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President Hollande’s Nonchalance with ‘Classified Information’

By: William Moray

French President François Hollande during the 11th November commemorations in 2002
French President François Hollande during the 11th November commemorations in 2002

A book written by two French journalists has been causing mayhem in France’s political arena for the past month. Published on October 11, 2016, A President Should Not Say That – Secrets of Five Years in Office was written by Gérard Davet and Fabrice Lhomme, who both work for the daily newspaper Le Monde. The book is the result of sixty interviews conducted over five years with the French President, François Hollande. It covers a wide variety of subjects, more or less sensitive, and also includes secret information about special operations. This case constitutes a classic example of the politicisation of intelligence through the publication of classified information. Moreover, it illustrates the indifference in which the French president holds the concept of Secret Défense – ‘top secret’ – and thus, potentially compromising his country’s national interests.

Secrecy key to covert actions

As the title of the book suggests, Hollande has made public use of data which is highly confidential, regarding the assassination of terrorists. For instance, the public learned that Hollande ordered ‘at least’ four targeted killings. These acts are part of what is called a disruptive action – better known under the American lexicon as ‘covert action’. Covert action may consist of any of the following four operations: propaganda, political action, information warfare or paramilitary activities, which includes assassination.[1] Information is allegedly the currency of intelligence services. Indeed, the purpose of intelligence, as Richard Betts argues, is to ‘facilitate a coherent decision in an incoherent environment’[2], which requires the collection and analysis of information. However, Len Scott suggests that the emphasis of intelligence work can shift to something else: secrecy. To that extent, it is natural that covert actions fall within the responsibility of intelligence, as it allows a state to preserve secrecy and/or plausible deniability when conducting such activities.[3]

It is undeniable that a Head of State ordering the execution of individuals raises ethical considerations, such as the violation of human rights and international law. For instance, Article 11 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) states that every individual has the right to the presumption of innocence as well as fair trial. This issue is worsened because covert operations had been conducted overseas and as such, infringe a fundamental principle of the current international order: the state sovereignty of a foreign country[4]. However, the purpose of this article is not to discuss or repeal such analyses, but rather to focus on another aspect – the importance of secrecy.

The problem, therefore, is not Hollande’s admission per se that the French intelligence machinery is involved in targeted assassinations. It is known that within the foreign intelligence service – the General-Directorate for External Security (DGSE) – there exists a special unit dedicated to black operations. Among them are ‘Homo Operations’ (opérations Homo); in other words, assassination. Former operatives of this unit, Action Service, have published books revealing some classified details. [5] The issue is rather that the Head of State purposely gave some classified information to the book’s authors, i.e. the targeted killing of at least four terrorists out of an alleged list of seventeen potential targets.

Politicisation of intelligence vs national interest

The motives behind Hollande’s act lie within French domestic politics. Indeed, France will elect its President next year. At the time, Hollande intended to be re-elected, but he faced terrible approval ratings, a record low of 4% as of last month, according to a poll conducted for Le Monde. The argument can thus be made that the Hollande was desperately looking for a solution to such issues and assumed that transparency via the disclosure of classified information would help him to appear as a strong leader and thus boost his popularity. Government Spokesman Stéphane Le Foll has claimed that the revelations published in the book prove that Hollande is ‘an honest man’.  Obviously, such a declaration is highly debatable, for two reasons. First, many political figures, including from his majority, denounced Hollande’s revelations to the authors, thus making his position even more difficult. Second, MPs of the right-wing conservative opposition have taken this opportunity to call for his impeachment, although with very little chance of success.

Paul Pillar defines politicisation as ‘the compromise of the objectivity of intelligence, or of how intelligence is used, to serve policy or political aims’ [6]; this process can take different forms, one of which is the publication [7]. Many politicians in the past have used it in the past, and it is not only limited to President Hollande’s case. Among one of them is the US Barack Obama took credit of Osama bin Laden’s death, at the hand of CIA operatives and Special Forces. This operation – codenamed ‘Neptune’s Spear’ – occurred on the May 2, 2011, one year before the American Presidential election was to take place. Thus, Obama’s popularity increased, but at the cost of deteriorated relations between America and Pakistan.

There is a strong analogy between both situations in terms of motives. Amidst the rhetoric of anti-terrorist sentiments in France, Hollande chose to publicize the killing of four jihadists, in hopes that this would garner him a better rating in the polls. Unfortunately, in disclosing classified information regarding ‘Homo Operations’ to journalists, Hollande has betrayed the core tenants of national secrecy of which he was sworn to protect, and also demonstrated that he did not hesitate to politicise intelligence. Put differently, the head of French state possibly infringed the raison d’État by putting Paris in a potentially delicate diplomatic dilemma, having lost the advantage of plausible deniability. He had to choose between protecting the national interest and prioritizing his own political agenda; he chose the poorer of the two options. The irony is that in the end, this public relations scheme did not prove to serve him well, as he announced on the 1st of December that he would not seek a second term.

William Moray is the BA representative for Strife Blog and he is a final year undergraduate in War Studies at King’s College London. His research interests include intelligence and the history of intelligence, terrorism, nuclear proliferation and the relations between Russia and the West. You can follow him @WilliamMoray

Notes:

[1] William J. Daugherty, ‘The Role of Covert Action’ in Handbook of Intelligence Studies, ed. Loch K. Johnson, (London: Routlege, 2009), pp. 281 – 283

[2] Richard K. Betts, ‘Analysis, War, and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures Are inevitable’, World Politics, Vol.31, No. 1 (Oct. 1978), p. 69, DOI: 10.2307/2009967

[3]  Len Scott, ‘Secret Intelligence, Covert Action and Clandestine Diplomacy’, Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 19, No. 2 (2004), p. 322

[4] As stated in the article 2, par. 1 of the United Nations Charter http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-i/

[5] Pierre Siramy, Laurent Léger, ’25 ans dans les Services Secrets’ (Paris : Flammarion, 2010) Pierre Martinet, ‘DGSE Service Action – Un Agent Sort de l’Ombre’ (Paris : J’ai Lu, 2012)

[6] Paul R. Pillar, ‘The Perils of Politicization’, in The Oxford Handbook of National Security Intelligence, ed. Lock Johnson (Oxford: 2010), p. 473.

[7] Ibid, p. 474

Image credit: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Fran%C3%A7ois_Hollande_(1).JPG

France: Aftershocks of Terror Attacks

By: Nicolas Seidman

A woman stands by a makeshift memorial in tribute to the victims of the deadly Bastille Day attack at the Promenade des Anglais in Nice (AFP Photo/Valery Hache)
A woman stands by a makeshift memorial in tribute to the victims of the deadly Bastille Day attack at the Promenade des Anglais in Nice (AFP Photo/Valery Hache)

This past year has been an unequivocal security challenge to the French government. November 13th marks the one-year anniversary of the Paris attacks, which left 130 dead and 368 wounded, as well as the State of emergency, still currently in place. France has sustained three additional significant terrorist attacks since last November, adding over 500 people to the list of casualties. [1] In response, the government has made efforts to improve its prosecution legislation, reform its internal intelligence networks, and expand its counter-violent extremism programs. Despite such well-intentioned actions, this progress has been largely negligible. The failure to implement a coherent counter-terrorism strategy rather than rely on emergency measures continues to make France vulnerable to future Paris style attacks.

Governmental responses to the attack

The French government has improved some of its counter-terrorism capabilities since the Bataclan attack, yet must pass legislation to better address the security concerns that the state of emergency cannot. The State of emergency includes the ability of the police to conduct mass raids, heighten surveillance, detain and put under house arrest all those deemed potential threats to the State.[2] This has led to over 3,000 raids, 743 weapons seized, 341 individuals in police custody, 571 judicial proceedings, 407 house arrests and 10 mosques closed for extremist ties.[3] Despite the impressive numbers, only 28 individuals have been prosecuted under anti-terrorism legislation since February and has not increased considerably since.

Soldiers patrols on the Promenade des Anglais in Nice, southern France, Wednesday, July 20, 2016. Joggers, cyclists and sun-seekers are back on Nice's famed Riviera coast, a further sign of normal life returning on the Promenade des Anglais where dozens were killed in last week's Bastille Day truck attack. Photo by Dan Kitwood/Getty Images
Soldiers patrols on the Promenade des Anglais in Nice, southern France, Wednesday, July 20, 2016. Joggers, cyclists and sun-seekers are back on Nice’s famed Riviera coast, a further sign of normal life returning on the Promenade des Anglais where dozens were killed in last week’s Bastille Day truck attack. Photo by Dan Kitwood/Getty Images

The failure to identify and correctly prosecute suspected terrorists highlights the necessity for a revamped counter-terrorism strategy. To this end, instances such as the deadly attack at a Church in Normandy in July underlines the failure of the State of emergency to provide a credible counter-terrorism strategy. The perpetrator was put under house arrest after trying to join ISIS twice. Despite the clear presence of a potential foreign fighter the assailant was allowed four hours to leave his premises every morning.[4] During this time, he was able to commit a terror attack in the church, killing a priest and injuring three others.[5]

France must continue to pass legislation to address the limitation of its counter-terrorism capabilities, such as internal intelligence reform and prosecution of terrorists. The government has begun, in some ways, to understand the issues with the State of Emergency. It has advanced to legislate twice on counter-terrorism since the November attacks; the law of surveillance of international electronic communications and the law against organized crime, terrorism, and their finance. The first law adds a new article to the domestic security law which facilitates surveillance of devices in suspect of terrorism-related activity. The second law provides prosecutors and judges with increased investigative power, allowing for more operation leeway in relation to the financing of organized crime and terrorism, as these two are often inter-related. These laws will likely enable a long-term solution. 

Deadlock

Most of the government’s failure in formulating an effective counter-terrorism strategy is attributed to the disagreement between policy-makers. Most notable example of this was after the release of a parliamentary inquiry into the State’s method of fighting against terrorism since January 2015.[6] French Parliamentarian Mr. Fenech, who spearheaded the inquiry, underlined the importance of a streamlined, more effective national intelligence agency. The inquiry highlighted the failure of intelligence agencies to maintain surveillance of Said Kouachi (one of the Charlie Hebdo assailants) when he moved from Paris to Rouen and failed to prevent Samy Amimour (one of the Bataclan assailants) from leaving to Syria despite being black-listed.[7] He proposed to use the framework underlying the National Counter-Intelligence Centre (NCTC), created post-9/11 by the United States for a new agency.

However, the current Minister of the Interior refuses to recognize the significance of the report, emphasizing that a national agency would create communication fog between agencies. Without a coherent strategy, the deadlock between MPs will only widen even further, and France will continue to be vulnerable to another Paris-style attack.

Clear and present danger

Despite the setbacks French counter-terrorism strategy has made some progress on its counter-violent extremism programs. Prisons have provided a breeding ground for the radicalization of inmates. It is estimated that 68 percent of foreign fighters from France, who left to join ISIS, have served prison time.[8] Five detention centres have been created specifically to address radicalized individuals. Additionally, 60 Muslim councilors have been recruited to maintain the narrative of peace in the Islamic faith.

The jihadists of tomorrow

France now faces a greater diversity of terrorist profiles as oppose to those of the November attacks. More specifically, the country can expect to witness two, more prominent, types to emerge. The first are returning foreign fighters from Iraq and Syria. With the decline in the territory of the ISIS, the European Jihadists are due to return to their native countries. The majority of these foreign fighters’ hail from France. These fighters bring back with them both greater skills and motivation than their home-grown counterparts. Second are ‘flash-to-bang’ radicalized individuals.[9] These are seen in perpetrators like the one from the Nice attack. These individuals are not long-time proponents to the jihadist ideology. Instead, they become radicalized within weeks, not months. This impulsive radicalization makes it harder for these individuals to get flagged by security services and thus impervious to their pre-emptive measures.

Conclusion

The perception of public insecurity in France shifts the narrative in favour of the terrorists. Its citizens must be resilient and go about their lives un-wavered by the threats of terrorism. The government can begin by cultivating a coherent strategy that addresses the changing landscape of the threat, far from the State of emergency that has failed to serve it well.

Nicolas Seidman is a second-year War Studies undergraduate at King’s College London. He previously worked as a research assistant for the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT) in Israel. His main areas of focus are Islamic radicalization in France, terrorist group cooperation, and COIN operations in the Sahel.

Notes:

[1] Magnaville (2 deaths), Nice (86 deaths and 434 wounded), and Normandy (1 death and 3 injured)

[2] “Mise En œuvre De L’état D’urgence Sur Le Territoire National / L’actu Du Ministère / Actualités – Ministère De L’Intérieur.” Http://www.interieur.gouv.fr/Actualites/L-actu-du-Ministere/Mise-en-aeuvre-de-l-etat-d-urgence-sur-le-territoire-national. Accessed March 9, 2016. http://www.interieur.gouv.fr/Actualites/L-actu-du-Ministere/Mise-en-aeuvre-de-l-etat-d-urgence-sur-le-territoire-national.

[3] “Prorogation De L’état D’urgence / L’actu Du Ministère / Actualités – Ministère De L’Intérieur.” Http://www.interieur.gouv.fr/Actualites/L-actu-du-Ministere/Prorogation-de-l-etat-d-urgence2, www.interieur.gouv.fr/Actualites/L-actu-du-Ministere/Prorogation-de-l-etat-d-urgence2

[4] “EN DIRECT – Saint-Etienne-du-Rouvray : L’un Des Assassins était Connu Des Services Antiterroristes.” Le Figaro, www.lefigaro.fr/actualite-france/2016/07/26/01016-20160726LIVWWW00086-prise-d-otage-en-cours-dans-une-eglise-de-saint-etienne-du-rouvray-pres-de-rouen.php

[5] “Saint-Etienne-du-Rouvray: L’un Des Auteurs était Connu Des Services Antiterroristes.” BFMTV, www.bfmtv.com/societe/en-direct-prise-d-otage-a-saint-etienne-du-rouvray-un-otage-est-mort-les-auteurs-abattus-par-la-police-1019683.html#content/contribution/edit

[6] “N° 3922 Tome 1 – Rapport D’enquête Relative Aux Moyens Mis En oeuvre Par L’Etat Pour Lutter Contre Le Terrorisme Depuis Le 7 Janvier 2015.” Assemblée Nationale ~ Les Députés, Le Vote De La Loi, Le Parlement Français, www.assemblee-nationale.fr/14/rap-enq/r3922-t1.asp

[7] “Commission D’enquête Sur Les Attentats: La France N’était “pas à La Hauteur” | Public Sénat.” Public Sénat, www.publicsenat.fr/lcp/politique/commission-denquete-attentats-france-netait-pas-hauteur-1415924

[8] “Radicalisation En France – Infogram, Charts & Infographics.” Create Online Charts & Infographics | Infogr.am, infogr.am/radicalisation_en_france4.

[9] “How Nice Represents Both the Dumbing Down and Growing Danger of Terror – The Washington Post.” Washington Post, www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/how-nice-represents-both-the-dumbing-down-and-growing-danger-of-terror/2016/07/18/cd89c01c-4aa3-11e6-90a8-fb84201e0645_story.html

Image 1 credit: http://www.leparisien.fr/societe/attentat-de-nice-chez-les-moins-de-30-ans-la-tristesse-l-emporte-sur-la-peur-22-07-2016-5986921.php

Image 2 credit: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/08/05/pictures-of-the-day-5-august-2016/french-soldiers-patrol-the-promenade-des-anglais-in-nice-france/

Feature image credit: http://www.teenvogue.com/gallery/paris-attack-image-slideshow

France’s Greatest Security Challenge: The Identity Crisis

By: Anastasia Beck

Often such images feed into the media’s negative narrative of the Parisian suburbs.
Often such images feed into the media’s negative narrative of the Parisian suburbs.

In only two years, France has suffered four terrorist attacks–two in Paris and one each in Nice and Rouen–in which 229 people died. The perpetrators of the Charlie Hebdo attacks, Cherif and Said and one of the perpetrators of the November attacks, Samy Amimour, had lived in the infamous suburbs of Paris – ‘la banlieue’. Since the attacks, the focus of media and government has shifted towards these areas which are prone to high levels of crime and now appear to be potential hotbeds for radicalisation.[1]  The process of radicalisation is a multifaceted one, but the issue of the ‘identity crisis’ as a precursor to radicalisation is one that  particularly emanates from ‘la banlieue’.  This identity crisis is a sense of a lack of belonging to one’s country of origin and one’s country of domicile.

France is home to numerous immigrant communities, many of whom live in the suburbs  of Paris due to the low cost of living; however, these suburbs are known for being riddled with poverty, unemployment, substandard educational opportunities, and crime.  Unemployment in such  suburbs is at a record 40 percent, compared to the average of under 10 percent in France.[2],[3]

Second-generation immigrants living in these suburbs face a degree of social discrimination given that schools in these areas tend to perform at lower levels than France’s national average. This is partly due to teachers preferring to be allocated to schools in more affluent areas, resulting in a lack of school teachers to accommodate a large suburban population.  Coupled with a lack of attention to individual students, children remain disincentivised to excel academically. This puts suburban youths at a competitive disadvantage in attaining university places in France.

Such problems are exacerbated when individuals from ‘la banlieue’ look for work as well. For long, employers have been known to discriminate against applicant addresses that are located in ‘la banlieue‘. This is partly caused by the nature of the media’s portrayal of the suburbs – often only reporting on them when there are riots, murders, or cars set alight.[5]  The basis for discrimination also extends to the names of the applicants.  Many immigrant communities living in les banlieues originate from North Africa and the Middle East, and employers often disregard applicants with minority-sounding names.[6]

The Kouachi brothers were known to have lived in ‘la banlieue’.
The Kouachi brothers were known to have lived in ‘la banlieue’.

People living in the suburbs feel shunned by society and are unable to adopt a French identity. Additionally, children of immigrants may have had little contact with their family’s country of origin. When a terrorist organisation recruits individuals, they are able to provide a sense of belonging to people who suffer from such an identity crisis.[8]  Recruiters entice people by offering them solidarity and a feeling of camaraderie.  Through this subtle process of radicalisation, these suburban residents turn to terrorism.

Government funding could be directed towards the upkeep of the suburbs, which are known for being unpleasant places to live in. Better housing and environment would boost morale and encourage the residents of the suburbs to look after the buildings and green spaces, and instil a sense of communal pride amongst the residents.

Funding can also be directed towards establishing youth programmes.  Sports centres, such as rugby or football clubs, community work, or working with government authorities will drive youngsters to interact frequently and partake in community activities. Currently, levels of criminality and drug-selling are rampant as many youths partake in such activities as a means of income. Youth programmes will encourage individuals to ‘stay off the streets’ and engage in legal activities. Working with government authorities may help alleviate the binary notions of  ‘us versus them.’ Otherwise, young adults from immigrant families may feel targeted by police because of their religion or skin colour, which may push them further towards radicalisation.[9] Exposure to authorities in a positive manner can help build a constructive relationship. Furthermore, police and law enforcement agencies will also need sensitivity training when approaching immigrant communities and make efforts to engage in a positive dialogue.

Due to the negative broadcasting of the suburbs by the media, the French government should take steps to create a discourse amongst media companies that encourage less biased reporting of ‘la banlieue’ to allow a wider audience to be positively exposed to the suburbs, helping to shift social perceptions of ‘la banlieue’.

By creating an environment where citizens of ‘la banlieue’ do not face discrimination based on their address and feeling part of a community which is fully integrated into French life, young adults may  identify more with France.  This will make it harder for recruiters to reach out to these individuals. If France hopes to contain this security threat in the long-term, it must persist with these measures.

Anastasia Beck is a postgraduate student with Intelligence and International Security in the Department of War Studies at King’s College London (KCL).  She holds a Bachelor’s degree in International Relations from King’s and has studied at the National University of Singapore and the Paris Institute of Political Studies (Sciences Po).  Anastasia’s research interests include counter-radicalisation, the role of intelligence in both peace and conflict, and the impacts of migration, both at the macro- and micro-levels.  She can be reached via email at anastasia.beck@kcl.ac.uk or beck.anastasia@yahoo.com.

Notes:

[1] C. Ruffini ‘Les Banlieue: Searching for the Seeds of Terror’ CBS News (Jan 2016)

[2] F. Keane ‘Charlie Hebdo attack: the suburbs and the suspects’ BBC News (Jan 2015)

[3] ‘France Unemployment Rate’ Trading Economics (July 2016)

[4] ‘Forgotten in the banlieues’ The Economist (Feb 2013)

[5] G. Packer “The Other France: Are the suburbs of Paris incubators of terrorism?” The New Yorker (Aug 2015)

[6] France’s Muslim Men Suffer CV Discrimination’ The Local FR (Oct 2015)

[7] C. Bremner ‘Battle of the banlieue: The French intifada by Andrew Hussey’ New Statesman (March 2014)

[8] D. Al Raffie ‘Social Identity Theory for Investigating Islamic Extremism in the Diaspora’ Journal of Strategic Security Vol.6 No. 4 (2013)

[9] A. Hamza ‘France struggles to address racial profiling by police’ France 24 (Oct 2013)

Image 1 credit: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/23/french-intifada-arab-banlieues-fighting-french-state-extract

Image 2 credit:http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/paris-terror-attack-isolation-fuels-the-anger-of-young-muslims-in-the-most-wretched-parisian-a6737081.html

Feature image credits: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/nov/13/memorial-plaques-unveiled-in-paris-on-first-anniversary-of-attacks#img-2

Libya’s civil war & the importance of strategic sequencing

By: Robert Andrea

Secretary_Kerry_Sits_With_Italian_Foreign_Minister_Gentiloni_and_UN_Special_Representative_for_Libya_Kobler_at_the_Italian_Foreign_Ministry_in_Rome_(23090680244)
US Secretary of State John Kerry at a 2015 meeting for the future of Libya in Rome. Source: Wikimedia

One of the most overlooked aspects in strategic deliberations is that of sequencing. It is much more common for the ‘what’ and the ‘how’ of a policy to receive the lion’s share of analysis. Despite this, the order in which the segments of a strategy are implemented can often be just as important. And while this may not always be the case, the cost of not giving due consideration to sequence can be painfully high. The ongoing Libyan Civil War provides a contemporary case study into how important sequencing can end up being in the pursuit of strategic interests.

Concerning Libya

In the immediate term, Western states appear to see (based on the different types of policy approaches on the table) two broadly defined interests in Libya. One is resolving the civil war that has been ongoing since 2014. The second is counterterrorism, primarily with regard to the increasing presence in Libya of the so-called Islamic State, but also of groups like the AQ-linked Ansar al-Sharia.

In terms of the civil war, the international community (particularly the United States and European Union) is committed to a diplomatic resolution of the conflict via the UN-led peace process. Dealing with the counterterrorism issue, on the other hand, will almost definitely involve a more kinetic approach.

Without the proper sequencing of these respective policies, however, neither issue will be solved effectively. Worse still, the situation on the ground would likely deteriorate significantly if the major actors fail to appreciate this.

Civil war

Following the overthrow of Colonel Muammar al-Qaddafi by NATO-backed rebels in 2011, Libya has struggled to rebuild effective state institutions, culminating in another civil war in 2014. This current conflict has essentially been fought between two rival entities – both claiming to be the legitimate government of Libya – each with their respective loyalists.

On one hand, there is the General National Congress. Often referred to as the Tripoli government or the Libya Dawn Coalition, the General National Congress (GNC) is comprised largely of Islamist militias and political blocs including the Justice and Construction party – considered by some to be the Libyan branch of the Muslim Brotherhood. The GNC and its allied militias are backed by Qatar, Turkey, and Sudan.

The rival of the GNC is the Tobruk-based House of Representatives, alternatively known as the Council of Deputies or the Tobruk government. Comprised of supposedly secular-leaning opponents of the Islamist-dominated GNC, the House of Representatives (HoR) is internationally recognized as the legitimate elected government of Libya. The HoR also maintains the loyalty of General Khalifa Haftar and his loyalists in the Libyan National Army.

In an effort to end hostilities, a U.N.-led diplomatic effort has produced a roadmap towards reconciliation.

In January of this year, a Government of National Accord (GNA) was announced, which, it is hoped, will unite the warring factions. For security reasons, the GNA (led by chairman and prime minister Fayez al-Sarraj) was not able to enter Libya until 30 March of this year, when he landed in Tripoli. In a somewhat surprising move, the Tripoli-based GNC announced shortly thereafter that it would remove itself from power in favor of the U.N.-backed unity government.

As of yet, the HoR has not ratified the agreement, as certain clauses would call for Haftar to step down as their army chief.

New place. Same threat. Same policy.

Taking advantage of the chaos during the civil war, the Islamic State has managed to establish a major foothold in Libya. This presence includes, but is not limited to, control of the coastal city Sirte. Increasingly concerned about these developments, Western states have been mulling more direct military options to combat the growing jihadist threat in Libya.

Earlier this year, a U.S. airstrike against an Islamic State camp in Sabratha, western Libya, killed around 50 people, including Noureddine Chouchane. Chouchane is thought to have been a key player in the two attacks last year targeting a museum and a beach resort in Tunisia. The attacks have been claimed by the Islamic State. However, this was a fairly isolated operation and there has yet to be a sustained Western airstrike programme conducted in Libya.

In terms of ground forces, part of the agreement that led to the GNA includes plans for an Italian-led multinational force of 6,000 troops to be deployed to Libya. It is still unclear what part of that force will be specifically devoted to counterterrorist operations and, for now, it is still a theoretical force. There doesn’t appear to be any reports of conventional Western troops actually in Libya currently, though multiple reports do place U.S., U.K., and French special operations forces in the country.

The foregoing reveals nothing to suggest that the counterterrorism programme in Libya will consist of anything tactically different than the ones implemented (mostly by the United States) in places like Yemen, Syria, or Somalia: Drone/airstrikes as well as occasional direct action raids by special operations forces (SOF). As we have learned time and time again though, airstrikes and SOF operations alone are usually insufficient in countering jihadist insurgencies. In the absence of a sizeable deployment of conventional Western troops, partnership with local ground forces would additionally be required to make these airstrike/SOF programmes effective.

If examined purely at a tactical level, the disparate nature of the two policies (conflict resolution and counterterrorism) would theoretically allow them to be pursued concurrently. That would be a very serious mistake – doing so would essentially ignore sequencing considerations and would likely end in catastrophe.

Enter the role of sequencing

It is critical to the long term effectiveness of both the political solution to the civil war and the West’s counterterrorism programme in Libya that the diplomatic portion of the strategy be conducted first. Only after the civil war has ended and the Libyan factions reach a modicum of unity, should counterterrorist operations against the Islamic State and other groups begin.

Without reaching a settlement to the civil war first, there will not be a single unified Libyan state to serve as a local military partner to foreign-led counterterrorism efforts. Rather, the prevailing status of a martially factionalized Libya would be the environment in which these counterterrorism operations would have to take place. In such a situation, the West would probably be forced to pick a side in the domestic conflict to act as its partner. This would undoubtedly result in an even more protracted civil war. Only now, it would be a civil war in which Western forces might find themselves as a target.

In the event of such a scenario, it’s more than likely that the Western powers would choose to side with the HoR and, specifically, Haftar over the GNC. For one, the HoR and Haftar are favoured by close partners of the West in the Middle East, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates. Furthermore, the Libyan National Army, under the command of Haftar, has proven to be the most capable fighting force in the country and has already shown a willingness to fight the Islamic State.

However, Haftar is also predisposed to fighting Islamists in general. This includes the Islamist-dominated GNC, which he labels (in its entirety) as terrorists. A foreign intervention siding with their chief rival would almost assuredly incense and seriously threaten the GNC.

Not only would this be a death blow to the diplomatic efforts towards national reconciliation, it would also seriously hamper counterterrorism operations. If they were to feel threatened by an HoR backed with Western military support, it is more than conceivable that some of the more hardline elements in the GNC might make common cause with the very jihadist organisations being targeted. This should not be viewed as a hypothetical. Certain GNC-aligned elements already cooperate from time to time with these jihadist groups.

Take the Benghazi Revolutionary Shura Council as an example. The Benghazi Revolutionary Shura Council (BRSC) is one of the primary elements fighting Haftar’s forces in the east and has often allied with the GNC. Comprised of multiple Islamist militias, the BRSC is led by Ansar al-Sharia in Libya (ASL). Both ASL, the group behind the 2012 attack on the US consulate in Benghazi, and the BRSC at large have periodically cooperated with the Islamic State against Haftar’s forces.

This places the GNC only one degree of separation away from the Islamic State. This is not to say that in the event of a foreign counterterrorism intervention that the GNC would swear the bay’ah to the caliphate en masse. It is entirely plausible however, that at least some of these forces decide to enhance their level of cooperation with the Islamic State if they were to perceive the West’s backing of their arch rival, Haftar, as a threat.

Such a strategic blunder would leave foreign counterterrorism forces facing an already capable enemy, but now potentially reinforced with thousands of new fighters.

If the aforementioned scenario were to occur, the chances for a political settlement to the Libyan Civil War would evaporate almost instantly and the jihadist threat that Libya already poses to the West (particularly to Europe) would increase drastically. Or, to put it succinctly: It would be an unmitigated strategic failure for the West.

To their credit, both the Western states and the U.N.-supported unity government are trying their best to properly sequence their strategies in Libya. Italy, who will be leading the eventual international troop deployment, has said it will refuse to lead the operation until the GNA is ratified by all parties and the Libyan military command structure is clarified. Even more recently, the GNA itself called on all military factions to hold off on any military operation against Sirte until a unified military structure is established.

So it would seem that, for now, the policymakers handling the Libya file in the West are aware of the importance of taking sequence into account.

Conclusion

All of this is not to say that utilising proper sequencing will guarantee success in Libya. The road ahead contains a veritable minefield of challenges to reaching some semblance of stability. In such a complicated political and security landscape, there is nothing to say that the peace process and/or counterterrorism operations in Libya might not face serious challenges in the future. That said, while sequencing might not be the most stimulating aspect of policy analysis, as we see in the case of the Libyan Civil War, failure to fully appreciate its necessity could lead to disastrous consequences.

 

 

Robert Andrea is an incoming MA student in War Studies at King’s College London. His research interests include U.S. and Iranian foreign policy, diplomatic strategy, and proxy warfare. He can be found on Twitter at @Bob__Andrea

France’s State of emergency- fight against terror or liberty?

By: Nicolas Seidman

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A man is searched by police a few days after the Bataclan attacks. Source: Christian Hartmann/Reuters

“The end may justify the means as long as there is something that justifies the end.” -Leon Trotsky ‘Their morals and ours’

The 13th of November will, for many years to come, mark a day of remembrance in France. Where on that night in 2015 one hundred and thirty Frenchmen and women, along with hundreds of others, were either wounded or killed in six different locations in Paris.[1] That same night French President François Hollande implemented a nationwide state of emergency. A move that has not been seen since the Algerian war in 1961[2]. This decision was taken by the state to improve its capabilities to tackle terrorism. Clearly prior initiatives in counter-terrorism policy failed, such as the intrusive surveillance laws post-Charlie Hebdo attack[3]. However the state of emergency suspends vital key human rights for French citizens. Rights that ensure a fair democratic rule; basing itself on the crucial three foundations of liberty, equality and fraternity. Currently citizens lacking ties to radical Islamic jihadism are collateral damage in the fight against terrorism.[4] They are subject to raids, house arrests and mass surveillance.[5] State of emergencies are meant to be a temporary band-aid while the State finds a more suitable, less radical, long-term solution. Despite this men like Prime Minister Manuel Valls strive to extend and even implement it in the constitution.[6] The French government should therefore understand that continuing with the state of emergency is not the way forward for a stabilized France.

This State of emergency is going to permanently leave its mark on French society. The government has allocated extraordinary powers to law enforcement without judicial oversight[7]. It includes the ability of the police to conduct mass raids, press suppression, dismantle groups threatening public order, detain and put under house arrest all those deemed potential threats to the State.[8] This capability of the police has both great merits, as well as flaws. 10 Mosques have been closed due to incriminating evidence of weapons and explosives. 578 guns have been seized, 400 people have been put under house arrest and 395 people have been detained by the police[9]. The state of emergency has made the state safer and neutralized many potential threats to human life. But at what cost? Since the beginning of the State of emergency in November over 3,000 raids have been conducted[10]. Many of the raids concerned Islamic religious moderates[11]. A considerable number of raids that reflect the extent at which the government will go to capitalize on its power. The authorities were able to engage in these activities without the necessity of a warrant. In this manner law enforcement base themselves off of negligible concrete evidence and most of the time solely on suspicion[12]. According to Human Rights Watch, the majority of raids on homes, businesses and mosques were unlawful[13]. Raids not only causes physical damage to private and religious property, but also to the individual[14]. More times than not damaging both their personal as well as social lives. Many lost their jobs, experienced anxiety and understandably sparked a sense of betrayal by the government[15].

The state of emergency is showing itself to be inefficient by indirectly dragging individuals, not involved with extremism, into the fight. Between the months of November to January there had been 563 judicial proceedings concerning offences against the state[16]. Despite the focus on counter-terrorism only 28 out of these 563 offences were considered terror related[17]. A far cry from prosecuting terrorists. The majority of these offences were related to everyday organized crime. Over 300 those prosecutions were drug or arms trafficking related[18]. The government has also used its power directly in non-terror related ways. During the COP21 climate conference in Paris 27 environmentalist activists were put under house arrest.[19]This was done despite their lack of jihadi radicalism terrorist intentions[20]. The Prime Minister explicitly expressed that the state of emergency would stay in place until Daesh is no longer a threat .[21] The real target are therefore individuals connected to this so called Islamic State. Hence, can the cause be considered just if those most targeted don’t fit in this description? The power allocated to the government can be seen as inefficient and a cause for extensive collateral damage. Therefore, on the short run, these policies may allow to detain current ‘radicals’ and seize weapons, but what does the future hold?

A future of split French identity

If a state no longer considers you as a citizen and does not respect your rights, then what is the point of abiding by its rules? What if the State does not keep its promise of a fair society? The religious moderates, who find themselves in the crossfire of the law, might be less inclined to empathise with the State. They are, however, are not the only ones that may feel betrayed. The ‘Projet de loi constitutionnelle de protection de la nation’[22] is a bill aims to strip French citizens, with dual-nationality, of their French citizenship if convicted of terrorism[23]. This would create, for lack of a better word, a second-class citizen. Someone that has been deprived of a certain right due to her/his position in society. This is not the view sprouting only from human and civil rights groups, but also from policymakers too. Christiane Taubira, the Minister of Justice, resigned due to her unwillingness to implement such a discriminatory bill[24]. She served four long years regardless of political instability in her party, racial remarks from the far-right for being black[25] and fought against major parties to pass the bill for the right to same-sex marriage[26]. Despite her dedication she would rather walk away from a position she dedicated herself to than implement a bill. This is a tell-tale sign the government is treading into waters it should not be in.

Do the ends justify the means?

The State of emergency is an effective tool in preventing terrorist attacks in the short term. However, the government is shooting itself in the foot if it is trying to maintain its ideological freedom and democracy. The freedom of privacy offered to their citizens is diminishing. Continuous raids, house arrests and mass surveillance offer no prospect of securing personal affairs from the government. The freedom of displacement can no longer be ensured when suspects are needed to report to the police three times a day to ensure authorities they have not left the country. Equal rights no longer persist as citizens are being targeted for their religious faith and especially when some of them are considered second class citizens. Unrest is beginning to stirrup amongst many who find the acts of the government non-democratic[27]. Protests broke-out at the end of January, spanning 70 towns, involving thousands of protesters. The Fraternity of many citizens, who once felt unified, is beginning to waver. The democratic cornerstone that has propped-up the Republic of France since its formation is crumbling. The Republic can no longer ensure a standard of rights for its citizens. President Hollande is attempting to amend the constitution to facilitate the extension of the state of emergency ‘until the threat of Daesh is gone’[28]. This could suggest indefinitely.

An end in sight?

The State of Emergency extension has been agreed upon, mid-February, to extend to May 26th. This happened despite recommendations from the UN, stating that France should not extend it[29]. The UN claimed that France has engaged in ‘excessive and disproportionate’ restrictions on key rights[30], attempting to dissuade them from extending past February. In the eyes of President Hollande and Prime Minister Manuel Valls the State of emergency is a necessary evil if in order to obtain security. The people of France must therefore ask themselves. What price must we pay?

 

 

Nicolas Seidman is a first-year War Studies student at King’s College London.

 

 

 

Notes:

[1] “Paris Attacks: What Happened on the Night.” BBC News. Accessed March 1, 2016. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-34818994.

[2] “Mise En œuvre De L’état D’urgence Sur Le Territoire National / L’actu Du Ministère / Actualités – Ministère De L’Intérieur.” Http://www.interieur.gouv.fr/Actualites/L-actu-du-Ministere/Mise-en-aeuvre-de-l-etat-d-urgence-sur-le-territoire-national. Accessed March 9, 2016. http://www.interieur.gouv.fr/Actualites/L-actu-du-Ministere/Mise-en-aeuvre-de-l-etat-d-urgence-sur-le-territoire-national.

[3] “Le Projet De Loi Sur Le Renseignement Massivement Approuvé à L’Assemblée.” Le Monde.fr. Accessed March 1, 2016. http://www.lemonde.fr/pixels/article/2015/05/04/que-contient-la-loi-sur-le-renseignement_4627068_4408996.html

[4] “Muslims in France Say Emergency Powers Go Too Far – The New York Times.” The New York Times – Breaking News, World News & Multimedia. Accessed March 9, 2016. http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/18/world/europe/frances-emergency-powers-spur-charges-of-overreach-from-muslims.html?_r=0.

[5] “France – Hollande seeks to extend state of emergency despite critics – France 24.” France 24. Accessed March 9, 2016. http://www.france24.com/en/20160126-france-state-emergency-hollande-civil-liberties-security-terrorism.

[6] “France Considers Extending National State of Emergency | World News | The Guardian.” The Guardian. Accessed March 9, 2016. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jan/22/france-considers-extending-national-state-of-emergency.

[7] “France – What does a ‘state of emergency’ mean in France? – France 24.” France 24. Accessed March 1, 2016. http://www.france24.com/en/20151115-what-does-france-state-emergency-mean.

[8] “Mise En œuvre De L’état D’urgence Sur Le Territoire National / L’actu Du Ministère / Actualités – Ministère De L’Intérieur.” Http://www.interieur.gouv.fr/Actualites/L-actu-du-Ministere/Mise-en-aeuvre-de-l-etat-d-urgence-sur-le-territoire-national. Accessed March 9, 2016. http://www.interieur.gouv.fr/Actualites/L-actu-du-Ministere/Mise-en-aeuvre-de-l-etat-d-urgence-sur-le-territoire-national.

[9] “Le Sénat Prolonge De Trois Mois L’état D’urgence | Public Sénat.” Public Sénat. Accessed March 1, 2016. http://www.publicsenat.fr/lcp/politique/senat-prolonge-trois-mois-l-etat-d-urgence-1230235.

[10] Ibid.

[11] “France: Abuses Under State of Emergency.” Human Rights Watch. Accessed March 9, 2016. https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/02/03/france-abuses-under-state-emergency.

[12] “My House Was Searched Because of France’s State of Emergency | United Kingdom.” VICE. Accessed March 9, 2016. http://www.vice.com/en_uk/read/house-search-state-of-emergency-france-paris-terrorism-bataclan-876.

[13] “France: Abuses Under State of Emergency.” Human Rights Watch. Accessed March 1, 2016. https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/02/03/france-abuses-under-state-emergency.

[14] “Muslims in France Say Emergency Powers Go Too Far – The New York Times.” The New York Times – Breaking News, World News & Multimedia. Accessed March 1, 2016. http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/18/world/europe/frances-emergency-powers-spur-charges-of-overreach-from-muslims.html?_r=0.

[15] “Upturned Lives: The Disproportionate Impact of France’s State of Emergency.” Amnesty International USA. Accessed March 1, 2016. http://www.amnestyusa.org/research/reports/upturned-lives-the-disproportionate-impact-of-france-s-state-of-emergency.

[16] “Le Sénat Prolonge De Trois Mois L’état D’urgence | Public Sénat.” Public Sénat. Accessed March 9, 2016. http://www.publicsenat.fr/lcp/politique/senat-prolonge-trois-mois-l-etat-d-urgence-1230235

[17] Ibid.

[18] “État D’urgence: 488 Procédures Judiciaires.” Le Figaro. Accessed March 9, 2016. http://www.lefigaro.fr/flash-actu/2015/12/16/97001-20151216FILWWW00127-etat-d-urgence-488-procedures-judiciaires.php.

[19] “Le Sénat Prolonge De Trois Mois L’état D’urgence | Public Sénat.” Public Sénat. Accessed March 9, 2016. http://www.publicsenat.fr/lcp/politique/senat-prolonge-trois-mois-l-etat-d-urgence-1230235

 [20] Ibid.

[21] “France – Hollande seeks to extend state of emergency despite critics – France 24.” France 24. Accessed March 9, 2016. http://www.france24.com/en/20160126-france-state-emergency-hollande-civil-liberties-security-terrorism.

[22] Constitutional bill to protect the nation

[23] “Déchéance De Nationalité : Qui Serait Concerné Par Le Projet De Loi Constitutionnelle ?” Le Monde.fr. Accessed March 1, 2016. http://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2016/01/04/decheance-de-nationalite-qui-serait-concerne-par-le-projet-de-loi-constitutionnelle_4841434_3224.html.

[24] “Upturned Lives: The Disproportionate Impact of France’s State of Emergency.” Amnesty International USA. Accessed March 1, 2016. http://www.amnestyusa.org/research/reports/upturned-lives-the-disproportionate-impact-of-france-s-state-of-emergency.

[25] “The Justice Minister and the Banana: How Racist is France?” The New Yorker. Accessed March 9, 2016. http://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/the-justice-minister-and-the-banana-how-racist-is-france.

[26] “How the Maverick Christiane Taubira is Transforming French Politics | Agnès Poirier | Opinion | The Guardian.” The Guardian. Accessed March 9, 2016. http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/aug/14/christiane-taubira-french-politics.

[27] “Etat D’urgence : « Ce N’est Pas Tous Les Jours Qu’on Touche à Notre Constitution ».” Le Monde.fr. Accessed March 1, 2016. http://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2016/01/31/manifestation-contre-l-etat-d-urgence-ce-n-est-pas-tous-les-jours-qu-on-touche-a-notre-constitution_4856665_3224.html.

[28] “France – Hollande seeks to extend state of emergency despite critics – France 24.” France 24. Accessed March 1, 2016. http://www.france24.com/en/20160126-france-state-emergency-hollande-civil-liberties-security-terrorism.

[29] “United Nations News Centre – UN Experts Urge France to Protect Fundamental Freedoms While Combatting Terrorism.” UN News Service Section. Accessed March 9, 2016. http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=53045.

[30] Ibid.