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Libya’s civil war & the importance of strategic sequencing

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By: Robert Andrea

Secretary_Kerry_Sits_With_Italian_Foreign_Minister_Gentiloni_and_UN_Special_Representative_for_Libya_Kobler_at_the_Italian_Foreign_Ministry_in_Rome_(23090680244)
US Secretary of State John Kerry at a 2015 meeting for the future of Libya in Rome. Source: Wikimedia

One of the most overlooked aspects in strategic deliberations is that of sequencing. It is much more common for the ‘what’ and the ‘how’ of a policy to receive the lion’s share of analysis. Despite this, the order in which the segments of a strategy are implemented can often be just as important. And while this may not always be the case, the cost of not giving due consideration to sequence can be painfully high. The ongoing Libyan Civil War provides a contemporary case study into how important sequencing can end up being in the pursuit of strategic interests.

Concerning Libya

In the immediate term, Western states appear to see (based on the different types of policy approaches on the table) two broadly defined interests in Libya. One is resolving the civil war that has been ongoing since 2014. The second is counterterrorism, primarily with regard to the increasing presence in Libya of the so-called Islamic State, but also of groups like the AQ-linked Ansar al-Sharia.

In terms of the civil war, the international community (particularly the United States and European Union) is committed to a diplomatic resolution of the conflict via the UN-led peace process. Dealing with the counterterrorism issue, on the other hand, will almost definitely involve a more kinetic approach.

Without the proper sequencing of these respective policies, however, neither issue will be solved effectively. Worse still, the situation on the ground would likely deteriorate significantly if the major actors fail to appreciate this.

Civil war

Following the overthrow of Colonel Muammar al-Qaddafi by NATO-backed rebels in 2011, Libya has struggled to rebuild effective state institutions, culminating in another civil war in 2014. This current conflict has essentially been fought between two rival entities – both claiming to be the legitimate government of Libya – each with their respective loyalists.

On one hand, there is the General National Congress. Often referred to as the Tripoli government or the Libya Dawn Coalition, the General National Congress (GNC) is comprised largely of Islamist militias and political blocs including the Justice and Construction party – considered by some to be the Libyan branch of the Muslim Brotherhood. The GNC and its allied militias are backed by Qatar, Turkey, and Sudan.

The rival of the GNC is the Tobruk-based House of Representatives, alternatively known as the Council of Deputies or the Tobruk government. Comprised of supposedly secular-leaning opponents of the Islamist-dominated GNC, the House of Representatives (HoR) is internationally recognized as the legitimate elected government of Libya. The HoR also maintains the loyalty of General Khalifa Haftar and his loyalists in the Libyan National Army.

In an effort to end hostilities, a U.N.-led diplomatic effort has produced a roadmap towards reconciliation.

In January of this year, a Government of National Accord (GNA) was announced, which, it is hoped, will unite the warring factions. For security reasons, the GNA (led by chairman and prime minister Fayez al-Sarraj) was not able to enter Libya until 30 March of this year, when he landed in Tripoli. In a somewhat surprising move, the Tripoli-based GNC announced shortly thereafter that it would remove itself from power in favor of the U.N.-backed unity government.

As of yet, the HoR has not ratified the agreement, as certain clauses would call for Haftar to step down as their army chief.

New place. Same threat. Same policy.

Taking advantage of the chaos during the civil war, the Islamic State has managed to establish a major foothold in Libya. This presence includes, but is not limited to, control of the coastal city Sirte. Increasingly concerned about these developments, Western states have been mulling more direct military options to combat the growing jihadist threat in Libya.

Earlier this year, a U.S. airstrike against an Islamic State camp in Sabratha, western Libya, killed around 50 people, including Noureddine Chouchane. Chouchane is thought to have been a key player in the two attacks last year targeting a museum and a beach resort in Tunisia. The attacks have been claimed by the Islamic State. However, this was a fairly isolated operation and there has yet to be a sustained Western airstrike programme conducted in Libya.

In terms of ground forces, part of the agreement that led to the GNA includes plans for an Italian-led multinational force of 6,000 troops to be deployed to Libya. It is still unclear what part of that force will be specifically devoted to counterterrorist operations and, for now, it is still a theoretical force. There doesn’t appear to be any reports of conventional Western troops actually in Libya currently, though multiple reports do place U.S., U.K., and French special operations forces in the country.

The foregoing reveals nothing to suggest that the counterterrorism programme in Libya will consist of anything tactically different than the ones implemented (mostly by the United States) in places like Yemen, Syria, or Somalia: Drone/airstrikes as well as occasional direct action raids by special operations forces (SOF). As we have learned time and time again though, airstrikes and SOF operations alone are usually insufficient in countering jihadist insurgencies. In the absence of a sizeable deployment of conventional Western troops, partnership with local ground forces would additionally be required to make these airstrike/SOF programmes effective.

If examined purely at a tactical level, the disparate nature of the two policies (conflict resolution and counterterrorism) would theoretically allow them to be pursued concurrently. That would be a very serious mistake – doing so would essentially ignore sequencing considerations and would likely end in catastrophe.

Enter the role of sequencing

It is critical to the long term effectiveness of both the political solution to the civil war and the West’s counterterrorism programme in Libya that the diplomatic portion of the strategy be conducted first. Only after the civil war has ended and the Libyan factions reach a modicum of unity, should counterterrorist operations against the Islamic State and other groups begin.

Without reaching a settlement to the civil war first, there will not be a single unified Libyan state to serve as a local military partner to foreign-led counterterrorism efforts. Rather, the prevailing status of a martially factionalized Libya would be the environment in which these counterterrorism operations would have to take place. In such a situation, the West would probably be forced to pick a side in the domestic conflict to act as its partner. This would undoubtedly result in an even more protracted civil war. Only now, it would be a civil war in which Western forces might find themselves as a target.

In the event of such a scenario, it’s more than likely that the Western powers would choose to side with the HoR and, specifically, Haftar over the GNC. For one, the HoR and Haftar are favoured by close partners of the West in the Middle East, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates. Furthermore, the Libyan National Army, under the command of Haftar, has proven to be the most capable fighting force in the country and has already shown a willingness to fight the Islamic State.

However, Haftar is also predisposed to fighting Islamists in general. This includes the Islamist-dominated GNC, which he labels (in its entirety) as terrorists. A foreign intervention siding with their chief rival would almost assuredly incense and seriously threaten the GNC.

Not only would this be a death blow to the diplomatic efforts towards national reconciliation, it would also seriously hamper counterterrorism operations. If they were to feel threatened by an HoR backed with Western military support, it is more than conceivable that some of the more hardline elements in the GNC might make common cause with the very jihadist organisations being targeted. This should not be viewed as a hypothetical. Certain GNC-aligned elements already cooperate from time to time with these jihadist groups.

Take the Benghazi Revolutionary Shura Council as an example. The Benghazi Revolutionary Shura Council (BRSC) is one of the primary elements fighting Haftar’s forces in the east and has often allied with the GNC. Comprised of multiple Islamist militias, the BRSC is led by Ansar al-Sharia in Libya (ASL). Both ASL, the group behind the 2012 attack on the US consulate in Benghazi, and the BRSC at large have periodically cooperated with the Islamic State against Haftar’s forces.

This places the GNC only one degree of separation away from the Islamic State. This is not to say that in the event of a foreign counterterrorism intervention that the GNC would swear the bay’ah to the caliphate en masse. It is entirely plausible however, that at least some of these forces decide to enhance their level of cooperation with the Islamic State if they were to perceive the West’s backing of their arch rival, Haftar, as a threat.

Such a strategic blunder would leave foreign counterterrorism forces facing an already capable enemy, but now potentially reinforced with thousands of new fighters.

If the aforementioned scenario were to occur, the chances for a political settlement to the Libyan Civil War would evaporate almost instantly and the jihadist threat that Libya already poses to the West (particularly to Europe) would increase drastically. Or, to put it succinctly: It would be an unmitigated strategic failure for the West.

To their credit, both the Western states and the U.N.-supported unity government are trying their best to properly sequence their strategies in Libya. Italy, who will be leading the eventual international troop deployment, has said it will refuse to lead the operation until the GNA is ratified by all parties and the Libyan military command structure is clarified. Even more recently, the GNA itself called on all military factions to hold off on any military operation against Sirte until a unified military structure is established.

So it would seem that, for now, the policymakers handling the Libya file in the West are aware of the importance of taking sequence into account.

Conclusion

All of this is not to say that utilising proper sequencing will guarantee success in Libya. The road ahead contains a veritable minefield of challenges to reaching some semblance of stability. In such a complicated political and security landscape, there is nothing to say that the peace process and/or counterterrorism operations in Libya might not face serious challenges in the future. That said, while sequencing might not be the most stimulating aspect of policy analysis, as we see in the case of the Libyan Civil War, failure to fully appreciate its necessity could lead to disastrous consequences.

 

 

Robert Andrea is an incoming MA student in War Studies at King’s College London. His research interests include U.S. and Iranian foreign policy, diplomatic strategy, and proxy warfare. He can be found on Twitter at @Bob__Andrea

France’s State of emergency- fight against terror or liberty?

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By: Nicolas Seidman

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A man is searched by police a few days after the Bataclan attacks. Source: Christian Hartmann/Reuters

“The end may justify the means as long as there is something that justifies the end.” -Leon Trotsky ‘Their morals and ours’

The 13th of November will, for many years to come, mark a day of remembrance in France. Where on that night in 2015 one hundred and thirty Frenchmen and women, along with hundreds of others, were either wounded or killed in six different locations in Paris.[1] That same night French President François Hollande implemented a nationwide state of emergency. A move that has not been seen since the Algerian war in 1961[2]. This decision was taken by the state to improve its capabilities to tackle terrorism. Clearly prior initiatives in counter-terrorism policy failed, such as the intrusive surveillance laws post-Charlie Hebdo attack[3]. However the state of emergency suspends vital key human rights for French citizens. Rights that ensure a fair democratic rule; basing itself on the crucial three foundations of liberty, equality and fraternity. Currently citizens lacking ties to radical Islamic jihadism are collateral damage in the fight against terrorism.[4] They are subject to raids, house arrests and mass surveillance.[5] State of emergencies are meant to be a temporary band-aid while the State finds a more suitable, less radical, long-term solution. Despite this men like Prime Minister Manuel Valls strive to extend and even implement it in the constitution.[6] The French government should therefore understand that continuing with the state of emergency is not the way forward for a stabilized France.

This State of emergency is going to permanently leave its mark on French society. The government has allocated extraordinary powers to law enforcement without judicial oversight[7]. It includes the ability of the police to conduct mass raids, press suppression, dismantle groups threatening public order, detain and put under house arrest all those deemed potential threats to the State.[8] This capability of the police has both great merits, as well as flaws. 10 Mosques have been closed due to incriminating evidence of weapons and explosives. 578 guns have been seized, 400 people have been put under house arrest and 395 people have been detained by the police[9]. The state of emergency has made the state safer and neutralized many potential threats to human life. But at what cost? Since the beginning of the State of emergency in November over 3,000 raids have been conducted[10]. Many of the raids concerned Islamic religious moderates[11]. A considerable number of raids that reflect the extent at which the government will go to capitalize on its power. The authorities were able to engage in these activities without the necessity of a warrant. In this manner law enforcement base themselves off of negligible concrete evidence and most of the time solely on suspicion[12]. According to Human Rights Watch, the majority of raids on homes, businesses and mosques were unlawful[13]. Raids not only causes physical damage to private and religious property, but also to the individual[14]. More times than not damaging both their personal as well as social lives. Many lost their jobs, experienced anxiety and understandably sparked a sense of betrayal by the government[15].

The state of emergency is showing itself to be inefficient by indirectly dragging individuals, not involved with extremism, into the fight. Between the months of November to January there had been 563 judicial proceedings concerning offences against the state[16]. Despite the focus on counter-terrorism only 28 out of these 563 offences were considered terror related[17]. A far cry from prosecuting terrorists. The majority of these offences were related to everyday organized crime. Over 300 those prosecutions were drug or arms trafficking related[18]. The government has also used its power directly in non-terror related ways. During the COP21 climate conference in Paris 27 environmentalist activists were put under house arrest.[19]This was done despite their lack of jihadi radicalism terrorist intentions[20]. The Prime Minister explicitly expressed that the state of emergency would stay in place until Daesh is no longer a threat .[21] The real target are therefore individuals connected to this so called Islamic State. Hence, can the cause be considered just if those most targeted don’t fit in this description? The power allocated to the government can be seen as inefficient and a cause for extensive collateral damage. Therefore, on the short run, these policies may allow to detain current ‘radicals’ and seize weapons, but what does the future hold?

A future of split French identity

If a state no longer considers you as a citizen and does not respect your rights, then what is the point of abiding by its rules? What if the State does not keep its promise of a fair society? The religious moderates, who find themselves in the crossfire of the law, might be less inclined to empathise with the State. They are, however, are not the only ones that may feel betrayed. The ‘Projet de loi constitutionnelle de protection de la nation’[22] is a bill aims to strip French citizens, with dual-nationality, of their French citizenship if convicted of terrorism[23]. This would create, for lack of a better word, a second-class citizen. Someone that has been deprived of a certain right due to her/his position in society. This is not the view sprouting only from human and civil rights groups, but also from policymakers too. Christiane Taubira, the Minister of Justice, resigned due to her unwillingness to implement such a discriminatory bill[24]. She served four long years regardless of political instability in her party, racial remarks from the far-right for being black[25] and fought against major parties to pass the bill for the right to same-sex marriage[26]. Despite her dedication she would rather walk away from a position she dedicated herself to than implement a bill. This is a tell-tale sign the government is treading into waters it should not be in.

Do the ends justify the means?

The State of emergency is an effective tool in preventing terrorist attacks in the short term. However, the government is shooting itself in the foot if it is trying to maintain its ideological freedom and democracy. The freedom of privacy offered to their citizens is diminishing. Continuous raids, house arrests and mass surveillance offer no prospect of securing personal affairs from the government. The freedom of displacement can no longer be ensured when suspects are needed to report to the police three times a day to ensure authorities they have not left the country. Equal rights no longer persist as citizens are being targeted for their religious faith and especially when some of them are considered second class citizens. Unrest is beginning to stirrup amongst many who find the acts of the government non-democratic[27]. Protests broke-out at the end of January, spanning 70 towns, involving thousands of protesters. The Fraternity of many citizens, who once felt unified, is beginning to waver. The democratic cornerstone that has propped-up the Republic of France since its formation is crumbling. The Republic can no longer ensure a standard of rights for its citizens. President Hollande is attempting to amend the constitution to facilitate the extension of the state of emergency ‘until the threat of Daesh is gone’[28]. This could suggest indefinitely.

An end in sight?

The State of Emergency extension has been agreed upon, mid-February, to extend to May 26th. This happened despite recommendations from the UN, stating that France should not extend it[29]. The UN claimed that France has engaged in ‘excessive and disproportionate’ restrictions on key rights[30], attempting to dissuade them from extending past February. In the eyes of President Hollande and Prime Minister Manuel Valls the State of emergency is a necessary evil if in order to obtain security. The people of France must therefore ask themselves. What price must we pay?

 

 

Nicolas Seidman is a first-year War Studies student at King’s College London.

 

 

 

Notes:

[1] “Paris Attacks: What Happened on the Night.” BBC News. Accessed March 1, 2016. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-34818994.

[2] “Mise En œuvre De L’état D’urgence Sur Le Territoire National / L’actu Du Ministère / Actualités – Ministère De L’Intérieur.” Http://www.interieur.gouv.fr/Actualites/L-actu-du-Ministere/Mise-en-aeuvre-de-l-etat-d-urgence-sur-le-territoire-national. Accessed March 9, 2016. http://www.interieur.gouv.fr/Actualites/L-actu-du-Ministere/Mise-en-aeuvre-de-l-etat-d-urgence-sur-le-territoire-national.

[3] “Le Projet De Loi Sur Le Renseignement Massivement Approuvé à L’Assemblée.” Le Monde.fr. Accessed March 1, 2016. http://www.lemonde.fr/pixels/article/2015/05/04/que-contient-la-loi-sur-le-renseignement_4627068_4408996.html

[4] “Muslims in France Say Emergency Powers Go Too Far – The New York Times.” The New York Times – Breaking News, World News & Multimedia. Accessed March 9, 2016. http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/18/world/europe/frances-emergency-powers-spur-charges-of-overreach-from-muslims.html?_r=0.

[5] “France – Hollande seeks to extend state of emergency despite critics – France 24.” France 24. Accessed March 9, 2016. http://www.france24.com/en/20160126-france-state-emergency-hollande-civil-liberties-security-terrorism.

[6] “France Considers Extending National State of Emergency | World News | The Guardian.” The Guardian. Accessed March 9, 2016. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jan/22/france-considers-extending-national-state-of-emergency.

[7] “France – What does a ‘state of emergency’ mean in France? – France 24.” France 24. Accessed March 1, 2016. http://www.france24.com/en/20151115-what-does-france-state-emergency-mean.

[8] “Mise En œuvre De L’état D’urgence Sur Le Territoire National / L’actu Du Ministère / Actualités – Ministère De L’Intérieur.” Http://www.interieur.gouv.fr/Actualites/L-actu-du-Ministere/Mise-en-aeuvre-de-l-etat-d-urgence-sur-le-territoire-national. Accessed March 9, 2016. http://www.interieur.gouv.fr/Actualites/L-actu-du-Ministere/Mise-en-aeuvre-de-l-etat-d-urgence-sur-le-territoire-national.

[9] “Le Sénat Prolonge De Trois Mois L’état D’urgence | Public Sénat.” Public Sénat. Accessed March 1, 2016. http://www.publicsenat.fr/lcp/politique/senat-prolonge-trois-mois-l-etat-d-urgence-1230235.

[10] Ibid.

[11] “France: Abuses Under State of Emergency.” Human Rights Watch. Accessed March 9, 2016. https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/02/03/france-abuses-under-state-emergency.

[12] “My House Was Searched Because of France’s State of Emergency | United Kingdom.” VICE. Accessed March 9, 2016. http://www.vice.com/en_uk/read/house-search-state-of-emergency-france-paris-terrorism-bataclan-876.

[13] “France: Abuses Under State of Emergency.” Human Rights Watch. Accessed March 1, 2016. https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/02/03/france-abuses-under-state-emergency.

[14] “Muslims in France Say Emergency Powers Go Too Far – The New York Times.” The New York Times – Breaking News, World News & Multimedia. Accessed March 1, 2016. http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/18/world/europe/frances-emergency-powers-spur-charges-of-overreach-from-muslims.html?_r=0.

[15] “Upturned Lives: The Disproportionate Impact of France’s State of Emergency.” Amnesty International USA. Accessed March 1, 2016. http://www.amnestyusa.org/research/reports/upturned-lives-the-disproportionate-impact-of-france-s-state-of-emergency.

[16] “Le Sénat Prolonge De Trois Mois L’état D’urgence | Public Sénat.” Public Sénat. Accessed March 9, 2016. http://www.publicsenat.fr/lcp/politique/senat-prolonge-trois-mois-l-etat-d-urgence-1230235

[17] Ibid.

[18] “État D’urgence: 488 Procédures Judiciaires.” Le Figaro. Accessed March 9, 2016. http://www.lefigaro.fr/flash-actu/2015/12/16/97001-20151216FILWWW00127-etat-d-urgence-488-procedures-judiciaires.php.

[19] “Le Sénat Prolonge De Trois Mois L’état D’urgence | Public Sénat.” Public Sénat. Accessed March 9, 2016. http://www.publicsenat.fr/lcp/politique/senat-prolonge-trois-mois-l-etat-d-urgence-1230235

 [20] Ibid.

[21] “France – Hollande seeks to extend state of emergency despite critics – France 24.” France 24. Accessed March 9, 2016. http://www.france24.com/en/20160126-france-state-emergency-hollande-civil-liberties-security-terrorism.

[22] Constitutional bill to protect the nation

[23] “Déchéance De Nationalité : Qui Serait Concerné Par Le Projet De Loi Constitutionnelle ?” Le Monde.fr. Accessed March 1, 2016. http://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2016/01/04/decheance-de-nationalite-qui-serait-concerne-par-le-projet-de-loi-constitutionnelle_4841434_3224.html.

[24] “Upturned Lives: The Disproportionate Impact of France’s State of Emergency.” Amnesty International USA. Accessed March 1, 2016. http://www.amnestyusa.org/research/reports/upturned-lives-the-disproportionate-impact-of-france-s-state-of-emergency.

[25] “The Justice Minister and the Banana: How Racist is France?” The New Yorker. Accessed March 9, 2016. http://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/the-justice-minister-and-the-banana-how-racist-is-france.

[26] “How the Maverick Christiane Taubira is Transforming French Politics | Agnès Poirier | Opinion | The Guardian.” The Guardian. Accessed March 9, 2016. http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/aug/14/christiane-taubira-french-politics.

[27] “Etat D’urgence : « Ce N’est Pas Tous Les Jours Qu’on Touche à Notre Constitution ».” Le Monde.fr. Accessed March 1, 2016. http://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2016/01/31/manifestation-contre-l-etat-d-urgence-ce-n-est-pas-tous-les-jours-qu-on-touche-a-notre-constitution_4856665_3224.html.

[28] “France – Hollande seeks to extend state of emergency despite critics – France 24.” France 24. Accessed March 1, 2016. http://www.france24.com/en/20160126-france-state-emergency-hollande-civil-liberties-security-terrorism.

[29] “United Nations News Centre – UN Experts Urge France to Protect Fundamental Freedoms While Combatting Terrorism.” UN News Service Section. Accessed March 9, 2016. http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=53045.

[30] Ibid.

The Paris terror attacks and their geopolitical implications

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By: Deborah Asseraf

US Marines and French Gendarmie inspect weapons as part of a 2014 training exercise. US Marines and French Gendarmerie exercise
US Marines and French Gendarmie inspect weapons as part of a training exercise. Source: Wikimedia.

Six coordinated terror attacks, involving seven terrorists took place in East Paris and near the Stade de France at Saint Denis on the evening of Friday, November 13. In Saint Denis, three terrorists blew themselves up near the stadium, while supporters inside attended a friendly France – Germany football match. Among the five attacks in East Paris, one was a suicide bombing, at the Boulevard Voltaire, and four others were shootings. This included the Bataclan concert hall hostage crisis, during which as soon as police launched the assault the four attackers detonated the bombs they were carrying. At least 132 people were killed and 350 wounded.

Islamic State responsibility

Islamic State claimed responsibility soon after in a statement that defined the attacks as the ‘first of the storm’. Indeed, France is likely to be a primary target for the terrorist group. For example, a video released in September 2014 attributed to Abu Muhammad al-Adnani, known as an ISIS spokesperson, instructed followers around the world to kill citizens of the countries involved in the coalition: ‘If you can kill a disbelieving American or European – especially the spiteful and filthy French – or an Australian, or a Canadian, or any other disbeliever from the disbelievers waging war, including the citizens of the countries that entered into a coalition against the Islamic State, then rely upon Allah, and kill him in any manner or way however it may be.’

Using the same rhetoric in another video released in October 2014, a French ISIS militant warned France that ‘as many bombs you dropped in Iraq and Sham [Syria], you will have as many murders, as many killings, like our brother Mohammed Merah did. You are afraid of one brother, there will be thousands and thousands in the future’. The call for attacks in France has become a key element of ISIS propaganda directed towards French potential recruits.

France is a main pool of recruitment for Islamic State. Among the 30,000 ISIS ‘soldiers’ in Syria and Iraq, most are foreign fighters, and in 2014 about 1,200 were said to be French. According to a 2015 report by a French Senate investigation committee dedicated to countering jihadist networks in France and Europe, 1500 French citizens who fled to Syria have been identified by the intelligence services. Accurate policy responses to handle the cases of those who return to France are yet to be found. The antiterrorism bill passed on November 13, 2014 modifies statutory law regulating the entry of foreigners but does not tackle the issue of French fighters coming back from Syria. The first article of the bill only allows authorities to prevent a suspected ‘jihadi candidate’ from going abroad.

At present, the intelligence administration has registered 4,000 people in ‘fiches S’, administrative memos compiling information about persons who are known for their ‘Islamic radicalization’ on French territory. One of the Bataclan terrorists, Omar Ismaïl Mostefaï was registered in a ‘fiche S’ for ‘radicalization’.

Internal responses to the crisis: a national emergency plan

President François Hollande, who was rushed out of the Saint Denis stadium as soon as the explosions were heard, immediately addressed the Nation that night. He called for an emergency ministerial meeting and announced two measures. President Hollande first declared a state of emergency, and second announced the closing of French borders. If these domestic responses to the crisis are mainly consensual in France, the issue of external action in Syria remains the subject of fierce debate.

The state of emergency is an exceptional legal situation in which French State authorities are allowed to take special action outside of the framework of ordinary law. Prefects (state representatives in regions) are allowed to impose bans on traffic, curfews, large gatherings, and allow searches and raids without warrants. The state of emergency is based on a 1955 law, passed in response Algerian National Liberation Front terror attacks in 1954. It was first used three times during the Algerian War of Independence. A state of emergency was last declared in 2005 on the occasion of the large-scale riots in the Parisian suburbs. In 2015, the state of emergency is not only applied at the local level, but to the entire national territory. It allows for the cancellation of cultural events, gatherings, the closure of public monuments and museums, and increased levels of security and surveillance. Accordingly, 1,500 soldiers were deployed in the capital and nearly as many police officers. In order to implement efficient border controls, customs staff were reinforced.

As part of the state of emergency, 168 antiterrorist raids took place on Sunday, November 15 and overnight into Monday, November 16, in the homes of potential terrorists registered in a ‘fiche S’ and 23 people were arrested. The raids were conducted in Bobigny (Northern Paris), Toulouse, Grenoble, Strasbourg, Lille-Roubaix, Marseille and Lyon, where a rocket launcher was discovered. In Villefranche-sur-Saône, close to Lyon, heavy weaponry was found, including a Kalashnikov assault riffle, a rocket launcher, pistols, and bullets. Aside from the current investigation that led to identify French and Belgian terrorist cells, raids current searches aim to dismantling other networks. Interior Minister Bernard Cazeneuve stated: ‘It is just the beginning’.

External response: is France at war?

In an official address on November 14, President Hollande stated that: ‘What happened yesterday in Paris and in Saint Denis close to the Stade de France was an act of war. Faced with war, the country has to take appropriate decisions. An act of war that was committed by a terrorist army, Daesh, a jihadist army against France, against the values we defend throughout the world, against who we are, a free country that speaks to the whole world’. The use of the expression ‘act of war’ is a crucial step for France. It suggests the terrorist attacks carried out on French territory have external belligerent outcomes. Designating ISIS as an ‘army’ seems very delicate considering the situation on the ground. Islamic State may have its own institutions, control territory, and a population, but it is not recognized as a state on the international scene. Hence, ISIS is not in control of a regular army but rather comprises a various range of actors from former Saddam Hussein officials to jihadist terror groups including the former Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI).

Declaring war against ‘the Caliphate’ is no less than declaring a war against terror. If the very term resembles G. W. Bush’s rhetoric, it can also be feared that such a war is already lost. Regarding the fact that terrorists carrying out such so-called ‘acts of war’ are French citizens, it seems impossible to consider ISIS as a defined enemy in the form of an army.

It is not clear whether President Hollande is really declaring war based on a use of international law. At the moment the French and US-led coalition against ISIS launched in 2014 includes Western countries (Australia, Canada, United Kingdom, Belgium, Denmark, Netherlands) as well as Arab and Middle-Eastern countries (Jordan, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, Turkey, United Arab Emirates). Nevertheless, the coalition intervention, consisting of airstrikes as well as arming and training support to the Kurds is completely informal. Western action could hardly be an UN-backed intervention, as a unanimity vote at the Security Council, would be likely impossible considering Russia’s pro-Assad agenda.

Nonetheless, the use of the term ‘act of war’ by President Hollande could be a way to legitimize an intervention under NATO provisions. Indeed, the 1949 Washington Treaty (article 5) states: ‘The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.’

Moreover, in 1999 NATO members recognized acts of terror as armed attacks that possibly bound allies to collective defence: ‘Any armed attack on the territory of the Allies, from whatever direction would be covered by Articles 5 and 6 of the Washington treaty. However, Alliance security must also take account of the global context. Alliance security interests can be affected by other risks of a wider nature, including acts of terrorism’.

As an act of war opens the legal possibility for a use of force under international law, France could call for its NATO allies to support and retaliate against ISIS and escalate the conflict. However, legitimizing war against ISIS through international law might also lead the nations involved to acknowledge that the earlier coalition was illegal. On the night of November 15, ten French fighter jets dropped twenty bombs in their biggest raid in Syria so far. They targeted Islamic State’s strongholds in Raqqa in coordination with US forces.

A strong response

While French intentions regarding the coalition against ISIS are not completely clear, it seems very unlikely that troops would ever be dispatched to the ground. However, the latest attacks will no doubt affect French foreign policy, and an escalation in airstrikes with support of the coalition may be occurring, as President Hollande vowed a ‘merciless response’ to ISIS. In order to strengthen French air force in Irak and Syria, the Charles de Gaulle aircraft carrier will leave Toulon for the Persian Gulf on November 18. It will carry eighteen Rafale and eight Super Étendard aircrafts, and join the six Rafale and six Mirage already based in Jordan.

Yet, relevant internal solutions must be found within France. The primary threat to French security is domestic. The country’s immediate enemies are to be fought on French territory. Internal policies dedicated to tackling, preventing, and understanding radicalisation are now essential in averting future attacks.

Deborah Asseraf is a graduate student at Sciences Po, Paris, specializing in the field of public policy and law. A research student in History at the School for Advanced Studies in the Social Sciences (EHESS Paris) she is interested in international relations and politics.

Lessons from Algeria: counter-insurgency, commitment and cruelty

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By Ethan Brooks and Thomas Giles:

French troops in Oran, northwest Algeria, 1956. Photo: JP Vasse (CC)
French troops in Oran, northwest Algeria, 1956. Photo: JP Vasse (CC)

In the Algerian War of 1954-62, the belligerents tore apart a society that had coexisted for a century. The wounds they left were too deep to heal. But the continuation of theviolence after the war and the spiraling civilian-targeted terror campaigns conducted by both French colonists and Algerian independence fighters was not inevitable. Avoiding this type of outcome is the point of counter-insurgency operations today. More than sixty years later, we can see that no counter-insurgency campaign can succeed with aggressive ‘search and destroy’ tactics against embedded insurgentsif the ultimate aim is peaceful coexistence in a divided society. The United States failed to take this lesson to Iraq and as a result had to adapt during its operations. Any country considering a counter-insurgency operation in the future must weigh up the extra costs of attempting it without this tool. France’s experience in Algeria shows that restraint and long-term commitment are vital if conflicts are to be resolved without the kind of fallout seen in Algeria in the 1960s and Iraq since 2011.

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Even today there are parts of France that have been part of the country for less time than Algeria was. Fully incorporated as an extension of metropolitan France from 1881 under the Second Republic, it was organized into départements like continental France and was complete with all the trappings of the French state.[1] After the war, the British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan spoke of ‘Winds of Change’ drawing the imperial era to a close, but in French Algeria the reality was different. For the colons (the Europeans living there) Algeria could never be just another colonial outpost to abandon during the seemingly inevitable tide of decolonization.

The French Empire was a civilizational mission to make Algeria and the rest of the colonies part of France. By contrast, while India had been ‘the jewel in the crown’ of the British Empire and its loss in 1947 had meant a loss of prestige, Britain did not feel as if it was losing a part of itself. The opposite was true of France. In the words of the French Prime Minister at the start of the conflict, Algeria was “irrevocably French”.[2]

If we read history through the lens of its destination, the gradual build-up of Algerian nationalism after the First World War is plain to see. Our eyes are drawn to the violent elements we recognize as important later on. But this is a mistake. The savage war and terror campaigns can in no way be described as inevitable.

Up until the end of the Second World War, French Algerian society was able to function as normal. Terrible violence did occur in the Sétif massacre in 1945 that followed police clashes with Muslim Algerians celebrating the German surrender, but Algeria was to have another decade of the peaceful coexistence it had enjoyed for over a hundred years. The majority of Arab Algerians favoured – or at least saw as the only viable outcome – a variation on the status quo with more political rights and the accompanying economic benefits.[3] Demands for violent overthrow of French rule were limited to the fringes. Nor for that matter were the colons too worried about their future. The idea of having to flee for their lives across the Mediterranean with their worldly belongings in suitcases would have seemed absurd.

To find the cause of the horror story, we must point to decisions made by both sides. In this case, to blame are, on the one hand, the civilian-targeting tactics of the Algerian revolutionary National Liberation Front (FLN), and on the other the unrestrained response of the French army and their failure to control the illegitimate combatants on their side. These combatants included the colon paramilitaries and the French intelligence services which operated in secret via proxies. Aggressive ‘search and destroy’ tactics cannot succeed in the long-term if the insurgents cannot be separated from the population. Hearts and minds cannot be won later on when the force aiming at ‘pacification’ is indistinguishable from the insurgents in the brutality of its tactics. Seen in this light, the bulk of the population can be seen as bystanders who were gradually sucked into the conflict as it grew in intensity. Civilian-targeting forced people to choose sides. The resulting divide was unbridgeable after the fighting. The only option for the Pied-Noirs and the Harkis (the Muslim Algerians who sided with the French) was to flee to France.[4]

The spark for the war came in November 1954 when the FLN carried out its first attacks, a series of over thirty bombings that left seven people dead, five of whom were European civilians. This shocked the French and triggered the deployment of paratroopers to Algeria. But even this event is easily exaggerated in importance. It was the response that leant the attack its significance.

At this point, the FLN was estimated to have only around 500 fighters and was only one small, albeit very violent, group within the broader Algerian independence movement. Before FLN ascendency, there were many moderate parties. These included the Mouvement National Algérien (MNA), which desired Algerian independence, but did not wish to achieve it by violence, the moderate republican party known as the Amis du Manifeste et des Libertés, and the Algerian Communist Party. The FLN rose to prominence because the French authorities allowed it to violently consolidate its dominance over other pro-independence groups, especially the MNA, a failure that stemmed from an unwillingness to distinguish between ‘good and ‘bad’ anti-French factions and engage with them politically before it was too late. Without the MNA, there was no Muslim Algerian voice arguing for a non-violent political solution. FLN dominance dictated the intensity of the conflict and the escalating response of the French authorities sealed Algeria’s fate. Fighting fire with fire, the French military establishment and the colons hit back hard, meeting the FLN’s terror war in Algiers with equal savagery.[5] The popularity of the FLN rapidly grew as ordinary Algerians turned against France.

While the aggressive French tactics were in part the result of existing military doctrine that advocated fierce repression, they were also a product of the military leadership. After humiliation in 1940 at the hands of the German Army, another defeat in Indochina in 1954, and the meekness that accompanied the Suez withdrawal in 1956, another military rout or feeble acquiescence would have shown France to be a cripple on the world stage.[6] The rot had to stop in Algeria. Left to their own devices by politicians in Paris stuck in the deadlock of the Fourth Republic, the generals took the responsibility for holding France together upon themselves. Political oversight should have led to tighter bounds placed on the use of force and long-term goals kept more clearly in mind. Without it, the army made its own decisions as to the lessons it believed it had learned in Indochina. Blaming defeat on a lack of toughness and panicked by the threat of communism, they resolved never to come second best in resolve or forcefulness again. The lack of restraint and the surprising cruelty of the French campaign was a direct result of this. A policy of summary killings, torture, intimidation and terror was carried out. By 1960-61, the FLN had been defeated militarily in Algiers and only small pockets of resistance remained. But during the fighting, aggressive tactics had turned the population of Algeria against the French.

In hindsight, it is difficult to imagine how France ever thought it could keep a peaceful hold on Algérie Française. The Arabs in Algeria were denied many of the political rights that the Europeans had and as a result felt treated as second-class citizens, but the anger and hatred that existed by 1962 did not exist in 1954. French rule could never have lasted in the long-term. However, the massacres, continued terror campaigns and the heart-breaking exodus of colons that followed Algerian Independence in the years 1961-1962 could have been avoided had a different approach been taken.

In looking back at the Algerian War, the goal is not to see how France might have held onto Algeria had it made better decisions. The goal must be to understand how western countries can carry out effective counter-insurgency efforts and avoid the level of suffering and bloodshed that is indelibly linked to Algeria’s independence experience. After the civilian-targeted violence of the war, there was no possibility that Muslim Algerians and the colons could continue to live together as they had done before. The precedent set by both the FLN and colon paramilitaries of targeting civilians with reprisals meant that the cycle of retaliatory massacres was and would have remained intractable.

Any mission that seeks to uphold a central authority against violent challengers must be willing to see the job through without allowing the fight to become personal in the way it was for the French in Algeria. Maintaining this sort of distance above the fray requires enormous sacrifice, restraint, and a willingness to let crimes against you go unpunished. On this last count the United States struggled in its Iraq mission and became the target of violence aiming to provoke a response similar to that of the French in Algeria. The sixty years that have passed since the Algerian War have seen many more counter-insurgency operations, including several in North Africa and the Middle East. Since the Arab Spring, we have seen that nearly every country in the region could find itself needing military help to avoid a drawn-out civil war and mass killings. Given this, it is probable that new counter-insurgency operations will be undertaken. Nor are they likely to be as easy as France’s mission in Mali, where the insurgents were mostly rural and the rebel fighters were geographically, religiously and ethnically distinct from the rest of the population. This especially applies today as events in Syria, Iraq and Libya progress. A lack of long-term commitment wrecked the mission in Iraq. The results of that failure are all too clear today.

Ethan Brooks is in his third year of a BA in International Politics at King’s College London. Thomas Giles is in his third year of a BA in War Studies, also at King’s.

NOTES

[1] Evans, Martin. Algeria: France’s Undeclared War, 2012, p.19

[2] Merom, Gil. How Democracies lose small wars: State, Society, and the Failures of France in Algeria, Israel in Lebanon and the United States in Vietnam, 2003, p.90

[3]Evans, Martin. Algeria: France’s Undeclared War, 2012, p. 101

[4]Horne, Alistair. A Savage War of Peace. p. 537.

[5] Branche, Raphaëlle. La torture et l’armée pendant la guerre d’Algérie. France: Gallimard (2001), p. 423-24

[6] De Saint Marc, Hélie. Mémoires les champs de braises. France: Perrin (2002), p.173

Charlie Hebdo: defending more than one narrative

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By Fernanda A. Marín:

Heads of State marching through Paris after the Charlie Bebdo attacks. Photo: European External Action (creative commons)
Heads of State marching through Paris after the Charlie Hebdo attacks. Photo: European External Action (creative commons)

I wasn’t lucky enough to be present at the latest demonstration in support of the “Je suis Charlie” movement, in solidarity with the victims of the terrorist attack in Paris that happened just under a month ago. I saw how all my friends living in Paris took out their pens and marched across the streets of their city to claim that freedom of speech would not be taken away from them with bullets and fear. I wanted to be there with them, marching by their side; but for different reasons.

Before I continue, I would like to be clear on two things: first, of course I believe in freedom of expression; and second, I am more than upset for the lives lost during the attack. Nonetheless, seeing this event simply as an attack on freedom of expression and French solidarity and unity would be too simplistic. This attack goes beyond the right to mock whoever we want, and it goes beyond the religion each of us is free to practice.

I refuse to believe in a simplistic narrative that portrays the shooting as an attack on French freedom of expression due to rising Islamic fundamentalism. The event is far more complex than mainstream media has led us to believe. The causes include a complex history of racial and religious tension and deep problems of integration that date back to the independence of Algeria, a former French colony.

Areas of Paris are stigmatized for their large migrant populations. This has led to the marginalisation of a Muslim population of 6 million. Almost 70% of French citizens say Muslims have failed to integrate into society, but the truth is that the country makes no effort to welcome them in, and the worst part is that we were all well aware of it. It was a ticking bomb waiting to explode. So the problem French society is now facing did not start the day of the shootings; it has evolved over many decades. This situation is getting worse, and it is something that we should all care about. This is why…

The question of censorship: should we have the right to mock religion?

Many have pointed out the parallels between Charlie Hebdo’s content and the anti-Semitic cartoons of 1930’s Germany. Those who defend the magazine claim that foreigners don’t understand the humour, and that freedom of expression is a fundamental right of any democracy. So having the right to mock whoever we want should never be censored. Nonetheless, an article by Jason Stanley in the New York Times made an interesting point about satire within societies where a minority feels oppressed. He claims that mocking the Pope is not the same as mocking Muhammad because Catholics (or at least Christians) are the overwhelming majority in France. The underlying tensions go beyond simple cartoons, but the cartoons serve to crystalize the feeling of many Muslims that they are an object of ridicule in French society.

So, going back to the original question, should there be a restriction of freedom of expression? No, absolutely not, but if we are to understand why those drawings had the power to create so much anger, we should not focus on the cartoons per se, but the society in which they are published. In other words, we should not blame the cartoonists, but try to understand the readers.

From the march to the paradox

When over 50 heads of state came to Paris to march next to François Hollande to make a stand for unity and freedom of expression, it’s more than European solidarity that made them take the journey. France, the country with the largest Muslim population in the EU, has just become the European guinea-pig for tackling these sorts of problems. If it succumbs to inter-communal tensions and political extremism, the rest of Europe will fear the experiment has failed.

The ‘threat of radical Islam’, increasing islamophobia and the rising popularity of extreme-right parties with openly xenophobic rhetoric is old news. However, the most painful irony of the killings in Paris is that it has helped radicalize fragile societies across Europe, creating further tension and violence. Furthermore it has given far-right parties ‘excuses’ to legitimize their racist and xenophobic policies.

Sadly, this movement to ‘defend freedom of speech’ has once again become a political tool. It has just fanned the flames of the so-called ‘war on terror’. Several countries are using this to increase security measures and reduce privacy. The UK and Australia are the clearest examples. David Cameron has called for additional powers in response to the attacks in Paris, despite the fact that the authorities already had the attackers on their books under the current regulations. In a speech given three weeks ago, he claimed that there should be no means of communication that authorities cannot access. This explicitly referred to encrypted messaging services such as WhatsApp and Snapchat no longer functioning with their current privacy terms and conditions.

This has all backfired on us. And we are allowing it. This freedom of speech and tolerance discourse is actually leading us towards the loss of our privacy rights and the rise of xenophobic parties. Quite the irony, isn’t it?

Fernanda A. Marín is a Master’s student in International Security at Sciences Po, Paris.