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Pakistan-Bangladesh Relations: Islamabad Calling, Will Dhaka Respond?

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Bangladeshi youth commemorate the Bengali freedom fighters of the 1971 war at the National Memorial in Dhaka, on Victory Day, 16 December 2019

By Silvia Tieri

In South Asia, music speaks politics. Among uncountable melodic masterpieces, there is a moving Pakistani ghazal, Woh Humsafar Tha, that goes like this:

Woh humsafar tha magar us sey humnawai na thi…

Adavatein thi, taghaful tha, ranjishein thi magar

Bicharne walay main sab kuch tha, bewafai na thi…

(He/She was my companion (fellow-traveller) but there was no harmony between us…

There were feelings of animosity, indifference, and anguish but

In my departing partner I had found all but unfaithfulness…)

The composition gained new popularity within and beyond the country in 2011 thanks to its indie-style remake that served as a soundtrack for a romantic soap-opera also named “Humsafar” (Hum: together; Safar: journey). However, few among its younger fans will know that this song tells the story of no typical heartbreak. In fact, the two co-journyers who had so much in common yet could not quite stick together – as the lyrics say – are Pakistan and Bangladesh, parting ways five decades ago. The ghazal was written by Naseer Turabi soon after the news of the fall of Dhaka (for Indians: Lt. Gen. Niazi’s surrender to Indian forces; for Bangladeshis: Victory Day) reached West Pakistan on 16 December 1971, leaving him shocked and in tears.

When the great partition of the Indian subcontinent divided Punjab and Bengal in 1947, Bengalis of the East had joined their Western co-religionists into a brave political journey called Pakistan: a homeland for South Asian Muslims, forming a nation separate from the Hindus’. However, while they officially constituted a single nation-state, the two wings of Pakistan (one’s capital was Karachi, the other’s Dhaka) were divided by significant cultural, ethnolinguistic, and socio-economic differences, as well as by more than two thousand kilometres of Indian territory. It could not last. Under the leadership of Sheikh Mujib “Bangabandhu”,  father of Bangladeshi nationalism as well as the current Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, the East eventually seceded, militarily supported by India. East and West Pakistan had existed as one for less than twenty-five years. In 1971 they split. It was a massive blow to the Two-Nations Theory that had been Pakistan’s raison d’être.

On paper, Pakistan and Bangladesh have much in common. They are the two Muslim-majority nations of the Indian subcontinent, carved out of British India by means of partition(s). They also both share a complicated relationship and some long borders with South Asian hegemon India, although the Indo-Bangladeshi border is rather porous, while the Indo-Pakistani is the most militarised in the world. Nonetheless, relations between Dhaka and Islamabad, which replaced Karachi as Pakistan’s capital in 1967, have been strained ever since Bangladeshi independence.

Hasina’s perceived closeness to India, as well as her government’s vigorous prosecution of former pro-Pakistani and Islamist forces since the late 2000s, have cast a long shadow on post-1971 bilateral relations. A partial rapprochement had occurred earlier, under the rule of Ziaur Rahman’s Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), traditionally closer to Pakistan. However, Hasina’s Awami League (AL) inherited the independence legacy and in 2008 returned to power, maintaining a solid grasp over it ever since. In 2009 the AL administration created the International Crimes Tribunal (ICT), a special court in charge of prosecuting war crimes, including genocide, committed by the Pakistani Army and its collaborators during the 1971 war. Because the convicted belong to political forces that are AL’s archenemies, the ICT receives criticism not only for its supposed low judicial standards, but also for being allegedly used to knock out political competition. In Bangladesh, it still counts on considerable popular support.

Bilateral relations between the once humsafars have been almost non-existent in the last decade. The execution of Bangladeshi members of Jamat-e-Islami (JeI) in 2013 and 2016, strongly condemned by the Pakistani Parliament, marked their lowest points. In May 2019, it even seemed that the two countries temporarily suspended reciprocal visa issuance. The last high-level official visit of a Bangladeshi head of state to Pakistan dates back to February 2006, when Islamabad received then-Prime Minister Khaleda Zia, heiress of husband Ziaur Rahman’s BNP leadership.

Speculations about a possible thaw, however, emerged following a series of gestures initiated by Pakistan in 2019 and continued in 2020. In September 2019, Pakistani Foreign Minister S.M. Qureshi phoned his Bangladeshi counterpart A.K.A. Momen to apprise him on Pakistan’s position over Kashmir after New Delhi revoked of Article 370 of the Indian Constitution, which had granted special status to the disputed region until August 2019.The two talked again in March 2020 regarding the  pandemic. In July 2020, Pakistani High Commissioner I.A. Siddiqui met Momen in Dhaka. Days later Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan paid a courtesy call to Sheikh Hasina, exchanging views on the COVID-19 emergency, Kashmir, and inviting the Prime Minister to visit Islamabad. Khan also expressed commitment to deepen relations. This was reiterated on 3 December 2020, when High Commissioner Siddiqui and Hasina held a courtesy meeting in Dhaka. Additionally, Pakistan expressed its interest in deepening the trade relationship with Bangladesh, especially in terms of partnerships and investments in the textile sector.

These unusual overtures alerted Indian hawks in particular, as they caught India in a turbulent period, dotted by protests and lockdown impositions in Kashmir, border tensions with China, and a general deterioration of relations with regional neighbours. Some consider that Pakistan’s move towards Bangladesh is an attempt to take advantage of the widening vacuum left by New Delhi’s policy towards its eastern neighbour, less attentive in the latest years despite declared intentions to “Look East” and to “Neighbourhood First”. One emerging commonality between Islamabad and Dhaka is their convergence towards China as a key investor, development partner, and defence supplier, proving Bangladesh has other reliable options besides India. While Pakistan remains China’s major ally in South Asia, Dhaka-Beijing relations have been recently upgraded to a “strategic partnership of cooperation” in 2016. 

Overall, Pakistan’s recent openings towards Bangladesh undoubtedly signalled an interest to rekindle an otherwise frosty bilateral relationship. But the critical issues that keep poisoning it have been left untouched. These are rooted in the divergent Pakistani and Bengali nationalisms, and their irreconcilable narratives of the facts of 1971. The AL and most Bangladeshis are determined that Pakistan owes a formal apology for its actions against the Bengalis of East Pakistan. Pakistan, on the other hand, acknowledges neither the accusation of genocide nor the number of victims alleged by Dhaka. Because the matter is so controversial, to establish where history ends and national narratives begin remains a challenging task. Other pending bilateral issues include the status of Bangladesh’s Biharis, the question of asset sharing, as well as the 1974 trilateral agreement on the repatriation of prisoners of war and civilian internees, of whose violation Bangladesh and Pakistan have accused each other. Meanwhile, to the dismay of Pakistan, the war crime trials have continued in Bangladesh. In 2019, the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court resumed hearing appeals of such trials after a three year interruption. In the same year, the ICT emanated 14 new death sentences to former militants of JeI and Razakar Bahini. Also, Bangladesh’s official stance on Kashmir remains non-intervention. Although the notorious abrogation of Article 370 was met with protests in Dhaka, Foreign Minister Momen reiterated that it is an internal issue of India into which Bangladesh will not get involved. 1971 was a bad break-up. Pakistan is now making a move. But Dhaka still wants Islamabad to apologise and make amends, before they can embark on a new journey, together.

Silvia Tieri is a political scientist and ethnographer in training based at King’s India Institute. In 2019 she joined the King’s College London-National University of Singapore Joint PhD Programme. Her doctoral research concerns the politics of linguistic identity in contemporary India and Pakistan. Before joining KCL, she was a Research Analyst at the Institute of South Asian Studies (ISAS), Singapore. She holds a Master’s in International Relations from the University of Pisa (Italy) and a Master’s by Research in South Asian Studies from the National University of Singapore.

Article 370’s Revocation: Integrating or Alienating Kashmir?

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by Prachi Aryal

There has been heavy military deployment in Kashmir in order to contain protests following the revocation of Article 370 (Image credit: Dar Yasin)

“Agar firdaus bar roo-e zameen ast, Hameen ast-o hameen ast-o hameen ast…”

“If there is a heaven on earth, it’s here, it’s here…”

– Amīr Khusrau (1253–1325), Indian poet on Kashmir

The land of Kashmir, often portrayed as heaven on earth, finds itself marred in a conflict between India and Pakistan, two countries that share a colonial past. The end of British Colonial control of the Indian subcontinent, in August 1947, led to the formation of India and Pakistan. In the aftermath of the partition, the many former princely states which had persisted under British suzerainty were left to decide which country to join. The state of Jammu and Kashmir, which lies in the northern mountainous region was seen as a strategically important area by both new-born states who each wanted it incorporated within their territory. The ruler of Kashmir, Maharaja Hari Singh, chose to remain independent.

The bloody saga which ensued through the partition and the infiltration by tribal militants posed a great threat to the state of Kashmir. The state, in a severe political dilemma, was required to take urgent action, leading to a request to the Indian state for military help. After multiple deliberations, the Instrument of Accession (IoA) was signed in October 1947 by Maharaja Singh and the Indian state in return for military help, thereby integrating Kashmir into India. The IoA stated that the Dominion of India would have control of the state in three major areas – defence, communications, and foreign affairs.

Nevertheless, the claim on Kashmiri land continued to be debated between India and Pakistan with specific counterclaims that the IoA was a farce. Nonetheless, negotiations between Kashmiri representatives and India led to the creation of Article 370 – which granted special autonomous status to the state of Kashmir in the Indian Constitution. While this legislation was being laid down, the state of Kashmir faced constant threats from tribal invaders who had their bases in Pakistan. Against the backdrop of large scale massacres that the nation had just witnessed, India decided not to resort to military actions and took the issue to the United Nations, following the advice of Lord Mountbatten, the last Viceroy of India,

The UN responded in January 1948 by passing Resolution 39  establishing the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan. In April of the same year, the Security Council decided to increase the power of the UNCIP under Resolution 47 to facilitate mediation between India and Pakistan. The resolution called upon the countries to withdraw their troops, after which point the UN would establish a temporary plebiscite administration in Kashmir, which would then carry out a fair and impartial plebiscite deciding the accession or autonomy of the state. Both the countries eventually agreed upon a ceasefire and a Line of Control (LOC) came into effect in January 1949, demarcating the territorial lines between the nations. Despite resolution 47, the failure to hold a plebiscite resulted in a divided rule over the region.

The Indian-administered area of Kashmir has been subject to internal violence ever since claims of a rigged election surfaced in 1987. An armed rebellion has existed against New Delhi’s rule in Kashmir, growing anti-India statements and a massive outcry for ‘azadi’ – freedom from Indian rule –  have triggered stringent military reactions from the Indian state. In August 2019, the Hindu Nationalist government of Narendra Modi abrogated Article 370 against the will of large numbers of Kashmiri people. This move was claimed to be yet another step towards ‘integrating’ Kashmir into India, a six-decades long nationalist endeavour supported in particular by the Bharatiya Janata Party.

Following the revocation of the special status of Kashmir, the dream of freedom from India’s rule has become stronger (Image credit: Dar Yasin).

The government went on to divide the state of Kashmir into two centrally administered territories. Indian military forces operating in Kashmir are shielded by the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA), which grants them immunity from human rights convictions, such as rape, extrajudicial killing and torture. Parallelly, the government is set to embark on a witch hunt of activists and journalists who raise their voices against the violence perpetrated by enforcing draconian anti-terrorism laws such as the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act (UAPA). Furthermore, critics claim that the government’s pseudo-secularism agenda has been furthered by the revocation of the article, where Hindu-nationalist policies are used to garner electoral votes.

Despite several concerns highlighted by the UN Human Rights Chief  Michelle Bachelet and UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres, any mediation on the issue of Kashmir has been blocked by India under claims that it is an internal issue, an exclusive concern of Indian sovereignty. Given the presence that India has in the international sphere, there have been little to no repercussions for the grave violations of human rights in the region. The lack of global attention due to restrictive anti-media practices alongside a rejection of third-party mediation has granted the government more leverage to continue unlawful activities. There have been mounting claims that the situation in Kashmir is getting worse by the day with Internet shutdowns, a government crackdown on media organisations and journalists, the arrest of political leaders and civilians many of them who are children.

Arundhati Roy, asserts that, ‘Indian Muslims have been effectively disenfranchised and are becoming the most vulnerable of people – a community without political representation.’ Critics claim that the government’s pseudo-secularism agenda has been furthered by the revocation of the article, where politics is used to secure votes. In the expansion of the Hindu Nation under Modi, international organisations have fallen victim, Amnesty International’s office in India was shut down following reprisal from the government over its coverage of human rights violations that occurred in Kashmir. This further erodes any ground for seeking justice or accountability for Kashmiris who have been subjected to various atrocities.

Since the revocation of article 370, civilians have been arbitrarily arrested and the valley remains in a state of siege with a stringent curfew. Meanwhile, the Indian government refutes claims of human rights violations, maintaining that this legislative move will pave the way for economic growth in the state. Inclusivity, however, remains a far-off dream for the people of Kashmir. Furthermore, the information ban and the detention of Kashmiri political leaders, civilians, and journalists outlines a rather meek prospect for the accountability of the Indian government.

The longstanding conflict has polarized the Kashmiris even further as they have been side-lined in political discussions and the decision on the fate of the valley of Kashmir is carried out by those who centrally rule the country. The aspirations of the Kashmiri people have been overlooked and they have been rendered voiceless with the revocation of the special status. The crisis requires the integration of Kashmiri people into the mainstream discussion, addressing their issues and concerns. The Indian government needs to be held accountable for its actions, decades of violence, and mass unnamed graves of Kashmiris if it wishes to truly integrate Kashmir and Kashmiris.

Prachi Aryal is a MA student in the Department of War Studies at King’s College London. Her research interest is inclined towards Gender, Human Rights, and Cross border conflicts in transitioning nations and how visuals from conflict zones play a role in communicating the realities of conflict to the broader world. She completed her BA in Journalism from the University of Delhi, India.

A Balancing Act? Women’s Participation in Indian Politics

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By Saawani Raje

17 May 2019

Indian Defence Minister Nirmala Sitharaman with military chiefs (Indian Express)

On 9 August 1942, Aruna Asaf Ali walked into a highly charged gathering of thousands of Indians at the Gowalia Tank Maidan in Mumbai and unfurled the tricolour flag launching the ‘Quit India’ movement against British rule. A prominent political leader in the Indian nationalist movement, she later went on to become the first mayor of Delhi in 1958.

Female leadership of this kind was not without precedent in India. As early as 1925, Sarojini Naidu became the president of the Indian National Congress, the main nationalist party in India before and after independence. Since then, the number of women in leadership positions in Indian politics has only increased. Indira Gandhi became the first female Prime Minister of India in 1966 and the second democratically elected female leader in the world. Sonia Gandhi, President of the Congress Party from 1998 to 2017 was one of the most powerful women in India and led her party to power twice at the Centre in two general elections. Other prominent female figures include Jayalalitha Jayaram– the first female Opposition leader in India, Mayawati, the leader of the third-largest party in India in terms of vote share, and Mamata Banerjee, the only female Chief Minister in India today.

Significantly, both the Defence Minister and the External Affairs Minister in India today—Nirmala Sitharaman and Sushma Swaraj— are women, holding portfolios that have been traditionally male-dominated. While cause for celebration, these examples are the exceptions to the rule when it comes to female participation in politics and decision-making.

This piece explores the juxtaposition of women’s participation in politics in India—as voters and as political leaders. It argues that using examples of powerful women leaders to point to the success of female empowerment in India ignores more structural and systemic limitations women in politics face in India today.

Women as voters 

Women have played a key role as voters since the first election in India. With the introduction of Universal Adult Franchise, women were given equal voting rights to men since India became independent in 1947.  However, in a stunning manifestation of the entrenched patriarchy, many women, especially in North India, wanted to be registered on the electoral role as “wife of” or “daughter of” instead of under their own names. The electoral officials did not allow this and Ornit Shani estimates that out of a total of nearly 80 million potential women voters in independent India, nearly 2.8 million failed to disclose their names and therefore could not be included in electoral rolls.

Women’s participation as voters in the decades after Indian independence remained low—female voter turnout lagged behind male turnout by 11.3% in 1967. This gap began to narrow in the 1990s, falling to 8.4% in 2004 and further reducing to 4.4% between 2004 and 2009. The past election in 2014 saw the closing of this gender gap to its narrowest on record—only 1.8%. In fact, in half of all Indian states and union territories, the female turnout surpassed the male turnout. This trend was repeated in the recent state elections held between 2012 and 2018 where women voters surpassed the male turnout in twenty-three Indian states.

Women casting their vote in a recent election (LiveMint)

This has made female voters a significant voter block for the leading political parties in the run up to the elections—and women and women’s issues have started to come to the fore in election rhetoric. At a recent rally in Rajasthan, Congress President Rahul Gandhi said that his party would seek to appoint women as Chief Ministers in half the states it rules by 2024. Another example is the controversy surrounding Gandhi’s statement that the Prime Minister had “asked a woman to defend him”, referring to Defence Minister Nirmala Sitharaman’s speech in a parliamentary debate about the contentious Rafale deal. The BJP responded with alacrity. Prime Minister Modi immediately rebuked the Congress leader for his “insult to the women in the country,” while BJP President Amit Shah demanded that Gandhi apologise for the remark. This seems to reflect an increase in the power of women voters. Women are now a significant enough voting block for political parties to turn comments like these into a battleground for their rhetoric in the run-up to the election. In contrast however, women continue to be underrepresented in policymaking roles within politics.

Women as political leaders 

Women have occupied positions of power in Indian politics. Women made up almost five percent of elected representatives in the first Lok Sabha (lower house) in 1952 as compared to two percent in the US House of Representatives and three in the UK Parliament during the same period. However, over the next seven decades, women’s growth in policymaking roles has stagnated. Women make up only 11.2% of the members of the Lok Sabha after the 2014 elections[1] and only 9% in state legislatures. India ranks fifth in women’s political representation in parliament in South Asia, behind Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Pakistan and Nepal.

There are many reasons for this underrepresentation. A significant factor is patriarchal attitudes towards female leadership in politics, where women politicians are often seen as fulfilling certain gender-specific roles. An exemplar of this is Indira Gandhi’s rise to the Congress party leadership—a move orchestrated by senior Congress leaders who saw Gandhi as a puppet willing to do their bidding. According to the Economic Survey 2018, other major obstacles faced by aspiring female representatives include domestic responsibilities, female illiteracy, financial disparity, lack of confidence and an increase in threats of violence.

An initiative to combat this disparity was implemented in 1993 as part of the 73rd amendment of the Indian constitution, whereby 33% of all seats in local self-government institutions were reserved for women. Since the enactment of this legislation, the representation of women in local administrations has increased to 44.2%. A study commissioned by the Poverty Action Lab showed that this increase in female representation heightened police responsiveness to crimes against women, improved children’s nutrition and education, improved male perceptions of female leaders, increased the aspirations of girls, and helped women get elected in subsequent elections.

In spite of this, deep-rooted structural problems remain. In 1996, the Women’s Reservation Bill was introduced which proposed to reserve 33% of the seats in the Lok Sabha for women. The bill was passed by the Rajya Sabha (upper house) in 2010 but lapsed in 2014 with the dissolution of Parliament. Passing this bill was also an election pledge of the current government but, five years later, there remains little sign of it becoming law. This bill has been left languishing for 22 years, and the representation of women therefore remains severely limited. The women voters turning out in large numbers actually have very few women to represent their issues and views in law-making bodies.

The political imbalance

Female representation in Indian politics thus remains conflicted and suffers from deep structural and systemic difficulties. The many examples of female leadership in Indian politics do tell a story of female empowerment—but celebrating this without looking deeper into existing disparities risks only half the story being told. To really address the gender disparity in Indian politics, the focus instead needs to turn to the representation of women as decision-makers and policymakers—the keepers of real political power in the world’s largest democracy.

Saawani is a PhD candidate at the King’s India Institute and a recipient of the King’s India Scholarship. Her PhD research is primarily a historical examination into civil-military decision-making during crises in independent India. After graduating from the University of Cambridge, she obtained an MA in South Asia and Global Security. She was previously a Research Associate at the Centre for Policy Research in Delhi, on the Oxford University Press Handbook on Indian Foreign Relations. While at King’s, she has been the Programme Manager for the FCO Diplomatic Academy South Asia Conference and has been teaching undergraduates at the Department of War Studies. Her wider research interests include diplomatic history, foreign policy, diplomacy and the study of contemporary conflicts. You can follow her on Twitter @saawaniraje.

India and Pakistan on the Brink of War at Jammu and Kashmir: What Role for China?

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By Axel Dessein

6 March 2019

Putting the RIC back in BRIC. Russia, India and China met for a trilateral meeting between the country’s foreign ministers, against the backdrop of the unfolding crisis in Jammu and Kashmir (China Daily)

Next to the ongoing U.S.-China trade war and the premature ending of Donald Trump’s meeting with North Korea’s Kim Jong-un in Vietnam’s Hanoi, it seems somewhat odd that the risk of war between the two nuclear-armed countries India and Pakistan was only the third newsworthy item last week. In retaliation of a suicide bombing against Indian paramilitary police in the Pulwana district of Jammu and Kashmir earlier last month, Mirage 2000 planes of the country’s air force on February 26 bombed a presumed stronghold of Jaish-e-Mohammed terrorists in the town of Balakot, located inside Pakistani territory. In response, the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) shot down two Indian Air Force (IAF) MiG-21 fighter jets on February 28, leading to the arrest of Wing Commander Abhinandan Varthaman. While the captured pilot was released on March 1 as a peace gesture by Pakistan’s prime minister Imran Khan, the fog of war has not yet receded.

The other fighter pilot presumably went down in Indian-controlled Kashmir, according to Major General Asif Ghafoor. There are also reports which indicate that the IAF shot down an F-16 of the PAF, but proof remains meagre at best. The suicide bombing, the deadliest since the beginning of the insurgency in 1989, set into motion a simmering spiral of events, which seemed to carry through over the weekend, with shelling resuming across the Line of Control (LoC) on Friday but declining in intensity later on. In this article, I aim to first focus on the crisis that took place, adding some more information to two earlier pieces. Next, I bring into account the role of China, Pakistan and India’s big neighbour to the East.

Don’t get MAD

This map, edited from Google Maps by Kamaldeep Singh Sandhu, shows the Line of Control, the de facto border between India’s and Pakistan’s parts of Jammu and Kashmir. (Google Maps/Kamaldeep Singh Sandhu/Strife)

Last week’s hostilities were yet another violent iteration of the countries’ territorial claims over the region of Jammu and Kashmir. In earlier articles published on the Strife blog, Kamaldeep Singh Sandhu and Saawani Raje graciously analysed the risk of nuclear war between the two countries according to an escalation ladder (or pyramid) with its three rungs of sub-conventional, conventional and nuclear response. Somewhat counterintuitively at first sight, the authors noted that the nuclear capabilities of both Pakistan and India in fact increase the stability in the region. Little wonder, since a nuclear exchange between these countries would be disastrous. As Karthika Sasikumar of San Jose State University notes, even a single strike on a big city, would lead directly to nuclear midnight, wreaking havoc on the socio-economic and political systems of both countries and the wider region. It is clear, nuclear war is MAD, as it would almost directly lead to mutually-assured destruction of Pakistan and India.

Nevertheless, it is clear that India has upped the ante by employing conventional firepower in the contested region of Jammu and Kashmir. The Indian Express even calls it a “milestone in India’s retaliatory response to terror.” The nature and scale of which was something like seen in Afghanistan, Iraq or Syria, as one senior officer is quoted as saying. Following the Pulwana attack, India’s prime minister Narendra Modi noted Pakistan’s involvement and publicly gave clearance to the country’s military brass to “decide the time and place of response.” However, details of what happened on the operational level remain scarce. Uncertainty is equally high about the success of the IAF mission. Indeed,  satellite imagery is raising doubts about whether the IAF’s Israeli-made SPICE-2000 precision-guided munitions actually hit the Madrassa Taleem al-Quran, a JeM religious school and the specific number of insurgent casualties. It is also unclear whether the IAF actually crossed the LoC or whether the SPICE missiles were launched from the Indian side of the line.

A road sign points the way to the Madrassa Taleem al-Quran, the religious school and presumed JeM training base on the hilltop that was hit by the IAF bombing. (Asad Hasim/Al Jazeera)

Reports are also unclear about whether the PAF scrambled F-16 or JF-17 fighter jets in response to the presumed IAF incursion of Pakistan’s air space. A deployment of the U.S.-made F-16s in this scenario for example would be an infringement on the end-user agreement, now said to be under investigation by the U.S. State Department. In contrast, the JF-17 is a product of a joint-venture between the Pakistan Aeronautical Complex (PAC) and the Chengdu Aircraft Corporation (CAC) of China. A further display of the ties between the countries whom define their relationship as an “all-weather strategic cooperative partnership,” was also visible shortly after the escalation by the IAF.

The neighbour to the East

With no real end in sight, Pakistan’s foreign minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi on February 27 called on his Chinese counterpart Wang Yi for China to play a “constructive role in easing the tensions.” As published on Sina News, Wang expressed his deep concern about the tensions between Pakistan and India, briefing Qureshi on the Chinese efforts to persuade and facilitate talks and reiterating the hope that both countries will exercise restraint and fulfil their commitment to prevent the escalation of the situation. The statement followed an earlier Chinese acknowledgement at the U.N. Security Council of the “heinous and cowardly suicide bombing” by JeM. Indeed, China’s Foreign Ministry repeated its condemnation of any form of terrorism and called upon the countries involved to cooperate in preserving regional peace and stability.

Interestingly, it was right in the middle of the Kashmir crisis that the 16th trilateral meeting between Russia, India and China took place on February 27 in Yueqing, China’s Zhejiang province. At this meeting, the country’s respective foreign ministers Sergei Lavrov, Sushma Swaraj and Wang Yi issued a joint statement condemning “terrorism in all its forms and manifestation” and called for the  strengthening of the U.N.-led counter-terrorism efforts. Here, it is interesting to draw attention to the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, a multilateral security alliance which Pakistan and India both joined as a full member during the June 2017 summit in Astana, Kazakhstan. With China and Russia leading this organisation’s struggle against terrorism, these countries could act as important mediators in the tensions between Pakistan and India.

The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor: bringing peace or worsening tensions? CPEC runs right through many contentious areas, including China’s Xinjiang, the region of Jammu and Kashmir and all the way to Balochistan. (Dawn)

However, China itself also has territorial disputes with India, tensions which undoubtedly complicate the manner in which China can play a mediating role. Most important among these disputes is the region of Aksai Chin, part of the erstwhile state of Jammu and Kashmir, and the northern Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh. But a small corridor between China, India and Bhutan is also cause for concern. To halt Chinese road-building, the area known as the Chicken’s Neck was the main stage of a long-lasting standoff at the Doklam plateau in the Summer of 2017. While not disputed territorially, it was the proximity of Chinese troops and their intrusion into Bhutan’s Doklam that raised Indian suspicion and ultimately triggered a reaction. In those towering heights of the Himalayas, Indian and Chinese troops even engaged in a stone-fight. To complicate matters even more, there is also the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, the flagship project of China’s Belt and Road Initiative, which aims to connect the Chinese north-western city Kashgar with the Pakistani port of Gwadar. As such, the CPEC can be traced right through many of disputed regions within Pakistan.

In an article for The Diplomat, Vasabjit Banerjee of Mississippi State University and Prashant Hosur Suhas of Eastern Connecticut State University offer important analysis on the Indian capabilities to handle a war with Pakistan or even a two-front war with Pakistan and China. While that may be so, the author similarly points to the fact that China’s military is primarily geared towards the U.S. and its allies, such as Japan. Rather than focusing on the possibility of nuclear war, one could do well by considering more broadly the many escalatory actions that can take place below the nuclear threshold. Indeed, when considering the close relationship between China and Pakistan, one can beg the question whether China may ultimately employ its relationship with Pakistan to add increasingly more pressure on India, in an area already rife with terrorist factions opposed to the Indian government. Somewhat contradictory, there is also the question of China’s expanding role in counter-terrorism and peace-keeping in Central Asia and beyond. Indeed, Gerry Shih of the Washington Post recently reported about Chinese uniformed presence in Tajikistan, near Afghanistan’s Wakhan Corridor. The question one can ask here is whether China’s political-territorial interests would prevail over the preservation of stability in the region itself.

Conclusion

While the meeting between Russia, India and China went largely unnoticed, it is an interesting development showcasing China’s commitment in creating a more secure region. In light of the deadly attack in Pulwana, the country strictly condemned the terrorists while calling on Pakistan and India to de-escalate the tensions. At the same time, China has many stakes of its own in the region. With the CPEC running right through Pakistan, it could very well be that the country would help its “all-weather” partner Pakistan secure its claims against India, the country with which China has several territorial disputes itself. Nevertheless, this episode has shown the potential role of China as a mediator between states. Let’s watch this space.

Axel Dessein is a doctoral candidate at King’s College London and a Senior Editor at Strife. His research focuses on interpreting the rise of China. Axel completed his BA and MA in Oriental Languages and Cultures at Ghent University in Belgium. You can follow him on Twitter @AxelDessein. 

Image sources:

http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201902/28/WS5c771b3ca3106c65c34ebd56.html

https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/02/indian-air-raid-site-casualties-mysterious-madrassa-190227183058957.html

https://www.dawn.com/news/1371720

Will India and Pakistan Go To War?

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By Saawani Raje

28 February 2019 

 

“Will India and Pakistan ever go to war?” This question has gained new significance since Pakistan shot down two Indian fighter jets early on the morning of 27th February and captured the pilot of one. For Pakistan, this escalation makes sense if you consider the escalation pyramid explained in the preceding piece. It could be in Pakistan’s strategic interests to frame Indian strikes on terrorist camps as a violation on Pakistani territory. This deflects from the main issue at hand — the existence of terrorist training camps in Pakistani territory (a claim that Pakistan has always vociferously denied) — and avoids the risk of international isolation.  This piece unpacks the question of the possibility of war by analysing the trend of Indian and Pakistani crises through the lenses of nuclear deterrence, international intervention, and crisis management. It argues that while there might be escalation in confrontational rhetoric even up to the level of a limited conflict, an all-out war on a scale seen previously in 1965 or 1971 is highly unlikely for a number of reasons.

Historically, it has been argued that India practices strategic restraint. However, a re-reading of past crises, especially wars against Pakistan in 1948, 1965 or 1971, actually shows Indian political and military leaders’ willingness to escalate.[1] Any restraint in these crises was influenced by issues like limited capabilities, risks associated with escalation, and the need to maintain national and international legitimacy.[2] Under Narendra Modi’s government, the ‘surgical strikes’ of 2016 reiterate the political and military leadership’s willingness to use force against Pakistan as an answer to its provocation. For India, this escalation is a risk the Modi government can afford to take. The possibility of war refocuses any discontent that the Indian public has with the government. It serves to unite Indian citizens behind the government against a common enemy: Pakistan. The social and news media rhetoric in India evidences this with repeated calls for war with Pakistan since the 14 February attack.[3] This rhetoric is especially significant given that this is an election year, and the BJP campaign has engaged quite strongly with the idea of nationalism. It is also India’s chance to call Pakistan’s bluff about its nuclear red lines. A show of strength in this regard might be a strong signal to the Pakistani establishment that India does not tolerate provocation and refuses to be held hostage to its nuclear doctrine. However, the evidence is greater to support the argument that India and Pakistan will in fact not go to war, especially on this occasion.

Firstly, both India and Pakistan have made it clear that they do not want war. When addressing the Pakistani retaliatory strikes on 27 February, Pakistani Major General Asif Ghafoor emphasised that no Indian military targets had been hit because Pakistan does not ‘want to go on the path of war.’ The Indian Minister for External Affairs, Sushma Swaraj echoed this sentiment when she said, ‘India doesn’t wish to see further escalation.’ Escalation to war is a risk neither side is willing to take. The existence of nuclear weapons and the economic costs of war are two factors that greatly influence this reluctance. Secondly, it is in the interests of the international community to step in with increased concern about the stability of the region in an attempt to stop escalation, as has been seen before.

Nuclear weapons in South Asia

Between 1974 and 1998, both India and Pakistan went through a period of ‘nuclear opacity.’ This was a situation in which neither state’s leaders had acknowledged the existence of their state’s nuclear program, but there was enough evidence about the program’s existence to influence the other nation’s perceptions and actions.[4] During this time, awareness about the other’s nuclear arsenal raised insecurities; however, neither state wanted to escalate tensions because they were unsure about the other’s nuclear posture. Such was the case in the 1986 Brasstacks Military exercise and a 1990 crisis between the two states that CIA Deputy Director Richard Kerr described as ‘the most dangerous nuclear situation’ he had faced. In both cases, the states reached the brink of crisis and withdrew, in part due to concern and ambiguity about each other’s nuclear posture.[5]

Following tests in 1998, both states declared themselves nuclear weapon-capable states. The Pakistani nuclear doctrine was India-specific and emphasised that given Indian conventional capability, Pakistan reserved the right to use nuclear weapons first in extremis.[6] This provided Pakistan with compelling incentive to provoke India, while remaining secure in the knowledge that its nuclear policy severely limited Indian retaliatory options. As exemplified in the 1999 Kargil conflict when, despite rhetoric from both sides showing willingness to explore nuclear avenues of escalation, India showed restraint in not crossing the Line of Control, avoiding crossing Pakistan’s nuclear red line.

Ironically, the years of nuclear opacity have been relatively more stable than the years following the declaration of India and Pakistan as nuclear powers. In addition, cases like Kargil, the 2001-02 military standoff between India and Pakistan, or the 2008 Mumbai attack show an emboldened and provocative Pakistan that uses its first strike nuclear doctrine as a shield against a restrained India that is limited by its no-first use doctrine. Pakistan’s testing of tactical nuclear weapons further complicates issues, as this operationalises nuclear weapons. Pakistan thus continues to attack India in low-level unconventional methods because it is safe in the knowledge that India’s ability to retaliate is limited. It thus falls upon India to call Pakistan’s bluff. The excuse of targeting terrorist havens in Pakistani territory, as the much-publicised surgical strikes showed, provide an efficient instrument for India to do just that. Thus, escalation of conventional conflict is a much bigger risk in South Asia than is purported.

International involvement in de-escalation:

The question then is, despite the increased instability, why does the conflict between the two states not lead to war? The answer lies in the examination of past wars between India and Pakistan and the role of the international community in bringing them to a close. India-Pakistan crises in 1965, 1999 and the 2001-02 standoff all saw the international community scramble to bring about de-escalation.[7] In all the crises, India adopted a strong coercive posture, possibly with the knowledge that in event of increased escalation, the international community will step in to cease hostilities as it did in each of those conflicts.        

In sum, nuclear weapons increase stability in the region in general. They do increase the likelihood of low-level conflict, but they decrease the likelihood of all-out war between the two states. Secondly, escalation of conflict between India and Pakistan has always been looked at with growing concern by the international community, which has more often than not played a pivotal role in the cessation of hostilities, as the cases of 1948, 1965 and Kargil show. These factors decrease the likelihood of India and Pakistan going to war with each other despite the possibility that they will engage in an escalation of rhetoric or even low-level hostilities. While the rhetoric in India today is inherently advocating strong retributive action against Pakistan, the above factors show that despite an escalation of rhetoric, diplomatic efforts or even limited military action, India and Pakistan will not actually end up in an all-out war with each other. The social media #saynotowar hashtag that is currently seen across a lot of Indian and Pakistani social media might be more on point than ever.

Saawani Raje is a PhD candidate at the King’s India Institute and a recipient of the King’s India Scholarship, as well as a Senior Editor at Strife. Her PhD research is primarily a historical examination into civil-military decision-making during crises in independent India. You can follow her on Twitter @saawaniraje.

Notes:

[1] Rudra Chaudhuri, ‘Indian “Strategic Restraint” Revisited: The Case of the 1965 India-Pakistan War’, India Review 17, no. 1 (1 January 2018): 55–75, https://doi.org/10.1080/14736489.2018.1415277; Srinath Raghavan, 1971 A Global History of the Creation of Bangladesh (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2013).

[2] Rudra Chaudhuri, ‘Indian “Strategic Restraint” Revisited: The Case of the 1965 India-Pakistan War’, India Review 17, no. 1 (1 January 2018): 55–75, https://doi.org/10.1080/14736489.2018.1415277.

[3] Fatima Bhutto, ‘Opinion | Hashtags for War Between India and Pakistan’, The New York Times, 27 February 2019, sec. Opinion, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/27/opinion/india-pakistan-crisis.html.

[4] Scott D. Sagan, ed., Inside Nuclear South Asia, Reprint edition (Stanford, Calif: Stanford Security Studies, 2009).

[5] Devin T. Hagerty, ‘Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia: The 1990 Indo-Pakistani Crisis’, International Security 20, no. 3 (1995): 79–114, https://doi.org/10.2307/2539140.

[6] ‘Krepon et Al. – 2013 – Deterrence Stability and Escalation Control in Sou.Pdf’, accessed 27 February 2019, https://www.stimson.org/sites/default/files/file-attachments/Deterrence_Stability_Dec_2013_web_1.pdf.

[7] Farooq Naseem Bajwa, From Kutch to Tashkent: The Indo-Pakistan War of 1965 (London: C Hurst & Co Publishers Ltd, 2013); Malik V. P. General, Kargil : From Surprise To Victory (New Delhi: Harpercollins, 2010); ‘To the Brink: 2001-02 India-Pakistan Standoff’, accessed 27 February 2019, http://www.indiandefencereview.com/spotlights/to-the-brink-2001-02-india-pakistan-standoff/; Sumit Ganguly and Michael R. Kraig, ‘The 2001–2002 Indo-Pakistani Crisis: Exposing the Limits of Coercive Diplomacy’, Security Studies 14, no. 2 (April 2005): 290–324.

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