘Polarization between occupier and occupied in Post-Saddam Iraq: humiliation and the formation of political violence’, Terrorism and Political Violence, 18(2): 217-238.
[6]Fontan, V. (Forthcoming in 2014). Out beyond Occupy Fallujah and the Islamic State in Iraq and Sham, there is a field. Researching Terrorism, Peace and Conflict Studies: Interaction, Synthesis and Opposition. H. Toros and Y. Tellidis. London, Routledge.
[7]Group, I. C. (2014). Iraq: Fallujah’s Faustian Bargain. Middle East Report. Headquarters. Brussels, International Crisis Group. 150.
[8]Fontan, V. (Forthcoming in 2014). Out beyond Occupy Fallujah and the Islamic State in Iraq and Sham, there is a field. Researching Terrorism, Peace and Conflict Studies: Interaction, Synthesis and Opposition. H. Toros and Y. Tellidis. London, Routledge.
[9] See http://www.counterpunch.org/2013/07/24/occupy-fallujah/, retrieved on 12 May 2014.
[10] See http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/01/iraq-government-loses-control-fallujah-20141414625597514.html, accessed on 12 May 2014.
[11]Group, I. C. (2014). Iraq: Fallujah’s Faustian Bargain. Middle East Report. Headquarters. Brussels, International Crisis Group. 150.
[12]Caillet, R. (2013). The Islamic State: Leaving al-Qaeda Behind. Canergie Endowment for International Peace.
[13]Group, I. C. (2014). Iraq: Fallujah’s Faustian Bargain. Middle East Report. Headquarters. Brussels, International Crisis Group. 150.
[14] On 1 December 2013, militant group Hamas al-Iraq claimed responsibility for the murder of Sheikh Hamoudi online. On the assassination and Hamas al-Iraq’s relationship with the Maliki government, see http://paxinnuce.com/2013/12/09/sheikh-al-hamoudi-and-the-right-to-peace/, accessed on 12 May 2014; on the Occupy Fallujah invitation of UNAMI, see Fontan, V. (Forthcoming in 2014). Out beyond Occupy Fallujah and the Islamic State in Iraq and Sham, there is a field. Researching Terrorism, Peace and Conflict Studies: Interaction, Synthesis and Opposition. H. Toros and Y. Tellidis. London, Routledge.
[15] Telephone and Viber conversations with Fallujah residents, names withheld, between January 2014 and now.
[16] Ibid. On the Halabja chemical attack, see: http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/march/16/newsid_4304000/4304853.stm, accessed on 12 May 2014.
[17] See http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/05/iraq-army-using-barrel-bombs-fallujah-2014511134023608197.html, accessed on 12 May 2014, the article says ‘alleged’ use of Barrel Bombs since it has not been confirmed by any Human Rights organization, however Fallujah residents testimonies concur, as well as that of Mohammed F. Iraqi Air force pilot. The allegation has since been corroborated by eyewitness reports and the helicopter pilot.
[18] The Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the use of Certain Conventional Weapons does not mention Barrel bombs, yet it bans the use of incendiary weapons. Iraq, however, is not a signatory to this particular convention, hence cannot be held accountable for its use of barrel bombs as an incendiary weapon. See: http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/INTRO/500?OpenDocument, accessed on 12 May 2014.
[19] See http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/american-can-stop-the-barrel-bombs-in-syria/2014/05/07/f3a24554-d498-11e3-95d3-3bcd77cd4e11_story.html, or http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-27180006, both accessed on 12 May 2014.
[20] See http://www.r4biaplatform.com/content/news-story/iraq-army-used-barrel-bombs-fallujah-chieftain, or http://brown-moses.blogspot.de/2014/05/is-iraqi-air-force-using-improvised.html, accessed on 12May 2014.
[21] Telephone and Viber conversations with Fallujah residents, names withheld, between January 2014 and now.
[22] Ibid.
[23] See http://www.preventgenocide.org/law/icc/statute/part-a.htm, accessed on 12 May 2014.
[24] See http://complex.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2014/05/08/exclusive_iraq_in_a_major_shift_might_want_some_us_troops_back?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_term=%2AMorning%20Brief&utm_campaign=MB%200509, accessed on 12 May 2014.

FURTHER READING

Caillet, R. (2013). The Islamic State: Leaving al-Qaeda Behind. Canergie Endowment for International Peace.
Fontan, V. (2006). “Polarization between occupier and occupied in Post-Saddam Iraq: humiliation and the formation of political violence.” Terrorism and Political Violence 18(2): 217-238.
Fontan, V. (Forthcoming in 2014). Out beyond Occupy Fallujah and the Islamic State in Iraq and Sham, there is a field. Researching Terrorism, Peace and Conflict Studies: Interaction, Synthesis and Opposition. H. Toros and Y. Tellidis. London, Routledge.
Group, I. C. (2014). Iraq: Fallujah’s Faustian Bargain. Middle East Report. Headquarters. Brussels, International Crisis Group. 150.

Filed Under: Blog Article Tagged With: barrel bombs, Iraq, ISIL, Maliki, Occupy, Syria

The unforgiven: How do soldiers live with their guilt?

April 28, 2014 by Strife Staff

By Kevin Sites:

When soldiers kill in war, the secret shame and guilt they bring back home can destroy them

November 2004, against a shattered wall in south Fallujah in Iraq, with video rolling, I conduct a battlefield interview with US Marine Corporal William Wold. He has just shot six men dead inside a room adjoining a mosque and is juiced with a mix of adrenaline and relief.

He describes the 30-second sequence with a profane candor I have never seen matched in my decade of reporting on war around the world. ‘It was a fucking small room, dude. It was fucking small!’ He shakes his head. ‘Thirty-five fucking rounds. I was fucking scared dude. I fucking grabbed my nuts.’ Then, with one hand, he does so again, and lets out a big ‘Ohhh!

‘I was told to go the room,’ he says, ‘and my first Marine went in… he saw a guy with an AK, I told him to shoot the guy, then I shot the six guys on the left… and my other Marine shot two other guys.’

Wold grew up near Vancouver in Washington State. A high-school linebacker, he had a college football scholarship waiting for him, but gave it up to join the Marines. His first assignment out of boot camp was with a small unit assigned to protect President George W Bush.

Sites-1
Photo by Alex Pena of Stars and Stripes

Now, here in Fallujah, the site of what will become the most famous battle of the US war in Iraq, the 21-year-old is covered in sweat, dirt and grime, which does nothing to diminish his charisma and good looks. We talk through the sound of machine-gun fire, tanks and even an air strike, the explosions providing unnecessary emphasis to his remarks.

‘My fiancée’s worried that I’m not going to come back the same. I’ll never tell her what things I did here. I’ll never tell anybody. ’Cause I’m not proud of killing people. I’m just proud to serve my country. I hate being here but I love it at the same time.’

Wold’s fiancée was right. He wouldn’t come back the same. He thought his war was over, but a few months later, back in the safety of his childhood home surrounded by his adoring family, the dark secrets and all the guilt emerged from his mind – like the Greeks from their hollow wooden horse, unrelenting in their destruction of ancient Troy.

The story of the Trojan horse, delivered as a gift but transporting lethal agents instead, has long served as an allegory for the destructive power of secrets – like the unaddressed guilt hidden in the minds of soldiers, repeated with every homecoming for thousands of years. War’s simple premise, killing, is like that Trojan horse, devastating those sent to do it and, ultimately, the society they return to when the war is done. The insidious damage is only made worse because wartime killing, a philosophically problematic act, has been left out of the global dialogue. After all, how can humanity’s greatest civil crime, killing, become heroic in the context of war? There are practical considerations as well: will too much discussion of killing make soldiers hesitate or even rebel against protecting us from threats?

I recognized the dissonance after completing a project for Yahoo News in 2006 called In the Hot Zone, in which I covered every major war in the world in one year. In 368 consecutive days of travel, 71 airplanes, 30 countries and 21 wars, the indisputable truth I found was this: combat is almost always the shortest and smallest part of any conflict, while collateral damage or civil destruction is war’s most enduring legacy. But even more surprising to me was that former combatants often become casualties themselves. War veterans I met across the globe, from Somalia to Sri Lanka, feel that they killed a part of their own humanity every time they pulled the trigger, becoming collateral damage as well.

Karl Marlantes, a former US Marine lieutenant in Vietnam in the late 1960s, says he and his fellow soldiers lacked context for the killing they would have to do. ‘When I did eventually face death – the death of those I killed and those killed around me,’ he wrote in his book What It Is Like to Go to War (2011), ‘I had no framework or guidance to help me put combat’s terror, exhilaration, horror, guilt and pain into some larger framework that would’ve have helped me find meaning in them later.’

What we’re beginning to learn now is that, of all those things Marlantes mentioned, unaddressed guilt might be the most dangerous for returning veterans. A recent study by the US Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) shows that nearly two-dozen veterans are killing themselves every day, nearly one an hour. This attrition, connected at least in part to combat-related post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and other war-related psychological injuries, is an enormous price to pay for avoiding the subject. So great, in fact, that the total number of US active duty suicides in 2012 (349) was higher than the number of combat-related deaths (295).

 If soldiers felt nothing about taking the life of another human being, that would be indicative of sociopathy

 VA researchers recognised the epidemic, and over the past five years conducted a series of studies trying to drill down. Overwhelmingly, the work showed that veterans who killed others in war were at greater risk of psychiatric problems and psychic break. In a 2010 paper in the Journal of Traumatic Stress, VA researchers studied 2,797 US soldiers returning from Operation Iraqi Freedom. Some 40 per cent of them reported killing or being responsible for killing during their deployment. Even after controlling for combat exposure, killing was a significant predictor of PTSD, alcohol abuse, anger, relationship problems – and suicide risk.

Armed with these results, VA clinicians developed a disruptive new theory they’ve termed ‘moral injury’ – the notion that it’s not simply witnessing trauma that undoes combat veterans, but guilt; and in particular, guilt over two things: killing and not being killed. The implication is that we humans are fairly resilient in our ability to see horrible things and somehow continue functioning, but we’re not so good at living with what we consider our more shameful deeds. Even if killing seems justified by the demands and duties of war, it sends our moral compasses spinning.

According to the VA psychologists Shira Maguen of San Francisco and Brett Litz of Boston, both experts on military trauma, the key precondition for moral injury, our so-called Achilles’ heel, is a sense of ‘transgression’, a betrayal of what’s right. ‘In the context of war,’ they write, ‘moral injuries may stem from direct participation in acts of combat, such as killing or harming others, or indirect acts, such as witnessing death or dying, failing to prevent immoral acts of others, or giving or receiving orders that are perceived as gross moral violations. The act may have been carried out by an individual or a group, through a decision made individually or as a response to orders given by leaders.’ Indeed, commanders are not just responsible for the physical wellbeing of their soldiers, but through the moral consequences of their orders, their future mental health.

Some military leaders are disturbed by the findings, and say the term moral injury impugns the character of their soldiers. But researchers argue it’s quite the opposite: if soldiers felt nothing about taking the life of another human being, that would be indicative of sociopathy. Disturbance caused by killing indicates the presence of morality, not its lack.

Indeed, Maguen and Litz report, the combatant might see himself as ‘an evil, terrible person’ and ‘unforgivable’ because of acts done in war. Veterans might feel betrayed by the society that sent them to war or the superior officers who placed them in a situation where accidental killing of their own men or innocent civilians occurred.

Sites-2
Photo by Alex Pena of Stars and Stripes.

‘When a leader destroys the legitimacy of the army’s moral order by betraying “what’s right”,’ writes the psychiatrist Jonathan Shay, an expert in combat trauma, in his book Achilles in Vietnam (1994), ‘he inflicts manifold injuries on his men.’ Returning vets who have killed are far more likely to report a sense of alienation and purposelessness caused by a breakdown in standards and values. They withdraw from or sabotage relationships.  The sense of self-condemnation, those feelings of guilt, betrayal and shame, might remain hidden inside the warrior’s head until he returns home, and once the Trojan horse is safely inside the gates of Troy, the agents of destruction are unleashed.

This could be what happened to Corporal William Wold, who, not unlike Homer’s Achilles in the Iliad, was a brave and accomplished warrior made vulnerable by a fatal flaw. Wold’s mother Sandi said he was fine for a while when he first got home, but after a few months the darkness seeped out. He couldn’t eat and he never slept.

The transgression that bothered him most wasn’t the carnage in the mosque, but another, even more disturbing incident, an accidental killing at a vehicle checkpoint in Iraq. The vague description Sandi gave to a local television reporter is horrifying: ‘A vehicle came through that hadn’t been cleared,’ she said. ‘The lieutenant says: “Take them out.” He took them out. They went to the van – it was a bunch of little kids. And he had to take their bodies back to the family.’

 It was in the calm of these ‘safe’ surroundings that his guilt and shame overwhelmed him

 Instead of killing an armed enemy, Wold had, through the orders of an officer, killed several children. Accidental killing of civilians in the Iraq War, as in all wars, are much more common than you can imagine. Numbers are so high it wouldn’t benefit the military to keep accurate tabs; rigorous documentation would just fan the public relations nightmare and boost the propaganda value of the deaths for the other side.

Wold, like many combatants, was able to contain his guilt while still in Iraq. But when he returned home, he brought the Trojan horse with him. It was there, in the calm of these ‘safe’ surroundings, that his guilt and shame overwhelmed him. He became addicted to the pain medication prescribed for an injury he had suffered in a roadside bomb attack and augmented that with methadone that he scored on the street.

It was clear to his family that Wold was deeply troubled. They took him to psychiatrists, psychologists, tried everything, but nothing seemed to help, and he was unable to find any peace in civilian life. Though his mother begged him not to, Wold ultimately rejoined the Marines. ‘My brothers will take care of me,’ he said.

But when the Marines discovered his drug problem, they sent him to a treatment programme. When he failed to complete the programme, he was sent to a naval hospital near San Diego, to await his discharge.

One night a couple of friends came to visit Wold there. They went out together to see a movie and get tattoos. When they returned to his room, Wold couldn’t remember if he had taken his medication or not – so he took it again, in front of his friends. They watched TV for a while. The friends left when Wold fell asleep, but had plans to return in the morning to take him on a camping trip.

The next morning, the friends found Wold in bed, in the same position he had been when they had left him the night before. Only now he wasn’t breathing. They began CPR and called the medical staff to try and revive him.

He was pronounced dead at 9:35am. The date was 10 November 2006, just two years to the day I had talked with him against that shattered wall in Fallujah – and also, the date on which the US Marine Corps annually celebrates its founding in 1775.

The medical examiner’s autopsy stated that the cause of death was drug toxicity likely caused by the methadone Wold had added to his mix of prescription drugs; the brew probably led to respiratory failure, and death.

Sandi felt the Marines had failed her son. But she knew he had loved the camaraderie of the corps and had him buried in his dress blues. She also knew that the uniform was just the surface of a much more complex story, a story of belief, duty and honor yes, but also about how guilt over killing in the pursuit of those ideals could lead to ruin.

Both parts of the story were imprinted on Wold’s skin. On the inside of his right forearm was the tattoo that he had gotten the night before he died, an exuberant design of a woman and an eagle wrapped in a flowing American flag with a banner that read: ‘All American Bad Ass’. But a second tattoo, this one on the right side of his chest, had a more sombre message, an image of a pair of praying hands with the words, ‘Only God Can Judge’.

It is that sense of violating one’s own basic moral values, of transgressing against what is right, that separates moral injury from garden-variety PTSD. Today’s standard treatment for veterans suffering from combat-related PTSD involves prolonged cognitive and psychodynamic therapies where subjects either tell or write their stories over and over in an effort to bring context and reason to their experiences. This is done in a clinical setting, but it is also a nod to the value of the age-old practice of storytelling, especially within warrior societies, as a method for sharing both the burdens and the glories of war – like the Greeks with their epic poems, or Native American tribes of the plains speaking around their campfires, or Maori warriors tattooing their battle exploits on their bodies. Litz calls these evidence-based treatment therapies ‘so extraordinarily effective that it should be considered malpractice not to use them’.

But to treat moral injury, which can and often does co-exist with PTSD, the VA is testing a different approach: a six-session pilot treatment programme, currently run by Maguen, called Impact of Killing in War, or in the military world of forced acronyms – IOK. Silly acronym or not, the programme represents a seismic shift in the treatment of war trauma, embracing for the first time the concept that real healing might need to include moral and spiritual notions such as forgiveness and giving back.

The first step in IOK involves education; veterans literally learn about the complex psychology of killing in war and the inner conflict it provokes. Then, looking inward, they are trained to identify those feelings in themselves. The third step involves the practice of self-forgiveness. Finally, the veterans are asked to make amends through individual acts of contrition or giving back.

Keith Meador, a psychiatrist with a pastoral religious background, has been breaking down the barrier between mental health and spiritual care to help the veterans heal. His programme at the Durham VA Medical Center in North Carolina is tagged with yet another acronym –Mental Illness Research, Education and Clinical Centers, or MIRECC.  ‘The piece that is particularly relevant,’ Meador told me, ‘is that patients don’t present to us saying this is my mental health need or this is my spiritual need. They come to us saying, “I’m suffering”.’

 In the truest warrior tradition, he shared his story as an act of faith and an act of healing

 A few small studies and reports suggest that the new therapy helps. Indeed, if Corporal Wold is our allegorical Achilles, felled by an untreated moral injury, then Lance Corporal James Sperry is our Odysseus, who, after struggling for years, finally makes it home.

I met Sperry, like Wold, during the Battle of Fallujah in Iraq in 2004. I videotaped him after he had been wounded during the first day of fighting. Like Wold, Sperry came home with a head battered from war and filled with guilt. But Sperry’s guilt wasn’t over killing; it was over not being killed, survivor’s guilt. His unit suffered some of the highest casualty rates of the war.

He sent me an email six years after Fallujah, thanking me for helping carry his stretcher that day and asking if I had any photos of his comrades killed in action. ‘I was the Marine that you helped carry to safety after I was shot by a sniper,’ he wrote. ‘I was wondering if you had taken any photos of me during that time of injury and any of my fallen friends. I have lost 20 friends in this war and would like to get as many pictures as I can.’

That note came during a dark period of Sperry’s life when he was struggling with cognitive impairment and debilitating migraines from his physical injuries and a host of psychological issues consistent with moral injury. He met nearly all of its criteria, including purposelessness, alienation, drug and alcohol use, and even a near-suicide attempt (he went as far as to sling a rope over the rafters of his garage).

His recovery, which took years, was not the result of a single act, but encouragement from family and friends, ongoing determination and a groundbreaking programme from the Shepherd Center in Atlanta, which specialises in helping those with brain and spinal cord injuries. That rehab blended the best traditions of Eastern and Western medicine, using yoga, acupuncture, hypnosis, psychotherapy and exercise. Once the myriad of prescribed medications he’d been taking had been dialled back, the fog that had enshrouded him for so many years began to lift.

Sperry did one more thing. He broke the silence. He shared his story with me for my book The Things They Cannot Say, with all of its setbacks, dark moments and eventual successes. In perhaps the oldest and truest warrior tradition, he shared his story as an act of faith and an act of healing, to help him and others, both soldiers and society, better understand what comes home inside a warrior’s mind after war. His story caught the attention of President Barack Obama and the First Lady, and he’s been invited to the White House twice.

But that wasn’t enough. In the style of veterans undergoing IOK therapy, his struggles inspired a new sense of purpose, leading him to found The Fight Continues, an organisation dedicated to helping veterans make the transition home. It does this in part, by tapping into the idea of service. Sperry and other members were in Moore, Oklahoma assisting victims of the devastating tornado there last May.

Corporal Wold and Lance Corporal Sperry are just two of millions. According to US Department of Defense data, since 2001 about 2.5 million Americans went to war in Afghanistan and in Iraq, with more than 800,000 deploying more than once. Nearly 700,000 of those veterans have already been awarded disability status, with another 100,000 pending, according to the VA.

They all need support. As Jonathan Shay wrote in Achilles in Vietnam: ‘When you put a gun in some kid’s hands and send him off to war, you incur an infinite debt to him for what he has done to his soul.’

We might do that best by anticipating what is coming home with them. If we can become more thoughtful about the consequences of conflict, the agents of destruction might someday be crowded out by the agents of hope inside the hollow horses pulled through our gates.

 

__________________

Backpack journalist and author Kevin Sites traded a career as a network news producer and correspondent (ABC, NBC, CNN) to become the first Internet correspondent for Yahoo! News. In his groundbreaking Hot Zone project, he covered nearly every war in the world in one year earning the 2006 Daniel Pearl Award for Courage and Integrity in Journalism and in 2010 was chosen as a Nieman Journalism Fellow at Harvard University.  

He is the author of three books, all published by Harper Collins imprint, Harper Perennial. They include: In the Hot Zone: One Man, One Year, Twenty Wars (2007), The Things They Cannot Say: Stories Soldiers Won’t Tell You  About What They’ve Seen, Done or Failed to Do in War  (2013) and his  latest book, Swimming with Warlords: A Twelve Year Journey Across the Afghan War to be released in October 2014. He’s a contributor to many online and print publications including, Aeon, Vice and Men’s Health magazines.   

He’s also an Associate Professor of Practice at the Journalism and Media Studies Centre at the University of Hong Kong, teaching courses in international news and online journalism.

 

This article was originally published in Aeon Magazine on 9 April 2014.

Filed Under: Blog Article Tagged With: conflict, Fallujah, Iraq, Marines, psychology, PTSD, soldiers, war

Beyond the fog of Iraq’s power vacuum

March 7, 2014 by Strife Staff

By Charlotte Manson:

Maliki 2010

Recent reports pouring out of Iraq paint a rather bleak picture. With unprecedented levels of countrywide violence in 2013, almost 7,818 civilians and 1,050 members of the security forces were killed in violent attacks. Iraqis face daily upheaval as unpredictable disorder infringes on their daily freedom of movement and sense of security. The sporadic breakdown of order has raised questions on the unity of the state of Iraq as multiple forces are at work. Semi-autonomous Kurdistan in the north enjoys relative stability, whilst further south the insurgent stronghold of al-Anbar province continues to be a flashpoint. As a result, the legitimacy of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has been routinely jeopardised. Yet, since assuming power in April 2006, Maliki has enacted a series of measures to cement centralised control in Baghdad and more particularly to the Prime Minister’s Office. Far from a power vacuum, Prime Minister Maliki’s time in office sheds light on new political developments in Iraq.

Beyond the fog of an apparent power struggle in Iraq, it is Nouri al-Maliki who currently holds the tightest grip on power in Iraq. Maliki’s military and political muscle continue to work in tandem, as demonstrated by a number of politically motivated acts. In recent years, Maliki ordered a number of violent high-profile arrests of Iraqiya politicians including Finance Minister Rafie al-Issawi and prominent MP, Ahmed al-Alwani in Ramadi. Heavy-handed crackdowns of anti-government protests in Fallujah and Ramadi have furthered volatility in the fragile al-Anbar province. Maliki’s politically marginalising tactics are not strictly sectarian though, as opposition to the Prime Minister among Shia Iraqis is often potent. Competing Shia factions have repeatedly undermined Maliki’s leadership in Iraq including Muqtada al-Sadr’s Sadrist Movement and the Da’wa Party offshoot the Islamist Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI).

In exacerbating pre-existing resentment, the successor of Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS) is working to exploit Maliki’s illegitimacy in Anbar province. In light of the looming April 2014 national elections, various strategic tactics are being deployed. In demonstrating the political clout behind his ‘State of Law’ party line, the Prime Minister has attempted to quash ISIS and restore order in Fallujah. With neither security forces nor a ceasefire providing results, the Iraqi Ministry of Defence is currently offering $25,800 (£15,500) for the capture of militants belonging to the group. Such attempts to destabilize insurgent strongholds are consistently met with sporadic and frequent ISIS-led attacks. With the neighbouring calamity in Syria, ISIS has broadened both its political objective and tactics towards the goal of establishing a single, transnational Islamic state from Damascus to Baghdad. The scope of ISIS attacks has stretched ferociously from ‘security forces and Shia mosques to suicide-bombings of cafés and even funerals across the country’.[1]

Insurgent gains and the unpredictability of their attacks coupled with the distancing of both Kurdistan and provinces from Baghdad, have mounted pressure on Maliki to assert his authority. A mosaic of forces – both political and militant – are by no means novel to Iraq. The difference lies in the framework of nascent democracy established from 2005 onwards. Institutions remain weak and provincial representatives struggle against centralised power. On the contrary, the pronounced focus for Prime Minister Maliki since assuming power has been to cement military and political loyalty to his rule.

So what (if anything) has changed in Iraq?

 Viewing recent events in Iraq as a sectarian struggle between Sunni-Shia Iraqis, neglects the broader picture. Processes of de-Baathification will remain a contested issue in the future, as will future visions of how Iraq ought to be governed. But sectarianism in Iraq is merely a useful tool. Intra-state violence is not occurring between Iraqis due to sectarian tensions as witnessed in 2006 to 2007 but rather, the use of force is employed by ISIS (and other insurgents) or by the Prime Minister’s Office. ISIS seeks to exploit Iraq’s sectarian fault lines whilst Maliki asserts the legitimate rule of law and his ‘dealing’ with al-Qaeda. Moreover, Maliki has not succeeded in gaining confidence from a wide-ranging Shia demographic and instead, from those loyal to his authority.

As Toby Dodge explains, Maliki’s first move in assuming power from 2006 to 2008 involved building a small, cohesive group of functionaries, the Malikiyoun, from his own party Da’wa and a patronage network either through personal or family relations. This move, coupled with the creation of two extra-constitutional structures in the security sector, has centralised power to the Prime Minister’s Office. Charles Tripp asserts that Iraq’s ‘shadow state of patronage and corruption’ is – once again – endemic in the country’s political leadership. Not only has Maliki garnered a tight grip on the country’s intelligence services and centralised the role as Commander-in-Chief of the Iraqi armed forces, but loyalists to the Prime Minister are constantly working in the shadows to ensure his position is secure.  Similarly, Levitsky and Way (later, Dodge) posit that ‘competitive authoritarianism’ has emerged from Maliki’s leadership. This hybrid regime is neither a closed authoritarian regime nor a functioning democracy, but:

‘Such regimes are competitive, in that democratic institutions are not merely a façade: opposition parties use them to seriously contest for power; but they are authoritarian in that opposition forces are handicapped by a highly uneven – and sometimes dangerous – playing field. Competition is thus real but unfair’.[2]

Processes within Iraq’s competitive authoritarian system have also emerged from Iraqi society. Vocal criticism of Prime Minister Maliki from both politicians and the public is thoroughly visible despite the routinised heavy-handed response. High-profile political figures have sharply criticized the Prime Minister and his authoritarian governance. The former Vice President of Iraq, Tariq al-Hashemi, recently blamed Maliki for the country’s crisis; the leader of the Sadrist movement Muqtada al-Sadr also spoke of the failures of the Iraqi political process due to Maliki’s tyrannical behaviour. Moreover, the participation of Sunni Arabs in the Iraqi political process marks a shift albeit marred by internal fractions between political parties. Having boycotted the 2005 elections, Sunni Arabs have seized the opportunity to return to politics since competing in the 2010 elections. . Iraqiya – a secular, large umbrella bloc – led by then Prime Minister Iyad Allwai has since come under pressure from Maliki as the party represents a direct threat to his rule.

Peaceful protests do take place whilst politicians own the space for discussion. In 2011, anti-government protesters organised the ‘Day of Rage’ which spanned the country from Sulaimaniyah to Basra, demanding the improved provision  of basic services, an end to corruption and food scarcity. All too aware of the steps towards tyranny from decades of rule under Saddam, the inherent flaws of Maliki’s rule since 2006 are continuously exposed. The public yearn for stable democracy. 62% voter turnout in the 2010 national elections underlines this commitment.

Mobilization through the utility of social media and networking sites is a significant tool for activism, as events in 2011 illustrate. Ultimately Maliki’s biggest challenge lies in the social fabric of Iraqi society which, at large, no longer fears criticising their government.

Sectarianism in Iraq, as in many others parts of the world, will continue to exist as many ethnic, religious and tribal lines exist embody the demographic. Basic services of electricity, reliable and clean sources of water, employment, education and health are the most pertinent issues for Iraqis throughout the country. Resources in Iraq are under further strain by an estimated 300,000 forcibly displaced Iraqis from Anbar province, along with the increasing numbers of Syrian refugees pouring across the border into refugee camps. The national elections will be a test for the Maliki in delivering free, fair and peaceful elections. Confidence in Iraqi state-society requires investment in the recognition that beyond this fog of uncertainty, a new democratic Iraqi state exists in which political participation is an even playing field.

Charlotte Manson is an MA student in War Studies at King’s College London. She has previously worked on conflict resolution projects in Iraq, Bahrain and Northern Ireland.

________________

NOTES
[1] ‘Violence in Iraq: The Nightmare Returns’, (The Economist, 17 July 2013) available – http://www.economist.com/blogs/pomegranate/2013/07/violence-iraq
[2] Levitsky and Way ‘Competitive Authoritarianism: The Origins and Dynamics of Hybrid Regimes in the Post-Cold war Era’, (Cambridge University Press, 2010).

Filed Under: Blog Article Tagged With: al-Qaeda, Charlotte Manson, Elections, Iraq, Maliki

COIN, resilience, and a new approach to conflict: Interview with Victoria Fontan

February 18, 2014 by Strife Staff

By Joana Cook, Managing Editor, Strife:

V.Fontan
Professor Victoria Fontan

Victoria Fontan is a Professor of Peace and Conflict Studies at the UN University for Peace in Costa Rica and author of “Decolonizing Peace” (2012) and “Voices from Post-Saddam Iraq” (2008). She is now undertaking her third PhD in the Department of War Studies, King’s College London.

*

Joana Cook: Thank you for speaking with us today. You have had an expansive and extensive career and I wanted to talk about your focus on Iraq. Can you elaborate more on the reason that Iraq has become the focus for you and about your roles and experiences in Iraq?

Victoria Fontan: Iraq came to me by accident because I was finishing my research on Lebanon and I had just defended by PhD thesis and the Iraq War happened. I thought I would find in Iraq the same type of Shiite, as my first doctorate was on Hezbollah and I thought that in Iraq there would be exactly, or similarly organised political/spiritual networks, and that these would revive Shiite-based socialism in the area, and I arrived and I found everything but that. I stumbled onto Fallujah, because at the time I was there as a researcher for a journalist at The Independent, and while there, saw a U.S. raid on the city. That’s when I realised that was going to be my focus, and I’ve never stopped going to Fallujah.

What was interesting that day, is that there was an American soldier who had died the night before, and his colleagues were actually raiding the streets to find the culprits. Going house to house in Fallujah, they arrested a woman who was a schoolteacher because she had a Kalashnikov and she didn’t want them to come into her house, and I could see the theatre of war right in front of me. As the raids finished at the end of that street, an old man, a shop keeper, gave a bottle of water to the soldiers and said ‘you must be so thirsty after all of this’, as if we had just snapped out of this scene and now everybody was friends again. I thought ‘wow,this is a fascinating topic’ and I focused on the perception of humiliation in the escalation of violence, between soldiers and Iraqi’s, because everybody is a loser in war and I think that soldiers need to understand why they are facing these situations.

Can you elaborate more on this theme of humiliation, which was quite prominent in your earlier work as well and link it with your current research focusing more on counterinsurgency (COIN) and civilians?

The perception of humiliation on both sides actually leads to a complete falling out in communication.  It is a tactic used against the opponent. COIN comes in because, in 2003-2004, I thought that the only way to prevent humiliation, or the perception of humiliation, would be to win hearts and minds. At the time I had found the Mateus and Petraeus earlier reports from US Army Field Manual, 3-24 and I was fascinated. I thought this is it; this is the answer, and I really thought it was going to save lives. I carried on and was in Baghdad during the ethnic cleansing during 2005-2006, those two summers. I saw that it was a lot more complex than [humiliation, violence and tactics], but I couldn’t put my finger on [what] it [was]. At the same time I went into the UN and realised that, because I was evaluating the electoral cycle (for the first three elections), I realised that we actually created the situation of sectarianism, through our democratisation process, and so COIN and liberal peace together created this mess. ….From a COIN perspective, [I was] really disappointed, because I believed in it. When the Americans established the human terrain system in Afghanistan, and had anthropologists on the ground to actually [communicate better with] the population, I thought that was brilliant.

Tell us more about this new kind of connection between COIN and resilience you are currently researching. What do you see as the new material or angle that can be brought to the field from this perspective?

 I think the innovative angle is how organic thinking gives us a fuller picture. It’s almost as if regular COIN looks at the tip of the iceberg, and the rest really tries to look at things more holistically. Holistically doesn’t mean looking at everything, every interconnection like some of the works that have been done at the moment in COIN, but trying to look at us and our initiatives and societies and situations as systems, systems of resilience, and resilient cycles. If we look at it that way it gives us not only a fuller picture, but an understanding of when to intervene and when not to intervene…. If you intervene, let’s say when you are in a conservation phase, there’s no space for innovation, no space for new connections. So obviously you’re going to fail miserably, and in retrospect this is one of the main mistakes that occurred in Iraq as well.

We haven’t seen levels of violence in Iraq like we currently are since 2008, and perhaps using this approach that you’re now exploring, can you comment more specifically on some of the dynamics we currently see in Iraq and more broadly how we see that affecting Sunni-Shiite tensions?

It’s unprecedented this Sunni-Shiite conflict, in French we call it guerre fratricide, it’s basically brothers killing each other. I think that the situation never really changed, it’s just our outlook, because really since 2008 it looks worse to us because maybe the numbers of bodies are piling up. But if you’re looking at the repression in the prisons, if you’re looking at the state’s structural violence, it’s actually always been there and I think that the government has been feeding this escalation to such a level that we only see the tip of the iceberg, but really the entire society has been divided, since probably the establishment of those personal ID cards which reflected a person’s religion, by stating the person’s family lineage and neighbourhood.

This has had tremendous consequences for the establishment of The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS) because they started in 2007, al-Qaeda is actually absorbed by the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI )and then [as] the years [have gone] by, whatever we tried to do in COIN has failed.  It’s as if we’ve given the wrong antibiotic and now we’ve created a resistant bug. I think that the strength of ISIS is it goes across states, it is transnational; it is also going back to a paradigm that exists outside the state. Before al Qaeda would say ‘We just want to take over the government and become a Caliphate and that’s it’, but it’s not an aphorism, it’s completely unprecedented.

You did mention the transnational nature of it, and specifically we’ve seen ISIS coming up a lot more in Syria. Can you briefly comment on your perceptions of the situation in Syria right now and perhaps how these dynamics will continue to evolve?

I remember last summer Syria was more a recreation ground for ISIS in Iraq, and the people from ISIS I met were saying that they were going to spend two weeks in Syria and it was going to be bonding time between them as a group, to go and actually fight for real somewhere else. So I think that to a large extent this is how it started.  The operations in Iraq are different; you plant bombs, you’re not really in it, actually not really giving your person to the fight, to the struggle. Of course this created tensions on the ground because they were so motivated, that they actually succeeded and advanced rapidly, they took over so many towns, and then Jabhat al-nusra was like, ‘Wait a second, al Qaeda, this is our fight, you have to [leave]’. That’s when they said ‘no, no, we are here for the greater Syria and the entire region.’

I think that the funders such as Qatar and Saudi Arabia, are very clever…. I think it’s going to depend on the [regional] funders more than anything else and who they’re ready to back up; this will be at the core of it. Especially groups like Islamic Front who were former Jabhat al-nusra who became more and more structured…. every funder is trying to create its own brand of al-Qaeda, but ISIS somehow comes out right now as the most ideologically sound, and religiously sound as well. They make mistakes, for instance they beheaded the wrong [target], about a month and a half ago, and then they apologised on the internet …. That’s very smart. By doing that the population sees that they might have a future with them. Right now though it’s also a propaganda war, we don’t know how they are going to fare until we actually understand how the local population reacts to them.

Thank you very much for all of your insights. As a final point on resilience, would you like to leave our readers with a final thought to ponder on?

The most important aspect  [of resilience] is to understand that whenever an obstacle comes our way, we have to make it become part of our landscape and not consistently try to destroy it.  We have to find a use for it within our landscape, which comes from this competitive symbiosis that author Rafe Sagarin talks about. Once we think outside the box and look at the larger picture what we will see…. if the different actors that seek to exist outside the state understand they are much better off together than against each other it creates the potential for a completely different kind of future. I think that this is the key for understanding resilience, how we can work together, and we have to work together from an organic perspective.

_______________

You can find more information on Victoria Fontan’s research on her website: http://www.victoriacfontan.com.

Filed Under: Blog Article Tagged With: #COIN, Iraq, ISIS, reliance, Victoria Fontan

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