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Strife Series on Counter-Terrorism in Modern Warfare (Part I) – The Importance of Labels: A Social Psychology Approach to Counterterrorism Policies

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by Lucía Ruiz Vila

Fighters of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) during their retreat from Turkey into Northern Iraq (Image credit: Firat News Agency/AP)

 

Terrorism is constituted through discourse. Understanding that process of construction can provide important insights for policy and practice. This piece will first address how a group’s identity determines the way in which the narrative on terrorism is constructed and how that identity impacts the possible policies in response. The second part is a case study of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê, PKK), in which two actors, in this case: Turkey and the EU, both label this group as ‘terrorist’ but differ in their counterterrorism policies towards it. This divergence is to do with their respective construction and understanding of terrorism, which are radically opposed. Ultimately, this group identity can be considered as the premise for constructing terrorism through language. By analysing the process behind labelling a group as terrorists, the type of counterterrorism policies available to each actor can be better understood.

Social Psychology, Discourse, and Terrorism  

This essay will particularly explore how social behaviour is determined by discourse. Social psychology is concerned with how individual behaviour is affected by social behaviour. Within the field, social psychologists link language with terrorism by arguing that the latter is a ‘naming-making practice,’ which implies that instead of focusing on the terrorists’ motivations, they look at people’s perceptions of those. Therefore, terrorism is a ‘socially constructed’ term, as what the terrorists think of themselves becomes less relevant than what ‘we make of the terrorists.’

It is important to remark that not everyone has equal power to construct this discourse. Bathia refers to the ‘politics of naming’ to explain how influential actors are the ones who impose their perception of reality on others. This imposition on the way in which we refer to reality will develop into the construction of ‘common knowledge,’ that is shared understandings of the reality which ultimately fence in the possibilities for policymakers to step out of that narrative.

Group Identity  

Discourse on terrorism is constituted by referencing, developing, or reassuring the identity of the group that is affected by terrorism. This essay suggests three guiding questions that reveal how this process is made:

  • Who is the ‘Other’?
  • Can we engage in a conversation with the Other’s claims?
  • Does an attack by the ‘Other’ threaten our identity?

Answering the first question allows an understanding of how a group builds its own identity by attributing undesirable characteristics to the opposite ‘Other.’ In the case of a terrorist attack against a specific group, their identity might be reinforced through negation, arguing that no one from the in-group could engage in such violent action. This notion of members of the inner group denying the possibility of ever being like the ‘Other’ resonates with Foucault’s explanation of group belonging and language. The French philosopher argued that groups distance themselves from others who they deem inferior by labelling them as ‘mad.’ Once this perception is built, and sanity is on the side of the group, the use of language will reinforce that perception.

If the ‘Other’ has been constructed as immoral, it is harder for individuals to engage with them in a conversation to try to understand their reasons, as they fear falling into a trap of ‘humanising‘ what is by nature ‘evil.’ In this case, this is even more difficult if the reasons behind a terrorist attack are blurred by media and politicians. For instance, in the United States after 11 September 2001, media and politicians referred to terrorism by reinforcing its irrationality and extremism, which portrayed them as an illogical actor with whom there could be no dialogue. If there is a sense of fear among the population, the practice of othering will become more acute, and the conditions for belonging to the in-group will be more restrained. This is how, to answer the third question, a group will determine if the terrorist attack impacts the core of their identity. This was also the case with the previous example of the post-9/11 USA, as American media spread a sense of fear through a victimising discourse accusing “the other” of threatening their values as a nation.

Limitations on Policies 

The limits on the possible policies in reaction to terrorism will mainly answer two questions:

  • Is this threat inevitably recurring? Or is it an extraordinary event?
  • Are we willing to do whatever it takes to respond to the threat?

If by answering the first question, the group identifies the threat as extraordinary, this will give rise to the ‘politics of exception’ which will allow for the government to have unchecked power in order to answer to the terrorist threat. Media can add to this narrative by fuelling a sense of urgency and fear that encourages governments to take measures that may be considered non-democratic to tackle the issue. Another reason why constructing the nature of the threat is important is because it will determine which departments of government will respond. For instance, because the US portrayed al-Qaeda as a military target, its response inevitably involved the Army and the Department of State; if it had been constructed as a criminal act, it would have been confronted by the police.

Furthermore, this differentiation will determine what type of limitations, if any, that group will set for its policies on terrorism. If the threat is seen as extraordinary, there will be a risk of forsaking civil liberties in exchange for the state to guarantee security. This state of exceptionality can also lead to an erosion of public morality, which will make terrorists seem undeserving of human rights. Nevertheless, perceiving the treat as exceptional does not mean that the group will be willing to set no restrictions on their possible policies in response. This was the case of Spain who decided not to extradite to the US an al-Qaeda cell found after 9/11, as they feared that the terrorists would be sentenced to the death penalty, which under the EU legislation would have been illegal.

Adaptability is also a very important part of the policy limitations on terrorism, as what is framed as extraordinary in a first instance, might become normalised over time. This was the case when the UK labelled migration as a security issue. This label became part of its counterterrorism narrative after 9/11. At present, the government understands migration as a matter of security because it may give rise to social tensions, but not because it is related to terrorism. This shift of perception promoted new democratic channels to tackle the issue instead of justifying political decisions on an overly extended threat or state of exceptionally. In conclusion, by understanding how group identity impacts the construction of terrorism through discourse, important insight can be gained on the types and limitations of counterterrorism policies available to different actors.

Case Study: The Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) as a terrorist group

The case of the PKK in Turkey is a prime example that shows how terrorism is constructed through language and discourse. It demonstrates how two actors, Turkey and the EU, who labelled the PKK as a terrorist group have radically opposed policies, due to their in-group identity, and how they construct the nature of the terrorist group. The Kurds have historically been suppressed by the Turkish state, unable to exercise their right to autonomous government or cultural expression of any kind. In the 1970s, the PKK was founded to defend the Kurds within Turkey, and in 1984 they began engaging in violent action against the government to reclaim their rights as an ethnic group.

The Turkish authorities referred to those Turks who were part of the PKK as ‘children’ who needed to come to their senses and leave their terrorist lifestyle behind. Öcalan, the leader of the PKK, was often referred to by the media as a ‘baby-killer’ whose followers were ‘uncivilized.’ The Turkish government for many years tried to capture the Kurdish leader, who thanks to the Greek authorities’ support, managed to escape Turkey. It was finally in 1999 when the Turkish state captured him. Offended by Greece’s attitude towards Öcalan, the Turkish president demanded that the EU added Greece to the list of countries that supported terrorism.

Leaving aside already existing tensions between Turkey and Greece, the reason why the latter was not seen as being complicit in terrorism was that the West did not perceive the PKK as a terrorist organization per se. At that time, Western media referred to the PKK as an ‘outlawed group’, a ‘rebel group’, or one conducting ‘guerrilla war’. Even the EU itself referred to the Kurds’ cause as a minority struggle and questioned the terrorist narrative around them. Unconcerned about Western opinion, the Turkish judiciary sentenced Öcalan to the death penalty, which caused demonstrations throughout Europe in support of the Kurdish cause. The European Union was clear in its response: if Turkey were to execute Öcalan, the country will never be considered to join the European Union.

Conclusion

Building on the case study, there are two clear processes of othering. On the one hand, the Turkish state identifies the Other as the Kurds, who are subsequently labelled as terrorists. According to Turkish anti-terror legislation, terrorism is an act that threatens the territorial unity of the state, and even non-violent propaganda against said unity is considered terrorism. As it has been mentioned, the Kurds were referred to as infantile and uncivilised, which made them an illogical actor with whom there could be no dialogue, and which ultimately threatened Turkish identity.

On the other hand, at the time Öcalan was captured, the EU did not have a terrorist list until after the 9/11 attacks and did not consider the PKK as terrorists. The decision not to give the terrorist label to the PKK was very significant for the EU’s identity, as they chose to ‘other’ the Turkish government instead of the Kurds. Turkey had long been a point of debate in determining the limits of Europe as a political unit, as the EU characterised itself as a ‘rational’ actor unlike those beyond its borders, as Isin argues. Ultimately, it was the death sentence of Öcalan which set the limits of Europe’s identity.

Interestingly, in 2002, there was a turning point for the PKK terrorist debate. Turkey overturned Öcalan’s death penalty sentence and changed it to life imprisonment, while the EU added the PKK to its terrorism list. The EU’s decision was highly controversial since the PKK had not engaged in violent action since 1999 and also because the procedure for adding the PKK to the list had not been transparent. It was later condemned by the European Court of First Instance. To this day, Turkey is unlikely to join the European Union, and the PKK remains in the EU list of terrorist organisations.

Although both the EU and Turkey now recognise the PKK as the Other and labels them as terrorists, their approaches to the issue and their policies vary. The EU is concerned with preventing terrorism in the first place, which makes them interested in learning about the root causes of terrorism. Following this rationale, they invited in February of 2020 representatives of the PKK to join a European Parliament Session. Yet, because for Turkey there is no possible dialogue with terrorism, Turkish media was outraged by the meeting.

Lucía Ruiz Vila graduated with honours in International Relations from the University of Deusto in Spain and afterwards studied a year abroad in the University of Richmond in the United States. Following this, Lucía completed a MA in Conflict, Security and Development at King’s College London where she researched transitional justice, counterinsurgency campaigns, DDR and SSR, peacekeeping missions, and women’s role in security. You can connect with her via LinkedIn. 

The Maoist Way of Guerilla Warfare and the Broader Challenge Presented by China

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by Tom Harper

Long Live Chairman Mao! Long, Long Live! (Image credit: Chineseposter.net)

In the eyes of the modern world, Maoism is a relic of a more ideologically divided world and of a China that no longer exists.  Nevertheless, the ideas and strategies of Mao continue to have a direct and indirect influence upon a diverse array of actors, ranging from the insurgent movements of the post-colonial world to post-Cold War Chinese foreign policy strategies. Here, followers of the strategies devised by Mao and his German-educated strategist, Zhu De, are inspired by their combination of Marxist ideology and the maxims from Sun Tzu’s The Art of War.  They applied these strategies to a China described by Mao as ‘half colonial, half feudal’[1], far removed from Marx’s original prognosis.

Prior to Mao’s leadership, China’s communist movement followed a strategy more in keeping with those of the Russian Bolsheviks, with cadres going to the Soviet Union for study.  The most prominent of these were known as the ‘Twenty-Eight Bolsheviks’, who were guided by advisors from the Soviet Comintern.  As a result of several strategic blunders in their rebellion against the nationalist KMT under Chiang Kai shek, which concluded in the Long March to Yan’an, Mao and Zhu were in a position to apply these strategies.

Mao and Zhu’s strategies were characterised by three main phases.  The first phase involved sending party cadres to the rural, isolated areas of China, which were often ignored by the KMT, which drew its support from the smaller urban class.  Unlike the Bolsheviks’ focus on the industrial proletariat, Mao saw the Chinese peasantry, which made up around eighty per cent of China’s population, as the driving force of communism in China.  To do so, these cadres sought to mobilise popular support through measures such as land reforms. These proved to be succesfull with a Chinese peasantry that had long been exploited by the feudal land-owning classes[2]. Over time, the communists were increasingly viewed as more capable administrators than the KMT, with the Chinese peasantry seeing the latter as corrupt and inefficient[3].

Through these measures, the Chinese communists had effectively created a parallel government in China’s agrarian provinces, in a manner similar to the earlier Taiping Heavenly Kingdom of Hong Xiuquan[4].  This made the KMT increasingly irrelevant to the lives of the Chinese peasantry which undermined Chiang Kai-shek’s rule.

The military aspects of Mao and Zhu’s strategies came in the second and third phases of these strategies.  The former involved utilising guerrilla tactics against stronger opponents, such as the KMT and the Japanese, to build support, and to acquire resources while the latter came in defeating the KMT through conventional warfare.  In doing so, the CPC was able to preserve their forces while the KMT bore the brunt of the Japanese invasion.  As a result, the CPC was better placed for the continuation of the Chinese Civil War after Japan’s surrender. In returning to Sun Tzu, Mao and Zhu used the maxim that ‘supreme excellence consists of breaking the enemy’s resistance without fighting’ to defeat a conventionally stronger opponent.  It was this maxim that had wider consequences as the new communist government sought to export its vision to the post-colonial world.

To China’s communist rulers, the largely agrarian post-colonial nations resembled pre-revolutionary China, which made it ripe for their efforts to replicate their earlier successes[5].  This came through assistance to the numerous anti-colonial movements battling the European colonial powers that had been damaged by the Second World War.  China’s bid to become the vanguard of communism in the developing world clashed with those of the Soviet Union, which also sought to promote its own vision of communism.  This became more pronounced with the Sino-Soviet Split of 1963 and there were often clashes between rival communist movements supported by Beijing and Moscow, such as the Angolan Civil War, where the Maoist UNITA battled the Soviet-backed MPLA.

It was the conflicts of the post-colonial world that drew attention to Maoist strategies from those who sought to combat it.  The earliest example of this was the French officer, David Galula, who witnessed the first phase of these strategies as a prisoner of the Chinese communists. After his release, Galula attempted to deploy these strategies against the anti-colonial movements throughout France’s overseas territories in a bid to deprive these movements of their local support.

While France failed to retain its colonies, Galula’s Maoist-inspired strategies caught the attention of American counter-insurgency planners who found themselves in the midst of the Vietnam War.  Like the Chinese communists before them, the National Liberation Front built support by mobilising the Vietnamese peasantry dissatisfied with the corrupt rule of the American-backed South Vietnamese government.  This influence was particularly notable in the Strategic Hamlets programme which replicated Galula’s earlier efforts in Algeria.

The Vietnam War was a case of where Maoist strategies influenced both insurgent movements and those who sought to combat them.  Ultimately, the Vietnamese communists were able to prevail over their stronger American foe by destroying its will to fight, as demonstrated by the fallout from the Tet Offensive in 1968.  Nevertheless, it was this pattern that would continue even after the Cold War.

With the end of the Cold War, Maoist strategies continued to maintain a degree of influence, the most visible of this being the groups within the developing world that still identified themselves with Mao’s ideas.  The most successful implementation of this was the overthrow of Nepal’s feudal monarchy by the Nepalese Communist Party in a manner eerily reminiscent of China’s own revolution, which once again came through the mobilisation of the Nepalese peasantry.

Maoist strategies also found a new audience in the midst of the War on Terror.  Just as these strategies had influenced Galula’s theories on counter-insurgency, American strategists, such as David Petraeus, invoked Mao and Zhu’s theories to justify the study of the non-military dimensions of warfare with the irregular conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq.  This continued the influence of these strategies on both insurgent movements and their opponents.

The most unexpected manifestation of Maoist strategies has been in Chinese foreign policy itself.  During the Cold War observers, such as John Cooley, warned that China’s strategies in Africa were aimed at expelling the United States from the continent.  In so doing, these attempts would turn Africa into a ‘major revolutionary outpost’ in a Sino-centric world where the US was largely irrelevant[6].  Cooley’s warnings are eerily reminiscent of later fears of Chinese influence in Africa and echoed the first phase of Mao’s strategies applied on a greater scale.

Ironically, this would come to pass, not through Chinese moves, but rather through the disinterest in Africa in the post-Cold War era[7].  As a result, China exploited this development to capture hearts and minds in the developing world, which had often been ignored by the major powers.  As a result, China has become an integral feature of the economic landscape of these nations, which has made it more relevant to the governance of these nations.  It is this template which China has deployed to the wider world.

In addition, China has also built a parallel international order, through institutions such as the BRI, SCO and AIIB.  These institutions shadow more established American led bodies, such as the IMF and NATO, which has seen the emergence of two competing forms of global governance just as China had been fought over by two rival governments.  From this, one can infer that Chinese strategies do not seek to overthrow American hegemony, as it has often been accused of doing, but rather seeks to render it irrelevant to global governance[8].

Whether it be the low-intensity guerrilla conflicts throughout the developing world or the globe-spanning machinations of Great Powers, Mao and Zhu’s strategies retain a significant influence.  This has become especially notable with China’s wider challenge, since it follows a strategic culture that is very different to those of the Great Powers that came before it.  Therefore, an understanding of this is an imperative in crafting a more effective response to Chinese strategies.

[1] Mao Zedong, On Guerrilla Warfare (New York: Dover Publications Inc, 2005), p. 68

[2] Erik Durschmied, Beware the Dragon: China: 1,000 Years of Bloodshed ( London: Andre Deutsch, 2008) p. 223

[3] Rana Mitter, The War Years, 1937-1949 in The Oxford Illustrated History of Modern China (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016) p. 175

[4] Jonathan D. Spence God’s Chinese Son: The Taiping Heavenly Kingdom of Hong Xiuquan (London: WW Norton and Company, 1996) p. 173

[5] Julia Lovell Maoism: A Global History (London, Bodley Head, 2019) p. 138

[6] Lovell, 2019, p. 186

[7] Joshua Eisenmann, Eisenman, Joshua (2012) China-Africa Trade Patterns: Causes and Consequences, Journal of Contemporary China, 21:77, p.45

[8] Tom Harper, China’s Eurasia: The Belt and the Road Initiative and the Creation of a New Eurasian Power, Chinese Journal of Global Governance, 5.2, October 2019, p. 103

Tom Harper is a doctoral researcher in politics and international relations from the University of Surrey. His research interest is Chinese foreign policy in the developing world and has been published in the Cambridge Journal of Eurasian Studies as well as in the Conversation, the Asia Times and the Independent and has been interviewed by the China Daily and the Gazeta Do Povo. His articles have been translated into Arabic, French, Japanese, and Spanish. He can also speak Mandarin Chinese and Japanese

Insurgency Scenario in Arunachal Pradesh

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By Athul Menath

 

Arunachal Pradesh, located in north east of India (Credit Image: The Tribune India)

The North Eastern states of India – often referred to as ‘the Seven Sister’ states – have been affected by insurgency in varying proportions since the 1950’s. Although the root causes of insurgencies can be traced back to India’s chaotic partition and colonial history, these violent movements arguably have been sustained due to failures of the Indian state, including a lack of transparent governance and employment opportunities, as well as the support  provided to militants by hostile neighbours .

Geography is also a big factor. Arunachal Pradesh borders Myanmar in the east, China in the north, Bhutan in the west, as well as the two insurgency affected states of Nagaland and Assam. Despite the absence of sustained high level violence or indigenous insurgency, this state has been adversely affected by armed conflicts in adjacent areas and has become the life line of militant movement in the region. According to Assam Director General of Police (DGP), Assam was facing militant threat from groups’ based out of Arunachal and Nagaland.

On February 1, Indian Security Forces (SFs) killed two militants of the independent faction of the United Liberation Front (ULFA-I) and People’s Liberation Army (PLA) at Shankapani in Changlang District of Arunachal Pradesh. Only a week earlier, on January 24, 2018, an Indian Army trooper of the 11 Grenadiers regiment was killed in a joint ambush by Coordination Committee (CorCom) of Manipur and ULFA-I, at Namsai District along the Assam-Arunachal Pradesh border.  This was the first SF fatality in more than a year. The last in state SF fatality was recorded in December 3, 2016 when two SFs were killed and eight wounded in Nginu village in Tirap District in a joint operation by Khaplang faction of National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN-K), ULFA-I and Kanglei Yawol Kanna Lup (KYKL).

The highest militancy-related fatality in Arunachal was recorded in 2001 with 63 fatalities, however between 2007-17 only three years recorded more than ten insurgency related fatalities.

        Year Civilians Security Forces Terrorists Total
2000 7 3 24 34
2001 40 12 11 63
2002 7 4 21 32
2003 7 1 31 39
2004 6 2 35 43
2005 3 1 15 19
2006 0 0 4 4
2007 2 3 16 21
2008 0 0 2 2
2009 0 0 9 9
2010 0 0 0 0
2011 0 0 41 41
2012 0 0 4 4
2013 0 0 4 4
2014 3 0 6 9
2015 2 4 4 10
2016 0 2 7 9
2017 0 0 6 6
2018 0 1 2 3
Total 77 33 242 352

*    Militancy fatalities between 2000-18 (Source : SATP)

Significance and Spillover Threat

Arunachal Pradesh – which spreads over 83,743 square kilometres with a population of about 1.3 million – is a logistical hub for militants from adjacent states of Manipur, Assam and Nagaland. The militants use the state to cross over to the loosely governed Sagaing region of Naga Self-Administered Zone (NSAZ) in Myanmar, where at least 2,500 Indian militants are based.

The Tirap, Changlang and Longding Districts of the state share 520 kilometers of the 1, 643 Kilometers long porous border with Myanmar. According to security agencies, these Districts  along with Nagaland’s Mon and Tuesang Districts have become the nerve centre of militant activity in the region. As of January 31, 2018, in the last ten years these five Districts accounted for about 313 fatalities.

 

District Civilian Security Forces Terrorists Total
Mon 6 13 110 129
Tirap 1 11 73 85
Tuesang 18 0 43 61
Changlang 5 3 26 34
Longding 0 0 4 4
Total 30 27 256 313

Fatalities from five bordering districts of India (Source* SATP)

 

The three districts of Arunachal host militant groups such as NSCN-K, a reformation faction of NSCN (NSCN-R); the ULFA-I; the Saigora faction of National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB-S); and CorCom. According to a Union Ministry of Home Affairs (UMHA) report, ‘several armed modules of ULFA-I either individually or jointly with CorCom are active in several locations….in Longding, Tirap and Changlang Districts.’ The notification also adds that the Assam-Arunachal interstate boundary continues to be used as hideouts and corridors for movement by militant groups.

NSCN-K, which abrogated the ceasefire agreement with the Indian Government in 2015, has been the predominant  organisation in Arunachal Pradesh. With a plethora of groups present in the region, the possibility of one militant group attempting to gain dominance in the area remains likely, which may result in a spike in factional clashes. According to an intelligence official, NSCN-IM, which currently conducts peace talks with Indian Government and is also a rival to NSCN-K, has attempted to gain dominance and destabilize NSCN-K by propping up local proxy militant groups such as the Eastern Naga National Government (ENNG).

Arunachal Pradesh Police records from 2016 indicate that there were at least 80 cases of extortion and about 103 incidents of abduction. In 2017, the number of abduction cases stood at 106 and extortion at 75. A majority of these incidents are perpetrated by militant groups as means to generate funds. Moreover, Arunachal Pradesh is located adjacent to the ‘golden triangle’, one of the primary opium producing regions in the world comprised of Myanmar, Laos and Thailand. According to a 2016 report, NSCN-R has reportedly been recruiting drug addicts across the opium belt of Arunachal Pradesh to broaden its extortion racket. Apart from Longding, Tirap and Changlang, Lohit and Anjaw Districts are notorious for opium cultivation. According to the Narcotics Control Bureau (NCB), Arunachal topped the list of states in illegal poppy production for opium during 2014-15. NCB officials also claim that illegal poppy farms are guarded by armed militia who are known to work with insurgents.

 

Shift in Centre of Gravity & Future of Violence

After Sheikh Hasina became the Prime Minister of Bangladesh in 2014, Dhaka cracked down on Indian insurgents based in the country, resulting in militant groups relocating to Myanmar’s Sagaing region. With this development, the ‘centre of gravity’ for the insurgent movement shifted to Myanmar. Union Minister for Home Hansraj Ahir stated that between 2015 and March 31, 2017, the Indo-Myanmar border witnessed a steady rise in insurgent activities, resulting in the death of 18 security personnel and 32 insurgents, as well as the arrest of 337 militants .

Other Indian militants groups such as PLA and ULFA-I have shifted their bases to Shan State in Myanmar bordering China’s Yunnan province. Chinese intelligence has reportedly renewed relations with some militant leaders. ULFA has established links with Beijing’s proxy in Myanmar the United Wa State Army (UWSA). Additionally, Chinese intelligence officers arguably favoured the constitution of UNFLWESA, a conglomerate of various groups . In 2017, ULFA-I issued a statement against the visit of the Dalai Lama to Arunachal Pradesh.

 

Conclusion

Although the Indian Army has been able to keep violence contained in three Districts, rampant extortion, abduction and drug production highlight the inefficiency of the policing machinery of the state. The inefficient policing apparatus could also be an indicator of a possible deficiency in human intelligence, since the police is likely to have more local level contacts as they are indigenous to the area, unlike the Army. Consequently, intelligence-based targeted operations carried out at a grass root level also suffer.

The primary causality for the drop in insurgent violence can be attributed to the security cooperation extended by Dhaka, but the Indian counter insurgency strategy can only occupy a peripheral secondary position. With Myanmar becoming the primary base of operations for insurgent groups, the Arunachal Pradesh will play a vital role in strategy of Indian insurgent groups. In light of Beijing’s claim on Arunachal Pradesh, the supply of weapons to insurgents makes it a geopolitical issue rather than an internal security issue. The Indian government would do well to act accordingly.

 

Athul Menath is a security analyst at the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP). His focus is the Insurgency in Northeast India. You can follow him on Twitter @loner/56

Image Source

Banner: here (Image Credit: File Photo – PTI)

Image 1: http://www.tribuneindia.com/news/nation/mod-clears-key-road-along-china-after-fresh-alignment/276202.html

 

ULFA: A Persistent Threat

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By Athul Menath

Two ULFA cadres guarding a camp in Tinsukia district, in the northeast Indian state of Assam. (Source: AFP)

 

Since 1979, the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) has been at the forefront of insurgent violence in the Indian state of Assam. The group sprang up during the ‘anti-outsider’ agitation which demanded the expulsion of ethnic Bengalis whose large scale influx had impacted the local demography of Assam. Soon the movement started showing a secessionist character, resulting in the birth of ULFA, under the leadership of Paresh Baruah. The group has been demanding session from the Union of India, claiming that Assam has been ‘colonised by New Delhi’. Although created in 1979, the group became active in 1982, when it killed a well-known Bengali lawyer, Kalipada Sen.

An undivided ULFA was estimated to have a cadre strength of about 5,000. Following a split in 2012, two factions emerged. The first is the Pro-talk faction of ULFA (ULFA-PTF), which  conducts peace talks with the Government of India. The second is the Independent faction of (ULFA-I), which is based in Myanmar and has a capacity of about three hundred cadres.

The article is an attempt to chronicle the renewed activity of ULFA-I and  to identify the underlying reason for its longevity in the plethora of insurgent outfits in the often under-reported and misunderstood Northeast India.

 

Recent activities

On January 13, 2018 an ULFA-I cadre was arrested from Chabua in the Dibrugarh District. He was reportedly tasked by ULFA-I to collect information on aviation-carrying turbine fuel (ATF) tankers entering Chabua Air Force station. The alleged purpose was to place an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) on ATF tankers entering the air base.

The month before, on the 8th December 2017, six militants of ULFA-I entered the Kunapathar Tea Estate in Bordumsa, Tinsukia District and opened fire at the estate manager, notably after the authorities refused to pay extortion money that the militants had previously demanded from the planters a couple of weeks prior. A few days later, on the 11th, the ULFA-I militants shot dead a Village Defense Party (VDP) President – identified as Anteswar Mahanta – and his son Karun at Dirak-Hunjan, Tinsukia District. The killing resulted in wide spread protests and demonstrations in the District, with civilians claiming that state Government had failed to provide security.

Additionally, reports in January 2018 indicate that ULFA-I and the Khaplang faction of National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN-K) were planning attacks in India. For instance, it has been reported that ULFA-I leaders have found a location near the Namdapha National Park in Changlang of Arunachal Pradesh to set up a transit camp for about seventy cadres. Furthermore, the same report also claims that once the camp is ready, parts of Assam close to the south-east of Arunachal Pradesh will witness a rise in violence.

The insurgent group is also conducting ‘recruitment drive’ in Udalguri and Darrang, as well as Tinsukia, Shivsagar and Dibrugarh, the districts which have been their strongholds.

There is evidence to suggest that ULFA has revamped its abduction for ransom activities within the region. For example, they abducted the son of a Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) local leader of Tinsukia District, for INR 20 million. He was released on the 25th December, after ten days in captivity, although his family stated that they did not give any extortion money. However, Assam Police argues that ULFA-I could target more tea gardens and the business community in Upper Assam for extortion, given the area was facing a severe financial crisis.

 

Official statements- From Dismissive to cautious

The resurgence in ULFA-I activity follows briefly after the Assam Chief Minister, Sarbananda Sonowal, stated that the strength of ULFA was “no more” and there is “no law and order problem” in Assam. Although the state only witnessed twenty-six insurgency-related fatalities (five civilians, three Special Forces and eighteen militants) in 2017, compared to eighty-six in 2016 (thirty-three civilians, four SFs and forty-nine militants), the threat of armed outfits are persistent in the state.

Despite the Chief Minister’s statement, Assam Director General of Police (DGP) was more cautious about dismissing the group as a spent force. He stated that ULFA-I “was down but not out”. He also added that the militants were using neighboring states of Nagaland and Arunachal Pradesh to enter Assam from Myanmar. The recent dormancy of ULFA-I, although interpreted by governing authorities as a sign of weakness, suggest that the organisation has been lying low to recover the losses it had incurred, and realign its strategy according to the evolving context in Assam.

The aforementioned contradictory statements may well be an indicator of the way by which inter-departmental coordination function at the state level. On the one hand, the political class may be attempting to convert the brief lull in to political gain as well as to claim the break in violence as a governmental achievement. On the other hand, however, the security establishment calls for a more cautious approach.

 

Secret of Longevity- Alliances

As Winston Churchill once said, there is only one thing worse than fighting with allies, and that is fighting without them.

The armed group has been able to keep itself alive over the years by developing a nexus with other militant groups in the region. Given that ULFA is a part of the United National Liberation Front of Western South East Asia (UNLFWSEA), a conglomerate of militant groups in north east India provides further credence that the group is yet to be defeated. UNLFWSEA was responsible for the June 2015 Paralon ambush in Manipur, where eighteen Army soldiers were killed. Also, the group was more recently involved in a joint insurgency attack in the same region, with another conglomerate group from a neighboring state and Coordination Committee (CorCom) – on the 22nd January 2017, it killed two SFs and two militants. It is also reportedly supported by Inter service Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan.

The connection takes place with other militant groups active in India such as the aforementioned NSCN-IM and the NSCN-K, as well as with Myanmar based militant groups such as the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), which was instrumental in imparting insurgent tactics to ULFA cadres. Such an endeavour has helped the secessionist militant group to sustain itself for more than three decades, by securing safe havens and bases outside of India. The connection it had with Bangladesh’s Directorate of Field Intelligence (DGFI) also helped not only about safe havens but also to set up income generating projects. ULFA reportedly had number of firms including media consultancies and soft drink manufacturing units. Moreover, it was reported to own three hotels, a private clinic, and two motor driving schools in Dhaka. Paresh Barua was reported to personally own or has controlling interests in several businesses in Bangladesh, including a tannery, a chain of departmental stores, garment factories, travel agencies, shrimp trawlers and transport and investment companies.

 

Indian security forces with the suspected ULFA member arrested in Chabua (Credit: Avik Chakraborty)

 

Significance of the recent reinvigoration

The latest reinvigoration by ULFA-I comes at a politically sensitive time for Assam, after the first draft of National Register of Citizens (NRC) was published. The NRC aims to identify the ‘illegal migrants’ in the state, an issue which ignited the armed separatist movement in Assam in the first place. The second draft will be published following the Supreme Court’s order later in 2018. Additionally, Assam is scheduled to host a Global Investors’ summit from the 3rd-4th February 2018, in an attempt to seduce investors. The summit is expected to attract both major domestic and international investors. Moreover, the reported plan to attack the air base might indicate an attempt from ULFA to significantly escalate the level of violence. Targets would no longer be limited to SF patrols or perceived ‘outsiders’, but would also include defence and infrastructural installations.

 

Conclusion

In light of the aforementioned events, the possibility of a high impact militant attack resulting in mass fatalities cannot be ruled out. Also, such an attack would send a message to the business community that the law and order in the state remains unstable and insurgent groups cannot be written off completely.

Additionally, it is important not to rule out how ULFA uses the NRC to indulge in ethnic violence against those perceived to be ‘non-Assamese’. Any ethnic violence would act as a huge boost for ULFA and simultaneously increase the amount of cadres in its ranks. This surge could result in the revival of militancy in Assam. Hitherto, the highest number of deaths occurred in 1998 and 2000, with 783 and 758 fatalities respectively.

This festering rebellion also highlights the limits of the Indian Government’s security-centric approach towards internal insurgencies. Indeed, it heavily relies on armed forces to bring about a military solution to the crisis. Whilst this strategy may help in reducing or containing militant violence, it is incapable of addressing the political motivations that initially fuel insurgents. As a result, while militant groups are tactically defeated, the underlying political grievances (real or perceived) pave the way for insurgents to revive themselves periodically.

 

Athul Menath is a security analyst at the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP). His focus is the Insurgency in Northeast India. You can follow him on Twitter @loner/56.

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Resource-Induced Conflicts, Part I: Petro-violence in the Niger Delta

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By: Obi, Cyril and Siri Aas Rustad

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Since the turn of the century, petro-violence has brought the oil-producing Niger Delta to the forefront of international energy and security concerns for strategic, socio-economic, historical and political reasons. However, the root causes of this conflict lie in decades of marginalisation of the region’s inhabitants, pollution and the highly centralised state control of oil revenues.[1] Over five decades of oil production has largely contributed to the enrichment of international oil companies and national and local elites, while at the same time leading to the disempowerment and impoverishment of the local population through direct dispossession, repression, and pollution of the air, lands and waters.[2]

The turn to violent resistance in the early 2000s took place in the context of prolonged military rule, marginalisation, and repression of community protests. Militias, riding on the back of widespread frustration about the ineffectiveness of prior non-violent protests, resorted to violence. The attacks on oil installations and the kidnapping of expatriate oil workers were initially intended to gain attention and support for their cause. Subsequently, however, the activities of some militias began to acquire other characteristics and goals that went beyond demands for resource control.[3]

While some scholars point to greed and personal enrichment as the motivation for violent conflict[4], there is a growing quantitative literature pointing to resource-related grievances as the main explanation of the statistical correlation between oil in particular and violent conflict. Østby, Nordås, and Rød (2009) find that regions with high level of group inequalities, combined with resource endowment, have a higher risk of conflict, while Rustad (2016), in a study of the Niger Delta, concludes that those who believe their region to be worse off than others are more likely to support violence. Similarly, Must and Rustad (2016) observe that a perception of unfair treatment also increases the likelihood of supporting the use of violence. The case of the Niger Delta brings some of these issues to the fore.

The petro-violence in the Niger Delta is closely linked to revenue sharing between the Nigerian state and oil-producing areas, control over the resources, as well as feelings of exclusion, marginalisation and exploitation endured by ethnic minority groups compared to larger groups on national level, such as the Ogoni and Ijaw communities. Perhaps most relevant are the ways in which the high stakes involved have fed into a vicious cycle of exploitation, protest, repression, resistance, militarisation and the descent into a volatile mix of insurgent violence and criminality[5]. Both these processes place great strain on the relationship between the local and the national levels.

The Niger Delta is a vast coastal plain in the southernmost part of Nigeria, with an estimated population of 31 million people. Traditionally, the local people earned their livelihood as farmers, fishers, and traders of items linked to the principal subsistence economies. At the same time, the region is also home to over 75% of Nigeria’s petroleum production and exports, including oil multinationals, state and local oil companies, oil service companies, ‘thousands of kilometers of oil pipelines, ten export terminals, four refineries and a massive liquefied natural gas (LNG) sector’.[6] The great challenge to forging a balanced relationship between the local and national level is the coexistence of a vast petro industry alongside the local grievances related to the subsistence livelihoods of the population.

At the national level, oil accounts for over 70% of government revenues[7] and 90% of merchandise export earnings[8], making it the fiscal basis of both state and federal power, as well as economic development. Thus, at the local level there is the strong feeling among ethnic oil minorities that the non-oil producing ethnic majority groups (Igbo, Yoruba and Hausa-Fulani), which dominate the federal government, also control the oil wealth, while those who produce the oil suffer from neglect, exploitation, and pollution.

Marginalisation

The feelings of marginalisation among the ethnic minorities in the Niger Delta compared to the larger national ethnic majorities gained momentum in the wake of Nigeria’s independence from British rule in 1960. In 1966, there was an attempt at secession by a group of ethnic Ijaw youth, the Niger Delta Volunteer Force (NDVF) led by Isaac Adaka Boro, who wanted to create a Niger Delta republic that would ensure Ijaw self-determination, and ownership and control of the oil in its territory.[9] The attempted secession failed. Instead, Colonel Odumegwu Ojukwu led the Biafran secession, ostensibly to fight for Igbo self-determination against perceived northern domination, but also to assert control over the Niger Delta oil fields. Boro joined the federal war against Biafra, to repel Biafran claims to oilfields in Ijaw territory. This struggle over oil riches in the 1960s, both amongst various ethnic groups within the Niger Delta, and between the ethnic minorities and the federal government, underline the grievances and claims that feature in many of the struggles witnessed today.

Several developments during and after the Biafran civil war had implications on the agitation for minority rights in the Niger Delta. The first was that the oil from the region became the main source of national revenues and export earnings. Secondly, the federal military government had seized control of oil through Decree No. 51/Petroleum Act of 1969. Specifically, it provided that “the entire ownership and control of all petroleum in, under or upon any lands…shall be vested in the state [Federal Government]”[10]. In section 2, the Act granted the federal oil minister “the sole right to grant oil mining leases to oil companies”. This legislation expropriated oil from the Niger Delta much to the chagrin of the ethnic minorities of the region, who had hoped that the individual states would own the oil within their respective territories. This meant a loss of power over the oil resources by local people and the loss of compensation for the full value of appropriated land. It also meant that multinational corporations (MNCs) could directly get oil and land leases from the government without recourse to local communities.

These feelings of exclusion, dispossession and disappointment were further reinforced by the progressive downward revision of the derivation principle for revenue allocation (i.e. the share of the revenues being returned to the producing state) from 50% in 1966 to 1.5% in the mid-1990s. While this level was raised to 13% following the return of democracy in 1999, the relationship between the Niger Delta and the federal government worsened when demands from the oil-producing states for an increase to 25% were blocked by the northern elites.[11]

Protests and militants

However, what followed was a systematic repression of Ogoni protests, including military raids on Ogoni villages, and arrests of suspected MOSOP cadres and sympathizers. This culminated in a trial, widely held as flawed, where Saro-Wiwa and eight MOSOP members were found guilty of the murder of four pro-government Ogoni leaders. In spite of worldwide pleas for clemency, they were executed in 1995.[12]

The return to democracy in 1999 also had negative ramifications for the human rights and pro-democracy movement. Politicians of the Niger Delta tapped into the groundswell of popular anger among the large number of unemployed or alienated youth in the region, frustrated over the lack of local jobs within the oil industry.[13] Some of these youths became ready tools of politicians, feeding into a spiral of local violence in the 1999 and 2003 elections. By 2006 these violent outbursts, combined with communal conflicts, politics of local resistance, and the struggle for resource control, evolved into a full-fledged insurgency. Although initially rooted in the militarization and coming together of youth groups and their protests at several levels, the insurgency quickly took on other agendas and dimensions. The complex conflict that raged in the Niger Delta involved broad militant alliances like the militant group Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), linked to the ethnic minority group Ijaw. This insurgent faction combined lethal attacks and sabotage of oil installations with the effective use of global media to publicize its campaign of fighting for the control of oil revenues by indigenes of the Niger Delta.[14]

Amnesty

Rising domestic and international concerns surrounding the conflict, alongside the inability of the government’s military Joint Task Force in reining in MEND – which had successfully managed to shut down a third of Nigeria’s oil production – formed the basis of a Presidential Amnesty granted to the Niger Delta militants in 2009. The aim was to restore security by ending the disruption of oil production and exports, which had contributed to the loss of oil revenues and profits, and offer the battle-weary militias an opportunity to partake in state patronage and assistance programs. The offer to ‘drop their guns in exchange for peace’ was accepted by the main militia leaders, while a faction of MEND remained opposed to the Amnesty. Consequently, there was a remarkable reduction in the level of violence between 2010-2011.

Over time, however, the region has been once again engulfed by violence; a trend mainly caused by ex-combatants who have either turned to criminality, or have engaged in protests over their perceived exclusion from the benefits of the Amnesty. Their behaviour can be traced back to several factors. The first was the election of President Muhammadu Buhari from north-central Nigeria in 2015. After taking office, Buhari reorganized the Amnesty program and fired the leadership appointed by former President Goodluck Jonathan, while reviewing and reducing the funding of the program. Secondly, speculations emerged on the alleged expiry of the Amnesty program at the end of 2017. These rumours arose, in part, due to on-going investigations of corruption in the program, as well as the allegations (raised by some ex-militia leaders) that the new President is hostile to the interest of the region and seeks to perpetuate northern domination of regional oil resources. Thirdly, Nigeria felt the negative impact caused by the crash of global oil prices on its oil-dependent economy and fiscal federalism. The stakes of gaining access to shrinking oil revenues in the midst of an economic recession led to intensified struggles.

The foregoing broadly defines the context within which a new group, the Niger Delta Avengers (NDA), emerged after over five years of relative peace in the Niger Delta, attacking MNCs’ oil installations in early 2016. While the Amnesty succeeded in buying some respite for a few years, it failed to address the underlying causes of the violent conflict. The local population still feels marginalised and the federal government retains control over the region’s natural resources. While the establishment of the Amnesty was a window of opportunity for the federal government to deal with the Niger Delta crisis, it seems that this window is about to close.[15] If the root causes continue to be left unsolved, and the old and new protagonists of the conflict see the struggle for power over oil in zero-sum ways, the oil-rich region could be engulfed by another wave of violence in the near future.

 

 

 

Siri Aas Rustad is a senior researcher at the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO). She has extensive experience with research on natural resource management, conflict, peace and the extractive industry both in Africa and Latin America.

 

Dr. Cyril Obi is a program director at the Social Science Research Council (SSRC) and leads the African Peacebuilding Network (APN) program. Dr. Obi is well published, and is a member of the editorial boards of many international journals. He is also a research associate of the Department of Political Sciences, University of Pretoria, South Africa, and a visiting scholar to the Institute of African Studies (IAS), Columbia University, New York.

 

This article was based on:

Obi, Cyril and Siri Aas Rustad (2011a), “The Complex Politics of an Insurgency?” in Oil and Insurgency in the Niger Delta: Managing the Complex Politics of Petroviolence edited by Cyril Obi and Siri Aas Rustad. Zed Books. London

 

 

Notes:

[1] Obi, Cyril (2014). “Oil and Conflict in Nigeria’s Niger Delta Region: Between the Barrrel and the Trigger”, The Extractive Industries and Society, 1: 147-153; Obi, Cyril Obi (2016), “Understanding the Resource Curse Effect: Instability and Violent Conflict in Africa”, in Pamela Aall (ed.), Minding the Gap: African Conflict Management in a Time of Change, Ontario: CIGI.; Watts, Michael J. and Ibaba Samuel Ibaba (2011), “Turbulent Oil: Conflict and Insecurity in the Niger Delta”, African Security, Vol. 4, Issue 1.

[2] Obi, Cyril (2010), “Oil Extraction, Dispossession, Resistance and Conflict in Nigeria’s Oil-Rich Niger Delta,”, Canadian Journal of Development Studies, Vol. 30, Issue 1-2.; Nwajiaku-Dahou, Kathryn (2012), “Then political economy of oil and Insurgency ‘rebellion’, Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 39, Vol. 39, Issue 132.; Agbiboa, Daniel (2013), “Have we heard the Movement for the Emancipation Last? Oil, environmental insecurity, and the impact of the amnesty programme on the Niger Delta and the empowerment of violence” Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 40, Issue 137.

[3] Boås, Morten (2011), “Mend Me’ the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta and the empowerment of violence” in Oil and Insurgency in the Niger Delta: Managing the Complex Politics of Petroviolence edited by Cyril Obi and Siri Aas Rustad. Zed Books. London; Ikelegbe, Augustine (2011), “Popular and Criminal Violence as instruments of struggle in the Niger Delta Region” in Oil and Insurgency in the Niger Delta: Managing the Complex Politics of Petroviolence edited by Cyril Obi and Siri Aas Rustad. Zed Books. London

[4] Collier, Paul and Anke Hoeffler (2004), ‘Greed and grievance in civil wars’, Oxford Economic Papers 56:663–595.

[5] Obi, Cyril and Siri Aas Rustad (2011b), “Is the window of opportunity closing for the Niger Delta?” in Oil and Insurgency in the Niger Delta: Managing the Complex Politics of Petroviolence edited by Cyril Obi and Siri Aas Rustad. Zed Books. London

[6] Watts, Michael (2007), “Petro-Insurgency or Criminal Syndicate? Conflict and Violence in the Niger Delta,” Review of African Political Economy, vol. 34, no. 114, p. 639.

[7] http://www.resourcegovernance.org/our-work/country/nigeria

[8] http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/TX.VAL.FUEL.ZS.UN?locations=NG&view=chart

[9] Obi (2010), ‘Oil Extraction, Dispossession, Resistance and Conflict in Nigeria’s Oil-Rich Niger Delta’, p. 225

[10] http://www.lexadin.nl/wlg/legis/nofr/oeur/arch/nig/petroleumact.pdf

[11] Ukiwo, Ukoha (2011), “The Nigerian State, Oil and the Niger Delta Crisis” in Oil and Insurgency in the Niger Delta: Managing the Complex Politics of Petroviolence edited by Cyril Obi and Siri Aas Rustad. Zed Books. London

[12] Obi, Cyril (1997) “Globalization and Local Resistance: The Case of Ogoni versus Shell”, New Political Economy, Vol. 2, Issue 1.;  Obi (2010), ‘Oil Extraction, Dispossession, Resistance and Conflict in Nigeria’s Oil-Rich Niger Delta’

[13] Ukoha (2011), “The Nigerian State, Oil and the Niger Delta Crisis”

[14] Rustad, Siri Aas (2016), “Socioeconomic Inequalities and Attitudes Towards Violence: A Test with New Survey Data in the Niger Delta”. International Interactions 42(1): 106-139

[15] Obi and Rustad (2011b), “Is the window of opportunity closing for the Niger Delta?”

Image Credit: Socialist Youth League of Norway (Sosialistisk Ungdom (SU)),  Flikr, https://c2.staticflickr.com/4/3607/4560583670_991d50ea04_b.jpg, (April 6 2010)