Iraq

ISIS and its conduct of war: interview with Professor Dr. Albert A. Stahel

February 12, 2016 by Annabelle Vuille

By: Annabelle Vuille

Professor Dr. Albert A. Stahel is the founder and head of the Swiss think tank Institut für Strategische Studien [Institute for Strategic Studies]. He has taught strategic studies at the Military Academy of the ETH Zürich and holds the title of honorary professor in the same field at the University of Zürich. His research findings have been featured in over 400 publications of Swiss and international scientific journals, as well as in specialised literature and book chapters.

Annabelle Vuille: What would you say is the primary factor making ISIS such a severe threat?

Prof. Dr. Albert Stahel: I would say that it is no single, but rather a triad of factors. Firstly, there is the Caliphate that has a profound impact on the Islamic world. Secondly, ISIS has been able to seize control of significant swaths of territory in Iraq and Syria. Finally, its reach goes far beyond the borders of the Middle East and has spread to various regions across the globe. It is this combination that makes ISIS such a real threat.

In a recent lecture at the University of Zurich, you mentioned that ISIS is a symbiosis between Saddam Hussein’s Ba’ath Party and Al-Qaeda in Iraq. How should we imagine the evolution of this connection?

The starting point was 2010. Following the death of its leaders, Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) was left without a functioning command structure. On the other side were the former officers of Saddam Hussein’s Ba’ath regime. Lacking a formal base they were looking for an organization that would not only grant them influence in Iraq but also enable them to wage real war. This opportunity presented itself in the prison cells of Abu Ghraib, where they learned a lot about AQI and could subsequently assume control. Leadership of this new Islamic State was to be given to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi – a possible member of the Prophet’s tribe and someone with a good reputation as being highly knowledgeable of Islam. On a side note, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi is not his real name but merely an alias.

Ba’athism is a secular ideology and yet, ISIS is officially led by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi who was appointed Caliph Ibrahim. One of your hypotheses is that ISIS exploits religion for the purpose of expanding its powerbase – Realpolitik + Religion. Could you explain how ISIS instrumentalises religion?

The foundation of Al Qaeda in Iraq was Islam in the form of Salafism and Wahhabism. This element remained even when the organization evolved into the Islamic State. Today, ISIS exploits religion to influence the people in their surrounding environment, and to attract believers not only in Iraq and Syria, but also in Europe. Whether or not such a strategy will prove successful will depend on the ability of ISIS to stabilise itself in the form of an internationally recognised state.

How does the aspect of religion influence ISIS’ conduct of war?

War is something that is not related to religion. Waging war is embedded in the tradition of humanity and has its roots in Greek philosophical thought. ISIS uses a combination of terrorism, guerrilla warfare, and conventional manoeuvre warfare. When confronted with a real army ISIS employs conventional warfare, but it can also turn to guerrilla warfare to target the logistics of its enemies. Additionally, terrorism is the means most used within cities against the Shia regime in Iraq, or against the people in Europe.

You touched on these three dimensions of warfare, which is a point also made by Jessica Lewis from the Institute for the Study of War (ISW). She argues that ISIS employs a form of hybridized warfare, which, as you mentioned, is comprised of terrorism, guerrilla warfare, and conventional manoeuvre warfare. Where do you see its greatest advantage?

The combination of these three dimensions is not a novel strategy but one that has frequently been used in history, for example in the Second World War. Success in war does not solely hinge on having a powerful conventional army. One also needs the ability to disrupt the logistics of the opposing force and, potentially, terrorise the enemy’s population and its regime. The recognition of this fact and the effective use of these three modes of war are that make ISIS such an agile opponent.

Let us delve a bit deeper into the aspect of guerrilla warfare. In April 2015, you published an article highlighting that Saddam Hussein had been inspired by the concept of guerrilla warfare coined by the Brazilian Carlos Marighella. How did it impact Saddam Hussein’s strategy in the 2003 Iraq War and has it transcended to the Islamic State?

In an interview given just before the U.S. invasion of Iraq, Saddam Hussein mentioned that he was fascinated by the writings of Carlos Marighella. One of Marighella’s main ideas is for the creation of small, militia-like forces that are capable of operating behind enemy lines. This is exactly what Saddam Hussein intended when he created the Fedayeen – the only forces that actively resisted the intervention of the Americans and their Coalition of the Willing. What is interesting is that the Fedayeen not only survived the occupation, but have now also become an integral part of the new armies under the Islamic State.

How would you assess the influence of Marighella in guiding the operations and tactics of ISIS? Is this what gives ISIS its operational strength?

According to Marighella, there are three phases of guerrilla warfare strategy: phase one is releasing urban guerrilla forces in large cities; phase two is releasing guerrilla forces in the hinterland; and phase three is fighting the opposing army with your own conventional forces. These three phases are, however, not mutually exclusive and can be applied simultaneously and in various combinations. In Syria, for example, ISIS is currently engaged in phases one and two, whereas in Iraq one can witness all three phases. It is not necessarily this phase-centric strategy that gives ISIS its operational strength, but rather the fact that its leaders are highly intelligent military minds. They know how to wage war, how to organize their forces, how to establish and run a government, how to finance their war efforts, and how to control their subjects. Most importantly, however, the leaders of ISIS are capable in clearly assessing the situation in each theatre of war and tailoring their strategies accordingly.

ISIS has expanded its bases from Iraq, Afghanistan and Syria to Yemen and, most recently Libya. With each sphere hosting unique terrain and opposing forces how do you judge ISIS’ strategies in these differing domains?

Firstly, the main bases of ISIS remain in Iraq and Syria. However, with its most important enemy the United States focusing on combatting the situation in these two domains, ISIS has recognised an opportunity to divert attention to its satellites in Afghanistan, Libya and Yemen. Therefore, this expansion is intended to ensure that the Americans are engaged on multiple fronts. Concerning its strategies, ISIS differentiated between its main and secondary theatres of war. Thus, Afghanistan and Libya terrorism is the most frequent means of combat, whereas in Iraq ISIS employs conventional manoeuvre warfare.

In your experience, how can such an agile opponent be weakened or even defeated? How would the US-led coalition have to adapt its approach and strategy?

Currently, ISIS controls approximately one third of Iraq and half of Syria. The only way that the US-led coalition could defeat or even weaken ISIS is therefore to seize and subsequently reoccupy these territories. This can, however, only be achieved through a huge conventional army and the problem is that the United States remains reluctant to put boots on the ground. In all of the decisions submitted to Congress, Barack Obama excludes the possibility of engaging ground troops and instead, looks towards mercenaries like the Kurds to get the job done. However, they are not the real army that is needed; ISIS can only be defeated with a conventional army – any other approach will prove ineffective.

Saudi Arabia recently announced that it is willing to send ground troops to Syria in the fight against ISIS. How effective do you think such a strategy would be in securing an operational advantage?

I think it would certainly be a good idea. However, it is important to note that by sending troops to Syria, Saudi Arabia is ultimately engaging in a realm that is not particularly friendly toward its regime. Thus, the effectiveness of such a strategy will depend on the support extended by the Americans, both politically and militarily. Whether or not Barack Obama will give his blessing is very difficult to assess. By backing Saudi Arabia, the United States would prove itself willing to take the risk of a direct confrontation not only with the regime of Bashar al-Assad, but also with Russia.

In one of your recent lectures you mentioned that ISIS might be a factor that the international community will have to accept and live with for another decade. Why is this so and what impact will it have on the Middle East?

That is correct. Essentially, one must recognise that ISIS has a government, a territory, and citizens. Thus, according to international law and the three-element-doctrine of George Jellinek, ISIS constitutes a state. If the international community and the United Nations accept this fact, it would not only nullify the famous Sykes-Picot Agreement but also ultimately lead to the disintegration of two artificial states: Iraq and Syria.

Is there any other relevant aspect or issue pertaining to ISIS and its conduct of war that we haven’t discussed today, and that you would like to mention?

I would say that we are currently at a crossroads. Either the situation will further deteriorate and ISIS will continue to exist or, if the coalition makes a definite decision to commit ground troops, then we could see ISIS defeated. The man who will ultimately decide on the future fate of ISIS sits in Washington DC.

Professor Dr. Albert Stahel was interviewed by Annabelle Vuille, a series editor at Strife and MA candidate in the Department of War Studies, in Zurich in February 2015. This is an edited version of the transcript.

IDPs in Iraq and the progress of the Islamic State: An interview with Hebatalla Taha (IISS)

October 14, 2015 by Strife Staff

By: Jack Curran-Persell

The UN estimates there are now over 3 million Internally Displaced Persons in Iraq with that figure only set to rise further. http://www.geo.tv/article-167331-Displaced-top-2-million-as-winter-hits-northern-Iraq

Hebatalla Taha is a Research Analyst for the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in London where she focuses on the Middle-East and North Africa.

Jack Curran-Persell: Earlier this month, you wrote a very interesting article for IISS on the situation for IDPs in Iraq. With the UN estimating over 3 million Iraqis have been displaced, could you explain what the current situation is like for these people?

Hebatalla Taha: Conditions for IDPs in Iraq have been dire. In the article, I focused on how ISIS in particular limits the movement of civilians in areas under its control, but there are actually various armed groups and actors across Iraq that make any movement across the country quite difficult. This is especially the case for IDPs in Anbar province, who represent 40% of displaced people in Iraq. Many head to Baghdad, which has one of the highest IDP populations alongside Anbar, but some are unable to enter and remain trapped in Anbar province. In Anbar there is humanitarian presence due to the high security risks, which restricts assistance to IDPs there. Other IDPs from provinces such as Diyala or Salah al-Din tend to go to Kurdish areas and Kirkuk.

According to the International Organisation for Migration, 70% of IDPs are living in private settings, such as homes that they are renting, with families, or hotels; 19% are in ad-hoc buildings, and another 8% in camps.

Funding for Iraqi IDPs is also becoming an issue. The UN’s 2015 appeal for Iraq is still 90% underfunded, and because of this, it has had to shut down, or scale back, various programmes assisting IDPs. Such conditions are related to the decision by many displaced people to flee the country altogether, whether to Europe or elsewhere, seeing no prospects for improvement.

What is the attitude of the Baghdad government, ISIS, and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) to those fleeing conflict in Iraq?

Regarding the attitudes towards IDPs, the government is worried about ISIS-linked infiltrators within refugee groups–especially in Baghdad which tends to have the highest number of monthly fatalities due to frequent bombings, many of which claimed by ISIS. Therefore the Baghdad government has implemented heavy restrictions and background checks, and the process often requires a long wait and sponsors. The Bzeibiz bridge between Anbar and Baghdad is mostly closed, according to UNOCHA, and only people who require medical treatment are actually allowed to cross into Baghdad.

The KRG is similar in that it is worried about ISIS operatives launching attacks in its territories, but it also cites economic reasons. The KRG says it is cash-strapped and doesn’t have the resources to deal with the influx of refugees. The situation is exacerbated by the KRG’s own rivalry with the Baghdad government; it feels that Baghdad is not sharing the burden. The political dynamics between the KRG and Baghdad are also affecting ‘contested’ areas such as Kirkuk, where the Kurds fear ‘Arabisation’ by IDPs and both sides are suspicious of one another’s actions in Kirkuk.

ISIS has tried to prevent people from leaving the territory under its control, placing explosives around cities, confiscating identity cards, and executing people who are caught trying to flee. Its bureaucracy has allowed people to leave in the past but under particular conditions, such as leaving their families hostage, giving up their homes, or paying large sums of money. ISIS is using the plight of the displaced people as a recruitment tactic. It uses images of Sunni IDPs struggling to enter Baghdad in its audio-visual material with the message, lamenting their inability to enter various provinces, including their own capital. It tries to depict itself as the only actor defending Sunnis and therefore they should to their homes in areas under ISIS control, or even volunteer to join the group.”

So Sunni people fleeing undermines ISIS’s image of a cohesive Islamic state-building project?

Very much so. And you can see this in recent propaganda videos directed at refugees leaving Iraq. A recent video urged refugees to join the ‘caliphate’, rather than fleeing to what it regards as a xenophobic Europe. Indeed, the fact that many people are fleeing ISIS contradicts the image of itself as a coherent state which it has been trying to project. Having people to govern over is essential for ISIS’s vision.

You mention at the end of your article that fleeing has become increasingly difficult because of a crackdown on internal resistance groups. How effective have groups such as the Mosul Brigade been and what types of resistance have they been putting up?

Information on resistance groups in Mosul is difficult to obtain and verify; this is the case with most of the information coming out of Mosul in general. That is why is it’s difficult to assess the impact or magnitude of such an internal resistance, or to speculate as to whether it is an organised resistance movement, Some claim they are coordinating with the Iraqi security forces and the coalition, but others appear to be individuals reacting to the violence perpetrated by ISIS or settling scores with ISIS fighters.

My guess would be that it is a combination of both. One of the main indicators that there is significant internal resistance in Mosul is that ISIS has actually instigated these heavy crackdowns in Mosul, executing hundreds of people (some sources have cited figures as high as 2,000). The make-up of those who have been executed is also telling: most are linked to the Iraqi security forces, who are thought to have been behind many of the attacks against ISIS fighters.

It has been exactly a year since the first UK airstrikes against ISIS in Iraq. How effective have these US-led air strikes in Iraq and Syria been?

The airstrikes on their own do not have a decisive effect, but combined with ground operations, they have assisted Kurdish groups in regaining significant swathes of territory in northern Iraq and restricting expansion by ISIS. In the operation against Tikrit in March 2015, for example, which was led by the Hashed al-Shabi militia, the belated airstrikes by the US-led coalition were in fact key in expelling ISIS from the city. The airstrikes have not been as effective in Syria, aside from assisting Kurdish groups in the north, such as the well-known battle for Kobani. This is linked to the more complicated dynamics of the Syrian crisis: there is a lot more happening than just ISIS.

What do you make of the recent Russian military commitment to Syria in order to support Assad supposedly against ISIS?

It is a disturbing development especially since the conflict contains many actors beyond Bashar al-Assad and ISIS, and, as you were suggesting, the first airstrikes didn’t target ISIS, but rather, rebel groups.

Tragically, I think this will most likely only enable the war to drag on longer, with severe humanitarian effects—ones that we already witnessing and that will not simply go away.

Away from Iraq and Syria, how much progress are ISIS making in areas such as Libya or Yemen?

In Yemen, ISIS-linked groups that have slowly emerged throughout the past year appear to be making progress in the chaos of the current war. A recent report from a journalist based in Aden noted that ISIS seem to be more organised than Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and has been successful in directing some of Al-Qaeda’s recruits and infiltrating its support bases. This is important because it suggests that the situation is changing. Earlier, ISIS-linked groups (which usually call themselves ‘Wilayet Sanaa’ or ‘Wilayet Aden’ or others based on the province) did not seem to be as organised as AQAP and were unable to challenge it. Most of the attacks by ISIS-linked groups in Yemen have been against the Houthi or Shia mosques in Sanaa, although there have been other smaller-scale incidents elsewhere, such as in the south.

In Libya, ISIS-linked groups are one of many groups vying for control, including various jihadi organisations and Islamist groups. ISIS-linked operatives have taken advantage of the chaotic war to establish a presence there and create a ‘jihadi front’ in North Africa—to which many foreign fighters have fled. It is important to emphasise that although the group has expanded due to foreign fighters, it has failed to gain many recruits from within Libya. So overall, within Libya’s military and political context, ISIS remains quite marginal.

In Egypt, the situation is different because there is a functioning state and a functioning army, but the ISIS-linked group, Wilayet Sinai in North Sinai has posed a serious threat, and its capacity has continued to grow, despite escalating crackdowns by the army.

While many of these groups have adopted tactics used by ISIS, such as beheadings, they don’t merely reflect an expansion by ISIS into these territories. Both sides effectively benefit from this partnership. ISIS can give the impression that it is unstoppable, undefeatable, and is everywhere. Its local affiliates – predominantly opportunistic groups – gain notoriety by leveraging ISIS’s name, which helps them win over recruits and possibly get funding or weapons. This is also discernible in who the ISIS-linked groups view as the main adversary in each of the different contexts, i.e. the army in North Sinai in Egypt, the Houthis in Yemen, and the Libya Dawn coalition in Libya.

In your opinion, how does a state like Libya which is effectively a failed state benefit groups like ISIS?

Armed groups such as ISIS thrive in that atmosphere of a political and security vacuum, and their emergence is fundamentally linked to the state of war. This state of war provides obvious logistical advantages, such as the ability to smuggle foreign fighters into the country, and the lack of a functioning security apparatus enables them to organise, expand, etc., but they also benefit from the political reasons that lead to the descent into a failed state. ISIS-affiliated groups, as I mentioned, are not created by ISIS, but are informed by the political crises governing each of the countries.

Thank you.

Jack Curran-Persell is currently completing an MA in Conflict, Security, and Development within the War Studies Department at King’s College London.

Photo essay from the frontline against IS: playing the waiting game with the Kurdish Peshmerga

September 28, 2015 by Strife Staff

By Christiaan Triebert:

A fighter from Koya in his base – a house recaptured from Islamic State – at one of the most southern positions of the Peshmerga. Photo: Christiaan Triebert.

Christiaan Triebert recently returned from the frontline between the Kurdish Peshmerga and Islamic State militants in northern Iraq. This is his account of his time with the Peshmerga.

***

“Get the brothers ready for tonight’s position.”

“Yes I will, inshallah.”

“Inshallah.”

A group of Peshmerga soldiers stand around a walkie-talkie. They listen to the Arabic of Islamic State (IS) fighters who are just a stone’s throw away. Another Peshmerga fighter scans the horizon with his binoculars. “There,” he points. Two cars drive off, leaving a cloud of dust behind them.

The question is whether the information is useful to the Kurds. The village where the IS fighters take their positions overnight is about 1.5km away. Close enough to clearly see it from the six-meter-high vantage point, but too far away to hit accurately. It would be a waste of ammunition. A cloth is draped around the barrels of a ZU-23-2 anti-aircraft gun for that reason. “We’ll take it off as soon as they move toward us.”

I stand here at the frontline in northern Iraq, between the Kurdish Peshmerga forces and Islamic State, east of the oil-rich city of Kirkuk. Oil is money, and there’s always someone who is willing to buy it, which makes this bit of land a target for IS.

In the nearby villages of Tel al-Ward and Mullah Abdullah IS flags flew six months ago. Now they have been replaced by the Alaya Rengin, the ‘Colourful Flag’ of Iraqi Kurdistan. The coalition’s air strikes have given the Peshmerga fighters the chance to recapture this territory from IS. Now they have created a new, more resilient defence line. A metre-high wall of sand separates the Peshmerga controlled area from that of IS. Every few metres a lookout has been built upon the defence line. On some of them sit sizeable guns.

An outpost overlooking 'no man’s land'. The boy holding the flagpost is fighting together with his father at this part of the frontline. — An outpost overlooking ‘no man’s land’. The boy holding the flagpost is fighting together with his father at this part of the frontline. Photo: Christiaan Triebert.

Peshmerga fighters listen to their commander. The house where they sit was captured from Islamic State and is now used as a Peshmerga base. Photo: Christiaan Triebert.

The area between the old and the new defence lines is marked by previous battles. Major General (liwa) Wurya grabs the base plate and bipod of an improvised mortar system. According to him, chloride-loaded mortars were fired from the installation. He then points to a huge hole. Twisted steel lies in and around it. “An Islamic State suicide vehicle exploded there, luckily enough we managed to hit it just in time before it exploded at our lookout.”

These suicide trucks, so-called VBIEDS (Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Device), are nightmares for the Kurds: heavily armoured vehicles loaded with explosives that drive straight into the Kurdish positions and are detonated by the driver in exchange for a one-way ticket to paradise.

“Have you ever seen the movie Mad Max,” asks retired liwa Abozid Salih. I nod. “Such vehicles are also made by IS. But worse. One foggy morning, we saw an armoured harvester armed with heavy artillery looming towards us. Bullets and rocket launchers were fired — nothing helped. That day, we lost a lot of men.”

It is not surprising that many fighters emphasise how happy they are with the German supply of MILAN anti-tank-missiles, which have proved to be effective against these moving monsters.

Yet many Peshmerga soldiers complain about the poor condition of their weapons and their lack of ammunition. Most of their weapons were seized from Saddam’s forces during the wars in 1991 and 2003. There are also several tanks and other hardware, but none of it can compare to the modern American-made weapons IS militants have looted from Iraqi bases.

In addition to the anti-tank-missiles, Germany has provided around 6,000 assault rifles: 3,000 G3s (“old junk”) and another 3,000 G36s (the standard weapon of the Bundeswehr), as well as thousands of machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs).

But still there are not enough weapons on the front. One soldier asks where the other weapons are. To which another responds, “In the hands of the KDP”. Others nod in agreement. Kurdish police officers had earlier said that Massoud Barzani, the current president of the Kurdish Autonomous Region (KAR), had a monopoly on arms distribution.

Former liwa Saleh holds 44-mm rocket for the RB M57, a Yugoslavian rocket-propelled grenade launcher (RPG). — Former liwa Saleh holds a 44-mm rocket for the RB M57, a Yugoslavian rocket-propelled grenade launcher (RPG). Photo: Christiaan Triebert.

A fighter in position with his Russian made PK machine gun at the frontline south of Kirkuk. Photo: Christiaan Triebert.

Despite the fact that the Iraqi Kurds are united in their fight against IS, the Peshmerga has always been plagued by internal division. The forces are still divided along political lines. Although they led the Kurdish resistance against Saddam together, armed conflict has broken out sporadically between the different Kurdish political groups, most notable in the bloody Kurdish civil war from 1994 to 1997.

On one side is the group that swears allegiance to the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) of the incumbent President Massoud Barzani and his family. On the other side are the groups that are loyal to the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), led by Jalal Talabani and his family. The two political parties together form the ruling coalition of the KAR.

The divide is noticeable on the frontlines. ISIS graffiti is often repainted with ‘PUK’ rather than ‘Peshmerga’. The KDP Peshmerga is mainly in the north while the PUK Peshmerga is stationed in the south. When Islamic State militants pushed an offensive on Kirkuk in June 2014, both factions sent too many troops to the region, leaving other strategic positions unmanned. At the moment, the Kirkuk front is predominantly staffed by PUK Peshmerga.

An older generation of PUK Peshmerga fighters. Photo: Christiaan Triebert.

Writing on a building just behind the frontline. Photo: Christiaan Triebert.

The main danger for the men at the Kirkuk front comes from IS mortars. Snipers are less of a threat: the walls of sand are tall enough and the distance is just too far.

Apart from the occasional mortar attacks, the front is quiet. Perhaps too quiet. In early August, Kurdish commanders said that many jihadists seemed to have been transferred from here to the IS stronghold at Mosul. But every so often there is a larger attack; recently 600 IS fighters attacked Peshmerga positions.

“I do not understand,” Wurya says. ‘Of those six hundred we killed, at least a hundred were foreigners. Why do Westerners, sometimes even with a university background, blow themselves up here? What is their right to fight here?”

This is the reason why Wurya and Saleh believe that Western countries should continue to support the Peshmerga and their fight against Islamic State. “After all, many of your compatriots are fighting here.”

There is debate as to what role radicalisation plays among the Kurdish youth. Certainly the motivation to fight is greater in the older generation than among the young. While defending their homeland is a source of pride – as demonstrated by the many British and American Kurds have come back to fight here – many youngsters talk openly about their desire to go to Europe.

They are tired of the front, or even find it boring. The boys keep themselves busy by playing FarmVille, cards, or watching ‘funny videos’. That gets boring after a while. They also denounce corrupt politicians and the little wages they receive for their efforts at the front. This explains the remarkably large number of taxis just behind the front. A lot of guys try to earn extra dinars as taxi drivers when they’re not at the front.

A Peshmerga fighter is using his phone for relaxation. Several fighters said there was not much to do: — A Peshmerga fighter using his phone for relaxation. Several fighters said there was not much to do: “Waiting, waiting, waiting.” Photo: Christiaan Triebert.

Peshmerga fighter Chewan, 22, bought his ‘US Army’ outfit in the local bazar in Koya. Most fighters have to pay for their own outfits. Photo: Christiaan Triebert.

Liwa Wury says he does not understand why so many Westerners are fighting for Islamic State. For that reason, Wurya believes, the West should continue its support for the Peshmerga. “After all, many of your compatriots are fighting here.” Photo: Christiaan Triebert.

“The problem of the youth is that they have learned to fight out of a book,” Wurya says. “We, by contrast, have gained experience by fighting in the mountains.” Holding a cup of tea, he laughs with his old comrades about the things they did during previous wars, reminiscing about the time one of them was the first on top of a bunker of Saddam’s troops.

Together they fought many armed conflicts, especially against the Iraqi authorities in the sixties, seventies and eighties. After the Gulf War, they fought against the KDP between 1995 and 1998 in the Kurdish civil war. In 2003, they stood side by side with the American elite units.

Yet there has been little training since Saddam was ousted from power, especially for a fight like the current one. “The Islamic State is by far the hardest enemy we’ve ever had,” Salih says. “And that battle is far from over.”

As night falls, the Kirkuk front becomes even quieter. But the silence is deceptive. There is unrest within the political landscape of the KRG, and frustrated youths would rather go to Europe than be stationed there. Whatever the case, Salih will continue his fight. He is certain that “something big will happen soon”.

A few days later, the Peshmerga launched a massive offensive involving over a thousand men. The attack was successful: IS was pushed back over 10km and several villages were recaptured. Air support from the coalition was vital to the success of the attack.

Salih knows how important that support is. He refers to the greater powers of the region and the world, all of whom have a stake in his fight. But it does not bother him. He is proud. “Despite the external support, this struggle is, to me, a Kurdish struggle. And with or without support — I will defend my country till my last breath.”

Retired liwa Saleh laughs with his old comrades about the things they did in previous wars, including fighting the forces of Saddam Hussein. — Retired liwa Saleh laughs with his old comrades about the things they did in previous wars, which included fighting the forces of Saddam Hussein. Photo: Christiaan Triebert.

For six months, it has been relatively quiet at this front. Some soldiers go fishing, just behind the frontline, to kill time. Photo: Christiaan Triebert.

Christiaan Triebert (1991) is a postgraduate student in Conflict, Security and Development at the Department of War Studies, King’s College London. He completed his undergraduate studies in International Relations and International Organisation as well as Political Philosophy at the University of Groningen in the Netherlands. He has visited several conflict-torn regions, most recently Northern Iraq. You can find more of his work on his website www.christiaantriebert.com or follow him on Twitter @trbrtc

NOTES

Thanks to Thomas van Linge for recognizing the ZU-23-2 anti-aircraft guns mounted on MT-LB’s.

UK Defence Analysis: Reduced capabilities amid growing threats

August 7, 2015 by Strife Staff

By Dan Zamansky & Hugh Pickering-Carter:

An RAF Typhoon FGR4 refuels from a Voyager tanker aircraft. Photo: MoD, Cpl Neil Bryden RAF.

This article summarises the changes in British military capabilities compared with their state in 1985, whilst also discussing their relevance to the current security context; focusing upon the threat of terrorism, Iran’s nuclear weapons programme and Russia’s military involvement in the Ukraine. The article makes two main arguments: first, British military capabilities have declined, in some cases very seriously; second, the world is in practice more dangerous now than it was in 1985, with the threat now confronting Britain much greater than it was thirty years ago. It is suggested that an urgent improvement in military capabilities is therefore required.

The 2015 Military Balance identified various capabilities as being in high demand: “strategic transport aircraft and fast-jet fleets, as well as intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) platforms”[1]. Given that these components of air power have been the first resort of the Government in numerous military operations, they are likely to remain a vital element of British force projection in the future. The relevant figures for these categories are summarised in the table below:

	1985	2015
Transports	20 (converted airliners)	19 (10 converted airliners and 9 dedicated heavy-lift)[2]
Fast Jets	485	203 [3]
ISR Aircraft	30 (6 dedicated and 24 pod-equipped)	30 (12 dedicated ISR aircraft, 8 pod-equipped and 10 Reaper UAVs) [4]

Clearly, the RAF’s strategic transport fleet has increased compared with 1985, largely due to the adoption of heavy transport aircraft, especially the C-17. Nevertheless, airframe numbers remain constant, even as the need to transport forces long-distance has increased dramatically, both for ongoing operations in the Middle East and the deployment of British troops to Eastern Europe with NATO’s High Readiness Joint Task Force.

Furthermore, fast jets have fallen by more than half. This comes at a time when RAF aircraft are continually involved in operations abroad, unlike 1985. In ISR assets, which have been the focus of procurement since the beginning of the war on terrorism in 2001, the RAF is somewhat better served. Nevertheless, there remains a significant capability gap, since the three electronic intelligence Nimrods are being replaced only gradually, with just one Rivet Joint aircraft available at present. The pressure on this particular capability is demonstrated by the fact that the second airframe will be deployed operationally immediately following delivery. The overall picture for air capability is that of a limited improvement in the fields of transport and ISR, which has not kept pace with increased commitments, and a very sharp decline in strike capability.

2015: An uncertain strategic environment

The deficiencies in capabilities are particularly significant in the context of a highly uncertain strategic environment, much changed from 1985. In that year, the Armed Forces had some 9,000 men deployed in Northern Ireland, supported by 6,500 men of the Ulster Defence Regiment.[5] This was the only deployment which involved an ongoing risk of casualties from hostile action, taking place at a time when the bulk of Britain’s forward-deployed military force was concentrated in Germany as part of NATO’s Cold War organisation.

The fall of the Berlin Wall witnessed the force number deployed in Germany reduce from 70,000 to just 12,300.[6] The 38-year Operation ‘Banner’ in Northern Ireland finally came to an end in July 2007, another way in which the old certainties are dissipating. The current operational deployments are much smaller, but take place in much more uncertain circumstances; 300 personnel remain in Afghanistan, where British forces have suffered 453 fatalities since 2001[7]. The casualty rates of the Afghan security services and civilian population rose to record levels in the year of 2014, signalling increased danger to British advisory forces.

The other active combat deployment, the Operation ‘Shader’ air campaign over Iraq, brings a different element of risk. The murder of Jordanian pilot Lt Moaz al-Kasasbeh by Islamic State (IS) shows that any loss of aircraft over terrorist-controlled territory could have serious political consequences, through its effect upon public perceptions and consequent demands for military retaliation.

Recently, the intensity of numerous conflicts has increased, which makes for a substantially more dangerous world. Since 2008, the number of conflict fatalities has increased from 56,000 to 180,000 annually[8]. War has also come geographically closer to Britain, with some 5,000 fatalities in the Eastern Ukraine conflict by the end of 2014[9]. The Ukrainian war poses a particular danger of a rapid increase in its scale and intensity, since the casualties in that conflict were increasing until the recent cease-fire, which is being repeatedly violated by Russian forces.[10] Increasing levels of Russian military posturing, as demonstrated by recent long-range air patrol activity, similarly indicates hostilities may spread to new areas such as the Baltic States, further increasing the danger posed to Britain.

The terrorist threat

Moreover, terrorism as an enduring phenomenon has also risen on the security agenda since the 9/11 attacks and has become a major threat to the West. The UK has since experienced similar attacks in the form of the 7/7 London bombings (2005) and the recent shooting in Sousse, Tunisia. The growing threat of IS has brought with it numerous challenges for security officials, including the coordination of a timely and effective response to an attack; the identification of an appropriate level of proportionality in any given response; and the issue of fighting an enemy that does not respect borders. The International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS) states ‘The actual and potential threat to international security posed by ISIS triggered a degree of military engagement and political alignment by regional and international states that had not been seen for some time’.[11] Nevertheless, this has not yet led to decisive success in tackling terrorism.

Decision-makers remain divided on the subject of how best to respond to IS. There have been extended debates regarding the use of air power as a means of disrupting terrorist activity in Iraq, with numerous MPs calling for further RAF air strike capabilities in Syria, in the hope of further reducing the IS threat. Support for the greater use of British air power has noticeably increased, while ‘the defence secretary [Michael Fallon] has long believed it is not logical to limit air strikes to Iraq when the terrorists do not respect, or even recognise, borders’. These additional air strike capabilities could be committed by September 2015 and would incorporate the use of both conventional aircraft, as well as Reaper and Predator drones.

The effectiveness of these potential strikes, however, is open to question, unless their employment is fully supported by intelligence on the ground and a firm commitment of resources by policy-makers. But the UK’s full engagement in Syria with conventional ground forces is the subject of an ongoing debate. RUSI’s Professor Michael Clarke has stated that ‘sooner or later someone has got to take IS on [in Syria] at the centre of their power’. Others may soon come round to his view, since IS continues to control a substantial area of territory in spite of an extended air strike campaign.

Iran’s nuclear programme

Another current issue in the Middle East is Iran’s nuclear programme. The Iranian government was caught violating the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 2002. The consequent 13 years of diplomatic stalemate was followed by the signing of an agreement this July. This deal has been called a ‘historic mistake’ by Benjamin Netanyahu, since, according to the Israeli president, it will allow Iran to produce nuclear weapons in 10-15 years, even if it abides by the terms of the accord.

It is noteworthy that Iran has made major policy changes in the past only under extreme pressure. At the end of the Iran-Iraq War in 1988, Ayatollah Khomeini declared the cease-fire “worse than drinking poison”. In 2003, the suspension of Iran’s nuclear programme was connected to regime fears of the US invasion of neighbouring Iraq. The latest statements made by Iran are very different, with Hassan Rouhani saying that the American commitment to keeping ‘all options are on the table’ has “broken legs”. Iran’s actions throughout the region suggest that it is unlikely to restrain its activities, since it is currently supporting both the Sunni terrorists of Hamas and the Shia terrorists of Hezbollah. Iran has also supplied weapons to the Houthi rebels in Yemen since at least 2009; contributing to the civil war there. It is likely that the confrontation between Iran and other Middle Eastern countries will intensify, as Iran’s budget grows following the lifting of sanctions.

Force readiness and willingness to use force

The UK’s force readiness remains in doubt, in terms of both conventional capabilities and newly emerging cyber technology. Admiral Sir Nigel Essenhigh stated that if UK spending does not increase, ‘the Government will be neglecting its prime and overriding duty … by failing to halt the progressive decline of British military capability into penny packet numbers.’ Concern has also arisen relating to the UK’s willingness to use force against both state and non-state actors. Britain has taken a leading role in the deployment of the High Readiness Joint Task Force to Eastern Europe, in response to Russia’s aggression in the Ukraine. Nonetheless, concerns have been fuelled by the fact that, on a Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) basis, Russia’s defence spending is now 5.4% of the world total, while the UK’s is just 2.4%.[12] Since 2011, Russian defence spending has grown from 2.7 to 3.4% of national GDP[13]. Russia may also be an example of the broadening threat of offensive cyber and psychological operations, which has been highlighted by the recent defection of Edward Snowden.[14]

Conversely, the British willingness to use air strikes in Syria has repeatedly come up against political opposition, which cited a deficit of hard intelligence and possible retaliatory domestic terrorist attacks. The SNP foreign affairs spokesperson, Alex Salmond, claimed that extending strikes to Syria would be ‘very hard to justify’, with a number of other MPs expressing similar sentiments. On the other hand, it is clear that the threat of IS will endure for a prolonged period given that ‘UK officials think some 600 Britons have fought in Syria, with 300 having returned.’

In summary, an image emerges of uncertain British capability in a time of increasing threat. Lord Dannatt has provided an important reminder that political commitment is vital for the success of military operations. Since such commitment, both in terms of capability and the desire to deploy available forces, has been weak or absent in several recent cases, the UK’s security position has deteriorated. In consequence, an urgent rethink of defence policy is required to meet a growing level of threat. The hour is late and the absence of policy change is likely to have extremely serious consequences as threats continue to appear.

Dan Zamansky & Hugh Pickering-Carter are KCL undergraduates in the Department of War Studies with an interest in current and foreign affairs.

NOTES

[1] IISS Military Balance 2015, p.68

[2] IISS Military Balance, 1985 and 2015.

[3] IISS Military Balance, 1985 and 2015.

[4] IISS Military Balance, 1985 and 2015.

[5] IISS Military Balance 1985, p. 41

[6] Ibid, p.43; IISS Military Balance 2015, p.152

[7] IISS Military Balance 2015, p.152

[8] IISS Armed Conflict Survey 2015, p. 78

[9] Ibid, p. 76

[10] Ibid, p. 326;

[11] IISS Military Balance 2015, p. 7

[12] IISS Military Balance 2015, p.22

[13] Ibid, p.164

[14] Ibid, p. 17

Review: 'Sudden Justice: America's Secret Drone Wars' by Chris Woods

June 15, 2015 by Strife Staff

By Harris Kuemmerle:

Chris Woods, Sudden Justice: America’s Secret Drone Wars. London, UK: Hurst Publishers., 2015. Pages: 400. £20.00 (hardback). ISBN: 9781849044028.

The recent growth over the past decade in the scope and complexity of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in warfare is remarkable not only for the immense pace by which the technology and procedural practices have matured, but also for the open secrecy under which that process has been shrouded. While their existence is common knowledge, true transparency as to the use of drones remains limited. As a result, getting a firm understanding of the historical evolution and contemporary role of drone warfare is a challenging prospect. But that is exactly what Chris Woods sets out to do in his book, Sudden Justice, which attempts to present an accessible and engaging narrative outlining the history and use of drones in warfare, while also coming to terms with some of the most pertinent moral and ethical questions that the use of drone warfare poses for the 21st century.

The book begins with a description of the genesis of the drone technology. It’s a history that is inexorably linked to a pair of individuals called the “Blue brothers”, and one which poetically echoes the history of the birth of aviation a century earlier. The Blue brothers were Colorado siblings whose ambition and a fateful flight across Latin America set them on a path which would see them – in partnership with the “Moses of modern drones”, pioneering Israeli engineer Abe Karem – essentially start up the entire drone industry in their garage. In the process they saved the fledgling drone industry from the same perceptions of inadequacy by established interests that once haunted the fledgling civilian and military aviation industry in the 1910s and 1920s. It’s undeniably a great story and an excellent, almost light-hearted, place to begin the historical narrative.

However, it does not take long for the history of drones to turn darker with the move into the post-9/11 “War on Terror” and the drones’ transition into the new role of both spy and assassin. The book charts the initial failures of the drone programme at the onset of the Afghan war, to the eventual rise of the targeted killing programmes in Yemen, Afghanistan, and Pakistan during both the Bush and Obama administrations.

It is here that the book comes into its element; presenting a chilling tale of secrecy, bureaucratic infighting, ruthless pragmatism, and just what happens when humans are given the power to kill almost anyone on demand with only a few minutes notice. Indeed, the author seems almost in awe of the power and technical accomplishments of the drone programme; detailing their capabilities and clinical efficiency, yet also in equal measure presenting that path towards the modern state of drone warfare as a cautionary tale.

The chapter on the valuation of human life and the psychological impact on drone operators drive home the human consequences of drone warfare; with the description of the cold ‘boxes’ in which operators pilot their craft especially unsettling. Concrete rooms, lit bright by screen light, in which pilot and operator fight a cripplingly boring covert war against an unknown enemy on behalf of often equally unknown ‘customers’ who they communicate with via dedicated online chat rooms. In that space it becomes easy to see how the human life on the monitor can be reduced to a few words; words such as ‘target’, ‘rifled’, ‘kinetic’, ‘kill’.

To that end, it’s in its description of the behind-the-scenes workings of the programme where Sudden Justice presents its most interesting questions. Is assassination legal or justified? Are civilian casualties ever justified? What role should private military corporations be allowed to play? Are drones even legal? These are the critical questions that underlie many of the issues that Chris Woods tackles, and he generally succeeds in presenting these issues clearly and providing a fair judgement. However, the book does not really set out to give a final answer to any of these questions, which is both a limitation and a quality. Sudden Justice simply presents the issue as fairly and as completely as possible, leaving it up to the reader to decide. It’s a refreshingly honest and factual take on a muddled topic. Though one which may leave readers wanting more finality.

Furthermore, while Creech Air Force Base (from where the majority of the drones are piloted) is discussed in great detail, the author chose not to personally visit the site. The author felt visiting the site would not be necessary or in the interest of the work. However, I would argue that the decision not to go may have missed out on key first-hand insight into elements of the day-to-day processes of running the drone programme, which could have expanded upon our understanding. Although the decision not to go is not in itself a serious limitation, it is definitely a missed opportunity.

A more serious limitation is that while it is clear that Afghanistan, Yemen, and Pakistan during the War on Terror served as the proving grounds for the concept of drone warfare as we know it today, their use has greatly expanded since 2003. By focusing on that area and time almost exclusively, Sudden Justice limits its applicability to a wider contemporary debate. For example, the author does not discuss in any great detail the implications for the further expansion of drone use outside of the US and UK to countries such as Russia, China, and Pakistan. Indeed, the limited scope of the book leaves some critical questions untouched: what are the implications for global security for other countries bringing online drone programmes? Will these countries use the legal framework developed by the US and UK during the War on Terror?

Likewise, the consequences of drone warfare in the context of inter-state global security more generally is not directly dealt with. While these issues are not within the aims of the work, their exclusion leaves the book somewhat unable to move beyond drones in the War on Terror and into the area of drones in contemporary global security. Though its discussions of the history, application, and legal and ethical aspects of drone warfare during the War on Terror remain excellent and widely applicable.

Sudden Justice is an excellent book which tells the story of the historical evolution of drone warfare, with only a few notable limitations. Sudden Justice is a must-read book for anyone interested in drone warfare. It effectively straddles the gap of being both clear and entertaining, while also offering insights for both experts in the field and the average reader.

Harris Kuemmerle is a PhD Researcher in War Studies at KCL. He received a BSc in International Relations from Plymouth University and a MSc from SOAS, University of London in Asian Politics. His professional experience includes working in journalism and US congressional elections. His areas of interest include; water politics, the impacts of water on state and human security, environmental security, health and security, US foreign and domestic politics, European politics, UK politics, UK foreign affairs, South Asia, and the domestic and foreign affairs of India and China. A native of the US, he has been based in the UK since 2008. Harris is a guest editor at Strife.

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