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Entretien avec Jean-Dominique Merchet sur les Réformes du Renseignement en France

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La France vivra dans quelques semaines des élections présidentielles dont l’enjeu est de taille pour l’avenir immédiat du pays. De nombreux dossiers attendent le futur chef de l’Etat, parmi lesquels la vague de terrorisme, une hypothétique réforme du renseignement, ou encore l’avenir de la construction européenne.

William Moray, de Strife, s’entretient avec Jean-Dominique Merchet (@jdomerchet) pour évoquer l’ensemble de ces sujets. M. Merchet est journaliste au quotidien L’Opinion et anime le blog Secret Défense depuis 2007. Expert reconnu en matière de défense, de sécurité et de stratégie, il est également auditeur de l’Institut des hautes études de défense nationale (IHEDN). Pour toute demande relative à cet article, merci de vous adresser à la rédaction de Strife Journal & Blog.

WM – Vous avez récemment écrit un article listant les potentielles réformes du renseignement, réformes sur lesquelles le futur Président de la République devra se pencher selon vous. Laquelle (ou lesquelles) de ces réformes devrait avoir être prioritaire?

JDM – Le point qui me parait être le plus important et le plus urgent est la nomination d’un nouveau directeur général de la Sécurité extérieure (DGSE). Il y a là une contrainte forte, dans la mesure où Bernard Bajolet quittera ses fonctions quinze jours après l’élection présidentielle.

Plus globalement, mon opinion personnelle est qu’il ne faut pas trop toucher à la Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure (DGSE, le service français de renseignement extérieur). Cette dernière est une spécificité française, un service « intégré », c’est-à-dire qu’elle rassemble divers services. En comparaison avec la Grande-Bretagne, la DGSE regroupe les services du MI6, du GCHQ ainsi qu’une partie des activités des SAS. Je pense que ce n’est pas un mauvais système, qu’il fonctionne bien. Certaines personnes aimeraient ‘casser la maison’, soit pour en retirer les activités militaires (le Service Action passerait ainsi aux mains du Commandement des Opérations Spéciales, le COS), soit pour réorganiser le service technique au sein d’une nouvelle agence, qui serait une NSA à la française. Pour autant, un haut fonctionnaire très impliqué dans ce dossier a récemment suggéré que : « on doit améliorer les choses, mais c’est aussi simple que de changer les pièces d’une voiture en train de rouler ». La formule me parait très raisonnable. Je ne crois donc pas qu’il y ait lieu à transformer la DGSE.

Ce qui ne va pas bien en revanche, c’est le ministère de l’Intérieur, qui en France chapeaute la Direction Générale de la Sécurité Intérieure (DGSI, le service français de renseignement intérieur). DGSI). Encore une fois, je parle strictement en mon nom propre, en tant qu’observateur attentif de longue date. Ce ministère fonctionne toujours plus ou moins de la même façon qu’au début du 20e siècle, s’agissant aussi bien de la police que du renseignement intérieur. A ce titre, il est toujours marqué par le poids des chapelles qui le composent, à savoir les préfets, la police nationale, etc. La distinction entre la préfecture de police de Paris et la Police Nationale est un autre exemple du problème, cette séparation n’a que peu de sens. Du reste, la DGSI est un service de police au fond et non une agence de renseignement intérieur, contrairement aux affirmations des politiques à sa création. Si modernisation il doit y avoir, ce serait donc davantage au niveau de l’Intérieur. A titre de comparaison, le ministère de la Défense (qui dirige la DGSE) s’est considérablement modernisé.

WM – Pourriez-vous brièvement revenir sur la polémique née de la publication du livre « Un Président ne devrait pas dire cela » ? Le Président Hollande a-t-il eu tort de rendre publiques des informations classées ‘secret défense’ au sujet des opérations spéciales, plus particulièrement des ‘opérations Homo’ ?

JDM – Oui, il a eu tort, évidemment. Comme l’énonce le titre de ce livre, François Hollande n’aurait pas dû faire cela. Je pense d’ailleurs que cet ouvrage l’a achevé, puisqu’il n’a pas pu se représenter. En d’autres termes, cet épisode aura été la dernière étape de son chemin de croix. Le vrai problème toutefois est qu’Hollande et les gouvernants dans leur ensemble ont usé et abuse de cette posture militaire, posture que je trouve très désagréable. J’entends par là le langage qui consiste à dire entre autres choses « on est en guerre ». Dans l’idéal, il faudrait en dire moins tout en en faisant autant. In fine, ce n’est pas aux politiques de nourrir les fantasmes.

WM – Comment se fait-il que l’unique réponse trouvée à ce jour par le gouvernement a la menace terroriste consiste en l’état d’urgence, à défaut d’une stratégie ? Cette mesure, qui par essence même, se veut temporaire et répondre à des circonstances exceptionnelles, a été prolongée a pas moins de cinq reprises depuis son instauration, au lendemain des attentats de Paris.

JDM – Je ne serais pas aussi catégorique quant à l’absence d’une stratégie. L’instauration de l’état d’urgence signifie élever l’état d’alerte au maximum. Il est impossible dès lors de baisser le niveau d’alerte car un tel geste constituerait un suicide politique. En d’autres termes, l’état d’urgence est une opération de communication politique ; le problème est que comme avec toute mesure de communication politique, le retour en arrière est difficile. Par exemple, j’estime personnellement que déployer l’armée dans les rues (dans le cadre du plan Vigipirate) ne sert pas à grand-chose, mais une fois que la mesure est prise, il est très difficile de revenir en arrière. Les services de renseignement, la police font leur travail, empêchent les attentats, dénouent les réseaux. Bien entendu, il importe de trouver des règles de vie ordinaire.

WM – Pourquoi la France est-elle cependant incapable de mettre en place une stratégie avec des mesures sur le long terme, à l’image de CONTEST au Royaume-Uni ?

Personne n’a la solution miracle contre le terrorisme. Une fois engage dans un cycle de terrorisme, on ne va pas s’en sortir comme ça. Il faut penser sur le long terme, bien entendu, ce qui implique trouver une solution contre la radicalisation, ainsi que tenir compte des effets de la politique étrangère. Une réflexion devrait être menée sur ces sujets et bien d’autres, et des améliorations sont toujours possibles. Pour autant, l’effort contre le terrorisme requiert aussi des mesures de protection immédiates, donc focalisées sur le court terme. L’un n’exclut pas l’autre. Il est important d’émettre des critiques, d’autant plus dans le cadre d’un état de droit, pour autant, j’estime qu’il est tout aussi crucial d’éviter les jugements à l’emporte-pièce. Vous évoquez l’exemple du Royaume-Uni ; les Britanniques ont eu la chance d’avoir été ces derniers temps moins touchés que la France ou l’Allemagne. Cependant, la France avait précédemment été épargnée pendant vingt ans tandis que l’on pointait du doigt la politique de Londres jugée trop laxiste à l’encontre des imams (et autres prêcheurs) radicaux. Bien entendu, il y a des choses qui ne marchent pas bien en France ; mais au fond, qui a la bonne stratégie ? La lutte contre le terrorisme n’est pas une science exacte.

Un soldat en patrouille sur l’esplanade du Trocadéro, haut-lieu touristique de Paris face à la Tour Eiffel. Crédit photo : AFP / Gonzalo Fuentes

WM – A l’issue du Brexit, la France restera l’unique Etat membre de l’UE disposant de l’arme nucléaire et disposant d’un siège permanent au Conseil de Sécurité de l’ONU. Cette situation place-t-elle Paris face à des responsabilités accrues en matière de politique extérieure ou de défense européenne ?

JDM – Non, pas tellement, dans la mesure où il est question de puissance. A ce titre, les Britanniques auront toujours un rôle important à jouer en sur le continent européen. Nous parlons après tout d’un Etat qui est un pilier de l’OTAN. Comme le soulignait fort justement Theresa May, « les Britanniques ont fait le choix de quitter l’UE mais pas de quitter l’Europe ». Du reste, je pense que l’impact auquel vous faites allusion est à relativiser : le Royaume-Uni ne jouait qu’un rôle limité au sein de l’UE en matière de défense et de sécurité extérieure. La coopération anti-terroriste ne sera pas non plus affectée, puisque les échanges de renseignement, notamment avec la France, ont lieu dans le cadre d’accords bilatéraux. A l’inverse, je ne suis pas non plus convaincu que le départ des Britanniques aura pour effet d’accélérer ces chantiers de diplomatie et de défense commune.

En résumé, je ne pense pas que le retrait de Londres aura grand impact sur l’UE dans un sens comme dans l’autre, et par conséquent les effets sur la France seront minimes. Le Brexit n’est pas bon pour l’ordre international, en termes de symbole et d’image. Mais d’un point de vue matériel, les effets seront limités.

WM – Eu égard aux nombreuses allégations de piratage informatique (émanant d’Etats ou d’autres entités) visant à perturber les récentes élections américaines, les services de renseignement français sont-ils aptes à faire face à une telle menace ? Les échéances électorales (présidentielles et législatives) approchent à grand pas.

JDM – Qui est capable de faire face à une cyber-attaque massive ? Je pense sincèrement que personne ne le peut à l’heure actuelle, pas sur une telle échelle (massive).

Toutefois, la France a conscience du problème et a des moyens pour se défendre. Une réunion du Conseil de défense et de sécurité nationale a eu lieu à l’Elysée le mercredi 1er Mars au cours duquel la question a été évoquée. Ce sujet est régulièrement abordé dans les médias, ne serait-ce que parce qu’il importe de sensibiliser le public a la réalité du problème. Par exemple, le terme ‘cyberattaque’ regroupe plusieurs niveaux. D’abord, les réseaux sociaux. Il s’agit ici de propagande, mais nous sommes aussi dans le cadre de la liberté d’expression. Le souci n’est pas tant que ces rumeurs proviennent de sources proches du Kremlin (RT ou Sputnik). Au fond, ce dont on parle, c’est de « soft power », or nombre de puissances occidentales (USA) font de même. Les Occidentaux n’ont aujourd’hui plus le monopole de la puissance et de la légitimité, les deux sont contestés. Non, le problème tient plutôt au fait qu’une partie de l’opinion publique ici, en France, souscrive à ces ‘trolls’ diffuses par les médias russes pro-gouvernementaux. Le second niveau est celui des attaques informatiques qui peuvent bloquer les sites. Encore une fois, il existe des moyens d’y parer, dans la mesure du possible. Enfin, le dernier niveau, le vrai piratage, est le vol de documents confidentiels (données et autres) dans un but précis. En France, nous n’avons pas – encore ? – eu de fuite à l’image de l’affaire Wikileaks, mais cela peut arriver.

Il importe de ne pas se faire une représentation fantasmatique du piratage informatique, au contraire, avoir une approche réaliste et concrète. Par exemple, le public ne s’est jamais plaint de Wikileaks. Par ailleurs, n’oubliez pas que le vote électronique n’a qu’un rôle extrêmement limité dans le système électoral français ; seuls les Français de l’étranger peuvent y avoir recours et dans le seul cadre des élections législatives. Au final, c’est bel et bien l’électorat qui décide, puisque le piratage du scrutin n’est pas possible. Le problème encore une fois est qu’une partie de cet électorat adhère aux trolls de la presse russe.

Depuis cette interview, le gouvernement a annoncé Vendredi 3 mars la suspension du vote électronique, par précaution pour éviter tout risque de piratage. 

Cet article a été traduit en français par William Moray. Vous pouvez trouver la version anglaise ici.

Feature image source: http://www.lopinion.fr/blog/secret-defense

Image 1 Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Paris_-_palais_de_l’%C3%89lys%C3%A9e_-_cour_05.JPG

Image 2 Source: http://www.abc.net.au/news/image/6009862-3×2-940×627.jpg

Strife Series on Counterterrorism and Human Rights, Part V – A perpetual state of emergency: the case of France

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By: Silvia Sclafani

© AFP / Lionel Bonaventure | Police patrol in Paris on November 14, 2015 at the Eiffel Tower, which has been closed to the public following a series of coordinated attacks in and around Paris late November 13, that left at least 128 people dead.

In times of crisis, governments often impose a state of emergency in which national security takes priority over individual rights originally safeguarded by the state. A state of emergency and the ensuing heightened security measures are intended to last for a short period, during which the government attempts to secure the state and restore order after facing imminent danger. In the case of France, a state of emergency is declared by the President with approval by the Council of Ministers in cases of ‘imminent danger arising from grave attacks on the public order, or circumstances demonstrating public calamity.’ [1] However, the renewal of the state of emergency in France has had a minimal effect on averting terrorist threats and has had disproportionately affected citizens of migrant backgrounds as the extended powers of search, seizure and detention have led to profiling and potential abuse.

Current State of Emergency in France

Since the terrorist attacks in Paris (in 2015) and in Nice (in 2016), France has been under a continued state of emergency with no clear end in sight. After the initial Charlie Hebdo attacks in January 2015, President François Hollande declared a state of emergency in Paris. This was then extended to a nationwide state of emergency in November 2015 after the second terror attack on various locations throughout Paris, which killed 130 people.[2] Since the Nice attacks in 2016, this nationwide-state of emergency has been maintained and recently extended by French lawmakers until after the 2017 elections.

The current state of emergency law allows the government greater policing powers and the ability to conduct searches without warrants, ‘shut down demonstrations, impose curfews, confiscate weapons, and put people under house arrest.’ Given the increasing frequency of terror attacks, France has tightened existing counter-terror measures to decrease the likelihood of yet another terrorist attack against the nation. The French government voted to write the state of emergency law into the constitution as of February of 2016 which expands policing powers even further. The ensuing proposal to ban individuals holding double citizenships of their French one – if convicted of terrorism-related offences – also sparked serious debate. Considering that most French citizens with dual citizenship come from migrant backgrounds, fears that this could lead to higher incidences of migrants being treated as ‘second-class citizens’ rose. President Hollande withdrew this proposal after it caused much backlash and controversy.

Implications for human rights

The state of emergency has proven to have negative effects on human rights. Most notably, these negative consequences affect French Muslim and North African populations, as they make up the majority of those who have been subjected to searches and placed under house arrest. This has led to increased profiling as well as tensions between ethnic French and Arab communities. According to Human Rights Watch, ‘This abuse has traumatized families and tarnished reputations, leaving targets feeling like second-class citizens.’ Bernard Cazeneuve, the French Interior Minister released a statement after the November 2015 attacks condemning the abuse of these expanded powers: some restaurants and homes near Paris were raided and had their doors broken by the police. In another report, the police broke into the home of a couple in the Barbés district in Paris and began beating two men. The police detained the couple and claimed they acted because they heard them use the term ‘Daesh.’ The use of violence and increased suspicion deny these people basic rights such as security and due process.

Effects on security remain questionable  

Despite the dramatic efforts of the French government to identify terror suspects through its emergency measures, only 7 percent of 4,000 searches under the emergency laws have led to court proceedings. Furthermore, post-November 2015 attacks, between 350 and 400 people were placed under house arrest; yet, the Paris counter-terrorism office only opened five terrorism-related investigations during the same period. In reality, French legislation offers favourable powers to its judiciary to proceed with prosecutions against terrorist suspects. The low percentage of court hearings resulting out of measures from the state of emergency laws poses serious questions about their effectiveness. A study conducted by a Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry found the continued state of emergencies as having a ‘limited impact’ on security. In terms of the deployment of soldiers at heritage and religious sites, the committee has questioned their usefulness as well. Under operation ‘Sentinelle’, combat troops are deployed to patrol and protect heritage sites as well as religious sites, streets, and art galleries. With over 10,000 troops across France, 6,500 have been deployed in the Paris area alone. Their presence and effectiveness in combatting terrorism have come into question. For some, uniformed soldiers with guns normalise a militarised state. While their presence provides more comfort to the locals as well as tourists, it does not help counter-terrorism efforts, as groups like ISIS have proven to be more sporadic rather than symbolic in their targets.

The populations most affected by these extended policing powers reside in France’s suburbs or banlieues. The term ‘banlieue’ has become a pejorative term referring to poorer suburbs that are located on the outskirts of French cities contain majority migrant as well as Arab populations. These populations find themselves increasingly isolated and stigmatised by society. As these heightened policing measures are increasingly used in the banlieues of France, there is a deterioration of trust between the French-Arab communities and law enforcement. Without a positive relationship between these communities and the government, it makes it more difficult to gather intelligence concerning radicalisation. Therefore, the continued usage of the state of emergency is not effective if the government fails to develop adequate community-based preventive measures. The persistence of the state of emergency is normalising extreme security measures in the name of national security while stripping some citizens of their basic constitutional rights. In their counter-terrorism efforts, lawmakers place too much focus on stricter security without regard for ameliorating social divisions and problems. Instead, the government should focus on the de-stigmatisation of the banlieues, ensure outreach to local Mosques, and increase prison imams. The state of emergency and its policies are exacerbating societal divisions and must change in 2017.

Silvia Sclafani (@ssclafani24) is completing a master’s degree in International Conflict Studies at the Department of War Studies at King’s College London. She has a bachelor’s degree in International Affairs from the George Washington University and can be reached at ssclafani24@gmail.com.

Notes:

[1] Daniel Severson. ‘State of Emergency: How the Paris Attacks Expanded France’s Police Powers,’ Lawfare. November 15, 2015.

[2] Ibid.

Image Source: http://www.france24.com/en/20151115-what-does-france-state-emergency-mean

President Hollande’s Nonchalance with ‘Classified Information’

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By: William Moray

French President François Hollande during the 11th November commemorations in 2002
French President François Hollande during the 11th November commemorations in 2002

A book written by two French journalists has been causing mayhem in France’s political arena for the past month. Published on October 11, 2016, A President Should Not Say That – Secrets of Five Years in Office was written by Gérard Davet and Fabrice Lhomme, who both work for the daily newspaper Le Monde. The book is the result of sixty interviews conducted over five years with the French President, François Hollande. It covers a wide variety of subjects, more or less sensitive, and also includes secret information about special operations. This case constitutes a classic example of the politicisation of intelligence through the publication of classified information. Moreover, it illustrates the indifference in which the French president holds the concept of Secret Défense – ‘top secret’ – and thus, potentially compromising his country’s national interests.

Secrecy key to covert actions

As the title of the book suggests, Hollande has made public use of data which is highly confidential, regarding the assassination of terrorists. For instance, the public learned that Hollande ordered ‘at least’ four targeted killings. These acts are part of what is called a disruptive action – better known under the American lexicon as ‘covert action’. Covert action may consist of any of the following four operations: propaganda, political action, information warfare or paramilitary activities, which includes assassination.[1] Information is allegedly the currency of intelligence services. Indeed, the purpose of intelligence, as Richard Betts argues, is to ‘facilitate a coherent decision in an incoherent environment’[2], which requires the collection and analysis of information. However, Len Scott suggests that the emphasis of intelligence work can shift to something else: secrecy. To that extent, it is natural that covert actions fall within the responsibility of intelligence, as it allows a state to preserve secrecy and/or plausible deniability when conducting such activities.[3]

It is undeniable that a Head of State ordering the execution of individuals raises ethical considerations, such as the violation of human rights and international law. For instance, Article 11 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) states that every individual has the right to the presumption of innocence as well as fair trial. This issue is worsened because covert operations had been conducted overseas and as such, infringe a fundamental principle of the current international order: the state sovereignty of a foreign country[4]. However, the purpose of this article is not to discuss or repeal such analyses, but rather to focus on another aspect – the importance of secrecy.

The problem, therefore, is not Hollande’s admission per se that the French intelligence machinery is involved in targeted assassinations. It is known that within the foreign intelligence service – the General-Directorate for External Security (DGSE) – there exists a special unit dedicated to black operations. Among them are ‘Homo Operations’ (opérations Homo); in other words, assassination. Former operatives of this unit, Action Service, have published books revealing some classified details. [5] The issue is rather that the Head of State purposely gave some classified information to the book’s authors, i.e. the targeted killing of at least four terrorists out of an alleged list of seventeen potential targets.

Politicisation of intelligence vs national interest

The motives behind Hollande’s act lie within French domestic politics. Indeed, France will elect its President next year. At the time, Hollande intended to be re-elected, but he faced terrible approval ratings, a record low of 4% as of last month, according to a poll conducted for Le Monde. The argument can thus be made that the Hollande was desperately looking for a solution to such issues and assumed that transparency via the disclosure of classified information would help him to appear as a strong leader and thus boost his popularity. Government Spokesman Stéphane Le Foll has claimed that the revelations published in the book prove that Hollande is ‘an honest man’.  Obviously, such a declaration is highly debatable, for two reasons. First, many political figures, including from his majority, denounced Hollande’s revelations to the authors, thus making his position even more difficult. Second, MPs of the right-wing conservative opposition have taken this opportunity to call for his impeachment, although with very little chance of success.

Paul Pillar defines politicisation as ‘the compromise of the objectivity of intelligence, or of how intelligence is used, to serve policy or political aims’ [6]; this process can take different forms, one of which is the publication [7]. Many politicians in the past have used it in the past, and it is not only limited to President Hollande’s case. Among one of them is the US Barack Obama took credit of Osama bin Laden’s death, at the hand of CIA operatives and Special Forces. This operation – codenamed ‘Neptune’s Spear’ – occurred on the May 2, 2011, one year before the American Presidential election was to take place. Thus, Obama’s popularity increased, but at the cost of deteriorated relations between America and Pakistan.

There is a strong analogy between both situations in terms of motives. Amidst the rhetoric of anti-terrorist sentiments in France, Hollande chose to publicize the killing of four jihadists, in hopes that this would garner him a better rating in the polls. Unfortunately, in disclosing classified information regarding ‘Homo Operations’ to journalists, Hollande has betrayed the core tenants of national secrecy of which he was sworn to protect, and also demonstrated that he did not hesitate to politicise intelligence. Put differently, the head of French state possibly infringed the raison d’État by putting Paris in a potentially delicate diplomatic dilemma, having lost the advantage of plausible deniability. He had to choose between protecting the national interest and prioritizing his own political agenda; he chose the poorer of the two options. The irony is that in the end, this public relations scheme did not prove to serve him well, as he announced on the 1st of December that he would not seek a second term.

William Moray is the BA representative for Strife Blog and he is a final year undergraduate in War Studies at King’s College London. His research interests include intelligence and the history of intelligence, terrorism, nuclear proliferation and the relations between Russia and the West. You can follow him @WilliamMoray

Notes:

[1] William J. Daugherty, ‘The Role of Covert Action’ in Handbook of Intelligence Studies, ed. Loch K. Johnson, (London: Routlege, 2009), pp. 281 – 283

[2] Richard K. Betts, ‘Analysis, War, and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures Are inevitable’, World Politics, Vol.31, No. 1 (Oct. 1978), p. 69, DOI: 10.2307/2009967

[3]  Len Scott, ‘Secret Intelligence, Covert Action and Clandestine Diplomacy’, Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 19, No. 2 (2004), p. 322

[4] As stated in the article 2, par. 1 of the United Nations Charter http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-i/

[5] Pierre Siramy, Laurent Léger, ’25 ans dans les Services Secrets’ (Paris : Flammarion, 2010) Pierre Martinet, ‘DGSE Service Action – Un Agent Sort de l’Ombre’ (Paris : J’ai Lu, 2012)

[6] Paul R. Pillar, ‘The Perils of Politicization’, in The Oxford Handbook of National Security Intelligence, ed. Lock Johnson (Oxford: 2010), p. 473.

[7] Ibid, p. 474

Image credit: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Fran%C3%A7ois_Hollande_(1).JPG

France: Aftershocks of Terror Attacks

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By: Nicolas Seidman

A woman stands by a makeshift memorial in tribute to the victims of the deadly Bastille Day attack at the Promenade des Anglais in Nice (AFP Photo/Valery Hache)
A woman stands by a makeshift memorial in tribute to the victims of the deadly Bastille Day attack at the Promenade des Anglais in Nice (AFP Photo/Valery Hache)

This past year has been an unequivocal security challenge to the French government. November 13th marks the one-year anniversary of the Paris attacks, which left 130 dead and 368 wounded, as well as the State of emergency, still currently in place. France has sustained three additional significant terrorist attacks since last November, adding over 500 people to the list of casualties. [1] In response, the government has made efforts to improve its prosecution legislation, reform its internal intelligence networks, and expand its counter-violent extremism programs. Despite such well-intentioned actions, this progress has been largely negligible. The failure to implement a coherent counter-terrorism strategy rather than rely on emergency measures continues to make France vulnerable to future Paris style attacks.

Governmental responses to the attack

The French government has improved some of its counter-terrorism capabilities since the Bataclan attack, yet must pass legislation to better address the security concerns that the state of emergency cannot. The State of emergency includes the ability of the police to conduct mass raids, heighten surveillance, detain and put under house arrest all those deemed potential threats to the State.[2] This has led to over 3,000 raids, 743 weapons seized, 341 individuals in police custody, 571 judicial proceedings, 407 house arrests and 10 mosques closed for extremist ties.[3] Despite the impressive numbers, only 28 individuals have been prosecuted under anti-terrorism legislation since February and has not increased considerably since.

Soldiers patrols on the Promenade des Anglais in Nice, southern France, Wednesday, July 20, 2016. Joggers, cyclists and sun-seekers are back on Nice's famed Riviera coast, a further sign of normal life returning on the Promenade des Anglais where dozens were killed in last week's Bastille Day truck attack. Photo by Dan Kitwood/Getty Images
Soldiers patrols on the Promenade des Anglais in Nice, southern France, Wednesday, July 20, 2016. Joggers, cyclists and sun-seekers are back on Nice’s famed Riviera coast, a further sign of normal life returning on the Promenade des Anglais where dozens were killed in last week’s Bastille Day truck attack. Photo by Dan Kitwood/Getty Images

The failure to identify and correctly prosecute suspected terrorists highlights the necessity for a revamped counter-terrorism strategy. To this end, instances such as the deadly attack at a Church in Normandy in July underlines the failure of the State of emergency to provide a credible counter-terrorism strategy. The perpetrator was put under house arrest after trying to join ISIS twice. Despite the clear presence of a potential foreign fighter the assailant was allowed four hours to leave his premises every morning.[4] During this time, he was able to commit a terror attack in the church, killing a priest and injuring three others.[5]

France must continue to pass legislation to address the limitation of its counter-terrorism capabilities, such as internal intelligence reform and prosecution of terrorists. The government has begun, in some ways, to understand the issues with the State of Emergency. It has advanced to legislate twice on counter-terrorism since the November attacks; the law of surveillance of international electronic communications and the law against organized crime, terrorism, and their finance. The first law adds a new article to the domestic security law which facilitates surveillance of devices in suspect of terrorism-related activity. The second law provides prosecutors and judges with increased investigative power, allowing for more operation leeway in relation to the financing of organized crime and terrorism, as these two are often inter-related. These laws will likely enable a long-term solution. 

Deadlock

Most of the government’s failure in formulating an effective counter-terrorism strategy is attributed to the disagreement between policy-makers. Most notable example of this was after the release of a parliamentary inquiry into the State’s method of fighting against terrorism since January 2015.[6] French Parliamentarian Mr. Fenech, who spearheaded the inquiry, underlined the importance of a streamlined, more effective national intelligence agency. The inquiry highlighted the failure of intelligence agencies to maintain surveillance of Said Kouachi (one of the Charlie Hebdo assailants) when he moved from Paris to Rouen and failed to prevent Samy Amimour (one of the Bataclan assailants) from leaving to Syria despite being black-listed.[7] He proposed to use the framework underlying the National Counter-Intelligence Centre (NCTC), created post-9/11 by the United States for a new agency.

However, the current Minister of the Interior refuses to recognize the significance of the report, emphasizing that a national agency would create communication fog between agencies. Without a coherent strategy, the deadlock between MPs will only widen even further, and France will continue to be vulnerable to another Paris-style attack.

Clear and present danger

Despite the setbacks French counter-terrorism strategy has made some progress on its counter-violent extremism programs. Prisons have provided a breeding ground for the radicalization of inmates. It is estimated that 68 percent of foreign fighters from France, who left to join ISIS, have served prison time.[8] Five detention centres have been created specifically to address radicalized individuals. Additionally, 60 Muslim councilors have been recruited to maintain the narrative of peace in the Islamic faith.

The jihadists of tomorrow

France now faces a greater diversity of terrorist profiles as oppose to those of the November attacks. More specifically, the country can expect to witness two, more prominent, types to emerge. The first are returning foreign fighters from Iraq and Syria. With the decline in the territory of the ISIS, the European Jihadists are due to return to their native countries. The majority of these foreign fighters’ hail from France. These fighters bring back with them both greater skills and motivation than their home-grown counterparts. Second are ‘flash-to-bang’ radicalized individuals.[9] These are seen in perpetrators like the one from the Nice attack. These individuals are not long-time proponents to the jihadist ideology. Instead, they become radicalized within weeks, not months. This impulsive radicalization makes it harder for these individuals to get flagged by security services and thus impervious to their pre-emptive measures.

Conclusion

The perception of public insecurity in France shifts the narrative in favour of the terrorists. Its citizens must be resilient and go about their lives un-wavered by the threats of terrorism. The government can begin by cultivating a coherent strategy that addresses the changing landscape of the threat, far from the State of emergency that has failed to serve it well.

Nicolas Seidman is a second-year War Studies undergraduate at King’s College London. He previously worked as a research assistant for the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT) in Israel. His main areas of focus are Islamic radicalization in France, terrorist group cooperation, and COIN operations in the Sahel.

Notes:

[1] Magnaville (2 deaths), Nice (86 deaths and 434 wounded), and Normandy (1 death and 3 injured)

[2] “Mise En œuvre De L’état D’urgence Sur Le Territoire National / L’actu Du Ministère / Actualités – Ministère De L’Intérieur.” Http://www.interieur.gouv.fr/Actualites/L-actu-du-Ministere/Mise-en-aeuvre-de-l-etat-d-urgence-sur-le-territoire-national. Accessed March 9, 2016. http://www.interieur.gouv.fr/Actualites/L-actu-du-Ministere/Mise-en-aeuvre-de-l-etat-d-urgence-sur-le-territoire-national.

[3] “Prorogation De L’état D’urgence / L’actu Du Ministère / Actualités – Ministère De L’Intérieur.” Http://www.interieur.gouv.fr/Actualites/L-actu-du-Ministere/Prorogation-de-l-etat-d-urgence2, www.interieur.gouv.fr/Actualites/L-actu-du-Ministere/Prorogation-de-l-etat-d-urgence2

[4] “EN DIRECT – Saint-Etienne-du-Rouvray : L’un Des Assassins était Connu Des Services Antiterroristes.” Le Figaro, www.lefigaro.fr/actualite-france/2016/07/26/01016-20160726LIVWWW00086-prise-d-otage-en-cours-dans-une-eglise-de-saint-etienne-du-rouvray-pres-de-rouen.php

[5] “Saint-Etienne-du-Rouvray: L’un Des Auteurs était Connu Des Services Antiterroristes.” BFMTV, www.bfmtv.com/societe/en-direct-prise-d-otage-a-saint-etienne-du-rouvray-un-otage-est-mort-les-auteurs-abattus-par-la-police-1019683.html#content/contribution/edit

[6] “N° 3922 Tome 1 – Rapport D’enquête Relative Aux Moyens Mis En oeuvre Par L’Etat Pour Lutter Contre Le Terrorisme Depuis Le 7 Janvier 2015.” Assemblée Nationale ~ Les Députés, Le Vote De La Loi, Le Parlement Français, www.assemblee-nationale.fr/14/rap-enq/r3922-t1.asp

[7] “Commission D’enquête Sur Les Attentats: La France N’était “pas à La Hauteur” | Public Sénat.” Public Sénat, www.publicsenat.fr/lcp/politique/commission-denquete-attentats-france-netait-pas-hauteur-1415924

[8] “Radicalisation En France – Infogram, Charts & Infographics.” Create Online Charts & Infographics | Infogr.am, infogr.am/radicalisation_en_france4.

[9] “How Nice Represents Both the Dumbing Down and Growing Danger of Terror – The Washington Post.” Washington Post, www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/how-nice-represents-both-the-dumbing-down-and-growing-danger-of-terror/2016/07/18/cd89c01c-4aa3-11e6-90a8-fb84201e0645_story.html

Image 1 credit: http://www.leparisien.fr/societe/attentat-de-nice-chez-les-moins-de-30-ans-la-tristesse-l-emporte-sur-la-peur-22-07-2016-5986921.php

Image 2 credit: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/08/05/pictures-of-the-day-5-august-2016/french-soldiers-patrol-the-promenade-des-anglais-in-nice-france/

Feature image credit: http://www.teenvogue.com/gallery/paris-attack-image-slideshow

France’s Greatest Security Challenge: The Identity Crisis

by

By: Anastasia Beck

Often such images feed into the media’s negative narrative of the Parisian suburbs.
Often such images feed into the media’s negative narrative of the Parisian suburbs.

In only two years, France has suffered four terrorist attacks–two in Paris and one each in Nice and Rouen–in which 229 people died. The perpetrators of the Charlie Hebdo attacks, Cherif and Said and one of the perpetrators of the November attacks, Samy Amimour, had lived in the infamous suburbs of Paris – ‘la banlieue’. Since the attacks, the focus of media and government has shifted towards these areas which are prone to high levels of crime and now appear to be potential hotbeds for radicalisation.[1]  The process of radicalisation is a multifaceted one, but the issue of the ‘identity crisis’ as a precursor to radicalisation is one that  particularly emanates from ‘la banlieue’.  This identity crisis is a sense of a lack of belonging to one’s country of origin and one’s country of domicile.

France is home to numerous immigrant communities, many of whom live in the suburbs  of Paris due to the low cost of living; however, these suburbs are known for being riddled with poverty, unemployment, substandard educational opportunities, and crime.  Unemployment in such  suburbs is at a record 40 percent, compared to the average of under 10 percent in France.[2],[3]

Second-generation immigrants living in these suburbs face a degree of social discrimination given that schools in these areas tend to perform at lower levels than France’s national average. This is partly due to teachers preferring to be allocated to schools in more affluent areas, resulting in a lack of school teachers to accommodate a large suburban population.  Coupled with a lack of attention to individual students, children remain disincentivised to excel academically. This puts suburban youths at a competitive disadvantage in attaining university places in France.

Such problems are exacerbated when individuals from ‘la banlieue’ look for work as well. For long, employers have been known to discriminate against applicant addresses that are located in ‘la banlieue‘. This is partly caused by the nature of the media’s portrayal of the suburbs – often only reporting on them when there are riots, murders, or cars set alight.[5]  The basis for discrimination also extends to the names of the applicants.  Many immigrant communities living in les banlieues originate from North Africa and the Middle East, and employers often disregard applicants with minority-sounding names.[6]

The Kouachi brothers were known to have lived in ‘la banlieue’.
The Kouachi brothers were known to have lived in ‘la banlieue’.

People living in the suburbs feel shunned by society and are unable to adopt a French identity. Additionally, children of immigrants may have had little contact with their family’s country of origin. When a terrorist organisation recruits individuals, they are able to provide a sense of belonging to people who suffer from such an identity crisis.[8]  Recruiters entice people by offering them solidarity and a feeling of camaraderie.  Through this subtle process of radicalisation, these suburban residents turn to terrorism.

Government funding could be directed towards the upkeep of the suburbs, which are known for being unpleasant places to live in. Better housing and environment would boost morale and encourage the residents of the suburbs to look after the buildings and green spaces, and instil a sense of communal pride amongst the residents.

Funding can also be directed towards establishing youth programmes.  Sports centres, such as rugby or football clubs, community work, or working with government authorities will drive youngsters to interact frequently and partake in community activities. Currently, levels of criminality and drug-selling are rampant as many youths partake in such activities as a means of income. Youth programmes will encourage individuals to ‘stay off the streets’ and engage in legal activities. Working with government authorities may help alleviate the binary notions of  ‘us versus them.’ Otherwise, young adults from immigrant families may feel targeted by police because of their religion or skin colour, which may push them further towards radicalisation.[9] Exposure to authorities in a positive manner can help build a constructive relationship. Furthermore, police and law enforcement agencies will also need sensitivity training when approaching immigrant communities and make efforts to engage in a positive dialogue.

Due to the negative broadcasting of the suburbs by the media, the French government should take steps to create a discourse amongst media companies that encourage less biased reporting of ‘la banlieue’ to allow a wider audience to be positively exposed to the suburbs, helping to shift social perceptions of ‘la banlieue’.

By creating an environment where citizens of ‘la banlieue’ do not face discrimination based on their address and feeling part of a community which is fully integrated into French life, young adults may  identify more with France.  This will make it harder for recruiters to reach out to these individuals. If France hopes to contain this security threat in the long-term, it must persist with these measures.

Anastasia Beck is a postgraduate student with Intelligence and International Security in the Department of War Studies at King’s College London (KCL).  She holds a Bachelor’s degree in International Relations from King’s and has studied at the National University of Singapore and the Paris Institute of Political Studies (Sciences Po).  Anastasia’s research interests include counter-radicalisation, the role of intelligence in both peace and conflict, and the impacts of migration, both at the macro- and micro-levels.  She can be reached via email at anastasia.beck@kcl.ac.uk or beck.anastasia@yahoo.com.

Notes:

[1] C. Ruffini ‘Les Banlieue: Searching for the Seeds of Terror’ CBS News (Jan 2016)

[2] F. Keane ‘Charlie Hebdo attack: the suburbs and the suspects’ BBC News (Jan 2015)

[3] ‘France Unemployment Rate’ Trading Economics (July 2016)

[4] ‘Forgotten in the banlieues’ The Economist (Feb 2013)

[5] G. Packer “The Other France: Are the suburbs of Paris incubators of terrorism?” The New Yorker (Aug 2015)

[6] France’s Muslim Men Suffer CV Discrimination’ The Local FR (Oct 2015)

[7] C. Bremner ‘Battle of the banlieue: The French intifada by Andrew Hussey’ New Statesman (March 2014)

[8] D. Al Raffie ‘Social Identity Theory for Investigating Islamic Extremism in the Diaspora’ Journal of Strategic Security Vol.6 No. 4 (2013)

[9] A. Hamza ‘France struggles to address racial profiling by police’ France 24 (Oct 2013)

Image 1 credit: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/23/french-intifada-arab-banlieues-fighting-french-state-extract

Image 2 credit:http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/paris-terror-attack-isolation-fuels-the-anger-of-young-muslims-in-the-most-wretched-parisian-a6737081.html

Feature image credits: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/nov/13/memorial-plaques-unveiled-in-paris-on-first-anniversary-of-attacks#img-2